The beginning of *Logic of Sense* is primarily about semantics and semiotics, or the study of meaning and the study of sign process. Basically, he posits that the language is only understandable through sense. Shit... this is difficult to describe, but the "problem" of language is that none of the available explanations are sufficient. This is a little rough to explain, since I don't fully understand the problem nor the thousands of years of arguments attached to it. But basically, Deleuze argues that behind all language is "sense."

Sense is constructed. Sense is also not innate. Sense is constructed as we use language in the world, in real time. It is constructed in the middle realm between "the realm of ideas" and "the universe of things." A great deal of the book is devoted to how sense is constructed, but honestly, I'm not sure if I can explain any of it.

Nonetheless sense is a great find. With it, Deleuze also notices the Event, as a quasi-event of sense. While Deleuze has some calculatory definitions as a difference noted also within mathematical difference, the Logic of Sense is the point at which Deleuze as a philosopher comes onto his own to begin to find his own voice. We can see traces of this genius in earlier works but the concepts are stilted, not yet quite refined although the trends are there.

This topology of accidents is where Badiou's event is situated. In fact Deleuze's sense is more synonymous with the concept of event in Badiou's Being and Event. Highly recommend it if your preoccupation is wide and varied.

Whereas for Badiou multiple being is set theoretic in his paradigm on multiplicity, Deleuze is the master of differential geometry and topology - my favourite subject at PhD. It is differential geometry not geometry as such (with its surfaces) which stands behind Deleuze's category of sense - not the straight values but the variations of multiples. I even found him solving an impossible problem of visualisation of a set of intrinsic coordinates.
The structuralist account is the most important aspect of Deleuzian metaphysics since it develops the static genesis of Ideas chapter in Difference and Repetition. Crucially there are two parts to the static genesis - one logical, the other metaphysical. The metaphysical part is different from the genetic account in that it takes the individual who is capable of grasping Ideas as the starting point. The logical aspect describes how all sense is inter-expressive and coexist on the virtual plane. We know, from DnR, that this plane consists of differential relations and singularities. Now, they translate into a pre-linguistic form of "infinitives", or pure verbs, that continue to subsist after particular occurrences/instantiations. For example, "to cut", "to scream", "to heal", "to decay", "to sleep" are all infinitives that are drawn together in the event of cutting oneself with a knife.

Deleuze develops a metaphysics of the surface. No longer do we subordinate reality to higher transcendent principles (philosophy of the heights) or reduce it to fundamental indivisible parts residing within the body (philosophy of the depths). The study of surface effects is concomitant with non-linear dynamics of natural science. It's philosophical nature consists in the production of new effects through creating Ideas and developing the intensive relations between these Ideas.

Deleuze tries to explain our propensity for 'sense-making'. Bear in mind that this book was published in 1969, where psychology and other sciences are only now beginning to show how humans are habitual "pattern formers".

Deleuze attempts a philosophy of language which uses a mixture of Kantian and Stoic metaphysics to bridge the gaps between denotative (Russell, Wittgenstein I), active (Austin, Lacan), and conceptual language.

This is Deleuze, so he ends up branching off into many other topics such as metaphysics, the history of philosophy, and literature. The sections on alcoholism and ancient cynical philosophy stuck out to me as really great. I could have done without the extended (and incredibly obscure) foray into psychoanalysis. It brought my enjoyment of the book down somewhat.

*Deleuze's Logic of Sense* is a timely and invaluable resource for resuscitating interest in a work that, despite the current renaissance in Deleuze studies, continues to perplex and discomfort those who seek a way into its unique and hybrid structure and conceptions.

Objects as we perceive them, for example, clearly have all sorts of characteristics as well that we don’t perceive. They have a history, and a potential for the future, for example. The worst problem is that objects as we see them are actually mixtures of things, the affects of complex causes: they are ‘overdetermined’, to use the phrase associated with both Freud and Marx.

Deleuze actually draws on resources in classical philosophy to argue this, especially the work of the Stoics, who saw objects and events as a ‘mixture of bodies’, this mixture emanating from somewhere in the depths, below conscious sense making. Incidentally, this reliance on the Stoics also makes Deleuze a bit stoical, in the sense that he thinks that these mixed bodies are part of some unified whole (he was going to call this Being), and the role of destiny is associated with the whole. It follows that ethically and conceptually, all human beings can do this discover the ways in which Being works.

There’s no point complaining about it either. This is the basis of Badiou’s critique of Deleuze. It is also the basis of Deleuze's anti-humanism: we don't understand reality by trying to develop a conscious synthesis, tracking analogies based on some notion of a shared Essence, or seeing God as an ultimate synthesiser for that matter.

We make sense of objects, events or state of affairs when we pin them down and describe them, state propositions about them. We can then develop these propositions into logical forms to draw conclusions, make predictions or whatever. The trouble is, neither objects as we see them, nor propositions as we commonly use them, are at all simple.

Events, and states of affairs are also more complex than they look, and Deleuze illustrates this discussion with the extraordinary notion of ‘composibility’ in Leibniz. Basically, the idea is that singularities can produce events in all sorts of divergent ways, all of them equally possible, and this potential is shrunk if we just study the actual course of events.

Objects are more complex than they look, with all sorts of bits of their being unavailable to us, but language is equally complex. Here, Deleuze tries to demonstrate this by looking at people who use all kinds of linguistic anomalies such as paradoxes, or, in the case of Lewis Carroll especially, portmanteau words or esoteric words.
Although these constructions offend logic, and are strictly speaking nonsense, they still make sense. This also points to some powers of language that are not immediately available to inspection. More conventionally, we know that the use of particular words can have different functions in any language system—they can denote, they can manifest inner thoughts, and they can signify (in the French sense, that is indicate the existence of a structured language system which enables us to communicate with each other.

Deleuze proposes to modify classical Saussurian semiotics by adding a moveable element, an 'empty space' or floating signifier). Again wordplay can deliberately confuse these different functions, as when I use the term ‘it’ to denote a specific object, only to refer to a whole process as ‘it’, to express myself by saying something about ‘it’ and so on (actual easy examples are thin on the ground in Deleuze!).

Then there is one of those (many) philosophical diversions into various types of explanation for the extra elements that are not available to actual objects or speech acts. Platonists thought the extra bits referred to some universal form or Idea, other philosophers like Husserl or Kant suggest there was some transcendental realm beyond the immediate.

The objects and words of our immediate perception are actualised are condensed out from much more complex objects and events at the virtual level. In this book, about the only candidate for these complex objects is the singularity, which actualizes itself in various partial ways. Deleuze goes on to develop this idea by saying that singularities themselves, and the events and objects they actualize, are produced in a random or arbitrary fashion, the chance is at the heart of actualisation. We learn that the virtual also has its own sense of time, which is not the usual one which is highly limited by the insistence on the present tense in human operations.

It is a very abstract discussion, which finally comes to an example I could understand—the emergence of language in Freud. As infants develop, their biological urges produce certain infantile concepts like part objects. These are classically mixed, deriving from contradictory drives in the depths of the unconscious. The sounds the infant makes are initially just bodily emanations, but they gradually come to take on the form of linguistic units, like phonemes. There are elements of adult language available too, of course, but these are initially unintelligible.

hen a process described as the phantasm manages to combine various infantile concepts together into a 'disjunctive unity', a mixture of heterogeneous elements which Deleuze thinks characterises most objects. A kind of primitive narrative develops in the phantasm, partly driven by biological drives, and partly driven by emerging linguistic competencies (such as the Oedipal scene). The key to this is the Freudian notion of the phallus, which both refers to a biological organs like penises, and to linguistic and cultural functions to do with authority and value.

The phallus is the ideal ambiguous object (or empty object as Deleuze insists on calling it), able to zigzag between bodies and language, and thus make divergent series ‘resonate’. The phantasm therefore develops an energy of its own, which permits a relative disengagement from sexual energy (sublimation) and, in the final stages, the proper development of language in the form of symbolisation. At last we have language and events brought together on the surface, that is of the level of consciousness. If I have read the appendices correctly, this phantasmic form is then generalised to include all the operations of making sense as describes right at the beginning.

Bodies can interact and cause effects in each other, but these effects are incorporeal, ‘logical or dialectical attributes… not things or facts but events’ (5). They have the kind of subsidiary existence, acting as verbs, and they are infinitives—the example is a cut inflicted on the body, which is seen as an incorporeal surface effect, compared to the actuality of bodies and their mixtures.

This argument had important implications for understanding the causal relation. Specific bodily causes produce other bodies, linked by some cosmic unity or destiny. Similarly, effects can be seen as having bonds between them, but effects can never be causes in themselves. They can only be ‘"quasi-causes’ following laws which perhaps express in each case the relative unity or mixture of bodies on which they depend for their real causes’ (6). These combinations and bonds do provide for some emergent qualities, which means that destiny can be avoided. An alternative is offered by the Epicurean classification of different kinds of causes which are relatively independent [and so can interact], and this is a Kantian idea too. There is a reference back to the capacities of language to offer ‘a declension of causes...[and]... a conjugation of effects’ (6).

Stoic philosophy introduces the notion of a Something behind both specific material beings and incorporeal events. The Idea must belong to ‘this impassive extra-Being which is sterile, inefficacious, and on the surface of things: the ideational or the incorporeal can no longer be anything other than an "effect!"’ (7). This in turn leads to a change of metaphor from surface/depth to just surface, to a series of effects which are manifestations and are of different...
his is the fourth dimension. It is an incorporeal, complex, and irreducible entity, at the surface of things’ (19). There are philosophers have discovered and rediscovered this quality. It is the idea of a Something again, beyond the propositions and the terms and the objects which are denoted, beyond the subjective I and things which are expressed. Sense is irreducible to propositions, and it is and must be ‘“neutral,”’ altogether indifferent to both particular and general, singular and universal, personal and impersonal’ (19). There is been little agreement about this possible fourth dimension, whether it exists simply in the form of some enquiry. It is not even immediately useful because it is neutral. It can only be inferred indirectly, by questioning characteristics of propositions as above—this is ‘inspired in its entirety by empiricism… [avoiding notions of essence or Idea, and knowing]… Have to track down, invoked and perhaps produce a phantom at the limit of a length or unfolded experience’ (20). It might be what Husserl called ‘expression’, lingering in terms such as the noema, as pure appearance, outside denotation or manifestation, linked in complex ways to appearances.

In the same way, sense does not exist outside propositions exactly, but ‘inheres or subsists’ (21). It is not just an expression, but an attribute, not just of the proposition, but of the thing or state of affairs’ (21), [the potential, ‘to be able to be green’ rather than just the denotation ‘green’ is the example here]. It is said of a thing, so it depends on propositions which express it and is therefore not separate from the proposition. It is something else, both the expressible, and the state of affairs: ‘It turns one side towards things and one side towards propositions’ (22). It is what joins propositions and things. [It is a becoming]. It operates on the surface, rather as mathematics does, or the nonsense of Carroll. It is the operation of sense that produces [meaningful] paradox.

Fourth series of dualities

Important dualities exist between causes and effects, and ‘corporeal things and incorporeal events’ (23). This is extended to a duality between things and propositions, bodies and language. This is expressed in Lewis Carroll as a duality between eating or speaking—the former is a matter of bodies actions and passions, and the latter movements of the surface and ‘ideational attributes or incorporeal events’ (23) [lots of examples from Alice about being presented to food and having food presented to you]. The normal relationship can be distorted by ‘verbal hallucinations… Unrestricted oral behaviour… And various disorders of the surface’ as bodily matters intrude—stuttering, left handedness (24).

Sense is always expressed in propositions, but it lies in states of affairs, it happens to things. In this sense, bodies and language are united in the production of sense, existing ‘on the two sides of the frontier represented by sense’, which constantly articulates the differences (24)—things include ‘ideational logical attributes which indicate incorporeal events’, and propositions include both denotations and expressions, names and adjectives, and verbs [the latter indicating becoming and chains of events] (24) [illustrated with words by Humpty Dumpty].

This duality in propositions represents two dimensions, the ‘denotation of things and the expression of sense’ (25) [here, it is sense that is being expressed not subjectivity, however]. This means the duality is inherent in propositions as well as between propositions and things. [More from Lewis Carroll page 26, turning on the universal denotation implied by the term ‘it’, and also the ability of the term to summarize the sense of an earlier proposition]. The two dimensions can emerge in an esoteric word, or in a ‘non identifiable aliquid’ (26). The example given is the word ‘snark’ [both a limited thing and a representation of anything that is to exotic to exist?]. [the section ends with an extended quotation from the Gardener’s Song in Sylvie and Bruno—pass]

Fifth series of sense

More paradoxes with formal logic attempting to be presuppositionless eg:

1. Explanations involve infinite regress. Deleuze’s example is the infinite regress of the Knight’s Song in Alice (the song has a name, the name is called something, that name is called something and so on). I think a better example is the infinite regress of the question ‘why?’ Why is the moon in the sky…why does gravity work like that…why must there be order…etc. Deleuze says that sense limits the regress (part of its general function to operate at the frontier of the different terms). Here, and below, he gets close to stumbling across a social dimension to sense (it becomes socially inappropriate to keep pursuing the regress) – but backs off of course. The closest he gets is langue and parole

2. Infinite regresses can be stopped by temporarily freezing the object in question as some sort of reality in itself, not relying on a proposition. OK but only a thin sort of sense can then be extracted. As in black boxing? Or when a power relation forbids inquiry – hier ist kein warum. We do learn something though – that actual events are largely ‘sterile’ when it comes to making sense (hence Deleuze’s indifference to empirical inquiry?) (There is a reference to Husserl’s indifference – as in the last bit of Cartesian Meditations – ‘don’t look outside, truth lies in the interior of
3. A logical one again - the sequence of proposition and object become confused and interchangeable, with us losing interest in which comes first – did Caroll compose the verse describing the gardener’s actions first, or after working out the actions? (I can’t think of a normal case. Sociologists often choose to black box this issue when asking research questions?) This helps Deleuze separate the action of sense from its usual form ‘good sense’, since counteraffirmations can still make sense? We can also see this when referring to modalitites such as ‘possibles’ which are not yet necessities.

4. Paradoxes raised by propositions which denote impossible objects – square circles (‘the present King of France’ is the classic one). These show how sense can be made of ideational events which cannot be realized, an extra-being. Apart from anything else, all this exposes a problem with essences. Irritatingly, the example is obscure again – Avicenna’s dictum that animal non est nisi animal tantum (animals are nothing but animals only) (34). D says essences have two things which reside in particular animals and in animals in general – and the term ‘only’ smuggles in a third kind of essence, which is ‘essence as sense’.

Sixth series on serialization
Sense operates through a series of propositions, as the example of infinite regress shows. Quite often, the series becomes more abstract or general. The purest form, however, is where separate series are established, one involving denotation, and the other making sense. These different series operate in different ways, one at the surface, with denoted objects, and one inside propositions linking expressions, and also connecting them to denotations [pretty much like the way in which signifiers link together in propositions, and then are occasionally attached to actual referents which themselves develop sequences. Deleuze wants to develop the term signifier to mean anything which is an aspect of sense, and signified to mean that which is denoted, or realized. He wants to connect it back to the difference between events and states of affairs. Notes that the signifier refers to the whole content of the proposition] The issue is how can the series be joined? There are a number of possibilities. Mystifying literary examples follow 37-39 [I think what they are referring to is the way in which terms can both symbolise and denote literally. Clever writers such as Joyce or Robbe-Grillet have indicated this in particular ways, for example by using esoteric words at crucial points.] These writers are able to show that there are genuine differences or displacements between the two series, and that both have their own momentum. However the signifying series contain an excess of meaning, while the denotated features a lack of: it is this that articulates the two series and makes them make sense.

Special entities are needed to join the series together – mirrors which are ‘at once word and thing, name and object, sense and denotatum, expression and designation’ (40). This term properly does not belong to either series. It is understood as ‘an extremely mobile empty place’ when considering excess, and ‘an occupant without a place’ when considering lack (41). An example in Alice ends the section.

Eighth series of structure
Levi Strauss has also noticed that signs always offer an excess. The system of language, ‘the order of the known’ exceeds actual speech, even attempts at totalization (48). Laws pre-exist actual cases. [So we were getting close to a role for social life, but then it gets metaphysical again]. As LS put it, the universe signified long before human beings knew what it was signifying. By contrast, the domination of nature proceeds partially and progressively, step by step unlike social life where all its goals and possibilities given at once. We’re back with two series, this time conceived as rhythms, social and natural. Both technocrats and dictators attempt a false synthesis of these two rhythms. Levi Strauss referred to ‘the floating signifier’ as a creative force and Deleuze wants to say it’s ‘the promise of all revolutions’ (49). There are also ‘floated signifieds’, which seem to be possibilities which have not yet been realized. These can fill the gap between signifier and signified [and are found in common sense expressions like ‘gadgets’ or ‘whatnot’ – maybe connected to the idea of a bricoleur?]. It implies a symbolic content, but does not attempt to fill it with specifics. Together, these possibilities constitute a structure, two heterogeneous series, one signifying, one signified, interdependent, and including particular events, singularities, emitted by a differentiator. The singularities belong to neither series exclusively and thus have no coherent identity – each is an excess in one series and a lack in the other. The singularities can react back on the series, so structures and events are interdependent [so structures need a dynamic element, and, D argues, an excess, an empty square instead of total systematic closure. Addresses the old issue of the static nature of structuralism]. The signifying series contains a series of ideal events, an internal history. Differentiators articulate series and this produces a ‘tangled tale’ overall (51).

Thirteenth series of the schizophrenic and the little girl
[Wild and wacky stuff here relating to Artaud’s work. I would normally chop it out altogether, except it provides some context for the emergence of the phrase ‘body without organs’, that crops up so prominently in Anti Oedipus]
Sense is fragile and is threatened by nonsense. Sometimes such nonsense can destroy everything, and we see this if we switch from the playful portmanteaux of Carroll to the schizophrenic writings of Artaud. These are real examples of nonsense, instead of the artificial ones discussed by philosophers. Artaud apparently disliked Carroll, and rendered Jabberwocky in a much more challenging schizophrenic language. Carroll is too superficial, whereas schizophrenia reveals the real problems with language.

Another work is discussed, by Woolfson, to focus on the duality between things and words. This takes the form of someone [schizophrenic?] experiencing a problem in translating from one language to the other, which somehow becomes transposed into an anxiety about eating. A schizophrenic interlude ensues involving associations between consonants as the basis for translation, and the paradoxes that emerge (85). The same basic 'oral duality (to eat/to speak)' is also found in Carroll’s work, and in Artaud’s. However, in Caroll, some sense is retained since this duality is explored ‘at the surface’ (86) [this also indicates, apparently that the operation of sense of the surface shows only a quasi-causal relation between its elements, since there are incorporeal elements driving it]. For Artaud, the classic schizophrenic symptoms included the absence of surface, especially with bodies. Apparently Freud also noticed this tendency for schizophrenics to see their body as ‘punctured by an infinite number of little holes’ (87). The body therefore incorporates everything into its depths, everything becomes corporeal and physical. The surface no longer limits the extension of the body. ‘Hence the schizophrenic manner of living the contradiction: either in the deep fissure which traverses the body, or in the fragmented parts which encase one another and spin about’ (87). The world loses its meaning and sense [because it can no longer split sensation into a signifying and signified separated by a surface?] Words become physical and affect bodies, or they burst into components [which relates back to the Woolfson example]. Schizophrenics experience ‘a pure language–affect’ (88) [sic --affect not effect].

Schizophrenics manage this by overcoming the effects of language, as in the strange translation activity in the Woolfson example. In Artaud’s case the solution was to create special words expressing ‘values which are exclusively tonic and not written’ (88). ‘To these values a glorious body corresponds, being a new dimension of the schizophrenic body, an organism about parts which operates entirely by insufflations, respiration, evaporation, and fluid transmission (the superior body or body without organs of Antonin Artaud)’ (88). This solution can never be complete because there can never be a total separation between suffering [‘passion’] and [remedial] action, and passion can be reintroduced, and the body corrupted-- a schizophrenic body is therefore a constant mixture of two actions or principles.

Artaud tries to invent a new language which cannot be decomposed and thus cannot be colonised, a language of ‘consonantal guttural and aspirated overloads’ (89). The words are joined by some invented principle, in this case a ‘palatalized’ one (89) which blurs the consonants together and prevents them being written down. The result is ‘so many active howls in one continuous breath’ (89) [sounds very much like Tzara’s Dadaist tone poems --Artaud's example on p.83]. These words are often the equivalent to portmanteaux [some examples are given on page 90]. Using these words can ‘enact a chain of associations… in a region of infra sense, according to a fluid and burning principle which absorbs and reabsorbs effectively the sense as soon as it is produced’ (90).

So two sorts of words related to two sorts of bodies, one fragmented and one without organs. There are also two theatres or two types of nonsense implied here: one where ordinary words are decomposed into nonsense, and one where tonic elements alone form nonsensical words. They are produced by things happening beneath the surface, unlike Carroll's playful superficiality. The two signifying and signified series disappear, and non sense engulfs signifiers and signified. There is no surface division to separate the expressivity of words and the attributes of actual bodies [which regulates ordinary language]. In schizophrenic language there is no grammar or syntax either, although both are preserved in Carroll. Nevertheless, it is Artaud who has ‘discovered a vital body and the prodigious language of this body… He explored the infra sense which is still unknown today’ (93). However, Caroll has explored those important surfaces, on which ‘the entire logic of sense is located’ (93).

We can still find schizoid fragments in ordinary speech, but these are normally reorganised. Similarly, Carroll can be retranslated as a schizophrenic piece (92). But it is wrong to generalise here, ‘believing to have discovered analogous forms which create false differences’ (92). Psychoanalysis should operate with a surface/depth structure rather than with analogies—‘it is geographical before it is historical’ (93). [While we are here, note that ‘it is hardly acceptable… to run together a child’s nursery rhymes, poetic experimentations, and experiences of madness… [And] justify the grotesque trinity of child, poet, and madmen’ (82-83). This must be a problem for those who think that Deleuze is arguing that children are philosophers?]

Sense has a double nature, reflecting a kind of double causality. Events or effects are not the same as causes, yet they result from them. There must be some heterogeneous relation between cause and effect. There are also relations between causes and relations between effects. Deleuze reserves the term ‘quasi cause’ to refer to the incorporeal roots of corporeal or empirical causes. [The example given here is how ‘the actions and passions of the body’ can produce effects, although it can look as if more tangible causes are responsible. Another example turns on the behaviour of liquids, which are affected by ‘intermolecular modifications… as their real cause, but also... the
variations of the surface tension on which they depend as their (ideational or "fictional") quasi cause (95). Why not just develop the notion of cause? Is Deleuze restricting the concept of cause to the classic determinist version? How good are philosophers at analysing empirical causes anyway? Once a quasi cause becomes known, doesn’t it become a cause? What about substituting terms like correlation and causality instead?

This is another illustration of how [common or good] sense is produced as an effect by non sense, an ‘aleatory point’ (95). Only this insures the full autonomy of an effect. Non sense can be apparent at the surface [in the form of paradoxes?], and are also found in the ‘two "deep" non senses of passion and action… [in]… the depth of bodies’ (95). Effects are related to quasi causes as well as normal causes, hence their autonomy. However, this makes sense [developing understanding?] into something that must be neutral, ‘neither active nor passive’ (95), different from both the denoted state of affairs and propositions. It must be related to quasi causes in order to fully grasp effects at the surface; quasi causes develop an ‘immanent relation’ to the effects. This also implies that the quasi cause is productive of sense, including producing the propositions that express it, as well as the denoted state of affairs. This is another contradiction—neutral in some ways, and productive in others. To use different terms, in formal logic, or false proposition can still have a sense, while in transcendental logic, propositions always possess the [deeper] truth. [I think the neutrality bit refers to general qualities that are not grasped by ordinary sense, and a generative bit relates to the connections with actual objects. Why can’t the bastard use clear terms?]

How is this opposition to be resolved? Most attempts to develop transcendental logic and link it with simple logic have attempted this. Husserl developed the concept of noema as something which has both a neutral core component [‘like noematic color, in which neither the reality of the object, nor the way in which we are conscious of it, intervenes’ (96)]. Only transcendental consciousness can see how this relates to actual objects, generating them [I think—97]. However, transcendental consciousness is described in too limited a way, as a matter of concepts and not events, and as a matter of simple unification between object and noema, not complex, heterogeneous, and nonsensical relation. The same problem arises with Kant. For both thinkers, transcendental sense is derived ultimately from commonsense and its operations in synthesising and bestowing identity. The transcendental becomes ‘a mere empirical exercise in an image of [commonsense] thought presented as originary’ (98). ‘It is the entire dimension of manifestation, in the position of the transcendental subject, which retains the form of the person, of personal consciousness, and of subjective identity, and which is satisfied with creating the transcendental out of the characteristics of the empirical’ (98). [The Kantian error is to deduce the transcendental syntheses from ‘corresponding psychological syntheses’ (98)—blimey, it could be Bourdieu!]

But philosophy must break with common sense if it is to be philosophy at all [classic example of philosophical reasoning!] We have to clarify a notion of sense not contaminated with common or good sense, and avoiding the notion that personal consciousness or subjective identity is the fundamental synthesising agency. [One problem with seeing human subjects as the basis of proper sense is that the subject itself has to be explained].

So, firstly, sense gets actualized in a field of singularities, then the Umwelt develops around individuals which express or describe this world, then, secondly, a whole objective world develops from common elements, a Welt. Persons can then define this common element and develop classes and properties derived from it. At the first level we find good sense, ‘an already fixed and sedentary organization of differences’. At the second level, commonsense serves the function of identification. Neither term explains how these activities are derived [in fact, Deleuze wants to suggest that the second level ‘is the work of non sense which is always copresent to sense (aleatory point or ambiguous sign)... Productive nonsense which animates the ideal game and the impersonal transcendental field’ (116). There is no conventional transcendental movement, especially one driven by a version of the ego. The person is a 'produced form, derived from this impersonal transcendental field… Always an individual in general, born… from the singularity which extends itself over a line of ordinary points and starts from the preindividual transcendental field' (116). Persons and their varieties of sense are all produced 'on the basis of sense and nonsense which do not resemble them' (117). This explains the paradoxes and limits of good sense and common sense. [So the existence of nonsense --paradox and impossible sentences etc -- in the ordinary subjective world shows the existence of non sense --something that produces ordinary sense in the first place, something objective? Individuals can only describe but as soon as they generalise and order concepts they necessarily assume some non-subjective world? The manoeuvre seems rather like the illicit transcendental Ego move by Husserl, generalising from an ordinary ego: here, explaining ordinary experience is used to explain some deeper virtual world as an extension?]

Seventeenth series of the static logical genesis
[Particularly dense and baffling stuff, attempting to show how the subjective world is a derivative of the objective play of singularities. Makes more sense with concrete and familiar examples as in DeLanda's stuff on biological membranes and their importance in embryology, instead of the abstract 'surfaces' of this account]]

Individuals are capable of infinite description, limited only by their bodies to express. Persons [human beings based
the more abstract notion of an individual?] can only produce propositions to describe the world to a limited extent. Both, however, are 'ontological propositions' [that is they create a kind of reality?]. Multiple classes and systems of categories are not produced by propositions. Instead we have to look at something that now produces human propositions themselves, as 'material instances' (118). [So human ontological activity only realises sense making in the form of denotations, manifestations, and signification as above?].

Denotations and the others are interconnected as we saw above. There is also no simple connection between, say, 'the individual and denotation, the person and manifestation, multiple classes or variable properties and signification' (119) [for similar reasons—for example, signification depends on the good sense already established by individuation]. The whole complex structure is produced by both ontological and logical genesis. Sense operates on the whole structure. [We can see this both in the fragility of sense and its tendency to be threatened by nonsense, and because the alternative is unpalatable—language and sense-making would be based on nothing but a 'undifferentiated abyss’ (120)].

So sense, 'in its organization of aleatory and singular points, problems and questions, series and displacement' (120) generates both logical propositions and also 'the objective correlates' of propositions… the denoted, the manifested, and the signified' (120).

The notion of an error suggests this although in a confused way. Normally we think of error as a matter of truth or falsity, when propositions are formed and tested. However, when we consider problems instead of propositions that offer solutions, the category of sense emerges strongly. [We have seen above the problem is an objective matter of structured possibilities]. We can see how both knowledge and the known are produced by this structure. [Problematics are further discussed as involving particular distributions of singularities in space and in time. As problems condense out, so do solutions—'the synthesis of the problem with its conditions engenders propositions, their dimensions, and their correlates' (121)]. Sense is produced or expressed when solutions, expressed as propositions, correspond to problems [act as ‘instances of a general solution’ (121)]

It is common to express sense in an interrogative form [although the interrogative also includes a more limited operation as in the closed question]. Specific questions and solutions are already determined by the problematic, however—‘the problem in itself is the reality of a genetic element, the complex theme which does not allow itself to be reduced to any propositional thesis’ (122). It is a mistake to define a problem in terms of possible solutions [which arise from human consciousness]. This would mean we 'confuse sense with signification, and… conceive of the condition only in the image of the conditioned'] (122). [This autonomous constitution of problems shows the inadequacy of subjective conceptions. Seeing problems as derived from propositions expressing solutions would also infringe the neutrality of sense].

Problems are neutral insofar as [modes of] propositions are concerned. For example 'a circle qua circle is neither a particular circle, nor a concept represented in an equation… It is rather a differential system to which an emission of singularities corresponds' (123). Problems in this sense exist in propositions but also allude to non being, as above. As a result, problems are neutral, that is ‘independent of both the negative and the affirmative' (123).

The neutrality of sense means it is never just the echo ['the double'] of propositions. Working with propositions can only lead to a partial understanding of sense. We have to develop another conception, not based on propositions or on images of conventional logical thinking. Philosophy must 'purge the transcendental field of all resemblance' in order to avoid trap of consciousness as the origin of the transcendental (123).

However, the earlier discussions defined the neutrality of sense as an effect produced by corporeal causes. Here, we are implying that it arises from its genetic power [to produce problematics] and this relates to a quasi cause. Sense is produced by bodies in a way which presupposes this more general kind of sense. The more general kind operates in a different way, not through concepts or describing mixtures.

This time it is a matter of depth [of bodies] and the effects of a surface. The pulsations of bodies produce surfaces in particular ways, sometimes as a minimum energy conserving form [DeLanda's soap bubble], sometimes as a more complex structure of multiplied differentiated surfaces [stretched, emulsified, absorbing etc are the examples given, p. 124]. Surfaces are produced by the 'actions and passions of mixed bodies' (124). Surfaces have no thickness of their own, which permits contact between the internal and the external. The quasi causes play on these surfaces, as a kind of 'fictitious surface tension… A force exerting itself on the plane of the surface' (125). Singularities are condensed extended and reshuffled. These surfaces have an existence in actual physics, and also in metaphysics—the surface becomes the transcendental field, the border between bodies and propositions. As such, the surface becomes the 'locus of sense and expression' (125).

Propositions and bodies are actually articulated on surfaces, 'so that sense is presented both as that which happens to bodies and that to which insists [sic] in propositions' (125). It is in this process of ‘doubling up’ that neutrality arises [I think the argument here is that neutrality is not some disembodied quality but a function of surfaces which enable 'the continuity of reverse and right sides' (125). It is the indifference of the objective, immune to appeals from human subjectivity? ]. The surface enables sense to be distributed, as both the expressed in propositions, and the event in bodies [depends on this very general definition of 'expression' again - more general than the use above where it means human expression as in manifestation etc]. If the surface is destroyed, bodies fall back into the
depth, the 'primary order [some sort of natural being which cannot be named or expressed?] which grumbles beneath the secondary organisation of sense' (125). But on the surface, sense is unfolded and is also affected by quasi causes. This sense in turn individuates and determines bodies, and signification, and all the propositions 'the entire tertiary arrangement or the object of the static genesis' (126).

Ethics links logic and the body. The Stoic notion of bodies included the passions, and good and evil intents: particular bodies might have evil mixtures, but the aggregate of bodies is perfect or good, the unity of causes themselves. In principle, each event can be linked to a particular cause and thus the unity of causes, and this could lead to the activity of divination [grasping the divine unity of causes] as a basis for ethics. The effects, lines have to be traced back from events to pure events and then to actions and passions [with a lot of poetic stuff as examples, 143]. Stoics took another route to ethics through logic [kind of working out which events will actualize]. Stoic philosophy then saw in representations of the limited event a connection with pure events [and ethical conduct seems to be to work towards actualizing such events?]. [Stoic accounts of representations ensue, 144-5.]

There is a difference [for Stoics] between representations of sense and of logic, denotations and significations, representations and expressions. Representation is not just resemblance, but includes a notion of adequate expression. Concepts have to be actualised in representation, and also expressed if they are to be comprehensive. Thus our knowledge of death is abstract, despite the number of deaths we witness, until it becomes personal, not indifferent, but concrete. This is where expression is needed.

In Stoic philosophy, moral conduct involves a relation with pure events unites those events with one's self. [The examples again come from Zen: 'the bowman must reach the point where the aim is also not the aim, that is to say, the bowman himself' (146).] An understanding of the pure event is required, as something which is 'eternally yet to come and always already past', but which has to be willed into actualization (146). The Stoic embodies incorporeal effects, aligning themselves with the quasi cause. It is necessary because quasi causes cannot embody themselves, except to the immediate instant, the present. [There is an equally baffling aside about the difference between actors and characters—actors represent by occupying the instant, while the character also 'portrays hopes or fears in the future and remembers or repents in the past' (147). Stoics therefore see themselves as uniting the instant with the unlimited future and past, willing the event and also representing it. [Largely incomprehensible, although I am starting to see how the normal notion of stoicism might fit—the patient resignation of one's self to one's fate—and also seeing how Deleuze thinks that human beings should reconcile themselves to solving the problems that reality creates in the form of a problematic].

Doctrines come from ‘wounds and vital aphorisms’ (148), and some writers see themselves as embodying events [hints of the stuff on Nietzsche and illness earlier]. Our will can act as a quasi cause of bodily events, as we live them. This is an ethical stance—‘not to be unworthy of what happens to us’ (149). The alternative is ressentiment. The normal moral notions such as just or unjust are themselves immoral. It is not just a matter of resignation to events, which can still be ressentiment, more an ‘apotheosis of the will’ (149) [citing Bousquet]. The organic is exchanged for the spiritual will [isn’t this just making the best of things, finding some deep meaning in personal tragedy?]. In this sense, freedom is the same as submitting to fate, actualizing events, making sense of events, seeing events as something expressed. One becomes ‘the offspring of one’s events are not of one’s actions, for the action is itself produced by the offspring of the event’ (150). In this way, actors somehow communicate with the Aion, instead of being dominated by Chronos. [Lots of implicit Christianity here, surely?]. All the components of an event, future as well as past, are united, so that one realises the impact of singularities, including preindividual components. [In this way, some sort of agency seems to remain? One can become ‘the actor of one’s own events – a counter actualization’ (150)].

Ressentiment arises from not realizing that our particular part of experience, which may well be unjust, is part of a more perfect whole. It is incorrect to judge everything from the perspective of the present. Some humourous recognition of the futility of it all is valuable—in the great scheme of things, states of affairs are always ‘impersonal and pre-individual, neutral, neither general nor particular’ (151). In these circumstances, either life can seem ‘too weak for me’ [not vivid enough, not enough focused in the present?], or ‘it is I who am too weak for life, it is life which overwhelms me, scattering its singularities all about, in no relation to me, nor to a moment determinable as the present except an impersonal instant’ (151). This is apparent when one considers death or the mortal wound, an event which is indifferent to me, ‘incorporeal and infinitive, impersonal, grounded only in itself’ (151), although it is I who has to actualize the event. However I can also counteractualize in the sense above.

It follows that the events of reality are quite different from personal experience, shown in the ‘splendour of the “they”… The splendour of the event itself order of the fourth person’ (152) [this fourth person is the ‘it’ as in phrases like ‘it is raining’]. The old distinctions between private and collective refer only to personal experience, whereas ‘everything is singular, and thus both collective and private… Which private event does not have all its coordinates, that is, all its impersonal social singularities?’ (152). Freedom exists only in recognising the impersonal
nature of the event, seeing all events as ‘a single Event which no longer makes room for the accident, and which
denounces and removes the power of ressentiment within the individual as well as the power of oppression within
society’ (152) [ridiculous philosophical notion of freedom overcoming oppression by an act of philosophy].
Ressentiment ties one to an oppressive order.
[Then a really sentimental and pathos ridden bit: ‘it is at this mobile and precise point, where all events gather
together in one that transmutation happens: this is the point at which death turns against death; where dying is the
negation of death and the impersonal at he of dying no longer indicates only the moment when I disappear outside of
myself, but rather the moment when death loses itself in itself, and also the figure which the most singular life takes
on in order to substitute itself for me’ (153)]