Transformative experience and the right to revelatory autonomy

Farbod Akhlaghi

1. Introduction

Transformative experiences raise difficult and much discussed questions regarding first-personal rational choice and agency. But, I argue, focus upon these issues has left crucial ethical questions regarding our behaviour towards others who face transformative choices untouched. Here, I ask: under what conditions, if any, is it permissible to interfere to try to prevent others from choosing to undergo a transformative experience? I argue that we possess a moral right to what I call revelatory autonomy, providing a conditional answer to this question that, unlike other views I shall consider, accommodates the epistemic peculiarities of transformative choices and lays a plausible groundwork for an ethics of transformative experiences.

2. The Question

Call an experience epistemically transformative if and only if it provides some knowledge or understanding that one can possess only if one undergoes that experience, like tasting a new fruit or first seeing a colour. And call an experience personally transformative just when it changes the core preferences, values and desires of whoever undergoes it, like starting a career, taking a university course or reading moving literature. A transformative experience is one that is both epistemically and personally transformative, such as becoming a parent, going to war or studying at university (Paul 2014: 16–17).¹

Transformative choices – choices whether to have transformative experiences – raise difficult questions about first-personal rational choice and agency. For how could one make an informed choice whether to go to university if one can only know what it is like if one goes? Even if one could know what it would be like, given that one will change when one goes there, whose preferences matter in this choice: one’s present or future preferences? And since the experience will change who you are, why should the outcome of this experience for some other self be relevant to what your present self should do now?

¹ These are voluntary transformative experiences. As Carel and Kidd (2020) helpfully illustrate, there are also involuntary experiences (unintended consequences of an action one is causally responsible for) and nonvoluntary experiences (due to actions one is not causally responsible for). I am concerned only with the voluntary. The others raise different ethical questions I hope to pursue elsewhere.
But suppose that it is not you who faces the transformative choice but instead your friend, sibling or your romantic partner(s). Such situations raise difficult ethical questions regarding our behaviour towards others who face transformative choices. Consider:

(Love) Jack and Jill are childhood sweethearts. Jack hopes to spend his life in their village. Jill hopes to pursue a university education elsewhere. Jill receives a full scholarship to a university elsewhere. Jack considers trying to stop Jill from taking up the scholarship.

(Friendship) Shireen and Siavash are best friends. Siavash has a high-paying city job. Recently Siavash has considered quitting this job to become a school teacher. Shireen considers trying to stop Siavash from doing so.

(Family) Adam is Charlie’s brother. Adam is considering whether to become a parent. Charlie considers trying to stop Adam from doing so.

The literature on transformative experiences typically proceeds as if we are only ever in the position of Jill, Siavash or Adam. But often we are in the position of Jack, Shireen or Charlie: not ourselves facing a transformative choice but in a position to influence another’s transformative choice. Why might we do so? We may have self-interested reasons to stop others from making certain choices, as Jack does in Love. And sometimes, without vested interests, as in Friendship or Family, it may simply be unclear what one may permissibly do when given the opportunity to affect another’s transformative choice.

These questions concern crucial moments in our interactions with those we stand in special relations to. They present an urgent ethical challenge that focusing upon first-personal transformative decision-making has left unexplored.\(^2\) To begin addressing these questions, I ask:

(The Question) Under what conditions, if any, is it morally permissible to interfere to try to prevent another from making a transformative choice?

I argue that three prima facie plausible answers to The Question fail. They seem attractive partly because they seem plausible as views of when

---

\(^2\) These interpersonal ethical questions go beyond what some who have begun tackling the ethical terrain in the decision-theoretic background have identified. For example, Srinivasan (2015), in her excellent review of Paul 2014, asks how one ethically ought to decide to make transformative choices; Howard (2015) explores an ethical justification for making transformative choices on behalf of others (e.g. our children); Barnes (2015) brilliantly suggests that whether and how an experience is transformative can be a matter of social justice; and Woollard (2021) explores pregnancy as an ethically important epistemically transformative experience.
we might permissibly interfere in another’s choice more generally. But these views fail, I argue, precisely because they concern transformative choices and experiences. I argue instead for an answer that recognizes a distinctive moral right, and corresponding duty, concerning transformative choices, laying the groundwork for an ethics of transformative experiences.

There are numerous forms of interference in another’s decision-making. For example, Charlie might coerce, manipulate, rationally persuade or force Adam not to become a parent. In what follows, ‘interference’ refers to any of these. What is required to permit such interventions may, of course, differ. But I will argue that the distinctive moral right we possess concerning transformative choices places a necessary condition on all such interference, and provides the best framework from which to make tractable other questions regarding the interpersonal ethics of transformative experiences.

3. The right to revelatory autonomy

Transformative experiences differ in valence: they can be positively or negatively transformative (Carel and Kidd 2020: 207–9). Positive epistemically transformative experiences increase our knowledge or understanding, and negative ones decrease them; positive personally transformative experiences change who we are for the better, morally or prudentially, and negative ones change us for the worse.

Perhaps, then, we may permissibly interfere with another’s transformative choice just when that experience will be a negative epistemically or personally transformative experience. For example, if Adam’s becoming a parent were to make him worse off epistemically or personally, then Charlie may permissibly try to dissuade Adam from doing this.

The problem, however, is that this view ignores that there are paradigmatic cases of transformative experiences where we do not know or we have no good reason to believe that they will be positive or negative until after they have happened.3 Becoming a parent, for example, is a positive personally transformative experience for some but not others (like those who learn they are emotionally incapable of good parenting). This epistemic barrier, characteristic of some paradigmatic transformative experiences, makes it implausible to think that permissible interference generally depends upon knowledge, or reasons for belief, that one cannot possess before that choice is made.

Of course, a third party can be in a slightly different epistemic position than a transformative chooser. If Charlie has experienced holding his baby

---

3 This view is also troubled by ambivalent transformative experiences, where it is unclear whether the experience was relevantly positive or negative (see Carel and Kidd 2020: 205–7).
child, then he may be in a better position to know what holding one’s baby is like in general than Adam. But there is no reason to think that what it is like for Charlie to hold his child is the same as what it would be like for Adam to hold his child. That is, whilst holding your baby child is a type of experience that is generally personally transformative and generates new phenomenological information, it is not always transformative in the same way, nor does it create the same new information.

For, as Barnes (2015: 175) puts it, ‘all the different experiences that will have led up to [the experience(s)], and all the differences in the two people who are the subjects of the experience’ make this unlikely. Given Charlie’s history and constitution prior to holding his child, his doing so may invoke joy and deep unconditional love. Adam, alternatively, may, given his history and constitution, come to feel deep fear, regret and resentment when holding his child. Parenthood can thus also be generally transformative without being so in the same way for everyone. Given the variation in the experiences that lead up to transformative experiences, and the differences in subjects, this point generalizes: we cannot know the value of such experiences for individuals in many paradigmatic cases.

Should we thus conclude that we may never permissibly interfere in a transformative choice, because we cannot have knowledge of what it would be like for someone at the time of their decision-making? This is too quick. For suppose someone wished to have the transformative experience of going on a killing spree, or to cut off their body from their waist down. Regardless of not knowing what this will be like for them, we clearly are permitted to prevent them from making these choices. So ‘there are no conditions’ is not a plausible answer to The Question.

A second view, then: it is permissible to interfere with another’s transformative choice just when it is in the best interests of that person for you to do so. For example, suppose Shireen knows that Siavash has expensive tastes that will likely not be met if he became a teacher, and that Siavash would have fewer opportunities to see his current workmates if he changed jobs. These seem like good grounds upon which to object to Siavash’s transformative choice.

Or a third view: the permissibility of interference in a transformative choice is determined by standard decision-theoretic procedures of determining what to do under conditions of uncertainty by calculating expected utilities. On this view, we calculate the expected consequences of choosing the transformative experience as opposed to not choosing it. Then, once we know which is more likely to maximize the expected utility for the chooser, we may permissibly intervene just when the choice will not maximize expected utility and not otherwise.

The problems with both views are these. First, we can only know what the interests of the future selves are and whether one’s present interests will be fulfilled after a transformative choice has been made. Siavash, for example, might manage to retain his current friendships and afford his expensive
tastes, and we do not know if future Siavash would wish this. Similarly, since the utilities associated with a transformative experience, such as Jill’s going to university, partly depend upon what it would be like for her, and since she can only know this after going, how could we know what the expected utility of her going to university is?

Second, even if we knew what the future person’s interests are and whether their present interests would be fulfilled, whose interests would morally matter for the permissibility of intervening in a transformative choice: those, say, of present Siavash or future Siavash? Such interests may differ, and it seems arbitrary to privilege one over the other. Similarly, even if we knew the expected utilities of, say, Jill’s going to university, which utilities morally matter for whether Jack may permissibly intervene: those of present Jill or future Jill?4

These problems are serious. First, by making the permissibility of interference dependent upon knowledge or reasons for belief we cannot possess at the time of choosing, both views entail that we can never know or have good reason to believe that we can permissibly interfere in a transformative choice. But this, as we have seen, is implausible. Second, given that there is a minimal condition on acting permissibly that one has good reason to believe the conditions that make your action permissible are met, they also entail that we can never permissibly intervene in a transformative choice. Since we can, these views are false.5

Answering The Question, I suggest, requires recognizing that the above views face their objections precisely because they concern transformative experiences. Owing to the epistemic barrier between the time before and after a transformative choice, views that depend upon the valence of a transformative experience, best interests of someone or expected utilities are unable to provide plausible accounts of when we may permissibly interfere in transformative choices.

This provides some adequacy conditions on an answer to The Question. First, the permissibility of interference should not be taken to depend upon knowing the valence of the relevant experience. Second, it should avoid leaving it an open question to whom some relevant moral obligation is owed between a present or

4 Of course, which epistemic utilities matter in first-personal rational decision-making receives much attention: see Pettigrew 2019 for excellent discussion. The point here is that, even if these issues were resolved, it remains unclear which utilities morally matter regarding interference in other’s transformative choices.

5 If this condition on morally permissible action is rejected and someone accepted one of the two views on the permissibility of interference above, then given the epistemic features of many paradigmatic transformative experiences, they are forced to accept that we can permissibly interfere in transformative choices but we cannot know when we can do so. This, I suggest, is implausible given the would-be killer and self-mutilation cases.
far future person. Third, it should not depend upon knowing the unknowable interests of, or the consequences of the choice on, some future person.

I suggest that it is highly plausible that we have:

(Revelatory Autonomy) The moral right to autonomously decide to discover how one’s life will go and who one will become by making a transformative choice.6

This is a right to autonomously decide for ourselves whether to discover what our lives will be like and who we will become after making a transformative choice. Importantly this is not just a right to autonomy. That right raises similar questions as the views we have already considered, such as whether others should act so as to respect the autonomy of the present person or their future self (which may conflict). Instead, it is a right to make specific autonomous choices that we are confronted with at a given time to have revealed to us, through making a transformative choice, who we will become. Insofar as a future version of someone has such a right, that right concerns only the transformative choices they may face in the future.

But what, one might object, is so morally important about making a free choice? Perhaps there is nothing specifically morally valuable about being allowed to make a free choice in general: as O’Neill (2003: 3) puts it, that ‘mere, sheer independence or choosing is morally important’. If so, then why think that there is such moral value to autonomously making transformative choices that we have a moral right to do so?

The answer, I suggest, is the moral value of autonomous self-making. It is not the value of making a choice as such but, rather, that of autonomously making choices to learn what our core preferences and values will become. For autonomously making transformative choices when facing them, deciding for ourselves to learn who we will become, gives us a degree of self-authorship. A degree of control, that is, over not necessarily who we become (since we do not know this, given the nature of transformative experiences) but over choosing ourselves to learn who we will become through a choice we make. And some degree of self-authorship in this sense is crucial for us and others to see ourselves as ourselves – selves we have become at least partly through transformative choices we have made. It is the value of autonomously self-making that grounds the right to revelatory autonomy.7

Such a right generates this correlative duty:

---

6 This is, of course, inspired by Paul’s (2014) solution to the decision-theoretic questions that transformative choices raise. My suggestion is that revelation has a crucial moral role to play in the ethics of transformative choices. For excellent discussion of the revelation approach to the decision-theoretic problems, see Shupe 2016.

7 Thus, my account is silent on what moral value there may be to what O’Neill (2003: 3–6) calls ‘rational autonomy’, as I focus solely on the moral value of autonomous self-making and not autonomous choice-making simpliciter. For similar remarks on what I call the value of self-making, see Tsai 2014: 89–101 and Wallace 2004: 396.
(Revelatory Non-Interference) The moral duty not to interfere in the autonomous self-making of others, through their choosing to undergo transformative experiences to discover who they will become.

Together, these suggest that it is permissible to interfere in the transformative choices of others only if their right to revelatory autonomy is outweighed. I suggest further that: if someone’s right to revelatory autonomy is outweighed and our duty of non-interference no longer binds us, then it is permissible to interfere to try to prevent another from making some transformative choice.

This conditional answer meets our adequacy conditions. For the grounds of permissibly interfering need not depend upon the valence of the transformative experience. Nor does it leave open to whom the relevant duty is owed. For the right to revelatory autonomy is a right of the present person and does not concern the interests or expected utility of some decision for a future person who does not face this choice. We thus also need not know anything about future interests or consequences to answer The Question.

Moreover, first, my answer explains how and why there are cases where it is morally permissible to interfere in another’s transformative choice, despite the epistemic barrier surrounding transformative experiences. Take the would-be killer. I suggest that their right to revelatory autonomy is plausibly outweighed by the wrongness of the killing of others done solely to discover who one would become by doing so. And with our would-be self-mutilator: the strength of the moral reasons to protect one’s friends from gratuitous harm plausibly outweighs their right to autonomously discover what it would be like to irreversibly harm themselves, and who they would become by doing so solely to discover this. Our corresponding duty of non-interference then is pro tanto (Ross 1930, 1939); it can be outweighed by competing moral considerations. By making the permissibility of interference depend upon knowledge we cannot possess prior to the making of a transformative choice, the other views considered cannot explain this.

Second, it seems plausible that some cases of interference in transformative choices are easier to justify than others. For example, what must obtain for it to be permissible to interfere in someone’s choice to eat a cheeseburger for the first time seems much less demanding than interference in their choosing to go to university. My view explains this. Since the value of the right to revelatory autonomy is grounded in the value of autonomous self-making, some transformative choices will be more morally valuable than others. Which? Those that are most likely to affect your core preferences, identity and values. As going to university is more likely to affect these than eating a cheeseburger for the first time, the strength
of the moral reasons for interference must be much greater for the former than for the latter.\footnote{The view also allows that the nature of the interference engaged in, and whether the interference was solicited, can play a part in what makes some cases of interference harder to justify than others.}

One might worry, however, that whilst it seems plausible that coercion, manipulation and force can in principle violate an agent’s right to revelatory autonomy, \textit{rational persuasion} cannot. Rather, rational persuasion \textit{always} respects an agent’s right to make autonomous decisions of any kind, since it involves offering reasons, evidence and arguments, and aims to promote (or at least not undermine) rational decision-making. Since rational persuasion is the form of interference most likely to be pursued in the cases used to motivate this paper, we might worry that this leaves the general framework I have offered troubled.

But distinguish between (a) respecting autonomy \textit{simpliciter} in the sense of respecting someone’s ability to be a competent, capable reasoner and (b) respecting one’s \textit{revelatory} autonomy, that is, their right to make a specific decision, at a given time, to learn who they will become through a self-making, transformative choice. Rational persuasion does respect an agent’s ability to be a competent, capable reasoner.\footnote{If it does not reveal an attitude of inappropriate distrust in another’s capacity to reason (Tsai 2014: 91).} But it does not entail respecting an agent’s autonomous self-authorship.

For example, one can treat someone in a way that respects their autonomy as a rational agent whilst failing to accord them the epistemic autonomy that they should be granted when facing self-making decisions. That an agent should be given the opportunity to deliberate on transformative choices for themselves is motivated by the value of self-making: the importance of making decisions \textit{for ourselves}. But, for example, one can, as Tsai (2014) argues, offer a rational argument against a choice at a time or in a way that prevents an agent from exercising such epistemic autonomy: offering it, for example, too early or too forcefully in an agent’s deliberative process.

Moreover, recall that we are considering rational persuasion in the context of transformative choices. Another way one can respect an agent’s autonomy \textit{simpliciter} whilst violating their right to revelatory autonomy is by trying to offer apparent reasons, arguments or evidence as if one is in an epistemically privileged position with respect to what some choice would be like for an agent. That would constitute a distinctive disrespect of an agent’s autonomous self-making whilst respecting their capacity for autonomous reflection. Even rational persuasion, then, can disrespect an agent’s right to revelatory autonomy.
4. Conclusion

Ethical questions regarding transformative experiences are morally urgent. A complete answer to our question requires ascertaining precisely how strong the right to revelatory autonomy is and what competing considerations can outweigh it. These are questions for another time, where the moral significance of revelation and self-making, the competing weight of moral and non-moral considerations, and the sense in which some transformative choices are more significant to one’s identity and self-making than others must be further explored.

But to identify the right to revelatory autonomy and duty of revelatory non-interference is significant progress. For it provides a framework to address the ethics of transformative experience that avoids complications arising from the epistemic peculiarities of transformative experiences. It also allows us to explain cases where we are permitted to interfere in another’s transformative choice and why interference in some choices is harder to justify than others, whilst recognizing plausible grounds for the right to revelatory autonomy itself in the moral value of autonomous self-making. This framework, moreover, opens novel avenues of engagement with wider ethical issues regarding transformative experience, for example concerning social justice or surrogate transformative choice-making. It is, at the very least, a view worthy of further consideration.10

Funding

This work was initially supported by a Graduate Development Scholarship from St Anne’s College, Oxford, and an Aristotelian Society Bursary, before being completed at Christ’s College, Cambridge. I am immensely grateful to all of these institutions for their support that made this work possible.

Christ’s College, University of Cambridge
UK
fa350@cam.ac.uk

References


10 I am extremely grateful to Roger Crisp, Geoff Keeling, Timothy Williamson, an audience of the Emerging Research Seminar Series at Christ’s College, Cambridge and three anonymous referees for their insightful feedback, which much improved this paper.


