



RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ON SOCIAL SCIENCES

*Monographs and Studies of the Jagiellonian
University - Institute of Public Affairs*

EDITED BY

**ROMAN DORCZAK
REGINA LENART-GANSINIEC
CHRISTIAN RUGGIERO
MEHMET ALI ICBAY**

Research and Development on Social Sciences

Edited by
Roman Dorczak, Regina Lenart-Gansiniec,
Christian Ruggiero, Mehmet Ali Icbay

Reviewers:

Prof dr hab. Łukasz Sułkowski, Jagiellonian University
dr Paweł Romaniuk, University of Warmia and Mazury

Series editing:

Chief Editor: dr hab. Ewa Bogacz-Wojtanowska, prof. UJ
Secretary: dr Wioleta Karna

Scientific Council:

prof. dr hab. Łukasz Sułkowski - Chairman
prof. dr hab. Aleksander Noworól
dr hab. Grzegorz Baran
dr hab. Zbysław Dobrowolski, prof. UJ
dr hab. Roman Dorczak
dr hab. Dariusz Grzybek
prof. dr hab. Monika Kostera
dr hab. Sławomir Magała
dr hab. Grzegorz Mazurkiewicz
prof. dr hab. Grażyna Praweńska-Skrzypek
prof. dr hab. Andrzej Szopa

Publisher:

Jagiellonian University Institute of Public Affairs
ul. prof. Łojasiewicza 4, 30-348 Kraków
tel. +48 12 664 55 44, fax + 48 12 644 58 59
e-mail: monografia_isp@uj.edu.pl
www.isp.uj.edu.pl

ISBN: 978 - 83 - 65688 - 32 - 3

ISBN: 978 - 83 - 65688 - 33 - 0 (e-book)

© Copyright by the Institute of Public Affairs
Jagiellonian University
1st Edition, Kraków 2018

Table of Contents

Communication

Semih Solak, Fatma Cakir

The Impact of Social Media Marketing on Consumer's Purchase and an Application on Facebook.....9

Mustafa Aslan, Yeter Can Domruk

The Use of Safranbolu Mumtazlar Mansion As A Cinematic Place: "120" As The Movie Example17

Basak Gezmen

A General Evaluation For Health Journalism in Turkey On Magazination25

Selda Bulut, Serpil Karlidag

A Discussion on Media Systems in Turkey35

Melike Selcan Cihangiroglu

Spatial Memory in Films: Analysis of "Alice in Wonderland"45

Akin Deveci, Adile Celik

The Hegemonic Discourse of Judges in the TV Competition Shows: An Analysis Over "O Ses Turkiye and Yetenek Sizsiniz" Shows.....53

Belgin Buyukbuga Tarhan, Ahmet Bora Tarhan

From Nationalist Grassroots to Center: The Good Party61

Konrad Gunesch

Leading Ladies' Communication Facilities in Contemporary Film: Individual Competence and Interpersonal Compassion as Artistic Role Models for Intercultural Consideration and Liberated Gender Relations71

Gulden Ozkan

Presidency as a Political Field: Reflections on Twitter from 24th June Elections in Field-Habitus Relationality81

Gul Nihan Guven Yesildag, Mesut Iris

The Reflections of Tourism Mobility in The Local Media: Kusadasi Sample89

Ozge Guven Akdogan

The Film Manifesto on the Frame of Walter Benjamin's Thoughts95

Nuran Irapoglu, Serap Durmus Ozturk

Signboards / Signs in Architecture Magazine: Yapi Journal..... 103

Christian Ruggiero, Simone Sallusti

Italian Golden Age of Populism: an Analysis of Movimento 5 Stelle and Lega TV Agenda in 2018 General Elections..... 113

Evrin Kabukcu Arslan

Use of Packaging Design Elements in Fashion Marketing And Communication 121

<i>Emel Karagoz, Aysel Tapan</i>	
Emoji's as a Product of Visual Culture and a Discursive Analysis Over the Meanings of Emojis	129
<i>Sara Longobardi</i>	
Discourse and Ideology in the Spanish Press on Adoptions during Francoist Dictatorship	137
<i>Nalan Ova, Rukiye Celik</i>	
Renewal Universities in The News Media Within The Context of Active and Healthy Ageing.....	145
<i>Osman Nacak</i>	
in Digital World, Digitizing State And Citizenship	155
<i>Ersoy Soydan, Gulsen Ismail Yusuf</i>	
Fifty Year of Turkish Television Broadcasting in The Balkans: 1969-2019	163
<i>Filiz Balta Peltekoglu, Emel Tozlu</i>	
Social Media Influencers: Are They Brand New Actors of Electoral Campaigns	173
<i>Mehtap Uyar</i>	
Communication Process of Violence against Women in Websites of the National Newspapers in Turkey: An Example of Abusive Boyfriend.....	179
<i>Mine Yazici</i>	
Optimization As A Translation Procedure in Medical Papers Istanbul University	187
<i>Sedef Zeyrekli Yas</i>	
Evaluating General Election Results in Turkey: From 1950 to Present	195
Language, Literature and Philosophy	
<i>Ozge Kocakula, Ender Altunoglu</i>	
'Law of the Father' in Management Practices	205
<i>Nuri Akdogan, Deniz Bilger</i>	
The Inhibitory Effect of Self on Critical Thinking.....	213
<i>Mehmet M. Akgunduz, Pervin Oya Taneri</i>	
Imagine a world without hatred: Preventing the Hate-Speech and Prejudice in the Society.....	217
<i>Ibrahim Okan Akkin</i>	
A Short Study on Spinoza's View of Religion.....	225
<i>Ibrahim Akkus</i>	
A Psychoanalytic Analysis of Joan Riley's The Unbelonging	233
<i>Nil Avci</i>	
Beauty and Art in Plato	239
<i>Bilge Doganli, Banu Berber Babalik</i>	
The Image of Women in Turkey According to The Social Gender Concept	247

<i>Meltem Can, Meryem Ayan</i>	
The Feminist Kunstlerroman: Art/iculation of the Silenced Women	257
<i>Asli Ege</i>	
Islam and the Middle Eastern Affairs from a Huntingtonian Perspective: “Clash of” or “Clash Within” Civilizations?	267
<i>Ekin Deveci</i>	
The Fantastic Body Image in Contemporary Turkish Painting	275
<i>Konrad Gunesch</i>	
Comparing Academic and Fictional Literature for Artfully Linking Linguistic Ability, Business Acumen and Cultural Understanding: International Integrations, Educational Aspirations and Individual Inspirations in the Political-Economic Novels of Morris West	281
<i>Nur Gulumser Ilker</i>	
Love, Affection And Beauty in Marianela.....	291
<i>Zeliha Isik</i>	
in Between the Sky and Every Piece of the Earth	299
<i>Elifhan Kose Cal</i>	
Religions as Source of Bio-Ethics: Different Approaches to the Assisted Reproduction Technologies(ARTs)	307
<i>Oljana Merkuri (Papa)</i>	
An analyze of the new Albanian regional dictionaries.....	315
<i>Aysun Aydin Oksuz, Bahar Kucuk Karakas, Gizem Seymen</i>	
Constructing Physical Environment in The Tanzimat And Early Republican Period Novels	323
<i>Svetlana Stomatova</i>	
Conceptualism in the Twentieth-Century Russian Literature	333
<i>Burcu Tekin</i>	
Transfer of Values in Children’s Literature: An Analysis of the Concept of Goodness in Luis Sepúlveda’s Works The Story of a Seagull and the Cat Who Taught Her to Fly and The Story of Mix, Max and Mex	339
<i>Hikmet Menguaslan</i>	
Appraising Ibn Khaldun’s Philosophy with Positivist Epistemology: Making Sense or Loose Interpretation.....	347
Geography and Urban Planning	
<i>Sengul Yalcinkaya</i>	
Spatial Satisfaction in Dormitory Rooms: Chaid Analysis	355
<i>Muteber Erbay, Deniz Saylam Canim</i>	
Review of Concept of Awareness Over Historical Environment & Buildings in Connection With Woman Users: A Pilot Study in Trabzon City.....	367

<i>Asu Besgen, Omer Aslanoz</i> Redefinition of Architecture over Aristotle.....	379
<i>Vahdet Ozkocak, Fikri Ozdemir</i> Anatomical Landmarks Used for Face Identification in Forensic Anthropology	387
<i>Nur Belkayali, Elif Ayan</i> Classification of Open Green Spaces and Parks: The Case of Kastamonu	395
<i>Yeter Can Domruk</i> The Influence of Bektashism On The Ornaments of Sipahi Mansion in Yoruk Village	405
<i>Musa Yavuz Alptekin</i> Corruption in Asian States And Its Social Roots: Geo-Cultural Approach	411
<i>Kamile Manav, Vedat Caliskan</i> Utilization of Traditional Houses in Tourism in Rural Environments: A Case Study of “Dugmeli Evler (Buttoned Houses)” (Antalya)	417
<i>Demet Ulku Gulpinar Sekban, Makbulenur Bekar</i> From past to present; Special plants	429
<i>Dilsa Gunaydin Temel, Z. Ezgi Haliloglu Kahraman</i> Modularity or Prefabrication: Comparative Analysis on Micro Homes & AFAD Saricam Settlements	437
<i>Melike Kaplan</i> A Traditional Healing Practice in Anatolia: "Ocak" Institution	445
<i>Pinar Kasapoglu Akyol</i> Convention For The Safeguarding of The Intangible Cultural Heritage: Experience of Turkey	451
<i>Miran Sadiku</i> Albanians in Austria	459
<i>Gizem Sazan</i> Representation of Architecture in Miniature Parks: The Case of Miniaturk	465
<i>Aysun Aydin Oksuz, Bahar Karakas, Gizem Seymen</i> Urban Memory Production Instruments of Power: Sample of Trabzon	473
<i>Busra Topdagi Yazici, Gizem Seymen, Nuran Irapoglu</i> Karacakaya Village: Traditional Architecture Texture And Today’s Conservation Situation	483
<i>Melis Yazici, Oguz Kirci</i> A Rural Settlement in The Netherlands: Zaanse Schans	493

History

<i>Ali Sonmez</i> Organizing the Zaptieh Organization after the Proclamation of the Tanzimat Firman and the Asâkir-i Zaptiye Statute of 1846	501
---	-----

<i>Nikollë Loka</i>	
Efforts to massive education in Mirdita in the years 1945-1952.....	511
<i>Banu Berber Babalik</i>	
1929 World Economic Crisis and its Effects on The Economic Policy Implemented in Turkey.....	515
<i>Vedat Caliskan, Ali Sonmez</i>	
Traditional Fairs of Rumelia and the Balkans in the Ottoman Period	523
<i>Berkant Genckal</i>	
Polyphonic Piano Music in the Late 19th Century Ottoman Empire Court	535
<i>Gergun Duyar</i>	
The Evaluation of 21st Century Socialism in Latin American Perspective	545
<i>Huseyin Turkseven</i>	
Evolution of Ottoman Museology From Cebehane to Muze-I Humayun	555
<i>Esin Yagmur Sahin, Yuksel Girgin, Ferchan Kalin Sali, Kubra Emre</i>	
Newspapers and Journals Published in Greece (Western Thrace Turkish Press 1974 and after)	563
<i>Mensure Ozturk</i>	
On the Sidelines of the Janissary Revolt in November 1808, Nizâm-i Cedîd’s Plundered Mansions and the Fate of the Obtained Goods	569
<i>Ibrahim Saritas</i>	
The Political History of German Conservatism: An Analysis on German Conservative Press between the French Revolution to the Second World War.....	579
<i>Olga Untila Kaplan</i>	
The First Newspaper of the Gagauz People “The Voice of Truth”: Rebirth	587
Law	
<i>Yavuz Guloglu, Eray Aktepe</i>	
Administrative Sanctions and Judicial Control Thereof for Environmental Protection in the Light of Judicial Decisions	597
<i>Sevgi Bozkurt Yasar</i>	
Major Changes in Turkish Design Law with Industrial Property Code Numbered 6769	607
<i>Selda Caglar</i>	
According to the Turkish New Constitutional System the Power of the President on Ratification of International Agreements	619
<i>Meric Karagozler</i>	
The Right of Foreign Real Persons to Individual Application to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey.....	629
<i>Nurten Ozturk, Mehmet Saydam</i>	
Undercover Agent as a Protection Measure in Turkish	639

A Short Study on Spinoza's View of Religion

Ibrahim Okan Akkin

1. Introduction

It is a matter of philosophical debate whether Jonathan Israel's assessment of Spinoza's notion of 'state religion' can be interpreted as an atheistic and Marxist reading of Spinoza. Contrary to the widely accepted view, Spinoza has a peculiar understanding of religion; and thus, his views cannot be equated with atheism. By relying on this fact, in this article, I am going to shed light on the issue and try to show, to what extent Israel's interpretation goes beyond what Spinoza himself claims, and whether or not Spinoza's views can make him an atheist. Another concern of the text will be elucidating Marx's critique of Bruno Bauer's argument for the abolition of religion and laying bare if there is any continuity between Marx and Spinoza on the problem of religion. After Israel's interpretation is restated, both Spinoza's view of religion, as he puts forward in *Theological-Political Treatise* [*Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, 1670] and *Political Treatise* [*Tractatus Politicus*, 1676], and Marx's arguments on the same issue, in "On the Jewish Question" [in *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbucher*, 1844], will be examined in detail. Depending on these investigations, it will be argued that what Israel defends in his text *Radical Enlightenment* [2001] does not make Spinoza an atheist; on the contrary, although Spinoza is not an advocate of the commonsensical view of religion, he defends his own understanding of religion—which causes him to be regarded, prejudicedly, as an atheist. Furthermore, it will be pointed out that Israel's interpretation cannot be a Marxist interpretation either because Marx's critique of religion is generally misunderstood and mistaken with that of Bruno Bauer. Neither Spinoza's views on religion nor that of Marx, are completely compatible with what Israel defends in *Radical Enlightenment*; nevertheless, this does not mean that Israel tries to make an atheist or Marxist out of Spinoza through his appropriation of the philosopher.

2. Jonathan Israel's Assessment of Spinoza's Notion of 'State Religion'

in the fifteenth chapter of his text *Radical Enlightenment*, Jonathan Israel introduces John Locke and Baruch de Spinoza as the representatives of the main schools of enlightenment; one is moderate (monarchical) and the other is radical (democratic republicanism). Israel (2001) makes a distinction between these philosophers regarding their understanding of the concept of 'toleration'. Depending on this distinction, he states that Spinoza's main concern about toleration is 'freedom of thought' and 'expression'; and hence, Spinoza is a defender of anti-theological tolerance. Therefore, Spinoza's approach to freedom of conscience and religion is radically different from that of Locke and other philosophers of his age. Besides, Spinoza understands freedom of belief in terms of 'liberation from religious pressure' rather than a 'freedom of conscience' in a general sense. Hence, Israel (2001) claims that, for Spinoza, freedom of worship is only a secondary issue; whereas individual freedom is of great importance: "Freedom of thought and expression should include freedom of the expression of ideas incompatible with the core tenets of revealed religion upheld by the churches" (pp. 265).

According to Israel (2001), Spinoza argues that everyone should be free to possess religious beliefs and express them without restriction; nevertheless, "large congregations should be forbidden unless they belong to the State religion" (p. 266). Israel's comment is that the "state religion" would be a philosophical religion, not Christianity, as Spinoza himself states, a "very simple universal faith" based on "worship of God and obedience to Him consists solely in justice and charity towards one's neighbor" (Spinoza, 2002, as cited in Israel, 2001, p. 266). Israel, just like Spinoza himself, explains the idea behind the exclusion of large dissenting congregations with the necessity that sovereignty of the state should be indivisible and there should be no authority other than State itself over its laws and ordinances. On the other hand, "churches proclaiming state religion" should be as large as possible but only patricians, senators and/or guardians and interpreters should be allowed to determine the ways of worship (Israel,

2001, p. 267). in other words, says Israel, clergy can only be a branch of the state and not an autonomous authority.

Depending on Moreau (1985)'s text "Spinoza et le *Jus circa sacra*", Israel goes further to make the strong claim that Spinoza is anxious about whittling down "the ecclesiastical power" (Moreau, 1985, as cited in Israel, 2001, p. 267). He argues that it was the general tendency of radical enlightenment project to reject the view that clergy's properties and privileges can be justified by Scripture or anything else; and thus, following this view, Spinoza did not want to permit the existence of religious sects and clergy as autonomous power groups within the state since this would result in an impairment of the state's power. This is because when the state loses its power and several religious sects get involved in a rivalry, each of them tries to influence people and even force them to join their side. "One sees an inverse relationship in Spinoza between the degree of influence ecclesiastical hierarchies acquire where these are distinct from the ruling élite, and the measure of liberty individuals enjoy to express their views" (Israel, 2001, p. 267). in other words, Israel (2001) says, "the individual is freer the less he or she is under the sway of an organized Church" (p. 267). At this point, it should be underlined that none of these restrictions are towards individuals' beliefs and activities of worship in private, but solely against the church as an institution or, indeed, against any kind of autonomous religious organization. Hence, neither Spinoza himself, as will be seen in the next section, nor Israel's interpretation, put Spinoza into the position of an enemy of religion. On the contrary, Spinoza makes a clear distinction between religion as 'faith in itself' and the organizational extensions of it.

Nevertheless, Israel (2001) does not stop at this point, as he continues to regard Spinoza as being in the same class with his followers whom he calls "English deists" and the "French philosophes", whose views on the conception of God, man, and the universe are opposed to that of the Churches (p. 268). He states that, for these thinkers, "an individual's beliefs and ideas have a higher status, and more beneficial to society when they are 'philosophical' and based on natural reason rather than theological doctrines" (Israel, 2001, p. 268). It is true to the extent that Spinoza aimed at making a distinction between theology and philosophy; but, on the other hand, regarding his views on the duties of the state, Spinoza addresses the eternal decree of God and equates the function of religion with the reason why states were established at the beginning, that is, to promote peace and harmony in the universe (Spinoza, 2007, p. 206; Spinoza, 2002, p. 693).

Israel clearly categorizes Spinoza as one—or rather the pioneer—of the radicals and even uses quotations from other philosophers of radical enlightenment and continues with Spinoza's views as if they are in the same line of thought. in this way, it gets more difficult to distinguish between their views, and one can easily believe that all the ideas that Israel introduces really belong to Spinoza himself since he is regarded as one of those radicals. However, the categorization of "radical enlightenment philosophers" itself is not *ipso facto* true; and thus, we do not have to accept it undisputedly. For example, Israel quotes Radicati's claim that "religion was instituted by legislators in order to give strength and credit to their laws" and then makes a distortion by continuing with a quote from Spinoza as if two thinkers hold the same view:

Since the sole purpose of theological doctrines is to instill good conduct and obedience, and obedience and charity are the measures of genuine piety, "everyone must adapt these dogmas of faith to his own understanding," "and interpret them for himself in whatever way he thinks will best enable him to adopt them unreservedly" (Spinoza, 2002, as cited in Israel, 2001, p. 269).

Although Spinoza talks about obedience and charity as the core of religion and further indicates the open endedness of theological doctrines, Israel puts it in a way, so that it comes to mean that religion itself is a construction of politicians. However, elsewhere Spinoza admits that he is not a champion of religion either, and since the eternal decree of God is unknown to human beings we can only take into consideration the religious commandments which come by special revelation—by the prophets who can prove themselves to be so by miracles only (Spinoza, 2007, pp. 205-6; Spinoza, 2002, p. 693). All the other theological doctrines are open to interpretation because they might have been distorted by the clergy.

Nevertheless, it does not mean that Spinoza is skeptical about the source of religion; i.e., God himself, but he is aware of the fact that in time religions have been institutionalized with a view to power and propagation, and deviated from the preaches of the Christ and other prophets. He also states that even when we have encountered a Prophet, we should believe in God and only God since the prophet is only God's mediator for propagating his commands, but God himself is the real judge (Spinoza, 2007, p. 206).

Israel (2001) then claims that, according to Spinoza and his followers,

Truth [...] can only be grasped through natural reason and philosophically, and cannot be embodied in theological doctrines. It is for this reason that freedom of thought and speech, and not the liberty of conscience and worship, constitutes the core of toleration in Spinoza's thought (p. 269).

Having stated Spinoza's critique of theological doctrines due to the human hand involved in them; i.e., their ambiguity, and also because of the impossibility of direct interaction with God's knowledge, I would say, Israel is consistent to make this claim. Furthermore, as it will be examined in the next section, Spinoza relates natural reason to the universal natural order of God. To observe the grounding for these views, we can turn to the argument that Spinoza establishes in the sixteenth chapter of *Theological-Political Treatise*.

Spinoza argues that the state of nature precedes religion and civil state; and hence, we shall not regard religious rules as laws of nature. Religious ordinances aim at the happiness of human beings, whereas laws of nature are in coherence with the universal order of nature, and thus designed in accordance with the eternal decree of God (Spinoza, 2007, p. 206). Therefore, by all means, laws of nature precede religious rules. Due to their nature, human beings were in a state of competition in the state of nature; i.e., everyone was being directed by their appetite, and their wills and benefits were opposing each other (Spinoza, 2007, p. 197). The establishment of State was natural reason's solution to this problem; i.e., in order to escape from the unending wills of their appetites, humans followed their reason and decided that it is best to leave their absolute freedom to a sovereign in a civil order. For this reason, the best State, in which everyone is free to philosophize and everyone feels safe, is supposed to be the most rational state. Religion also occurred within states. Hence, no theological doctrine is superior to the laws and ordinances of a Commonwealth, unless it is directly prescribed by a living prophet who is the messenger of God and can prove themselves to be a prophet by special means like miracles (Spinoza, 2007, p. 205). This is because, by its very nature, a sovereign cannot contradict with the will of God. Power of the sovereign comes from the fact that all of us have transferred our rights and freedoms—which we had in the state of nature—to the sovereign and by doing this we followed universal natural reason. Henceforth, the duty of the sovereign is to secure freedom and promote peace and harmony according to the universal laws of nature which are compatible with the eternal decree of God—which is unknown to human beings.

Being parallel to what has been defended up here, Jonathan Israel ends up the related section in his text with the following quote:

...the state can pursue no safer course than regard piety and religion as consisting solely in charity and just dealing and that the right of the sovereign, both in the religious and secular spheres, should be restricted to men's actions, with everyone being allowed to think what he wishes and say what he thinks (Spinoza, 2002, as cited in Israel, 2001, p. 270).

3. Spinoza's Peculiar Approach to Religion

At the beginning of the sixteenth chapter of *Theological-Political Treatise*, Spinoza states that his aim, throughout the whole text, had been to separate philosophy from theology in order to provide freedom to philosophize, that is, freedom of thought and expression for everyone. Depending on this distinction between theology and philosophy, it can be concluded that activities like propagating a religion, or being organized under the roof of a religious belief, have nothing to do with philosophizing; and thus, they are not within the scope of freedom of thought and expression. Besides, due to their religious

beliefs, if a people do not obey the laws and ordinances of the state, again, this is not a right provided by intellectual freedom.

Obviously, freedom of conscience is limited by the following proviso in Spinoza's political thought: Unless it is the state religion, religious affiliations can only be tolerated on the individual level, provided that they do not include actions towards religious propaganda; and thus, propagation.

In order to go into the details of this argumentation it seems to be a logical necessity to start with the definitions regarding civil state which is introduced at the beginning of the third chapter of *Political Treatise* by Spinoza himself; and then, continue with the features of the civil order:

"Definitions. 'Civil order' means the order regulated by a state and there are three kinds of civil order, namely, democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy (Spinoza, 2002, pp. 689-90). It should be noted that, unlike Hobbes, Spinoza is in favor of democracy in which power of the state is not in the hands of an individual or a limited group of people. "Commonwealth" is the body of the state in its entirety (Spinoza, 2002, p. 689). "State affairs" are public businesses of the state under the control of a sovereign (p. 690). "Citizens" are men who benefit from living under a commonwealth by civil right (p. 690). Finally, "subjects" are people as they are obliged to live according to the laws of the Commonwealth (p. 690).

After making these definitions, Spinoza concentrates on the features of the civil order in general. For the aim of this essay, it is enough to examine only two of these features.

First of all, Spinoza (2002) dwells in the supreme right of the sovereign. He equalizes this right to the "right of nature," and claims that it is determined by 'the people' when they are considered as a whole—not as parts or individuals (p. 690). The more power a state has over its subjects the less right its citizens have. Accordingly, although there is a direct proportion between the rights—liberties—and power of each individual, there is an inverse proportion between the power that the state imposes on its subjects and their individual freedom (Spinoza, 2002, p. 690). Naturally, if the citizens in a civil order are given absolute freedom, i.e. the right to live as they please, the Commonwealth loses all its power because in this case those who are given an absolute right to live as they please become sovereign, and since the Commonwealth is divided into individual powers it is left with no sovereignty. Indeed, it is contradictory, even, to think of any two people as having an absolute sovereignty at the same time since their wills would potentially negate each other (Spinoza, 2002, pp. 690-1). Spinoza further puts forth a semi-Hobbesian comment on the relationship between reason, freedom, and peace. He thinks that

...peace cannot be achieved unless the common laws of the commonwealth are kept inviolate. So the more a [human] is guided by reason—that is, the more [they] are free—the more steadfast [they] will be in preserving the laws of the state and in carrying out the commands of the sovereign whose subject they are (Spinoza, 2002, p. 691).

In other words, in the state of nature, human beings are not free because they are not guided by reason but by their passions only; and hence, the most reasonable thing to do is to obey the ordinances and laws of the commonwealth—that is, to live in a civil order—by means of which individual powers are transferred to the sovereign in whom individual wills are substituted by the will of all. Here it seems that freedom, in Spinoza's political theory, is an obligation discovered by natural reason.

Secondly, Spinoza (2002) explains that, genuinely, commonwealth's rights do not include things which are contrary to human nature; and thus, subjects follow the ordinances and laws of the commonwealth not only because they fear its power or threats, or because they are so tightly attached to the civil order, but also because it is reasonable to do so. Hence, commonwealth's right does not command the subjects to do insane things such as torturing themselves, killing their parents or denying the existence of God (Spinoza, 2002, p. 692). So, even though some mad people can reject to obey the orders of the commonwealth, or some religious cults might "regard the laws of the state as the worst of all evils", there are many reasonable people who will follow these laws and orders anyway (pp. 692-3). At this point, Spinoza introduces religious cults as oppositions to State's power since the followers of such groups are so insane that neither threats nor rewards can persuade them to carry out the orders of the state. Therefore, this tension between the state and some religious cults can also be regarded as

the contrast between reason and appetites. Depending on this analysis, Spinoza (2002) argues that it is the state's right to coerce those who are fully in control of their own right but not that of the state (p. 693).

Spinoza (2002) admits that people are required to worship God; nevertheless, as his views on the sovereignty of the state does not enable him to let religious sects—which prescribe their followers to obey laws other than those of the state—maintain within civil society, he is faced with the following objection: “Does the state give away with religion?” (p. 693). His reply to this question constitutes the core of Spinoza's peculiar understating of religion which can be criticized as a this-worldly reduction of religion.

Spinoza (2002)'s peculiar account of religion has to do with first, “true knowledge and love of God” and second, “charity towards one's neighbor” (p. 693). He regards the two actions of charity—safeguarding peace and promoting harmony—as the highest forms of religious charity and argues that these actions follow from natural reason. In other words, it is not external coercion, that is anyone else's jurisdiction, but one's own reason which directs them to charity actions. Since the Commonwealth's laws are also consistent with the ideals of promoting peace and harmony within civil order, there is no sufficient reason to think that being subjected to the laws of the state would cause a divergence and disaffection from religion. Obviously, at this point, Spinoza repeats his underlying claim that State's path is the path of reason.

When it comes to the other dimension of religion, that is, propagation, he thinks, since no one but only prophets are capable of performing divine actions such as creating miracles or casting out unclean spirits; and since there are no living prophets; the duty of propagating religion should be left to God or the Sovereign. Religious groups other than those which are directed by the state are not so important for Spinoza; and even if their actions are precluded by the state, it does not mean that the state gives away with religion (Spinoza, 2002, p. 693). Furthermore, it should be noted that Spinoza is not against religious practices on the individual level—such as praying by oneself—, but he is only precautionary about regarding religion as an alternative source of legitimacy for proclaiming sovereignty based on religion as it would harm sovereignty of the state and unity of the body politic.

In Spinoza's line of thinking, even if an individual's ideas conflict with the mainstream religious views, their freedom to philosophize on issues with a religious context is always of higher importance than their freedom of belief and worship. After all, if a state does not take the freedom of philosophizing seriously as one of its main concerns, in this state—which is not an ideal state—there will not be any freedom of conscience anyway. Of course, many points of objection remain even after his peculiar account of religion. First of all, not everyone would be so willing to accept such a this-worldly account of religion which is only concerned with the peace and harmony in *this* world and not interested in an afterlife at all. Secondly, historical States cannot prove themselves to be promoters of peace, and a state's rationale might not be consistent with that of another. Yet, if we take Spinoza as a fundamentalist who argues that there is no diversity in truth and reason, he would easily reply to such critiques by stating that he is talking about *the* State and *the* Truth. Thus, if a State's will have nothing to do with promoting peace and harmony, it is because that state is not following the path of universal/natural reason. Hence, an ideal state would be so religious that it would not need the existence of religion as a secondary reference for making out means for maintaining peace.

Following the steps that Spinoza has built, one can see the two reasons why subjects should be prevented from disobeying the rights of the State. First, if people were given the right to live as they please; i.e., to live by their own right, this would cause a division in the authority of the State; and thus, the sovereignty of Commonwealth would be broken. Second, the State always wills what is good and what is reasonable, the common good, for the people, and it is the will of all. However, religious cults are against natural reason and they cause a deviation from obedience to the laws and ordinances of the commonwealth. In other words, religious cults are against the authority of the state. Therefore, unlike in the case of religious wills, individual wills should always be harmonious with the will of the State.

4. Marx's Considerations on Religion

On the Jewish Question is considered as one of Karl Marx's early texts in which he uses the well-known dialectic method; i.e., historical materialism, to criticize Bruno Bauer's argument regarding German Jews' desire for emancipation—which is presented in Bauer's own essay *The Jewish Question* [Braunschweig, 1843]. Marx begins with restating Bauer (1843)'s resolution of the Jewish issue and indicates that there is a fatal misconception of 'freedom' in his argumentation. Afterwards, Marx introduces his own view of freedom; i.e., 'human freedom', as distinct from mere 'political liberation'. While Bauer sees religion as an obstacle to the political emancipation of the people and the state, Marx thinks the other way; i.e., political emancipation is not a complete human emancipation. Marx (1978) claims that Bauer follows the Neo-Hegelian tradition which holds the view that religion and secular state are opposing forces or identities in the human history which are doomed to be resolved throughout the journey of the Human Mind—*dialectics* (p. 28). Nevertheless, Bauer is mistaken because he cannot go deeply into the roots of religion and the capitalistic state.

According to Bauer, Jews are selfish if they desire emancipation for themselves because, he says, in Germany nobody is free. Unless Jews demand emancipation of the state from religion completely; i.e., political emancipation, and no longer want to be Judaists, and Germans to be Christians, nobody will be free (Bauer, 1843, as cited in Marx, 1978, p. 27). If the Jews want the same "privileges" that the Germans have in the Christian State, they are self-contradictory, since what makes the Germans in the Christian State privileged is the fact that they are "Christians" (p. 27). Therefore, he argues, the Jews should desire the emancipation of whole humanity from religion. Furthermore, Bauer thinks, even if the Christians were to leave their religion it would be much more difficult for the Jews to be freed due to the particularistic character of their religion; according to which they claim their own allegedly-superior morality which does not lean on universal principles concerning whole humanity (Marx, 1978, p. 29).

Marx, however, believes that Bauer does not go far enough; because Marx defends the view that political liberation is not the same thing as human liberation. According to Marx, the type of freedom at stake under the assurance of Human Rights is only political freedom. Theocratic state—as in the case of German state—is a theological institution, whereas the constitutional state is political. Nevertheless, neither of the two can provide human emancipation. Here Marx puts his finger on a key problem of modern constitutional state: that there is a huge gap between civil society and the political state; the organic link between the two is missing.

Indeed, civil citizens' religious troubles come from worldly matters. In a state which is not established upon the problem of human emancipation, the antinomy of political liberation and religious freedom occurs. Liberation of the state from religion does not mean liberation of real human from religion. Marx denies the significance of a distinction between human rights and civil rights. The Declaration of Human Rights existing in France and North America is actually the declaration of political citizen rights and it just brings political liberation, which is limited to the political framework of the present state. Marx points out that what is meant by 'human' in this context is an abstract human being considered in isolation from his economic and social reality. Concepts of the present Human Rights Covenants is nothing but a defender of bourgeois interests and guardian of capitalism (especially private property rights). Therefore, they are not the rights of humans but that of civil bourgeois. In this context, equality means that everyone has equal right to gain as much private property as they like in return for their labor. Freedom means that everyone's freedom is limited to that of the others' (liberalism), and security is the security of properties where property means that the citizens have right to accumulate and own private property. All these rights are, indeed, in favor of Capitalism. Therefore, the social emancipation of the individual is the emancipation of humanity from Capitalism, and not from religion as a system of theological doctrines.

At this point, if we turn back to Spinoza's account of religion, it can be seen that it is similar to that of Bruno Bauer only to the extent that both thinkers desire a secular state which bestows no favors on any religious groups within society. Nevertheless, Spinoza has his own account of a state religion, and he goes further by equating the ultimate aim of the existence of the state with that of religion. On the other hand, Marx's and Spinoza's views are much closer since they both observe the necessity of

the existence of religion as an earthly need, that is, in Spinoza to promote harmony and peace, and in Marx the sense of community and belonging. Nevertheless, they still have quite different viewpoints as, unlike Marx, Spinoza is rather strict about the abolition of religious cults and institutions. As to Jonathan Israel's allegedly atheistic and Marxist interpretation of Spinoza, it does not follow since neither of these philosophers is an advocate of atheism. What is more, Marx's analysis of the capitalistic/egoistic society sheds light into the problem of human emancipation with a very different perspective, whereas Spinoza's main concern is freedom of thought and expression as Jonathan Israel correctly emphasized.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

Baruch de Spinoza is one of the major philosophers when the tension between democracy and religion is at stake. Though he is famous for his masterwork *Ethica*, the impact of his ethics, on his political philosophy is also fascinating. Therefore, it really worth focusing on his notion of the 'state religion' introduced both in *Theological-Political Treatise* and *Political Treatise*.

Briefly, state religion is a universal secular religion based on natural laws that are in accordance with the eternal decree of God which is unknown to human beings. The central tenets of the state religion are maintaining harmony within society, promoting peace and charity towards one's neighbor. Another important aspect of the state religion is that religious laws or rituals are not determined by the clergy or religious people, but by officers; i.e., the senators or directly by the Sovereign. Furthermore, the existence of secular state prohibits other religious cults' activities towards institutionalization and propagation. Depending on these provisions on religion in the ideal state, many scholars interpreted Spinoza as an atheist or enemy of religion. Some others tried to make Marxist interpretations of his philosophy. Among these commentators, the most well-known must be Jonathan Israel.

in his text *Radical Enlightenment*, Israel introduces Spinoza as the pioneer of the French philosophes and English deists, and he always puts the ideas of Spinoza in the same line with the manifestly deist advocates of enlightenment. For the same reason, he is accused of making an atheistic and Marxist interpretation of Spinoza. However, Israel's objective is to underline Spinoza's main concern with regards the notion of tolerance—the view that ideal State should be the one in which everyone can freely think and express their ideas, even if these ideas are opposed to the theological doctrines of religious cults and the Churches. Depending on Israel's categorization of enlightenment thinkers, it can be said that Spinoza is narrated as a radical enlightenment philosopher who stands up for the conception of an anti-theological, philosophical tolerance with a view to secure intellectual freedom in a civil order.

Since it is also an issue of debate whether there is a resemblance between Marx's critique of religion and that of Spinoza, it was inevitable to touch upon Marx's text "On the Jewish Question" as it is another masterpiece at the heart of the debate on religious tolerance, and a brief investigation of this text provided us with an understanding of Marx's point of view on the issue.

According to Marx, the crucial function of religion in capitalistic states is that it creates a sense of community within society. Hence, Bruno Bauer is severely mistaken and unfair to demand the abolition of religion completely. Even if a secular state is at stake, unless the core of religion and that of the state are cross-examined, it is not possible to discover the conditions of complete human freedom. Therefore, political emancipation of the state from religion and individual people from being religious is not a solution to the problem of freedom. Human freedom is to be found in the actualization of human-being as a species being in the societal life.

in the light of these remarks, it can be understood that Spinoza is neither an atheist nor one hundred percent compatible with a Marxist interpretation. What is peculiar to Spinoza is his own view of a this-worldly religion that is liberated from institutions, cults, and the clergy, and put back into the heart of the individual.

5. References

- Israel, J. (2001). *Radical Enlightenment Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Marx, K. (1978). "On the Jewish Question". in R. Tucker (Ed. and Trans.), *The Marx-Engels Reader* (pp. 26-46). New York: Norton & Company. (Original work published 1844).
- Spinoza, B. (2002). *Political Treatise*. in M. L. Morgan (Ed.). *Spinoza Complete Works (676-754)*. (S. Shirley, Trans.). Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. (Original work published 1676).
- Spinoza, B. (2007) *Theological-Political Treatise*. J. Israel (Ed.). (M. Silverthorne & J. Israel, Trans.). New York: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1670).