VIRTUES AND ARGUMENTS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY

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REFERENCES


Virtue ethics is perhaps the fastest growing field in ethical theory. Virtue theories have also been proposed in other disciplines, such as epistemology and jurisprudence. This paper stakes a claim in another area: argumentation.


Virtue theories have become influential in ethics and epistemology. This paper argues for a similar approach to argumentation. Several potential obstacles to virtue theories in general, and to this new application in particular, are considered and rejected. A first attempt is made at a survey of argumentational virtues, and finally it is argued that the dialectical nature of argumentation makes it particularly suited for virtue theoretic analysis.


If good argument is virtuous, then fallacies are vicious. Yet fallacies cannot just be identified with vices, since vices are dispositional properties of agents whereas fallacies are types of argument. Rather, if the normativity of good argumentation is explicable in terms of virtues, we should expect the wrongness of fallacies to be explicable in terms of vices. This approach is defended through case studies of several fallacies, with particular emphasis on the ad hominem.


Several authors have recently begun to apply virtue theory to argumentation. Critics of this programme have suggested that no such theory can avoid committing an ad hominem fallacy. This criticism is shown to trade unsuccessfully on an ambiguity in the definition of ad hominem. The ambiguity is resolved and a virtue-theoretic account of ad hominem reasoning is defended.


I want to say something about the sort of arguments that it is possible to lose, and whether losing arguments can be done well. I shall focus on losing philosophical arguments, and I will be talking about arguments in the sense of acts of arguing. This is the sort of act that one can perform on one’s own or with one other person in private. But in either of these cases it is difficult to win—or to lose. So I shall concentrate on arguments with audiences. We may think of winning or losing such arguments in terms of whether the audience is convinced. Of course, this doesn’t necessarily have anything to do with who is in the right. That means that there are two sorts of loser: real losers, who lose the argument deservedly, because they are in the wrong, and mere losers, who lose the argument undeservedly, because they are in the right. Hence there must also be two sorts of winner: real winners, who win the argument deservedly, because they are in the right, and mere winners, who win the argument undeservedly, because they are in the wrong. An optimal outcome for arguments with losers would be if all the losers are real losers.


What should a virtue theory of argumentation say about fallacious reasoning? If good arguments are virtuous, then fallacies are vicious. Yet fallacies cannot

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just be identified with vices, since vices are dispositional properties of agents whereas fallacies are types of argument. Rather, if the normativity of good argumentation is explicable in terms of virtues, we should expect the wrongness of bad argumentation to be explicable in terms of vices. This approach is defended through analysis of several fallacies, with particular emphasis on the ad misericordiam.


Is bias an obstacle to a virtue theory of argumentation? Virtue theories seem vulnerable to a situationist challenge, analogous to similar challenges in virtue ethics and epistemology, that behavioural dispositions are too situation-specific for virtues to be psychologically plausible. This paper argues that virtue argumentation may respond to this challenge by combining a defence of the virtue of humility with a demonstration of the role of attitude strength, as exhibited by deep-seated virtues.


What are the prospects (if any) for a virtue-theoretic account of inference? This paper compares three options. Firstly, assess each argument individually in terms of the virtues of the participants. Secondly, make the capacity for cogent inference itself a virtue. Thirdly, recapture a standard treatment of cogency by accounting for each of its components in terms of more familiar virtues. The three approaches are contrasted and their strengths and weaknesses assessed.


This paper proposes that virtue theories of argumentation and theories of visual argumentation can be of mutual assistance. An argument that adoption of a virtue approach provides a basis for rejecting the normative independence of visual argumentation is presented and its premisses analysed. This entails an independently valuable clarification of the contrasting normative presuppositions of the various virtue theories of argumentation. A range of different kinds of visual argument are examined, and it is argued that they may all be successfully evaluated within a virtue framework, without invoking any novel virtues.


Some of the key features of virtue theories of argument (VTA) are anticipated by earlier argumentation theories. This paper explores the dispositional account of critical thinking, and argues that it may be retrospectively assimilated to the VTA programme. A full exploration of this story is not only an independently interesting piece of recent intellectual history, it also serves to ground VTA in the substantial body of empirical research into critical thinking dispositions.


I intend to bring recent work applying virtue theory to the study of argument to bear on a much older problem, that of disagreements that resist rational resolution, sometimes termed “deep disagreements”. Just as some virtue epistemologists have lately shifted focus onto epistemic vices, I shall argue that a renewed focus on the vices of argument can help to illuminate deep disagreements. In particular, I address the role of arrogance, both as a factor in the diagnosis of deep disagreements and as an obstacle to their mutually acceptable resolution. Arrogant arguers are likely to make any disagreements to which they are party seem deeper than they really are and arrogance impedes the strategies that we might adopt to resolve deep disagreements. As a case in point, since arrogant or otherwise vicious arguers cannot be trusted not to exploit such strategies for untoward ends, any policy for deep disagreement amelioration must require particularly close attention to the vices of argument, lest they be exploited by the unscrupulous.


Virtue theories of argumentation comprise several conceptually distinct projects. Perhaps the boldest of these is the pursuit of the fully satisfying argument, the argument that contributes to human flourishing. This project has an independently developed epistemic analogue: eudaimonistic virtue epistemology. Both projects stress the importance of widening the range of cognitive goals beyond, respectively, cogency and knowledge; both projects emphasize social factors, the right sort of community being indispensable for the cultivation of the intellectual virtues necessary to each project. This paper proposes a unification of the two projects by arguing that the intellectual good life sought by eudaimonistic virtue epistemologists is best realized through the articulation of an account of argumentation that contributes to human flourishing.


In this chapter I argue that intellectual humility is related to argumentation in several distinct but mutually supporting ways. I begin by drawing connections between humility and two topics of long-standing importance to the evaluation of informal arguments: the ad verecundiam fallacy and the principle of charity. I then explore the more explicit role that humility plays in recent work on critical thinking dispositions, deliberative virtues, and virtue theories of argumentation.

Deep disagreements are characteristically resistant to rational resolution. This paper explores the contribution a virtue theoretic approach to argumentation can make towards settling the practical matter of what to do when confronted with apparent deep disagreement, with particular attention to the virtue of courage.


Virtue theories of argumentation (VTA) emphasize the roles arguers play in the conduct and evaluation of arguments, and lay particular stress on arguers’ acquired dispositions of character, that is, virtues and vices. The inspiration for VTA lies in virtue epistemology and virtue ethics, the latter being a modern revival of Aristotle’s ethics. Aristotle is also, of course, the father of Western logic and argumentation. This paper asks to what degree Aristotle may thereby be claimed as a forefather by VTA.


This chapter argues that a virtue-theoretic account of argumentation can enhance our understanding of the phenomenon of populism and offer some lines of response. Virtue theories of argumentation emphasize the role of arguers in the conduct and evaluation of arguments, and lay particular stress on arguers’ acquired dispositions of character, otherwise known as intellectual virtues and vices. Several factors to which the rise of populism has been attributed may be understood as arising from vices of argumentation, including arrogance, emulousness, and insouciance. Conversely, virtues of argument such as humility and good listening offer some prospect of a constructive response to populism.


The fallacy fallacy is either the misdiagnosis of fallacy or the supposition that the conclusion of a fallacy must be a falsehood. This paper explores the relevance of these and related errors of reasoning for the appraisal of arguments, especially within virtue theories of argumentation. In particular, the fallacy fallacy exemplifies the Owl of Minerva problem, whereby tools devised to understand a norm make possible new ways of violating the norm. Fallacies are such tools and so are vices. Hence a similar problem arises with argumentative vices. Fortunately, both instances of the problem have a common remedy.


The virtues and vices of argument have become an established part of argumentation theory. They have helped direct attention to hitherto neglected aspects of how we argue. However, it remains controversial whether a virtue theory has much to contribute to some central questions in argumentation theory. Notably, Harvey Siegel has disputed whether arguments in the abstract propositional sense can be evaluated meaningfully within a virtue theory [most recently in Siegel, 2022]. This paper explores the prospects for grounding an account of argument evaluation in arguers’ virtues and vices by examination of a corresponding debate in virtue ethics: can an ethics of virtue guide our actions? In particular, it adapts to argumentation Rosalind Hursthouse’s idea of a v-rule [e.g. Hursthouse, 2006]. It will thereby be shown that an affirmative answer is possible: virtues suffice for argument evaluation.


Anonymous argumentation has recently been the focus of public controversy: flash points include the outing of pseudonymous bloggers by newspapers and the launch of an academic journal that expressly permits pseudonymous authorship. However, the controversy is not just a recent one—similar debates took place in the nineteenth century over the then common practice of anonymous journalism. Amongst the arguments advanced by advocates of anonymous argumentation in either era is the contention that it is essential if the widest range of voices are to be heard; amongst the counterarguments of its critics, that it weakens the credibility of individual arguments and irresponsibly cheapens the standard of public discourse. This paper explores some implications of the controversy for the ethics of argumentation in general and virtue theories of argumentation in particular.


It has been a decade since the phrase virtue argumentation was introduced, and while it would be an exaggeration to say that it burst onto the scene, it would be just as much of an understatement to say that it has gone unnoticed. Trying to strike the virtuous mean between the extremes of hyperbole and litotes, then, we can fairly characterize it as a way of thinking about arguments and argumentation that has steadily attracted more and more attention from argumentation theorists. We hope it is neither too late for an introduction to the field nor too soon for some retrospective assessment of where things stand.


There are at least two reasons why contemporary moral and political philosophers should be attentive to Aristotle’s account of practical reason. First, in contradistinction with views that characterize the emotions primarily as a hindrance to practical reasoning, moral philosophers have become increasingly impressed with the revived Aristotelian insight that good practical reasoning systematically relies on the emotions. Second, accounts of practical reason have become increasingly important for political philosophers seeking to theorize the regulative principles governing democratic deliberation. My intention in this paper is to demonstrate that Aristotle shows how an account of practical reason and deliberation that constructively incorporates the emotions can illuminate key issues about deliberation at the political level. First, I argue that, according to Aristotle, character (êthos) and emotion (pathos) are constitutive
features of the process of phronetic practical deliberation: in order to render a determinate action-specific judgment, practical deliberation cannot be simply reduced to logical demonstration (apodeixis). This can be seen, I argue, by uncovering an important structural parallel between the virtue of phronesis and the art of rhetoric. Second, this structural parallel helps to tease out the insights of Aristotle’s account of practical deliberation for contemporary democratic theory— in particular, the ethical consequences that follow from the fact that passionate political deliberation and judgment are unavoidable in democracy and are always susceptible to straying from issuing forth properly ethical outcomes.


Critical thinking in nursing is largely theorized as a clinically-based idea. In the context of mental health education, this presents a problem, given documented evidence of a shift to demedicalize mental illness. Using institutional ethnography, this article examines the critical thinking of nursing faculty in a baccalaureate nursing program in a Canadian university by way of focus group interviews, observation periods, and the analysis of a number of institutional and legislative texts. The findings suggest that the critical thinking of nursing faculty is caught within a constrained institutional-textual order. Drawing on critical theory and Foucauldian philosophy, recommendations for nursing education are made in order to diversify and extend critical thinking in mental health nursing.


Educators concerned with critical thinking have two distinguishable objectives: to teach a set of skills and to offer an ideal for a liberally educated citizen. Either objective requires focus on the development of the person, not simply the teaching of methods. Positive attitudes and dispositions toward critical inquiry must be encouraged. With such lofty and valuable goals, attention must be devoted to the prospects for success.


Can one be open-minded about a strongly held belief? I defend a reconciliation of the suggested conflict that turns on open-mindedness as an educational aim subordinate to the aim of knowledge, and as an attitude about one’s beliefs (a second-order or meta-belief), not a weakened attitude toward a proposition believed. The reconciliation is applied to a number of related issues such as the tension between teaching for autonomy and rightful claims to authority.


The best way to nail your opponent—to succeed at the base motivation of winning or embarrassing or destroying him—within legal bounds—is to genuinely refute him, and because the refutation is likely to be a surprise to the ill-motivated and to have to meet high standards, the base motives will likely lead to no different a result than if the motives were pure. If an Aristotelian VE is to work, it will do so only for domains with intellectually weak standards and either where the inquirer works in isolation or he is a member of a inquiring community that is already varied.


Mark Warren argues that good manners facilitate democratic deliberation. Their absence or violation impedes it. Consequently, efforts should be taken to ensure that one’s speech displays good manners, extending to insincerity and hypocrisy. Those whose speech is ill-mannered should be ignored or condemned, expressive, I infer, or of our disgust or contempt. They are not deserving of challenge or dispute. My main critical comment is that great effort must go into realizing Warren’s recommendations. Implementing them courts dangers of their own for democratic deliberation. Warren does not produce evidence either that the problems motivating his recommendation are severe enough to justify his recommendations or that the consequences of his recommendations are likely to work out as he envisages. Finally, testable, alternative proposals extend reasonable hope to manage those problems in less intrusive ways.


Western rhetorical history reveals conflicting claims about where the strength of our discipline lies. Plato’s suspicion that sophist rhetoric offers nothing more than political advancement and the ability to win audiences over to a predetermined position is challenged by alternative strains that perceive rhetorical skill as an ethical enterprise grounded in the pursuit of a just society. While these opposing perspectives have been highly visible in historical accounts of our field’s development, perhaps our most significant contribution to public discourse resides not in the promise that rhetoric can achieve particular material outcomes, but in our longstanding commitment to the virtue of intellectual humility. The focus on language and symbols in rhetorical studies, alongside our field’s historic relationship to preparing students for civic deliberation, provides rhetorical scholars and teachers with a unique role in exploring the potential of pedagogical methods that promote this virtue, particularly as a resource for revitalizing academic and public discourse. To embrace this role entails acknowledging the challenge of promoting intellectual humility as a virtue, coming to terms with forces that have historically undermined this virtue’s centrality to our discipline, and exploring ways in which we can ensure that intellectual humility flourishes within our academic community and beyond.


Recently, it has become popular to account for knowledge and other epistemic states in terms of epistemic virtues. The present paper focuses on an epistemic virtue relevant when deferring to others in testimonial
contexts. It is argued that, while many virtue epistemologists will accept that epistemic virtue can be exhibited in cases involving epistemically motivated hearers, carefully vetting their testimonial sources for signs of untrustworthiness prior to deferring, anyone who accepts that also has to accept that an agent may exhibit epistemic virtue in certain cases of blind deference, involving someone soaking up everything he or she is told without any hesitation. Moreover, in order to account for the kind of virtue involved in the relevant cases of blind deference, virtue epistemologists need to abandon a widespread commitment to personalism, i.e., the idea that virtue is possessed primarily on account of features internal to the psychology of the person, and accept that some virtues are social virtues, possessed in whole or in large part on account of the person being embedded in a reliable social environment.


There is a tension with regard to regulative norms of inquiry. One’s commitments must survive critical scrutiny, and if they do not survive, they should be revised. Alternately, for views to be adequately articulated and defended, their proponents must maintain a strong commitment to the views in question. A solution is proposed with the notion of holding one’s own as the virtue of being reason-responsive with the prospects of improving the view in question.


The bottom line is that war and sport metaphors reflect the intrinsic adversariality of argument. That does not mean that arguments thereby must be hypercombative. Rather, once we recognize this intrinsic adversariality of argument, we must develop techniques to moderate the heat of argumentative exchanges. My argument is that the alternative models of arguments can achieve these ends. In this respect, I fully endorse the development of nonadversarial metaphors for argument but precisely for the reason that argument is adversarial and they help its management.


Fallacy theory has been criticized for its contributing to unnecessary adversariality in argument. The view of minimal adversariality by Trudy Govier has received similar criticism. A dialectical modification of Govier’s minimal view is offered that makes progress in replying to these challenges.


This essay has two connected theses. First, that given the contrastivity of reasons, a form of dialectical adversariality of argument follows. This dialectical adversariality accounts for a broad variety of both argumentative virtues and vices. Second, in light of this contrastivist view of reasons, the primary objection to argumentative adversarialism, the winners-and-losers problem, can be answered.


Argument is widely taken to be the resolution of disagreements by way of the exchange of reasons. This is a good start, but it seems that sometimes we argue when there is no disagreement, and sometimes there is no actual exchange of reasons when arguments are given in monologue. Regardless, argument requires reasons, and those reasons when marshaled are supposed to yield some change in what is accepted or the degree to which it is accepted. Additionally, arguments are products of our rational sociability, for with argument we share evidence, address questions, resolve our differences, and create solidarity. Given that argument is a social activity, it stands to reason that there are ethical norms that bear on the practice. This entry will survey three debates regarding the ethics of argument. The first bears on whether argument is intrinsically adversarial and what norms obtain regarding how arguments must be managed in light of the adversariality question. Call this the adversariality debate. Second, given that, structurally, arguments are composed of premises and conclusions, there is a question of what ethical norms bear on the management and presentation of those core structural elements. Call this the dialecticality debate. Third, and finally, there is the question of what is worth arguing over and who is welcome in those arguments. The question is how open should inquiry and public argument be. Call this the argument liberalism debate. This entry will provide overviews of these three sites of controversy.


We argue that there are three norms of critical discussion in stark relief in *Republic I*. The first we see in the exchange with Cephalus—that we interpret each other and contribute to discussions in a maximally argumentative fashion. The second we see in the exchange with Polemarchus—that in order to cooperate in dialectic, interlocutors must maintain a distance between themselves and the theses they espouse. This way they can subject the views to serious scrutiny without the risk of personal loss. Third, and finally, from Socrates’ exchange with Thrasymachus, it is clear that uncooperative discussants must be handled in a fashion that reinforces the goals of dialectic. So Thrasymachus is refuted and silenced not just for the sake of correcting his definition of justice, but also for the sake of those listening.


The straw man fallacy consists in inappropriately constructing or selecting weak (or comparatively weaker) versions of the opposition’s arguments. We will survey the three forms of straw men recognized in the literature, the straw, weak, and hollow man. We will then make the case that there are examples of inappropriately reconstructing stronger versions of the opposition’s arguments. Such cases we will call iron man fallacies. The difference between appropriate and inappropriate iron manning clarifies the limits of the virtue of open-mindedness.
[39] Scott F. Aikin & J. Caleb Clanton. Developing group-deliberative virtues. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 27(4):409–424, 2010. In this paper, the authors argue for two main claims: first, that the epistemic results of group deliberation can be superior to those of individual inquiry; and, second, that successful deliberative groups depend on individuals exhibiting deliberative virtues. The development of these group-deliberative virtues, the authors argue, is important not only for epistemic purposes but political purposes, as democracies require the virtuous deliberation of their citizens. Deliberative virtues contribute to the deliberative synergy of the group, not only in terms of improving the quality of the group’s present decisions, but also improving the background conditions for continued group deliberation. The authors sketch a preliminary schedule of these group-deliberative virtues modelled on Aristotle’s conception of virtue as the mean between two extreme vices. The virtues discussed in this article include deliberative wit, friendliness, empathy, charity, temperance, courage, sincerity, and humility.

[40] Scott F. Aikin & Robert B. Talisse. Modus tonens. Argumentation, 22:521–529, 2008. Restating an interlocutor’s position in an incredulous tone of voice can sometimes serve legitimate dialectical ends. However, there are cases in which incredulous restatement is out of bounds. This article provides an analysis of one common instance of the inappropriate use of incredulous restatement, which the authors call “modus tonens.” The authors argue that modus tonens is vicious because it pragmatically implicates the view that one’s interlocutor is one’s cognitive subordinate and provides a cue to like-minded onlookers that dialectical opponents are not to be treated as epistemic peers.

[41] Timo Airaksinen. Socratic irony and argumentation. Argumentation, 36(1):85–100, 2022. Socratic irony can be understood independently of the immortal heroes of Plato’s Socrates. We need a systematic account and criticism of it both as a debate-winning strategy of argumentation and teaching method. The Speaker introduces an issue pretending to be at a lower intellectual level than her co-debaters, or Participants. An Audience looks over and evaluates the results. How is it possible that the Speaker like Socrates, is, consistently, in the winning position? The situation is ironic because the Participants fight from a losing position but realize it too late. Socratic irony compares with divine irony: divine irony is a subtype of Socratic irony since you lose when you challenge gods. Socratic irony is also, prima facie, a subtype of dramatic irony when the Audience knows more than the Participants on the stage. We must distinguish between the ideal and realistic elements of Socratic Irony. The very idea of Socratic irony looks idealized, or it is an ideal case, which explains the Speaker’s consistently winning position. In real life, the debate must be rigged, or the Dutch Book argument applies to the Participants, if the Speaker is so successful.

[42] Khameiel Al Tamimi. Evaluating narrative arguments. In Patrick Bondy & Laura Benacquista, eds., Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21, 2016. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2016. This paper will discuss how narrative arguments should be evaluated, i.e. I will offer a means of differentiating between acceptable and unacceptable narrative arguments. I will argue that narrative arguments should not be evaluated as products; hence narrative argument evaluation will be a rhetorical evaluation focused on the process. In line with the rhetorical model of argument evaluation, I develop an account of the virtuous audience, which will be the standard for assessing narrative arguments.

[43] Khameiel Al Tamimi. A Narrative Account of Argumentation. Ph.D. thesis, York University, Toronto, 2017. In this dissertation I attempt to accomplish three goals. The first goal is to develop a narrative account of argumentation. I show that storytelling serves as a legitimate mode of argumentation. Further, I develop an account of narrative argument based on generalized features of narrative and a conception of argument that is rhetorical and in line with Charles Willard’s notion of argument as an interaction (1989). I identify features of narrative argument that enable narrative to function as an argument and thus to provide reasons for a claim in the context of disagreement. As a result, I synthesize literatures on narrative and argumentation to provide a definition of narrative argument. The second goal of the dissertation is to argue for maintaining the narrative as a process without reconstructing the narrative into the dominant model of argument, the Critical-Logical Model. In this part of the dissertation, I further elaborate on the definition of narrative argument and argue that narrative argument must be understood as a process, and not as a product of argument. While the product view focuses on the form and structure of an argument as being linear, explicit, and containing premises and a conclusion, and thus treats arguments as things, the process view focuses on the whole act of arguing, thus highlighting the importance of the context of argumentation and the people involved. In support of this thesis, I show that reducing the narrative into premises and a conclusion is problematic because it deprives it of some of its persuasive force. As such, I argue against the reductionist approach to narrative argument that seeks to extract premises and a conclusion from a narrative, because I contend that the whole act of storytelling is an argument. Reducing the narrative into a product removes the real argument—part of which is implicit—from its context, its unique situation, and its complex social setting. The third goal of this dissertation is to develop an account of argument evaluation that is suitable for narrative argument understood as a process. I offer an account of how to evaluate narratives using ‘the virtuous audience,’ a novel evaluative method that combines theories of virtue argumentation and rhetorical audiences. In sum, this dissertation provides a definition of narrative argument, stipulates the conditions of narrative arguments that make them successful, and offers ways of evaluating the narrative while maintaining its form as a process.
I intend to argue here that Aristotle’s identification of aretē with dynamis in *Rhetoric* can be understood within the highly specific context of rhetoric as an art as more appropriate, both metaphysically and ethically, than would have been an identification of aretē with hexis. I also intend to argue that, while certain tensions and difficulties are created by the classification of aretē as a dynamis in the *Rhetoric* and as a hexis in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle can be defended against the charge of inconsistency.

I consider three questions arising from Cohen’s interesting paper: Is sincerity in premise assertion a premise virtue? Are arguers who are insincere in the assertion of one or more of their premises necessarily indifferent to the truth? Does their insincerity necessarily prevent their argumentation from producing cognitive benefits?

The concept of virtue figures prominently in current approaches to moral and epistemic reasoning. This chapter aims to apply virtue theory to the domain of legal reasoning. My claim is that a virtue approach to legal reasoning illuminates some key aspects of legal reasoning. From a virtue perspective, I shall argue, emerges a picture of legal reasoning that differs in some essential features from the prevalent rule-based approach to legal reasoning.


There are many potential applications of virtue theory to law. One could hold an aretaic theory of law, according to which the aim of the law is to make citizens virtuous. One could develop a theory of legal ethics on a model of virtues, as some scholars have started to do. Virtue theory could also be applied to examine problems in diverse areas of the law, beyond criminal law, such as torts, evidence law, or constitutional law. Virtue approaches to justice, which is arguably, a pivotal virtue in law and the more legal of the virtues, could be developed as well. Finally, one could also develop an aretaic approach to adjudication, that is, an account that explains in aretaic terms the conditions under which legal decisions are justified. In what follows, I shall focus on the possibilities of developing a virtue-based account of adjudication. First, I shall provide some reasons why one might find an aretaic approach to legal justification appealing. Secondly, I shall distinguish different versions of virtue jurisprudence, depending on the role that they assign to virtue in a theory of justification. Last, I shall explore some of the implications of an aretaic approach to legal justification to the theory of legal reasoning.
to contribute to the study of the social dimensions of deliberation about factual issues in law. More specifically, I will examine the relevance of group deliberative virtues, i.e., the traits of character that enable sound group-deliberation, to the epistemology of legal proof.


In his lucid and suggestive commentary Juliano Maranhão poses two questions, in my view related to each other, about the proposal which I defend in the article he comments upon of developing a theory of legal argumentation based on virtues. The first question refers to the role that rules play in an aretaic theory of legal argumentation. Do the rules in my proposal, Juliano wonders, fulfill a normative role? The second question that Juliano raises in his comment refers to the possibility of formalizing virtuous deliberation. What role can formal models of reasoning play in an aretaic theory of legal argumentation? I am very grateful to Juliano for his comment, which gives me the opportunity to go deeper and make my point of view more explicit about some central questions for the development of an aretaic theory of legal argumentation. In this short reply, I will address these questions in the order in which they have been asked; both questions, as I will point out at the end of this commentary, point to a common problem, namely, the role that the rules—of law or of logic—fulfill in a theory of legal argumentation based on virtues.


This paper examines the normativity of law, i.e., law’s capacity to guide behavior by generating reasons for action, from the perspective of virtue jurisprudence. It articulates a virtue-based model of law’s normativity according to which the law generates first order reasons for action (i.e., loyalty-reasons) that need to be factored in citizens’ and legal officials’ practical reasoning, which consists, primarily, in the search for the best specification of the values involved in light of an account of the good life and the role that the law plays therein. The outcome of this piece of practical reasoning is a judgment about what ought to be done, the rightness of which depends, on the proposed model, on whether it is a judgment that a virtuous person would characteristically do in the circumstances. This model, it is argued, has distinctive features that set it apart from some prominent accounts of the normativity of law. It may, however, be disqualified as a plausible alternative account of the normativity of law on the grounds that it fails to provide action-guidance. The last part of the paper responds to this objection in a way that unveils the relevance of the social dimensions of virtue to law’s normativity.


This paper develops a virtue-account of legal reasoning which significantly differs from standard, principle-based, theories. A virtue approach to legal reasoning highlights the relevance of the particulars to sound legal decision-making, brings to light the perceptual and affective dimensions of legal judgment, and vindicates the relevance of description and specification to good legal reasoning. After examining the central features of the theory, the paper proposes a taxonomy of the main character traits that legal decision-makers need to possess to successfully engage in legal reasoning. The paper concludes by discussing an array of strategies in legal education, institutional design, and legal culture that can be put in place to work virtue in legal decision-making.


Examining the rhetorical notion of ethos at the crossroads of disciplines, this article builds up an integrated model attempting to reconcile Bourdieu’s theory of language and power with pragmaviews of illocutionary force. For the sociologist, the authority of the orator depends on his institutional position; for Ducrot or Maingueneau, drawing on Aristotle, the image of the orator is built by the discourse itself. Analyzing political as well as literary texts, this essay takes into account the institutional position of the speaker; his “prior ethos” (the image his audience has of him before he takes the floor); the distribution of roles inherent in the selected genre and the stereotypes attached to these roles; and the verbal strategies through which the speaker builds an image of self in his discourse. “Argumentative analysis” thus explores a dynamic process in which social, institutional, and linguistic elements are closely connected.


The classical Greek term pistis (trust) is presented as a relevant norm in the analysis of parliamentary debate. Through exploration of pistis apparent similarities to the term ethos have appeared. It is proposed that pistis can be viewed as the equivalent to ethos, concerning the common space or connection between the speaker and the audience. Tentatively “truth”, “faith” and “respect” are proposed as the elements equivalent to phronesis, aretē and eunoia.


Paul van den Hoven questions the way I use the term pistis. To some extent the critique is understandable, as I only very briefly examine the classic rhetorical origins of pistis.


Citizens across many democracies today face a crisis of democratic backsliding due to politicians and media sources that promote distrust, division, resentment, and fear among the people. To respond to this toxic discourse with contempt and disdain only fans the flames of division by turning politics into a war over who is superior to whom. Toxic discourse suppresses free
communication of first-order concerns and thereby derail democracy. We can all do our part to overcome this problem by practicing empathy, tolerance, humility, and mercy when we discuss politics. Assiduously practicing these virtues can defuse fear, resentment, and distrust and inspire reciprocal responses in others. Only then can we strengthen the foundations of a democratic way of life.

[59] Marcela Andoková & Silvia Vertanova. Is rhetoric ethical? The relationship between rhetoric and ethics across history and today. *Graccolatina et Orientalia, 37–38:*133–145, 2016. The theme of the relationship between rhetoric and ethics brings us back to old Greece, which has become a cradle of European civilization. The need to develop speech abilities was conditioned by the need for individual defense during court trials, and gradually became important in political discourse within Athenian democracy. Sometimes, the voices of such philosophers as Plato began to echo very quickly, accusing rhetoric of being unethical. Over the course of history, many scientists and thinkers have overlooked rhetoric and even rejected it, considering it to be an effective means of manipulation. For this reason, communicators sometimes deny the fact that they are using rhetoric in their speech. Definitely, the most effective forms of rhetoric are those that hide their own strategies and intentions. The complete denial of freedom of public expression during the political totalitarian regimes of the 20th century can be considered the culmination of the decline of rhetoric. With the spread of mass media and ongoing globalization, however, the need for rhetorical education within education systems appears more urgent in today’s world than ever before. Current society is under heavy pressure from mass media, which often does not even count on real or fictitious dialogue with its recipients as it used to be in antiquity. Therefore, we strive to emphasize that ethics is in no way contradictory to rhetoric, but it can become an effective weapon in the hands of both the speakers and their listeners. What rhetoric makes good or bad is the ethical/unethical attitude of the person who uses it.

[60] Satoru Aonuma. Dialectic of/or agitation? Rethinking argumentative virtues in *Proletarian Eloquence.* In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., *Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013.* OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014. This paper explores the possible rapprochement between Marxism and argumentation attempted in *Proletarian Eloquence,* a 1930 Japanese publication. Against a Western Marxist commonplace that “[a]s far as rhetoric is concerned, . . . a Marxist must be in a certain sense a Platonist” (Eagleton, 1981), the paper discusses how this work seeks to take advantage of the inquiry and advocacy dimensions of argumentation for the Marxian strategy of “agitprop” and rearticulate it as part of civic virtues.

[61] David Archard. Political disagreement, legitimacy, and civility. *Philosophical Explorations, 4*(3):207–222, 2001. For many contemporary liberal political philosophers the appropriate response to the facts of pluralism is the requirement of public reasonableness, namely that individuals should be able to offer to their fellow citizens reasons for their political actions that can generally be accepted. This article finds wanting two possible arguments for such a requirement: one from a liberal principle of legitimacy and the other from a natural duty of political civility. A respect in which conversational restraint in the face of political agreement involves incivility is sketched. The proceduralist view which commands substantive disagreement within agreement on procedures is briefly outlined, as is the possible role for civic virtue on this view.


[63] Judi Atkins. How virtue-theoretic arguments may be used in the justification of policy. *Politics, 28*(3):129–137, 2008. Politicians frequently deploy moral principles in the justification of policy. While many thinkers have examined the use of consequentialist and deontological arguments in politics, the role of virtue-theoretic principles is relatively under-theorised. Drawing on the work of MacIntyre, this article offers an initial exploration of how such principles are deployed in political argument, with particular emphasis on policies in the area of community. It will be shown that virtue is linked to the idea of the common good, which governments seek to promote through a range of policy initiatives relating to such issues as law and order and citizenship.

[64] Adam E. O. Auch. Virtuous argumentation and the challenges of hype. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewinski, eds., *Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013.* OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014. In this paper, I consider the virtue of proportionality in relation to reasoning in what I call ‘hype contexts’ (contexts in which otherwise perfectly temperate claims take on an outsized or inappropriate importance, simply due to their ubiquity). I conclude that a virtuous reasoner is one that neither accepts nor rejects a claim based on its ubiquity alone, but who evaluates its importance with reference to the social context in which it is made.

[65] Agnese Augello, Giuseppe Città, Manuel Gentile, & Antonio Lieto. A storytelling robot managing persuasive and ethical stances via ACT-R: An exploratory study. *International Journal of Social Robotics,* forthcoming. We present a storytelling robot, controlled via the ACT-R cognitive architecture, able to adopt different persuasive techniques and ethical stances while conversing about some topics concerning COVID-19. The main contribution of the paper consists in the proposal of a needs-driven model that guides and evaluates, during the dialogue, the use (if any) of persuasive
techniques available in the agent procedural memory. The portfolio of persuasive techniques tested in such a model ranges from the use of storytelling, to framing techniques and rhetorical-based arguments. To the best of our knowledge, this represents the first attempt of building a persuasive agent able to integrate a mix of explicitly grounded cognitive assumptions about dialogue management, storytelling and persuasive techniques as well as ethical attitudes. The paper presents the results of an exploratory evaluation of the system on 63 participants.


The noun persuasion (pistis) and its plural are introduced by Aristotle to delineate a fundamental theoretical instrument with regard to his rhetorical methodology. The term persuasion is a technicality that is defined in detail in Rhetoric while still leading to interpretive difficulties. A first aspect that delimits ‘persuasion’ is the classification between persuasions inherent to art and non-art addressed in chapter 2 of book I (cf. Rhetoric I 2 1355b35-6). The latter (pisteis átechnoi) precede art, since they are not obtained by us; they are witnesses, confessions under torture and documents (cf. ib. I 2 1355b36-7); to these, then, laws and oaths are added (cf. ibid. I 15 1375a24-5). Those typical of art (pisteis éntechnoi) are those that are built following a method (cf. ib. I 2 1355b38-9). Aristotle subdivides them into three species (cf. ib. I 2 1356a1-2). At that time, the constituent element of each is named. Three points seem to be the determining factors in each of the persuasions: the character of the speaker, the predispositions of the listener, and the speech itself through demonstrating or apparent demonstrating (cf. ib. I 2 1356a2-4). The first subdivision of persuasions proper to art, persuasion by character (pistis diá tou ethous) is the present object of our interest.


I take as my immediate focus that which is distinctive of open-mindedness as compared with other intellectual virtues—not the qualities that make open-mindedness an intellectual virtue per se or the qualities it has in common with other intellectual virtues. In addition to sketching an account of the basic nature and structure of open-mindedness, I shall also give brief consideration to two further issues: first, the characteristic function of open-mindedness vis-à-vis other intellectual virtues; and second, the issue of when (or to whom or how much) an exercise of open-mindedness is intellectually appropriate or virtuous.


After a brief overview of what intellectual virtues are, I offer three arguments for the claim that education should aim at fostering ‘intellectual character virtues’ like curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual honesty. I then go on to discuss several pedagogical and related strategies for achieving this aim.


The so-called ‘value turn’ in epistemology has led to increased attention to the upper normative dimensions of the cognitive life—to states like understanding and wisdom and to the sorts of character traits or ‘intellectual virtues’ that facilitate the acquisition of these epistemic goods. This richer, more normative focus has brought with it a renewed interest in the acquisition of these epistemic goods. This richer, more normative focus has brought with it a renewed interest in the acquisition of these epistemic goods.


This paper explores the relationship between intellectual virtues and critical thinking, both as such and as educational ends worth pursuing. The first half of the paper examines the intersection of intellectual virtue and critical thinking. The second half addresses a recent argument to the effect that educating for intellectual virtues (in contrast to educating for critical thinking) is insufficiently action-guiding and therefore lacks a suitable pedagogy.


Are there limits to what it is morally okay to imagine? More particularly, is imaginatively inhabiting morally suspect perspectives something that is off-limits for truly virtuous people? In this paper, I investigate the surprisingly fraught relation between virtue and a familiar form of imaginative perspective taking I call empathy. I draw out a puzzle about the relation between empathy and virtuousness. First, I present an argument to the effect that empathy with vicious attitudes is not, in fact, something that the fully virtuous person can indulge in. At least one prominent way of thinking about the psychology of the virtuous person excludes the possibility that the virtuous could emotionally apprehend the world in a less than virtuous way, and empathizing with vicious outlooks does seem to run afoul of that restriction. Then, I develop an argument that runs in the contrary direction: virtue in fact requires empathy with vicious outlooks, at least in some situations. There is reason to think that a crucial part of being virtuous is ministering effectively to others’ needs, and there is also reason to think that other people may need to be empathized with, even if their emotional outlooks are at least mildly vicious. Finally, I outline two different solutions to this puzzle. Both solutions hold some promise, but they also bring new challenges in their train.
VIRTUES AND ARGUMENTS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY


In his title, Emery Hyslop-Margison boldly proclaims the failure of critical thinking. He decries its vices and concludes that critical thinking is beyond rehabilitation. As an alternative, he extols the virtues of virtue epistemology. I shall argue that critical thinking is in no need of rehabilitation as Hyslop-Margison’s case against it is misdirected. I shall also examine to what extent the notion of epistemic virtue provides a viable conceptual or pedagogical alternative to critical thinking.


I find myself in agreement with some specific claims, for example, that a certain type of community is important for objectivity (critical thinking), that there is a connection between emotion or affect and objectivity (critical thinking), and, more broadly, that psychological research can be relevant to discussions of critical thinking (for example, the cognitive bias research). Where I shall focus my commentary is on her conception of the two main concepts which underpin the central claim, objectivity and happiness, and on her account of the relationship between them.


The pioneering work of Blair and Johnson has made an extremely significant contribution to both research and pedagogy by making reasoning and argumentation a central concern. Their ideas have generated and inspired a great deal of research focusing on both the conceptualization of argument and the teaching of argumentation. In this chapter we would like to extend that work by developing a dimension of reasoning which is seldom made explicit—that of the appreciation of reason. Reason appreciation involves a respect for reasoning based on an understanding of its nature, role and significance, and a recognition of its subtleties and aesthetic aspects. A full appreciation of reason has both cognitive and affective dimensions. Reason appreciation should be one of the goals of critical thinking instruction.


This paper addresses Cohen’s criticism of the Dominant Adversarial Model (DAM) of argumentation in his paper “Missed Opportunities in Argument Evaluation”.

We argue that, while Cohen criticizes the DAM account for conceptualizing arguments as essentially agnostic, he accepts its basic framing and does not follow its critique where it leads. In so doing, he misses the opportunity to develop an alternative, non-adversarial account of argumentation which would avoid his criticism of how we evaluate arguments.


This paper examines what constitute the virtues of argumentation or critical thinking and how these virtues might be developed. We argue first that the notion of virtue is more appropriate for characterizing this aspect than the notion of dispositions commonly employed by critical thinking theorists and, further, that that it is more illuminating to speak of the virtues of inquiry rather than of argumentation. Our central argument is that learning to think critically it is a matter of learning to participate knowledgeable and competently in the practice of inquiry in its various forms and contexts. Acquiring the virtues of inquiry arise through getting on the inside of the practice and coming to appreciate the goods inherent in the practice.


Although there has been considerable recent debate on the topic of adversariality in argumentation, this debate has rarely found its way into work on critical thinking theory and instruction. This paper focuses on the implications of the adversariality debate for teaching critical thinking. Is there a role for adversarial argumentation in critical thinking instruction? Is there a way to incorporate the benefits of adversarial argumentation while mitigating the problems?


There has been considerable recent debate regarding the possible epistemic benefits versus the potential risks of adversariality in argumentation. Nonetheless, this debate has rarely found its way into work on critical thinking theory and instruction. This paper focuses on the implications of the adversariality debate for teaching critical thinking. Is there a way to incorporate the benefits of adversarial argumentation while mitigating the problems? Our response is an approach based on dialectical inquiry which focuses on a confrontation of opposing views within a collaborative framework.


In Argumentative Virtues: Back to Basics (ECA 2022), Paglieri poses challenges to the treatment of virtues in Aberdeen’s and Cohen’s Virtue Argumentation Theory (VAT) as well as in Bailin and Battersby’s Inquiry Approach to critical thinking (IA). He challenges the link between virtues and argument quality, and questions what useful role virtues play in argumentation and in critical thinking education. Although VAT and IA differ in significant ways, they do have common cause in emphasizing the centrality of virtues. In this paper, we
elucidate our shared disagreements with Paglieri’s comments, criticizing both the conception of virtue and the unclear conception of argumentation which underlie his critique. In contrast, we argue for the importance of virtues, both in thinking about critical thinking as conceptualized in IA, and in thinking about argumentation as conceptualized in VAT, and argue for their centrality in educating critical thinkers and being good arguers.


Drawing upon contemporary virtue ethics theory, The Model of The Principled Advocate and The Pathological Partisan is introduced. Profiles are developed of diametrically opposed archetypes of public relations and advertising practitioners. The Principled Advocate represents the advocacy virtues of humility, truth, transparency, respect, care, authenticity, equity, and social responsibility. The Pathological Partisan represents the opposing vices of arrogance, deceit, secrecy, manipulation, disregard, artifice, injustice, and raw self-interest. One becomes either a Principled Advocate or a Pathological Partisan by habitually enacting or embodying the virtues or vices in the context of professional practices.


Whereas professional persuasion is a means to an immediate and instrumental end (such as increased sales or enhanced corporate image), ethical persuasion must rest on or serve a deeper, morally based final (or relative last) end. Among the moral final ends of journalism, for example, are truth and freedom. There is a very real danger that advertisers and public relations practitioners will play an increasingly dysfunctional role in the communications process if means continue to be confused with ends in professional persuasive communications. Means and ends will continue to be confused unless advertisers and public relations practitioners reach some level of agreement as to the moral end toward which their efforts should be directed. In this article we advance a five-part test (the TARES test) that defines this moral end, establishes ethical boundaries that should guide persuasive practices, and serves as a set of action-guiding principles directed toward a moral consequence in professional persuasion. The TARES Test consists of five principles: Truthfulness (of the message), Authenticity (of the persuader), Respect (for the persuadee), Equity (of the persuasive appeal) and Social Responsibility (for the common good). We provide checklists to guide the practitioner in moral reflection and application of TARES Test principles.


When it comes to political, religious or ethical issues, many people consider a tolerant “live and let live”-attitude to be the best reaction to disagreement. However, the current debate about the epistemic significance of disagreement within social epistemology gave rise to certain worries about the epistemic rationality of tolerance. Setting aside those already extensively discussed worries, I would like to focus on the instrumental rationality of a tolerant attitude with respect to our epistemic goals.


Student relativism is a widespread phenomenon in philosophy classes. While the exact nature of student relativism is controversially discussed, many authors agree on two points: First, it is widely agreed that SR is a rather problematic phenomenon, because it potentially undermines the very purpose of doing philosophy—if there is no objective truth, arguing seems to be pointless. Second, it is widely agreed that there will be some close connection between SR and a tolerant attitude towards conflicting opinions. In this paper, I will argue that if these two assumptions are true, then discussing some basic philosophical insights about the concept of tolerance with students will be a promising new strategy of dealing with SR.


Dominik Balg’s study convincingly demonstrates that the demand for a general intellectual tolerance, despite its initial appeal and despite its widespread acceptance in everyday life, is, on closer inspection, neither reasonable nor useful on the path to truth. According to Balg, we should not be tolerant but open-minded and humble when we encounter persistent dissent.


Dominik Balg asks how, with what goals, and with what prospects it makes sense to argue—especially in ethics and philosophy classes. According to Balg, the ability to (situationally) assess this should also be promoted in addition to the classic argumentative skills. He suggests how such a meta-competence of appropriate use of reasoning can itself be broken down into more specific sub-competences.


Why are some arguments fallacious? Since argumentation is an intellectual activity that can be performed better or worse, do we evaluate arguments simply in terms of their content, or does it also make sense to evaluate the *arguer* in light of the content put forward? From a ‘virtue’ approach, I propose understanding fallacies as having some link with intellectual vice(s). Drawing from recent work by Paul Grice, Linda Zagzebski, Andrew Aberdein, and Douglas Walton, this essay argues that if there is some sense of argumentation where an argument is (1) truth-propagating and not (2) put forward in order to ‘win’, fallacies may be
the vicious element in arguments that undermines (1), most often because the arguer’s goal is only (2). From this perspective, fallacies may not only be improper ‘moves’ in an argument, but may also reveal something lacking in the arguer’s intellectual character.


Most of what we believe comes to us from the word of others, but we do not always believe what we are told. We often reject thinkers’ reports by attributing biases to them. We may call this debunking. In this essay, I consider how debunking might work and then examine whether, and how often, it can help to preserve rational belief in the face of disagreement.


Presumably, The Daily Show has not achieved [its] status simply because of a vacuum in credible news media, but rather because the show exhibits qualities that lead its viewers to see it as trustworthy in its own right—in rhetorical terminology, qualities that lead its audience to judge it as possessing ethos, a trait that “brings to mind a person’s moral character, [and] communal existence,” exhibited through their skillful use of rhetoric (Hyde, 2004, p. xvii). Over the rest of this chapter we briefly review the concept of ethos, then turn to consider how The Daily Show exhibits its ethos.


The article calls for a departure from the common concept of autonomy in two significant ways: it argues for the supremacy of semantic understanding over procedure, and claims that clinicians are morally obliged to make a strong effort to persuade patients to accept medical advice. We interpret the value of autonomy as derived from the right persons have to respect, as agents who can argue, persuade and be persuaded in matters of utmost personal significance such as decisions about medical care. Hence, autonomy should and could be respected only after such an attempt has been made. Understanding suffering to a significant degree is a prerequisite to sincere efforts of persuasion. It is claimed that a modified and pragmatic form of discourse is the necessary framework for understanding suffering and for compassionately interacting with the frail.


Fogelin’s (1985) Wittgensteinian view of deep disagreement as allowing no rational resolution has been criticized from both argumentation theoretic and epistemological perspectives. These criticisms typically do not recognize how his point applies to the very argumentative resources on which they rely. Additionally, more extremely than Fogelin himself argues, the conditions of deep disagreement make each position literally unintelligible to the other, again disallowing rational resolution. In turn, however, this failure of sense is so extreme that it partly cancels its own meaning as a failure of sense. Consequently, it paradoxically opens new possibilities for sense and therefore rationally unexpected resolutions.


The recent literature on ad hominem argument contends that the speaker’s character is sometimes relevant to evaluating what she says. This effort to redeem ad hominem requires an analysis of character that explains why and how character is relevant. I argue that virtue epistemology supplies this analysis. Three sorts of ad hominems that attack the speaker’s intellectual character are legitimate. They attack a speaker’s: (1) possession of reliabilist vices; or (2) possession of responsibilist vices; or (3) failure to perform intellectually virtuous acts. Legitimate ad hominem conclude that we should not believe what a speaker says solely on her say-so.


I offer a working analysis of the trait of intellectual perseverance. I argue that it is a disposition to overcome obstacles, so as to continue to perform intellectual actions, in pursuit of one’s intellectual goals. Accordingly, I contend that the trait of intellectual perseverance is not always an intellectual virtue. I provide a pluralist analysis of what makes it an intellectual virtue, when it is one. Along the way, I argue that the virtue of intellectual perseverance can be contrasted with both a vice of deficiency (capitulation) and a vice of excess (recalcitrance). I also suggest that the virtues of intellectual courage and intellectual self-control are types of intellectual perseverance. The essay ends with several open questions about the virtue of intellectual perseverance. My hope is that this essay will stimulate further interest in, and analysis of, this important intellectual trait.


I intend this project to be a contribution to the developing field of ‘vice epistemology,’ which focuses on dispositions, attitudes, and character traits that make us bad thinkers. The industry-term for these qualities is intellectual vices. The foundational goals of vice epistemology include determining which qualities are intellectual vices, and providing analyses of those qualities. Here, I propose analyses of closed-mindedness and arrogance that allow us to distinguish between them, while also explaining why they are so often found together. If this is on the right track, closed-mindedness and arrogance are correlated, but they are not the same. By way of preview, section I identifies closed-mindedness with being unwilling to engage seriously with intellectual options or unwilling to revise one’s beliefs. Section II identifies arrogance with under-owning one’s cognitive shortcomings and over-owning one’s cognitive strengths. These analyses of closed-mindedness and arrogance allow for cases where they come apart. Section
III focuses on a sub-set of such cases in which agents are closed-minded but not arrogant. Real world illustrations include academics, who engage with flat-earthers, and activists, who engage with white supremacists, while being unwilling to revise their own beliefs that the earth is round and that people are people. The final section explains why we should nevertheless expect closed-mindedness and arrogance to be found together.


This article argues that an interlocutor’s deference and open-mindedness can indicate servility rather than virtuous humility. Section 1 evaluates an influential philosophical analysis of the virtue of humility and two psychological measures, all of which emphasize the contrast between humility and arrogance. Section 2 develops a philosophical analysis of servility, building on the limitations-owning view. It argues that servility is an unwillingness or inability to be attentive to and own one’s strengths, and a disposition to be overly attentive to and overown one’s limitations. Section 3 sketches a picture of servility in political discourse, suggesting that we can expect servility to be positively correlated with deferring to others, open-mindedness, and belief-revision, and negatively correlated with anger. Section 4 sketches a picture of countering servility in political discourse through the virtues of pride and humility. By comparison with servility, we can expect virtuously proud and virtuously humble people to exhibit higher correlations with refusals to defer, to be open, to engage, and to revise beliefs. It points us toward psychological measures that aim to distinguish the virtue of humility from the vice of servility.


Building upon the role values take in Walton’s theory of practical reasoning, this paper will frame the question of how values should be evaluated into the broader question of what reasonable practical argumentation is. The thesis argued for is that if a positive evaluation of practical reasoning argumentation requires that the argument avoid a morally negative conclusion, then the role of values should be given a central, rather than supportive, position in practical argumentation evaluation.


In this paper I argue that underlying phronēsis is the more foundational virtue of a willingness to be rationally persuaded (WTBRP). A WTBRP is a virtue in the sense that it fulfills the doctrine of the mean by falling between two vices—never sticking to your position and never giving it up. Articulating a WTBRP in this way also helps address problems phronēsis faces in light of implicit bias research.


In this paper, I extend contemporary virtue ethics by pointing to a philosophical insight that emerges from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*: technical mastery of a discipline or practice involves cultivating the virtue of practical wisdom. After reviewing features of Alasdair MacIntyre’s virtue ethics, I draw attention to specific virtues identified by MacIntyre while noting the relative absence of the virtue of practical wisdom in his discussion of social practices. I compare and contrast MacIntyre’s virtue ethics with that of Aristotle. Focusing on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, I show how Aristotle suggests that the virtue of practical wisdom is integral to technical mastery in the art of persuasive public speaking. I argue that Aristotle’s insight about the tight connection between practical wisdom and technical mastery is not limited to the art of rhetoric. Retrieving insights from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* brings into focus ways in which the virtue of practical wisdom is requisite to technical mastery more generally.


In our search for an appropriate assessment of the place of rhetoric in courts, we see that the history of philosophy offers a variety of descriptions of what rhetoric is as well as a variety of notions of what rhetoric should be. The paper shows that in the work of Aristotle rhetoric and ethics are inextricably connected. Aristotle’s limitation of rhetorical activity to three domains, his description of rhetoric as an offshoot from politics, his view on emotions and his elaboration of rhetoric as ‘technê’ all imply that the art of rhetoric is directly related to the orientation towards the good life. Subsequently the paper shows that *Nicomachean Ethics* has a rhetorical calibre. The contingent character of practical truth implies that discovering and communicating practical truth inevitably has a rhetoric dimension.


Some philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement claim that conciliationist responses to peer disagreement embody a kind of intellectual humility. Others contend that standing firm or “sticking to one’s guns” in the face of peer disagreement may stem from an admirable kind of courage or internal fortitude. In this paper, we report the results of two empirical studies that examine the relationship between conciliationist and steadfast responses to peer disagreement, on the one hand, and virtues such as intellectual humility, courage, grit, and actively open-minded thinking, on the other. We observed positive correlations between measures of conciliationism, intellectual humility, and actively open-minded thinking but failed to find any reliable association between steadfastness, courage, and grit. Our studies reveal that there are at least two
important intellectual virtues associated with conciliationist responses to peer disagreement (viz., intellectual humility and actively open-minded thinking) and two vices associated with steadfast responses (intellectual arrogance and myside bias). These findings shed new light on the overall epistemic goodness of the conciliationist perspective.

[101] Teresa M. Bejan. Locke on toleration, (in)civility and the quest for concord. History of Political Thought, 37(3):556–587, 2016. Lockeean toleration has long been criticized as ethically minimal and indifferent to the interactions of private individuals. Yet these criticisms ignore Locke’s lasting preoccupation with intolerance and incivility as obstacles to coexistence. These concerns were instrumental in the development of his understanding of toleration as a complex package of negative and positive virtues in- formed increasingly by a vision of concordia—a Christian ideal of unity in diversity. But by linking the outward virtue of civility ever more closely with sincere esteem and inward charity, Locke ultimately premised affective concord on an agreement between individuals more ‘fundamental’ than the disagreements that divided them. Re-interpreting Lockeian toleration—and its limits—in this light has important implications for both its critics and its defenders, who likewise prefer concord to mere toleration while neglecting its exclu- sionary potential.

[102] Teresa M. Bejan. Mere Civility: Disagreement and the Limits of Tolerance. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2017. Today, politicians and intellectuals warn that we face a crisis of civility and a veritable war of words polluting our public sphere. In liberal democracies committed to tolerating diversity as well as active, often heated disagreement, the loss of this conversational virtue appears critical. But is civility really a virtue? Or is it, as critics claim, a covert demand for conformity that silences dissent? Mere Civility sheds light on our predicament and the impasse between “civilitarians” and their opponents by examining early modern debates about religious toleration. As concerns about uncivil disagreement achieved new prominence after the Reformation, seventeenth-century figures as different as Roger Williams, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke could agree that some restraint on the war of words would be necessary. But they recognized that the prosecution of incivility was often difficult to distinguish from persecution. In their efforts to reconcile diversity with disagreement, they developed competing conceptions of civility as the social bond of tolerant societies that still resonate. Most modern appeals to civility follow either Hobbes or Locke by proposing to suppress disagreement or exclude persons and positions deemed “uncivil” for the sake of social concord. Compared with his contemporaries’ more robust ideals, Williams’s unabashedly mere civility—a minimal, occasionally contemptuous adherence to culturally contingent rules of respectful behavior—is easily overlooked. Yet Teresa Bejan argues that Williams offers a promising path forward in confronting our own crisis of civility, one that fundamentally challenges our assumptions about what a tolerant—and civil—society should look like.

[103] Carl Bereiter. A dispositional view of transfer. In Anne McKeough, Judy Lee Lupart, & Anthony Marini, eds., Teaching for Transfer: Fostering Generalization in Learning, pp. 21–34. Routledge, New York, NY, 1995. There seems to be a trend toward reinterpreting what are usually thought of as mental abilities or cognitive skills and treating them instead as dispositions. Schrag (1988) and Brell (1990) both argued for reinterpreting critical thinking in this way—treating it as a virtue, like honesty and kindness, rather than as a mental skill like deductive reasoning and problem solving. Perkins (1991) made a similar proposal regarding creativity, offering what he called a dispositional view—in which creative accomplishment is seen as depending on a combination of personal characteristics, such as persistence and willingness to take risks, which thus dispense a person to do creative work. I offer a dispositional view of transfer. This is a somewhat different matter from the previous one, because transfer is not usually thought of as an ability but rather as an event, and the potential for transfer is not usually thought of as residing in the learner but rather in whatever has been learned.

[104] Ryan Bevan. Expanding rationality: The relation between epistemic virtue and critical thinking. Educational Theory, 59(2):167–179, 2009. In this essay, Ryan Bevan explores the pedagogical implications of taking virtue epistemology as the philosophical foundation of educational theory rather than following the instrumentalist approach that is currently dominant. According to Bevan, the critical thinking strategies characteristic of instrumentalism generally work to further the vocationalization of educational discourse as well as the cultivation of unreflective moral agents. He contends that critical thinking should be expanded beyond its rationalist criteria to focus on the process of inquiry. Such a virtue epistemology approach, according to Bevan, has the potential to uncover and change fundamental misconceptions that pervade current theoretical assumptions by encouraging learners to engage in a more inclusive inquiry that draws out alternative perspectives. Bevan concludes that citizenship education in particular can benefit greatly from this more expansive theory with concrete pedagogical implications.

[105] Noell Birondo. Virtue and prejudice: Giving and taking reasons. The Monist, 99(2):212–223, 2016. The most long-standing criticism of virtue ethics in its traditional, eudaimonistic variety centers on its apparently foundational appeal to nature in order to provide a source of normativity. This paper argues that a failure to appreciate both the giving and taking of reasons in sustaining an ethical outlook can distort a proper understanding of the available options for this traditional version of virtue ethics. To insist only on giving reasons, without also taking (maybe even considering) the reasons provided by others, displays a badly illiberal form of prejudice. The paper finds and criticizes such a distortion in Jesse Prinz’s recent discussion of the “Normativity Challenge” to Aristotelian virtue ethics, thus highlighting a common tendency that we can helpfully move beyond.

This essay seeks to answer the question whether there can be an ethics of argumentation. The alternatives, that no norms apply to argumentation, and that any norms that apply to argumentation are exclusively non-moral, are rejected. Three arguments support the moral normativity of argumentation. First, some standard moral norms apply to argumentation in particular; second, some standard obligations of argumentation seem to have a moral supervenience in some situations; third, there do seem to be moral vices and virtues attributable to arguers. However, the moral normativity of argumentation, where it occurs, has only pro tanto application.


Mark Alfano claims that the heuristics and biases literature supports inferential cognitive situationism, i.e., the view that most of our inferential beliefs are arrived at and retained by means of unreliable heuristics rather than intellectual virtues. If true, this would present virtue reliabilists with an unpleasant choice: they can either accept inferential skepticism, or modify or abandon reliabilism. Alfano thinks that the latter course of action is most plausible, and several reliabilists seem to agree. I argue that this is not the case. If situationism is true, then inferential non-skepticism is no more plausible than reliabilism. But inferential cognitive situationism is false. The heuristic-based inferences that facilitate successful perception and communication have proven remarkably accurate, and even the psychological research on inductive reasoning does not support Alfano’s situationism. More generally, negative assessments of human reasoning tend to ignore the fact that the research on cognitive biases focuses primarily on the performance of individuals in isolation. Several studies suggest that we reason much more effectively when in critical dialogue with others, which highlights the fact that our epistemic performance depends not only on the inner workings of our cognitive processes, but on the environments in which they operate.


This discussion reviews the thinking of some prominent philosophers of argument to extract principles common to their thinking. It shows that a growing concern with dialogical pragmatics is better appreciated as a part of applied ethics than of applied epistemology. The discussion concludes by indicating a possible consequence for philosophy of argument and invites further discussion by asking whether argumentation philosophy has an implicit, underlying moral, or even political, posture.


Infusing logic with new rhetoric, dialogical pragmatics, and emphasizing argument context revolutionized the practice of logic. Critiquing oppressive practices and promoting justice, argumentationists empower participants to mediate their own argumentative situations. Against relativism to rescue the normative utility of good argument, argumentationists invoke the universal audience. Still, context-concerns eclipse its independence or resurrect rationalist absolutism. This vacillation imposes an external mediation that subverts establishing theoretical ground for promoting an empowering culture of justice.


There is an extensive body of philosophical, educational, and popular literature explaining Socratic pedagogy’s epistemological and educational ambitions. However, there is virtually no literature clarifying the relationship between Socratic method and doxastic responsibility. This article fills that gap in the literature by arguing that the Socratic method models many of the features of an ideally doxastically responsible agent. It ties a robust notion of doxastic responsibility to the Socratic method by showing how using defeaters to undermine participants’ knowledge claims can facilitate responsible belief. It then argues that more robust notions of doxastic responsibility can be augmented by constructs found in the American Philosophical Association’s Delphi Report. Finally, it shows how considering challenges (that is, entertaining defeaters) and modifying beliefs accordingly are objectives of the Socratic method and crucial elements of what it means to be a responsible believer.


The aim of this paper is to adapt Miranda Fricker’s concept of testimonial injustice to cases of what I call “argumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer’s social identity brings listeners to place too much or little credibility in an argument. My recommendation is to adopt a stance of “metadistrust”—we ought to distrust our inclinations to trust or distrust members of stereotyped groups.


This paper will have two parts. In the first, it will point out the agreement between lists of paradigm epistemic and argumentative virtues, and it will take that agreement as prima facie support for the epistemic approach to argument evaluation. Second, it will consider the disagreement over whether successful argument resolution requires change of belief or whether it only requires change of commitment. It turns out that the epistemic approach is neutral on that question.


Argumentation theorists are beginning to recognize that ad hominem arguments are often legitimate.
Virtue argumentation theorists argue that a character trait approach to argument appraisal can explain why ad hominem arguments are legitimate, when they are legitimate. But I argue that we do not need to appeal to virtue argumentation theory to explain the legitimacy of ad hominem arguments; a more straightforward evidentialist approach to argument appraisal is also committed to their legitimacy. I also argue that virtue argumentation theory faces some important problems, and that whereas the virtue-theoretic approach in epistemology is (arguably) well-motivated, that motivation does not carry over to virtue argumentation theory.


This paper will explain that, while justified biases can give rise to both legitimate and illegitimate ad hominem attacks, unjustified biases only give rise to illegitimate ad hominem arguments. It will also point out that, just as unjustified biases can make fallacious ad hominem arguments seem persuasive even when the bias is made explicit, so too can unjustified biases make legitimate ad hominem arguments seem unpersuasive, even when the bias is made explicit.


I am grateful to Andrew Aberdein for his thorough and helpful commentary; he points out a number of places where I need to clarify my view. In this brief reply, I will address three of his points.


This chapter will discuss some outstanding examples of persuasion that are presented in the Homeric poem *The Iliad.* Even if it is a mythical narrative, it reflects the influence of dialogues and poetry in the Heroic Ages of Greek culture some centuries before the Golden Age of Athens and the creation of the art of rhetoric. This approach emphasizes the cultural development of natural skills of persuasion and relates them to the virtues that are necessary for sustaining a democratic commercial society.


This Open Access book examines many of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic through the distinctive lens of civility. The idea of civility appears often in both public and academic debates, and a polarized political climate frequently leads to allegations of uncivil speech and behaviour. Norms of civility are always contested, even more so in moments of crisis such as a global pandemic. A focus on civility provides crucial insight and guidance on how to navigate the social and political challenges resulting from COVID-19. Furthermore, it offers a framework through which citizens and policymakers can better understand the causes and consequences of incivility, and devise ways to recover civility in our social and political lives.


I argue that much moral disagreement between cultures centers on what metaethicists call “thick concepts,” such as cruelty and courage. The main question I will address is “What are the advantages of combining virtue ethics with casuistry for addressing thick concepts central to media ethics disagreements between cultures?” A related secondary question is “How does this framework compare with ‘global media ethics’ approaches that prioritize thin concepts, such as ‘right’ and ‘ought’?” I will argue that the virtue/casuistry combination: (a) preserves the contexts that give thick ethical concepts their meaning; (b) conceives of moral agents as situated selves and confirms the value of moral expertise; and (c) presses for closure while resisting codification.


Falk Bornmüller and Mario Ziegler examine the ethos of argument from a phenomenological point of view. They consider a suitable, didactically useful audio-visual presentation of a concrete conversation between people, who each embody a certain ethos in the conversation. The authors use the film *Twelve Angry Men* to show how its characters demonstrate argumentative virtues such as restraint and listening, observing and showing, and embodying courage — virtues that Bornmüller and Ziegler identify as an important framework for argumentative conversations.

[121] **Tracy Bowell.** Commentary on Deep disagreement and patience as an argumentative virtue, 2020. Presented at Evidence, Persuasion and Diversity: 12th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, University of Windsor, ON.


This paper considers whether there are limits to responsible argumentation when confronting positions that are a manifestation of bigotry, are racist, misogynistic, homophobic, or highly offensive in other ways. Can responsible arguing become irresponsible in such contexts? And are there situations in which a refusal to engage is the most responsible way to deal with a particular position?

In this paper, I consider whether there are limits to virtuous argumentation in certain situations. I consider three types of cases: 1) arguing against denier discourses, 2) arguing with people who make bigoted claims, and 3) cases in which marginalised people are expected to exercise virtues of argument from a position of limited agency. For each type of case, I look at where limits to arguing responsibly might be drawn. I argue that there are situations in which we might withdraw from engagement for practical reasons and others in which withdrawing or refraining from engagement is a responsible way to deal with a particular position. Finally, I argue that in the third type of case, expecting the marginalised to argue as though on even terms with the positions of the dominant risks perpetrating argumentative harm.

[124] Tracy Bowell. Argument, virtues and normativity. 2023. Presented at the 10th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA 2023), Leiden, Netherlands. More than a decade on from the publication of Andrew Aberdein’s paper, ‘Virtue in Argument’, in which he made the case that virtue theory can be profitably applied to argument, work on agent-based approaches to argument continues to mine productive seams of discussion and analyses. Much of that work follows through on Aberdein’s suggestion (2010, 177) that there is much work to be done in the provision of sensitive analyses of individual virtues. Less of the current literature in the VAT field attempts to respond to his closing suggestion that, even more significantly, virtue argumentation holds out the possibility of a systematic basis for the frequently unanalysed appeals to normative obligations to be found in many discussions of reasoning. In this paper, I address this question of the source of the normative force of argumentative virtues. I begin the paper by considering relevant similarities and differences between the practices of argument and the practices of morality in order to identify significant differences between them that should be taken into account by any virtue-theoretic approach to argument. I then look at the prospects for a target-centred account of the argumentative virtues as a means of providing a plausible explanation of their normative force.

[125] Tracy Bowell & Justine Kingsbury. Virtue and argument: Taking character into account. Informal Logic. 35(1):22–32, 2013. In this paper we consider the prospects for an account of good argument that takes the character of the arguer into consideration. We conclude that although there is much to be gained by identifying the virtues of the good arguer and by considering the ways in which these virtues can be developed in ourselves and in others, virtue argumentation theory does not offer a plausible alternative definition of good argument.

[126] Tracy Bowell & Justine Kingsbury. Critical thinking and the argumentational and epistemic virtues. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014. In this paper we argue that while a full-blown virtue-theoretical account of argumentation is implausible, there is scope for augmenting a conventional account of argument by taking a character-oriented turn. We then discuss the characteristics of the good epistemic citizen, and consider approaches to nurturing these characteristics in critical thinking students, in the hope of addressing the problem of lack of transfer of critical thinking skills to the world outside the classroom.

[127] Tracy Bowell & Justine Kingsbury. Virtue and inquiry: Bridging the transfer gap. In Martin Davies & Ron Barnett, eds., Palgrave Handbook of Critical Thinking in Higher Education, pp. 233–245. Palgrave, London, 2015. In this paper we suggest that a virtues-oriented approach to teaching critical thinking has the potential to help bridge the transfer gap. If critical thinking skills are not sticking, perhaps that is at least in part because students lack certain intellectual virtues or dispositions toward conscientious inquiry. We conclude with some suggestions about how these virtues might be fostered in the context of a first-year undergraduate critical thinking course.

[128] Tracy Bowell & Justine Kingsbury. Enquiring responsibly in context: Role relativity and the intellectual virtues. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings of the First European Conference on Argumentation, Lisbon, 9–12 June 2015, vol. 2, pp. 301–309. College Publications, London, 2016. In previous work we have outlined a distinction between three kinds of intellectual virtues: cognitive, regulatory and motivational. In the first part of this paper we outline this distinction. Using it as a framework for analysis, we develop some case studies through which we consider which of those characteristics are most crucial to inquiring responsibly when occupying particular roles in professional and personal lives. We then consider possible impediments to acquiring and exercising those intellectual virtues.

[129] Tracy Bowell & Justine Kingsbury. Open-mindedness. In Patrick Bondy & Laura Benacquista, eds., Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21, 2016. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2016. Dewey defines open-mindedness as “freedom from prejudice, partisanship, and other such habits as close the mind and make it unwilling to consider new problems and entertain new ideas” (1910, p. 30). It is commonly included in lists of epistemic and argumentative virtues. We begin this paper with brief discussion of various accounts of open-mindedness. Our principal interest is in what it is to behave as an open-minded enquirer. Drawing on two cases, we consider whether open-minded behaviour varies between the contexts of solitary and community inquiry and whether inquirers face different challenges to behaving open-mindedly in each of these contexts. We conclude that although group deliberation introduces some extra barriers to open-mindedness, it can also make it easier to achieve by providing an external check that is absent in solitary inquiry.

According to virtue argumentation theorists, virtues displayed by the arguer are constitutive of good argument. In earlier work we raise some problems for this approach, but as Paglieri points out, our objections presuppose a view of what argument is, and what good argument is, not accepted by virtue theorists. Here we first clarify our position. Then, prompted by Paglieri and Aberdein, we step back from this particular debate to consider more general questions it raises.


In Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, logos must be conceived as enthemematical argumentation relative to the issue of the case. Ethos and pathos also can take the form of an enthymeme, but this argumentation doesn’t relate (directly) to the issue. In this kind of enthymeme, the conclusion is relative to the ethos of the speaker (or reasons for) the pathos of the audience. In an ideal situation—with a good procedure and rational judges—logos dominates and in the real situation of Aristotle’s time—with an imperfect procedure and irrational judges—ethos and pathos prevail.


“Meta-argument allegations” consist of protestations that an interlocutor’s speech is wrongfully offensive or will trigger undesirable social consequences. Such protestations are meta-argument in the sense that they do not interrogate the soundness of an opponent’s argumentation, but instead focus on external features of that argument. They are allegations because they imply moral wrongdoing. There is a legitimate place for meta-argument allegations, and the moral and epistemic goods that can come from them will be front of mind for those levelling such allegations. But I argue there is a dark side to such allegations, and their epistemic and moral costs must be seriously weighed. Meta-argument allegations have a concerning capacity to derail discussions about important topics, stymieing argumentational interactions and the goods they provide. Such allegations can license efforts to silence, punish and deter—even as they provoke the original speaker to retaliate in kind. Used liberally, such allegations can escalate conflicts, block open-mindedness, and discourage constructive dialogues. In response, I defend “argumentational tolerance”—a principled wariness in employing meta-argument allegations—as a virtue of ethical argument.


Contemporary argumentation theory has developed an impressive array of norms, goals and virtues applicable to ideal argument. But what is the moral status of these prescriptions? Is an interlocutor who fails to live up to these norms guilty of a moral failing as well as an epistemic or cognitive error? If so, why? In answering these questions, I argue that deliberation’s epistemic and cognitive goods attach to important ethical goods, and that respect for others’ rationality, the ethics of joint action, and the importance of consensus join forces with these goods to provide strong reasons for cleaving to high standards of argument. I sketch an illustrative continuum of argument practices of different deliberative-cum-ethical standards, and consider how one should ethically respond when faced with an interlocutor employing less than ideal standards.


Peggy Breitenstein takes the view that it is difficult to motivate learners to argue objectively if in public discourse they repeatedly experience the quality of arguments as not at all important. She examines the causes of the failure of arguments in public discourse and, with reference to Butler and Arendt, among others, opens up the political and ethical dimensions of argumentation. It becomes clear, among other things, that there is more to “democratic capability” than argumentative skills in the narrow sense. In doing so, she refers to hermeneutic and ethical virtues.


Examines the theoretical underpinnings of the debate on the transferability of critical thinking skills and discusses methods of fostering critical thinking in the classroom. The foremost task in teaching critical thinking is fostering in students habits of inquiry which lead to a disposition to seek intellectual, moral, and social integration.


I begin by commending my friend Gary Lawson for his important treatment of the nature of evidence and proof in his book *Evidence of the Law*. I write, very much, I think, in the spirit of his book and his own *agonophilic* (I shall explain this concept) style, to question whether his theory of proof hinders its explanatory power by omitting to recognize virtues of arguments other than the one on which he (and, for that matter, most philosophers—he is in good company) focuses, namely, argumentative proofs that produce true or probabilistically warranted propositions. To make my argument I draw on my own theory of the nature of argument and method of analyzing the virtues and vices of argument. I call this method and its supporting theory the Logocratic Method (“LM”). My task in this Lecture is to present enough of the LM—including two of its concepts central to my critique, “agonophilia” and “agonophobia”—and enough of a re-presentation of what I understand Gary’s argument about the nature of proof to be, to raise my question about the explanatory adequacy of Gary’s theory.


The Logocratic Method, and the Logocratic theory that underwrites it, provide a philosophical explanation of three purposes or goals that arguers have for their arguments: to make arguments that are internally strong (the premises follow from the conclusions,
to a greater or lesser degree—greatest degree in valid deductive arguments), or that are dialectically strong (win in some forum of argument competition, as for example in litigation contests of plaintiffs or prosecutors on the one hand, and defendants, on the other), or that are rhetorically strong (effective at persuading a targeted audience). This article presents the basic terms and methods of Logocratic analysis and then uses a case study to illustrate the Logocratic explanation of arguments. Highlights of this explanation are: the use of a (non-moral) virtue (and vice) framework to explain the three strengths and weaknesses of arguments that are of greatest interest to arguers in many contexts (including but not limited to the context of legal argument), the Logocratic explication of the structure of abduction generally and of legal abduction specifically, the concept of a system of arguments, and the concept of the dynamic interactive virtue (and vice) of arguments—a property of systems of arguments in which the system of arguments as a whole (for example, the set of several arguments typically offered by a plaintiff or by a defendant) is as virtuous (or vicious) as are the component arguments that comprise the system. This is especially important since, according to Logocratic theory (and as illustrated in detail in this paper), some arguments, such as abduction and analogical argument, are themselves comprised of different logical forms (for example, abduction always plays a role within analogical argument, and either deduction or defeasible modus ponens, always plays a role within legal abduction).


There are at least three possible readings of the vir bonus doctrine in Book XII, and it seems clear that Quintilian intends all three: (1) an orator ought to be good; (2) an orator will be effective only if good; (3) an orator is good as a matter of definition. The remainder of this essay will be devoted to an examination of each of these three, in turn, with some emphasis on connections between the second and third and Platonism.


There has been extended discussion of “ethical proof” by recent speech theorists; but it has for the most part centered around diluted conceptions of ἄθος and focused almost exclusively on empirical questions. It is the question of the nature of the appeal to ἄθος as a form of argument which is the subject of the present essay. Our discussion will begin with Aristotle’s conception of “ethical proof” in the Art of Rhetoric, but will then turn to the Nicomachean Ethics for a fuller conception of ἄθος and for materials which will be sufficient for a more adequate account of its role in argument, with a view toward its justification. We will then turn to some actual uses of ἄθος in reasoning by Seneca and other Stoics. Finally, we will consider briefly the role of ἄθος in wider contexts of argumentation.


When the logician proclaims triumphantly, as a result of the way he orders his premises, that Socrates is mortal, he does not need to know anything about himself or his respondents (except that they are “rational” and will follow the rules) to know the conclusion is entailed by the premises. But when an arguer maintains a philosophic position, a scientific theory, or a political policy—in short, any substantive proposition—the coarguer’s response may be influenced by who he is, who the arguer is, and what their relationship is. Perhaps as good a way as any to distinguish the study of logic from the study of argument is to understand that logicians can safely ignore the influence of people on the transaction; arguers cannot.


Under what conditions is a group belief resulting from deliberation constitutive of group knowledge? What kinds of competences must a deliberating group manifest when settling a question so that the resulting collective belief can be considered group knowledge? In this paper, we provide an answer to the second question that helps make progress on the first question. In particular, we explain the epistemic normativity of deliberation-based group belief in terms of a truth norm and an evidential norm, introduce a virtue-reliabilist condition on deliberative group knowledge, and provide an account and a taxonomy of the types of group competences that are necessary for this type of collective knowledge.


In section I, I argue that the current epistemic environment of liberal democracies—especially the one found on social media—is not conducive to good democratic decision-making by identifying three distinct threats that relate to their use: epistemic bubbles, echo chambers and misinformation. Section II argues that the acquisition of a set of four intellectual virtues—open-mindedness, intellectual caution, intellectual courage and intellectual humility—is a partial remedy to these epistemic threats. It also sketches pedagogical strategies that can facilitate the acquisition of such virtues in the classroom. Finally, section III discusses two possible justifications for the inclusion of intellectual virtues in school curricula. While the most straightforward way to justify this claim is on intellectually perfectionist grounds, I contend that individuals who reject intellectual perfectionism can still support the teaching of intellectual virtues properly democratic reasons.


Common law judges were worried that if jurors learned of the accused’s past acts or character traits, they would punish him not for being proved guilty of this crime, but for the kind of person that he is. Unfortunately, our attempt to correct this powerful tendency has only made things worse. When jurors cannot hear how someone has behaved in the past, they will instead
rely on immutable facial features—rooted in racist, sexist, and classist stereotypes—to draw character inferences that are even more inaccurate and unfair. Undisputed findings from social psychology demonstrate that we rely on features like the distance between the eyes, the width of the nose, the angles of the jawline, and the color of skin to spontaneously infer whether someone is threatening, intelligent, or kind. This in turn predicts election outcomes, hiring decisions, teaching evaluations, and even jury verdicts. Because this split-second process is subconscious and pervasive, it is not susceptible to mitigation through jury instructions. Witnesses will be considered untrustworthy based only on their face, and in some cases, justice may require admitting bolstering evidence before their character is technically attacked. I thus propose reversing the ban on character evidence, in favor of a presumption of inadmissibility for immoral traits only. My proposal has a number of benefits, including rechanneling the rule to its moral, normative roots and acknowledging that not all past act evidence will be unfairly prejudicial. Finally, delivering the greatest balm to judges and attorneys, admissibility would no longer hinge on the gossamer-thin distinction between propensity and non-propensity uses. This is because jurors will automatically use whatever information is available, including evidence of mental states, to infer character traits, predict behavior, and assess blame.


Starting as a reaction to the dominant ideology, [political correctness] has become the dominant ideology. It defines the terms and parameters of any national debate. Anything that is not PC is automatically condemned. It provides a framework for understanding public debate and the general public vividly argue about what should be done with monuments of historical figures such as Stalin or Colston: Should we demolish the building they funded? Should we revere their statues? Should the street named after them be renamed?; and the general public vividly argue about what should be done with the legacy of producers, directors and actors in debates of the #MeToo movement: Should their new movies be distributed? Should their scenes be deleted from motion pictures? Should their stars from the Hollywood Walk of Fame be removed? Many arguments in these debates boil down to the character of the public figures: He was a slave trader!—But he is a part of our history; He harassed a young girl!—But he is an important actor.


The aim of this paper is to provide a model that allows the representation and analysis of circularity in ethotic structures, i.e. in communication structures related to the speaker’s character and in particular, his credibility. The paper studies three types of cycles: in self-referential sentences, embedded testimony and ethotic begging the question. It is shown that standard models allow the reconstruction of the circularities only if those circular utterances are interpreted as ethotic arguments. Their alternative, assertive interpretation requires enriching the existing models with a purely ethotic component related to the credibility of the former of any (not necessarily argumentative) speech act.


The aim of this paper is to discuss research process which employs linguistic methods of corpus analysis in order to better understand dialogue strategies people use. Theories developed in such a way are then suitable to be used for argument mining, i.e. for automated identification and extraction of these strategies from large resources of texts in natural language. The paper considers two types of communication phenomena related to Aristotelian notions of logos (i.e. inferential premise-conclusion structures) and ethos (i.e.communication structures related to the character of the speaker). The goal of the paper is accomplished in four steps. The task of identifying the main problem (Sect. 1) allows us to give an outline of the corpus study method for automated argument mining (Sect. 2). Next, the explication of this method paves the way for discussing two examples of applying the corpus method to analyse logos and ethos, namely controversy and consensus (Sect. 3) and ethotic structures in a dialogue (Sect. 4).


Ethotic arguments, such as arguments from expert opinion and ad hominem arguments, play an important role in communication practice. In this paper, we argue that there is another type of reasoning from ethos, in which people argue about actions in the world. These subspecies of ethotic arguments are very common in public debates: societies are involved in heated disputes about what should be done with monuments of historical figures such as Stalin or Colston: Should we demolish the building they funded? Should we revere their statues? Should the street named after them be renamed?; and the general public vividly argue about what should be done with the legacy of producers, directors and actors in debates of the #MeToo movement: Should their new movies be distributed? Should their scenes be deleted from motion pictures? Should their stars from the Hollywood Walk of Fame be removed? Many arguments in these debates boil down to the character of the public figures: He was a slave trader!—But he is a part of our history; He harassed a young girl!—But he is an important actor. The reasoning step here is legitimised by the association between a person and an extra-linguistic object: the association between a historical figure and their statue or between an actor and their movie. The nature of this association is explained in the paper using Peirce’s theory of signs. We propose to extend an existing approach to patterns of reasoning from ethos that will help us to shed new light on ethotic argumentation and open an avenue for a systematic account of these unexplored argument forms.


The aim of the paper is to explore the interrelation between persuasion tactics and properties of speech acts. We investigate two types of arguments ad: ad hominem and ad baculum. We show that with both of these tactics, the structures that play a key role are not inferential, but rather ethotic, i.e., related to the speaker’s character and trust. We use the concepts of illocutionary force and constitutive conditions related
to the character or status of the speaker in order to explain the dynamics of these two techniques. In keeping with the research focus of the Polish School of Argumentation, we examine how the pragmatic and rhetorical aspects of the force of ad hominem and ad baculum arguments exploit trust in the speaker’s status to influence the audience’s cognition.


Becoming a reasonable thinker and actor has a central place among our educational aims. Whatever else we might want students to become, most accounts of education include the desire to foster in them the habits of thought of a reasonable, reflective, open-minded person. Debates, however, arise over three issues: first, exactly what becoming “rational” or “reasonable” entails; second, how best to pursue that aim; and third, what other educational aims we might hold, and how they relate to or conflict with that goal. In this paper I want to sketch some answers to these issues and suggest a defensible conception of “reasonableness” as an educational aim.


The standard view among philosophers is that an arguer’s hypocrisy (understood as failure to practice what one preaches) has no bearing on either the merits of his or her argument or the acceptability of the argument’s conclusion. I challenge this view. Using the case of Peter Singer, who has famously argued for a moral obligation to relieve famine, but who does not, by his own admission, live in accordance with the standard he espouses, I explain why (and how) an arguer’s hypocrisy matters. If I am correct, then the standard view of the relation between arguer and argument must be revised.


The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by an “infodemic” of misinformation and conspiracy theory. This article points to three explanatory factors: the challenge of forming accurate beliefs when overwhelmed with information, an implausibly individualistic conception of epistemic virtue, and an adversarial informational environment that suborns epistemic dependence. Normally we cope with the problems of informational excess by relying on other people, including sociotechnical systems that mediate testimony and evidence. But when we attempt to engage in epistemic “superheroics” – withholding trust from others and trying to figure it all out for ourselves – these can malfunction in ways that make us vulnerable to forming irrational beliefs. Some epistemic systems are prone to coalescing audiences around false conspiracy theories. This analysis affords a new perspective on philosophical efforts to understand conspiracy theories and other epistemic projects prone to collective irrationality.


This robust, clear, and well-researched textbook for classes in logic introduces students to both formal logic and to the virtues of intellectual inquiry. Part 1 challenges students to develop the analytical skills of deductive and inductive reasoning, showing them how to identify and evaluate arguments. Part 2 helps students develop the intellectual virtues of the wise inquirer. The book includes helpful pedagogical features such as practice exercises and a concluding summary with definitions of key concepts for each chapter.


Introductory-level undergraduate classes in Logic or Critical Thinking are a staple in the portfolio of many Philosophy programs. A standard approach to these classes is to include teaching and learning activities focused on formal deductive and inductive logic, sometimes accompanied by teaching and learning activities focused on informal fallacies or argument construction. In this article, I discuss a proposal to include an additional element within these classes—namely, teaching and learning activities focused on intellectual virtues. After clarifying the proposal, I identify three reasons in favor of implementing it and I discuss how to implement it, focusing on questions about pedagogical strategies and pedagogical resources.


All of us depend on others in our inquiries; and, indeed, sometimes it is others who depend on us in theirs. But what does it take to perform excellently in these contexts in which one is depended upon by other inquirers? What does it take, that is, to be intellectually dependable? This question is relevant for both epistemology—how we should conceptualize the ideal inquirer—and education—how we can enable developing learners to grow toward this ideal. This book aims to answer the question by providing a virtue theory of the epistemic and educational ideal of intellectual dependability. The chief aim is to identify and conceptualize several of the key intellectual virtues that contribute distinctively to a person’s excellence as a dependable inquirer. Virtues discussed include intellectual benevolence, intellectual transparency, communicative clarity, audience sensitivity, and epistemic guidance. In each case, an interdisciplinary treatment of the nature, value, measurement, and cultivation of the virtue is offered, drawing especially on relevant research in Philosophy and Psychology. The book concludes with a chapter devoted to distinctive ways these virtues of intellectual dependability are manifested when it is inquiring communities, rather than individuals, that occupy the position of intellectual dependence. As the first research monograph devoted to its topic, the book marks a novel turn of scholarly attention explicitly toward a neglected dimension of the ideal inquirer that will inform both for epistemological theorizing and educational practice.

In a recent book and journal article, I have developed an account of intellectual transparency as an other-regarding intellectual virtue, and have explored its conceptual relationship to the virtue of honesty. This paper aims to further advance understanding of intellectual transparency by examining some of the ways in which the trait is instrumentally valuable. Specifically, I argue that intellectual transparency tends to enhance its possessor’s close personal relationships, work performance, and civic engagement. On account of their intellectual transparency, the intellectually transparent person is likely to enjoy better quality, more satisfied personal relationships such as romantic relationships and friendships. They are likely to contribute to better work outcomes, especially when working in a team context. And, they are likely to be more civically active and to promote epistemic values of democratic deliberation.


In this paper, I discuss the ways in which epistemic anxiety promotes well-being, specifically by examining the positive contributions that feelings of epistemic anxiety make toward intellectually virtuous inquiry. While the prospects for connecting the concept of epistemic anxiety to the two most prominent accounts of intellectual virtue, i.e., ‘virtue-reliabilism’ and ‘virtue-responsibilism’, are promising, I primarily focus on whether the capacity for epistemic anxiety counts as an intellectual virtue in the reliabilist sense. As I argue, there is a close yet unexplored connection between feelings of epistemic anxiety and the form of inference commonly known as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ (IBE). Specifically, I argue that both the recognition that some fact requires an explanation—a necessary first step in applying IBE—and the subsequent motivation to employ IBE are typically facilitated by feelings of epistemic anxiety. So, provided IBE is truth-conducive the capacity for epistemic anxiety should count as an intellectual virtue in the reliabilist sense. After outlining my main argument, I address the challenge that the capacity for epistemic anxiety has the potential to be misleading. To respond to this challenge, I discuss how our recognition that a fact requires an explanation must in part be a species of practical knowledge, rather than theoretical knowledge. For the agent to skillfully distinguish between facts that require an explanation and facts that do not, she must develop the virtuous disposition to feel the appropriate amount of epistemic anxiety. Despite the many negative aspects associated with anxiety, as I conclude, being disposed to feel the appropriate amount of epistemic anxiety is ultimately good for us.


The decline of civility has increasingly become the subject of lament both in popular media and in daily conversation. Civility forestalls the potential unpleasantness of a life with other people. Without it, daily social exchanges can turn nasty and sometimes hazardous. Civility thus seems to be a basic virtue of social life. Moral philosophers, however, do not typically mention civility in their catalogues or examples of virtue. In what follows, I want to suggest that civility is a particularly interesting virtue for moral philosophers because giving an adequate account of the virtue of civility requires us to rethink the relationship between moral virtue and compliance with social norms.


Scholarly literature on moral education has until recently failed to take seriously the central role of virtue in the moral life. This article addresses the issue of how the centrality of virtue might be accommodated in dialogue within common schools under the conditions of pluralism. Two contrasting approaches to moral dialogue under these conditions Nel Noddings’s and J. S. Mill’s are examined and found wanting. A third approach, derived from John Rawls’s conceptions of reasonableness and democratic tolerance, is explained and defended.


In antiquity, rhetorical treatises generally identified clarity and obscurity as positive and negative qualities of style, respectively. But in the fifth century, Augustine developed a valuation such that both clarity and obscurity could potentially function as equally viable resources for persuasion. While previous rhetorical treatises acknowledged that standards of perspicuity varied with genre, Augustine’s stipulations for variability are tied much more closely to the particulars of the rhetorical situation. In a bold vision of the potency of style, Augustine demonstrates how a principle like clarity can be adjusted according to the rhetorical situation.


The theoretical possibility of deep disagreement gives rise to an important practical problem: a deep disagreement may in practice look and feel like a merely stubborn normal disagreement. In this paper I critique two strategies for dealing with this practical problem. According to their proponents these strategies exhibit argumentative virtue, but I will show that they embody serious argumentative (and even moral) vices. I will close by outlining several genuinely virtuous approaches to the problem.


The concept of deep disagreement is useful for highlighting skills and resources required for reasons-giving to be effective in restoring cooperative or joint action. It marks a limit. When it is instead understood as a challenge to be overcome by using reasons, it leads to significant practical, theoretical, and moral distortions.
[163] Jonathan Anthony Caravello. *Empathy, Open-Mindedness and Virtue in Argumentation*. Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2018. How should we respond when someone challenges the very norms we assume when evaluating arguments? I challenge a widely-accepted dogmatist answer according to which we can justly assert or rely on foundational norms or principles even when we know our interlocutors reject them. I go on to develop a virtue-theoretic approach to argumentation, highlighting the central role played by open-mindedness and related virtues in distinguishing good from bad arguments. The resulting theory elucidates the pragmatic nature of argumentative circularity, offers normative guidance for those looking to improve their discursive behavior, and makes some progress towards resolving ongoing debates over the proper response to peer disagreement.

[164] David Carr. Knowledge and truth in virtuous deliberation. *Philosophia*, 48(4):1381–1396, 2020. The overall aim of this paper is to explore the role of knowledge and truth in the practical deliberation of candidate virtuous agents. To this end, the paper considers three criticisms of Julia Driver’s recent defence of the prospect of ‘virtues of ignorance’ or virtues for which knowledge may be considered unnecessary or untoward. While the present essay agrees with the general drift of Driver’s criticism that we should reject such virtues construed as traits that deliberately embrace ignorance, it is more sympathetic to the suggestion that virtue and virtues may need to accommodate some absence or deficit of knowledge and proceeds to further scrutiny of this possibility. More radically, however, the paper concludes by arguing that while knowledge is an overall desideratum of virtue and virtuous conduct, there are circumstances in which even complete knowledge may be insufficient to identify or determine the precise course and direction of such conduct.

[165] J. Adam Carter & Daniella Meehan. Vices of distrust. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective*, 8(10):25–32, 2019. Vices of distrust are dangerous in their own right, and in ways that often harm others along with oneself. The three vices of distrust we want to explore—with a particular focus on their manifestations online—are: close-mindedness, emollience, and arrogance. Each contributes to vicious distrust in its own distinctive way.

[166] John P. Casey. Revisiting the adversary paradigm. In Bart Garssen, David Godden, Gordon R. Mitchell, & Jean H.M. Wagemans, eds., *Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation*, pp. 155–163. Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2019. Some argue that adversariality is extraneous to the core concept of argument. I argue that if we take argument to be about beliefs, rather than commitments, then two considerations should be adversariality as an essential part of it. First, beliefs are not under our direct voluntary control. Second, beliefs are costly both for the psychological states they provoke and for the fact that they are causally related to our actions.

[167] John P. Casey. Adversariality and argumentation. *Informal Logic*, 40(1):77–108, 2020. The concept of adversariality, like that of argument, admits of significant variation. As a consequence, I argue, the question of adversarial argument has not been well understood. After defining adversariality, I argue that if we take argument to be about beliefs, rather than commitments, then two considerations show that adversariality is an essential part of it. First, beliefs are not under our direct voluntary control. Second, beliefs are costly both for the psychological states they provoke and for the fact that they are causally related to our actions. As a result, argument involving agreement can also be understood to be adversarial.


[169] Quassim Cassam. Doubt as a political virtue. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 45:371–391, 2021. This article explicates the notion of doubt and the relationship of doubt to belief and conviction. It distinguishes three types of political virtue—leadership, systemic, and corrective—and considers whether doubt is a political virtue in any of these three senses. It is argued that while doubt is not a leadership virtue, it is a systemic and a corrective virtue. Specifically, it is potentially an antidote to methods, ideological, and psychological extremism. A distinction is drawn between extremism and forms of radicalism that have resulted in social progress. It is possible for doubt to play a role in countering extremism without thereby also countering progressive radicalism. The concluding section develops a theory of deradicalization and identifies the role of radical doubt in deradicalization programmes. The proposed empirically informed account of deradicalization highlights the role of narratives in radicalization and deradicalization.

[170] R. Michael Cassidy. Character and context: What virtue theory can teach us about a prosecutor’s ethical duty to “seek justice”. *Notre Dame Law Review*, 82:635–698, 2006. Any attempt to regulate how prosecutors should “act” in certain highly contextualized and nuanced situations by developing more specific normative rules is unworkable. Prosecutorial discretion would be better constrained in these areas by focusing on what type of character traits prosecutors should possess or strive to acquire. Only after we answer the critical preliminary question of who we want our public prosecutors to “be” can we possibly hope to discern what we expect our prosecutors to “do.” In the concluding Part of the Article, I will demonstrate that a renewed emphasis on character and virtue has direct implications for how prosecutor’s offices should be structured and organized in this country, and how individual prosecutors working within these offices should aspire to conduct their professional lives.

This article discusses a procedural, minimalist approach to justice in terms of fair hearing applicable to value conflicts at impasse in politics. This approach may be summarized in the Adversary Argumentation Principle (AAP): the idea that each side in a conflict should be heard. I engage with Stuart Hampshire’s efforts to justify the AAP and argue that those efforts have failed to provide normatively cogent foundations for it. I suggest deriving such foundations from a basic idea of procedural equality (all parties in a conflict should be granted an equal chance to have a say) which all conflicting parties could be thought to endorse. But what happens once all parties have been heard if no agreement is reached? Borrowing a distinction well known to scholars of peace studies, but surprisingly neglected by justice-driven political philosophers, I claim that although the AAP might be inconclusive with regard to resolving a conflict, it is a promising principle for managing value conflicts justly. The AAP is thus considered anew through the lens of conflict management: as a principle of justice to characterize normatively the way conflicting parties should interact for their interaction to be morally justifiable to such parties with a view to changing antagonistic conflict dynamics into cooperative ones.


Causal reasoning is an aspect of learning, reasoning, and decision-making that involves the cognitive ability to discover relationships between causal relata, learn and understand these causal relationships, and make use of this causal knowledge in prediction, explanation, decision-making, and reasoning in terms of counterfactuals. Can we fully automate causal reasoning? One might feel inclined, on the basis of certain ground-breaking advances in causal epistemology, to reply in the affirmative. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that one still has good skeptical grounds for resisting any conclusions in favour of the automation of causal reasoning. If by causal reasoning is meant the entirety of the process through which we discover causal relationships and make use of this knowledge in prediction, explanation, decision-making, and reasoning in terms of counterfactuals, then one relies besides on tacit knowledge, as might be constituted by or derived from the epistemic faculty virtues and abilities of the causal reasoner, the value systems and character traits of the causal reasoner, the implicit knowledge base available to the causal reasoner, and the habits that sustain our causal reasoning practices. While certain aspects of causal reasoning may be axiomatized and formalized and algorithms may be implemented to approximate causal reasoning, one has to remain skeptical about whether causal reasoning may be fully automated. This demonstration will involve an engagement with Meno’s Paradox.


This article addresses the issue of social conflict from the epistemology of “deep disagreements”. Unlike other types of disagreements, deep ones generate incommensurability and cannot be corrected through rational argumentation, precisely because it can amplify the disagreement and exacerbate the problem. At the base of these divergences lie two irreconcilable epistemological positions: infallibilism and fallibilism. The fallibilist style of argumentation is embodied in attempts to find objective truth through final and conclusive evidence. Such a position induces them to defend their own beliefs through vicious cycles that Carlos Pereda has called “argumentative vertigos”, generating different silencing and devaluation strategies based on identity prejudices (a kind of “grievance” that, in Miranda Fricker’s words, constitutes an act of “epistemic injustice”). Dizzying argumentation can even lead to an epistemic annihilation of the Other as a valid interlocutor. This phenomenon is presented as “epistemicide” (adapted from the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos). In this work, the analysis of the frictions, tensions and disputes that can be activated in the course of the production and validation of knowledge is taken further, to probe the conditions under which devaluation and annihilation may be perpetrated. Against himself. I call this phenomenon “autoepistemicide”, and I draw a comparison between this concept and its concomitant in the clinical setting: that of “Gaslighting”. Finally, I extract the most important reflections of the article, opening new horizons for future research.


What qualities do we need in order to be good philosophers? Wittgenstein insists that virtues of character – such as honesty, humility, courage, and strength – are more important for our philosophizing than the relevant intellectual talents and skills. These virtues are essential because doing good philosophy demands both knowing and overcoming the deep-seated desires and inclinations which lead us astray in our thinking, and achieving such self-knowledge and self-overcoming demands all of these virtues working in concert. In this paper I draw together many of Wittgenstein’s seemingly offhanded remarks on these issues in order to re-construct his understanding of philosophy’s ‘difficulties of the will’ and the virtues needed to overcome them.


Michael Gilbert argues that Cartesian reasoning defined as rational, linear thought processes preclusive of emotions, intuitions and lived experience, i.e. “Natural Light Theory” (NLT), fails because it arbitrarily excludes standard feminine forms of reasoning and neglects the essentially social nature of argumentation. In this paper, I supplement Gilbert’s view by showing that NLT fails in a distinctive manner in moral argumentation contexts. Specifically, by requiring arguers to value truth and justice above their relationship with their argumentative partner, it tends to alienate the arguer from her moral motives, engendering a kind of moral schizophrenia.

A persuasive argument is one that responds to the concerns and priorities of the particular person one is trying to persuade, one that resonates with his or her worldview and self-understanding. On this account, when we persuade we have done more than offer a list of reasons for holding an opinion or taking an action. We have, whether consciously or not, evoked and appealed to particular set of beliefs, concerns, and priorities. In the process, we may have done more than simply persuade that person on the issue at hand. We may also, whether intentionally or not, have helped to reinforce and entrench the particular “hierarchy of values” to which we have appealed.


I suggest that argument itself—including legal scholarship, law teaching, political rhetoric, and public policy advocacy—is also potentially constitutive. Moreover, I would suggest that the ways in which we argue, and in particular the assumptions on which we base our arguments, are potentially constitutive not just of particular norms, but of something arguably deeper. What we let or make matter in our collective conversation about law and policy may help construct our sense of what matters in life. And what we let matter in our lives determines to some extent our capacity to thrive—to live full and productive lives.


Legal speech and religious speech inevitably do some of the same work. Both are vehicles through which we both talk about and become the kind of people we are. Granted, those of us who teach and argue about the law do not often conceive of our work in this way. That is part of what I hope to begin to remedy in this essay. While the construction of character is a more obvious aspect of religious than legal thought, law, including legal argument, can be constitutive in similar ways. If so—if our ways of talking about the law serve some of the same ends as do our ways of talking about religion—then we may be able to learn how better to talk about the law by thinking about how we talk about religion. I do not mean things like paragraph structure or argument organization or the proper use of headings, but rather something more subtle and more fundamental. One way to put it is this: legal speech can learn from religious speech how to be less small, and perhaps more emboldening.


I hope here to highlight a set of concerns about the impact of our speech that are deeper than mere civility or even honesty. Following Socrates, I suggest that the way we speak, particularly when we seek to persuade, can play a role in forming the character of our listeners. Arguments are, in that sense, potentially constitutive. As Socrates describes and demonstrates, how we speak to people can influence how they think about themselves and their world. And that in turn can influence whether and how they thrive.


This chapter highlights the risk that populist rhetoric, by appealing to people’s need for certainty and simplicity, may nurture that need and thus undercut people’s capacity to deal well with uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity. This is potentially problematic and ironic, because this capacity is an epistemic virtue popular governance in particular needs in citizens. Democracy needs citizens who can deal well with the uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity inherent in modern social and political life. Democratic rhetoric should, therefore, to the extent possible, seek to foster rather than stunt the development of that capacity.


This chapter aims to show how the Aristotelian theory of practical reasoning presupposes and mobilises a linguistic community in a specific sense and to understand the dialogical structure assumed by practical reason.


The claim that argumentation has no proper role in either philosophy or education, and especially not in philosophical education, flies in the face of both conventional wisdom and traditional pedagogy. There is, however, something to be said for it because it is really only provocative against a certain philosophical backdrop. Our understanding of the concept “argument” is both reflected by and molded by the specific metaphor that argument-is-war, something with winners and losers, offensive and defensive moments, and an essentially adversarial structure. Such arguments may be suitable for teaching a philosophy, but not for teaching philosophy. Surely, education and philosophy do not need to be conceived as having an adversarial essence—if indeed they are thought to have any essence at all. Accordingly, philosophy and education need more pragmatic goals than even Peirce’s idealized notion of truth as the end of inquiry, e.g., the simple furtherance of inquiry. For this, new metaphors for framing and understanding the concept of argumentation are needed, and some suggestions in that direction will be considered.


Arguments are more than just sequences of inferences, so we should not limit our thinking about bad arguments to just those that include bad inferences. Arguments include arguers, and there are more ways for arguers to go wrong than simply to make bad inferences. Arguments include audiences, whose presence creates further chances for problematic argumentation. Argument analysis requires more than the toolbox of logical fallacies generally provides. The task I
am undertaking here is outlining a new taxonomy of errors in arguments, to include not just logical missteps—fallacies—but also rhetorical and dialectical mistakes. The organizing principle refers to the norms that are violated, norms that are associated with the three dominant conceptions—metaphors or models or paradigms, as you prefer—for arguments. A second task, subsequent to the first and approached only tentatively here, is completing the picture by the raising the possibility of a new model.


One result of successful argumentation—able arguers presenting cogent arguments to competent audiences—is a transfer of credibility from premises to conclusions. From a purely logical perspective, neither dubious premises nor fallacious inference should lower the credibility of the target conclusion. Nevertheless, some arguments do backfire this way. Dialectical and rhetorical considerations come into play. Three interrelated conclusions emerge from a catalogue of hapless arguers and backfiring arguments. First, there are advantages to paying attention to arguers and their contexts, rather than focusing narrowly on their arguments, in order to understand what can go wrong in argumentation. Traditional fallacy identification, with its exclusive attention to faulty inferences, is inadequate to explain the full range of argumentative failures. Second, the notion of an Ideal Arguer can be defined by contrast with her less than ideal peers to serve as a useful tool in argument evaluation. And third, not all of the ways that arguers raise doubts about their conclusions are pathological. On the contrary, some ways that doubts are raised concerning our intended conclusions are an integral part of ideal argumentative practice.


Virtue epistemology (VE) was modeled on virtue ethics theories to transfer their ethical insights to epistemology. VE has had great success: broadening our perspective, providing new answers to traditional questions, and raising exciting new questions. I offer a new argument for VE based on the concept of cognitive achievements, a broader notion than purely epistemic achievements. The argument is then extended to cognitive transformations, especially the cognitive transformations brought about by argumentation.

[187] Daniel H. Cohen. Now THAT was a good argument! On the virtues of arguments and the virtues of arguers, 2008. Presented to the Centro de Estudios de la Argumentación y el Razanamiento (CEAR), Santiago, Chile.

I begin by noting three attractive features of – perhaps even compelling reasons for – virtue argumentation theories. I then consider some objections that have been raised to such approaches, one concerning virtue approaches in epistemology and a set of related objections directed at the specific project of integrating the aforementioned senses of “good argument.” Together, the reasons for and the objections against VAT focus and finalize the discussion on three interconnected concepts: good arguments, good arguers, and good arguing – leading to yet a third argument for the virtue approach, viz. that there is an integrated and holistic conception of good argument that escapes traditional approaches to argument evaluation and that requires its own special virtues.


Virtue-based approaches to epistemology have enjoyed notable success recently, making valuable contributions to long-standing debates. In this paper, I argue that many of the results from Virtue Epistemology (VE) can be carried over into the arena of argumentation theory, but also that a virtue-based approach is actually better suited for argumentation than it is for justification. First, some of the unresolved challenges for VE, such as the limitations of voluntarism with respect to beliefs, do not have counterparts in argumentation. Second, a new argument for VE based on the concept of cognitive achievements broadens its applicability to arguments. Third, because virtue-based approaches shift in focus from products and processes to agents, and arguments are essentially inter-agent transactions, important new questions come into focus, along with signposts leading to their resolution. Questions about different roles in argument (protagonists, antagonists, judges, spectators) and the virtues needed for each, come into focus, as do questions about when, why and with whom to argue, which often get lost in the shadow of the primary question, how we should argue. Finally, two specific virtues—open-mindedness and a sense of proportion—are offered as test cases for Virtue Argumentation Theory.


It is a virtue of virtue theory approaches to argumentation that they integrate many of the different factors that make arguments good arguments. The insights of virtue argumentation are brought to bear on a variety of versions of the requirement that good arguments must have good premises, concluding that a sincerity condition serves better than truth or assertability conditions, despite apparently counterintuitive consequences for arguments involving heterogeneous coalitions.


Why do we argue? To out-reason our opponents, prove them wrong, and, most of all, to win... Right? Philosopher Daniel H. Cohen shows how our most common form of argument—a war in which one person
must win and the other must lose—misses out on the real benefits of engaging in active disagreement.

[192] Daniel H. Cohen. Skepticism and argumentative virtues. Co-

If arguing is a game that philosophers play, then it’s a rigged game. Although many theories of argumentation explicitly connect argumentation with reason, rationality, and knowledge, it contains certain built-in biases against knowledge and towards skepticism. Argumentation’s skeptical biases can be put into three categories: those built into the rules of play, those embedded in the skills for playing, and finally some connected to the decision to play. Three ancient philosophers from different traditions serve exemplifying case studies: the Middle Way Buddhist Nagarjuna, the Greek Pyrrhonian Sextus Empiricus, and the Chinese Taoist Zhuangzi. They have very different argumentation styles and they reach very different kinds of skepticism, but in each case, there is an organic connection between their argumentation and their skepticism: Nagarjuna produced arguments for the Truth of No Truth; Sextus generated strategies for counter-argumentation; while Zhuangzi deftly avoided all direct argumentation—in an implicit argument against arguing. I conclude that Virtue Argumentation Theory, with its focus on arguers and their skills, provides the best lens for understanding the lessons to be learned about argumentation and skepticism from this idiosyncratic trio.


Virtue argumentation theory provides the best framework for accommodating the notion of an argument that is “fully satisfying” in a robust and integrated sense. The process of explicating the notion of fully satisfying arguments requires expanding the concept of arguers to include all of an argument’s participants, including judges, juries, and interested spectators. And that, in turn, requires expanding the concept of an argument itself to include its entire context.


Why do we hold arguers culpable for missing obvious objections against their arguments but not for missing obvious lines of reasoning for their positions? In both cases, their arguments are not as strong as they could be. Two factors cause this: adversarial models of argumentation and the permeable boundaries separating argumentation, meta-argumentation, and argument evaluation. Strategic considerations and dialectical obligations partially justify the asymmetry; virtue argumentation theory explains when and why it is not justified.


Data from neuroscience suggest that, contrary to the conference theme, argumentation and reasoning are not the main vehicles for our decisions and actions. They are “fifth wheels” on those vehicles: ornate but ineffective appendages whose maintenance costs exceed their contributions. Although the data, their interpretations, and their putative implications all deserve challenge, this paper explores how to accept and incorporate these findings into a coherent view of what we do when we reason.


Technology has made argumentation rampant. We can argue whenever we want. With social media venues for every interest, we can also argue about whatever we want. To some extent, we can select our opponents and audiences to argue with whenever we want. And we can argue however we want, whether in carefully reasoned, article-length expositions, real-time exchanges, or 140-character polemics. The concepts of arguing, arguing well, and even being an arguer have evolved with this new multiplicity and diversity; theory needs to catch up to the new reality. Successful strategies for traditional contexts may be counterproductive in new ones; classical argumentative virtues may be liabilities in new situations. There are new complications to the theorist’s standard questions – What is an argument? and Who is an arguer? – while new ones move into the spotlight – Should we argue at all? and If so, why? Agent-based virtue argumentation theory provides a unifying framework for this radical plurality by coordinated redefinitions of the concepts of good arguers and good arguments. It remains true that good arguers contribute to good arguments, and good arguments satisfy good arguers, but the new diversity strains the old unity. Ironically, a unifying factor is provided by an examining those paragons of bad arguers, argument trolls whose contributions to arguments are not very good, not really contributions, and, ultimately, not genuine argumentation.


Psychological and neuroscientific data suggest that a great deal, perhaps even most, of our reasoning turns out to be rationalizing. The reasons we give for our positions are seldom either the real reasons or the effective causes of why we have those positions. We are not as rational as we like to think. A second, no less disheartening observation is that while we may be very effective when it comes to giving reasons, we are not that good at getting reasons. We are not as reason-responsive as we like to think. Reasoning and argumentation are, on this view, charades without effect. This paper begins by identifying a range of theoretical responses to the idea that reasoning and argumentation
have little casual role in our thoughts and actions, and, consequently, that humans are not the reasons-giving, reasons-responsive agents that we imagine ourselves to be. The responses fall into three categories: challenging the data and their interpretations; making peace with the loss of autonomy that is implied; and seeking ways to expand the causal footprint of reasoning and argumentation, e.g., by developing argumentative virtues. There are indeed possibilities for becoming more rational and more reasons-responsive, so the reports of our demise as the rational animal are greatly exaggerated.


Argumentation theory often focuses very narrowly on a very narrow conception of arguments, but some aspects of argumentation need a broader backdrop than the study of discrete arguments affords. Much of what makes argumentation important occurs before and after arguers engage. This paper examines the category of “inter-argument argumentative virtues” that are characteristic of good arguers when they are preparing for and processing arguments rather than actively arguing.


John Stuart Mill situated “logic”, in his broad sense of the term, at the confluence of empiricist epistemology, utilitarian ethics, and liberal political theory. Thus, he often commented on argumentation, especially as it appears in public forums concerning the body politic. Mill’s theory of argumentation, as reconstructed by Hans V. Hansen, is not comfortably encapsulated in the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor, despite the common association, but most resources of contemporary argumentation theories are already present—along with some virtues of its own. This paper uses Mill’s theory to address two important but often overlooked questions: Why should we argue, when we should? and Why shouldn’t we argue, when we should not?


The best arguments are distinguished by more than logical validity, successful rhetorical persuasion, or satisfactory dialectical closure. Argument appraisal has to look beyond the premises, inferences, and conclusions; it must consider more than just the objections and replies, and resolutions that satisfy the arguers might not satisfy outside critics. Arguers and their contexts can be important factors for assessing arguments. This conclusion is reached by considering several scenarios in which similar arguments—up to and including complete word-for-word identity—merit different critical responses.


It is a truth universally acknowledged that contemporary political argumentation is in need of a fix. The consensus does not extend to either curatives or palliatives, but at least part of the problem is in how we think about arguments. If they are conceived as inferentially structured sequences of propositions or a series of speech acts, then the primary concern of argumentation theorists becomes fallacies. They are fertile ground for research programs and while they may be hard to avoid and harder to teach, they are, at bottom, relatively easy problems to identify and fix. For the most part, they are inferential mistakes in arguing, rather than sins, crimes, or injustices. That makes them the common cold in a pandemic of more serious argumentative pathologies: they share some symptoms but they have different underlying conditions. The pandemic does not target the inferential system; it targets the communal system.


While deductive validity provides the limiting upper bound for evaluating the strength and quality of inferences, by itself it is an inadequate tool for evaluating arguments, arguing, and argumentation. Similar remarks can be made about rhetorical success and dialectical closure. Then what would count as ideal argumentation? In this paper we introduce the concept of cognitive compathy to point in the direction of one way to answer that question. It is a feature of our argumentation rather than my argument or your argument. In that respect, compathy is like the harmonies achieved by an accomplished choir, the spontaneous coordination of athletic teamwork, or the experience of improvising jazz musicians when they are all in the flow together. It is a characteristic of arguments, not a virtue that can be attributed to individual arguers. It makes argumentation more than just the sum of its individual parts. The concept of cognitive compathy is brought into focus by locating it at the confluence of two lines of thought. First, we work up to the concept of compathy by contrasting it with empathy and sympathy in the context of emotions, which is then transplanted into epistemic, cognitive, and argumentative soil. Second, the concept is analytically linked to ideal argumentation by way of authenticity in communication. In the final section, we explore the extent to which argumentative virtues are conducive to producing compathetic argumentation, but reach the unhappy conclusion that the extra value of compathetic argumentation also transcends the evaluative reach of virtue argumentation theory.


How is it possible that biases are cognitive vices, objectivity is an exemplary intellectual virtue, but objectivity is itself a bias? We argue that objectivity is indeed a bias but an argumentative virtue nonetheless. Using courtroom argumentation as a case study, we analyze and explain objectivity’s contextually variable value. The conclusions from this study ground a response to...
recent criticisms from Goddu and Godden regarding the conceptual foundations of virtue-based approaches to argumentation.


My topic is an issue in the individuation and epistemology of fallacious inferences. My thesis is that there are instances of reasoning that are fallacious not in themselves, that are not intrinsically fallacious, but are fallacious only relative to particular reasoning agents. This seems like a peculiar notion. It would seem that if it was fallacious for you to reason a certain way, and I do the same thing, I would be committing a fallacy as well. Bad reasoning is bad reasoning, no matter who is doing it. But it is useful to ask: What would it take for it to be possible for there to be such a thing as an agent-relative fallacy? Here are two sets of conditions, the obtaining of either of which would be sufficient for the existence of agent-relative, or extrinsic, fallacies. Type One is that there are two agents who are intrinsically alike, molecule-for-molecule doppelgangers, one of whom is reasoning fallaciously while the other is not, due to differences in their respective environments. The other scenario, Type Two, is that there are two agents (who are not doppelgangers) who engage in intrinsically identical instances of reasoning, one of whom reasons fallaciously while the other does not, due to differences located elsewhere in their minds that affect the epistemic status of their respective inferences.

I will attempt to demonstrate that it is at least possible for agents to meet either set of conditions, and that in fact some people do meet the Type Two conditions, so agent-relative fallacies are not only possible, but actual.


Recent theorists have tended to deprecate the role of rhetoric in constructing public morality, and have resorted to “privatized” models of morality. This essay outlines weaknesses in the foundational metaphors of that position and offers a theory of the rhetorical crafting of public morality. Morality is described as humanly generated, objectively constrained, and contingent. The theory is illustrated and substantiated by a description of the public moral struggle over moral justice for Afro-Americans.


The pedagogy of virtue has identified certain specific habits of intellect and will which characterize human flourishing. In the intellectual realm, virtue theory traditionally distinguishes between speculative and practical virtues. The speculative virtues are those habits of thought which permit the intellect to pursue truth for its own sake. The practical virtues are those habits of mind which guide the intellect in pursuing knowledge for the sake of action.

In replying to Griffin’s critique, I would like to clarify my conception of the dynamics of assent within the context of critical thinking. I would also like to suggest a recent area in critical-thought literature where some resources for a more affirmative concept of critical inquiry have emerged. This is the resurgence of virtue theory in the description of the noetic agent committed to the process of critical scrutiny.


Background: Medical ethics has recently seen a drive away from multiple prescriptive approaches, where physicians are inundated with guidelines and principles, towards alternative, less deontological perspectives. This represents a clear call for theory building that does not produce more guidelines. Phronesis (practical wisdom) offers an alternative approach for ethical decision-making based on an application of accumulated wisdom gained through previous practice dilemmas and decisions experienced by practitioners. Phronesis, as an ‘executive virtue’, offers a way to navigate the practice virtues for any given case to reach a final decision on the way forward. However, very limited empirical data exist to support the theory of phronesis-based medical decision-making, and what does exist tends to focus on individual practitioners rather than practice-based communities of physicians.

Methods: The primary research question was: What does it mean to medical practitioners to make ethically wise decisions for patients and their communities? A three-year ethnographic study explored the practical wisdom of doctors (n = 131) and used their narratives to develop theoretical understanding of the concepts of ethical decision-making. Data collection included narrative interviews and observations with hospital doctors and General Practitioners at all stages in career progression. The analysis draws on neo-Aristotelian, MacIntyrean concepts of practice-based virtue ethics and was supported by an arts-based film production process. Results: We found that individually doctors conveyed many different practice virtues and those were consolidated into fifteen virtue continua that convey the participants’ ‘collective practical wisdom’, including the phronesis virtue. This study advances the existing theory and practice on phronesis as a decision-making approach due to the availability of these continua.

Conclusion: Given the arguments that doctors feel professionally and personally vulnerable in the context of ethical decision-making, the continua in the form of a video series and app-based moral debating resource can support before, during and after decision-making reflection. The potential implications are that these theoretical findings can be used by educators and practitioners as a non-prescriptive alternative to improve ethical decision-making, thereby addressing the call in the literature, and benefit patients and their communities, as well.

Virtues and Arguments: A Bibliography


Normative theories of argumentation tend to assume that logical and dialectical rules suffice to ensure the rationality of debates. Yet empirical research on human inference shows that people systematically fall prey to cognitive and motivational biases which give rise to various forms of irrational reasoning. Inasmuch as these biases are typically unconscious, arguers can be unfair and tendentious despite their genuine efforts to follow the rules of argumentation. I argue that arguers remain nevertheless responsible for the rationality of their reasoning, insofar as they can (and arguably ought to) counteract such biases by adopting indirect strategies of argumentative self-control.


This paper sought to elucidate the problem of how goals and emotions can influence people’s reasoning in everyday-life debates. By distinguishing between three categories of motivational biases, we were able to show that arguers tend to engage in different forms of fallacious reasoning depending on the type of motive that underlies their tendentiousness. We have examined some plausible connections between certain types of biases and certain types of fallacies, but many other correlations could be found.


This article argues that debiasing techniques meant to reduce biases in argumentation and decision-making are more effective if they rely on environmental constraints, rather than on cognitive improvements. I identify the four main factors that account for the inefficiency of critical thinking with regard to debiasing and claim that extra-psychic strategies are more reliable tools for counteracting biases in contexts of uncertainty. Finally, I examine several examples of debiasing strategies that involve contextual change.


While there is growing consensus over the need to counteract biases in contexts of argumentation and decision-making, researchers disagree over which debiasing techniques are likely to be most effective. I attempt to show that contextual debiasing is more effective than cognitive debiasing in preventing biases, although I challenge the claim that critical thinking is utterly ineffective. In addition, a distinction is introduced between two types of contextual debiasing: situational correction, and dispositional correction. Drawing on empirical work on accountability, I argue that the later type of correction is more likely to prove effective against biases in everyday contexts. Holding arguers accountable is a contextual constraint that has the virtue of also enhancing cognitive skills and virtues.


In this article I argue that most biases in argumentation and decision-making can and should be counteracted. Although biases can prove beneficial in certain contexts, I contend that they are generally maladaptive and need correction. Yet critical thinking alone seems insufficient to mitigate biases in everyday contexts. I develop a contextualist approach, according to which cognitive debiasing strategies need to be supplemented by extrapsychic devices that rely on social and environmental constraints in order to promote rational reasoning. Finally, I examine several examples of contextual debiasing strategies and show how they can contribute to enhance critical thinking at a cognitive level.


The problem I address is: how are cogent inferences possible? In §1 I distinguish three senses in which we say that one is “compelled” by an inference: automatic, seductive-rhetorical and epistemic compulsion. Cogency (in my sense) is epistemic compulsion: a cogent inference compels us to accept its conclusion, if we accept its premises and we aim at truth. In §§2–3 I argue that cogency is intelligible if we consider an inference as a compound linguistic act in which several component acts (assertions and hypotheses) are related to one another by a commitment that the premises support the conclusion. Non-automatic inferences are primarily public acts in an intersubjective context. But cogency arises in special contexts described in §4, epistemic contexts, where the participants care for truth, i.e. are intellectually virtuous. An inference is cogent in an epistemic context if it stands up to all the objections raised in the context. In §5 I consider three different kinds of cogent inferences. In §§6 I argue that in all three cases cogency is fallible and propose a fallibilist variety of inferentialism. In §7 I distinguish context of utterance and contexts of evaluation. Cogency is relative to epistemic contexts of evaluation. However, validity, i.e. stable cogency, is transcontextual.


Is open-mindedness a moral virtue? Surprisingly, this question has not received much attention from philosophers. In this paper, we fill this lacuna by arguing that
there are good grounds for thinking that it is. In particular, we show that the extent account of openmindedness as a moral virtue faces an objection that appears to show that exercising the character trait may not be virtuous. To offset this objection, we argue that a much stronger argument can be made for the case that openmindedness is a moral virtue by appealing to the notion of moral understanding. Specifically, we provide a new rationale as to why we should exercise open-mindedness and offer several arguments to allay the concern that doing so can at times cause us to be in an epistemically and morally weaker position.


A theory of argumentation is an attempt to set forth the *ideal* conditions and standards to be satisfied in normative discourse. A reconstruction of Hsün Tzu’s theory of argumentation is thus an ideal explication. A fairly complete and adequate explication would deal with the following topics: (1) the desirable qualities or attitudes and dispositions of the participants; (2) the standards of competence; (3) phases of discourse; (4) diagnosis of ills that beset the participants and corresponding remedial measures. In this paper, I center my attention on the first two themes, particularly the second. In explication, I have tried to discuss and connect certain basic ideas of Hsün Tzu, and to develop them with a view to their coherence and plausibility. This way of proceeding accords with Hsün Tzu’s frequent emphasis on the importance of unity in ethical discourse (*t'ung*).


Two prominent features of the current educational-theoretical landscape are the mountains of literature on critical thinking and on moral education. Between them lies a fertile wilderness, where the streams fed by those mighty sources vanish in a lush tangle of confusion. Those who sit on the mountains above look across with suspicion, and are hesitant to descend from the security of the high ground and meet each other below in the darkness of a jungle floor where friends and enemies may be hard to distinguish. From the vantage point of these heights it is not easy to detect, through the overgrowth of supposition and forgetting, the paths of previous expeditions and the neglected remnants of their outposts, the bodies of thought once laid out so carefully, lying long since in a vegetative state. Little notice is taken, and not much made, of the fact that the dominant aim of higher education, from its birth in fifth-century Athens onward, was *good judgment* (*phronesis*), which was understood to be a product of both virtue and reason and the consummation of both.


Based on an examination of Josina Makau and Debjan Marty’s *Cooperative Argumentation*, and James Crosswhite’s *The Rhetoric of Reason*, this essay identifies concepts and premises central to a dialogical argumentation theory and argues that that theory may be further developed by concepts and principles from Ivan Boszorményi-Nagy’s contextual theory, a theory based on Martin Buber’s philosophical anthropology. The paper begins by identifying central concepts and premises of the emerging dialogical argumentation theory, develops the resultant model of dialogical argumentation in light of concepts from contextual theory, and concludes with a discussion of the implications of the relational-ethical view of argument for argumentation and rhetorical studies.


Philosophers often seek the truth through methods taught under the banner “Critical thinking”. For most, some variation on this method is used to organize thoughts and filter away subjectivity and biases. Feminist philosophers have highlighted a critical set of shortcomings within such methods that are yet to be fully addressed. In this paper, we explore these critiques and how they can be mitigated by incorporating elements from critical pedagogy and dispositional thinkers. The result is a set of recommendations for improved critical thinking methods which better account for contextualized bias while also more accurately tracking the truth.


The central topic of this brief study is the linguistic-discursive creation of ethos in rhetorical and argumentative texts. In order to understand why ethos plays a fundamental role in those text types it seems necessary to first discuss the very notions of rhetoric and argumentation. The main goal of rhetorical and/or argumentative texts is persuasion. For this reason it also has to be clarified how persuasion works in those text types. After that we will look at the topic of ethos from various points of view: ethos besides pathos and logos as one of the key elements of rhetoric; Aristotle’s classification of the constituents of ethos into phronesis, eunoia, and arête; ethos seen almost as a mask in the Jungian sense; the distinction between ethos as a discursive phenomenon and ethos as a prediscursive phenomenum; the role of topoi and doxa in the construction of ethos and finally the differentiation between rhetorical argumentation and linguistic argumentation, the latter of which being of particular interest for our applied analysis. In that final part we will eventually analyze a few exemplary morphosyntactic structures which in a way create the speaker’s ethical portrait or, to put it differently, which discursively construct the speaker’s ethos. The speeches we will draw upon were delivered by Mussolini between 1921 and 1941.


What is the relevance of ideals for determining virtuous argumentative practices? According to Bailin and Battersby the telos of argumentation is to improve our cognitive systems, and adversariality plays no role in ideally virtuous argumentation. Stevens and Cohen grant
that ideal argumentation is collaborative, but stress that imperfect agents like us should not aim at approximating the ideal of argumentation. Accordingly, it can be virtuous, for imperfect arguers like us, to act as adversaries. Many questions are left unanswered by both camps. First, how do we conceptualize an ideal and its approximation? Second, how can we determine what is the ideal of argumentation? Third, can we extend Stevens and Cohen’s anti-approximation argument beyond virtue theory? In order to respond to these questions, this paper develops a second-best perspective on ideal argumentation. The Theory of the Second Best is a formal contribution to the field of utility (or welfare) optimization. Its main conclusion is that, in non-ideal circumstances, approximating ideals might be suboptimal.


This essay analyzes Senate debate over the nomination of John Ashcroft for Attorney General using Kenneth Burke’s theory of form in an effort to understand how (in)civility is created through the argumentative process. Personal attacks are nearly always rhetorically justified by senators who make them: Senators carefully create and then satisfy an appetite for incivility. This conclusion indicates that the norm of civility constrains floor rhetoric, but that civility needs to be rethought as a rhetorical enactment in relation to multiple audiences, rather than simply as a set of unwritten rules. Such an approach foregrounds audience fragmentations as an influence on Congressional speech and conceptualizes civility as a rhetorical choice made by speakers within the constraints of normative behaviors.


This article offers a theoretical examination of civility within the modern U.S. Senate (USS), grounding the contemporary literature—which conceives of civility as a set of standards for public argument—in the notion of civil society as espoused by Adam Ferguson. Ferguson’s theory of civil society suggests that civility within deliberative bodies should be weighed against other factors, including the antagonistic nature of debate and the morality (in a utilitarian sense) of its participants and outcomes. The essay concludes with examples of how critics might apply this perspective to USS debate to reveal the rhetorical functions of (in)civility.


Adversariality in argumentation is typically theorized as inhering in, and applying to, the interactional roles of proponent and opponent that arguers occupy. This paper considers the kinds of adversariality located in the conversational roles arguers perform while arguing—specifically listening. It begins by contending that the maximally adversarial arguer is an arguer who refuses to listen to reason by refusing to listen to another’s reasons. It proceeds to consider a list of boisterous listeners in order to illustrate the variety of ways that the conversational role of listener can be performed adversarially. Because conversational roles, while not adversarial by nature, can be enacted adversarially, arguers are properly subject to praise and blame for their performances of these roles. Thus, the paper concludes, argumentation theory stands in need of an articulated normative vocabulary and theory to codify, apply, explain, and justify the norms of listening governing, guiding, and appraising arguers’ performances of listening in argumentation.


It is argued that argumentative deliberation, which involves the interpersonal exchange and evaluation of reasons and counter-reasons, is crucial for the generation of epistemic goods given that it helps us eradicate errors and neutralise biases. However, to reap argumentative deliberation’s epistemic benefits, the deliberators seem to need to instantiate a certain intellectual character: in particular, to be intellectually humble and autonomous. Given that, it is argued that the educational system should foster the development of the intellectual virtues of humility and autonomy. Moreover, some pedagogical strategies and practices as to how this can be achieved in the classroom are offered.


I present two types of argument for liberal-democratic virtues, both of which are grounded in the pragmatist thought of Charles Peirce and John Dewey. The first type relies on their substantive teleological accounts of truth and moral flourishing. The second type, however, is based on their account of the general conditions of inquiry and not on any substantive ontology or moral ideal. I argue that, under conditions of liberal pluralism, the latter is more practically viable and morally justifiable. I conclude by applying the general argument for liberal-democratic virtue to the case of civic education and by addressing some objections. The argument from a pragmatist account of inquiry shows the legitimacy of coerced civic education while giving due respect to the plurality of moral traditions among those being coerced.


The Regula Pastoralis of Gregory the Great constructs a model of pastoral authority that stresses the importance of the pastor’s virtuous life to the success of his preaching: not only will his example be the strongest testimony to his belief, but his own understanding of the truth will be clearer if it is not obscured by his refusal to recognize his own vices. In adopting such an epistemology, in which virtue is the ground of knowledge, Gregory is participating in a centuries-long debate about the ultimate locus of authority in Christian discourse: what gives credibility to a claim? Such an epistemology by itself, however, does not provide any mechanism for resolving disagreements. Living in a period when the fragmentation of the Church into a number of national churches was a very real threat,
Gregory created a model of argumentation that could contain controversy. He vested the ultimate authority in the hierarchy of church office, insisting that pride is corrupting and thereby circumscribing the knowledge claims that could be made on the basis of virtue.


This paper employs mixed methods, namely, corpus linguistic and rhetorical analysis methods, to examine Confucius's theory on language, persuasion, and virtue as reflected in the *Analects*. The triangulation of methods allows in-depth analysis of Confucius's use of key concepts surrounding the language–virtue relationship and the way these concepts operate in different levels of persuasion. The study shows Confucius's theory as a virtue-centered rhetoric. For him, virtuous conduct, rather than artful words, should be employed as the primary persuasive tool.


Many French-speaking approaches to argumentation are deeply rooted in a linguistic background. Hence, they "naturally" tend to adopt a descriptive stance on argumentation. This is why the issue of "the virtues of argumentation"—and, specifically, the question of what makes an argument virtuous—is not central to them. The argumentative norms issue nevertheless cannot be discarded, as it obviously is crucial to arguers themselves: the latter often behave as if they were invested with some kind of argumentative policing duty when involved in disensual exchanges. We describe several researches developing a descriptive approach to such ordinary argumentative policing: we claim that the virtues of argumentation may be an issue even for an amoral analyst. We will connect this issue with linguistic remarks on the lexicon of refutation in English and in French.


This paper explores a distinctive form of social interaction—interpersonal inquiry—in which two or more people attempt to understand one another by engaging in conversation. Like many modes of inquiry into human beings, interpersonal inquiry partly shapes its own objects. How we conduct it thus affects who we become. I present an ethical ideal of conversation to which, I argue, at least some of our interpersonal inquiry ought to aspire. I then consider how this ideal might influence philosophical conceptions of the self.


Argumentation virtue theory is a new field in argumentation studies. As in the case of virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, the study of virtue argumentation draws its inspiration from the works of Aristotle. First, I discuss the specifics of the argumentational virtues and suggest that they have an instrumental nature, modeled on the relation between the Aristotelian intellectual virtue of ‘practical wisdom’ and the moral virtues. Then, inspired by Aristotle’s discussion of akanasia, I suggest that a theory of fallacy in argumentation virtue theory can be built upon the concept of ‘incontinence’.


In my paper I aim to present a possible approach to the theory of fallacy specific to virtue argumentation theory. This shall be done employing conceptual pairs as virtue/vice or incontinence, and illustrated by means of Aristotelian practical syllogisms. Based on these considerations I will then focus on two topics: 1. the possibility of a causal relation between incontinence and vice; 2. the difference between sophisms and paralogisms from the perspective of virtue argumentation.


The purpose of the present paper is to sketch the possibility of an audience theory specific to virtue argumentation taking as a starting point what Aristotle has to say about political audiences in the context of specific political constitutions and building on insights offered by the New Rhetoric argumentation theory of Chalm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca and the responsibilist virtue epistemology of Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski.


In response to Lawrence Solum’s advocacy of a ‘virtue-centred theory of judging’, I argue that there is indeed important work to be done in identifying and characterising those qualities of character that constitute judicial virtues—those qualities that a person needs if she is to judge well (though I criticise Solum’s account of one of the five pairs of judicial vices and virtues that he identifies—avarice and temperance). However, Solum’s more ambitious claims—that a judge’s vice necessarily corrupts her decisions, and that in at least some contexts we must define a legally correct decision as one that would be reached by a virtuous judge—should be rejected: we can undermine the former by attending to the requirements of due process, and the latter by attending to the ways in which a judge would try to justify her decision.


Online at [http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2012/03/16/essay-value-first-year-writing-courses](http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2012/03/16/essay-value-first-year-writing-courses)

The Rush Limbaugh debate and other examples of political incivility point to the need for the kind of instruction offered in many first-year writing courses, writes John Duffy.


In this paper, I will argue that to teach writing is by definition to teach ethics; more specifically it is to teach what I will call "ethical dispositions," or the communicative practices of honesty, accountability, compassion, intellectual courage, and others. I will propose that the teaching of writing is “always and already” the teaching of ethics, and that in the discourse of ethical dispositions we are offered a language through which we may tell the story of our discipline and effectively intervene in the conduct of public argument. I will conclude by suggesting that an engagement with what I am calling "ethical dispositions" may help us rediscover
and perhaps recover an older, richer, more fully realized tradition of ethics that we have forgotten or purposefully discarded.


> What does it mean to teach ethical discourse? How can we help students develop ethical habits of speech and writing? In the very brief time we have today, I’d like to consider toward that end three concepts, three ways of thinking about pedagogy of rhetorical ethics. And these concepts are *situation, exemplar, and dissensus,* or pronounced disagreement within groups of people.


> Whether or not the concept of virtue will find a place in Writing Studies remains to be seen. I have tried to suggest that it provides a language for thinking about the ethics of rhetorical practice, and that it may offer us a way out of the bind alleys of our current dysfunctional discourse. But I think it finally does more than that. In the tradition of the virtues we find, or so it seems to me, the very telos or purpose of our work as teachers and scholars of writing: why do we do what we do. Why do we care so deeply about the teaching of writing? Toward what ends do we work? What visions move and animate us?


> I will attempt in this essay to address the following:

* What is “virtue”? “Virtue ethics”? What do we understand these terms to mean? How do we derive from these terms the construct of “rhetorical virtues”? * Why virtue ethics for writing studies, and why now? What reasons—political, cultural, and rhetorical—suggest a disciplinary reconsideration of the virtues? * Finally, what might a commitment to rhetorical virtues mean in the writing classroom? How might it shape teachers’ and students’ understandings of what it means to be a “good writer”?


> When to be tolerant or intolerant, how to justify the decisions one makes, how to express these judgments in speech and writing, and finally what it means to be a tolerant speaker and writer in the intolerant rhetorical climate of the contemporary U.S.—these are among the lessons we teach each day, in different ways, in our rhetoric and writing courses. In teaching such lessons, we have the opportunity to make explicit, for our students and ourselves, the language of the impossible virtue of tolerance.


> In *Provocations of Virtue,* John Duffy explores the indispensable role of writing teachers and scholars in countering the polarized, venomous “post-truth” character of contemporary public argument. Teachers of writing are uniquely positioned to address the crisis of public discourse because their work in the writing classroom is tied to the teaching of ethical language practices that are known to moral philosophers as “the virtues”—truthfulness, accountability, open-mindedness, generosity, and intellectual courage.

> Drawing upon Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and the branch of philosophical inquiry known as “virtue ethics,” *Provocations of Virtue* calls for the reclamation of “rhetorical virtues” as a core function in the writing classroom. Duffy considers what these virtues actually are, how they might be taught, and whether they can prepare students to begin repairing the broken state of public argument. In the discourse of the virtues, teachers and scholars of writing are offered a common language and a shared narrative—a story that speaks to the inherent purpose of the writing class and to what is at stake in teaching writing in the twenty-first century. This book is a timely and historically significant contribution to the field and will be of major interest to scholars and administrators in writing studies, rhetoric, composition, and linguistics as well as philosophers and those exploring ethics.

[244] **Matthew Duncombe.** Is the elenchus an example of virtuous adversariality?, 2017. Presented at Ninth European Congress of Analytic Philosophy (ECAFP9), LMU Munich.


> Most theorists agree that the ability to think critically is distinct from the disposition to do so. Many of us may have the ability to be critical thinkers, but unless we are consistently and internally motivated to think and reason this way, these abilities are effectively redundant. Such dispositions are both intellectual character traits, and dispositions to behave in certain ways. As such, the first step to understanding critical thinking requires us to develop an operationalized taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions. To avoid explicating these dispositions in *abstracto,* this article draws upon a murder trial in order to demonstrate the central role dispositions play in critical thinking.


> This dissertation seeks to cultivate a deeper conceptual understanding of critical thinking within the philosophy of education tradition. For until such time as theorists understand what critical thinking is, including, how it works, educators will remain unclear as to what sort of educational accomplishments are required if one is to be rightly considered a critical thinker, and what means are likely to be successful in teaching people to think critically. Within this context, the dissertation argues for a neo-Aristotelian conceptualization of critical thought based on Harvey Siegel’s (1988, p.23) “reasons-assessment” criteria. Here I argue for the importance of critical thought embodying the prototypical *phronimos,* where habituated deliberative excellence accurately determines undefeated or decisive reasons for normatively-calibrated actions in the practical domain. This judgment (proairesis) is based on stress-testing the strength of normatively-calibrated reasons supporting a given course of action. Drawing on theorists such as, Dunne (1993), Paul & Elder (2002; 2005; 2007; 2009), and Siegel (1988; 1997; 2017), I proffer a new conceptual explication of criticality, one which integrates phronetic deliberation and judgment with a deep sensitivity and responsiveness to the probative force of reasons-normativity in accurately determining...
undisputed reasons for “knowing what one should do” in the practical domain (Anscombe, 1957, p13).

[247] RORY DUTHIE. Mining ethos in parliamentary debate. Ph.D. thesis, University of Dundee, 2020. In summary, this research has described novel advances in the new sub-field of argument mining, ethos mining, contributing: (i) manual corpora of ethos supports and attacks; (ii) the automatic classification of ethos supports and attacks; (iii) the creation of deep learning methods (DMRNN) in text classification for extracting ethos; (iv) manually annotated corpora containing ethos types; (v) the development of an NLP pipeline for classifying ethos types; and (vi) a set of ethos analytics. These advances are widely applicable to various domains not only as a tool to gauge political opinion, but to extract public opinion from various sources of natural language. Social media discussions or public deliberation can be used to build profiles of individuals over large time periods from the natural language and identify individuals or groups at the centre of popular (or unpopular) opinion.


Endorsing the character of allies and destroying credibility of opponents is a powerful tactic for persuading others, impacting how we see politicians and how we vote in elections, for example. Our previous work demonstrated that ethos supports and attacks use different language, we hypothesise that further distinctions should be made in order to better understand and implement ethotic strategies which people use in real-life communication. In this paper, we use the Aristotelian concept of elements of ethos: practical wisdom, moral virtue and goodwill, to determine specific grounds on which speakers can be endorsed and criticised. We propose a classification of types of ethos supports and attacks which is empirically derived from our corpus. The manual classification obtains a reliable Cohen’s kappa \( \kappa = 0.52 \) and weighted \( \kappa = 0.7 \). Finally, we develop a pipeline to classify ethos supports and attacks into their types depending on whether endorsement or criticism is grounded in wisdom, virtue or goodwill. The automatic classification obtains a solid improvement of macro-averaged F1-score over the baseline of 10%, 25%, 9% for one vs all classification, and 16%, 18%, 10% for pairwise classification.


Despite the fact it has been recognised since Aristotle that ethos and credibility play a critical role in many types of communication, these facts are rarely studied in linguistically oriented AI which has enjoyed such success in processing complex features as sentiment, opinion, and most recently arguments. This paper shows how a text analysis pipeline of structural and statistical approaches to natural language processing (NLP) can be deployed to tackle ethos by mining linguistic resources from the political domain. We summarise a coding scheme for annotating ethotic expressions; present the first openly available corpus to support further, comparative research in the area; and report results from a system for automatically recognising the presence and polarity of ethotic expressions. Finally, we hypothesise that in the political sphere, ethos analytics – including recognising who trusts whom and who is attacking whose reputation – might act as a powerful toolset for understanding and even anticipating the dynamics of governments. By exploring several examples of correspondence between ethos analytics in political discourse and major events and dynamics in the political landscape, we uncover tantalising evidence in support of this hypothesis.


In my talk, I will develop a model for philosophical inquiry that I call ‘virtuous adversariality’, which is meant to be a response to critics from both sides [those who criticize and those who endorse adversariality in philosophy]. Its key feature is the idea that a certain form of adversariality, more specifically disagreement and debate, is indeed at the heart of philosophy, but that philosophical inquiry also has a strong cooperative, virtuous component which regulates and constrains the adversarial component. The main inspiration for this model comes from ancient Greek dialectic.

[251] CATARINA DUTILH NOVAES. Metaphors for argumentation, 2017. Presented at Ninth European Congress of Analytic Philosophy (ECAP9), LMU Munich. Argumentation is very often conceived as a form of battle; as the title of an influential piece by D. Cohen (1996) summarizes, ‘Argument is war... and war is hell!’ This conceptualization of argumentation, while still widely held, has also been forcefully criticized in particular by feminist writers. But if argumentation is not war, what is it then? In this talk, I explore alternative metaphors/conceptualizations for argumentation, as well as their implications for philosophical practice. I discuss in particular the well-known argumentation-as-therapy metaphor, and a novel argumentation-as-social-exchange metaphor, which I am currently developing.


Argumentation is important for sharing knowledge and information. Given that the receiver of an argument purportedly engages first and foremost with its content, one might expect trust to play a negligible epistemic role, as opposed to its crucial role in testimony. I argue on the contrary that trust plays a fundamental role in argumentative engagement. I present a realistic social epistemological account of argumentation inspired by social exchange theory. Here, argumentation is a form of epistemic exchange. I illustrate my argument with two real-life examples: vaccination hesitancy, and the undermining of the credibility of traditional sources of information by authoritarian politicians.
Since at least the 1980s, the role of adversariality in argumentation has been extensively discussed within different domains. Prima facie, there seem to be two extreme positions on this issue: argumentation should (ideally at least) never be adversarial, as we should always aim for cooperative argumentative engagement; argumentation should be and in fact is always adversarial, given that adversariality (when suitably conceptualized) is an intrinsic property of argumentation. I here defend the view that specific instances of argumentation are (and should be) adversarial or cooperative to different degrees. What determines whether an argumentative situation should be primarily adversarial or primarily cooperative are contextual features and background conditions external to the argumentative situation itself, in particular the extent to which the parties involved have prior conflicting or else convergent interests. To further develop this claim, I consider three teloi that are frequently associated with argumentation: the epistemic telos, the consensus-building telos, and the conflict management telos. I start with a brief discussion of the concepts of adversariality, cooperation, and conflict in general. I then sketch the main lines of the debates in the recent literature on adversariality in argumentation. Next, I discuss the three teloi of argumentation listed above in turn, emphasizing the roles of adversariality and cooperation for each of them.

In this essay, I argue that we cannot adequately characterize the aims of education in terms of narrowly intellectual virtues or some formal conception of what it is to think well. Implementing any such aim requires us to rely on, and to communicate, further substantive normative commitments. To put my point another way, there is no adequate ideal of being a good thinker divorced from the content of what such a person thinks or the commitments that she has.

Can arguments change minds? Philosophers like to think that they can: by engaging in the (presumably rational) process of carefully considering reasons in favor or against a given position or view, we should update our beliefs accordingly. However, a wealth of empirical evidence seems to suggest that arguments are in fact not very efficient tools to change minds. What to make of these radically different assessments of the mind-changing potential of arguments? To address this issue, it seems that we need to look beyond the content and quality of arguments alone: we must also take into account the broader contexts in which they occur, in particular the propagation of messages across attention networks, and the choices that epistemic agents must make between alternative potential sources of content and information. These choices are very much influenced by perceptions of reliability and trustworthiness, which means that the source of the argument may be even more decisive than its content or quality when it comes to how persuasive it will be for a given person. In a nutshell: arguments may well be able to change minds, but only under conducive, favorable socio-epistemic conditions. In this paper, I deploy a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange that I’ve been developing over the past years to (hopefully) shed light on the mechanisms involved in these processes, and on the conditions under which arguments can change minds.

In the spirit of virtue ethics, this paper uses the primary defense brief in the consolidated cases known as Furman v. Georgia as an example of how good advocacy can help a lawyer practice virtue, particularly in what may be the most difficult brief-writing dilemma of all: dealing with bad facts.

The article discusses relationships and contexts for “reason”, “knowledge”, and virtue in Aristotle, based on and elaborating some results from Eikeland (2008). It positions Eikeland (2008) in relation to Moss (2011, 2012, 2014) but with a side view to Cammack (2013), Kristjansson (2014), and Taylor (2016). These all seem to disagree among themselves but still agree partly in different ways with Eikeland. The text focuses on two questions: 1) the role or tasks of “reason”, “knowledge”, and “virtue” respectively in setting the end or goal for ethical deliberation, and more generally, 2) the role of dialogue or dialectics in Aristotle’s philosophy, including its role concerning question one. The author argues that phronësis needs to be interpreted in the context of the totality of Aristotle’s philosophy, and explains how this totality is fundamentally dialectical.

Beginning in his PhD program, and over a period of years in the 1960s, Richard Paul thoughtfully examined and deliberately critiqued existing theories of logic and reasoning. This laid the foundation for what was to become a long and splendid career of scholarship, culminating in the reconstruction and enrichment of the theory of logic, of reasoning, and of critical reasoning. Paul took what was a very narrow conception of reasoning (still used widely among philosophers today), and broadened it to more accurately represent what in fact happens in human thinking when people reason. He captured the idea of universal intellectual standards by exploring standards typically used for disagreement among themselves but still agree partly in different ways with Eikeland. The text focuses on two questions: 1) the role or tasks of “reason”, “knowledge”, and “virtue” respectively in setting the end or goal for ethical deliberation, and more generally, 2) the role of dialogue or dialectics in Aristotle’s philosophy, including its role concerning question one. The author argues that phronësis needs to be interpreted in the context of the totality of Aristotle’s philosophy, and explains how this totality is fundamentally dialectical.

In this essay, I argue that we cannot adequately characterize the aims of education in terms of narrowly intellectual virtues or some formal conception of what it is to think well. Implementing any such aim requires us to rely on, and to communicate, further substantive normative commitments. To put my point another way, there is no adequate ideal of being a good thinker divorced from the content of what such a person thinks or the commitments that she has.


by skilled reasoners, and then assembling these standards into a constellation of ideas easily understandable by scholars attempting to reason at the highest levels within their fields, as well as by everyday persons. Recognizing the importance of placing ethics at the heart of a substantive conception of critical thinking, Paul cultivated and extensively developed the theory of intellectual virtues; early on Paul distinguished between what he termed strong sense (or ethical) critical thinking and weak sense (or unethical) critical thinking, and staunchly advocated for fostering critical thinking in the strong sense— in education and throughout society. Paul realized that, without intervention in egocentric and sociocentric tendencies, the mind was likely to miss pathologies in thinking. He revolutionized our conceptions of reasoning, of critical reasoning and of logic, and called into question both historical and contemporary conceptions of philosophy itself. Paul made it clear that neither metaphysics, nor formal logic, nor mathematical reasoning, nor informal logic, nor argumentation, nor any other individual subject could ever adequately guide the human mind through the myriad complexities it faces in dealing with the difficult problems of real life. Following the tradition of Socrates, Paul continually emphasized the importance of developing deep conceptual understandings based in foundational ideas and principles of analysis and critique and tested through the real living of one’s life. Paul’s work laid the groundwork for what may be termed first principles in critical thinking and for a legitimate field of critical thinking studies, a field which has yet to emerge due to a number of complex academic, social, and political barriers.


[261] Robert H. Ennis. Critical thinking dispositions: Their nature and assessability. Informal Logic, 18(2–3):165–182, 1996. Assuming that critical thinking dispositions are at least as important as critical thinking abilities, Ennis examines the concept of critical thinking disposition and suggests some criteria for judging sets of them. He considers a leading approach to their analysis and offers as an alternative a simpler set, including the disposition to seek alternatives and be open to them. After examining some gender-bias and subject-specificity challenges to promoting critical thinking dispositions, he notes some difficulties involved in assessing critical thinking dispositions, and suggests an exploratory attempt to assess them.

[262] Robert H. Ennis. Commentary on: Ian Goldberg, Justine Kingsbury and Tracy Bowell’s “Measuring critical thinking about deeply held beliefs”. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014. The authors, all critical thinking teachers, have presented the results of a comparison of five possible ways to measure critical thinking, the fifth of which served as the criterion variable for judging the others. The ultimate goal is to have a valid critical thinking test to check the effectiveness of different approaches to teaching critical thinking.

[263] Peter A. Facione. The disposition toward critical thinking: Its character, measurement, and relationship to critical thinking skill. Informal Logic, 20(1):61–84, 2000. Theorists have hypothesized that skill in critical thinking is positively correlated with the consistent internal motivation to think and that specific critical thinking skills are matched with specific critical thinking dispositions. If true, these assumptions suggest that a skill-focused curriculum would lead persons to be both willing and able to think. This essay presents a research-based expert consensus definition of critical thinking, argues that human dispositions are neither hidden nor unknowable, describes a scientific process of developing conventional testing tools to measure cognitive skills and human dispositions, and summarizes recent empirical research findings that explore the possible relationship of critical thinking skill and the consistent internal motivation, or disposition, to use that skill. Empirical studies indicate that for all practical purposes the hypothesized correlations are not evident. It would appear that effective teaching must include strategies for building intellectual character rather than relying exclusively on strengthening cognitive skills.

[264] Peter A. Facione & Noreen C. Facione. Critical thinking for life: Valuing, measuring, and training critical thinking in all its forms. Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 28(1):5–25, 2013. This essay describes the questions which shaped and continue to fuel Peter and Noreen Facione’s passionate involvement with critical thinking, its definition, measurement, training, and practical application to everyday decisions, big and small. In reflecting on their work they say “we have identified three groups of questions: those vexing, recurring questions that motivate us to explore critical thinking, those scholarly questions around which we organized our empirical and conceptual research, and those urgent practical questions which demand the development of applications and assessment solutions. We conclude with two recommendations for the consideration of all those who value fair-minded, well-reasoned, reflective decision making.”


[266] Fran Fairhaur. Injustice in the spaces between concepts. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 58(1):102–136, 2020. I argue that epistemic injustice manifests not only in the content of our concepts, but in the spaces between them. Others have shown that epistemic injustice arises in the form of “testimonial injustice,” where an agent is harmed because her credibility is undervalued, and “hermeneutical injustice,” where an agent is harmed because some community lacks the conceptual resources that would allow her to render her experience intelligible. I think that epistemic injustice also arises as a result of prejudiced and harmful defects in the inferential architecture of both scientific practice and everyday thinking. Drawing on lessons from the philosophy...
of science, I argue that the inferential architecture of our epistemic practices can be prejudiced and wrongful, leading to a variety of epistemic injustice that I am calling “inferential injustice.” This type of injustice is fully structural; it inheres in our epistemic practices themselves rather than as a direct result of an individual’s action. For this reason, cases of inferential injustice are importantly different from extant cases of epistemic injustice and are especially hard to track. We need a better understanding of inferential injustice so that we can avoid and ameliorate cases such as the ones I present here.


In this article, we look at the ways judges, advocates, and scholars employ the “disrespectful” rhetorical strategies of advocacy. After sketching some background theory on role-differentiated morality and the ethics of advocacy in Part I, we describe in Part IB some features of legal rhetoric that seem to offend universalist notions of morality—e.g., abuse of classical rhetoric’s strategies of logos, ethos, and pathos, as exhibited in ipse dixit argument, misuse of precedent, use of “false implicature” to mislead, arguing what one does not believe, misreading opposing views, and belittling those who hold such views. In Part II, we examine a microcosm of legal rhetoric—the judicial, advocacy, and scholarly prose that has been engendered by one issue in criminal procedure. Finally we examine the possible moral, institutional, and practical justifications for the law’s disrespectful rhetoric and consider whether a radical change in language behavior is, realistic or not, the only solution consistent with the duty of respect. We conclude that the negative potential of the law’s rhetoric of disrespect is troubling enough to require radical change. The deceit, insincerity, hyperbole, and scorn that characterize much legal rhetoric are especially problematic because of the law’s rhetoricty—the law is in large part affirmation and declamation. Thus, if the law’s dishonest and disrespectful rhetoric causes it to fall into disrepute, it has no other practice with which to redeem itself. Moreover, the rhetorical excesses of judges are especially dangerous, because judicial rhetoric is consequential—disposing of life, liberty, property, and reputation—and almost always immutable. Dissenters and commentators may expose the weak arguments and mean spirits of a judicial opinion, but short of reversal the court’s words will not only stand but resonate in future controversies.


This essay reintroduces Rhetoric as the principle art for giving emphasis and importance to contested matters; in other words, for making things matter. In a speculative reading of the Aristotelian rhetorical tradition, Aristotle’s interpretations of magnitude, contingency and practical wisdom are critically examined from both an aesthetic and an ethical–political point of view. The concluding discussion attempts to apply these same concepts to a growing dilemma in the present age. The dilemma is that monumental changes in scale have all but eroded the prospects for engaged encounters with contemporary contingency. It remains the challenge of rhetorical practice to reframe actions and events so that they and we may hold some hope for an engaged civic life.


Integrating insights from the Ancient Greeks (e.g. concerning virtue, eudaimonia, and the original meaning of “democracy”), John Dewey, and recent work in virtue epistemology, this chapter develops a virtue-based defense of democracy, one that conceives of democracy as an inquiry-based mode of social existence. This account of democracy is developed by responding to three common concerns raised against democracy, which the author calls the Irrationality Problem, the Problem of Autonomy, and the Epistocracy Objection. Virtue epistemology can help elucidate the link between democracy and human flourishing by drawing attention to democracy’s potential for cultivating and refining the “intellectual virtues” (e.g. intellectual humility, fairness in evaluating the arguments of others, the social virtue of being communicative, etc.) constitutive of the good life.


Technocratic lawyering may indeed dull sentimental responsiveness, impairing to some degree the capacity for robust, authentic ethical deliberation. Yet at the same time technocratic lawyering requires genuine lawyerly virtues, traits useful to an attorney performing her function. These include dedication (to both client and task), cleverness and creativity. All lawyers should strive for these virtues. The moral-philosophical question that remains is their compatibility with the virtues of a good ethical deliberator, such as a sense of personal responsibility for one’s ethical choices, the ability to recognize genuine ethical dilemmas and, perhaps most importantly, the disposition to respond to ethically difficult situations with appropriate sentiments. Honor- able lawyering is possible only if an attorney can possess and exercise both technocratic and ethical virtues in combination. We do not know the different mixtures psychologically available, either to lawyers in general or to any particular attorney. At worst, further investigation might reveal that most or even all lawyers cannot possess both technocratic and ethical virtues or cannot exercise them simultaneously in their professional practice. More likely, we will discover some measure of tradeoff between the cultivation and exercise of technocratic virtues and ethical ones. If so, we should turn our attention to minimizing this measure. Certainly, various aspects of legal education and current law practice influence which virtues lawyers have and employ. In this Article, I have identified one variable in the cultivation and exercise of lawyerly virtues: black letter ethics codes, which are quite likely to stimulate technocratic virtues at the expense of ethical ones, thereby reducing lawyers’ chances of being good ethical deliberators.

Epistemologists have long worried that the willingness of open-minded people to reconsider their beliefs in light of new evidence is both a condition of improving their beliefs and a risk factor for losing their grip on what they already know. In this article, Matt Ferkany introduces and attempts to resolve a moral variation of this puzzle: a willingness to engage people whose moral ideas are strange or repugnant (to us) looks like both a condition of broadening our moral horizons, and a risk factor for doing the wrong thing or becoming bad. Ferkany pursues a contractualist line of argument according to which such hazardous engagement is a virtue only when it matters to our interlocutors whether they can justify themselves to us on terms we can accept—for our sake or for the sake of their own virtue, not instrumentally or to get something out of us. When it does not so matter, openness can be unintelligent or gullible—in other words, not virtuous.


In Aristotelian virtue theories, phronesis is foundational to being good, but to date accounts of how this particularly important virtue can emerge are sketchy. This article plumbs recent thinking in Aristotelian virtue ethics and developmental theorizing to explore how far its emergence can be understood developmentally, i.e., in terms of the growth in ordinary conditions of underlying psychological capacities, dispositions, and the like. The purpose is not to explicate Aristotle, nor to assimilate Aristotelian ideas to cognitive developmental moral theorizing, but to draw on both to build an independently plausible theory of practical intelligence and its development. It is argued that one fruitful direction attends to the psychology of virtues Aristotle associates with practical intelligence, including comprehension, understanding, sense, and cleverness, instead of Aristotle’s remarks distinguishing fully virtuous persons from the continent, incontinent and the many.


How should we talk to Angry Uncle, or attempt to persuade any very ignorant audience? This paper discusses several strategies, including fact dumping, consistency checking, pandering, and just being friendly. It defends the continued value of fact dumping and consistency checking despite skeptical doubts rooted in recent cognitive science literature about their strategic efficacy. Pandering and friendliness often fail to confront our audience with epistemic resistance and so face serious limitations as means of responding to ignorance. Any reasonable view of how to talk to Angry Uncles must also consider how to meet relevant moral standards, such as showing respect for ourselves, our audience, and important social causes. Without some fact dumping and consistency checking, pandering and friendliness often fail to meet these standards. All in all, the various modes work best together, and it would be a mistake to conclude from unfavorable cognitive science research that we should avoid fact dumping and consistency checking in Angry Uncle exchanges.


How is intellectual virtue related to critical thinking? Can one be a critical thinker without exercising intellectual virtue? Can one be intellectually virtuous without thereby being a critical thinker? How should our answers to these questions inform the instruction of critical thinking? These were the questions informing the 2023 Charles McCracken endowed lectureships given at Michigan State University by Professors Harvey Siegel and Jason Baehr. This brief commentary introduces their respective papers, which appear in the current issue of *Informal Logic*.


Andrew Aberdein recently explored whether Aristotle held a (proto-)virtue argumentation theory, which would evaluate a good argument in terms of whether the arguers engaged virtuously. Aberdein admits, however, that connections between virtue, character, and argumentation are scarce within Aristotle’s works. Accordingly, here Cassie Finley approaches this question from a different angle, comparing Aristotle’s concepts of dialectic and rhetoric with virtue theories of argumentation. She argues that the essential features of dialectic and rhetoric are in tension with the defining characteristics of virtue argumentation theories. However, this tension raises a deeper methodological tension within virtue argumentation theories regarding their “intuitive” conception of arguments. Finley outlines a more viable route forward for virtue argumentation theorists, one that dissolves this tension through reframing their project as a virtue dialogue theory. This shift toward dialogue would help to assuage the main objections to virtue argumentation theories regarding adversariality, incompleteness, and vulnerability to ad hominem. At the same time, developing toward a virtue dialogue theory better aligns with the intuitive sense of engaging well with others that defines the virtue argumentation project, and it also more fruitfully sets up the project to encourage future scholarship connecting virtue ethics, virtue epistemology, and philosophy of education.


In this paper, I explore connections between two disciplines not typically linked: argumentation theory and urban design. I first trace historical ties between the art of reasoned discourse and the idea of civic virtue. I next analyze discourse norms implicit in three theories of urban design: Jane Jacobs’ *The Death and Life of Urban Design*.
of Great American Cities (1961), Christopher Alexander’s A Pattern Language: Towns, Buildings, Construction (1977), and Peter Katz’s The New Urbanism: Toward an Architecture of Community (1994). I then propose a set of ‘settlement’ issues of potential interest to both urban designers and argumentation theorists: size, density, heterogeneity, publicity, security, and identity. I conclude by suggesting that the ‘good city’ be seen as both a spatial and a discursive entity. From such a perspective, good public discourse is dependent, at least in part, on good public space; and good public space is defined, at least in part, as a context conducive to good public discourse.


Democratic education requires people who desire to practice civility, mutual respect, and reasoned debate; it requires people who are motivated to recognize the integrity of views they do not accept. According to the account I have provided here, one cannot sustain such practices without having been shaped by the right kinds of dispositions. Humility is just such a disposition, and for this reason we should include it within democratic education’s catalogue of virtues. In short, we should consider humility a deliberative virtue. Of course, a person might be reluctant to embrace the theological commitments that accompany traditional accounts of humility. And while my defense of humility does not require her to accept those commitments, her allegiance to democratic education may be measured by whether she is willing to consider and evaluate their alleged truth. At the very least, she should recognize that humility—a virtue on which the success of our deliberative practices depends—is tied to and bequeathed by the Christian tradition.


Aristotle recognized that presentations of good character need not aim at working an emotional effect. They may be intended to establish the credibility of the speaker and so to meet the demands of soberminded auditors. Aristotle, therefore, created a third mode of persuasion which he labeled ‘persuasion through character’ and placed alongside argumentational and emotional appeal.


In his work on rhetoric—his Τέχνη ρήτορική—Aristotle established the framework with which many of us, perhaps most of us, still approach the subject. In particular, the Stagirite recognized three modes of persuasion: namely, through the character of the orator, through the emotions of the hearers and through the arguments of the speech. In addition, he marked off style from delivery and distinguished all of the foregoing from arrangement conceived of as the parts of an oration. His discussion of the three modes of persuasion takes place in the first two books; and his remarks on delivery, style and the parts of an oration are found in the third book. None of that is news. Nor is the fact that Aristotle’s treatment of persuasion presupposes some fundamental advances in logic and philosophical psychology. The development of a formal dialectic underlies the account of rhetorical argumentation, and clarifying the relationship between thought and emotion is basic to the account of persuasion through the hearers. Less clear, however, is the thinking that stands behind Aristotle’s discussion of persuasion through character. That is not to say that the subject has been passed over in the scholarly literature. In fact, it has recently received considerable attention, and advances have been made. But there is, I think, room for further study; and in my own case, it may be time to collect scattered remarks and to attempt a comprehensive analysis.


With this paper, we aim to present what has been developed so far in the field of argumentation and education in South America to the best of our knowledge. However, we also aim to anticipate new trends that will arise from the challenges South American democracies face right now, and the role of collective reasoned discussion in tackling them. Traditionally argumentation studies have been proposed within three broad areas of research and practice. First, argue to learn, as the uses of argumentation practices to develop conceptual knowledge in different domains of education. Second, learn to argue by promoting argumentative practices to develop argumentative and thinking skills. Third, teacher professional development enables teachers to enact argumentation in their classrooms. From this scenario, we argue that three interrelated branches of research are the future ahead of us: studies of argumentation and citizen education using deliberative practices, cultivating virtuous intellectual habits, and the rise of deliberative teaching focused on collaborative settings designed to empower democratic values (diversity, equality, and participation). We conclude by stating that South America has helped the advancement of argumentation theory, but we still have a road ahead in developing more spaces for democratic participation.


Critical thinking is not just private pondering, nimble mental gymnastics, or a braid set of teachable skills. Yet some critical thinking texts describe skills of logical deduction, inference, and argument as if thinking were something other than an activity which real people do together. The Ethical Practice of Critical Thinking explores the ethical questions it poses: When we learn and uphold worthy standards of thinking, how does this also help us to sustain discussion? How is upholding personal dignity and respecting one another interwoven with thinking at our very best about issues which matter for us? How can we begin, develop, and sustain a meeting, group, or organization as a place worthy of our best thinking and our best ethical skills? We collaborate in critical thinking by taking each other’s
thinking seriously. That means that we listen objectively, we dig and research with curiosity, and we argue with care. But we care more about how we treat each other than our arguments. This allows us to think and work our way through conflicts so that our community of discourse becomes stronger instead of falling apart. Open this door to ethical relationships, and we can ask some new questions of critical thinking: Are fallacies just blameless mistakes in reasoning or should we be morally ashamed of them at times? Is mathematical reasoning above and beyond ethics or is critical thinking with numbers just as soaked with ethical implications as the ways in which we argue with words? Finally, in a media culture which churns words, numbers, and, of course, images into a mundane, hectic, distracting, and ultimately stupefying torrent of information, how can critical thinkers not only survive but thrive together to think hard and keep thinking?


Virtue approaches to communication ethics have experienced a resurgence over the last decades. Tied to rhetoric since the time of Aristotle, virtue ethics offers scholars in the broad field of communication an approach to ethics based on character and human flourishing as an alternative to deontology. In each major branch of communication scholarship, the turn to virtue ethics has followed a distinctive trajectory in response to concerns about the adequacy of theoretical foundations for academic and applied work in communication ethics. Recent approaches to journalism and media ethics integrate moral psychology and virtue ethics to focus on moral exemplars, drawing on the work of Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse, or explore journalism as a MacIntyrean tradition of practice. Recent work in human communication ethics draws on MacIntyre’s approach to narrative, situating communication ethics within virtue structures that protect and promote particular goods in a moment of narrative and virtue contention.


I shall discuss legal argument in terms of how in making arguments the speaker or writer “show[s] himself to be of a certain character” and seeks to have his listeners (or readers) identify with that kind of character. When we advance arguments, we say “be like me” (or, at least, be like the character I am presenting myself to be in this argument). When we respond, “yes, that’s what I think” after listening to another’s arguments, we expose and foster an aspect of our own character, advancing a conception of who we consider ourselves to be. Arguments soothe, nurture, move people toward a conception of themselves. They also offend, disturb or repel us. In both these ways, they help create the character of those who respond to them. People often say that arguments appeal to values, but values are not “things” people “have” on which they “base” their decisions. Values are defined, modified, rejected, nurtured, suppressed and clarified in the process of forming one’s character.


Joan McGregor argues that “colleges and universities should adopt as part of their core mission the development of skills of civil discourse” rather than engaging in the practice of restricting controversial speakers from making presentations on campuses. I agree with McGregor concerning the need for increased civil discourse. However, this does not mean universities should welcome speakers to publicly present any material they wish without restriction or oversight. In this paper, I make three main arguments: (i) Colleges and universities have a duty to protect members of the campus community from the harm and exclusion resulting from hateful or harmful speech, in the same way that they must protect them from sexual assaults and consumptions. (ii) In the vast majority of cases, this duty can be fulfilled by holding speakers to standards of discourse that prevail in academic debate, and insisting on a number of procedural requirements. (iii) We should be wary of conservative arguments framed in terms of free speech, because they can be deployed to undermine important functions of the university in a democratic society, namely, to teach students how to be discerning citizens, and to protect thinkers willing to be critical of the government and the ruling classes.


This dissertation theorizes Bad Faith Rhetorics, or rhetorical gestures that work to derail, block, or otherwise stymy knowledge-building efforts. This work explores the ways that interventions against existing social hierarchies (i.e., feminist and antiracist interventions) build knowledge (that is, are epistemologically active), and the ways that bad faith rhetorics derail such interventions. This dissertation demonstrates how bad faith rhetorics function to defend the status quo, with its social stratification by race, gender, class, and other intersectional axes of identity. Bad faith argumentative maneuvers are abundant in online environments. Consequently, this dissertation offers two case studies of the comment sections of two TED Talks: Melody Hobson’s “Color Blind or Color Brave?” and Juno Mac’s “The Laws that Sex Workers Really Want.” The central analyses deploy online ethnographic field methods and close reading to characterize bad faith rhetorical responses and to identify 1) trends in such responses, 2) the net effects on other conversational participants, and 3) bad faith rhetoric mitigation strategies. This work engages Sartre’s work on Bad Faith, rhetoric scholarship on the knowledge-building affordances of argument, public sphere theory, critical race studies, and feminist scholarship. This dissertation’s theorization and case studies illustrate the pitfalls of specific counterproductive argumentative tactics that block progress toward more equitable ways of being (bad faith rhetorics), and makes several preliminary recommendations for mitigating such moves.

This essay presents a theory of rhetorical decay, a rhetorical state that results from argumentative gestures that “derail” and suppress productive discourse (i.e., exchanges that produce new understandings, consensus, or “legitimate disensus” between members of a public). Reviewing works from critical race studies, rhetorical criticism, and feminist rhetorical studies, the author identifies several individual preexisting concepts that can be classified as individual rhetorical decay—fostering practices. However, a gap remains in theorizing the larger category and understanding the outcomes of such rhetorics; this essay intervenes in this space by creating the metatheory of rhetorical decay, characterizing the family of gestures, examining affiliate concepts, providing an example of rhetorical decay in a contemporary public argument (over lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender marriage), and identifying precedents for mitigating such practices.


In its recent attention to reasoning that is agent-based and target-driven, logic has re-taken the practical turn and recovered something of its historic mission. In so doing, it has taken on in a quite general way a game-theoretic character, precisely as it was with the theory of syllogistic refutation. We will explain two fallacious patterns of thought that often affect patterns of thought. We conclude by suggesting how the intellectual virtues can militate against these fallacies, focusing on the virtues of charity and humility.


The questions I use as my title derive from the assumption that since rhetorical actions may be judged as ethical as well as effective, the teaching of such actions must entail, at some level, a theory of moral deliberation. In thinking about what an ethical rhetoric requires and how to teach it, phronesis—as practical wisdom in the moral realm—provides a helpful concept, but one that is elusive or perhaps even unknowable. It is the paradox of teaching something that may be both theoretically necessary and necessarily enigmatic that prompts this inquiry.


In the first two sections of the chapter, we identify and explain two fallacious patterns of thought that often afflict discussions of controversial issues: entailment-by-entailment (section 1) and the attitude-to-agent fallacy (section 2). In effect, these sections diagnose two diseases of discourse. We conclude each section with practical suggestions—in the form of thinking routines—for treating these disorders. We will argue that part of the cure is to be found in the intellectual virtues. In particular, we will explain how the virtues of intellectual carefulness, fairness, charity, and humility can inoculate the mind against the fallacies we identify.


Contemporary discourse is littered with nasty and derailed disagreements. In this paper we hope to help clean things up. We diagnose two patterns of thought that often plague and exacerbate controversy. We illustrate these patterns and show that each involves both a logical mistake and a failure of intellectual charity. We also draw upon recent work in social psychology to shed light on why we tend to fall into these patterns of thought. We conclude by suggesting how the intellectual virtues can mitigate against these fallacies, focusing on the virtues of charity and humility.
A virtue approach to argumentation would focus on the arguers’ character rather than on their arguments. Therefore, it must be explained how good arguments relate to virtuous arguers. This article focuses on this issue. It is argued that, besides the usual logical, dialectical, and rhetorical standards, a virtuously produced good argument must meet two additional requirements: the arguer must be in a specific state of mind, and the argument must be broadly conceived of as an argumentative intervention and thus excel from every perspective.


I contend that in matters of practical argument and judgment, ethical criteria apply to arguments, not only arguments. Because our judgments of arguments are often ethical, and appropriately so, the arguments themselves are ethical. When an argument is ethical, we respond and evaluate ethically. Understanding and judging practical argument is as much an ethical matter as it is a logical matter. An alternative way of putting my thesis is to say that judging ethical arguments—indeed, arguments in general—takes intellectual virtues and, more controversially, that those same intellectual virtues are the subject of our judgments.


What role does reason play in our lives? What role should it play? And are claims to rationality liberating or oppressive? For the Sake of Argument addresses questions such as these to consider the relationship between thought and character. Eugene Garver brings Aristotle’s Rhetoric to bear on practical reasoning to show how the value of such thinking emerges when members of communities deliberate together, persuade each other, and are persuaded by each other. That is to say, when they argue. Garver roots deliberation and persuasion in political friendship instead of a neutral, impersonal framework of justice. Through incisive readings of examples in modern legal and political history, from Brown v. Board of Education to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, he demonstrates how acts of deliberation and persuasion foster friendship among individuals, leading to common action amid diversity. In an Aristotelian sense, there is a place for pathos and ethos in rational thought. Passion and character have as pivotal a role in practical reasoning as logic and language.


These are the three constituent elements of rhetoric: the speech, or logos; the disposition of the audience, or pathos; the character of the speaker, or ethos. One of the purposes of this paper is to show their interrelations in the realm of global governance. Despite its fragmentation in different academic traditions, the constituent elements of rhetoric do not have internal hierarchy and they all take part in shaping legal debates. This paper aims at describing how there can be a responsible rhetoric without privileging one element over the other. The purpose is to identify a form of rhetoric that is not only aimed at ‘winning’ an argument, but to obtain cooperation towards global common goods. As Aristotle pointed out, the art of rhetoric is not about defeating an opponent, but it is the ability ‘to see the available means of persuasion’.


Is a virtue approach in argumentation possible without committing the ad hominem fallacy? My answer is

The virtue of critical thinking has been widely emphasised, especially the habit of calling into question any standpoint. While that is important, argumentative practice is not possible unless the participants display a willingness to trust. Otherwise, continuous questioning by one party leads to an infinite regress. Trust is necessary in order to allow for testimony and expert opinion, but also to exclude unwarranted suspicions that could damage the quality of an argumentative discussion.


Virtuous arguers are expected to manifest virtues such as intellectual humility and open-mindedness, but from such traits the quality of arguments does not immediately follow. However, it also seems implausible that a virtuous arguer can systematically put forward bad arguments. How could virtue argumentation theory combine both insights? The solution, I argue, lies in an analogy with virtue epistemology: considering both responsibility and reliabilist virtues gives us a fuller picture of the virtuous arguer.


The place that belongs to virtue argumentation theory in the field of argumentation studies has been recently discussed by Gensollen, who proposes that it should be characterized as a complementary theory that deals with moral evaluation. Against this assessment, in the present article I argue that a virtue approach to argumentation is not restricted to moral evaluation, but it is also relevant to the study of human cognition and reasoning. Moreover, I criticize such a distinction between “complementary” and “fundamental” theories, as well as the criterion Gensollen uses in order to demarcate them.


Virtuous arguers are expected to manifest virtues such as intellectual humility and open-mindedness, but from such traits the quality of arguments does not immediately follow. However, it also seems implausible that a virtuous arguer can systematically put forward bad arguments. How could virtue argumentation theory combine both insights? The solution, I argue, lies in an analogy with virtue epistemology: considering both responsibility and reliabilist virtues gives us a fuller picture of the virtuous arguer.


We are living, it is often said, in a time that is characterised by the rise of irrational beliefs and the disregard of scientific knowledge. However, our time is also characterised by the praise—at least in words—of critical thinking against unreflective gullibility. It is doubtless necessary to take various factors into account in order to explain this apparent paradox. In this paper I will focus on one factor that concerns our very conception of critical thinking and that, in my view, contributes to the escalation of irrationality: the exaltation of autonomy. I will argue that the emphasis of cognitive autonomy both by philosophy and by the divulgation of critical thinking turns out to be harmful in two respects. On the one hand, the praise of cognitive autonomy may cause the rejection of scientific knowledge that contradicts our personal experience. This is perhaps most clearly seen in the case of those who believe in pseudo-therapies. On the other hand, the emphasis on autonomous reflection contributes to the formation of a false confidence in biased reasoning. Against these two problems, I will defend the epistemic virtues of rational trust and argumentation.


The virtue approach to argumentation is an approach to the philosophical field of argumentation that gives a primordial role to the psychological dispositions of the subjects that argue. In general terms, the supporters of this approach maintain that the different branches of argumentation (such as formal or informal logic) do not account for all the aspects necessary for argumentative processes to be performed correctly. According to these authors, it is necessary to take into account a set of psychological traits of ethical character (the virtues), which ensure that the logical resources and different types of reasoning are applied properly. In the present article we will make a brief exposition of the virtue approach to argumentation. First, we will address its predecessors in other philosophical disciplines, which can be found in virtue ethics and in virtue epistemology. In fact, a thread can be drawn from the application of
the doctrine of virtues to ethics, through virtue epistemology, and ending in the argumentative virtues themselves, which are no more than the extrapolation of the virtues to the field of argumentation. Secondly, we will present the argumentative virtues approach historically and we will discuss some of the problems that such an approach faces. Finally, not to leave aside the practical character that in one way or another is usually present in all virtue approaches, we will offer a provisional typology of what the argumentative virtues should be.


The aim of this paper is to analyze the importance and relevance of Carlos Pereda’s thought in argumentation theory, focusing on his work entitled Vértigos Argumentales, which has as its central purpose the defense of an emphatic reason, not deprived of uncertainty, but neither of objectivity. Keeping in mind that Carlos Pereda’s theory of argumentation is close to his conception of rationality, the author turns to the analysis of issues that intersect, such as epistemic virtues, the concept of rationality, an ethics of argumentation, etc. The paper concludes with the view of argumentation through the concept of ‘practice’, where different aspects to be considered in argumentative action are pointed out. It concludes that Vértigos Argumentales formulated and developed some basic intuitions that are present in the contemporary debate about argumentation and virtue.


We live in a plural world. It is increasingly clear to us that other people have beliefs, desires and wishes different from our own. They live different or opposing lifestyles. Plurality is a fact. This means that it is not something that we may like or not like: it is something we have to deal with. Each essay in this book seeks to illuminate a perspective or relationship. One central concern guides them all: what role should argumentation play in public life? For this reason, some essays seek to clarify the relationship between argumentation, imposition and other forms of violence; sketch some aspects of our argumentative culture; or deal with some particular problem in our public life in which argumentation plays (or should play) a central role. All share the principle that it is necessary to notice the character traits (be they virtuous or vicious) of those who argue. Virtues and argumentative vices have a high explanatory potential with respect to what often happens when we argue in public life.


In this paper my purpose is to locate Virtue Argumentation Theory’s place within Contemporary Argumentation Theory. There are some possibilities that have been opened in considering argumentation as a communicative practice. I consider some typical features of argumentative practice that are relevant to locate Virtue Argumentation Theory, and indicate some difficulties that are faced by contemporary theorists of argumentation. Then, from the previous coordinates, I seek to locate virtue argumentation theorists as bidders of a complementary approach to the logical approach or to the pragma-dialectical approach, while they consider argumentation as a cooperative practice. Finally, my point is that the possibility opened with Virtue Argumentation Theory is the moral analysis and evaluation of argumentation.


This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first, I try to show what now makes it possible for us to study something more than the arguments that are presented in our argumentation. In doing so, I seek conceptual, not historical, precision. Thus, rather than a narrative of the peculiarities, successes and failures of an event in Western thought that continues to be written, this is an abstraction and generalization. In the second part, which is much more prospective and constructive, I try to point out why it is important to pay attention to at least a couple of character traits of those who argue: humility and arrogance. I argue that these features can enhance or hinder the achievement of some of the most important goods that we seek when we argue. Therefore, they are features that are important to take into account when we evaluate not good and bad arguments, but good and bad arguing.


This article examines the critical thinking (CT) dispositions, as measured by the California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory, of students at a four-year, private, liberal arts, comprehensive university. This paper follows up results first published in 1995. The present findings represent another snapshot of CT dispositions among students who participated in 1996 and during the original investigation in 1992. Longitudinal results about students tested as freshman in 1992 and again as seniors in 1996 are presented. Cross sectional results are reported as well. Questions explored include the relationship between the disposition toward critical thinking, as measured by the CCTDI, and students’ major, gender, class level, and grade point average.


The author assesses three major problems in critical reasoning methods as taught in introductory logic courses. First, the author critiques the use of fallacies as a mode of analysis. Second, the author objects to the negative outlook expressed in the name “critical reasoning.” Lastly, the author scrutinizes the critical reasoning method’s lack of focus on the people that are arguing or their relevance to the arguments under examination. The author suggests that critical reasoning should focus more on the process of argumentation
rather than treating the argument presented as an artifact since the argumentative process takes place between people who are in disagreement. Critical reasoning should not be replaced but expanded and modified to a new method which embraces arguers and not just their arguments.


Informal Logic, as presented by both Blair and Johnson describes a system of organization and analysis of arguments that can be applied in a multitude of contexts. While some minimal background and description of situation is required to undertake an analysis, the system does not take into account the personal makeup of the proponent or, when appropriate, the interlocutor. The speakers do not have gender, cultural, racial, geographic, class or educational characteristics that may be relevant to understanding or judging their arguments. This essay undertakes an investigation of the need for incorporating psychosocial information regarding the participants and what consequences that has for Informal Logic. The results suggest that the argument analysis component of Informal Logic is best viewed as a skeleton, that prior to judging the legitimacy of an argument based on such an analysis the context must be fleshed out by relations of person, power, and so on. So, forms of argument, for example, that are not legitimate in one culture may be acceptable in another. Fallacy theory must also be amended so that intersectional differences become relevant. E.g., an individual in a position of power may be committing an ad baculum when the same words spoken by someone not in power may be admissible.


Natural normativity describes the means whereby social and cultural controls are placed on argumentative behaviour. The three main components of this are Goals, Context, and Ethos, which combine to form a dynamic and situational framework. Natural normativity is explained in light of Pragmatic-dialectics, Informal Logic, and Rhetoric. Finally, the theory is applied to the Biro-Siegel challenge.


Arguing with People brings developments from the field of Argumentation Theory to bear on critical thinking in a clear and accessible way. This book expands the critical thinking toolkit, and shows how those tools can be applied in the hurly-burly of everyday arguing. Gilbert emphasizes the importance of understanding real arguments, understanding just who you are arguing with, and knowing how to use that information for successful argumentation. Interesting examples and partner exercises are provided to demonstrate tangible ways in which the book’s lessons can be applied.


One question in the debate between the rhetorical and dialectical approaches concerns the availability of rules and standards. Are there objective standards, or are they changeable and situational? In Part One I briefly identify three concepts, context, audience and ethos. In Part Two I focus on ethos and how it is endemic to argument with familiars. Part Three shows that ethos concerns many local factors is situational. Finally, in Part Four, it is shown how the pragma-dialectical Rule 1 is situational.


In this chapter I want to examine the nature of personal ethotic standings that we, as individual arguers, apply to others and seek to have applied to us. Toward this end three core concepts of Persuasion Theory, knowledgability, trustworthiness, and liking will be used as meta-concepts in an analysis of Grice’s maxims as they apply to individual judgments of ethos. Grice’s maxims, and adherence to them, provide a ready and familiar frame for those traits that tend to create positive ethos. In addition, it will be argued that Grice’s maxims need to be localized for both cultural and specific context. Using Gilbert’s notion of familiars we will examine how the maxims apply both across the board and in specific contexts in forming and maintaining personal ethotic standing.


Gilbert has introduced and expanded on the concept of “familiars”. This talk argues that the concept is central to the idea of everyday argumentation. Using Grice’s ideas on cooperation it is argued that cultures and fields may have differing rule sets dictated by meta-maxims or Super-Duper maxims. These must be considered for successful argumentation.


Emotion always plays a role in arguing. While it can be misused and over used, a good argument must use emotion in order to proceed to a fair and virtuous conclusion. This leads to the importance of inferring emotions, which is subject to a number of variables: the rhetorical skill of the arguers, the kind of argument, and the goals of the arguers. So, emotional inferences are not always possible, always accurate, or always expected. Rather, emotional states and reactions are frequently inferred from facial and body expressions, tonality, and context, and can be extremely useful in the process of argumentation.

Discourse, dialogue and deliberation are important frames for thinking about and creating an ideal intersubjective condition and a dignified society at present. This article presents the contours of such a new ethics of argumentation by carrying out a detailed discussion of the relationship between Gandhi and Tagore, and the way they argued with each other. Their arguments and counter-arguments were not for the sake of winning any egotistic victory but for exploring truth. It also connects this new ethics of argumentation in dialogue with the agenda of moral argumentation offered by Jurgen Habermas, the heart-touching social theorist of our time.


I will begin by highlighting what I take to be the most important features of Campolo’s view and the perspective it offers on deep disagreements. Second, I will contrast Campolo’s advice concerning the use of reason when faced with seemingly intractable disagreements, or disagreements having the appearance of depth, with the advice offered by Adams (2005). Finally, I will conclude with some points which I suggest might be reparative of this difference.


This paper argues against the priority of pure, virtue-based accounts of argumentative norms (VA). Such accounts are agent-based and committed to the priority thesis: good arguments and arguing well are explained in terms of some prior notion of the virtuous arguer arguing virtuously. Two problems with the priority thesis are identified. First, the definitional problem: virtuous arguers arguing virtuously are neither sufficient nor necessary for good arguments. Second, the priority problem: the goodness of arguments is not explained virtuistically. Instead, being excellences, virtues are instrumental in relation to other, non-aretic goods—in this case, reason and rationality. Virtues neither constitute reasons nor explain their goodness. Two options remain for VA: either provide some account of reason and rationality in virtuistic terms, or accept them as given but non-aretic goods. The latter option, though more viable, demands the concession that VA cannot provide the core norms of argumentation theory.


Our meta-argumentative vocabulary supplies the conceptual tools used to reflectively analyse, regulate, and evaluate our argumentative performances. Yet, this vocabulary is susceptible to misunderstanding and abuse in ways that make possible new discursive mistakes and pathologies. Thus, our efforts to self-regulate our reason-transacting practices by articulating their norms makes possible new ways to violate and flout those very norms. Scott Aikin identifies the structural possibility of this vicious feedback loop as the Owl of Minerva Problem. In the spirit of a shared concern for the flourishing of our rational, argumentative practices, this paper approaches the Owl of Minerva Problem from a vantage point that, by comparison with Aikin’s, affords perspectives that are more pessimistic in some aspects and more optimistic in others. Pessimistically, the problem at the root of the weaponization of our meta-argumentative vocabulary is motivational, not structural. Its motivational nature explains its resistance to the normal repertoire of reparative (meta-)argumentative maneuvers, as well as revealing a profound and deeply entrenched misunderstanding of the connection between our reasons-transacting practices and the goods achievable within them. Optimistically, in the absence of this motivational problem, the misunderstandings and errors made possible by our meta-argumentative vocabularies are amenable to remedy by familiar techniques of discursive instruction and repair. More optimistically, even though our meta-argumentative vocabularies are generated only retrospectively, they can be used prospectively, thereby making possible an aspirational motivation resulting in a virtuous cycle of increasingly autonomous normative self-regulation. Properly harnessed, the Owl of Minerva releases the Lark of Arete.


The purpose of this paper is (i) to determine the nature of virtue argumentation—to determine what aspect of argumentation the theory is trying to explain and (ii) to pose some challenges that such a theory needs to overcome.


One of the greatest challenges confronting organizations is how to select and develop leaders. The dearth of inexpensive, easily administered assessment instruments contributes to the problem. The current explanatory, quantitative study examined the correlation between the critical thinking disposition and leadership behaviors of leaders in service industries in the United States. The study results indicate a moderately positive correlation between the critical thinking disposition and transformational behaviors of the study participants. The finding supports further research into whether critical thinking disposition could be used to predict leadership emergence. The study result has potential implications for trait theory of leadership and leadership development and may provide the foundation for a new model of leadership assessment: leadership disposition.

[333] Ilan Goldberg, Justine Kingsbury, & Tracy Bowell. Measuring critical thinking about deeply held beliefs. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation:
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The California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory (CCTDI) is a commonly used tool for measuring critical thinking dispositions. However, research on the efficacy of the CCTDI in predicting good thinking about students’ own deeply held beliefs is scant. In this paper we report on preliminary results from our ongoing study designed to gauge the usefulness of the CCTDI in this context.


The California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory (CCTDI) is a commonly used tool for measuring critical thinking dispositions. However, research on the efficacy of the CCTDI in predicting good thinking about students’ own deeply held beliefs is scant. In this paper we report on our study that was designed to gauge the usefulness of the CCTDI in this context, and take some first steps towards designing a better method for measuring strong sense critical thinking.


From early modernity, philosophers have engaged in skeptical discussions concerning knowledge of the existence, state, and standing of other minds. The analogical move from self to other unfolds as controversy. This paper reposes the problem as an argumentation predicament and examines analogy as an opening to the study of rhetorical cognition. Rhetorical cognition is identified as a productive process coming to terms with an other through testing sustainable risk. The paper explains how self-sustaining risk is theorized by Aristotle’s virtue ethics in the polis. Moral hazard is identified as a threat to modern argument communities.


Concerns are raised repeatedly about the uncivil and simplistic way in which politicians often express their ideas. This political communication style runs counter to deliberative democratic virtues such as respectful interactions and well-justified arguments. Its use is therefore problematic from a normative point of view, yet there are indications that it is an effective communication style to persuade citizens. Two survey experiments – text and audio – were developed to investigate the effects of uncivil communication and simplistic argumentation on political trust and on persuasive power in political election debates. The results show that 1) uncivil communication lowers political trust and is slightly less convincing than civil communication, 2) simplistic argumentation, i.e. political arguments presented in ill- or non-justified ways, does not affect political trust and is not more persuasive than well-justified argumentation, and 3) the strongest violation of social norms, i.e. a combined use of uncivil communication and simplistic argumentation, decreases both trust in the political candidate and persuasive power. Interestingly, politically cynical citizens and citizens who do not value inclusionary debates react differently to uncivil communication and simplistic argumentation: their level of trust does not decline and they are persuaded slightly more by simplistic arguments expressed in uncivil ways.


Ethotic arguments are defined as sequences of claims-and-reasons regarding speaker character, based on which the plausibility of speaker assertions can be questioned. This is an exploratory study concerning the role of visuals in ethotic arguing. In this paper, I bring together contributions from visual argumentation theory and from studies regarding various modes of construing an ethotic argument, in an attempt to offer an adequate account of the argumentative action of images in ethotic sequences of discourse. In the last section, I propose a case study which illustrates the argumentative action that visuals may perform in the ethotic genre of advertising.


Does social media influence our ability to extract valuable knowledge from public debates? This is the question that I address in my current research. The architecture of social media platforms offers the possibility to get instant replies that challenge the point of view advanced by a user, thus encouraging awareness of one’s own fallibility. It also allows for deliberative groups to be created with the purpose of discussing a specific topic, which means that a user can easily find multiple perspectives on an issue in one place. Yet, by taking all participants on stage and explicitly counting the number of visualizations, appreciations, and distributions of their contributions, social media affordances encourage an exaggerated quest for getting attention and saving one’s face in confrontation with possible counterarguments. In addition, by capitalizing on our natural curiosity and lack-of-thoroughness in inquiry, social media affordances tend to encourage our engagement in debates that belong to domains in which we lack basic knowledge, which makes us easy targets of distorted, decontextualized or outright false information. Moreover, even when the data presented by participants to an online debate is truthful, our mode of engagement with it in social media tends to decrease our chance to transform that data into personal knowledge, since we seldom have the patience to analyse and fully grasp its context, activities that would be necessary for its successful integration in our web of meanings. I identify one epistemic vice that underlies most of these problems and discuss a set of actions that would help users overcome its consequences, in order to make social media debates more cognitively fruitful.
The purpose of this paper is to outline the way in which an epistemic virtue approach can be used to address epistemological issues in law. My claim is that relativism is the right kind of approach. First, I will briefly examine the difference between this conception and the reliabilist conception of intellectual virtues. Then, I will explore two major relativist projects that contain several features required for an appropriate virtue approach to legal fact-finding. Next I will discuss the belief/acceptance dichotomy and attempt to show that it is acceptance – rather than belief – the right type of propositional attitude to be held by legal fact-finders, and that this may be regulated by intellectual virtues. In the end, it will be argued that the conjunction of a relativist epistemology and a theory of acceptance constitutes a good theoretical framework for the analysis of legal reasoning about matters of fact.


Aimed at core problems of contemporary moral rhetoric—pluralistic argument, incommensurable disagreement on ordering terms, and a theoretical move away from essence to relativism—this study is an attempt to restore rhetoric as an art capable of investigating and positing terms of order and being. This restoration relies upon viewing rhetoric as a practice of epistemic mediation between the experiential and language-based knowledge of the local, and the perfected knowledge of the Absolute. I propose characteristically Socratic notions of contingency and ignorance as the bases for this mediated approach. As a recognition of what is unknown and uncertain in relation to the Absolute, contingency and ignorance promote rhetoric as “genuine dialogue,” an other-recognizing, inclusive, and open-ended practice carried out in the local but aimed at the Perfect. Genuine dialogue allows agents to relationally enact virtue, collapsing virtue and rhetoric together as a craft or techne. The study is structured as an argument against imminent notions of contingency (in historical and political utopianism and progressivism), and a-discursive notions of ignorance, which are demonstrated to violate basic values of dialogue. Concluding remarks focus on the praxis of contingent, ignorant dialogue as enacted in actual policy settings, as well as focusing on future directions and applications.

[341] Jerry Green. Metacognition as an epistemic virtue. Southwest Philosophy Review, 35(1):117–129, 2019. Metacognition, often glossed as “thinking about thinking” or “cognition about cognition,” is a buzzword in education, a battleground in philosophy of mind, and a central area of study in psychology. But it is rarely discussed in epistemology, which is somewhat surprising given its deep roots in the field stretching back to Plato’s Charmides and Aristotle’s De Anima. In this paper, I will argue that metacognition deserves a bigger role in epistemology. More specifically, I will argue that metacognition qualifies as an epistemic virtue, and is therefore of interest in the currently flourishing subfield of virtue epistemology.

[342] Susan Haack. The erosion of academic virtue. Journal of Philosophical Investigations, 16:1–17, 2023. Haack articulates something of what she takes the moral demands of academic life to be, calling for such virtues as industry, honesty, realism, patience, and consideration. She then explains why she believes the current academic environment is sapping the strength of character these virtues require, and why graduate students are caught in the middle. She writes primarily about philosophy, but much of what she has to say applies to other humanities disciplines and much of that to other disciplines as well—and while she writes primarily about the U.S. situation, much of what she says industry, patience, research, applies elsewhere too.

[343] Pedro H. Haddad Bernat. Epistemic virtue and acceptance in legal fact-finding. Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea, 1(1):181–205, 2016. The purpose of this paper is to outline the way in which an epistemic virtue approach can be used to address epistemological issues in law. My claim is that relativism is the right kind of approach. First, I will briefly examine the difference between this conception and the reliabilist conception of intellectual virtues. Then, I will explore two major relativist projects that contain several features required for an appropriate virtue approach to legal fact-finding. Next I will discuss the belief/acceptance dichotomy and attempt to show that it is acceptance – rather than belief – the right type of propositional attitude to be held by legal fact-finders, and that this may be regulated by intellectual virtues. In the end, it will be argued that the conjunction of a relativist epistemology and a theory of acceptance constitutes a good theoretical framework for the analysis of legal reasoning about matters of fact.

[344] Pedro H. Haddad Bernat. Epistemología de virtudes robustas: Sobre los límites y las posibilidades de su aplicación a la prueba de los hechos en el derecho. Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 49:5–26, 2017. In Spanish. The purpose of this paper is to define the general features of a suitable epistemology for law. In particular, the paper is concerned with a very influential project that is nowadays offered in the literature: robust virtue epistemology. As I will show here, such a project is untenable for law, since a satisfactory and complete epistemology of legal proof requires the conjunction of both the agent’s perspective (the “tier-of-facts”) and the inquiry system’s perspective (the rules of evidence).

[345] Benjamin Hamby. The Virtues of Critical Thinkers. Ph.D. thesis, McMaster University, 2014. Critical thinking is an educational ideal with an accumulating canon of scholarship, but conceptualizing it has nevertheless remained contentious. One important issue concerns how critical thinking involves an interplay between cognitive abilities and associated character traits, dispositions, and motivations. I call these and other aspects of the critical thinker “critical thinking virtues”, taking them to be intellectual excellences of character, cultivated by people who tend to aim towards making reasoned judgments about what to do or believe. The central virtue that motivates any critical thinker to engage her skills in critical thinking I call “willingness to inquire”, connecting the character of the person to the skills she must use consistently to be a critical thinker. Willingness to inquire is the virtue that ranges over the application of all critical thinking skills, a basic motivational drive guiding a person towards the educational ideal. Other critical thinking virtues, such as open-mindedness, fairness, and respect for dialectical partners, also facilitate the appropriate application of critical thinking skills in a process of inquiry. Pedagogues should therefore seek not only to instruct for skills, but also to explicitly mention and instruct for the virtues as well. I conclude by offering curricular recommendations in this regard.


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all skilled thinking that contributes to critical thinking. The willingness to inquire is therefore a more primary critical thinking virtue than open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, or intellectual courage, because without the disposition to employ the skills that aim toward reasoned judgment, there is no way to employ those skills appropriately to that end.


The willingness to suspend judgment while thinking carefully in an effort to reach a reasoned judgment, what I call the “willingness to inquire”, stands behind all skilled thinking that contributes to critical thinking. The willingness to inquire is therefore a more primary critical thinking virtue than open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, or intellectual courage, because without the disposition to employ the skills that aim toward reasoned judgment, there is no way to employ those skills appropriately to that end.


Many argumentative interactions proceed more or less as we would wish, with good reasons given and acknowledged. If this were always so, there would be no more use for this chapter than one on proper breathing during communication. But the fact is that sometimes we experience disagreement without reasoning, as when small children or enraged adults simply exchange demands. Sometimes reasons are present but fail elementary tests of textual coherence or connection to the other person. Sometimes reasons are given, answered, and then simply repeated. All of these are examples of incompetence, and people can learn to do better.


I wish to argue in favor of a particular orientation, one expressed in Brockriede’s remark that “arguments are not in statements but in people”. While much has been gained from textual analyses, even more will accrue by additional attention to the arguers. I consider that textual materials are really only the artifacts of arguments. The actual arguing is done exclusively by people, either the argument producers or receivers, and never by words on a page. In fact, most of our textual interpretations are quietly founded on the assumption that the artifact is fully informative about what people think.


Let us keep the supposed superior faculty of the mind, reason, with its long aristocratic history, in its proper place as an equal alongside the other thoughtful activities assigned to the imagination. Let there be no philosopher-kings, and no substantial principles of justice which are to be permanently acceptable to all rational agents, seeking harmony and unanimous agreement. Rather political prudence, recognized as a high virtue, must expect a perpetual contest between hostile conceptions of justice and must develop acceptable procedures for regulating and refereeing the contest. The contests are unending if only because what is generally thought substantially just and fair today will not be thought just and fair tomorrow. This is as it should be, always provided that the old and new moral claims can expect finally to be given a hearing. The rock-bottom justice is in the contests themselves, in the tension of open opposition, always renewed.


New research suggests that a healthy democracy requires intellectual humility. When citizens are intellectually humble, they are less polarized, more tolerant and respectful of others, and display greater empathy for political opponents. But a flourishing democracy also requires people with political convictions. If the electorate were apathetic, they would not participate in democratic decision-making procedures. Do these two democratic ideals conflict? The standard view in philosophy and psychology is that intellectual humility and political conviction are compatible. In this paper, we challenge the standard view. We appeal to empirical and theoretical work indicating that intellectual humility can result in political apathy or lack of conviction. We conclude by suggesting that there are different varieties of intellectual humility, some aligned with conviction and engagement, and others of a more quietist character. To illustrate this, we sketch a kind of ‘political quietism’, modelled by philosophical thinkers such as Burke and Oakeshott. If so, there are many kinds of intellectual humility with different implications for political convictions and that manifest in different political stances.


In the film and play Twelve Angry Men, Juror 8 confronts the prejudices and poor reasoning of his fellow jurors, exhibiting an unwavering capacity not just to formulate and challenge arguments, but to be open-minded, stay calm, tolerate uncertainty, and negotiate in the face of considerable group pressures. In a perceptive and detailed portrayal of a group deliberation a ‘wheel of virtue’ is presented by the characters of Twelve Angry Men that allows for critical thinking virtues and vices to be analysed in context. This article makes the case for (1) the film being an exceptional teaching resource, and (2), drawing primarily on the ideas of Martha Nussbaum concerning contextualised detail, emotional engagement, and aesthetic distance, its educational value being intimately related to its being a work of fiction.


Starting from the observation that argumentation studies have low recognition value both within and without the academy, and mindful of the current desiderata that academic research should be relevant outside the academy, I introduce the concept of an argumentation profile as a panacea for our ills. Argumentation profiles are sketches of the argumentation behaviour
of either individuals or groups (such as political parties) and are based on concepts unique to argumentation studies such as argumentation schemes, dialogical roles and responsiveness. It is argued that argumentation profiles would be of interest to voters as well as political parties.


With a theoretical focus, this study traces and examines how rhetoric’s relation to ethics has transformed over the past 60 years from our discipline’s Aristotelian/Platonic/Socratic inheritance to the introduction of multiple new perspectives and voices. In suggesting that the goal of rhetoric is more than persuasion—a major focus of the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition dominant in the field of rhetoric and composition in the early 20th Century—this study traces a “turn” within our discipline from “confrontational” rhetoric to “invitational” rhetoric. It suggests that invitational rhetoric challenges a strict definition of rhetoric as persuasion, seeks instead to understand rather than convert, support camaraderie and mutuality (if not unity) instead of reinforcing dominant power relationships, challenge the speaker as much as the audience, and privilege listening and invitation over persuasion when appropriate. Rhetorical ethics is defined as the ethical decisions made in the everyday interactions that constantly invite us to make rhetorical choices that inevitably have consequences in the world. The study examines kairos/sophistic rhetoric, identification, and responsibility to establish a potential framework for rhetorical ethics, as well as listening and acknowledgement as methods for enacting this model. The ambition is a rhetoric of ethics that attends to everyday situations; accommodates different, often “silenced,” voices; and offers the possibility of an ethical encounter with others.


Written by four members of the Calvin College philosophy department, The Little Logic Book is a valuable resource for teachers and undergraduate students of philosophy. In addition to providing clear introductions to the modes of reasoning students encounter in their philosophy course readings, it includes a nuanced description of common informal fallacies, a narrative overview of various philosophical accounts of scientific inference, and a concluding chapter on the ethics of argumentation.


William Hare believes that open-mindedness – the disposition to form a belief, and if necessary to revise or reject it, in the light of available evidence and argument – stands in need of a defence because it is under widespread attack. In this sequel to his highly regarded Open-mindedness and Education [1979], he examines the numerous ways in which opposition to open-mindedness is expressed, and shows how these criticisms can be countered. He argues that the general indictment of open-mindedness as a habit of mind leading to nihilism and scepticism, as well as to neglect of the emotions, is based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of the concept, which in his opinion is by no means incompatible with personal commitment and confidence. Similar confusions are exposed in such areas as elementary schooling, moral education, educational standards, methods of teaching, the administration of schools, and the teaching of science. In each of these areas, examples are taken from the writings of influential critics to illustrate the nature of the doubts concerning open-mindedness – doubts that are carefully analysed and show to rest ultimately upon erroneous assumptions. And since he believes that many who set out to champion open-mindedness manage to confuse this ideal with other notions, Hare undertakes in a concluding chapter to protect the ideal from its would-be friends and supporters.


The ideal of critical thinking is a central one in Russell’s philosophy, though this is not yet generally recognized in the literature on critical thinking. For Russell, the ideal is embedded in the fabric of philosophy, science, liberalism and rationality, and this paper reconstructs Russell’s account, which is scattered throughout numerous papers and books. It appears that he has developed a rich conception, involving a complex set of skills, dispositions and attitudes, which together delineate a virtue which has both intellectual and moral aspects. It is a view which is rooted in Russell’s epistemological conviction that knowledge is difficult but not impossible to attain, and in his ethical conviction that freedom and independence in inquiry are vital. Russell’s account anticipates many of the insights to be found in the recent critical thinking literature, and his views on critical thinking are of enormous importance in understanding the nature of educational aims. Moreover, it is argued that Russell manages to avoid many of the objections which have been raised against recent accounts. With respect to impartiality, thinking for oneself, the importance of feelings and relational skills, the connection with action, and the problem of generalizability, Russell shows a deep understanding of problems and issues which have been at the forefront of recent debate.


Open-mindedness is properly thought of as a kind of critical receptiveness in which our willingness to consider new ideas is guided by our best judgment with respect to the available evidence. Genuine open-mindedness requires finding some middle ground between being ready to entertain every idea seriously and being excessively resistant to reasonable possibilities. This line of thought suggests a natural connection with an Aristotelian account of virtue as involving a mean between two extremes to be determined by the use of practical wisdom. We may go too far in the direction of critical skepticism and lose sight of open-mindedness; but it is no mark of open-mindedness to be unwilling ever to draw a conclusion, or to be ready to abandon a promising line of inquiry merely to pursue some other possibility.

This is a brief guide to the ideal of open-minded inquiry by way of a survey of related notions. Making special reference to the educational context, the aim is to offer teachers an insight into what it would mean for their work to be influenced by this ideal, and to lead students to a deeper appreciation of open-minded inquiry. From assumptions to zealotry, the glossary provides an account of a wide range of concepts in this family of ideas, reflecting a concern and a connection throughout with the central concept of open-mindedness itself. An intricate network of relationships is uncovered that reveals the richness of this ideal; and many confusions and misunderstandings that hinder a proper appreciation of open-mindedness are identified.


Open-mindedness involves a readiness to give due consideration to relevant evidence and argument, especially when factors present in the situation tempt one to resist such consideration, with a view to increasing our awareness, understanding and appreciation, avoiding error, and reaching true and defensible conclusions. It means being critically receptive to alternative possibilities and new ideas, resisting inflexible and dogmatic attitudes, and sincerely trying to avoid whatever might suppress or distort our reflections. Open-mindedness is relevant to whatever views we presently hold in the sense that we remain committed to reconsidering them in the light of new questions, doubts, and findings; and it also involves maintaining a certain outlook throughout the entire process of inquiry, whereby we remain willing to accept whatever view proves in the end to have the strongest evidential and reasoned support.


A philosophical conception of open-minded inquiry first emerges in western philosophy in the work of Socrates. This paper develops an interpretation of Socratic open-mindedness drawing primarily on Socratic ideas about (i) the requirements of serious argument, and (ii) the nature of human wisdom. This account is defended against a number of objections which mistakenly interpret Socrates as defending, teaching, or inducing skepticism, and neglecting the value of expert wisdom. The ongoing significance of Socratic open-mindedness as an ideal of inquiry is brought out through examination of a notorious Canadian case in the context of forensic pathology.


In this article four anxieties expressed by Peter Gardner about our conception of open-mindedness and its educational implications are examined. It is argued that none of Gardner’s anxieties undermine our view that open-mindedness requires neither neutrality nor indecision with respect to a matter in question, but rather that open-mindedness is compatible with holding of beliefs and commitments about such matters provided that the beliefs and commitments are formed and held in such a way that they are open to revision in the light of evidence and argument.


I shall argue that how we behave with respect to forming our beliefs is as morally significant as other morally significant actions. As a result, there is a moral imperative to teach critical thinking, and teachers are under a moral obligation to help students acquire those skills and dispositions commonly associated with critical thinking. Not to do so may well be unethical.


Feminist philosophers have been some of the most vocal critics of reason and rationality. While most feminists realize that rationality is a concept that cannot be entirely abandoned, few have considered how to construct a positive account of rationality. This book represents a sustained argument for a feminist theory of rationality. It opens by asking the question: is reason inherently masculine? Deborah K. Heikes goes on to answer this question negatively and to examine what feminists actually want from a theory of rationality, specifying what a virtue theory of rationality is and how it works. She identifies those features that feminists believe are central to reason, identifying four dichotomies that are central to feminist thinking (mind/body, reason/emotion, identity/difference, objectivity/subjectivity), and argues that they can be captured by conceiving of rationality as a virtue concept. She further demonstrates how a specifically feminist theory of rationality can provide objective grounds for feminists’ moral, political and epistemic agendas.


During the Enlightenment, rationality becomes not a property belonging to all humans but something that one must achieve. This transformation has the effect of excluding non-whites and non-males from the domain of reason. Heikes seeks to uncover the source of this exclusion, which she argues stems from the threat of subjectivism inherent in modern thinking. As an alternative, she considers post-Cartesian reactions of modern representationalism as well as ancient Greek understandings of mind as simply one part of a functionally diverse soul. In the end, she maintains that treating rationality as an evolutionarily situated virtue concept allows for an understanding of rationality that recognizes diversity and that grounds substantive moral concepts.


This paper critically examines non-adversarial feminist argumentation model specifically within the scope of politeness norms and cultural communicative practices. Asserting women typically have a particular mode of arguing which is often seen as ‘weak’ or docile within
male dominated fields, the model argues that the feminine mode of arguing is actually more affiliative and community orientated, which should become the standard within argumentation as opposed to the Adversary Method. I argue that the non-adversarial feminist argumentation model (NAFAM) primarily focuses on one demographic of women’s communicative styles—white women. Taking an intersectional approach, I examine practices within African American women’s speech communities to illustrate the ways in which the virtues and vices purported by the NAFAM fail to capture other ways of productive argumentation.


This paper seeks to complicate two primary norms within argumentation theory: 1. engaging with one’s interlocutors in a ‘pleasant’ tone and 2. speaking directly to one’s target audience/interlocutor. Moreover, I urge argumentation theorists to explore various cultures’ argumentative norms and practices when attempting to formulate more universal theories regarding argumentation. Ultimately, I aim to show that the two previously mentioned norms within argumentation obscure and misrepresents many argumentative practices within African American Vernacular English—or Ebonics, specifically the art of signifying.


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This essay explores the possibility of grounding an ethic of rhetoric in virtues suggested by the practice of rhetoric itself. For clues regarding rhetorical virtues, it examines the connection between rhetoric and virtues in a variety of rhetorical and literary critics. Finally, an initial effort to identify several rhetorical virtues is undertaken following suggestions by Alasdair MacIntyre. Rhetorical virtues, it is argued, are discovered by examining the goods inherent to rhetoric, as well as the sources of cooperation and the standards of excellence implied by the practice of rhetoric. The possibility of a virtues oriented pedagogy of communication is also considered.


Loci personarum, ‘topics for persons’ were used in Latin rhetoric for the description of persons, their external circumstances, physical attributes, or qualities of character. They stood in the way of fusing rhetoric and dialectic, the goal of sixteenth-century ‘humanistic’ logic: the project of a unified theory of invention depends on the exclusion of loci personarum from the domain of dialectic proper. But still they cannot easily be replaced in the classroom. Bartholomaeus Keckermann resolved these difficulties: he proposed to abandon the notion that loci personarum could play a role in finding new arguments concerning persons. So they pose no risks for a unified theory of invention, because they can only be used for the exposition of information that we already have. Since loci personarum are concerned with individuals, the knowledge about individuals that is available to us is inescapably circumstantial and contingent, defying the claim of generality or necessity of dialectic made by Keckermann’s sixteenth-century predecessors. However, our thinking about persons is primarily interested in those aspects that we do not share with other members of our species. For Keckermann, persons are therefore logically different from most individuals belonging to other species.


In this programmatic essay, I approach the question “What is open-mindedness?” through three more specific questions, each designed to foreground a distinct dimension along which the analysis of open-mindedness might proceed. When is open-mindedness? What is not open-mindedness? Where is open-mindedness? The first question refers to the temporal dimension of open-mindedness, which I analyze in terms of Dewey’s distinction between recognition and perception and the psychoanalytic concept of disavowal. The second question refers to the dialectical dimension of open-mindedness, to what the many aspects of closed-mindedness reveal about open-mindedness. Here I recall Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. The third question refers to the dimension of scale, asking what open- and closed-mindedness look like on the interpersonal and social levels. To bring out this third dimension, I draw on Jonathan Lear’s reading of the Republic and psychoanalytic group dynamics theory. Through these three related inquiries I show the range of this central intellectual virtue and bring out its connections to two central, related features of the moral life: the need for integration and the need for openness to newness and complexity.


This essay addresses the relationship between norms of reasoning and norms of humour: To what extent can one be funny and reasonable at the same time? For this purpose, a normative system of reasoning (i.e., the model of the pragma-dialectical critical discussion) is contrasted with three approaches to humour: ancient rhetorical humour, and the modern Script-based
Semantic Theory of Humour (SSTH) and the Benign Violation Theory (BVT) respectively.


Many hold that theoretical reasoning aims at truth. In this paper, I ask what it is for reasoning to be thus aim-directed. Standard answers to this question explain reasoning’s aim-directedness in terms of intentions, dispositions, or rule-following. I argue that, while these views contain important insights, they are not satisfactory. As an alternative, I introduce and defend a novel account: reasoning aims at truth in virtue of being the exercise of a distinctive kind of cognitive power, one that, unlike ordinary dispositions, is capable of fully explaining its own exercises. I argue that this account is able to avoid the difficulties plaguing standard accounts of the relevant sort of mental teleology.


Young argues—successfully in my view—that we need not rely on unreflective intuitions to ground argument norms and that intellectual virtues can ground them instead. His suggestion is engaging, provocative, and has interesting implications for a variety of issues in argumentation. In response, I have suggested a few options for further exploration including relevant work in reliabilist and responsibilist virtue epistemologies, the problem of achieving epistemic value through intellectual virtue, the relation of virtuous argument norms to ethical argument, and the role of intellectual community in the development of virtue epistemic argument norms.


At first glance, happiness and objectivity seem to have little in common. I claim, however, that subjective and eudaemonic happiness promotes arguer objectivity. To support my claim, I focus on connections between happiness, social intelligence, and intellectual virtue. After addressing objections concerning unhappy objective and happy unobjective arguers, I conclude that communities should value happiness in argumentative contexts and use happiness as an indicator of their capacity for objective argumentation.


In this paper I argue that the objectivity of persons is best understood in terms of intellectual virtue, the telos of which is an enduring commitment to salient and accurate information about reality. On this view, an objective reasoner is one we can trust to manage her perspectives, beliefs, emotions, biases, and responses to evidence in an intellectually virtuous manner. We can be confident that she will exercise intellectual carefulness, openmindedness, fairmindedness, curiosity, perseverance, and other intellectual virtues in her reasoning.


While anger can derail argumentation, it can also help arguers and audiences to reason together in argumentation. Anger can provide information about premises, biases, goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement that people might otherwise fail to recognize or prematurely dismiss. Anger can also enhance the salience of certain premises and underscore the importance of related inferences. For these reasons, we claim that anger can serve as an epistemic resource in argumentation.


There are at least three strategies we might take in approaching controversial issues: (i) we might accept the conclusions of experts on their authority, (ii) we might evaluate the relevant evidence and arguments for ourselves, or (iii) we might give up on finding the answers. Students of “critical thinking” are regularly advised to follow strategy (ii). But strategies (i) and (iii) are usually superior to (ii), from the standpoint of the goal of gaining true beliefs and avoiding false ones.


Trudy Govier argues in *The Philosophy of Argument* that adversariality in argumentation can be kept to a necessary minimum. On her account, politeness can limit the ancillary adversariality of hostile culture but a degree of logical opposition will remain part of argumentation, and perhaps all reasoning. Argumentation cannot be purified by politeness in the way she hopes, nor does reasoning even in the discursive context of argumentation demand opposition. Such hopes assume an idealized politeness free from gender, and reasoners with inhuman or at least highly privileged capabilities and no need to learn from others or share understanding.


Tempest Henning takes a short piece by Scott Aikin and Robert Talisse and a certain thread in feminist philosophy of argument, pulling on their assumptions to reveal tacit problems generally at work in argumentation theory. I agree with Henning’s call for theorists to pay better attention to actual practices of arguing and that the failure to do so is both an ethical and epistemological problem with argumentation theory. However, I suggest that argumentation scholarship has resources that can be developed to address her concerns.


The normative stability of a deliberative and democratic political order and the creativity and quality of the decisions it produces depend on citizens developing civic orientations and capacities through participation.
in deliberative events aiming at the cooperative solution of political problems. That, at least, is the claim made by critics of the systems approach to deliberative democracy, who argue that its proponents have lost sight of the educative function that respectful public reasoning plays for citizens. In this article I offer a response to this line of argument. There is no good philosophical reason to suppose that only unitary deliberation can perform an educative function for citizens. The kinds of informal and uncooperative public speech that occur in distributed deliberative processes can also develop participants’ civic capacities and civic virtue—and not merely through their systemic effects. This is an insight that should encourage us to rethink the design and facilitation of deliberative forums and pay more attention to citizens’ everyday deliberation.


In this essay, I want to argue that the lack of success enjoyed by critical thinking instruction arises at least in part from the significant conceptual and epistemological errors embedded in the discourse surrounding the term. These persistent errors follow from the fallacious Cartesian metaphysics on which mental process terms are often predicated. Rather than attempting to rehabilitate critical thinking, then, I propose jetsetting the concept in favor of a potentially more fruitful pedagogical approach free of this Cartesian baggage. Although the idea of epistemic virtue has been largely ignored in mainstream educational discourse, it may provide a more effective strategy to enrich the intellectual development of students.


This reading of De Oratore uses Stoic philosophy and rhetoric to trace out a complex Ciceronian theory of rhetoric. Cicero rejected Stoic style, labeling it as meager and unpersuasive. However, he coalesced Stoic philosophy with Greek rhetoric to produce his ideal orator. Cicero described eloquentia as natural public speech that was distinctive to every person, yet he also explained how eloquence, like wisdom, unified aspects of the entire universe. Through these connections, Stoic influences enabled Cicero to negotiate major questions concerning rhetoric, such as the emotional control of the orator, the virtue of eloquence, and the status of rhetoric as an art. Cicero’s negotiation is productive of a theory of rhetoric that is useful today, especially as it holds speech and public action as important and fundamental acts of human individuality.


This understanding of the ad hominem and the sin it embodies—the sin of irrelevance—has recently come under examination by philosophers and scholars in the discipline of speech communication. The ad hominem and its presumed invalidity has also been an issue for feminist epistemological projects, either directly or indirectly. We will begin with a discussion of the relationship between feminist epistemological projects and the ad hominem, and then move to a discussion of the argument against understanding the ad hominem as a fallacy in all cases, presented by Douglas Walton in A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy. We will then orchestrate a conversation between Lorraine Code and Douglas Walton to examine where Code’s feminist project overlaps with Walton’s project and where they part company, and conclude with some remarks on how these projects differ from other social epistemological projects.


Christopher Johnson has put forward in this journal the view that ad hominem reasoning may be more generally reasonable than is allowed by writers such as myself, basing his view on virtue epistemology. I review his account, as well as the standard account, of ad hominem reasoning, and show how the standard account would handle the cases he sketches in defense of his own view. I then give four criticisms of his view generally: the problems of virtue conflict, vagueness, conflation of speech acts, and self-defeating counsel. I then discuss four reasons why the standard account is superior: it better fits legal reality, the account of other fallacies, psychological science, and political reality.


The 2010 political unrest in Thailand manifested countrywide divisions between the Red supporters of the ousted prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, and the Yellow supporters of the government. One of the few places where these two sides communicated is online political discussion forums. This chapter examines one such forum using coding for civility and argumentation, corpus analysis, and qualitative discourse analysis to see whether the forum promotes agonism or antagonism. The findings show that messages generally focus on attacking others’ beliefs rather than justifying own beliefs, and that the forum is dominated by antagonistic Thai Yellow contributors with most Red contributors being foreigners. The confrontational discourse suggests that reconciliation between the two sides is unlikely.


Johnson builds on the idea that agents, at least sometimes, have an epistemic obligation to voice disagreements. Any of four background theories, inspired by influential work in social epistemology, can generate these obligations. However, each background theory generates obligations with different characteristics. Johnson explores these differences by looking at the extent and
limits of each. Key questions include the conditions under which agents should voice their disagreement, and to what extent that disagreement must be sincere. One way of asking this second question is to ask, to what extent are we epistemically obligated to play devil’s advocate?


Empathy can be terribly important when we talk to people who are different from ourselves. And it can be terribly important that we talk to people who are different precisely about those things that make us different. If we’re to have productive conversations across differences, then, it seems we must develop empathy with people who are deeply different. But, as Laurie Paul and others point out, it can be impossible to imagine oneself as someone who is deeply different than oneself—something that plausible definitions of empathy seem to require. How then, can these terribly important conversations take place? I argue that philosophical and psychological work on intellectual humility can show us a way to empathize and have these conversations even when we can’t imagine ourselves as the other.


*Ad hominem* arguments are generally dismissed on the grounds that they are not attempts to engage in rational discourse, but are rather aimed at undermining argument by diverting attention from claims made to assessments of character of persons making claims. The manner of this dismissal however is based upon an unlikely paradigm of rationality: it is based upon the presumption that our intellectual capacities are not as limited as in fact they are, and do not vary as much as they do between rational people. When we understand rationality in terms of intellectual virtues, however, which recognize these limitations and provide for the complexity of our thinking, *ad hominem* considerations can sometimes be relevant to assessing arguments.


Aristotle’s writings on the subjects of ethics, rhetoric, and politics advance a view in which these arts are fundamentally interrelated. Moreover, this view implies some striking and significant conclusions concerning the proper function of communication in humanity’s search for virtue and well-being. This essay explores and seeks to clarify the relationship in Aristotle’s thought among these arts, and argues finally for a unifying vision of moral virtue, suseive speech, and the deliberative activities of the polis. For Aristotle, the political life of the human community is the agency by which individual moral visions are tested, clarified, modified, and shared, giving rise to the particular moral truths that serve to ground individual conduct and social policy, and thus that serve to guide the development of individual character and community life.


What kind of higher education will allow us to meet the challenges of a 21st century economy? Though we are repeatedly told that we need to produce more specialists in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Math), the best education suited to our age is a well-rounded, liberal education in natural science and the humanities. Looking backward to Ancient Greece, we introduce and explain the history of liberal arts education. The model of that form of education, adapted to the demands of the modern world, can be found at St. John’s College, which requires a general education in the tradition of Western great books. That education cultivates the habits of virtue, of discussion, of translation, writing, experimentation, mathematical demonstration, and musical analysis to train students to become highly adaptable, creative thinkers around complex problems. Paradoxically, it is the oldest education in the arts of understanding that, as our pioneers in the fields of technology and entrepreneurship have demonstrated, will prepare students to be “future-proof” in the uncertain economy of the future.


This essay employs the samurai and their virtue-oriented *bushido* code as a conceptual framework for legal professionalism and civility to promote a greater consciousness of virtue-oriented lawyering—the hallmark of an ethical and socially responsible lawyer. However, I do not purport to be an expert on *bushido* or the virtues it represents, for these topics have been the subject of philosophical discourse for centuries. I hope to illuminate the congruence between *bushido* and the modern practice of law as a way to inspire thoughtful reflection on legal professionalism in a meaningful way.


Deep disagreement is a disagreement about epistemic principles relating to the choice of justification and argumentation methods. Relying on the conceptual metaphor of “hinges” by Wittgenstein, the researchers conclude that deep disagreement cannot be resolved. This conclusion leads to relativism in the argumentation theory. The purpose of the study is to show that, in case of deep disagreement, one can theoretically determine which of parties in dispute has better epistemic status and, consequently, is argumentatively virtuous. To substantiate this thesis, we propose carrying out such thought experiment as an epistemic method game by M. Lynch and applying the virtue argumentation...
theory by D. Cohen and A. Aberdein. This research has a purely theoretical, philosophical aim to criticize relativism in argumentation theory and justify its regulatory status. The right moves in argumentation are such that an agent with the entire argumentative virtues would prefer, and wrong moves, or argumentative fallacies, are such that an agent with argumentative virtues would make.


This article substantiates the relevance of personality qualities, such as epistemic virtues and epistemic vices, for the interpretation of informal argumentation in public discourse. An internalist approach to argumentation is suggested. From this perspective, “good” argumentation is defined as “virtuous” and faulty argumentation as “vicious”. The interpretation of some informal fallacies of argumentation in the context of virtue theory is considered: “Ad Hominem”, “Straw Man”, “Argument to Authority”. It is shown that reference to the conceptual apparatus of virtue theory reveals justified and unjustified uses of these arguments. Some criticisms of the use of the aretaic approach to argumentation in general are also discussed.


An argument developed by Michael Huemer raises doubts about the epistemic responsibility of taking a “critical thinking” approach to belief formation. This paper takes issue with Huemer’s depiction of critical thinking as an approach that rejects all reliance on the intellectual authority of others, and it offers a more realistic depiction. The paper ultimately contends that Huemer’s argument fails because it rests on an impoverished and unaccountably individualistic notion of epistemic responsibility.


I will argue that the ethic of expediency in Western culture which Aristotle first treated systematically in the Rhetoric, the Nicomachean Ethics, and especially the Politics, was rhetorically embraced by the Nazi regime and combined with science and technology to form the “moral basis” of the Holocaust. While there is a concern for ethics in the field of technical communication, and while few in our society believe expediency is an adequate moral basis for making decisions, I will suggest that it is the ethic of expedience that enables deliberative rhetoric and gives impulse to most of our actions in technological capitalism as well, and I will explore some of the implications and dangers of a rhetoric grounded exclusively in an ethic of expediency.


The tradition of Nyāya philosophy centers on a dispassionate quest for truth which is simultaneously connected to soteriological and epistemic aims. In this paper, I show how Vācaspats Miśra brings together the soteriological concept of dispassion (vātāra) with the discourse practices of debate (kāthā), as a response to Buddhist criticisms in Dharmacīrti’s Vādānaya. He defends the Nyāyasūtra’s stated position that fallacious reasoning is a legitimate means for a debate, under certain circumstances. Dharmacīrti argues that such reasoning is rationally ineffective and indicates unvirtuous qualities. For Vācaspats, fallacies are a way to prevent the spread of morally weighty falsehoods when no other method is available to a debater. After showing textual relationships between Vācaspats’s defense and Dharmacīrti’s earlier criticism, I evaluate their arguments, concluding that Vācaspats’s position involves irresolvable tensions with other Nyāya commitments.


Throughout the history of western philosophy, the Socratic injunction to ‘follow the argument where it leads’ has exerted a powerful attraction. But what is it, exactly, to follow the argument where it leads? I explore this intellectual ideal and offer a modest proposal as to how we should understand it. On my proposal, following the argument where it leads involves a kind of relationship between the ideal and common sense or ‘Moorean’ responses to revisionary philosophical theorizing.


This paper offers an analysis of the structure of epistemic vice-charging, the critical practice of charging other persons with epistemic vice. Several desiderata for a robust vice-charge are offered and two deep obstacles to the practice of epistemic vice-charging are then identified and discussed. The problem of responsibility is that few of us enjoy conditions that are required for effective socialisation as responsible epistemic agents. The problem of consensus is that the efficacy of a vice-charge is contingent upon a degree of consensus between critic and target that is unlikely or impossible where vice-charging is most likely to be provoked. It emerges that a robust critical practice of vice-charging is possible in principle, but very difficult in practice.


In this paper, I explore the relationship of virtue, argumentation, and philosophical conduct by considering the role of the specific virtue of intellectual humility in the practice of philosophical argumentation. I have three aims: first, to sketch an account of this virtue; second, to argue that it can be cultivated by engaging in argumentation with others; and third, to problematize this claim by drawing upon recent data from social psychology. My claim is that philosophical argumentation can be conducive to the cultivation of virtues, including humility, but only if it is conceived and practiced in appropriately ‘edifying’ ways.

[404] Ian James Kidd. Epistemic vices in public debate: The case of ‘new atheism’. In Christopher Cotter, Philip Quadrio, &
In this chapter, my concern is with a set of criticisms that, though quite familiar, are surprisingly neglected in the literature on the new atheists: that the new atheists typically evince negative character traits, or vices, such as arrogance, dogmatism, and closed-mindedness.


This Chapter challenges the common claim that vicious forms of argumentative practice, like interpersonal arrogance and discursive polarisation, are caused by mutual metaphors, such as ARGUMENT AS WAR. I argue that the problem isn’t the metaphor, but our wider practices of metaphorising and the ways they are deformed by invidious cultural biases and prejudices. Drawing on feminist argumentation theory, I argue that misogynistic cultures distort practices of metaphorising in two ways. First, they spotlight some associations between the martial and argumentative domains while occluding others, resulting in a sort of myopia. Second, those cultures interfere with a phenomenon I label normative isomorphism—the capacity of some structural metaphors to enable (and often encourage) a transfer of normative character traits from the source domain to the target domain. Crucially, the normative status of character trait often changes across domains—traits that are virtuous in the martial domain are often vicious in the argumentative domain, and vice versa. Sexist myopia tends to deform practices of metaphorising by interfering with normative isomorphism by privileging the transfer across domains of traits that recapitulate invidious cultural constructions of masculinity in terms of aggression, domination, and violence. Basically, the problem isn’t the metaphors, but the cultures.


Among proponents of critical thinking, Harvey Siegel stands out in his attempt to address fundamental epistemological issues. Siegel argues that discursive inclusion of diverse groups should not be confused with rational justification of the outcome of inquiry. He maintains that epistemic virtues such as inclusion are neither necessary nor sufficient for rational judgment, and that if we are to avoid falling prey to relativism, criteria are needed to distinguish which of these virtues are indeed rational. However, the author argues that at least some of Siegel’s own rational criteria cannot pass the “necessary or sufficient” standard by which he measures epistemic virtues. Moreover, reliance upon criteria fails to settle conflict in cases of disagreement over what constitutes authoritative evidence. Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality can help us to overcome this impasse, because it provides a non-relativistic basis for justifying inclusion and giving it a place of priority in practical reasoning.


In this paper I argue that Confucius’ view of learning in the Analects entails critical thinking. Although he neither specified the logical rules of good reasoning nor theorised about the structure of argument, Confucius advocated and emphasised the importance of critical thinking. For Confucius reflective thinking of two sorts is essential to learning: (1) reflection on the materials of knowledge, in order to synthesise and systemise the raw materials into a whole, and to integrate them into oneself as wisdom; (2) reflection on oneself, (a) in order to ensure that such synthesis, systemisation, and integration proceed in an open-minded, fair and autonomous way, and (b) in order to integrate knowledge with the self, that is, to internalise it until it becomes oneself.


A dialogue-based analysis of informal fallacies does not provide a fully adequate explanation of our intuitions about what is wrong with ad baculum and of when it is admissible and when it is not. The dialogue-based analysis explains well why mild, benign threats can be legitimate in some situations, such as cooperative bargaining and negotiation, but does not satisfactorily account for what is objectionable about more malicious uses of threats to coerce and to intimidate. I propose an alternative deriving partly from virtue theory in ethics and epistemology and partly from Kantian principles of respect for persons as ends-in-themselves. I examine some specific kinds of social relations, e.g., parent-child and partner relationships, and ask what kinds of threats are permissible in these relationships and especially what is wrong with the objectionable threats. My explanation is framed in terms of the good character and contributing virtues of the ideal parent or partner on the one hand, and the bad character and contributing vices of the abusive parent or violent partner on the other. This analysis puts the discussion of threats in the context of virtue theory, of human flourishing, and of the kind of social relations it is best to have. In general, what’s wrong with argumentum ad baculum should be explained in terms of the intentions, purposes, and character of threateners, and the differences in intentions and purposes for which threats are made. The characters of those who make the threats will provide the criteria for distinguishing benign and malicious threats.


In this paper I provide support for the view that at least some forms of adversariness in argumentation are legitimate. The support comes from Aristotle’s theory of illegitimate adversarial argumentation in dialectical contexts: his theory of eristic in his work On Sophistical Refutations. Here Aristotle develops non-epistemic standards for evaluating the legitimacy of dialectical procedures, standards which I propose can be understood in terms of the pragmatic notion of context as common ground. Put briefly, Aristotle makes the answerer’s meaning in giving assent in dialectical contexts the basis for further moves in the game of dialectic.
Moves which subvert the answerer's meaning or do not solicit the answerer's consent are marked as eristic, i.e. adversarial in a problematic sense. I conclude with remarks on what Aristotle's theory may teach us about how semantic features relate to the normative evaluation of argumentation.

Much recent work in virtue epistemology has focused on the analysis of such intellectual virtues as responsibility, conscientiousness, honesty, courage, open-mindedness, firmness, humility, charity, and wisdom. Absent from the literature is an extended examination of perseverance as an intellectual virtue. The present paper aims to fill this void. In Sect. 1, I clarify the concept of an intellectual virtue, and distinguish intellectual virtues from other personal characters and properties. In Sect. 2, I provide a conceptual analysis of intellectually virtuous perseverance that places perseverance in opposition to its vice-counterparts, intransigence and irresolution. The virtue is a matter of continuing in one's intellectual activities for an appropriate amount of time, in the pursuit of intellectual goods, despite obstacles to one's attainment of those goods. In Sect. 3, I explore relations between intellectually virtuous perseverance and other intellectual virtues. I argue that such perseverance is necessary for the possession and exercise of several other intellectual properties. In this article, we research a particular instance of such negotiation, drawing lessons for health promotion and for COVID-19 communication. We study a Norwegian television debate in which an MD presented harsh criticism of the health authorities' chosen crisis response in the early phase of the pandemic. Unpacking the rhetorical constitution of the expert ethos of the MD and of the health authorities, respectively, we find that representatives of the authorities are more open to participation and better at connecting to everyday experiences than the MD, who primarily builds her expert ethos on mastery of scientific language and methods, combined with alarmist rhetoric. Further, we identify main tenets of the public's reception of the debate through an analysis of 1961 tweets that commented on the program. The analysis indicates that public health authorities might maintain high levels of trust by rhetorically cultivating their positions within institutional and (social) media networks of expertise.

Arguably, one of the defining traits of an expert is certainty of knowledge. So, what happens when experts in a critical situation in public simultaneously must recognize uncertainty about knowledge and the situation and argue for specific policies and actions? This has been the challenge for many national health experts during the COVID-19 crisis. We examine such argumentative strategies by asking: what are the argumentative strategies used when attempting to secure and bolster the ethos of expertise when an expert must also acknowledge uncertainty and insufficient knowledge? The chapter examines such argumentative strategies by health authorities participating in debate and interview programs. Contrary to previous research our findings indicate that the health experts do acknowledge uncertainty, often explicitly, and also do it as a way of bolstering their ethos. Firstly, our analyses point to two ways of introducing and expressing uncertainty and lack of knowledge. Secondly, our analyses point to six ways of delimiting and qualifying the expressed uncertainty in a way that rebolsters the expert’s authority and ethos of expertise.

This book is for anyone interested in the subject of moral integrity in journalism, whether they are journalists, the subjects and sources of news stories, or consumers of news. Each chapter provides an analytical framework for examining fundamental concepts such as truth, bias, harm, trust, manipulation, and accountability. The principles developed in this framework are used throughout the book to analyze concrete cases.

This paper is part of an increasingly rich contribution to argument studies from disciplines studying human interaction in general. The paper is an invitation, rather than an argument, and my response is to accept the invitation. The paper offers current empirical data and theoretical considerations to ground our discussion of trust. It also invites us to consider some specific questions about how argumentation theory might incorporate this new information. I shall offer a preliminary exploration of where this might take us.


Is argument a game everyone should be able to play? If it is, current argument practices do not yet level the playing field enough for a fair game. We may build in subtle imbalances that work against people who cannot easily adapt to the most common patterns of argumentative interaction. We need better ways to build trust, to create safety, and adapt goals in order to bring everyone into the game.


It has typically been assumed that affective and social components of disagreement, such as trust and fair treatment, can be handled separately from substantive components, such as beliefs and logical principles. This has freed us to count as “deep” disagreements only those which persist even between people who have no animosity towards each other, feel equal to one another, and are willing to argue indefinitely in search of truth. A reliance on such ideal participants diverts us from the question of whether we have swept away the opportunity for some real arguers to have their voices heard, and for those voices to determine the real substance of the disagreement. If affective and social issues need to be assessed side by side with belief differences and reasoning paradigms, investigating trust may assist us to understand and make progress on the affective and social components that are involved in disagreement.


Scholars have long recognized the existence of myriad widespread deep disagreements on values, justice, morality, and ethics. In order to come to terms with such deep disagreements, resistant to rational solution, this article asserts the need for developing an ethics of disagreement. The reality that theoretical disagreements often turn into practical conflicts is a major justification for why such an ethics is necessary. This paper outlines an ethics of deep disagreement that is primarily conceived of as a form of virtue ethics. Such an ethics asks opposing parties in moral and intellectual conflicts to acknowledge that (a) deep disagreements exist, (b) opposing positions should be recognized as worthy of respect, and that (c) one should seek dialogue and mutual understanding. This ethical approach conceives of toleration as a moral and political virtue and presents an argument for toleration based on deep disagreements.


Contributing to an understanding of the true virtues of argumentation, this paper sketches and exemplifies a theoretically reasoned but simple typology of argumentative vices or ‘malpractices’ that are rampant in political debate in modern democracies. The typology reflects, in negative, a set of argumentative norms, thus making a bid for something that civic instruction might profitably teach students at all levels about deliberative democracy.


The complexity of problems that engineers address requires knowledge, skills, and abilities that extend beyond technical engineering expertise, including teamwork and collaboration, problem-solving, curiosity and lifelong learning, cultural awareness, and ethical decision-making. How do we prepare engineering students to develop these essential capacities? One promising approach is to integrate character education into the undergraduate curriculum. Using an established and commonly used taxonomy advanced by the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues at the University of Birmingham, this paper explores the extent to which virtues are already incorporated into engineering education. Four prominent virtues in undergraduate engineering education are detailed in this paper: (1) critical thinking (an intellectual virtue), (2) empathy (a moral virtue), (3) service (a civic virtue), and (4) teamwork (a performance virtue). By conducting a literature review of these four virtues, we gain insight into how engineering educators already infuse virtues into engineering education and identify the gaps and opportunities that exist to enrich undergraduate engineering education through a virtue framework. Although virtues are part of engineering education, our findings reveal that most engineering educators do not explicitly describe these concepts as “virtues” and tend to treat them instead as “skills.” While virtues and skills are developed in similar ways, we identify four distinctions that reveal the added benefits of recasting and cultivating these capacities as virtues: 1) virtues, unlike skills alone, are necessarily ordered to morally good ends, 2) virtues have a motivational component that skills often lack, 3) virtues involve evaluating and addressing potential conflicts among values, and 4) virtues are interconnected and mutually reinforcing in ways that skills often are not. These conceptual distinctions have practical implications for undergraduate engineering education, enabling educators to draw on the pedagogical literature in character education to help students consider their values and develop the most relevant virtues.
across a four-year curriculum. This more comprehensive and holistic approach empowers students and future engineers to better navigate the complexity of real-world ethical decision-making and develop the virtues needed to serve the greater good.


The paper discusses the nature and functioning of argumentation ad misericordiam, a well-known but less theorised type of argument. A monograph by D. Walton (1997) offers an overview of definitions of misericordia (which he eventually translates as ‘pity’), as well as the careful analysis of several cases. Appeals to pity, Walton concludes, are not necessarily fallacious. This view seems to be supported and further refined by the critical remarks of H. V. Hansen (2000), as well as the recent work of R. H. Kimball (2001, 2004) and A. Aberdein (2016) focusing on the virtue ethical aspects of such arguments. There is, on this account, a difference between ad misericordiam arguments and fallacies, even though the former may be fallacious in some cases. In this paper I argue for a narrower concept of ad misericordiam, as distinguished from the more generic class of appeals to pity, limiting it to cases in which someone asks for the non-application of a certain rule, clearly relevant to their case, with reference to some (unfavourable) circumstance, which is, however, irrelevant for the application of the rule.


In Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1.13, arguments from fairness are based on a combination of filling gaps (elleimma) in the law and an extensive or restrictive interpretation of the rule, with the latter being performed through the former. This paper examines how the concepts of ‘legal gaps’ and ‘open texture’ can contribute to our understanding of Aristotelian fairness (epiesikea).


In their book Commitment in Dialogue, Walton and Krabbe claim that formal dialogue systems for conversational argumentation are “not very realistic and not easy to apply”. This difficulty may make argumentation theory less well adapted to be employed to describe or analyse actual argumentation practice. On the other hand, the empirical study of real-life arguments may miss or ignore insights of more than the two millennia of the development of philosophy of language, rhetoric, and argumentation theory. In this paper, we propose a novel methodology for adapting such theories to serve as applicable tools in the study of argumentation phenomena. Our approach is both theoretically-informed and empirically-grounded in large-scale corpus analysis. The area of interest are appeals to ethos, the character of the speaker, building upon Aristotle’s rhetoric. Ethic techniques are used to influence the hearers through the communication, where speakers might establish, but also emphasise, weaken or undermine their own or others’ credibility and trustworthiness. Specifically, we apply our method to Aristotelian theory of ethos elements which identifies practical wisdom, moral virtue and goodwill as components of speakers’ character, which can be supported or attacked. The challenges we identified in this case and the solutions we proposed allow us to formulate general guidelines of how to exploit rich theoretical frameworks to the analysis of the practice of language use.


In this paper, a challenge is outlined for Walton’s recent analysis of the fallacy of poisoning the well. An example of the fallacy in action during a debate on affirmative action on a South African campus is taken to raise the question of how Walton’s analysis squares with the idea that disadvantaged parties in debates about race may be “epistemically privileged”. It is asked when the background of a participant is relevant to a debate and it is proposed that a proper analysis of the poisoning the well well will outline conditions under which making one participant’s background an issue in a debate would be legitimate and illegitimate. Expanding Walton’s analysis to deal with the challenge, it is concluded that calling into question a participant’s suitability to take part in a debate is never legitimate when it is based simply on a broad fact about their background (like their race or gender).


Virtue epistemology is among the dominant influences in mainstream epistemology today. An important commitment of one strand of virtue epistemology – responsibilist virtue epistemology (e.g., Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 1996; Battaly 2006; Baehr 2011) – is that it must provide regulative normative guidance for good thinking. Recently, a number of virtue epistemologists (most notably Baehr, 2013) have held that virtue epistemology not only can provide regulative normative guidance, but moreover that we should reconceive the primary epistemic aim of all education as the inculcation of the intellectual virtues. Baehr’s picture contrasts with another well-known position – that the primary aim of education is the promotion of critical thinking (Scheffler 1989; Siegel 1988; 1997; 2017). In this paper – that we hold makes a contribution to both philosophy of education and epistemology and, a fortiorem, epistemology of education – we challenge this picture. We outline three criteria that any putative aim of education must meet and hold that it is the aim of critical thinking, rather than the aim of instilling intellectual virtue, that best meets these criteria. On this basis, we propose a new challenge for intellectual virtue epistemology, next to the well-known empirically-driven ‘situationist challenge’. What we call the ‘pedagogical challenge’ maintains that the intellectual virtues approach does not have available a suitably effective pedagogy to qualify the acquisition of intellectual virtue as the primary aim of education. This is because the pedagogic model of the intellectual virtues approach (borrowed largely from exemplarist thinking) is not
properly action-guiding. Instead, we hold that, without much further development in virtue-based theory, logic and critical thinking must still play the primary role in the epistemology of education.

[426] KRISTJÁN KRISTJÁNSSON. Ten myths about character, virtue and virtue education – plus three well-founded misgivings. British Journal of Educational Studies, 61(3):269–287, 2013. Initiatives to cultivate character and virtue in moral education at school continue to provoke sceptical responses. Most of those echo familiar misgivings about the notions of character, virtue and education in virtue – as unclear, redundant, old-fashioned, religious, paternalistic, anti-demonstrative, conservative, individualistic, relative and situation-dependent. I expose those misgivings as ‘myths’, while at the same time acknowledging three better-founded historical, methodological and practical concerns about the notions in question.

[427] KRISTJÁN KRISTJÁNSSON. On the old saw that dialogue is a Socratic but not an Aristotelian method of moral education. Educational Theory, 64(4):333–348, 2014. Kristján Kristjánsson’s aim in this article is to bury the old saw that dialogue is exclusively a Socratic but not an Aristotelian method of education for moral character. Although the truncated discussion in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics of the character development of the young may indicate that it is merely the result of a mindless process of behavioral conditioning, Nancy Sherman has argued convincingly that such a process would never yield the end result that Aristotle deems all-important—a precondition for the ascription of virtue—namely, reason-infused phronesis. Rather than having to rely on impressionistic Aristotelian reconstructions here, Kristjánsson observes, considerable enlightenment can be gleaned by studying Aristotle’s account of friendship, especially his account of how character friends reciprocally construct each other’s selfhood through sustained, dialectical engagement. It is clear from this description that ideal character building essentially involves dialogue. If that is correct, however, in the case of character friendship, new light can be shed on other Aristotelian staples of character education, such as role modeling and the use of literature and music, as those will then also, by parity of reasoning, involve sustained use of a dialogical method.

[428] TONE KVERNBEEK. Johnson, MacIntyre, and the practice of argumentation. Informal Logic, 28(3):262–278, 2008. This article is a discussion of Ralph Johnson’s concept of practice of argumentation. Such practice is characterized by three properties: (1) It is teleological, (2) it is dialectical, and (3) it is manifestly rational. I argue that Johnson’s preferred definition of practice—which is Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of practice as a human activity with internal goods accessible through participation in that same activity—does not fit these properties or features. I also suggest that this failure should not require Johnson to adjust the properties to make them fit the practice concept. While MacIntyre’s concept of practice clearly has some attractive features, it does not provide what Johnson wants from a concept of practice.

[429] TONE KVERNBEEK. Commentary on Daniel H. Cohen and Katharina Stevens, “Virtuous vices: On objectivity and bias in argumentation”. In Patrick Bondy & Laura Benacquista, eds., Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21, 2016. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2016. I have contented myself to comment on just a small bit of Cohen and Stevens’ paper. I have left out all the stuff about virtues and vices, and have concentrated on bias and objectivity. If I apply Mackenzie’s understanding of bias to my own commentary, I am forced to conclude that it is far from unbiased as I have left lots of possible considerations untreated. But then again I might be off the hook – I was after all allowed by the authors to adopt a bias.

[430] JACK M. C. KWONG. Epistemic injustice and open-mindedness. Hypatia, 30(2):337–351, 2015. In this paper, I argue that recent discussions of culprit-based epistemic injustices can be framed around the intellectual character virtue of open-mindedness. In particular, these injustices occur because the people who commit them are closed-minded in some respect; the injustices can therefore be remedied through the cultivation of the virtue of open-mindedness. Describing epistemic injustices this way has two explanatory benefits: it yields a more parsimonious account of the phenomenon of epistemic injustice and it provides the underpinning of a virtue-theoretical structure by which to explain what it is that perpetrators are culpable for and how virtues can have normative explanatory power.

[431] JACK M. C. KWONG. Open-mindedness as a critical virtue. Topoi, 35(2):403–411, 2016. This paper proposes to examine Daniel Cohen’s recent attempt to apply virtues to argumentation theory, with special attention given to his explication of how open-mindedness can be regarded as an argumentational or critical virtue. It is argued that his analysis involves a contentious claim about open-mindedness as an epistemic virtue, which generates a tension for agents who are simultaneously both an arguer and a knower (or who strive to be both). I contend that this tension can be eased or resolved by clarifying the nature of open-mindedness and by construing open-mindedness in terms of its function. Specifically, a willingness to take a novel viewpoint seriously is sufficient for making open-mindedness both an epistemic and a critical virtue.

[432] JACK M. C. KWONG. Open-mindedness as engagement. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 54(1):70–86, 2016. Open-mindedness is an under-explored topic in virtue epistemology, despite its assumed importance for the field. Questions about it abound and need to be answered. For example, what sort of intellectual activities are central to it? Can one be open-minded about one’s firmly held beliefs? Why should we strive to be open-minded? This paper aims to shed light on these and other pertinent issues. In particular, it proposes a view that construes open-mindedness as engagement, that is, a willingness to entertain novel ideas in one’s cognitive space and to accord them serious consideration.

Open-mindedness is generally regarded as an intellectual virtue because its exercise reliably leads to truth. However, some theorists have argued that open-mindedness’s truth-conduciveness is highly contingent, pointing out that it is either not truth-conducive at all under certain scenarios or no better than dogmatism or credulity in others. Given such shaky ties to truth, it would appear that the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is in jeopardy. In this paper, I propose to defend open-mindedness against these challenges. In particular, I show that the challenges are ill-founded because they misconstrue the nature of open-mindedness and fail to consider the requisite conditions of its application. With a proper understanding of open-mindedness and of its requirements, it is clear that recourse to it is indeed truth-conducive.


This paper explores how open-mindedness and its exercise can be social in nature. In particular, it argues that an individual can be regarded as open-minded even though she does not conduct all of the intellectual tasks as required by open-mindedness by herself; that is, she delegates some of these tasks to her epistemic peers. Thinking about open-mindedness in such social terms not only opens up the possibility that there are different and surprising ways for an individual to be open-minded, but can also help offset some recent criticisms raised against open-mindedness and its status as an intellectual virtue.


Post-truth trades on the corruption of argument and evidence to protect ideological commitment and social identity. We distinguish two kinds of post-truth environments, epistemic bubbles and echo chambers, and argue that facets of post-truth are countered the more science (and general) education encourages the development of intellectual virtues and internalization of science identity. After first locating our perspective on intellectual virtues within virtue epistemology and Aristotelian virtue theory, we argue that intellectual character is strongly metacognitive and requires a concept of science identity to provide a motivational force to the work of virtues. Our educational response to post-truth focuses on Aristotelian-inspired pedagogy for teaching virtues, metacognitive virtue strategies, and the development of science identity. The internalization of science identity is further developed in terms of moral education and Self-Determination Theory. We suggest further lines of theory and research and conclude that science education is in the business of character education.


Argumentation that uses the beliefs of one’s opponents to refute them is well known (ab hominem in the classical sense). This paper proposes that there is a hitherto unnoticed counterpart to it, to be called ab homine, in which speakers/writers argue through the manner in which they deliver a message. Since the manner of delivery can never be turned into a premise or premises, this form of argumentation—although somewhat resembling Aristotle’s ethos—is much closer to the peculiar force of Socratic elenchos.


Perelman’s view of the role of persons in argument is one of the most distinctive features of his break with Cartesian assumptions about reasoning. Whereas the rationalist paradigm sought to minimize or eliminate personal considerations by dismissing them as distracting and irrelevant, Perelman insists that argumentation inevitably does and ought to place stress on the specific persons engaged in an argument and that the relationship between speaker and what is spoken is always relevant and important. In taking this position, Perelman implicitly revives the classical conception of proof by character (ethos or “ethotic” argument), but despite an extended discussion of act and person in argument, The New Rhetoric does not give much consideration to the classical concept and confuses differing approaches to it within the tradition. The result is that Perelman treats the role of the speaker in argument only by reference to abstract techniques and does not recognize the importance of examining particular cases in order to thicken understanding of how ethotic argument works in the complex, situated context of its actual use. Consequently, Perelman’s account of the role of persons in argument should be supplemented by reference to case studies, and to that end, I consider ethotic argument in W.E.B. Du Bois’ famous essay “Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others”.


Many of us read Peter Singer’s work on our obligations to those in desperate need with our students. Famously, Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give a significant portion of our assets to famine relief. If my own experience is not atypical, it is quite common for students, upon grasping the implications of Singer’s argument, to ask whether Singer gives to famine relief. In response it might be tempting to remind students of the (so called) ad hominem fallacy of attacking the person advancing an argument rather than the argument itself. In this paper I argue that the “ad hominem reply” to students’ request for information about Singer is misguided. First I show that biographical facts about the person advancing an argument can constitute indirect evidence for the soundness/unsoundness of the argument. Second, I argue that such facts are relevant because they may reveal that one can discard the argument without thereby incurring moral responsibility for failing to act on its conclusion even if the argument is sound.


Eristic has been studied more and more intensively in recent years in philosophy, law, communication theory, logic, proof theory, and A.I. Nevertheless, the modern origins of eristic, which almost all current researchers see in the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, are considered to be a theory of the illegitimate use of logical and rhetorical devices. Thus, eristic seems to violate the norms of discourse ethics. In this paper, I argue
that this interpretation of eristic is based on prejudices that contradict the original intention of modern eristic. Eristic is not an art of being right or winning an argument, but an art of protecting oneself from the one who deliberately violates norms of discourse ethics to gain argumentative acceptance. For this reason, eristic must be seen as a discipline of Enlightenment philosophy and a correlate of discourse ethics. Especially in the age of alternative facts and post-factual politics, this makes eristic a valuable discipline.


Mark Warren may be right that it is worth considering relaxing the sincerity norm that underpins much theorizing in deliberative democracy in favor of a commitment to insincerity in the form of good manners. However, we should not yet commit ourselves to so doing until a few issues are clarified: (1) We must have a detailed account of the motivation individuals might have to take up the attitude of strategic good manners (given that the adoption of these manners implies a rejection of the view that the recipients of these good manners are deserving of equal consideration); (2) we must carefully distinguish situations in which insincerity is harmful from those in which it is beneficial from the perspective of achieving genuine resolution to sensitive issues; (3) we need to have a clear account of whether good manners apply to the content of speech or merely the demeanor with which speech is presented; and (4) we need an account of the nature of the transformative effect we can expect from insincerity, as well as an account of the conditions under which this transformative effect is possible and likely. I worried here that Warren ignores the possible impact that known insincerities—deployed as an element of strategic good manners—will have on the trust relations that necessarily underpin cooperative communication. Until these details are provided, we ought to be wary of turning away from our prima facie commitment to sincerity in deliberation.


This paper contends that most of us have no duty to gather evidence on both sides of controversial moral and political questions. On the contrary, on most of the controversial questions debated in our newspapers and on television, we actually ought to refrain from gathering such evidence. ‘Balance’ and open-mindedness will tend to lead not to rationality and justification, but to their opposite.


We are constantly called upon to evaluate the evidential weight of testimony, and to balance its deliverances against our own independent thinking. ‘Intellectual autonomy’ is the virtue that is supposed to be displayed by those who engage in cognition in this domain well. I argue that this is at best a misleading label for the virtue, because virtuous cognition in this domain consists in thinking with others, and intelligently responding to testimony. I argue that the existing label supports an excessively individualistic conception of good thinking, both within and outside philosophy. I propose replacing ‘intellectual autonomy’ with ‘intellectual interdependence’, which properly emphasizes the depth of our reliance on one another, without suggesting we ought ever to be epistemically servile.


A maxim is a proposition that tells people how to act. The use of a maxim is a maxim argument. Such arguments can show the character of the speaker and are mainly used in deliberative speech. The reasoning mode that practical wisdom makes people possess is the normative structure of maxim arguments. Thus, normative argument has “ends–means” schemes and “rule–case” schemes.


In this essay, I argue the value of integrating aspects of social identity theory with informal logic generally. Interpretation and judgment can break down in rhetorical contexts where social differences are significant. This is often the result of “residual prejudice” (Fricker, 2007) and unconscious bias. Using several examples from a study on classroom dialogue in an inner city Midwestern elementary school, I show how bias was the result of unreflective and unconscious social attitudes. I propose a 4 stage process of “intellectual empathy” as a route to more socially reflective thinking, drawing on the strengths of informal logic and social theory.


I argue that Kotzee’s (*Argumentation* 24:265–281, 2010) model of meta-debate succeeds in identifying illegitimate or fallacious charges of bias but has the unintended consequence of classifying some legitimate and non-fallacious charges as fallacious. This makes the model, in some important cases, counter-productive. In particular, cases where the call for a meta-debate is prompted by the participant with epistemic privilege and a charge of bias is denied by the participant with social advantage, the impasse will put the epistemically advantaged at far greater risk. Therefore, I propose treating epistemic privilege as a variety of expert opinion specifically in cases where meta-debate participants come to an impasse in deliberation. My proposal exposes the problem of interpreting debate contexts as both adversarial and free from social power differentials.


The aim of this talk is to defend the relevance and the value of the study of argumentative virtues. Paying attention to the latter proves helpful, in the first instance, for the purpose of analyzing certain phenomena inherent to our argumentative practices. In the second instance and from a methodological perspective focusing on argumentative virtues — rather than developing a theory of argumentation based on virtue

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(Virtue Argumentation Theory) – may broaden argumentation theorists’ outlooks on the logical practices deployed by rational agents. In particular, it will be argued that adopting this perspective on argumentative virtues helps overcome the retrospective bias of argumentation theory, with valuable consequences of a political and pedagogical nature.

[447] Christopher W. Love. The epistemic value of civil disagreement. Social Theory and Practice, 47(4):629–655, 2021. In this article, I argue that the practice of civil disagreement has robust epistemic benefits and that these benefits enable meaningful forms of reconciliation—across worldview lines and amid the challenging information environment of our age. I then engage two broad groups of objections: either that civil disagreement opposes, rather than promotes, clarity, or else that it does little to help it. If successful, my account gives us reason to include civil disagreement among what Mill calls “the real morality of public discussion,” a fact that should stir us to take more seriously the decline of civility in contemporary life.

[448] James MacAllister. Virtue epistemology and the philosophy of education. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 46(2):251–270, 2012. This article initially provides a brief overview of virtue epistemology; it thereafter considers some possible ramifications of this branch of the theory of knowledge for the philosophy of education. The main features of three different manifestations of virtue epistemology are first explained. Importantly, it is then maintained that developments in virtue epistemology may offer the resources to critique aspects of the debate between Hirst and Carr about how the philosophy of education ought to be carried out and by whom. Wilfred Carr’s position—that educational practitioners have privileged access to philosophical knowledge about teaching practice—will in particular be questioned. It will be argued that Carr’s view rests on a form of epistemology, internalism, which places unreasonably narrow restrictions upon the range of actors and ways, in which philosophical knowledge of and/or for education might be achieved. In declaring that practical wisdom regarding teaching is ‘entirely dependent’ on practitioner reflection, Carr not only radically deviates from Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom, he also, in effect, renders redundant all philosophical research about education that is not initiated by teachers in this manner. It is concluded that Aristotle’s general approach to acquiring information and knowledge about the world might yet still offer a foundation for a more comprehensive philosophy of education; one that makes clear that the professional testimony and reflection of teachers, observation of teaching practice, and already existing educational philosophy, theory and policy can all be perceived as potentially valuable sources of philosophical knowledge of and for education.


[450] Alice MacLachlan. Rude inquiry: Should philosophy be more polite? Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 31(2):175–198, 2021. Should philosophers be more polite to one another? The topic of good manners—or, more grandly, civility—has enjoyed a recent renaissance in philosophical circles (Buss 1999; Calhoun 2000; Burrow 2010; Westacott 2011; Stohr 2012; Reiheld 2013; Zerilli 2014; Olberding 2019), but little of the formal discussion has been self-directed: that is, it has not examined the virtues and vices of polite and impolite philosophizing, in particular. This is an oversight; practices of rudeness do rather a lot of work in enacting distinctly (analytic) philosophical modes of engagement, in ways that both shape and detract from the aims of our discipline. If we fail to recognize practices of rudeness, we become vulnerable to some of their confounding effects, and we miss their capacity to chill and exclude. Despite these dangers, there are reasons not to embrace the abolition of rudeness, both on its own merits and for the risks inherent in any abolitionist project. My argument proceeds in four stages. First, I provide an analysis of rudeness, detailing its complex relationship to disrespect. Second, I identify three varieties of philosophical rudeness, and consider the extent to which they are intrinsic or extrinsic to philosophical practices. In the final two sections, I provide the case for and against philosophical rudeness, highlighting its variable value—and I conclude with some modest proposals for its regulation.


The incompleteness problem for virtue ethics is inherited by a virtue-based theory of argumentation as developed by Daniel Cohen (2007). A complete normative theory of argumentation should be able to provide reasons for why argumentative virtues such as opennessmindedness are worthwhile, along with being able to resolve conflicts of such virtues. Adumbrating virtue-based argumentation theory with a pragmatic utilitarian approach constitutes a more complete theory that can account for why argumentative virtues are worthwhile.

[452] B. J. C. Madison. Is open-mindedness truth-conducive? Synthese, 196:2075–2087, 2019. What makes an intellectual virtue a virtue? A straightforward and influential answer to this question has been given by virtue-reliabilists: a trait is a virtue if and only if it is truth-conducive. In this paper I shall contend that recent arguments advanced by Jack Kwong in defence of the reliabilist view are good as far as they go, in that they advance the debate by usefully clarifying ways in which to best understand the nature of open-mindedness. But I shall argue that these considerations do not establish the desired conclusions that open-mindedness is truth-conducive. To establish these much stronger conclusions we would need an adequate reply to what I shall call Montmarquet’s objection. I argue that Linda Zagzebski’s reply to Montmarquet’s...
objection, to which Kwong defers, is inadequate. I conclude that it is contingent if open-mindedness is truth-conducive, and if a necessary tie to truth is what makes an intellectual virtue a virtue, then the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is jeopardised. We either need an adequate reliabilist response to Montmarquet’s objection, or else seek alternative accounts of what it is that makes a virtue a virtue. I conclude by briefly outlining some alternatives.


“One who elects to serve mankind by taking the law into his own hands thereby demonstrates his conviction that his own ability to determine policy is superior to democratic decision making. [Defendants’] professed unselfish motivation, rather than a justification, actually identifies a form of arrogance which organized society cannot tolerate.” Those were the words of Justice Harris L. Hartz at the sentencing hearing of three nuns convicted of trespassing and vandalizing government property to demonstrate against U.S. foreign policy. Citizens engaging in civil disobedience are indeed at times accused of being arrogant because they apparently think their own political judgment is superior to that of the democratic majority. This paper examines and evaluates the claim that dissenters are epistemically arrogant. Contrary to the dominant viewpoint in the literature, I argue that epistemic arrogance involves inflating the epistemic worth of one’s view. Indeed, the most plausible charge against civil dissenters consists of two claims: (A) civil dissenters have a higher degree of rational certainty in P than is warranted, and (B) civil dissenters use a method of expression that requires a higher level of rational certainty than is warranted in the propositions that their political view is right and the injustice they fight is substantial. I argue that civil disobedience does not necessarily involve epistemic arrogance. Whether an act of civil disobedience evinces epistemic arrogance has to be determined on a case-by-case basis depending on the extent to which each dissenter lives up to (A) and (B).


In contemporary society, as in classical Greece, we need citizens that deliberate well both for themselves and for society overall. Different competitors contend about the right principles in the theory of education. This paper holds that ‘character education’, descending from the ancient ethics of virtues, still represents the best option available for people who want to deliberate well for the common good. A special place in deliberation is taken by legal reasoning because the law is central in the distribution of goods in our society. Rather than focusing only on rules and principles I follow the EV approach and focus on the qualities of the good decision-maker, the reasonable judge. The intellectual virtues of phronesis and techné combine those personal and professional qualities that we want at work in any judge. But it is the exercise of the civic art of rhetoric that expresses at best the public dimension of the reasonable judge.


The ‘reasonable person standard’ (RPS) is often called on in difficult legal cases as the last resource to be appealed to when other solutions run out. Its complexity derives from the controversial tasks that people place on it. Two dialectics require some clarification: the objective/subjective interpretation of the standard and the ideal/ordinary person controversy. I shall move through these dialectics from the standpoint of an EV (ethics of virtues) approach, assuming that on this interpretation the RPS can perform most persuasively its tasks. The all-round model of phronic agent that I present not only works better than competing models—such as the utilitarian-economic and the Rawlsian—in the law of tort but shows its best potentialities in other kinds of cases. In criminal law and matrimonial law cases the recourse to the EV approach offers through the virtues rich and substantial resources to evaluate conflictual cases. This approach makes the threshold of evaluation much closer to real life than competitors.


Reasonableness is a complex notion recently developed by legal and political theorists. John Rawls’ famous proposal of ‘reasonableness as reciprocity’ requires careful testing in the light of several criteria arising from legal doctrine and adjudication. I enquire into this variety of concepts in search of a common thread that makes sense of the use of the same concept in diverse contexts. I assume the normative thrust of reasonableness as an institutional and an individual virtue the basic core of which derives from Aristotelian phronesis. However, this double aspect of reasonableness betrays its major complexity that I try to shape through the help of two categories: subjective agency and objective context. The upshot of my enquiry will be that of showing that we can use another model, alternative to Rawls’ and better able to make sense of the variety of legal and ethical uses: Von Wright’s reasonableness as ‘the right way of living’.


As a philosophy instructor, I strive to get my students to think critically about the subject matter. However, over the years I have encountered many students who seem to deliberately want to avoid thinking critically. I am talking particularly about some students in my “Science and Religion” course, who subscribe to scientific creationism and endorse anti–scientific beliefs which seem to be irrational. In this essay, I will offer reflections of my experiences from these classes, and argue that individuals who subscribe to creationism exhibit a combination of epistemic vices that makes them prone to holding incorrect views. Employing Quassim Cassam’s framework on the epistemic vices of conspiracy theorists in his “Vice Epistemology”, I argue that the creationists’ beliefs can best be understood as resulting from similar vices. Subsequently, I move to consider the reasons why these students subscribe to creationism, using Katherine Dormandy’s analysis in her “Does Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?” as a
springboard. Following Dormandy, I explore how epistemic vices (in particular the lack of epistemic humility) lead to someone holding false—even irrational—beliefs. Finally, I will consider strategies in dealing with vice-charging the epistemically vicious students in a way that avoids the practical difficulties noted by Ian James Kidd in his “Charging Others with Epistemic Vice”.

[458] Alessia Marabini. Critical Thinking and Epistemic Injustice: An Essay in Epistemology of Education. Springer, Cham, 2022. This book argues that the mainstream view and practice of critical thinking in education mirrors a reductive and refined conception of competences that ultimately leads to forms of epistemic injustice in assessment. It defends an alternative view of critical thinking as a competence that is normative in nature rather than refined and reductive. This book contends that critical thinking competence should be at the heart of learning how to learn, but that much depends on how we understand critical thinking. The book draws from a conception of human reasoning and rationality that focuses on belief revision and is interwoven with a Bildung approach to teaching and learning: it emphasizes the relevance of knowledge and experience in making inferences.

[459] Patricia Marechal. Practical wisdom as conviction in Aristotle’s ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming. This paper argues that Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronesis) is a state of conviction (pistis) in the goodness of our goals based on proper grounds. This state of conviction can only be achieved if rational arguments and principles agree with how things appear to us. Since, for Aristotle, passions influence appearances, they can support or undermine our conviction in the goodness of ends. For this reason, we cannot be practically wise without virtuous dispositions to experience appropriate passions. Along the way, I argue that this reading allows us to explain the shortcomings of self-controlled and akritic agents.

[460] Lavinia Marin & Samantha Marie Copeland. Self-trust and critical thinking online: A relational account. Social Epistemology, forthcoming. An increasingly popular solution to the anti-scientific climate rising on social media platforms has been the appeal to more critical thinking from the user’s side. In this paper, we zoom in on the ideal of critical thinking and unpack it in order to see, specifically, whether it can provide enough epistemic agency so that users endowed with it can break free from enclosed communities on social media (so-called epistemic bubbles). We criticize some assumptions embedded in the ideal of critical thinking online and, instead, we propose that a better way to understand the virtuous behaviour at hand is as critical engagement, namely, a mutual cultivation of critical skills among the members of an epistemic bubble. This mutual cultivation allows members within an epistemic bubble (in contrast, as we will show, with the authority-based models of epistemic echo chambers) to become more autonomous critical thinkers by cultivating self-trust. We use the model of relational autonomy as well as resources from work on epistemic self-trust and epistemic interdependence to develop an explanatory framework, which in turn may ground rules for identifying and creating virtuous epistemic bubbles within the environments of social media platforms.

[461] Bruno Mastroianni. From the virtues of argumentation to the happiness of dispute. In Adelino Cattani & Bruno Mastroianni, eds., Competing, Cooperating, Deciding: Towards a Model of Deliberative Debate, pp. 25–41. Firenze University Press, Florence, 2021. Will there be any ‘happy dispute’ again? A debate among people holding different opinions that does not end with a repetition of the initial idea, but rather with an improvement of one’s own beliefs and those of others? In order to achieve this, we need to rely on education which, through deliberative debate training activities, can foster the development of rhetorical and dialectical skills (the ability to persuade and compete) as well as critical thinking and open-mindedness (living together and cooperating). A number of scholars from around the world reflect on the topic both from a theoretical point of view—the significance of debate in a hyperconnected society—and from a practical point of view, the application of educational models and tools to measure their effectiveness.

[462] Jeffrey Maynes. Critical thinking and cognitive bias. Informal Logic, 35(2):184–204, 2015. Teaching critical thinking skill is a central pedagogical aim in many courses. These skills, it is hoped, will be both portable (applicable in a wide range of contexts) and durable (not forgotten quickly). Yet, both of these virtues are challenged by pervasive and potent cognitive biases, such as motivated reasoning, false consensus bias and hindsight bias. In this paper, I argue that a focus on the development of metacognitive skill shows promise as a means to inculcate debiasing habits in students. Such habits will help students become more critical thinkers. I close with suggestions for implementing this strategy.

[463] Jeffrey Maynes. Steering into the skid: On the norms of critical thinking. Informal Logic, 37(2):114–128, 2017. While cognitive bias is often portrayed as a problem in need of a solution, some have argued that these biases arise from adaptive reasoning heuristics which can be rational modes of reasoning. This presents a challenge: if these heuristics are rational under the right conditions, does teaching critical thinking undermine students’ ability to reason effectively in real life reasoning scenarios? I argue that to solve this challenge, we should focus on how rational ideals are best approximated in human reasoners. Educators should focus on developing the metacognitive skill to recognize when different cognitive strategies (including the heuristics) should be used.

[464] Simona Mazilu. Reason and emotionality in argumentation in the era of globalization. Interstudia, 15:116–128, 2014. The paradoxical nature of globalization in between diversity and atomization seems to have a great impact on the way people communicate within a culture and across cultures, as well. Whether we speak about politics, science, religion or economy, individuals are encouraged to express their views showing tolerance and flexibility towards the other so as to minimize areas of disagreement. Nevertheless, the antagonist tendency is to promote individualism through excessive competitiveness and gradual loss of empathy towards the other

[465] Deirdre McCloskey. Bourgeois virtue and the history of P and S. The Journal of Economic History, 58(2):297–317, 1998. Since the triumph of a business culture a century and half ago the businessman has been scorned, and so the phrase “bourgeois virtue” sounds like an oxymoron. Economists since Bentham have believed that anyway virtue is beside the point: what matters for explanation is Prudence. But this is false in many circumstances, even strictly economic circumstances. An economic history that insists on Prudence Alone is misspecified, and will produce biased coefficients. And it will not face candidly the central task of economic history, an apology for or a criticism of a bourgeois society.


This paper will explore the multifaceted nature of the controversies around campus speech and academic freedom and what should be the appropriate university response to those issues. Where there is widespread agreement is that there is currently a lack of civil discourse around political, scientific, social, and religious ideas in our country. The level of vitriol has grown, and name-calling is the norm in the public space, whether real or virtual. College campuses are not immune to the political climate and tone of the country. Concerns about free expression and responses to unpopular ideas at universities point to the larger failure to develop the skills of civil discourse in our students and citizens. The inability to engage in civil discourse is a dangerous threat to advancing knowledge and for assuring a robust deliberative democracy. Colleges and universities should be places where controversial ideas, even noxious ideas, can expressed and challenged, and students need to be part of that process. I will argue that colleges and universities should adopt as part of their core mission the development of the skills of civic discourse, which is the foundation of the virtue of civility, a necessary virtue for a deliberative democracy and one that is sorely lacking in current times.

What is trust? How does it function as a primary virtue for persuasive arguments? How does its presumption contribute to the effectiveness of an argument’s persuasiveness? This presentation will explore these questions and the controversy among scholars regarding how trust is generated and under what conditions it is lost. We will also discuss whether inauthentic trustworthiness is a manipulation used for gaining a fallacious advantage in argumentation.

[468] Russell Douglas McPhee. A Virtue Epistemic Approach to Critical Thinking, Ph.D. thesis, Bond University, 2016. In this thesis I develop a virtue-theoretic conception of critical thinking. I argue that many conceptions of critical thinking have conflated “critical thinking” with “good thinking”. In contrast to other intellectual pursuits, I identify critical thinking as its own activity which aims at the achievement and maintenance of intellectual autonomy. I identify the constitutive virtues of critical thinking as conscientiousness, self-awareness, and prudent wariness. I argue that virtues require internal success, and intellectual autonomy is the achievement of the external success of the critical thinking virtues. It is a mistake to consider other virtues or character traits involving moral or cooperative behaviour as constitutive of critical thinking, though these may be ancillary virtues and useful to foster alongside the virtues of critical thinking. The conception I offer in this thesis suggests a solution to concerns regarding transfer of learning and offers a pedagogically-clear way of framing a critical thinking curriculum.

[469] Todd Meit. Incorporating virtues: A speech act approach to understanding how virtues can work in business. Philosophy of Management, 21(1):15–29, 2022. One of the key debates about applying virtue ethics to business is whether or not the aims and values of a business actually prevent the exercise of virtues. Some of the more interesting disagreement in this debate has arisen amongst proponents of virtue ethics. This article analyzes the central issues of this debate in order to advance an alternative way of thinking about how a business can be a form of virtuous practice. Instead of relying on the paired concepts of internal and external goods that define what counts as virtuous, I offer a version of speech act theory taken from Paul Ricoeur to show how a business can satisfy several aims without compromising the exercise of the virtues. I refer to this as a polyvalent approach where a single task within a business can have instrumental, conventional, and imaginative effects. These effects correspond to the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary dimensions of meaning. I argue that perlocution provides a way in which the moral imagination can discover the moral significance of others that might have not been noticed before, and furthermore, that for such effects to be practiced, they require appropriate virtues. I look at two cases taken from consultation work to thresh out the theoretical and practical detail.

The argument of this paper is that we should think of the extension of cognitive abilities and cognitive character in integrationist terms. Cognitive abilities are extended by acquired practices of creating and manipulating information that is stored in a publicly accessible environment. I call these cognitive practices (2007). In contrast to Pritchard (2010) I argue that such processes are integrated into our cognitive characters rather than artefacts; such as notebooks. There are two routes to cognitive extension that I contrast in the paper, the first I call artefact extension which is the now classic position of the causal coupling of an agent with an artefact. This approach needs to overcome the objection from cognitive outsourcing: that we simply get an artefact or tool to do the cognitive processing for us without extending our cognitive abilities. Enculturated cognition, by contrast, does not claim that artefacts themselves extend our cognitive abilities, but rather that the acquired practices for manipulating artefacts and the information stored in them extend our cognitive abilities (by augmenting and transforming them). In the rest of the paper I provide a series of arguments and cases which demonstrate that an enculturated approach works better for both epistemic and cognitive cases of the extension of ability and character.

Because only moral arguments in the thick sense could possibly qualify as proper responses to moral problems, the absence of morality in thin arguments means that these arguments will fail to give us a reason to do whatever they claim that we ought to do, even if we see no independent reason to question the truth of the premises or the logical validity of the argument.

This paper advances the claim that skilful reflection is a master virtue in that skilful reflection shapes and corrects the other epistemic and intellectual virtues. We make the case that skilful reflection does this with both competence-based epistemic virtues and character-based intellectual virtues. In making the case that skilful reflection is a master virtue, we identify the roots of ideas central to our thesis in Confucian philosophy. In particular, we discuss the Confucian conception of reflection, as well as different levels of epistemic virtue. Next we set out the Dual Process Hypothesis of Reflection, which provides an explanation of the workings of reflection in relation to Type 1 and Type 2 cognitive processes. In particular, we flag how repetition of Type 2 processes may eventually shape Type 1 processes and produce what we call downstream reflection. We distinguish competence-based epistemic virtues from character-based intellectual virtues. We also explain how our metacognition account of reflection, drawing on a Confucian conception of reflection and the Dual Process Hypothesis of Reflection, explains skilful reflection as a master virtue. Finally we outline an application of our metacognition account of reflection to a current debate in epistemology.

This article questions a view dominant among theorists of critical thinking: that the critical thinker has certain character traits, dispositions, or virtues. Versions of this theory (hereafter called the Character View) have been advanced without much analysis. The impression is that these traits or virtues are obvious accompaniments to critical thinking, yet such is
not the case. Versions of the Character View are inconsistent; even within one version unlikely scenarios arise. Furthermore, historical evidence can be brought against this view. Most people assume that the greatest contributors to intellectual progress would be critical thinkers. Yet a number of intellectual giants, including Marx, Rousseau, Bacon, Freud, Russell, Newton, and Feynman lacked many of the traits which the Character View holds to be necessary for critical thinking. This discrepancy calls into question the connection between having certain dispositions or virtues and the ability to think critically. Rather than concluding that these and other great thinkers cannot have been critical thinkers, one can subscribe to an alternative view which makes no claims about character, namely that critical thinking is a skill or set of skills (hereafter, the Skill View). According to this view, a critical thinker is someone who practices the skills of critical thinking frequently, just as a mathematician is a person who does mathematics frequently. Critical thinking is here defined as the consideration of alternative theories in light of their evidence, a definition which I believe encompasses the skill criteria of Ennis and Paul. The Skill View has for the most part been disparaged, yet the evidence in its favor would appear to be stronger; it has the advantage of theoretical simplicity; and it does not smuggle in moral prescriptions, leaving ethics instead to the scrutiny of critical thought. Finally, it is arguable that an historical version of the Skill View can show critical thinking to be more exciting than any version which the Character View has offered thus far.


Two types of theories about critical thinking offer a choice. The Character View seems intuitively right to many theorists. But, at the moment, its proponents have offered no evidence beyond the obviousness of their many principles, and, in fact, I have shown evidence against several of Siegel’s traits claimed for the process of critical thinking. This evidence forces the acceptance of Newton’s Theory of Motion as a great piece of critical thinking, while concluding that Newton was not (much of) a critical thinker. And similar results obtain for Darwin. Finally, the Character View is complicated. The Alternative Argument Theory (AAT) is by comparison quite clear because it is simple, it has supporting evidence, but it runs counter to some deep-seated beliefs. I would recommend for the time being against the Character View until it can build a better evidentiary case for itself, and recommend provisional acceptance of the Alternative Argument Theory. Whatever you decide, by the AAT you have done critical thinking; by the Character View, that’s anybody’s guess.


In this paper, I sketch an answer to the question “Why be an intellectually humble philosopher?” I argue that, as far as philosophical argumentation is concerned, the historical record of Western Philosophy provides a straightforward answer to this question. That is, the historical record of philosophical argumentation, which is a track record that is marked by an abundance of alternative theories and serious problems for those theories, can teach us important lessons about the limits of philosophical argumentation. These lessons, in turn, are relevant to why philosophers should argue with humility.


In this paper, I intend to articulate an answer to the powerful particularist objection against the notion of moral and legal reasoning based on universal principles. I defend a particular way of specifying and contextualising universal principles. I claim that this account preserves legal and moral justification conceived as subsumption to legal and moral principles. I also try to show how virtues can be reconciled with this account, i.e. what is the right place for virtues in legal adjudication. To carry this out, I draw on a virtue epistemology.


This paper describes and defends the “virtues of ingenuity”: detachment, lucidity, thoroughness. Philosophers traditionally praise these virtues for their role in the practice of using reasoning to solve problems and gather information. Yet, reasoning has other, no less important uses. Conviction is one of them. A recent revival of rhetoric and argumentative approaches to reasoning (in psychology, philosophy and science studies) has highlighted the virtues of persuasiveness and cast a new light on some of its apparent vices—bad faith, deluded confidence, confirmation and myside biases. Those traits, it is often argued, will no longer look so detrimental once we grasp their proper function: arguing in order to persuade, rather than thinking in order to solve problems. Some of these biases may even have a positive impact on intellectual life. Seen in this light, the virtues of ingenuity may well seem redundant. Defending them, I argue that the vices of conviction are not innocuous. If generalized, they would destabilize argumentative practices. Argumentation is a common good that is threatened when every arguer pursues conviction at the expense of ingenuity. Bad faith, myside biases and delusions of all sorts are neither called for nor explained by argumentative practices. To avoid a collapse of argumentation, mere civil virtues (respect, humility or honesty) do not suffice: we need virtues that specifically attach to the practice of making conscious inferences.


To assess critical thinking is to comment on its goodness. Yet, as the chapters in this book reveal, the essential goodness of critical thinking is a complex and highly contentious matter. Engaging in the educational assessment of critical thinking compounds questions of goodness as it raises questions about not only the goodness of critical thinking, but also about the goodness of the assessment methodology one employs. Given these challenges, how does one conduct oneself well in the...
assessments of critical thinking? In answering this question, I draw upon the philosophical exploration of “epistemic responsibility” articulated in Code (1987). For reasons I discuss, I believe it can help in the development of assessment strategies, tools, and practices that can inform the teaching of critical thinking.


Traditionally, it has been held that critical thinking requires a set of cognitive skills and dispositions. The present work supports the opinion of some theorists who have proposed that these might not be the only two ingredients necessary for improving critical thinking. More specifically, new factors could be necessary if critical thinking is to be achieved, such as gaining an epistemological understanding of critical thinking; reaching a given level of epistemological development, or the beliefs that are held about thinking. These new components are analyzed conceptually and instructionally. Special attention is also devoted to dispositions.


The execution of critical thinking depends on a set of skills and dispositions. It is unanimously accepted that skills represent the cognitive component, but consensus varies with regard to dispositions. Although most theorists admit that this is a complex construct integrated by motivations and mental habits, they don’t explain further. We have performed a study attempting to explore the internal structure of dispositions. We suggest a possible hypothesis of “Motivational Genesis of Dispositions,” according to which disposition would be formed by motivation and by mental habits, although the contribution of each of these factors would change depending on the practice gained in critical thinking. Thus, when a person is not practised in critical thinking, motivation makes a greater contribution than mental habits. Nevertheless, with practice and motivated exercise of the skills of critical thinking, the influence of these mental habits increases. The regression analyses carried out support such a hypothesis.


The main goal of this paper is to outline an agent-centered theory of argumentation. Our working hypothesis is that the aim of argumentation depends upon the agenda agents are disposed to close or advance. The novelty of this idea is that our theory, unlike the main accounts of argumentation, does not establish a fixed function that agents have to achieve when arguing. Instead, we believe that the aims of argumentation depend upon the purposes agents are disposed to achieve (agendas).


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Satoru Aonuma breaks new ground in a field largely neglected by argumentation theorists and Marxists alike: the argumentative virtues of revolutionary political speech. I emphasize “revolutionary” in order to raise certain questions concerning the author’s conclusion that Marxist speech be evaluated under the generic rubric of “civic virtues.” I will contend that “civic virtues” are virtues that contribute to the health of a given polity. The aim of revolutionary speech, in contrast, is to incite the overthrow of the established order. Good revolutionary speech would thus have the opposite effect of civically virtuous speech.


I rely on Nel Noddings’ analysis of receptivity as “an essential component of intellectual work,” to argue that receptivity is a virtue of argumentation (1984:34), practicing the principle of charity excellently for the sake of an author and their philosophical community. The deficiency of receptivity is epitomized by the philosopher who listens to attack. The excess of receptivity is the vice of insufficiently critical acceptance of an author regardless of the merits of an argument.


Why hasn’t Latin American philosophy produced any internationally recognized figure, tradition, or movement? Why is it mostly unknown inside and outside Latin America? Some skeptical answers to these questions have recently focused on critical-thinking competences and dispositions. Latin American philosophers are said to lack, for example, originality in problem-solving, problem-making, argumentation, and to some extent, interpretation. Or does the problem arise from their vices of “arrogant reasoning?” On my view, all of these answers are incomplete, and some even self-defeating. Yet they cast some light on complex, critical-thinking virtues and vices that play a significant role in philosophical thinking.

This paper examines the relationship between morality and reasoning in a general sense. Following a broadly Aristotelian framework, it is shown that reasoning well about morality requires good character and a grounding in virtue and experience. Topic neutral ‘critical thinking’ on its own is not enough and may even be detrimental to morality. This has important consequences both for philosophy and for education. While morality is objective and universal, it should not be seen purely in terms of the intellectual grasp of true propositions. As Simone Weil shows, it emerges from very basic aspects of our nature. As well as reasoning in an abstract sense we need what Pascal calls esprit de finesse based in our humanity as a whole, in sens, raison et coeur. The paper concludes with some reflections on our propensity to fail morally and on the relationship between virtue and happiness.


Public philosophers have tended to think of their audience as the public, or perhaps a public or counterpublic. In my work on the Ask a Philosopher booth, however, it’s been helpful to think of our audience as made up of a handful of characters—types defined by the way in which they engage (or decline to engage) with the booth. I describe the characters I’ve encountered at the booth: orbiters, appreciators, readers, monologuists, freethinkers, scholars, and peers. By reflecting on these characters and their needs, we can both imagine other forms of public philosophy that might better serve them, and better articulate the values that inhere in public philosophy projects like the Ask a Philosopher booth. I conclude with a brief case for the philosophy of public philosophy.


In this paper, I argue that, despite the progress made in recent years, virtue argumentation theory still lacks a more systematic acknowledgment of other-regarding virtues. A fuller recognition of such virtues not only enriches the field of research of virtue argumentation theory in significant ways, but also allows for a richer and more intuitive view of the virtuous arguer. A fully virtuous arguer, it is argued, should care to develop both self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. He should be concerned both with his own development as an arguer and with helping other arguers in that regard.


Khameiel Al Tamimi’s paper addresses and tries to connect two topics that have recently become rather significant within contemporary argumentation studies: namely the exploration of the potential argumentative qualities of narrative discourse and the so called virtue theory of (or virtue approach to) argumentation.


This paper revises the extended convergence and mutual influence between the pedagogical movement of Critical Thinking and research done in the interdisciplinary field of Argumentation Theory. While there is a widely held consensus that a critical thinker is a human being with certain specific skills and dispositions, here the possibility of characterizing these skills and dispositions as explicitly argumentative and particularly interactive and dialectic is explored, revising contributions made by some argumentation theorists and some representatives of the critical thinking movement. Relocating critical thinking skills and dispositions as inherently associated with the capacity of actively and relevantly taking part in communicative practices of giving, asking for and examining reasons it is also possible to make justice to the pragmatist origins of the initial aims of the critical thinking movement.


In this paper we draw on the munazara tradition to intervene in the debate on whether argument assessment should be agentor act-based. We introduce and deploy the notion of sequencing – the ordering of the antagonist’s critical moves – to make explicit an ambiguity between the agent and the act of arguing. We show that sequencing is a component of argumentation that inextricably involves the procedure as well as the agent and, therefore, its assessment cannot be adequately undertaken if either agentor act-based norms are ignored or
demoted. We present our intervention through a challenge that virtue argumentation needs to address for it to be considered an alternative to existing theories of argument assessment (Section 2). We then briefly introduce munazara and focus on its notion of sequencing to explicate the interdependence between the agent and the procedure (Section 3). Next, we address the challenge by offering an account of the virtuous arguer as a virtuous sequencer (Section 4). In conclusion, we reflect on the implications of sequencing on virtue argumentation and the norms of argumentation.


The aim of this paper is to highlight an interdependence between procedural and agential norms that underlies their neat separation when appraising argumentation. Drawing on the munazara tradition, we carve a space for sequencing in argumentation scholarship. Focusing on the protagonist’s sequencing of critical moves, we identify each sequence’s corresponding values of argumentation: coalescence, reliability, and efficacy. These values arise through the mediation of virtues and simultaneously underpin procedural as well as agential norms. Consequently, an ambiguity between procedure and agent becomes apparent. This ambiguity hints at the potential for a virtue theory of argumentation that draws on procedural norms.


The reasons behind the success of the type of practical exercise envisaged to overcome the power of biases remain underexplored in Zenker’s contribution. I will try to show here that the success of the type of practical proposal defended in this paper constitutes evidence of the social function of reasoning.


Virtue argumentation theory and Pragma-Dialectics are indeed complementary approaches to the argumentative practice. Gascon (2017) once introduced virtue into the rules and other second-order conditions for critical discussion. In a similar vein, this paper will try to find more places in pragma-dialectics that can be explained by virtue approach. First, I start with the discussion about the pragma-dialectical view of fallacies, and argue that the violations of rules could also be regarded as an excess or a lack of argumentative virtue. Second, in addition to bias, I will consider other inner conditions related to the arguer’s psychological state, which could be connected with virtue most directly. Finally, I will attempt to interpret the role of virtue in the process of strategic maneuvering.


This paper opposes the view that studying argumentation from a decision theoretic perspective is a purely descriptive project. On the contrary, I argue that such an approach is naturally suited to tackle normative issues, shedding new light on how strategic rationality interacts with other virtues of argumentation – namely, inferential validity and dialectical appropriateness. My views on this issue will be developed against the backdrop of virtue argumentation theory (Cohen 2009; Aberdein 2010; Battaly 2010).


Virtue argumentation theory (VAT) has been charged of being incomplete, given its alleged inability to account for argument validity in virtue-theoretical terms. Instead of defending VAT against that challenge, I suggest it is misplaced, since it is based on a premise VAT does not endorse, and raises an issue that most versions of VAT need not consider problematic. This in turn allows distinguishing several varieties of VAT, and clarifying what really matters for them.


Virtue argumentation theory (VAT) has been charged of being incomplete, given its alleged inability to account for argument validity in virtue-theoretical terms. Instead of defending VAT against that challenge, I suggest it is misplaced, since it is based on a premise VAT does not endorse, and raises an issue that most versions of VAT need not consider problematic. This in turn allows distinguishing several varieties of VAT, and clarifying what really matters for them.


This paper summarizes the basic assumptions of a decision theoretic approach to argumentation, as well as some preliminary empirical findings based on that view. The relative neglect for decision making in argumentation theory is discussed, and the approach is defended against the charge of being merely descriptive. In contrast, it is shown that considering arguments as the product of decisions brings into play various normative models of rational choice. This presents argumentation theory with a novel challenge: how to reconcile strategic rationality with other normative constraints, such as inferential validity and dialectical appropriateness? It is suggested that strategic considerations should be included, rather than excluded, from the evaluation of argument quality, and this position is put in contact with the growing interest for virtue theory in argumentation studies.

A foundational issue haunts virtue argumentation theory (VAT): what does it mean for a virtue to count as argumentative? If left unanswered, this problem invites more pressing concerns, such as what (the hell) is VAT?—to quote Goddu, who originally raised the problem (2016). To answer, virtue theorists can either demonstrate that argumentative virtues are specific to argumentation (manifesting exclusively or primarily during arguments) or show how they affect an act of arguing qua argument (improving its argumentative quality, however defined). The former strategy is ineffective, since all alleged argumentative virtues (Oliveira de Sousa, 2020; Aberdein, 2021; Phillips, 2021; Stevens & Cohen, 2021) are generic virtues that have roles in other intellectual activities besides argumentation (Goddu, 2016). The second strategy is more promising, yet it leaves open the problem of clarifying how virtues affect argument quality: this paper discusses alternative ways of addressing this conundrum (see also Paglieri, 2023).


This paper considers argumentation in the context of the current economic-financial crisis by focusing on the attempt made by UBS Bank to retain stakeholders’ confidence. As a case in point, I analyze a press release through which the bank announces important changes in the Board of Directors. The text includes a clearly argumentative aim: convince stakeholders, in particular clients, to retain their confidence in the bank. The message exploits and emphasizes the positive qualities of the would-be chairman and indirectly leverages on the interests and emotions of the concerned audience, to bring to the inferential structure of the argument those shared values (endoxa) that make it “trustworthy,” i.e. persuasive.


The role intellectual virtues play in scientific inquiry has raised significant discussions in the recent literature. A number of authors have recently explored the link between virtue epistemology and philosophy of science with the aim to show whether epistemic virtues can contribute to the resolution of the problem of theory choice. This paper analyses how intellectual virtues can be beneficial for successful resolution of theory choice. We explore the role of virtues as well as vices in scientific inquiry and their beneficial effects in the context of theory choice. We argue that vices can play a role in widening the set of potential candidate theories and support our claim with historical examples and normative arguments from formal social epistemology. We argue that even though virtues appear to be neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific success, they have a positive effect because they accelerate successful convergence amongst scientists in theory choice situations.


Do we have an obligation to argue? If so, where does that obligation come from and how does it bind us? Is the obligation to argue a moral obligation, or a prudential one, or is it perhaps an obligation of some other sort? These questions all fall within a more general sphere of concerns that I believe would be aptly labeled the sphere of normativity in argumentation. These questions are not the whole of this sphere of concerns, but they are important members of it—perhaps even essential starting points. In this paper I will address this sphere by arguing: 1) that we do have an obligation to argue, and 2) that the obligation to argue applies to us by virtue of our standing as co-participants in a convention of argumentation. My account has its basis in social philosophy, and so is somewhat unlike other contemporary views on offer regarding the obligation to argue. It will be worthwhile to begin with a brief review of these accounts before proceeding to my own.


Why do historians so often talk about objectivity, empathy, and fair-mindedness? What roles do such personal qualities play in historical studies? And why does it make sense to call them virtues rather than skills or habits? Historians’ Virtues is the first publication to explore these questions in some depth. With case studies from across the centuries, this Element identifies major discontinuities in how and why historians talked about the marks of a good scholar. At the same time, it draws attention to long-term legacies that still exist today. Virtues were, and are, invoked in debates over the historian’s task. They reveal how historians position themselves vis-à-vis political regimes, religious traditions, or neoliberal university systems. More importantly, they show that historical study not only requires knowledge and technical skills, but also makes demands on the character of its practitioners.


Written for *Thinking: The Second International Conference* (1987), this paper explores a series of themes familiar to Richard Paul’s readers: that most school learning is irrational rather than rational, that there are two different modes of critical thinking and hence two different kinds of critical persons, that strong sense critical thinking is embedded in the ancient Socratic ideal of living an examined life, and that social studies instruction today is, in the main, sociocentric. Paul illustrates this last point with items from a state department of education critical thinking test and illustrations from a popular university-level introductory political science text. Paul closes with an argument in favor of a new emphasis on developing the critical thinking abilities of teachers: “If, in our haste to bring critical thinking into the schools, we ignore the need to develop long-term strategies for nurturing the development of teachers’ own critical powers and passions, we shall surely make the new emphasis on critical thinking into nothing more than a passing fad, or worse, into a
new, more sophisticated form of social indoctrination and scholastic closedmindedness.


Educators and theorists tend to approach the affective and moral dimensions of education as they approach all other dimensions of learning, as compartmentalized domains, and as a collection of learnings more or less separate from other learnings. As a result, they view moral development as more or less independent of cognitive development. “And why not!” one might imagine the reply. “Clearly there are highly educated, very intelligent people who habitually do evil and very simple, poorly educated people who consistently do good. If moral development were so intimately connected to cognitive development, how could this be so?” In this paper, I provide the outlines of an answer to that objection by suggesting an intimate connection between critical thinking, moral integrity, and citizenship. Specifically, I distinguish a weak and a strong sense of each and hold that the strong sense ought to guide, not only our understanding of the nature of the educated person, but also our redesigning the curriculum.


Power in communication takes two main forms. As ‘external’ power, it consists in the ability to acknowledge or disregard a speaker or a discourse. As ‘internal’ power, it is the ability of an argument to eliminate other arguments by demonstrating its superiority. A positive or negative value may be ascribed to these forms of power. Four ideal-typical positions are discussed – strategy, technocracy, constructionism, and deliberation. Public deliberation has three virtues – civic virtue, governance virtue and cognitive virtue. Deliberation lowers the propensity to, and the benefit of, strategic behaviour. It also increases knowledge, enhancing the quality of decisions. For Habermas, the unity of reason is expressed in the possibility of agreement on the most convincing argument. However, sometimes conflicts are deep-lying, principles and factual descriptions are profoundly different, and uncertainty is radical. The best argument cannot be found. There is no universal reason. The question is whether non-strategic agreement may spring from the incommensurability of languages. In search of an answer, Rawls’s concept of overlapping consensus, the feminist theory of the public sphere, and the idea of deliberation as co-operation are discussed. The argument developed is that the approach to deliberative democracy may be renewed by rethinking its motivational and cognitive elements. Public deliberation is grounded on a pre-political level of co-operation. Intractable controversies may be faced at the level of practices, looking for local, contextual answers.


Both the principle of charity and responsibility condition are thought to be central elements of argument reconstruction and productive discourse. These conditions are problematic in arguments that contain various forms of deception. In this paper, I will focus on multivocal appeals (popularly known as dog whistles,) which are meant to be heard by only certain audience members. I will argue that arguments containing dog whistles require more nuanced tools to reconstruct the argument.


During a year when there is much tumult around the world and in the United States in particular, it might be surprising to encounter a paper about patience and argumentation. In this paper, I explore the notion of deep disagreement, with an eye to moral and political contexts in particular, in order to motivate the idea that patience is an argumentative virtue that we ought to cultivate. This is particularly so because of the extended nature of argumentation and the slow rate at which we change our minds. I raise a concern about how calls for patience have been misused in the past and argue that if we accept patience as an argumentative virtue, we should hold people in positions of power, in particular, to account.


It is no secret that we inhabit an increasingly irrational world, plagued by rampant pseudoscience, science denialism, post-truths and fake news. Or perhaps, human nature being what it is, we have always lived in such a world and we are now simply more keenly aware of it because of easy and widespread access to social media. Moreover, the stakes are higher, as pseudoscience in the form of the anti–vax movement imperils the lives of many, while climate change denialism literally risks a collapse of the human ecosystem. So how do we deal with the problem? How do we talk to otherwise perfectly reasonable and functional people who nevertheless espouse all sorts of nonsense — and vote accordingly? In this paper I will explore a couple of real life conversations among many that I have had with believers in pseudoscience, and then present and discuss virtue epistemology as one approach to ameliorate the problem. No silver bullets are available, unfortunately, but it is our intellectual and moral duty to keep, as Carl Sagan famously put it, the candle of reason lit even when surrounded by the darkness of unreason.


Political solutions to problems like global warming and social justice are often stymied by an inability to productively communicate in everyday conversations. Motivated by these communication problems, the paper considers the role of the virtuous listener in conversations. Rather than the scripted exchanges of information between individuals, we focus on lively, intra-active conversations that are mediating events. In such conversations, the listener plays a participatory role
by contributing to the content and form of the conversation. Unlike Miranda Fricker’s negative virtue of testimonial justice, which neutralizes the listener’s identity-prejudices in their credibility judgments of the speaker’s testimony, we consider the positive virtues of a good listener. These positive virtues enable listeners to productively contribute to the conversation by helping create the fertile epistemic space of a non-adversarial, caring relationship that facilitates critical and creative thinking.


Following David Hitchcock and Stephen Toulmin, this paper takes warrants to be material inference rules. It offers an account of the form such rules should take that is designed (a) to implement the idea that an argument/inference is valid only if it is entitlement preserving and (b) to support a qualitative version of evidence proportionalism. It attempts to capture what gives warrants their normative force by elaborating a concept of reliability tailored to its account of the form such rules should take.


The long version of Siegel’s paper is an extremely useful overview of the literature on two aspects of the epistemology of disagreement, and I’m in complete agreement with what I take to be his main conclusions, namely (1) that because of ambiguities in the treatment of peerhood and the variety of different cases which require different sorts of treatment, there do not seem to be any general epistemic principles concerning peer disagreement, other than what has come to be called the Total Evidence View, and (2) that Fogelin is wrong in supposing or concluding that there are disagreements “which by their nature are not subject to rational resolution.” I would however call brief attention to two aspects of Siegel’s presentation about which I have reservations.


In a 2006 paper I claimed that the virtue arguments or inferences must have is not that they be truth-preserving, but that they be entitlement-preserving (in Brandom’s sense of that phrase). I offered two reasons there why such a conception of argument virtue is needed for a satisfactory treatment of defeasible arguments and inferences. This paper revisits that claim, and assesses the prospects for a more thorough defense than was offered in that paper.


Defiance is sometimes treated as behavior that needs to be punished or even diagnosed, especially when it is expressed by the subjugated. In contrast to that view, I argue that the readiness to be defiant is a virtue. Drawing upon an Aristotelian framework, updated by an uncompromising challenge to hegemonic power differences, I indicate a way for the subjugated and disenfranchised to recoup self-worth and moral agency. Defiance even may help correct for burdened virtues, as Lisa Tussman analyzes them. Thus, this article falls within the domains of moral psychology and social change. Difficulties in conceptualizing and operationalizing defiance as a virtue, especially since defiance tends to be divisive within society, are discussed in terms of cases. Special attention is paid to medicalizing discourses that take defiance to be a sign of pathology, especially with members of oppressed groups.


The present research conceptualizes open-minded cognition as a cognitive style that influences how individuals select and process information. An open-minded cognitive style is marked by willingness to consider a variety of intellectual perspectives, values, opinions, or beliefs—even those that contradict the individual’s opinion. An individual’s level of cognitive openness is expected to vary across domains (such as politics and religion). Four studies develop and validate a novel measure of open-minded cognition, as well as two domain-specific measures of religious and political open-minded cognition. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis (controlling for acquiescence bias) are used to develop the scales in Studies 1 to 3. Study 4 demonstrates that these scales possess convergent and discriminant validity. Study 5 demonstrates the scale’s unique predictive validity using the outcome of Empathic Concern (Davis, 1980). Study 6 demonstrates the scale’s unique predictive validity using the outcomes of warmth toward racial, religious, and sexual minorities.


It is argued that two plausible goals of the educational enterprise are (i) to develop the intellectual character, and thus the intellectual virtues, of the student, and (ii) to develop the student’s intellectual self-confidence, such that they are able to have conviction in what they believe. On the face of it, however, these two educational goals seem to be in tension with one another, at least insofar as intellectual humility is a genuine intellectual virtue. This is because intellectual humility seems to require that one does not have conviction in one’s beliefs. It is argued that this tension can be avoided so long as we have the right account of intellectual humility in play. This enables us to understand what educating for intellectual humility might involve, and how it might co-exist with the educational development of a student’s intellectual self-confidence.


Can one enter into an argument with one’s intellectual equals in good faith if one regards the matter in hand as already settled? Adopting such an attitude looks very much like taking a dogmatic stance, in that...
one is closing one’s mind to counterarguments in advance. Dogmatism is, of course, an intellectual vice. Moreover, such dogmatism seems morally problematic, in that one is failing to treat one’s adversary with due respect. While there is clearly something correct about this line of thinking—dogmatism, like all intellectual vice, is obviously to be avoided—it is also maintained that, properly understood, there need be nothing intellectually viceful about engaging in an argument where one regards the subject matter as settled. Related to this point, it is contended that someone who possesses the intellectual virtue of intellectual humility may well engage in arguments in just this fashion. The upshot is that one can consistently and properly argue with both conviction and intellectual humility.


The article aims to present a new interpretation of Stanislaw Herakliusz Lubomiirski’s De vanitate consiliorum by discussing the way the Latin notion of prudentia and the two-fold argument (disputatio in utramque partem) are employed in the dialogue. The first part of the article briefly discusses the origin and meanings of prudentia as it was employed in the Ciceronian tradition. The notion of prudence as practical judgement in relation to affairs of state is linked here to the Ciceronian mode of arguing in utramque partem, allowing a careful examination of different aspects of any given issue before taking political action. The second part of the article outlines the ways the notion of prudence is used throughout De vanitate consiliorum. Prudentia is referred to by the characters of the dialogue as a faculty that allows the statesman to make the best of contradictory forces influencing the course of political affairs—a faculty which does not ensure success, but allows one to achieve the best possible result in the contingent sphere of human affairs. The third and final part of the article discusses the two ways the image of ‘twoheaded prudence’ is invoked in De vanitate consiliorum, either in reference to the prudent judgement which carefully examines different aspects of the issue at hand or to the council’s indecisiveness which hinders the possibility of consensus necessary to take political action. An interpretation of the dialogue as a rhetorical exercise in prudence is proposed in this part, arguing that the way Lubomiirski employs rhetorical deliberation in utramque partem invites the reader to constantly exercise his own practical judgement in relation to affairs of state.


In recent years, increasing attention has been given to virtue ethics in business. Aristotle’s thought is often seen as the basis of the virtue ethics tradition. For Aristotle, the idea of phronesis, or ‘practical wisdom’, lies at the foundation of ethics. Confucian ethics has notable similarities to Aristotelian virtue ethics, and may embody some similar ideas of practical wisdom. This article considers how ideas of moral judgment in these traditions are consistent with modern ideas about intuition in management decision making. A hypothetical case is considered where the complexity of ethical decision making in a group context illustrates the importance of intuitive, phronesis-like judgment. It is then noted that both Aristotelian and Confucian virtue ethics include suggestions about support for moral decision making that are also consistent with modern theory.


We suggest that in some instances the apparent logical inconsistency of moral hypocrisy stems from different evaluations of a weak argument, rather than dishonesty per se. Extending Corner, Hahn, and Oaksford’s (2006) analysis of slippery slope arguments, we propose that inferences of hypocrisy depend on perceived similarity of actions to previous standards. In Experiment 1, dissimilar actions were rated as less hypocritical than their similar counterparts. If observers are choosing between competing theories (i.e., hypocrisy or legitimate dissimilarity), evidence of self-serving motives will positively support inferences of hypocrisy independent of changes in similarity. In Experiment 2, we manipulated potential self-serving interests that an action would produce while keeping similarity between cases identical. Actions that would result in a beneficial outcome for the actor were seen as more hypocritical than their non-self-serving counterparts. These results support the possibility that Bayesian analyses of weak arguments have implications for assessing moral reasoning.


Aspects of legal cases hinge on understanding the situation of the disputants. While categories such as feeling, empathy, law and politics have limited discriminating capacity here, I propose to draw upon the Aristotelian scheme of intellectual virtues. Specifically, I look at how the judge exercises discernment (gnômê) and the comprehension of what others say (synesis). In the context of practical wisdom, Hurthouse has argued that discernment requires experience of exceptions. I add that the judge exercises her discernment by suspending the application of principles to an individual, while listening. Furthermore, I add that the exceptions include experiences lived through, which Hurthouse’s technical view neglects. When using her comprehension to absorb the details of the situation based upon testimony, the judge will have to be open to different perspectives, able to move between them, and yet courageous enough to stand by what she deems right. I conclude with a hypothetical about the judge’s involvement in the process contributing to a better understanding of the other in a global environment.

Since its creation by Peirce, the nature of abductive inference has been construed in many ways. Three construings are analyzed, and some of their derivatives, to then examine the possibility for considering abduction as an argumentative virtue of cognitive character, in line with current theories on epistemological virtues resulting from E. Sosa’s works and argumentative virtues according to A. Aberdein. Based on the said construing, it is proposed that abduction could play the role of justification of natural deduction rules that introduce hypothetical clauses.


[528] Chris Ranalli. Closed-minded belief and indoctrination. American Philosophical Quarterly, 59(1):61–80, 2022. What is indoctrination? This paper clarifies and defends a structural epistemic account of indoctrination according to which indoctrination is the inculcation of closed-minded belief caused by “epistemically insulating content.” This is content which contains a proviso that serious critical consideration of the relevant alternatives to one’s belief is reprehensible whether morally or epistemically. As such, it does not demand that indoctrination be a type of unethical instruction, ideological instruction, unveridical instruction, or instruction which bypasses the agent’s rational evaluation. In this way, we can account for why indoctrination can occur for liberal democratic beliefs as much as it occurs for fascist, fundamentalist, or fanatical belief: for indoctrination is fundamentally a structural epistemic phenomenon.

[529] William Rehg. Assessing the cogency of arguments: Three kinds of merits. Informal Logic, 25(2):95–115, 2005. This article proposes a way of connecting two levels at which scholars have studied discursive practices from a normative perspective: on the one hand, local transactions—face-to-face arguments or dialogues—and broadly dispersed public debates on the other. To help focus my analysis, I select two representatives of work at these two levels: the pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion and Habermas’s discourse theory of political-legal deliberation. The two models confront complementary challenges that arise from gaps between their prescriptions and contexts of actual discourse. In response, I propose a theory of argument cogency that distinguishes three kinds of merit: content, transactional, and public. Normative links between the two levels arise through the ways argument contents spread across multiple transactions in a social space whose structure and composition favor collective reasonableness.

[530] Magne Reitan. Ethos and pathos: Philosophical analysis. In Bart Garssen, David Godden, Gordon R. Mitchell, & Jean H.M. Wagemans, eds., Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, pp. 953–962. Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2019. It is argued in this paper that ethos and pathos have dual natures, with both being argumentative and causal. This dual nature is based on both trust and emotions having a complex nature, that they are composed of both a cognitive component and a non-cognitive component. One can argue with respect to the first, but not the second. The second has a causal role, and this makes ethos and pathos forceful means of persuasion.

[531] Suzanne Rice. Toward an Aristotelian conception of good listening. Educational Theory, 61(2):141–153, 2011. In this essay Suzanne Rice examines Aristotle’s ideas about virtue, character, and education as elements in an Aristotelian conception of good listening. Rice begins by surveying of several different contexts in which listening typically occurs, using this information to introduce the argument that what should count as “good listening” must be determined in relation to the situation in which listening actually occurs. On this view, Rice concludes, there are no “essential” listening virtues, but rather ways of listening that may be regarded as virtuous in the context of particular concrete circumstances.

[532] Wayne Riggs. Open-mindedness. Metaphilosophy, 41(1-2):172–188, 2010. Open-mindedness is typically at the top of any list of the intellectual or “epistemic” virtues. Yet, providing an account that simultaneously explains why open-mindedness is an epistemically valuable trait to have and how such a trait is compatible with full-blooded belief turns out to be a challenge. Building on the work of William Hare and Jonathan Adler, I defend a view of open-mindedness that meets this challenge. On this view, open-mindedness is primarily an attitude toward oneself as a believer, rather than toward any particular belief. To be open-minded is to be aware of one’s fallibility as a believer, and to acknowledge the possibility that anytime one believes something, one could be wrong. In order to see that such an attitude is epistemically valuable even to an already virtuous agent, some details of the skills and habits of the open-minded agent are elucidated.

[533] Juho Ritola. Justificationist social epistemology and critical thinking. Educational Theory, 61(5):565–585, 2011. In this essay Juho Ritola develops a justificationist approach to social epistemology, which holds that normatively satisfactory social processes pertaining to the acquisition, storage, dissemination, and use of knowledge must be evidence-based processes that include appropriate reflective attitudes by the relevant agents and, consequently, the relevant institutions. This implies that the teaching of critical thinking and reasoning in general should strive to bring about such attitudes in students. Ritola begins by sketching a justificationist approach and defending it on a general level against the criticism posed by Alvin Goldman. He then defends it on the level of individual reasoners against the argument set out by Michael Bishop and J.D. Trout. Based on empirical evidence, Bishop and Trout argue that the kind of reflection advocated by a justificationist approach to reasoning leads to worse outcomes than the use of various statistical prediction rules. Ritola, in contrast, maintains that one cannot and should not replace critical reflection on evidence by a mechanical application of rules. Instead, he asserts, statistical prediction rules and empirical evidence regarding our reasoning performance are part of the total evidence that we should reflect on in our critical reasoning.

Michael Huemer (2005) argues that following the epistemic strategy of Critical Thinking—that is, thinking things through for oneself—leaves the agent epistemically either worse off or no better off than an alternative strategy of Credulity—that is, trusting the authorities. Therefore, Critical Thinking is not epistemically responsible. This article argues that Reasonable Credulity entails Critical Thinking, and since Reasonable Credulity is epistemically responsible, the Critical Thinking that it entails is epistemically responsible too.


The aim of this paper is to offer an explanation of the legitimacy of certain ad hominem arguments by appealing to virtue epistemology. The main thesis is that there are ad hominem arguments that are acceptable if they are conceived as inductive arguments, whose soundness is given by a fair appeal to the interlocutor’s epistemic vices. It is argued that some abusive ad hominem arguments are acceptable if they rest on a fair pointing out of the interlocutor’s lack of agential intellectual virtues. Likewise, some circumstanceal ad hominem arguments would be acceptable if they rest on a fair pointing out of the interlocutor’s lack of non-agential intellectual virtues. The paper exposes some problems of other attempts to vindicate ad hominem arguments.


Taking into consideration that classical Rhetoric is the art that deals with the composition and use of persuasive discourse, and that Aristotle classifies arguments into three modes (a) by reason (logos); by the speaker’s character (ethos), and by emotion (pathos), the aim of the this article is both to study the ethical appeal and to demonstrate that Aristotle’s rhetorical system has moral grounds based on the qualities of the writer or speaker which are shown by the speech. The methodology is of qualitative type. It studies the Rhetoric and other ethical works of Aristotle. It starts with a conceptualization of the Aristotelian rhetorical system, its principles and methods of persuasion. It emphasizes the argumentation for ethos and on the definition of the concepts of good sense (frônesis), high moral character (arête) and benevolence (eunoía), qualities that a person engaged in a communicative discourse must possess. It concludes with an enumeration of the proper features of a phrónimos man, and with a reflection on values and the importance of logos, as language and argument.


While significant work in argumentation theory (and philosophy of argument) has been devoted to the presentation of arguments, many now argue for renewed attention to responses to arguments, and, in particular, to the epistemic responsibilities of responders who clearly also play a central role in the successes or failures of argumentation. As Kathryn Norlock notes, this renewed attention is motivated, among other things, by concerns about the ancillary adversarial “blood sport” practices of argumentation that are not unknown in philosophy and in other contexts of debate. Since practices of argumentation are significantly communal and relational, Norlock adds, we need to assess these practices as also ethical ones. More particularly, she argues that we can usefully mine insights from an ethic of caring (as advanced by Nell Noddings especially), and she endorses Noddings’s account of receptivity (“the precondition for ethical interaction”) as a virtue that practitioners of argumentation might usefully exhibit. My comments will focus on two central topics: the ambivalent use of “caring” as central to the ethical picture Norlock sets out, and the relationship between the epistemic and the ethical in argumentation as suggested by her account.


While agreeing with Plato’s concerns about the skills of brilliant Persuaders, Aristotle proceeds to differentiate types of intellectual virtues or excellences, distinguishing those that are capable of successfully but uncritically achieving their aims from those whose exercise intrinsically incorporate good and admirable ends. He then analyzes the constituents of the virtues of practical wisdom, distinguishing those that—like wit, cleverness, and perspicuity—can be exercised independently of the moral virtues. A Persuader can successfully craft an astute and even insightful legal defense for an unjust cause, but he does not qualify as a person of practical wisdom unless his desires and ends are genuinely good. His audience can understand his argument and accept his judgment without being directed or committed to acting well. On the other hand, to qualify as a phrónimos, a person of practical wisdom, a Persuader must not only be capable of shrewdly sizing up a jury or an Assembly, saying the right words at the right time and in the right way, he must also do so for the right reason, for the right aims, as an expression of the unity of his intellectual and character virtues. In short, a brilliant, successful Persuader need not be a phrónimos, but a phrónimos must—among other things—rightly as well as successfully exercise the skills of a talented Persuader.


If argument forms evolve then the possible existence of localized argument forms may create an interpretive impasse between locally distinct argument communities. Appeal to evolutionarily ‘deep’ argument forms
may help, but might be strained in cases where emergent argument forms are not reducible to their base conditions. Overcoming such limits presupposes the virtue of compromise, suggesting that compromise may stand as ‘deep virtue’ within argumentative forms of life.


Zarefsky’s overall argument draws an important distinction about commentary on the debate, arguing that Obama won the second debate not only because of an aggressive style, but also because of his argumentative skill. Rather than comment on Zarefsky’s insightful description of crucial argument exchanges in the debate or his analysis of Romney’s use of ethotic argument or how both candidates relied on association and disassociation, I want to focus on underlying implications of his argument. My approach is to use Zarefsky’s analysis as a jumping off point to draw distinctions about what argumentative analysis reveals about American presidential debates.


We believe that a consistent Aristotelian view of the relation between rhetoric, ethics, and politics can be developed and that Aristotelian ethical theory places substantially different requirements on the rhetor than those imposed by competing theories of rhetoric. In addition, we shall argue that Aristotle’s ethical system is valuable because it commands attention to both the emotional and rational faculties and is well adapted to the needs of a democratic society. We shall develop this position by arguing that rhetoric is both an art of discovering all of the available means of persuasion, and an object which the rhetor produces. As an art, rhetoric is amoral; as a product, rhetoric is either moral or immoral. After clarifying the dual nature of rhetoric as art (techne) and product, we shall systematically analyze the assumptions of Aristotelian ethics. In the final section of this essay, we shall sketch the relevance of Aristotle’s rhetorical ethic for the rhetor in a democracy.


Parliamentary debates may seem as anachronistic today given their limited role in forging majorities within parliaments. Yet, this paper seeks to demonstrate that they still play a diversity of other roles. They contribute to frame ideologically a debate and therefore to link policy proposal to electoral politics. They can also be regarded as ways of both controlling and motivating members. They bring credibility to the view that parliaments are representative – feeding people mimetic relations to politics. Last, they help implementing the accountability process forcing ministers to speak, to listen to criticisms and to answer them. Those four aspects, based on a variety of literature, are considered to be still relevant in the contemporary period.


A responsible argument provides justification for believing its conclusion. Bondy and I may disagree on some of the details, but we are essentially in agreement about the nature of responsible argumentation and on the nature of a virtuous arguer, namely, someone disposed to give and to recognize responsible arguments.


Which kind of disagreement should we promote? I tackle this question via a reflection on the standard for determining which arguments and reasons are allowed into public debates. Drawing on the works of Maev Cooke and Michael Gilbert I propose non-authoritarian argumentation as a model for the analysis and evaluation of public argumentation in democracies. I argue for, and explicate, the promotion of disagreement that square a dual-commitment to pluralism and solidarity.


I want to take seriously a claim that legal practitioners frequently made some twenty years ago, but one that fell into disrepute when academic legal ethicists took over the subject of legal ethics. The claim is that good lawyering is good ethics. This claim makes ethics a descriptive task, the description in question being a description of good lawyering. Of course, such a description of lawyering must come from, or at least start within, the practice. Thus far I mean to say nothing more than that the excellence of lawyering, similar to the excellence of baseball, must be defined within the practice. Through the playing of baseball, we come to know that disciplined attention by a fielder to each batter is an excellence of the sport requiring certain knowledge, skills, and virtues, some of which are the abilities to maintain a calm temperament, to forget prior bad plays quickly, to avoid criticism of teammates for mistakes, and so forth. For lawyers, specific excellences of textual analysis, attention to detail, consideration of opposing arguments, sympathetic detachment, and general excellences of counseling, of persuasion, and of a particular form of practical wisdom are much the same.


In this paper we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions—agent-reliabilism and agent-responsibilism (or neo-Aristotelianism)—as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude
that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be attributed to an over- or inappropriate reliance on System 1 cognition. By the same token, the proper employment of System 2 cognition results in the virtuous functioning of our cognitive systems (agent-reliabilism). Moreover, the role of motivation in attenuating cognitive biases and the cultivation of certain epistemic habits (a search for accuracy, being accountable for one’s judgments, the use of rules of analysis, and exposure to differing perspectives) points to the tenets of agent-responsibilism in epistemic virtue. We identify the proper use of System 2 cognition and the habits of mind that attenuate biases as demonstrations of the virtue of intellectual humility. We briefly explore the nature of these habits and the contribution of personality traits, situational pressures, and training in their cultivation.


In this study, we compare the overall level of disposition towards critical thinking among college freshmen in New Mexico with that of other undergraduates from around the world. We ascertain whether there are dominant dispositional attributes among students who prefer a certain discipline as their major, between genders and ethnicity.


In an effort to encourage community dialogue while also building reader loyalty, online newspapers have offered a way for readers to become engaged in the news process, most popularly with online reader comment boards. It is here that readers post their opinion following an online news story, and however much community interaction taking place therein, one thing appears evident: sometimes the comments are civil; sometimes they are not. Indeed, one of the chief defining characteristics of these boards has become the rampant incivility—a dilemma many newspapers have struggled with as they seek to strengthen the value of the online dialogue. Many journalists and industry observers have pointed to a seemingly straightforward reason for the offensive comments: anonymity. Despite the claim, however, there is a striking dearth of empirical evidence in the academic literature of the effect that anonymity has on commenters’ behavior. This research offers an examination of user comments of newspapers that allow anonymity (N = 450) and the user comments of newspapers that do not (N = 450) and compares the level of civility in both. In each group, comments follow news stories on immigration, a topic prevalent in the news in recent years and which is especially controversial and prone to debate. Results of this quantitative content analysis, useful for journalism practitioners and scholars, provide empirical evidence of the effect that anonymity has on the civility of user comments.


This study focuses on fostering the motivation to think critically through teaching with exemplars. First, I argue that teachers and parents can be seen as exemplars who exhibit thought processes and attitudes relevant to critical thinking, as can fictional characters in media such as novels and films. Second, I demonstrate that, through learning from exemplars, children may begin to develop their own way of critical thinking. Third, I conclude that admiration for exemplars can motivate children to think critically, even small children who have not yet developed a sensitivity toward evidence and reasons.


Practical wisdom provides a powerful paradigm for understanding legal reasoning and adjudication. One of the primary insights of practical wisdom is that it recognizes a role for character as well as intellect in deliberation. Intellect alone may suffice to make one clever, enabling one to figure out how to achieve one’s ends. As Aristotle notes, however, if the ends are wrong, cleverness may facilitate mere villainy. Virtue of character, together with experience, transforms cleverness into practical wisdom. Kromman’s account of the virtues of character necessary for exercising practical wisdom—sympathy (or mercy) and detachment (or justice)—is helpful but incomplete. The (or at least a) missing ingredient is humility. Humility helps one to become more just and more merciful. It also aids deliberation and choice by one who is just and merciful, one who is trying to determine the appropriate course of action in a particular situation. For these reasons, humility is a virtue of character that we should especially seek and value in judges.


Legal, and especially judicial, reasoning is a complex combination of practical wisdom (phronesis), craft (techne), and rhetoric (rhetorica). These three concepts have unique concerns, components, distinctive characteristics, and measures of success. Each of the concepts is also accompanied by risks, or what I have termed the dark sides of practical wisdom, craft, and rhetoric. While these concepts, when taken individually, provide an incomplete and even dangerous account of legal reasoning, these dangers are overcome when they are united to form the bedrock characteristics of the good lawyer and judge. The virtues of intellect and character inherent to practical wisdom temper the risks associated with craft and rhetoric. Practical wisdom imbues craft with a moral dimension that it otherwise lacks and elevates rhetoric above mere sophistry. Craft’s connection with the past tempers the troubling tendencies associated with practical wisdom and rhetoric. Craft balances the elitist and arrogant tendencies of practical wisdom by adding an aspect of humility and grounds rhetoric in a tradition that helps limit rhetorical excesses. Rhetoric’s commitment to giving reasons makes
practical wisdom more articulate and craft less secretive, cunning, and tricky. Only in combination do practical wisdom, craft, and rhetoric create a balanced, complete, and compelling account of legal reasoning.

[553] Brett G. Scharffs. Abraham Lincoln and the cardinal virtue of practical reason. Pepperdine Law Review, 47(2):341–359, 2020. Practical wisdom is an elusive concept. This Article focuses on a case in which Abraham Lincoln, prior to his election as President, participated (or more accurately did not participate) to frame a discussion of what practical wisdom means and how it makes a difference for lawyers.

[554] John Schilb. Nuance as a rhetorical virtue. Rhetoric Review, 37(4):341–346, 2018. The very word virtue tends to evoke a person’s overall character, not specific moves the person makes. Because I’ve treated nuance as a set of strategies, you might think it isn’t a virtue after all. When writers habitually use these strategies, though, they do engage in self-development. They’re composing admirable identities, both in their writing and in their lives. When we call a text nuanced, I suspect we’re responding to more than some of its bits. We don’t itemize its nuances; we don’t inventory them; they’re not something we count. We’d laugh if someone calculated that the text contained two hundred-and-fifty-three nuances in total. What we’re ultimately taken with is the text’s presiding sensibility: what rhetoricians call the author’s ethos. We sense a nuanced mind at work. It’s a kind of mind for students to imagine and strive for, especially in a writing class.


In saying of someone that he or she is a good thinker we may mean one of two things: that the person is intelligent or that the person is thoughtful. A person may be clever without being thoughtful and vice versa. In the first sense, we commend something more like an ability or trait of character. The educator’s focus, I shall argue in this book, ought to be on the development of the virtue or character trait of thoughtfulness.

[557] Margrit Schreier & Norbert Groeben. Ethical guidelines for the conduct in argumentative discussions: An exploratory study. Human Relations, 49(1):123–132, 1996. An exploratory study is aimed at systematically developing ethical criteria for evaluating contributions to argumentative discussions by bringing together strategies from popular rhetoric with the normative theoretical concept of argumentational integrity. Argumentational integrity constitutes the focus of research in a project of the same name which aims at reconstructing the ethical criteria participants use in evaluating contributions to argumentative discussions. The study rests on the assumption that the diversity of strategy lists in popular theoretical texts can be reduced by asking competent subjects to sort the strategies according to similarity. The similarities themselves can be taken to constitute ways of acting to be avoided in a fair discussion; as a consequence, they can be used to formulate ethical rules or standards of fair argumentation. The construct of argumentational integrity services as a theoretical framework for this systematization.


The article introduces the concept of ‘argumentational integrity’ as the basis for developing ethical criteria by which contributions to argumentative discussions can be evaluated; the focus is on the derivation, definition, and specification of the concept. The derivation of the concept starts out from a prescriptive use of ‘argumentation’, entailing in particular the goal of a rational as well as a cooperative solution. In order to make this goal attainable, contributions to argumentative discussions must meet certain conditions. It is assumed that participants are not only intuitively aware of these conditions, but in fact expect of themselves and others that they will not consciously violate the conditions. This assumption leads to the most general definition of the norm of argumentational integrity: Speakers must not knowingly violate the argumentative conditions. On the basis of an empirical study drawing upon classifications of unethical strategies in popular rhetorical texts, the general norm is then specified in the form of 11 ‘standards of fair argumentation’.


For much of the modern period, theologians and philosophers of religion have struggled with the problem of proving that it is rational to believe in God. Drawing on the thought of Thomas Aquinas, this book lays the foundation for an innovative effort to overturn the longstanding problem of proving faith’s rationality, and to establish instead that rationality requires to be explained by appeals to faith. To this end, Schumacher advances the constructive argument that rationality is not only an epistemological question concerning the soundness of human thoughts, which she defines in terms of ‘intellectual virtue’. Ultimately, it is an ethical question whether knowledge is used in ways that promote an individual’s own flourishing and that of others. That is to say, rationality in its paradigmatic form is a matter of moral virtue, which should nonetheless entail intellectual virtue.


This article takes up the issue of deliberation and the importance of internal constraints for the proper functioning of a deliberative environment. Those who seek to engage in deliberation must possess certain characteristics, or virtues, that will facilitate deliberation. This article discusses humility within this context. Humility serves as a principle deliberative virtue. Theorists should focus on the characteristics of individuals who make deliberation possible before looking for the
proper institutional arrangements. I provide a definition and illustration of humility through a reading of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s ‘Dream of a Ridiculous Man’ and ‘Legend of the Grand Inquisitor’.

[561] Alan Sears & Jim Parsons. Towards critical thinking as an ethic. Theory and Research in Social Education, 19(1):45–68, 1991. For a long time, there has been a disparity between social studies as it is conceived by theorists at universities and as it is practiced by teachers. The fundamental difference between the two groups is that the theorists focus on developing critical thinking abilities, while teachers have focused on content acquisition as central. Many reasons for this dichotomy have been advanced. These reasons mainly focus on problems with the educational system itself. This paper proposes an alternative view of the fundamental reason for the lack of consistency between theory and practice. Our view is that, while teachers have been exposed to critical thinking as a teaching strategy, they have not, by and large, adopted it as an ethic. When faced with the difficulties of implementing a critical thinking based program in their classrooms, teachers who have no ethical commitment to the process choose alternative teaching strategies. These strategies are “safer” and usually involve more traditional content. Critical thinking as an ethic is built on several fundamental principles that cannot be learned, but must be experienced. It is incumbent then for university professors to embody the ethic of critical thinking in their own teaching if they hope to influence prospective teachers to adopt and teach a critical social studies.

[562] Tonguc Seferoglu. Plato’s Phaedo on disagreement and its role in epistemic improvement. Ancient Philosophy Today, 2(1):24-44, 2020. Recent studies suggest that the form and style of Plato’s dialogues have significant associations with their philosophical contents. Few scholars, however, have focused on the role of disagreements in epistemic improvement within the context of Plato’s Phaedo. This paper seeks to unearth a ‘theory of disagreement’ underpinning the Phaedo by examining the conversation between Socrates and his interlocutors. In doing so, I will highlight the epistemic importance of recognizing disagreements. It is shown that there is a positive relationship between the correct method of philosophical argument and epistemic modesty, which plays a crucial role in solving disagreements and facilitating epistemic improvement.

[563] Lois S. Self. Rhetoric and phronesis: The Aristotelian ideal. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 12(2):130–145, 1979. This essay seeks to establish the claim that there is an “association of persuasion and virtue” in Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric which derives from the nature of the art of rhetoric itself; more specifically, that the ideal practitioner of Aristotle’s Rhetoric employs the skills and qualities of Aristotle’s model of human virtue, the Phronimos or “man of practical wisdom,” who is described in the Nicomachean Ethics. Three arguments support this contention. First, Aristotle’s view of rhetoric should be understood in relation to the concept of practical wisdom since the definitions and provinces of concern assigned by Aristotle to the two concepts are strikingly similar. Secondly, excellent performance of the art of rhetoric Aristotle describes requires the characteristics associated with practical wisdom (phronesis). Finally, the desirable relationship of the man of practical wisdom to the public closely parallels the relationship Aristotle posits between the rhetor and the audience in the Rhetoric.

[564] Brett Richard Jacinto Shanley. The Rhetorical Ethics of Antiquity and Their Legacy in American Higher Education. Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 2022. The question as to where ethical philosophy ought to end and oratory begin was an abiding interest for the rhetoricians-philosophers of Antiquity. This study considers the relationship between the two now distinct disciplines in the theory and practice of Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome, and the United States, through the lens of transformative education. A “classical,” primarily Roman model of rhetoric that centered the teaching of ethics predominated in American higher education until the late 19th century; as evidenced through both qualitative and quantitative data, when the classics fell it took the ethical model of rhetoric along with it. Discourse around rhetorical ethics has not ceased, however, and there is indication that interest might be on the rise. Relevant scholarship among compositionists gives a glimpse as to the direction of that still nascent discipline. Given their complex influence on later theory, the focus of this study remains on the treatment of ethics and rhetoric among ancient sources, namely Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. By examining both their theories and the complex socio-political circumstances in which they wrote them, we can develop a richer understanding of the role ethics play in the teaching of rhetoric, past, present, and future.

[565] Lisa Shapiro. On the inseparability of reasoning and virtue: Madame de Maintenon’s Monsieur royale de Saint-Louis. Metaphilosophy, 54(2-3):254–267, 2023. This paper engages with the curriculum at Madame de Maintenon’s school for girls at Saint-Cyr to raise and address a set of questions: What is it to teach someone to reason? The curricular materials of Saint-Cyr suggest that learning to reason is a matter of practice. How is one to distinguish autonomous reason from habituation or automatic trained responses? How can practices in reason giving informed by social mores have objective validity? Moreover, if we think of the role of a philosopher as the cultivation of rational faculties and recognize that how this role is played is bound up with social norms, by what standards ought we to evaluate whether a philosophical educator is good or bad? Intertwined with the discussion is also a question about the limits of philosophy for the question.

[566] Harvey Siegel. Not by skill alone: The centrality of character to critical thinking. Informal Logic, 15(3):163–177, 1993. Connie Missimer (1990) challenges what she calls the Character View, according to which critical thinking involves both skill and character, and argues for a rival conception—the Skill View—according to which critical thinking is a matter of skill alone. In this paper I criticize the Skill View and defend the Character View from Missimer’s critical arguments.

Genuine thinking dispositions are real tendencies, propensities, or inclinations people have to think in particular ways in particular contexts. As such, they are not the same as, or reducible to, either formal rules of good thinking or specific behaviors or patterns of behavior. They can, moreover, contribute to genuine explanations of episodes of thinking, and of long-term patterns of thinking. If this is so, my title questions are answered. The preceding paragraph summarizes what thinking dispositions are. To the question “What good are they?” at least one answer is clear: Thinking dispositions are good to the extent that they cause or bring about good thinking. They do their job when they constitute the “animating force” that causes thinkers to think well.

[568] Harvey Siegel. Open-mindedness, critical thinking, and indoctrination: Homage to William Hare. *Pâdeusis*, 18(1):26–34, 2009. William Hare has made fundamental contributions to philosophy of education. Among the most important of these contributions is his hugely important work on open-mindedness. In this paper I explore the several relationships that exist between Hare’s favored educational ideal (open-mindedness) and my own (critical thinking). I argue that while both are of central importance, it is the latter that is the more fundamental of the two.

[569] Harvey Siegel. Argumentation and the epistemology of disagreement. In Dima Mohamed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., *Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2012. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.* When epistemic peers disagree, what should a virtuous arguer do? Several options have been defended in the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement, which connects interestingly to the controversy launched by Fogelin’s famous paper on ‘deep disagreement.’ I will argue that Fogelin’s case is transformed by the new work on disagreement, and that when seen in that broader epistemological context ‘deep’ disagreement is much less problematic for argumentation theory than it once seemed.

[570] Harvey Siegel. Critical thinking and the intellectual virtues. In Jason Baehr, ed., *Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays in Applied Virtue Epistemology*, pp. 95–112. Routledge, New York, NY, 2016. What is the relation between critical thinking (henceforth CT) and intellectual virtue? Is CT an intellectual virtue or a cluster of such virtues? Is there anything more to CT than the intellectual virtues it involves? In what follows I hope to answer these questions by addressing three clusters of issues: (1) Are the dispositions, habits of mind and character traits constitutive of the “critical spirit” rightly considered as intellectual virtues? What is gained or lost by so conceiving them? (2) Do the intellectual virtues include abilities as well as dispositions, or are abilities something separate? (3) Should we be “reliabilists” or “responsibilists” with respect to the intellectual virtues? That is, must the intellectual virtues, in order to be virtues, reliably secure the truth? Or might they rather be “excellences” or “perfections” that needn’t secure the truth, or be reliable generators of it, in order rightly to be considered virtues? Finally, I will address a more specific question:

(4) What is the connection between virtue and reason? More specifically still: Is a virtuous intellect eo ipso a rational one?

[571] Harvey Siegel. Education’s Epistemology: Rationality, Diversity, and Critical Thinking. Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2017. *Education’s Epistemology* extends and further defends Harvey Siegel’s “reasons conception” of critical thinking. It analyzes and emphasizes both the epistemic quality, and the dispositions and character traits that constitute the “critical spirit,” that are central to a proper account of critical thinking; argues that that epistemic quality must be understood ultimately in terms of epistemic rationality; defends a conception of rationality that involves both rules and judgment; and argues that critical thinking has normative value over and above its instrumental tie to truth. Siegel also argues, contrary to currently popular multiculturalist thought, for both transcultural and universal philosophical ideals, including those of multiculturalism and critical thinking themselves.

[572] Harvey Siegel. Arguing with arguments: Argument quality and argumentative norms (or, every theory in its place: The virtues of the epistemic theory), 2022. Presented at 4th European Conference on Argumentation. ‘Argument’ has multiple meanings and refers in contemporary argumentation theory. Theorists are well aware of this, but often fail to acknowledge it in their theories. In what follows I distinguish several senses of ‘argument’, and argue that important theories are largely correct about some senses of the term but not others. In doing so I hope to show that apparent theoretical rivals are better seen as collaborators or partners, rather than rivals, in the multi-disciplinary effort to understand ‘argument’, arguments, and argumentation in all their varieties. I argue as well for a pluralistic approach to argument evaluation and argumentative norms, since arguments and argumentation can be legitimately evaluated along several dimensions, and for the conceptual priority of epistemic norms.


[574] Harvey Siegel. Arguing with arguments: Argument quality, argumentative norms, and the virtues of the epistemic theory. *Informal Logic*, forthcoming. ‘Argument’ has multiple meanings and refers in contemporary argumentation theory. Theorists are well aware of this, but often fail to acknowledge it in their theories. In what follows I distinguish several senses of ‘argument’, and argue that some highly visible theories are largely correct about some senses of the term but not others. In doing so I hope to show that apparent theoretical rivals are better seen as collaborators or partners, rather than rivals, in the multi-disciplinary effort to understand ‘argument’, arguments, and argumentation in all their varieties. I argue as well for a pluralistic approach to argument evaluation and argumentative norms, since arguments and argumentation
can be legitimately evaluated along several dimensions, but that epistemic norms enjoy conceptual priority.


What does it mean to disagree with people with whom you usually agree? How should political actors concerned with emancipation approach internal disagreement? In short, how should we go about critiquing not our enemies or adversaries but those with whom we share emancipatory visions? I outline the notion of comradely critique as a solution to these questions. I go through a series of examples of how and when critique should differ depending on its addressee, drawing on Jodi Dean’s figure of the comrade. I develop a contrast with its neighbours the ally and the partisan, thus identifying key elements of comradely critique: good faith, equal humanity, equal standing, solidarity, collaboration, common purpose and dispelling fatalism. I then analyse Theodor W. Adorno and Herbert Marcuse’s private correspondence on the 1960s German student movement as an illustration of (imperfect) comradely critique. I conclude by identifying a crucial tension about publicness and privateness.


The value of conceptualizing the desirable dispositions of the teacher as virtues is illuminated through distinguishing such dispositions-as-virtues from other dispositions and from personality traits. Dispositions as virtues are qualities achieved by the individual’s initiative, in the face of obstacles, and are intrinsically motivated. The complexity of any construct for student assessment is illustrated through distinguishing educational goals from teacher dispositions, specifically social justice; describing dispositions under the three categories of character, intellect, and care; and then indicating the complexity of each through self-knowledge, truthfulness, and compassion as exemplars of each category. Finally, using William Hare’s work on open-mindedness, it is argued that transparent assessment is needed in which criteria are perspicuous to assessor and assessed. Student teachers can then create self-assessment protocols for each disposition-as-virtue to enhance understanding and professional growth.


“Virtue jurisprudence” is a normative and explanatory theory of law that utilizes the resources of virtue ethics to answer the central questions of legal theory. The main focus of this essay is the development of a virtue-centered theory of judging. The exposition of the theory begins with exploration of defects in judicial character, such as corruption and incompetence. Next, an account of judicial virtue is introduced. This includes judicial wisdom, a form of phronesis, or sound practical judgment. A virtue-centered account of justice is defended against the argument that theories of fairness are prior to theories of justice. The centrality of virtue as a character trait can be drawn out by analyzing the virtue of justice into constituent elements. These include judicial impartiality (even-handed sympathy for those affected by adjudication) and judicial integrity (respect for the law and concern for its coherence). The essay argues that a virtue-centered theory accounts for the role that virtuous practical judgment plays in the application of rules to particular fact situations. Moreover, it contends that a virtue-centered theory of judging can best account for the phenomenon of lawful judicial disagreement. Finally, a virtue-centered approach best accounts for the practice of equity, departure from the rules based on the judge’s appreciation of the particular characteristics of individual fact situations.


This paper gives a new and richer account of open-mindedness as a moral virtue. I argue that the main problem with existing accounts is that they derive the moral value of open-mindedness entirely from the epistemic role it plays in moral thought. This view is overly intellectualist. I argue that open-mindedness as a moral virtue promotes our flourishing alongside others in ways that are quite independent of its role in correcting our beliefs. I close my discussion by distinguishing open-mindedness from what some might consider its equivalent: empathy and tolerance.


This article draws on the ideas of Stuart Hampshire to examine political practices of our culture as a basis for deriving a shared understanding of justice. It is argued here that such practices intimate a notion of procedural justice or “hearing the other side” of the idea that there is virtue in settling the various disputes that arise among us concerning our different interests and conceptions of the good, including our different conceptions of substantive justice, by processes of adversarial argument rather than force. The article also argues that, if public administration scholars and practitioners wish to foster procedural justice, then, they need to have an understanding of an appreciation for our constitutional practices of adversarial argument, as well as seeking other ways of promoting such adversarial argument within their own particular agencies and organizations.


While many warn about the failures of politics, this article argues that politics serves to resolve conflicts of interests and values among us in a manner that limits the use of violence and also protects and fosters value pluralism and freedom. Public administration scholars often look to science to improve governance but science cannot resolve our many conflicting ends and values, nor can it take proper account of the freedom and resulting sheer unpredictability that we have come to experience within our own tradition of politics. It is argued that the practice of politics requires not a science of governance, but simply a certain kind of toleration, namely a willingness to hear the other side and to engage in practices of adversary argument. Implications for the “politics of fear” are also discussed.

Since there can be no language that is free of our moral and political values, it is difficult, if not impossible, for public administrators and those of us who study and teach them to be “ethically neutral.” However, the idea of neutrality, thought of in terms of “fairness,” or a willingness to “hear the other side,” remains a value that is worthwhile for public administrators to pursue. The implications of this argument for American constitutionalism and public administration practice and education are examined.


Among those who regard open-mindedness as a virtue, there is dispute over whether the trait is essentially an attitude toward particular beliefs or toward oneself as a believer. I defend William Hare’s account of open-mindedness as a first-order attitude toward one’s beliefs and critique Peter Gardner’s view of open-mindedness as a non-committal posture and Jonathan Adler’s claim that open-mindedness is a second-order recognition of one’s fallibility as a knower. While I reject Adler’s account of open-mindedness as a meta-attitude, I affirm his intuition that there is a closely related second-order intellectual virtue pertaining to the attitude we take toward ourselves as knowers. However, this trait is intellectual humility not open-mindedness. I explain why both of these traits are intellectual virtues and how they properly build off one another in the virtuous mind.


While open-mindedness as an intellectual trait has been recognized for centuries, Western philosophers have not explicitly endorsed it as a virtue until recently. This acknowledgment has been roughly coincident with the rise of virtue epistemology. As with any virtue, it is important to inform contemporary discussion of open-mindedness with reflection on sources from the history of philosophy. Here I do just this. After reviewing two major accounts of open-mindedness, which I dub “Contest” and “Indifference,” I explore some ideas pertinent to the subject in four philosophers spanning eighteen centuries: Sextus Empiricus, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Paul Feyerabend. Despite their varying concerns and terminology, their contributions may valuable inform current reflection on the virtue of open-mindedness, whether construed in terms of the Contest or Indifference account.


The current debate about disagreement has as rivals those who take the steadfast view and those who affirm conciliationism. Those on the steadfast side maintain that resolute commitment to a belief is reasonable despite peer disagreement. Conciliationists say that peer disagreement necessarily undermines warrant for one’s belief. This article discusses the relevance of open-mindedness to the matter of peer disagreement. It shows how both the steadfast and the conciliatory perspective are consistent with a robust and substantive display of open-mindedness. However, it also turns out that there are more ways to display open-mindedness on the steadfast view than on the conciliatory view.


Objective: Intellectual humility (IH) refers to the recognition that personal beliefs might be wrong. We investigate possible interpersonal implications of IH for how people perceive the intellectual capabilities and moral character of their sociopolitical opponents and for their willingness to associate with those opponents.

Method: In four initial studies (N = 1,926, Mage = 38.880 females, 1,035 males), we measured IH, intellectual and moral derogation of opponents, and willingness to befriend opponents. In two additional studies (N = 508, Mage = 40.252 females, 314 males), we presented participants with a specific opponent on certain sociopolitical issues and several social media posts from that opponent in which he expressed his views on the issue. We then measured IH, intellectual, and moral derogation of the opponent, participants’ willingness to befriend the opponent, participants’ willingness to “friend” the opponent on social media, and participants’ willingness to “follow” the opponent on social media.

Results: Low-IH relative to high-IH participants were more likely to derogate the intellectual capabilities and moral character of their opponents, less willing to befriend their opponents, and less willing to “friend” and “follow” an opponent on social media. Conclusions: IH may have important interpersonal implications for person perception, and for understanding social extremism and polarization.


Intellectual virtues like open-mindedness, clarity, intellectual honesty and the willingness to participate in rational discussions, are conceived as important aims of education. In this paper an attempt is made to clarify the specific nature of intellectual virtues. Firstly, the intellectual virtues are systematically compared with moral virtues. The upshot is that considering a trait of character to be an intellectual virtue implies assuming that such a trait can be derived from, or is a specification of, the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for truth. Secondly, several (possible) misconceptions of intellectual virtues are avoided by making the required distinctions. For example, it is argued that our concept of an intellectual virtue should not be confused with a normative conception of intellectual virtuousness.


When evaluating the arguer instead of the argument, we soon find ourselves confronted with a puzzling situation: what seems to be a virtue in one argumentative situation could very well be called a vice in another. This paper will present the idea that there are in fact two sets of virtues an arguer has to master—and with them four sometimes very different roles.

Feminist argumentation theorists have criticized the Dominant Adversarial Model in argumentation, according to which arguers should take proponent and opponent roles and argue against one another. The model is deficient because it creates disadvantages for feminine gendered persons in a way that causes significant epistemic and practical harms. In this paper, I argue that the problem that these critics have pointed out can be generalized: whenever an arguer is given a role in the argument the associated tasks and norms of which she cannot fulfill, she is liable to suffer morally significant harms. One way to react to this problem is by requiring arguers to set up argument structures and allocate roles so that the argument will be reasons-reflective in as balanced a way as possible. However, I argue that this would create to heavy a burden. Arguers would then habitually have to take on roles that require them to divert time and energy away from the goals that they started arguing for and instead serve the goal of ideal reasons-reflectiveness. At least prima facie arguers should be able to legitimately devote their time and energy towards their own goals. This creates a problem: On the one hand, structures that create morally significant harms for some arguers should be avoided—on the other hand, arguers should be able to take argument-roles that allow them to devote themselves to their own argumentative goals. Fulfilling the second requirement for some arguers will often create the morally significant harms for their interlocutors. There are two possible solutions for this problem: first, arguers might be required to reach free, consensual agreements on the structure they will adopt for their argument and the way they will distribute argumentative roles. I reject this option as both fundamentally unfeasible and practically unrealistic, based on arguments developed by theorists like Krabbe and Jacobs. I argue that instead, we should take a liberal view on argument ethics. Arguers should abide by moral side constraints to their role taking. They should feel free to take roles that will allow them to concentrate on their argumentative goals, but only if this does not create a situation in which their interlocutors are pushed into a role that they cannot effectively play.

I argue that Walton’s method of grounding argument evaluation in the goals of argumentative dialogues can be adapted by identifying moral goals of argumentation associated with harm avoidance and respect for dignity. This makes it possible to determine whether argumentative behavior is desirable or undesirable from a moral point of view without needing to inquire into an arguer’s intention. Crossing that line is only necessary if we want to determine whether moral blame should be put on the arguer.

In this paper I argue for a pro tanto moral duty to be charitable in argument. Further, I argue that the amount of charitable effort required varies depending on the type of dialogue arguers are engaged in. In non-institutionalized contexts, arguers have influence over the type of dialogue that will be adopted. Arguers are therefore responsible with respect to charity on two levels: First, they need to take reasons for charity into account when determining the dialogue-type. Second, they need to invest the amount of effort towards charity required by the dialogue-type.

One way in which we may be able to legitimately determine the norms that will guide our arguments is by using meta-dialogues. Unfortunately, situations where meta-dialogues are actually needed are also often situations of power inequality so that arguers may feel that it is too risky to attempt initiating a meta-dialogue. I argue that argumentative smothering is a high risk here, and that we therefore cannot rely on meta-dialogues to solve the problems of determining argumentative norms.

Arguments involve, at minimum, attempts at presenting something that an audience will take to be a reason. Reasons, once understood, affect an addressee’s beliefs in ways that are in some significant sense outside of their direct voluntary control. Since such changes may impact the well-being, life projects, or sense of self of the addressee, they risk infringing upon their autonomy. We call this the “autonomy worry” of argumentation. In light of this worry, this paper asks whether one ought to seek an addressee’s consent before arguing with them. We first consider the view that arguing of any sort and on any topic requires consent. However, such a view is extreme, and we reject the general requirement of consent because argument contains its own internal permission structure. We find, however, that this permission structure is not always operative, and that consent may nonetheless be morally required in certain kinds of cases.

If arguers were exclusively concerned with cognitive improvement, arguments would be cooperative. However, we have other goals and there are other arguers, so the default is adversarial argumentation. We naturally inhabit the heuristically helpful but cooperation-inhibiting roles of proponents and opponents. We can, however, opt for more cooperative roles. The resources of virtue argumentation theory are used to explain when proactive cooperation is permissible, advisable, even mandatory—and also when it is not.

In this paper I argue for a pro tanto moral duty to be charitable in argument. Further, I argue that the amount of charitable effort required varies depending on the type of dialogue arguers are engaged in. In non-institutionalized contexts, arguers have influence over the type of dialogue that will be adopted. Arguers are therefore responsible with respect to charity on two levels: First, they need to take reasons for charity into account when determining the dialogue-type. Second, they need to invest the amount of effort towards charity required by the dialogue-type.

One way in which we may be able to legitimately determine the norms that will guide our arguments is by using meta-dialogues. Unfortunately, situations where meta-dialogues are actually needed are also often situations of power inequality so that arguers may feel that it is too risky to attempt initiating a meta-dialogue. I argue that argumentative smothering is a high risk here, and that we therefore cannot rely on meta-dialogues to solve the problems of determining argumentative norms.

Arguments involve, at minimum, attempts at presenting something that an audience will take to be a reason. Reasons, once understood, affect an addressee’s beliefs in ways that are in some significant sense outside of their direct voluntary control. Since such changes may impact the well-being, life projects, or sense of self of the addressee, they risk infringing upon their autonomy. We call this the “autonomy worry” of argumentation. In light of this worry, this paper asks whether one ought to seek an addressee’s consent before arguing with them. We first consider the view that arguing of any sort and on any topic requires consent. However, such a view is extreme, and we reject the general requirement of consent because argument contains its own internal permission structure. We find, however, that this permission structure is not always operative, and that consent may nonetheless be morally required in certain kinds of cases.

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If circumstances were always simple and all arguers were always exclusively concerned with cognitive improvement, arguments would probably always be cooperative. However, we have other goals and there are other arguers, so in practice the default seems to be adversarial argumentation. We naturally inhabit the heuristically helpful but cooperation-inhibiting roles of proponents and opponents. We can, however, opt for more cooperative roles. The resources of virtue argumentation theory are used to explain when proactive cooperation is permissible, advisable, and even mandatory—and also when it is not.


Is argumentation essentially adversarial? The concept of a devil’s advocate—a cooperative arguer who assumes the role of an opponent for the sake of the argument—serves as a lens to bring into clearer focus the ways that adversarial arguers can be virtuous and adversariality itself can contribute to argumentation’s goals. It also shows the different ways arguments can be adversarial and the different ways that argumentation can be said to be “essentially” adversarial.


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This essay argues for a pedagogical renewal in the academic debate community, which currently lacks a clear telos. Practical wisdom, as defined by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, is proposed as the final cause of academic debating. Practical wisdom is identified with the process of good decision-making. Controversies in the theory of disadvantages, counterplans, and critiques are evaluated. In order to realize the final cause of practical wisdom, debate theory needs to be restructured according to a common-sense understanding of decision-making. The authors advocate a more rigorous and systematic approach for debating and evaluating theoretical arguments.


This research aims at evaluating the psychometric properties of the adapted California Critical Thinking Dispositions (CCTDI) particularly the construct validity. CCTDI consists of 75 Likert-type items measuring seven dispositions, namely truth-seeking, open-mindedness, analyticity, systematicity, inquisitiveness, self-confidence and maturity. The participants of this study involved 425 undergraduate and graduate students. Results showed that the CCTDI has satisfactory construct validity with seven subscales extracted and confirmed by exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. These evidences of construct validity were further supported with the results of high Cronbach alpha indicating that it is a valid and reliable instrument to measure critical thinking dispositions.


Being able to discriminate poorly justified from well justified arguments is necessary for informed citizenship. However, it is not known whether the ability to recognize argument strength generalizes across different types of arguments, and what cognitive factors predict this ability or these abilities. Drawing on the theory of argument schemes, we examined arguments from consequence, analogy, symptoms, and authority in order to cover all major types of arguments. A study (N = 278) on the general population in Finland indicated that the ability to discriminate between strong and weak arguments did not differ between these schemes. Argument strength discrimination ability correlated positively with analytic thinking dispositions promoting both quality and quantity of thinking, slightly positively with education, and negatively with overconfidence. It was unrelated to an intuitive thinking style, and to self-rated mental effort.


Critical thinking does not provide a path to cozy and reassuring beliefs. It will not necessarily support your favorite ideology, it is potentially disruptive to some aspects of your current way of life, and it may even irritate some of your friends and family. Nevertheless, a critical thinker should favor truth over comfort. We ought to favor truths even though we sometimes derive some pleasure from believing falsehoods. Typically, careful students of critical thinking find they must abandon at least some of their cherished opinions or comfortable habits of thought. Doing so requires courage, intellectual maturity, and humility. Not all of us can be courageous and mature all of the time. However, an education in critical thinking requires that, at a minimum, you aspire to these virtues. Some people claim that they would rather be wrong and feel good than be right and not feel good. This book is not for them.


Civility is widely regarded as a duty of democratic citizenship. This Article identifies a difficulty inherent within the enterprise of developing an adequate conception of civility. Challenging the idea civility is the requirement to remain calm, peaceable, or dispassionate in political debate, it is argued that that civility is instead the requirement to address one’s political arguments to one’s interlocutors. In this way, civility
is a second-order requirement, a norm governing our conduct in political disagreement. From there, a conceptual problem for civility so understood is raised, the problem of semantic descent. It is argued that any plausible conception of civility is prone to being “weaponized,” transformed into a partisan device for incivility. The general upshot is that as important as civility is for a well-functioning democracy, its usefulness as a diagnostic tool for repairing political dysfunctions is limited.


This article proposes a Confucian conception of critical thinking by focussing on the notion of judgement. It is argued that the attainment of the Confucian ideal of li (normative behaviours) necessitates and promotes critical thinking in at least two ways. First, the observance of li requires the individual to exercise judgement by applying the generalised knowledge, norms and procedures in dao (Way) to particular action-situations insightfully and flexibly. Secondly, the individual’s judgement, to qualify as an instance of li, should be underpinned and motivated by the ethical quality of ren (humanity) that testifies to one’s moral character. Two educational implications arising from a Confucian conception of critical thinking are highlighted. First, the Confucian interpretation presented in this essay challenges the perception that critical thinking is absent from or culturally incompatible with Chinese traditions. Secondly, such a conception advocates viewing critical thinking as a form of judgement that is action-oriented, spiritual, ethical and interpersonal.


Drawing on MacIntyre’s notion of rationality, this article examines the conceptions and practices of critical thinking in Chinese schools. Focusing on the perceptions of school leaders in Shanghai, this study reports that they interpreted critical thinking primarily as personal inquiry and problem solving. They drew attention to the promotion of critical thinking under the current education reform and highlighted ongoing challenges arising from the high-stakes assessments and prevailing socio-cultural values. This paper shows that definitions and applications of critical thinking in Chinese schools are rooted in and shaped by socially embodied and historically contingent traditions. Cultural influences are manifested in an exam-oriented system, an emphasis on didactic teaching, the centrality of textbooks, a non-confrontational view of critical thinking, and a hierarchical relationship between the teacher and students. The example of Shanghai foregrounds the existence and legitimacy of diverse approaches to and expressions of critical thinking across contexts.


Arrogance has widespread negative consequences for epistemic practices. Arrogant people tend to intimidate and humiliate other agents, and to ignore or dismiss their views. They have a propensity to manhandle. They are also angry. In this paper I explain why anger is a common manifestation of arrogance in order to understand the effects of arrogance on debate. I argue that *superbia* (which is the kind of arrogance that is my concern here) is a vice of superiority characterised by an overwhelming desire to diminish other people in order to excel and by a tendency to arrogate special entitlements for oneself, including the privilege of not having to justify one’s claims.


Self-affirmation techniques can help reduce arrogant behaviour in public debates. This chapter consists of three sections. The first offers an account of what speakers owe to their audiences, and of what hearers owe to speakers. It also illustrates some of the ways in which arrogance leads to violations of conversational norms. The second argues that arrogance can be understood as an attitude toward the self which is positive but defensive. The final section offers empirical evidence why we should expect self-affirmation to reduce defensiveness and thus the manifestation of arrogance in debate.


A number of philosophers have defended the view that seemingly intellectually arrogant behaviours are epistemically beneficial. In this chapter I take issue with most of their conclusions. I argue, for example, that we should not expect steadfastness in one’s belief in the face of contrary evidence nor overconfidence in one’s own abilities to promote better evaluation of the available evidence resulting in good-quality group-judgement. These features of individual thinkers are, on the contrary, likely to lead groups to end up in stalemates and to polarise over issues. It is true that groups benefit from including members that, prior to discussion, hold diverse views. But disagreement benefits group judgement only when it is transient, rather than entrenched. That is, groups reach better quality conclusions when a number of diverse opinions are disseminated and evaluated fairly before reaching a consensus. If this is right, it would seem that individual qualities, such as open-mindedness and even-handedness about the epistemic value of opinions other than one’s own, rather than steadfastness or overconfidence are conducive to better quality group judgement.


Anger dominates debates in the public sphere. In this article I argue that there are diverse forms of anger that merit different responses. My focus is especially on two types of anger that I label respectively arrogant and resistant. The first is the characteristic defensive response of those who unwarrantedly arrogate special privileges for themselves. The second is often a source of insight and a form of moral address. I detail some discursive manifestations of these two types of anger. I show that arrogant anger is responsible for attempts...
to intimidate and humiliate others with whom one disagrees. Whilst resistant anger can be intimidating, it is also essential in communicating moral demands.


In this chapter, after a review of some existent empirical and philosophical literature that suggests that human beings are essentially incapable of changing their mind in response to counter-evidence, I argue that motivation makes a significant difference to individuals’ ability rationally to evaluate information. I rely on empirical work on group deliberation to argue that the motivation to learn from others, as opposed to the desire to win arguments, promotes good quality group deliberation. Finally I provide an overview of some epistemic virtues and vices crucial to the political-epistemic activities of arguing, debating, and listening to a contrary point of view.


The pervasiveness of agonism, that is, ritualized adversativeness, in contemporary western academic discourse is the source of both obfuscation of knowledge and personal suffering in academia. Framing academic discourse as a metaphorical battle leads to a variety of negative consequences, many of which have ethical as well as personal dimensions. Among these consequences is a widespread assumption that critical dialogue is synonymous with negative critique, at the expense of other types of ‘critical thinking’. Another is the requirement that scholars search for weaknesses in others’ work at the expense of seeking strengths, understanding the roots of theoretical differences, or integrating disparate but related ideas. Agonism also encourages the conceptualization of complex and subtle work as falling into two simplified warring camps. Finally, it leads to the exclusion or marginalization of those who lack a taste for agonistic interchange. Alternative approaches to intellectual interchange need not entirely replace agonistic ones but should be accommodated alongside them.


Teaching critical thinking is widely regarded as a vital task, both for educators in general and philosophers in particular. It is simultaneously acknowledged as being notoriously difficult to instill in students. In part, this seems to be the result of critical thinking skills being to some extent domain-specific. For example, teaching can help students learn to avoid certain logical fallacies in a particular domain such as political science, and yet the same students fall into logically identical fallacies in another area of their lives without noticing and without any apparent conflict. This is a problem noted both by philosophers interested in the theoretical implications and educators attempting to address it in practice. My MRP will explore a virtue-based strategy for addressing this problem. Virtue ethics literature focuses on both character virtues and intellectual virtues, while the virtue epistemology literature has focused primarily just on intellectual virtues. These include open-mindedness and intellectual courage. I believe this makes for a gap in the virtue epistemology literature. It is a gap because some epistemic problems, including the domain-specificity challenge to critical thinking, have underappreciated bases in general character traits, in addition to the already recognized bases in general intellectual traits. To help address epistemic problems such as overcoming domain-specificity of critical thinking, virtue epistemology ought to focus on character virtues, not just intellectual virtues.

To help show this, I use humility as a case study. My main thesis is that having the general character trait of humility is an essential prerequisite for routinely good critical thinking across multiple domains. Without this and other general character traits, an agent will too often be unwilling and/or unable to apply theoretical knowledge of critical thinking that is necessary for routinely succeeding at critical thinking.


Quintilian does not offer an explicit mechanism that connects eloquence and ethics. This essay suggests that this omission is a consequence of the significant role that imitation plays in Quintilian’s pedagogy. This essay further suggests that the particular habits of mind that are cultivated through imitation are those that are associated with civic virtue, and it offers some ways that civic virtue might be cultivated in contemporary classrooms through a pedagogy that relies on imitation.


Most critical thinking theories address the problems of how to develop reasoning abilities and encourage students to be more rational. I would like to argue that there is another necessary quality for being a critical thinker that is as important as the propensity to be rational: the ability to be receptive and caring, open to others’ ideas and willing to attend to them, to listen and consider their possibilities.


I want to examine here the ontological and epistemological assumptions of caring as a form of moral orientation. By doing so, I will be able to make the case that caring is as vital for epistemological theories as it is for moral theories. Caring does not just inform ethics, it informs reasoning as well. I will argue that caring reasoning helps ensure we understand each other’s different, shifting views fairly and generously while at the same time avoiding too narrowly defining caring and risking essentializing it. Caring reasoning can help answer concerns feminists have expressed about caring, as a moral orientation, in terms of supplying justification and drawing awareness to historical context and social systems.


A virtue account is focused on the character of those who argue. It is frequently assumed, however, that virtues are not action guiding, since they describe how
to be and so fail to give us specific actions to take in a sticky situation. In terms of argumentation, we might say that being a charitable arguer is virtuous, but knowing so provides no details about how to argue successfully. To close this gap, I develop a parallel with the thick-thin distinction from ethics and use Hursthouse’s notion of “v-rules.” I also draw heavily from the work in argumentation by Daniel Cohen to develop Wayne Brockriede’s notion of arguing lovingly. But “argue lovingly” has a delicious ambiguity. For Brockriede it describes how we engage with others arguers. It can also mean, however, a loving attachment to knowledge, understanding, and truth. Applying the thick-thin distinction to argumentation in general and loving argumentation in particular shows that a virtue theoretic approach to argumentation is valuable for two reasons: it can provide one articulation of what it means to be a virtuous arguer and provide some insights into how to become one.

615 David Thunder. A Rawlsian argument against the duty of civility. *American Journal of Political Science, 50*(3):676–690, 2006. In this article, I show that the assumptions underpinning John Rawls’s so-called “duty of civility” ought to lead one not to affirm the duty but to reject it. I will begin by setting out in its essentials the content and rationale of the “duty of civility,” which lies at the heart of Rawls’s ideal of public reason. Secondly, I will argue that the very premises allegedly underpinning the duty of civility—namely, the values of reciprocity and political autonomy, and the burdens of judgment—in fact rule it out. Thirdly, I will suggest that if my argument against the duty of civility is correct, then one recent attempt to salvage political liberalism and reasonableness from the charge of incoherence fails. Finally, I draw some challenging lessons from our discussion for political liberalism and the liberal tradition as a whole.

616 Valerie Tiberius. Virtue and practical deliberation. *Philosophical Studies, 111*:147–172, 2002. The question of how to reason well is an important normative question, one which ultimately motivates some of our interest in the more abstract topic of the principles of practical reason. It is this normative question that I propose to address by arguing that given the goal of an important kind of deliberation, we will deliberate better if we develop certain virtues. I give an account of the virtue of stability and I argue that stability makes reasoners (of a certain sort) reason better. Further, I suggest at the end of the paper that an account of virtues that conduces to good reasoning might go a long way toward answering some of the traditional questions about the principles of practical reason.

617 Valerie Tiberius. Open-mindedness and normative contingency. *Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 7*:182–204, 2012. Open-mindedness seems to be a virtue because an open mind is more receptive to the truth. But if value judgments are best understood as a human projection, expression, or construction, then it is unclear why open-mindedness is a virtue when it comes to normative judgments. If moral truths are not “out there”, what is the point of an open mind? What are we being open to? Further, if oights and values are, in some way, contingent on us, open-mindedness may put us at greater risk of losing important convictions than in the case of belief about the world. In this paper I defend open-mindedness for normative judgment in the context of meta-ethical theories that makes values mind-dependent.

618 Thomas T. Tominaga. Toward a Confucian approach to cultivating the reasoning mind for the social order. *Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 12*:20–23, 1993. Implicit in Confucius’s emphasis on self-cultivation is the need not only to cultivate our jen (benevelence, humanity, kindheartedness), but also to develop and apply our reasoning mind—as an enlightened and disciplined way of bringing about and maintaining social order. In this paper, I would like to investigate how this is understood and pursued from the Confucian perspective. The ideas I express are developed from those of Confucius and his influential followers—Mencius, Chu Hsi, and Wang Yang-ming.

619 Zhichao Tong. The virtues of truth: On democracy’s epistemic value. *Philosophy and Social Criticism, 48*(3):416–436, 2022. Drawing on Bernard Williams’s *Truth and Truthfulness* and Miranda Fricker’s *Epistemic Justice*, this article presents an epistemic argument for democracy on the basis of its ability to incentivize more people to display the virtues of truth required for the social production and aggregation of knowledge. In particular, the article compares democracy respectively with autocracy and epistocracy, showing that it is likely to be, within the context of a modern pluralistic society, an epistemically superior regime in the sense that it creates more favourable conditions for the pooling of epistemic resources. The article concludes with a multi-dimensional framework of democratic legitimacy, where democracy’s epistemic value is directly tied with both the safeguard against elite domination and the development of citizens’ ethical and intellectual capabilities. In this regard, the article also helps to bridge the gap between epistemic and non-epistemic approaches in democratic theory and unite what might be called the wisdom, power, and virtue of the multitude.

620 Lawrence Torcello. On the virtues of inhospitality: Toward an ethics of public reason and critical engagement. *Philo, 17*(1):99–115, 2014. This article seeks to re-conceptualize Rawlsian public reason as a critical tool against ideological propaganda. The article proposes that public reason, as a standard for public discourse, must be conceptualized beyond its mandate for comprehensive neutrality to additionally emphasize critique of ideologically driven ignorance and propaganda in the public realm. I connect uncritical hospitality to such ideological propaganda with Harry Frankfurt’s concept of bullshit. This paper proposes that philosophers have a unique moral obligation to engage bullshit critically in the public sphere. The obligation for such critique, I argue, represents philosophy’s essential moral component in a society committed to the protection of free speech and deliberative democracy.

621 Brian Treanor. Environmentalism and public virtue. *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 23*:9–28, 2010. Much of the literature addressing environmental virtue tends to focus on what might be called “personal virtue”—individual actions, characteristics, or dispositions that benefit the individual actor.
has, in contrast, been relatively little interest in either ‘virtue politics’—collective actions, characteristics, or dispositions—or in what might be called “public virtues,” actions, characteristics, or dispositions that benefit the community rather than the individual. This focus, however, is problematic, especially in a society that valorizes individuality. This paper examines public virtue and its role in environmental virtue ethics. First, I outline different types of virtue in order to frame the discussion of public virtues and, in particular, a subclass of virtues I will refer to as political virtue. Second, I focus on practical problems and address the inadequacy of personal virtue for effecting social change and, therefore, for addressing most environmental crises. Finally, I argue that public and political virtues are necessary, if under emphasized, conditions for the flourishing of the individual, and that they are important complements to more traditional environmental virtues.


In this paper, I propose a virtue-theoretic approach to semantics, according to which the study of linguistic competence in particular, and the study of meaning and language in general, should focus on a speaker’s interpretative virtues, such as charity and interpretability, rather than the speaker’s knowledge of rules. The first part of the paper proffers an argument for shifting to virtue semantics, and the second part outlines the nature of such virtue semantics.


Rational persuasion is paternalistic, I argue, when it is motivated by distrust in the other’s capacity to adequately recognize or weigh reasons that bear on her good, when it conveys that she is insufficiently capable of engaging with those reasons, as a competent person is expected to be able to do, and when it occludes an opportunity for her to engage independently with those reasons herself.


Positing the conceptual priority of the agent over the act, the virtue approach in argumentation has developed considerably in the last decade. Although some proposals towards a taxonomy of virtues and vices exist (Cohen 2006; Aberdein 2010), the virtue approach has not so far come up with any method to recognize them in action. We argue that rather than an independent, solely agent-based perspective, virtue argumentation can develop systematically in connection to act-based perspectives in argumentation, especially along the ‘dialectical tier’. The paper offers a taxonomy of argumentative vices and liabilities, as an initial step in exploring the connections between procedural norms and virtues. We review a series of dialectical procedural norms, and drawing especially from Pragma-Dialectical discussion rules (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004), identify thirteen argumentative vices. Noting that not all procedural derailments translate to agential attributes with equal precision and force, we discuss a virtuous arguer’s eight liabilities.


This paper investigates civility from an Aristotelian perspective and has two objectives. The first is to offer a novel account of this virtue based on Aristotle’s remarks about civic friendship. The proposed account distinguishes two main components of civility—civic benevolence and civil deliberation—and shows how Aristotle’s insights can speak to the needs of our communities today. The notion of civil deliberation is then unpacked into three main dimensions: motivational, inquiry-related, and ethical. The second objective is to illustrate how the post-truth condition—in particular, the spread of misinformation typical of the digital environments we inhabit—obstructs our capacity to cultivate the virtue of civility by impairing every component of civil deliberation. The paper’s overall ambition is to direct virtue theorists’ attention to the need to foster civic virtues as a means of counteracting the negative aspects of the post-truth age.


Should we always engage in critical thinking about issues of public policy, such as health care, gun control, and LGBT rights? Michael Huemer (2005) has argued for the claim that in some cases it is not epistemically responsible to engage in critical thinking on these issues. His argument is based on a reliabilist conception of the value of critical thinking. This article analyses Huemer’s argument against the epistemic responsibility of critical thinking by engaging it critically. It presents an alternative account of the value of critical thinking that is tied to the notion of forming and deploying a critical identity. And it develops an account of our epistemic responsibility to engage in critical thinking that is not dependent on reliability considerations alone. The primary purpose of the article is to provide critical thinking students, or those that wish to reflect on the value of critical thinking, with an opportunity to think metacritically about critical thinking by examining an argument that engages the question of whether it is epistemically responsible for one to engage in critical thinking.


Disagreement is inevitable, particularly in our current context, marked by the close coexistence of conflicting values and perspectives in politics, religion, and ethics. How can we deal with disagreement ethically and constructively in our pluralistic world? In Disagreeing Virtuously Olli-Pekka Vainio presents a valuable interdisciplinary approach to that question, drawing on insights from intellectual history, the cognitive sciences, philosophy of religion, and virtue theory. After mapping the current discussion on disagreement among various disciplines, Vainio offers fresh ways to understand the complicated nature of human disagreement and recommends ways to manage our interpersonal and intercommunal conflicts in ethically sustainable ways.

This research, conducted at a midsize university, focused on the virtue of tolerance as it relates to an often-neglected area of diversity—diversity of conscience. Defined as 'legitimate differences of moral and religious conscience', tolerance is essential for fostering civility in our increasingly diverse societies and for promoting the free exchange of perspectives central to the mission of higher education. A short whiteboard animation video was created in an effort to teach the concept of tolerance of diversity of conscience in an engaging way. This video was embedded in an online workshop that also presented the cardinal virtues as accountability parameters for civil dialogue. The results from pre- and post-workshop questionnaires revealed that students increased in self-reported understanding of the concepts, and were able to apply knowledge of the concepts, thus providing support that this modality may be a useful first step in teaching tolerance of diversity of conscience.


As someone who has participated in real life as a debater and a lecturer, I have heard (and unfortunately continue to hear) many silly and few sound arguments. This huge difference between theory and practice creates a rather strong tension, and, in general terms, that tension is what I want to discuss here. More specifically, if we take into account all the real-life aspects of a debate, a discussion, or an argumentation, what does it mean to defend a thesis, a position, or a claim in an efficient way? In section two, I am more explicit, though rather brief, about the above mentioned ideal reasoner or debater. Then I sketch the picture that comes closer to real-life situations. In section four, I outline what this new look entails for argumentation, discussion, and debate. Next, I present some concrete cases, and in the final section, I raise the ethical issues posed by all this.


Anne-Maren Andersen starts her contribution developing the term pistis into an analytical tool that she summarizes in table 1. She then applies the tool on Danish parliamentary debate. Forced to make a choice I limit myself to some sketchy remarks about the first part, the way Andersen develops the term pistis. In my opinion it is useful to elaborate on the history of this term pistis to decide whether we should adopt this term to denote the analytical tool presented in table 1. My conclusion will be not to adopt it this way. However, that does not mean that the analytical tool pretended by Andersen is not useful to analyze parliamentary debate. The theoretical foundation however can be found in existing theories about the principle of charity and cooperation principle.


Negotiation is not only used to settle differences of interest but also to settle differences of opinion. Discussants who are unable to resolve their difference about the objective worth of a policy or action proposal may be willing to abandon their attempts to convince the other and search instead for a compromise that would, for each of them, though only a second choice yet be preferable to a lasting conflict. Our questions are: First, when is it sensible to enter into negotiations and when would this be unwarranted or even fallacious? Second, what is the nature of a compromise? What does it mean to settle instead of resolve a difference of opinion, and what might be the dialectical consequences of mistaking a compromise for a substantial resolution? Our main aim is to contribute to the theory of argumentation within the context of negotiation and compromise formation and to show how arguing disputants can shift to negotiation in a dialectically virtuous way.


It’s intuitive to think that (a) the more sure you are of something, the harder it’ll be to change your mind about it, and (b) you can’t be open-minded about something if you’re very sure about it. If these thoughts are right, then, with minimal assumptions, it follows...
that you can’t be in a good position to both escape echo chambers and be rationally resistant to fake news: the former requires open-mindedness, but the latter is inimical to it. I argue that neither thought is true and that believing them will get us all mixed up. I show that you can be open-minded and have confidently held beliefs, and that beliefs in which you are less sure are not, thereby, more fragile. I close with some reflections on the nature of rational belief change and open-mindedness and a brief sketch about what might actually help us in the fight against misinformation and belief polarization.


In this paper, I defend a silencing view of practical reasoning. I begin by presenting McDowell’s view and some criticisms of it. I argue that the silencing view is not as vulnerable to these criticisms as it might first appear. The view does not, I contend, require the virtuous to be detached, unfeeling, or unpalatable stoic. Furthermore, I suggest that the psychological phenomenon of silencing itself may not be exclusive to the virtuous. Finally, I offer what I argue is a psychologically plausible interpretation of McDowell’s claim that the virtuous see situations in a distinctive sort of way. Despite its idealism, the picture of the virtuous that we get on the account that I develop here is a decidedly human one.


In the contemporary philosophical literature, ideal virtue is often accused of setting a standard more appropriate for saints or gods than for human beings. In this paper, I undermine divinity-infused depictions of the fully virtuous, and argue that ideal virtue is, indeed, human. I focus on the virtuous person’s imperviousness to temptation, and contend that this imperviousness is not as psychologically implausible as it might seem. I argue that it is a virtuous person’s subjective construal of a situation that silences reasons in favour of acting contrary to virtue. That silencing, however, is not the whole story when it comes to their practical reasoning. Practical reasoning can, and often does, continue beyond silencing, particularly in the search for what Bernard Williams calls ‘constitutive solutions’. The upshot is a view of the virtuous as less god-like and more human—who will sometimes have to figure out what the virtuous response to a situation is, and who can still care deeply about the central concerns of human existence, including their life, health, loved ones, and life projects, even if those things will never provide them with a reason to act contrary to virtue.


Argumentation is a mechanism to support different forms of reasoning such as decision making and persuasion and always cast under the light of critical thinking. In the latest years, several computational approaches to argumentation have been proposed to detect conflicting information, take the best decision with respect to the available knowledge, and update our own beliefs when new information arrives. The common point of all these approaches is that they assume a purely rational behavior of the involved actors, be them humans or artificial agents. However, this is not the case as humans are proved to behave differently, mixing rational and emotional attitudes to guide their actions. Some works have claimed that there exists a strong connection between the argumentation process and the emotions felt by people involved in such process. We advocate a complementary, descriptive and experimental method, based on the collection of emotional data about the way human reasoners handle emotions during debate interactions. Across different debates, people’s argumentation in plain English is correlated with the emotions automatically detected from the participants, their engagement in the debate, and the mental workload required to debate. Results show several correlations among emotions, engagement and mental workload with respect to the argumentation elements. For instance, when two opposite opinions are conflicting, this is reflected in a negative way on the debaters’ emotions. Beside their theoretical value for validating and inspiring computational argumentation theory, these results have applied value for developing artificial agents meant to argue with human users or to assist users in the management of debates.


When evaluating the arguer instead of the argument, we soon find ourselves confronted with a puzzling situation: What seems to be a virtue in one argumentative situation could very well be called a vice in another. This talk will present the idea that there are in fact four roles an arguer has to master – and with them four sometimes very different sets of virtues.


Is it always ethical to ask a person to be “open-minded” in volatile political contexts? What might open-mindedness entail and when might such an expectation be harmful? Drawing on observations and interviews related to a controversial dialogue that occurred in Charlottesville, Virginia, following the violent Unite the Right rally of August 2017, Rachel Wahl argues, first, that whether we might consider someone “open-minded” has little to do with their participation in processes that formally affirm and even genuinely aim for this virtue. Second, the division between people who view civil dialogue as the key to social progress and people who aver that direct resistance is what is called for is rooted in deeply different conceptions of the social world and what aids the nation. This divide is at once a response to the political moment and to the human condition, as it is a manifestation of an enduring tension between openness and commitment. Third, the disposition to be what one might call “open-minded” about this division is premised on how one understands one’s
self and life. While popular and philosophical conceptions of this division tend to valorize either openness or commitment, Wahl draws on René Arcill’s conception of a life of education in order to articulate how these might be integrated. The possibility of understanding one’s life as an education illustrates what may have made it possible for one exemplary participant in the Charlottesville dialogue to be open-minded even about the value of some expressions of open-mindedness while maintaining his principled commitments.

Political deliberation typically aims to improve the legitimacy of collective decisions. This article proposes a different function for deliberation, which is both more modest but nevertheless critical in public life: the legitimation not of decisions, but of fellow citizens. This outcome is especially important in polarized societies, where what divides citizens is not only differences in conceptions of the good, but also the perception that the other side is not motivated by any good at all. Drawing on the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Charles Taylor as well as on an empirical study of political dialogue between university students after the 2016 election in the United States, I show how a particular form of political dialogue can help interlocutors recognize the conceptions of the good that motivate others’ views. Such learning can help create what Taylor suggests is necessary for diverse democracies: a shared understanding that does not obscure and in fact brings to the fore principled and significant divisions. Such recognition has the potential to diminish support for violence and the disenfranchisement of political opponents.

I first examine the assumptions about the relationship of discourse to rationality that I see as operating in the contention that political dialogue can both reduce polarization and advance specific justice commitments. Next, I consider whether and how these assumptions align with what occurred in a series of structured dialogue sessions between politically opposed university students. I observed these sessions and conducted in-depth interviews with 52 students following their dialogue participation from 2017 to 2020.

In preparing an argument, there are always strategic and tactical decisions that will influence your ethos with the listener. Think about those decisions—and their potential effect on your ethos—the next time you try a case or argue a motion or an appeal. Consider how a certain argument might affect the listener’s perception of your integrity, of your knowledge, of your sincerity. Ponder whether your clever allusions will make the jury like you or identify with you. What Aristotle observed long ago, contemporary research has confirmed: Ethos could make the difference between whether your argument succeeds or fails.

Wisdom is usually regarded, both historically and in contemporary research, as an unalloyed good. But is wisdom always beneficial? Or could it, like other virtues, sometimes be misunderstood and misused? This article reviews evidence—from the world’s religions, contemplative practices, psychologies, and philosophies, as well as from contemporary research—suggesting that wise insights and practices can have their traps and seductions. The article identifies six types of such traps: cognitive, emotional, developmental, egocentric, social, and those associated with altered states of consciousness. Many traps can lead to opposites of wisdom, and there are several kinds of opposites. Traps are more likely to occur with initial rather than mature insights, and when unbalanced by other virtues. Specific wise insights and practices require further wise insights and virtues to balance, complement, and protect them.

In this paper, it is shown how formal dialectic can be extended to model multi-agent argumentation in which each participant is an agent. An agent is viewed as a participant in a dialogue who not only has goals, and the capability for actions, but who also has stable characteristics of types that can be relevant to an assessment of some of her arguments used in that dialogue. When agents engage in argumentation in dialogues, each agent has a credibility function that can be adjusted upwards or downwards by certain types of arguments brought forward by the other agent in the dialogue. One type is the argument against the person or argumentum ad hominem, in which personal attack on one party’s character is used to attack his argument. Another is the appeal to expert opinion, traditionally associated with the informal fallacy called the argumentum ad verecundiam. In any particular case, an agent will begin a dialogue with a given degree of credibility, and what is here called the credibility function will affect the plausibility of the arguments put forward by that agent. In this paper, an agent is shown to have specific character traits that are vital to properly judging how this credibility function should affect the plausibility of her arguments, including veracity, prudence, sincerity and openness to opposed arguments. When one of these traits is a relevant basis for an adjustment in a credibility function, there is a shift to a sub-dialogue in which the argumentation in the case is re-evaluated. In such a case, it is shown how the outcome can legitimately be a reduction in the credibility rating of the arguer who was attacked. Then it is shown how the credibility function should be brought into an argument evaluation in the case, yielding the outcome that the argument is assigned a lower plausibility value.

Robert Kimball, in “What’s Wrong with Argumentum Ad Baculum?” (*Argumentation*, 2006) argues that
dialogue-based models of rational argumentation do not satisfactorily account for what is objectionable about more malicious uses of threats encountered in some ad baculum arguments. We review the dialogue-based approach to argumentum ad baculum, and show how it can offer more than Kimball thinks for analyzing such threat arguments and ad baculum fallacies.


“Place” as an argumentative domain, which has been taken for granted and treated by theorists of argumentation simply as a physical notion designating the occasion where an argumentation takes place, carries far more complex meanings beyond its traditionally assumed domain in the following three dimensions: as a geographical locale; as a concept, an idea, a history or a notion with its own disputable narratives and presuppositions; and as an imaginative geography. Similarly, an image or a character projected through argumentative discourse should be among the central concerns for argumentation studies, however, limited attention has nevertheless been paid to this traditional face of argument in general and the collective face in particular. We argue that image is a site of discursive production, a symbolic field or a discursively disputable space. The discursive interplay among “place,” “image,” “argument” and “time” offer a new way of thinking about ethic argument and its key role in the establishment of discursive credibility.


This paper argues that the most influential philosopher in ancient China, Confucius, can be seen as a potential supporter of Virtue Argumentation Theory (VAT), and his virtue theory could also be a helpful resource for VAT. First, we explain how some of Confucius’ thoughts on argumentation are quite close to the ideas of VAT. For example, Confucius has advocated that those who have virtue must have words, a view which is very similar to the basic position of VAT. Second, we explore Confucius’ well-known theory and practice of teaching students in accordance with their aptitude, which could be taken as his special way of putting the VAT ideas into use. Third, we try to reconstruct the list of argumentation virtues as developed in Confucius’ theory, and make a comparison with Aberdein’s list. On that basis, we further explain how the Confucius’ view might contribute to the future development of VAT.


I conclude that sensitive issues pose strategic challenges for deliberative democrats: the criteria that govern the validity of assertions—in particular, truthfulness and sometimes even truth—often trade off against those features of communication that endow individuals with the status of participants. Deliberative diplomacy—which may require expressive insincerities—is to be preferred when issues are at their most sensitive and concern discourse less than ideal.


Good manners “interfere with expression for the sake of responsiveness to others, and such interferences are both more noticeable and more important under conditions of conflict”. Insincerity of this kind, and within the context of sensitive issues, may sometimes have a role to play in enabling deliberation—a position I call “deliberative diplomacy.” It is this claim to which Lenard and Adler take exception, since they view my position as endangering the ethic of truthfulness upon which reasoned discourse depends. I respond by developing eleven interrelated elements of the argument which, although stated in the article, were either not sufficiently developed or remained implicit.


There is something fundamentally wrong with the “critical thinking” (CT) movement that has gained so much momentum in American education over the last decade. In this essay I shall argue (1) that the general content of CT pedagogy is not truly centered on human thinking at all, but on some other vital, but radically different, mental faculty that might better be called “reasoning”; and (2) that the development of the capacity for true thinking, and not merely reasoning, is profoundly important and may even be the crucial condition for the development of individual moral consciousness. Thus, the so-called CT movement, while intending in part to develop moral insight or knowledge, may actually be self-restricting in this regard. In distinguishing thinking from reasoning, this essay endeavors to restore virtue to the activity of thinking, virtue in the sense of essential nature, as well as in the sense of moral worth.


Despite some recent extensive work on the characterisation of the character-based virtues (e.g. Roberts and Wood, 2007; Baehr 2011) no detailed treatment of the intellectual virtue of inquisitiveness has yet been forthcoming. Inquisitiveness, however, is often cited as an example of intellectual virtue in the contemporary literature (e.g. Baehr 2011; Zagzebski 1996). An in-depth examination of the virtue of inquisitiveness is therefore apt in the context of this emerging discourse. Part I of this paper will review three approaches to characterising the intellectual virtues taken by Zagzebski (1996), Roberts and Wood (2007) and Baehr (2011) and subsequently develop a characterisation of inquisitiveness. Part II will extend this examination by investigating the unique role that inquisitiveness plays in the intellectually virtuous life thus highlighting its place at the heart of the autonomous virtue epistemological framework.

Questioning is a familiar, everyday practice which we use, often unreflectively, in order to gather information, communicate with each other, and advance our inquiries. Yet, not all questions are equally effective and not all questioners are equally adept. Being a good questioner requires a degree of proficiency and judgment, both in determining what to ask and in deciding who, when, and how to ask. Good questioning is an intellectual skill. Given its ubiquity and significance, it is an intellectual skill that, I believe, we should educate for. In this paper, I present a central line of argument in support of educating for good questioning, namely, that it plays an important role in the formation of an individual’s intellectual character and can thereby serve as a valuable pedagogical tool for intellectual character education. I argue that good questioning plays two important roles in the cultivation of intellectual character: good questioning (1) stimulates intellectually virtuous inquiry and (2) contributes to the development of several of the individual intellectual virtues. Insofar as the cultivation of intellectually virtuous character is a desirable educational objective, we should educate for good questioning.


Interpreting the concept of “rationality” as referring to a kind of virtue helps us to solve some of the problems that arise when we theorize with this concept. For example, this interpretation helps us to understand the relations between “rationality” and “rational requirements”, and the distinction that epistemologists often signal by the terms “propositional” and “doxastic justification”. Finally, interpreting rationality in this way will help us to answer some of the objections that have been raised against the thesis that the term ‘rational’, as it is used in these contexts in epistemology and decision theory, expresses a normative concept of any kind. In particular, I shall argue that this interpretation helps us to answer the following objection. It has seemed plausible to many formal epistemologists and decision theorists that rationality involves having mental states with certain formal features—such as consistency or probabilistic coherence in one’s beliefs, or preferences that meet certain so-called “axioms” like transitivity, monotonicity, stochastic dominance, and the like. However, it is not obviously even possible for ordinary agents to have mental states with these formal features. If “rationality” is a normative concept, would not the claim that rationality requires these formal features conflict with the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’? As I shall argue, understanding rationality as a kind of virtue will help us to find a solution to this problem.


Brian MacPherson has, it seems to me, offered us an excellent account showing that and why virtue-based argumentation theories need supplementation, and he has, in my view, directed us to the right sort of supplementation to overcome this problem. But some may see problems with the supplementation he offers, and so his next task should be to clarify the nature and role of the pragmatic-utilitarian supplementation he gestures towards.


The Dominant Adversarial Model (DAM) has arguers in a metaphorical battle, each arguer seeking to destroy the other’s argument. In this commentary on “DAMmed If You Do, DAMmed If You Don’t” by Sharon Bailin and Mark Battersby (which is itself a commentary on a paper by Dan Cohen on the Dominant Adversarial Model) I raise one issue about the metaphor and suggest an alternative metaphor. Cohen thinks we should reject or replace or supplement the DAM. Bailin and Battersby agree but think Cohen does not go far enough.


For Smith, logic is a two way street. It is not simply the case that an audience analyzes an argument as presented by an arguer and then the arguer modifies it accordingly. (This description is reminiscent of Ralph Johnson’s dialectical tier of argumentation.) Rather, arguing is a sympathetic process, in Smith’s sense of the term. It is built on the potential of discrete individuals to come together by modulating their inferences based upon the comparison of their own insights with those around them—a social precursor to Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, perhaps. If an individual’s *pathos* interferes with the accurate communication of his or her *ethos*, then *logos* will necessarily be distorted.


Agreement among professionals is often considered as evidence that a decision is correct. The reasoning behind this principle is that it is unlikely that independent experts would all choose a wrong alternative. Concurring opinions in medicine, consensus on faculty committees, and unanimous appeals court decisions exemplify how the principle makes us confident. The expertise of someone who disagrees with the consensual answer is deemed questionable. We challenge this view, arguing that agreement with other experts is neither necessary nor sufficient for expertise.


This essay discusses the relationship between Quintilian’s vision of the ideal orator and his emphasis on declamation. I argue that, for Quintilian, declamation
was much more than a useful exercise. Rather, it was a method for training orators to experience the world from a variety of perspectives, something Quintilian considered to be both an essential rhetorical skill and an important quality of the “good man speaking well.” I further argue—taking an exercise from my own first-year writing classes as an example—that contemporary adaptations of ancient rhetorical pedagogy often fail to fully engage with the ethical dimensions of exercises such as declamation. I conclude by calling for a greater consideration of the ethical dimension of ancient rhetorical exercises in our contemporary adaptations of them so that we can truly meet Quintilian on his own ground.


Although open-mindedness is generally valued, people are not equally open-minded in all situations. Open-mindedness is viewed as socially desirable when individuals encounter viewpoints that are compatible with conventional social norms. However, open-mindedness is viewed in less desirable terms when individuals encounter viewpoints that undermine these norms. The perceived desirability of open-mindedness is also influenced by the individual’s personal attitudinal convictions. Individuals ‘inflate’ the normative appropriateness of open-mindedness when it serves to reinforce their convictions, but devalue the normative appropriateness of open-mindedness when it serves to contradict these convictions. Conversely, normative prohibition of closed-mindedness is exaggerated when a closed-minded orientation threatens the individual’s personal attitudinal convictions, but is minimized (or reversed) when a closed-minded orientation reinforces these convictions. Paradoxically, the perceived appropriateness of open-mindedness is engendered (at least in part) by the motivation to confirm one’s prior attitudinal convictions. Evidence of this attitude justification effect is obtained in two experiments.


*A Guide to Good Reasoning* has been described by reviewers as “far superior to any other critical reasoning text.” It shows with both wit and philosophical care how students can become good at everyday reasoning. It starts with attitude—with alertness to judgmental heuristics and with the cultivation of intellectual virtues. From there it develops a system for skillfully clarifying and evaluating arguments, according to four standards—whether the premises fit the world, whether the conclusion fits the premises, whether the argument fits the conversation, and whether it is possible to tell.


This article traces my own pedagogical journey to find strategies for teaching critical thinking that emphasize intellectual cooperation, empathy, and argument repair, a journey that found me frequently turning to sources outside of philosophy, including work in intergroup dialogue and pedagogical work in rhetoric and composition. Theoretically, the article showcases Maureen Linker’s notion of “cooperative reasoning” (2015), sets it against the “adversary paradigm” Janice Moulton critiques, and illustrates how Peter Elbow’s challenges to critical thinking as a “doubling game” resonate with Linker’s work. Practically, it illustrates the structure and the role of peer-to-peer dialogues in my own reasoning classroom, an enactment of a cooperative, belief-based approach to reasoning inspired by Linker and Elbow alike, while also learning from the methodologies of intergroup dialogue.


Never having been trained in rhetorical theory or, to any appreciable extent, classical philosophy, and not having done nearly enough reading in either, I’m more than a little afraid to be doing what I’m doing here, presuming to be able to write a professional paper on my topic, ethos and argument. But being of good character (or ethos), and, in particular, being truthful, I’d like you all to blame Alan Brinton if this paper is the dismal failure that it may well be. It was Brinton who first introduced me to rhetorical theory and encouraged me to write on the topic.

[663] Minghui Xiong. Confucian philosophical argumentation skills. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., *Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014. Becker argued Confucianism lacked of argumentation, dialogue and debate. However, Becker is wrong. First, the purpose of philosophical argumentation is to justify an arguer’s philosophical standpoints. Second, both Confucius’ *Analects* and Mencius’ *Mengzi* were written in forms of dialogues. Third, the content of each book is the recorded utterance and the purpose of dialogue is to persuade its audience. Finally, after Confucius, Confucian’s works have either argued for those unjustified standpoints or re-argued about some justified viewpoints in the *Analects*.


Mencius was known as “being fond of argumentation”. The philosophical foundation of reasonableness in Mencius’s argumentative discourse is analysed by resorting to the pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion where dissociation appears with different argumentative functions. The analysis reveals that reasonableness is originated in goodness in human nature, which is embodied as humaneness and righteousness respectively, and which is reflected in holding to the Mean that is based on principle and allows for expediency.

[665] Ya-Ting C. Yang & Heng-An Chou. Beyond critical thinking skills: Investigating the relationship between critical thinking skills and dispositions through different online instructional strategies. *British Journal of Educational Technology*, 39(4):666–684, 2008. The purpose of this study was to investigate (1) the relationship between critical thinking skills (CTS) and
critical thinking dispositions (CTD), and (2) the effectiveness of different levels of instructional strategy (asynchronous online discussions (AODs), CTS instruction with CTD cultivation via AODs) in improving students’ CTS and CTD. A pretest and posttest quasi-experimental design was employed to achieve this purpose. The participants in this study were 220 students enrolled in a general education course at a large university in Taiwan. The findings of this study were as follows: (1) the overall relationship between CTS and CTD was positive. However, further analysis of the relationship between the different levels of CTS and CTD showed that only the students with high CTS and medium CTD showed a significant correlation; (2) the enhancement in CTS reinforced CTD, but the improvement in CTD did not increase the level of CTS. In addition, it is recommended that to improve the CTS and CTD of all students (including the students with a high level of CTS), the instructional strategy, CTS instruction with CTD cultivation, be employed.


An ad hominem fallacy is committed when an individual employs an irrelevant personal attack against an opponent instead of addressing that opponent’s argument. Many discussions of such fallacies discuss judgments of relevance about such personal attacks, and consider how we might distinguish those that are relevant from those that are not. This paper will argue that the literature on bias and testimony can helpfully contribute to that analysis. This will highlight ways in which biases, particularly unconscious biases, can make ad hominem fallacies seem effective, even when the irrelevance is recognized.


An ad hominem fallacy is an error in logical reasoning in which an interlocutor attacks the person making the argument rather than the argument itself. There are many different ways in which this can take place, and many different effects this can have on the direction of the argument itself. This paper will consider ways in which an ad hominem fallacy can lead to an interlocutor acquiring less status as a knower, even if the fallacy itself is recognized. The decrease in status can occur in the eyes of the interlocutor herself, as seen in cases of stereotype threat, or in the eyes of others in the epistemic community, as in the case of implicit bias. Both of these will be discussed as ways in which an ad hominem fallacy can constitute an epistemic injustice.


Stephen Stich has criticized the possibility of providing a legitimate set of norms for reasoning, since such norms are justified via reference to pretheoretical intuitions. I argue that through a process of perspicuously mapping the belief sphere one can generate a list of intellectual virtues that instrumentally lead to true beliefs. Hence, one does not have to rely on intuitions since the norms of reason are derived from factual claims about the intellectually virtuous agent.


Is ethics all about rights and duties, or is it about living a happy, flourishing life? For millennia in the West, ethics was about the way to flourish as an individual and a community. The qualities that enable people to live that way are the virtues, and that style of ethics is called Virtue Ethics. In the early modern period, Virtue Ethics went out of fashion and ethics began to focus on right and duties, where rights and duties are demands made against others. In this article I argue that the language of rights and duties has made it almost impossible for people on opposing sides of public policy issues to come to agreement. I defend the return of Virtue Ethics in philosophy, and propose that if it can be adopted by ordinary people, we will have a better chance at overcoming our deep divisions.


By consensus, President Barack Obama’s performance in the first 2012 Presidential debate was weak. Anticipating the second debate, commentators asserted that he must make a strong comeback to revive his candidacy. He is widely judged to have done so. I will examine the major argumentative exchanges in the debate to determine to what degree it exhibited virtues of argumentation and whether Obama’s perceived comeback was a matter of argumentative superiority as well as performance.


There is little to criticize in Christian Kock’s presentation. Contemporary political argumentation often falls far short of displaying the virtues we ideally would like to see. Sometimes, as Kock asserts, the absence of these virtues actually counts as vice. Claims put forward as arguments, or for which arguments are required, often stand as unsupported assertions. Debaters present as deductive entailments what really are inductive, probabilistic arguments, for which Kock’s stipulated standards of accuracy, relevance, and weight are appropriate. And advocates often ignore counterarguments.


The basic premise driving this work is fairly straightforward: that contextualized argumentation in science education may be understood as an instance of education for citizenship. If one accepts this premise, then it becomes essential to present to students the humanistic
face of scientific decisions that entail moral and ethical issues, arguments and the evidence used to arrive at those decisions. Separating learning of the content of science from consideration of its application and its implications (i.e., context) is an artificial divorce.


We present empirical evidence that methods employed to teach critical thinking are likelier to facilitate the discernment and correction of biases in others’ reasoning than to have a similar effect in the self-monitoring case. Therefore, standard CT instruction likely fails to foster one of the virtues of argumentation: to know one’s biases. Exemplified by false polarization, we suggest that instruction may be improved by fostering student’s abilities at counterfactual meta-cognition (a.k.a. “seriously considering the other side”).


Despite its long tradition the research of classical rhetoric can provide many interesting perspectives even today, since through renewed readings of ancient works possible reinterpretations of certain concepts that belong to the ancient system of classical rhetoric are enabled. At the same time a detailed research of the classical rhetorical system offers one of the most useful starting points to refine our perception of its concepts and recognize the value of their application to the contemporary models of rhetorical and argumentative analysis. In this sense, one of the most interesting classical concepts appears to be rhetorical ethos, a strategy of (favorable) character presentation. Known and studied mostly either solely from Aristotle’s conceptualizations of pisteis entekhnoi or from the perspective of a moral character that comes from Isocrates and Plato, ancient rhetorical ethos in fact reveals a multifaceted nature that comes from different conception of the role of the speaker in Greek and Roman society. Based on this hypothesis, we present examples of different ancient conceptions of character presentation and propose two main interpretative directions that, only when joined together, fully constitute a complex concept of classical rhetorical ethos. Considering some contemporary notions of ethos that can be identified within modern rhetorical and argumentative theoretical models, we also demonstrate how such elaborated understanding of rhetorical ethos can contribute to modern rhetorical or/and argumentative analysis.


In the article, we explore the points of contact between pedagogical authority and rhetoric as a special form of language use in the pedagogical process. Drawing on the relational conceptions of authority, we emphasise its rhetorical nature and point out the need to be aware of the close connection between rhetoric as a skill of public persuasion and the successful enacting of the authority relationship in the pedagogical process. On the basis of the general conceptualization of rhetoric, which defines the process of persuasion as a reciprocal relationship between the speaker and the listeners, we present a scheme of rhetorical construction of pedagogical authority based on the understanding of authority as a complex process that is established in the teacher – student interaction and consists of three elements: an effective demonstration of a speaker’s trustworthy image, (ethos), a successful (discursive) response to the emotional states of the audience (pathos), and use of sound and valid argumentation (logos) in speech.