Euthyphro Dilemma - Ishmam Mohammad Adnan

Prologomenon
"Consider Plato's Euthyphro problem: Do the gods love 'the good' because it is good, or is 'the
good' good because the gods love it? Plato proposed that the good derives its goodness not
from the gods but from the Form of the Good that exists in the abstract realm of the Forms. But
open naturalism does not appeal to the realm of the Forms (or any other abstract foundation of
norms and values, e.g., Kant's rational foundation for morality), and given that open naturalism
does not appeal to God either, it is left with the perhaps unsettling conclusion that the good is
good contingently (the good is good because the gods love it).

Primacy of being
Being is the most basic of all concepts, not the concept of self, being is ontologically prior
to self because the self can be conceived of not existing. Being cannot be conceived of not
to existing. But being cannot not be unless it is attributed to something. But if that thing is
contingent then we still have the same problem of being being ontologically prior to that thing.

Therefore, being must be identical to that thing's essence and thus make it necessary. So one
cannot ask, why couldn't God command this or that? Or why did He command such and such;
because it is what it is.

Coming back to the original dilemma, theologian, philosopher Dr. Paul Copan says that, "[t]here
seems to be no good reason to take the Euthyphro dilemma seriously." He even says it's
actually a red-herring!

Conclusion
To simplify it for retards, Plato says, " Good and being combined equals God" (paraphrased).
Now, is this good an externally standard? No. That means the dilemma itself is dialectically
toothless (to quote my friend Joseph Schmid). The word "good" is, like any other word, "vehicle
to meaning." Meaning, the word refers to an attribute of someone, and what is that someone?
Evidently, it's the ultimate being. Isn't it? Meaning, here our sense of morality and the ontological
grounding of morality is getting conflated. Allah is Al-Barr (The Good), whatever He commands
is "good" by virtue of who He is!

Notes

[1] Dr. Mashhad Al-Allaf, THEISM AND ATHEISM: OPPOSING ARGUMENTS IN PHILOSOPHY, p. 60.


[3] We can't have a moral objection anyway. Because "Using the sense of justice equipped to us
by the Just to measure the justice of the Just is utterly foolish."

[4] See, Dr. Paul Copan, in The Rationality of Theism, chap. 4 for the reasons.


[7] (Dr.) Hamza Andreas Tzortzis, in his conversation with Dr. John Vervaeke.