



PRESUPPOSITIONS AS REQUIRED LEXICOGRAPHIC SUPPLIED UTTERANCES FOR UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DISCOURSE

Mustafa Shazali Mustafa Ahmed

Nile Valley University/Sudan

ABSTRACT

The main point of this paper is to find new ways for describing the linguistic pragmatic inference of presupposition. The data of this study is driven empirically from two selected dictionaries as a purposeful sampling. The first, is "A dictionary of Islamic Juristic Terminologies" , written in English language by Al Busiari (2007) The second one is " A Dictionary of Philosophy" translated from Russian into English language by Dixon and Saifulin (1967) . All the philosophical literature on this subject have dealt with it as a heterogeneous collection of semantics, and other varieties of pragmatic implication .The present study adopts Ahmed's(2011) double system of linguistic structures "illustrate" , and what is actually conveyed by these same linguistic structures, "extend" to solve the problem of literal sense- equivalents, and non-existed equivalents in the target language . Also , the study, and by investigating two entries from each dictionary mentioned above is potentially revealing "how source language knowledge", is presupposed by the conventional structures of the target language sentences in question. These presupposition dictionaries' entries proposed are not like any of the different types of the known "Encyclopedic entries. These 'lexicosuppositions dictionaries (if this coinage is appropriate) are balancing entries for the non- existed, or with only literal sense terms,(knowledge) in the target language by which the dictionary is written to make sure that these particular terms are likewise what they are intended by the source languages' audiences .

Keywords: lexicographic, pragmatics, presupposition, semantics, target language., utterances .

Introduction:

In his attempt to justify that presupposition structures cannot be thought of as only semantics, Levinson (1983,p.167) assumes that language structures are commonly based on certain contextual assumptions which can clearly be seen in the cooperativeness of participants in a conversation. He (1983, p.168) showed two types of presuppositions. That is, presupposition can either be used in its ordinary sense, or it is used technically as in the following :

"... What these examples have in common is that they use the ordinary language notion of presupposition to describe any of background assumption against which an action, theory, expression or utterance makes sense or is rational. In contrast, the technical sense of presupposition is restricted to certain pragmatic inferences or assumptions that seem at least to be built into linguistic expressions and which can be isolated using specific linguistic tests (especially, traditionally, constancy under negation", ... (p. 168)

These views of presupposition are, after all, still, scope out this inference as semantics, as well as pragmatics fields. There are other research findings on the topic, also, minimized this inference to include linguistic structures of sentences and conversations. For example, Kärttunen and Peter (1977) see it as conventional implicatures. Kempson(1975), and Wilson (1985) reduce it to matters of entailment and conversational implicatures. In addition presupposition was a central issue in linguistic theory during the period 1969-1976, because it provided forward opposing propositions to all kinds of generative linguistic theories prevailing at that time.

The inference thus also been linked to definite description; factive verbs; imperative verbs; change of state verbs; iteratives, verbs of judging; temporal clauses; cleft sentences; implicit clefts with stressed constituents; comparisons and contrasts; non-restrictive relative clauses; counterfactual conditionals; and questions (see Levinson's , 1983, pp. 84-181) list of examples for more details. All the above grammatical items were considered as presupposition – triggers by Kaspersky and Kaspersky (1971), Fillmore (1971), Lyons (1977), Katz (1972). Some of these examples are selected ,here,. as a sentence followed immediately by its presupposition (between brackets) as in the following :

1. John saw/ did not see *the man with two heads*.

(There exist a man with two heads)

2. John *realized*/did not *realize* that he was in debt.

(John was in debt)

3/John *managed*/ did not *manage* to open the door.

(John tried to open the door)

4. John *stopped*/ did not *stop* beating his wife.

(John had been beating his wife)

5. The flying saucer came / did not come *again*

(The flying saucer came before)

6. Agatha *accused*/ did not *accuse* Ian of plagiarism

(Agatha thinks) plagiarism is bad

7. *Before* Strawson was even born , Frege noticed/ did not notice presupposition

(Strawson was born)

8. It *was* / *wasn't* Henry that kissed Rosie.

(someone kissed Rosie)

9. Linguistics wasn't invented by CHOMSKEY!

(someone invented linguistics)

10. Marianne called Adolph a male chauvinist , and then **HE** insult **HER**

(For Marianne to call Adolph a male chauvinist would be to insult him)

11. The Proto- Harrappans , who flourished 2800-2650 B.C. , were / were not great temple builder

(The Proto- Harrappans flourished 2800-2650 B.C.)

12. *If Hannibals had only had twelve more elephants* , the Romance languages would/ would not this day exist.

(Hannibal didn't have twelve more elephants)

13. Who is the professor of linguistics at MIT?

(Someone is the professor of linguistics at MIT)

Again, one of the strongest controversy against generative theories is Karttunen's quoted in Levinson's (1983, p.181) notion of blocking and filtering of the presupposition inference which appears in the following examples.

- If I have a wife, then my wife is blonde.
- If it's already 4 a.m., then my wife is probably angry.

Here, the first clause of the conditional in the first sentence does not imply that I have a wife; therefore, the inferred presupposition is blocked. The conditional in the second sentence acts as a filter for the presupposition that is triggered by the expression in its consequent clause.

Presupposition inference has also been linked to linguistic pragmatics in items like social deixis, conventional and conversational implicatures, to Searle's (1969) notion of felicity condition within the theory of speech acts, and as two set, of a sentence background and foreground entailments. Here, it is assumed that the sentence background entailments remains as it is, while, the sentence foreground entailments keeps changing by providing new information to the background, in order to convey what is intended by the producer of the utterance in question. Example for this is taken from Levinson (1983, p. 179).

John, who is a good friend of mine, regrets that he stopped doing linguistic, before he left Cambridge.

Levinson's (1983, p. 180) natural questions on the subject: 'what are the structure and lexemes that give rise to presuppositions?', 'do they have anything in common?', 'why do some linguistic items have such inferences built into them and not the others?' and so forth, have provided so intricate, sophisticated views. These views listed this inference with logical implication Frege.(trans.1952), assertion (Strawson, 1952), relation between sentences (Frege trans.1952), or statements (Strawson), or relation between speakers and their assumptions etc.

There are, but a few, new attempts which conjoined the inference of presupposition with syntactic processes, sociolinguistics, and psycholinguistics (See, Levinson,1983, p. 373) for more details.

Having reviewed all the attempts so far mentioned on the topic, the writer of this paper, still, thinks that all these attempt, from Frege's (trans.1952) remarks on the topic, until now, have not moved the cursor from semantics, and pragmatics as linguistic domains. There is, but, a different attempt of Ahmed (2011, p. 65) which looked at this inference as something over and above the linguistic structures of a sentence. Ahmed(2011) based his study on François Bacon's four idols of, (tribes, cave, marketplace, theatre), whose descriptions are able to tell about, or presuppose for the intellectual philosophy of his time. The idol of tribes is presupposing for deceptive beliefs inherent in the mind of man. They are considered as mere abstractions in error mingled with some existing facts. Ahmed (2011) used this idol to answer Watson and Hills (1977, 9. 151) media questions: ' how audience actually uses the news?' , ' how far newstories actually do inform and influence the audience?'. The idol of cave redresses the thoughts of an individual wandering over in this dark cave "mind" by external assistance like temperament, education, habit, environment, and accident. Individual in this inference, according to Ahmed's (2011) view, are presupposing for their peculiar interests, and to the degree of the knowledge they have obtained in their lives. The idol of marketplace assumes that "words" of a language often betray their own purposes. This idol's description

has been proven to be true by the modern pragmatic theories of conventional implicatures. These types of conventional implicatures usually arise from "lexical synonyms", "language particles", "rhetorical questions", "social deictic", and "discourse deictic expressions". The idol of theatre is attributed to sophistry and false learning. This idol is built up in the field of theology, philosophy, and science. This idol is completely accepted by the masses because it is uttered by learned groups.

Using the presuppositions of Bacon's four idols, Ahmed (2011) is able to describe this inference as a powerful force that directs the process of communication to certain changes and development that are required by the discourse in question. Ahmed's (2011, p. 68) table showed this notion of how presupposition inference can illustrate as well as extend the discourse in question .

Table 1 The Role of Pragmatic Inferences in Discourse Analysis process

Diesis categories	Speech acts	Implicatures	Presuppositions
clarify/ illustrate	identify/ illustrate	beautify/ illustrate	Illustrate/ extend

Ahmed (2011) in table 1 provides a technical definition for this inference of presupposition to include both linguistic structures of a language (illustrate), and the practical uses of these linguistic structures to help an individual pursue knowledge of something that he may come to know about ,or may not even be conscious of (extend) .

Methodology:

By adopting Ahmed's (2011) technical definition on the subject, the present study uses this double system of "illustrate", and "extend" to investigate some lexicographic samples of presuppositions that are pertaining to different human paradigms. These paradigms are seen as human intellectual perceptions, or views held by an individual, a society as a pattern of how things work in the world (see Business Dictionary for the world paradigm).

Lexicographic presuppositions (lexicosupposition) "if this coinage is accepted", are theological, philosophical, and scientific "words" which presuppose, (convey, or catch) meanings or knowledge that help people with their communications. For example, the late AlBusiari (2007) was striving so hard to clarify, using English language as a target language, some of the Islamic juristic terms, in his 'Dictionary of Islamic juristic terminologies'. He illustrates the Islamic "word" "taymum" meaning as the following

"I translate the term "taymum" as dry ablution (wadu) and explain it as the purification by sand or stone instead of water replacing the customary ritual

ablution (al-wadu), or, if necessary the greater allusion (ghusl) as well. The substitution is made if water is not available or if, for health reasons, one cannot use water". (AlBusiari, 2007, p. xxxi).

AlBusiari has linked the above term "taymum" with five Islamic presuppositions which appears in the following it– cleft sentences :

1. It is a dry ablution.
2. It is a kind of purification by sand or stone.
3. It is replacing the customary ritual ablution (al-wadu), or the greater ablution (ghusl).
4. It is ordered if water is not available.
5. It is done for health reasons, for example, if one cannot use water.

It can be assumed, then, that AlBusiari (2007) has signaled out five Islamic presuppositions, or, new knowledge for the Islamic term "taymum" to the target language audience, or, in this case, English language speakers throughout the world.

The previous literature on the topic, however, has labeled this inference with other pragmatic inferences such as implicatures, speech acts theory. Also, much of the previous findings have examined it as "linguistic structures of sentences", (see Levinson, 1983, p. 225). The present study looks at it with the two categories of "illustrate", and "extend" mentioned earlier. Also, for the study to be heuristic, and to control these two variables of "illustrate", and "extend", two dictionaries are examined. The first is AlBusirai's (2007) "Dictionary of Islamic Juristic Terminologies", and the second is "A Dictionary of Philosophy", which is translated from the Russian language to English language by Dixon and Saifulin (1967). In examining the two dictionaries, the study employs meaning based, rather than statistical form of analysis (Polkinghorne, 1983). The study, also, narrow its focus by selecting from each dictionary only two entries, or terms. The study has followed Creswell's, (1998) purposeful sampling by choosing two dictionaries of "theology", and "philosophy" The methodology which is used by this study is to enroll, under the entry, what are claimed to be the presuppositions of the entry in question.

Results:

AlBusiari's (ibid, p. 70) first term is the following:

Al – idah:

*The woman's prescribed waiting period or interval
of time of retreat following the dissolution of a marriage,
during which the legal rights of the spouses are*

not wholly extinguished. In particular a widow or a divorcee is not allowed to remarry during this period.

The above term presupposes for the following Islamic orders:

1. There is a prescribed waiting period following the dissolution of a marriage.
2. During this period the legal rights of spouses are not wholly extinguished.
3. A widow, or a divorcee is not allowed to remarry during this period.

There are, still, the writer of this paper thinks, some presuppositions that should ,also, be questioned such as "how many months of waiting that are prescribed for each of "a widow", and "a divorcee" and why? It is also important ,if the lexicographer adds, a sentence to show the Islamic philosophy behind such a doctrine. Islam prescribes four months and ten days as a waiting period for the widow , and three months for the divorcee to make sure if there is , or there is not a baby in the womb . There are much more Islamic terms' presuppositions which have no exact equivalents in target languages , and only these terms' presuppositions expressed in the target languages are promising to fill the gap between existent and nonexistent terms . One of these types of Islamic terms mentioned in AlBusiari (2007) is '**Arrida**': *'fosterage' or ' milk relationship' the act of suckling a baby which counts like blood relationship .*

AlBusiari's (2007 p. 36) second term , selected by this study, is (riba), or in English language "usury".

Riba:

An increase, an addition over and above the principal sums that is lent or expended. Basically interest on a capital loan, the term covers many forms of gain and profit which are precisely calculable at the time the transaction was concluded.

Riba as – Sawiq:

Meal of parched barley (as – sawiq) which had water poured upon it and in consequence swelled.

Riba al-fadl:

An exchange of a superior things for more of an interior quantity of the same kind and thus receiving profit (i.e. an addition that is obtained by selling food for food or ready money for ready money.

Riba annasia:

*Profit obtained in the case of delay of payment (nasia).
A delay of payment Is deferred by the creditor to a future period or a sale on credit in which the payment is to be made at a certain or definite period.*

The term riba (usury) in Islam provides the following presuppositions:

1. It is an increase over and above the principal sum that is lent or expanded.
2. It has many types. For example, riba as sawiq which is described as a meal of swelled parched barley because of some water that had been poured on it. Riba al-fadl is a process of exchanging of the same commodity, that is, a superior versus an inferior quantity. Riba annesia is a profit gained in case of delay of payment.

The study, again, has selected the first term of philosophy from Dixon and Saifulin's "dictionary of philosophy" (1967, p. 29).

*A priori in idealist philosophy, A, is used to qualify knowledge obtained prior to and independent of experience, knowledge which is inherent in consciousness from the beginning as opposed to a posteriori (q.v.) knowledge, which results from experience. This contraposing of the two terms is particular typical of Kant's (q.v.) philosophy; Kant stated that knowledge obtained by means of sensory perception is untrue and contra posed to it as authentic knowledge the a priori forms of sensation (space and time) and reason (cause, necessity, etc.).
Dialectical materialism does not accept any form of a priori knowledge.*

The term in the idealist philosophy is presupposing for two types of knowledge. A priori is used to qualify knowledge that is independent of experience A posteriori is used to

describe knowledge that got by experience. It is also presupposing that Kant philosophy adopted the former one; while Dialectical materialism rejected it.

The second term by Dixon and Saifulen's dictionary (p. 87) is the following:

Comparison a way of determining resemblances and differences between objects. It is the key premiss of generalization (q.v.). C. is prominent in judgments by analogy (q.v.). Judgments expressing the result of C. serve the purpose of determining the content of concepts of the objects compared. In this sense, C. is a method supplementing and sometimes replacing, definitions

The above term used by the analogists to determine the content of concepts of the objects compared. It is a method that replacing definitions. It is presupposing, also, for determining resemblance and differences between objects.

Discussion:

Levinson (1983, p. 186) provides the example; 'John doesn't know that Bill came' , to prove that presuppositions are defeasible. He (1983) comments on that by saying such a sentence can presuppose for the second person "Bill came", but it cannot presuppose for the first person "I don't know Bill came". More importantly, it is believed by the most philosophical literature on the term that presupposition can be cancelled, suspended, or even completely abandoned as in "Sue died before she finished her thesis". All the findings so far have synthesized the inference as a unique part of the conventional meaning of linguistic expressions.

The present study, however, and by adopting Ahmed's (2011) definition of "illustrate" (conventional meaning of expressions), and extend (new gained knowledge), is able to conceive it differently. Presupposition, according to the present study, is always preserved, and cannot be denied, but it can be negotiated. Also, it has been observed ,that is, the Islamic juristic presuppositions remains fixed and constant over the time. Also , there is ,may be a need for thousands of scientific research findings by the modern science to be synthesized and pieced together to show why such prescribed duration that Islam has assigned for a 'widow', and 'divorcee' proved over years to be valid , and reliable for families as important social units entities .While , as it has been noticed, the philosophical presuppositions keep changing in every different time (e.g. ' A priori according to Kant vs. ' A priori according to the ' Dialectical materialism' From , here , it can be claimed that presupposition inference, with this new sense in this paper, is promising to find some answers to the relation between

'philosophy', and 'religion' an area which was questioned much in the old philosophy, and, also, to reconcile between different extremes and help human beings understand each other more deeply. There is, for instance, still, much is needed to fully understand about the prescribed period of the divorcee, and the term may generate other presupposition entries in order to pointedly convey its Islamic juristic meaning. These new dictionaries of lexicosuppositions, the study hopes, are promising to plainly generate and embrace this world new discoveries, expanding knowledge, and growing science.

Concluding Remarks:

New types of dictionary entries should be thought of- as effectual means for advancing all parts of useful knowledge to all human being who live in this world. These entries should be classified according to the mechanism of "illustrate", and extend mentioned earlier in this paper. These entries should convey the knowledge, that has no direct equivalent, in the target language, by which a particular dictionary is written, and even if the equivalents are found, only with their literal senses. The presupposition inference, then, is promising to send all the relevant triggers (knowledge) of a particular language entry to a certain speech community that uses a different linguistic code. Firth (1966, p. 207) for example, states that there are "2,000 million human beings on this planet speak about 1,500 languages. These huge varieties, the writer of this present paper thinks, need to know about each other. Dictionaries of presuppositions should be designed to solve this serious issue. The present study coins the "lexicosupposition entries" as a name replacing words, like "terminologies", special words, and connotations. For example, a 'dictionary of Islamic juristic lexicosuppositions' is more precise nomenclature rather than the word "terminologies" which are seen as special words, or expressions used in relation to a particular subject or activity in a certain language. Presupposition triggers, however, are seen, as a double system which compromises "different knowledge" between a source and target language ". Lexicosupposition dictionaries proposed by this study, then, are not like encyclopedia entries which usually written for a target audience who share one language. Lexicosupposition entries are seen, here, as identity-cards like, which present factual information of a particular culture, ethnic, or national perspective to target audience with nominal knowledge. That is, these presupposition-triggers should be short, precise, and dealing with one category of knowledge (e.g. AlBusiari's juristic terms). Dixon and Saifulin's dictionary of philosophy, on the other hand, is a general reference that deals with different entries of philosophy at different historical

times . The present study's idea, then, and in order to promote it into a 'lexicographic presupposition' is to classify each philosopher's pronouncements alone in a dictionary , and this type of classification , whether it is alphabetically ,or as information retrieved system, may help the presupposition entry in question to thoroughly be detailed, and quickly be understood That is , in order for a lexicographer to lexicosuppose for any terms, s/he should ,honestly, transfer the intended terms without any kind of distortion, and leave them as they are to see how far they work in the target language , and how far the target audience's coincide with ,or show a kind of reaction against them. This mechanism is considered by the present study as the required supplied utterances for pointedly understanding human discourse . .

About the Author:

I am Mustafa Shazali Mustafa Ahmed. I am associate professor in English language / Nile valley University / Sudan. I have been working in Nile Valley University in Sudan since 1994. I have worked for three academic years in Saudi Arabia / Al – Baha University 2011-2014. I have written many scientific papers in some International reputed journal. Also, I am an editor of many international journals. I have supervised a considerable number of international and local M.A, and PhD students .

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