

## The Residue of Anthropocentrism in Heidegger's Question after Technic

### *Heidegger'in Tekniğe İlişkin Sorgulamasındaki İnsan-merkezcilik Kalıntısı*

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Received: 08.07.2018 | Accepted: 16.09.2018

**Abstract:** In his text, *The Question Concerning Technology*, Heidegger argues that modern mind is unaware of Being's self-destining which determines Dasein's relation to their own essence and that of other beings because it is in a delusion of being an 'efficient cause'. A bluntness of this kind not only endangers human-freedom but also puts natural entities at the risk of losing their authenticity since the modern mode of production regards nature as a reserve that is constantly in the service of human-doings. Accordingly, the discussion carried out in this article is, despite his criticism of the conception of 'agency' underlying western metaphysics, whether or not Heidegger overcomes the problem of anthropocentrism in his own philosophy.

**Keywords:** Heidegger, anthropocentrism, nature, Dasein, technology, technic, art.

© Akkin, İ. O. (2018). The Residue of Anthropocentrism in Heidegger's Question after Technic. *Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy*, 8 (2), 427-440.



## Introduction

Heidegger (1962)'s text "*die Frage nach der Technik*" is built upon a series of phenomenological questions unfolding, gradually, through a meditation on technology and the relation that human being, *Dasein*, has to it. Right at the beginning of his article, Heidegger asserts that his intention is to seek for a *way* through which a *free* relationship between human being and technology can be established. Therefore, although the question concerns technology, it is deeply a question about Being (Heidegger, 1993: 328). Human being is not only one side of the coin in Heidegger's investigation, but also the primary correspondent of the danger and *the saving power* he sees in the essence of technology which comes out of Being itself.

Heidegger argues that Being does not send the same destiny, *Geschick*, for itself throughout the history. At one stage, specifically, in Antiquity, it destined itself as *eidōs*, 'the being of being', and, in other epochs, the names of the destiny were *reason*, *spirit*, *will to will* etc. In the pre-Socratic period, it was *poiesis* and, at present, the last name Being sends is for its destiny is "*Gestell*" (Brogan, 2007: 49). Therefore, Heidegger takes the position that the essence of modern technology, *Gestell*, is not a human doing; on the contrary, it is the way in which Being gives itself, that is, by concealing itself in and as the complete unconcealed-ness of beings. Nevertheless, Being happens between beings, entities, and *Dasein*; i.e., there is a reciprocal relation between them. In this respect, although Heidegger does not admit that humans are autochthonous beings, there is still a residue of anthropocentrism in his philosophy according to which it is meaningless to think of the *aletheic* movement of *physis* without *Dasein*.

The way Heidegger transforms Greek terms and constructs new concepts can be regarded as a remedy of the human-centred attitude too since these terms are given an anthropomorphic character so that *Dasein* attains the momentous role of being the correspondent of beings. Ironically, when Heidegger is most cautious about not to think of natural events as human-doings, his terms become the most anthropomorphized. For instance, he thinks that the originary parting of being into different "regional ontologies" as *physis*, that is, into 'the natural' and 'the artificial',



is not a human-doing but it “belongs to *physis*” (Brogan, 2007: 44). Nonetheless, he describes this event as a “de-cision,” “*Ent-scheidung*”, according to which *physis* is regarded as generating the *physei-ousia*, growing things, on the one hand, and *byle*, matter and *morphe*, form, on the other (44). The role of *Dasein* is, thusly, placed within the ‘decision’ of *physis* while it seems as if there is no praise to the fact that humans happen to exist. Seemingly, this reversed anthropocentrism; i.e., taking it as if ‘it is nature who offers itself to human beings’, lessens the impact of *Dasein*, and it becomes as if nature approves its own destruction. Furthermore, Heidegger expressly states that his real concern is not the destruction that nature is exposed to—e.g., the genetically modified foods, hydroelectric stations, cloned DNAs, nuclear energy and lab animals are not his problems. For him, it is *the way of thinking* and the danger concealed in the way Being essences itself: *Gestell* is the danger which, above all, endangers the essence of *Dasein*. This is a proof of the unaimed humanism in Heidegger’s philosophy, and in order to present a well-developed argument to support this claim, the phenomenological order Heidegger establishes in “the Question Concerning Technology” needs to be followed. Accordingly, it is initial to concentrate on Heidegger’s phenomenological method and, secondly, the contrast he sees between ancient and modern modes of producing—*poiesis* vs. *Gestell*—must be examined and, finally, the belief in the danger and the saving power can be interpreted as the safe shore of humanism remaining in Heidegger’s question after technology.

### Heidegger’s Way

According to Heidegger (1993), when we judge technology by its usefulness/harmfulness—with no reference to its essence—what we have in mind is, indeed, ‘technological devices’, and this is an example of the instrumentalist mode of explanation through which we are set aside from the actual thing in question. This is because the doxic layers which cover the essence of technology cannot be cleaned up by the instrumentalist or anthropocentric conceptions (312). With the definition of a ‘doxic conception’, Heidegger already introduces the type of *humanism* he is opposed to, that is, “man is the measure of everything”, and we are thusly precluded from judging him as a humanist. Nonetheless, as it will be dis-



cussed further, he is still an ‘anthropocentric’ philosopher in at least one sense of the term.

For Heidegger (1993), the logic of the excluded middle, the either/or thinking, is a typical example of the *doxic* conception (311). Regarding technology, the alternative he proposes against the excluded middle is neither simply pointing out technology’s goodness/badness nor rejecting that it is either good or bad, the neutral stance, or taking no notice of it (312). Hence, in questioning technology, his task is to show this phenomenon from within—to show itself as it is in its essence. To illuminate the distinction between essences and instances, we might consider the example of a tree. The ‘tree’, as a concept, is different from particular trees out there: “If we want to know the ‘tree’ as such, [its essence, the tree-ness itself,] we wouldn’t look for it among trees . . . [Similarly,] the essence of technology is ‘by no means’ anything technological” (311, 334).

Heidegger (1993)’s aim in making a distinction between technology and its essence is to establish an open, free, relationship between *Dasein* and technology as well as deconstructing the “history” of productionist metaphysics and preparing a “way” for the arrival of a new epoch in the history of Being (329; Zimmerman, 1990: 222). However, it should be underlined that he does not deconstruct metaphysics *itself* or inscribe a new *metaphysical system*. In the age of modern technology, history of Being has the name *Ge-stell*, according to which the productionist understanding is widely-imposed. Therefore, Heidegger believed that “in meditating on the nature of *Gestell*” he could gain an “insight into the new beginning”; i.e., *sense* the *saving power* in technology.

Having stated that the ‘essence’ of technology is different from the technological devices, Heidegger tries to put forth his second thesis that this essence has not been the same for all the time. With the Socratic intervention, there has been a crucial break with the cosmologists (Parmenides, Thales, Heraclitus...). As Cicero (1886) puts it, it was Socrates who “first called philosophy down from heaven, and [...] forced it to make inquiry into life and morals [...]” (257). Put differently, with the Socratic intervention, the focus of philosophy has changed as it has become a matter of the city instead of being concerned with the cosmos. Therefore, Heidegger advocates the view that the essence of modern technolo-



gy was already prepared with the Socratic shift of perspective, which will be explained in the following section.

### Ancient Conception of Technology

According to the modern understanding, "Truth" is an achievement of humans whereas for Parmenides it was a Goddess that of which we do not have control (Zimmerman, 1990: 175). In most of his works, Heidegger empathises with the pre-Socratic theory of truth and states that Truth is disclosed to human beings; i.e., we are receivers, not agents of truth. *Dasein* is the open site where the disclosure of being happens. However, in western metaphysics, starting from the Socratic shift, humans have been regarded as the one in control. The notion of mastery and control also shows itself in the modern conception of 'causality' which did not exist in the pre-Socratic period.

To understand the essence of ancient technology, Heidegger (1993) focusses on particular things like the *chalice* example (315). The Romans adopted the paradigm of "four-causes" which is rather close to the modern conception of causality. According to this view, making of a *chalice* consists of four stages in each a certain type of *causa* is dominant. The *materia* is the *causa materialis* and it is the first underlying cause. The second is *causa formalis*, and the third is *causa finalis*, the end in view. The last one is *causa efficiens*, the person who makes the chalice; i.e., who is efficient in the completion of the making of the chalice (313-314). Modern understanding of causality consists of four phases as well: matter, form, end/purpose and the efficient cause—the silversmith, agent, who *makes* the chalice. It should be noted that, both in Roman and modern versions of it, the silversmith is considered as the most active and dominant cause whereas matter is regarded as passive raw material, standing reserve, on which the form is imposed. On the contrary, Ancient Greeks considered each of the four *aitiai* (namely, *hyle*, *eidōs*, *telos* and *technitēs*) as equally 'co-responsible' for the producing of the chalice. Therefore, the chalice is obliged, "indebted", to the *aitiai* (Heidegger, 1993: 314). To clarify, Greeks regarded *hyle* and other parts of the *aitiai* as co-operating in order to produce the chalice, which was a guided, not arbitrary, cooperation. It is as if *hyle* itself suggests an *eidōs*, a *telos* and a *technitēs* to produce the chalice.



The silver does not impose it, but only *suggests* it. “This is like making little statues out of some clay; i.e., that lamp of clay is sort of pregnant to the other three *aitiai*” (315; Brogan, 2007: 51).

In the Greek case, the artisan is not a *technities* without the suggestions of the *hyle*. Hence, the chalice is not exclusively indebted to one but to all four *aitiai*. “An *aition* is something that lets something come into its own” (Heidegger, 1993: 315). According to ‘the modern cause’; however, someone brings something, which was previously non-existent, into existence through an act of ‘wilful force’, and this wilful force is *an active subject*, whereas the *aitiai* are passive, indebted. In the producing of the chalice, the co-responsible fourth thing is the Silversmith but not in the manner of *causa efficiens* (Heidegger, 1993: 315). What the Silversmith does is only a “careful consideration and gathering together”, *legein*, of the other three *aitiai* (315).

It is crucial to understand Heidegger’s interpretation of the Greek way of producing in terms of *aletheia*; i.e., as a movement from unconcealment to concealment. While producing in the sense of self-showing, the *aitiai* play together in two different ways one of which is φύσις, *physis*, and the other is τέχνη, *techne*. Whereas in *techne* self-showing happens through the intervention of another, the *technities*, in *physis* it is like a self-happening, an eruption, like bursting out of a blossom (Heidegger, 1993: 317). The *technities* ‘occasions’, releases, the thing to begin self-showing. In *techne*, it is a prerequisite that the thing is lying before and lying ready, “*Vorliegen und Bereitliegen*”, for the movement from concealment to unconcealment to happen (316; Heidegger, 1962: 10). The *aletheic* movement, qualitative change, can happen only under appropriate conditions, that is to say, when the right conditions come together the thing can be ‘let come to its own’. Both *techne* and *physis* are modes of bringing forth, *poiesis*. *Techne* is an active letting, “*Ver-an-lassen*”, but the un-concealing itself is not a human doing in the modern sense (10). Humans can only feel “responsible” for revealing, “*Entbergen*”, the process of unconcealment since the thing itself has to be *in this process* beforehand (11; 1993: 318).

Heidegger (1962) suggests that *physis* has an intrinsic tendency towards self-actualization; therefore, being can break open or erupt, “*aufbruch*”, through *physis* (11). *Physis* (eruption in itself) is *poiesis* in the highest



sense because it is a self-happening through which the thing is smoothly actualized. Therefore, things in accordance with *physis* are ontologically self-sufficient, but things that are produced by *techne* are deficient in that they need the human element, the *technities*. In this respect, artefacts are beings by *techne* and growing things are beings by *physis* (1998: 192).

In the case of *poiesis* through *techne*, the human response to the *aletheic* movement is *Entbergen*, revealing. The doing of the *technities* is a proper activity of *legein*, seeing beforehand. It is, in a certain sense, close to *theoria*, carefully considering or *episteme*. The *technities* finds a proper way of gathering together the *aitiai*. With this activity, something that would not occur otherwise is uncovered through revealing. This is not creation *ex nihilo*, but, like discovering something which is already there; i.e., responsiveness to the potential through each of the *aitiai*. In this context, the movement of Being is prior to the human response and; thus, it is ontologically primordial. Nevertheless, neither *legein* nor the function of *techne*, *episteme* or *logos* should be regarded in the sense of a dominant, active, making. In the Greek model, we are expected to understand *hyle* and *morphe* as active participants of the poetic mode of producing. When Being essences itself like this, human beings are not the masters but only correspondents of *physis*. Though, it should be noted that Heidegger does not concentrate much on the self-disclosure of *physis* as *physei-ousia* (growing things) but more on the artificial aspect of self-disclosure. This is because the artificial is the only area where human being can establish a relation with Being and; thus, find an opportunity of self-actualization—essence(ing) oneself as a free being whose being is there among other beings. Therefore, it can be said that even in his reading of the Ancient Greek mode of producing or technology, Heidegger's real concern is neither technology nor *physis* or nature, but the way human being could establish a freer relation with Being in the mode of *poiesis*. For the same reason, Heidegger's contrastive investigation of *poiesis* and *Gestell*, mostly, matters to *Dasein*.

### Modern Conception of Technology

In his reading of the Greek conceptions of *physis* and *techne*, Heidegger claims that these notions were mirror images, and the Greek-



*poiesis* was a more originary mode of producing than modern technology.

As Zimmerman (1990) explains, the pre-Socratics were aware of the ontological difference between Being and entities because “they experienced the being of entities as presencing, as rising into appearance, as unconcealment” (223). Therefore, Heidegger interprets Parmenides’ phrase, “being and thinking are the same”, to mean that “there is an internal relationship between the temporal transcendence of human existence” and “the presencing of entities” (223-224). However, starting from Plato’s conception of *eidos*, there has been an “obscuration” in the relation between Being and beings: Plato’s *ideas* resulted in the reduction of Being itself to the status of a superior kind of entity (224). In the 19<sup>th</sup> century; however, while for something “to be” meant extensionality, matter, energy, sensibleness and calculability, “Being” itself came to mean nothing apart from entities (Heidegger, 1996: 83-94). Cartesian construction of being (substance ontology) contemplates “nature” simply as calculable *materia* (Ruin, 2010: 185-186). Substantialist metaphysics understands being in terms of presence-at-hand, *Vorhandenheit*. On the contrary, for the Greeks, the mode of being for things, *pragmata*, with which we are concerned in *praxis* is *Zuhandenheit*, readiness-to-hand. *Pragmata* is not meaningless spatial extension, but always contextually meaningful things embedded in a whole surrounding world of concerns. Therefore, *pragmata* are not “objectified” but they live within a pre-reflective referential context. In this sense, Heidegger’s analysis of the “world” departs from *pragmata*. The primary phenomenon of world, “lived world”, is a meaning-context into which we are always already thrown, whereas the other is an objectified world of calculable entities as presented in natural science (Ruin, 2010: 186).

In the transition from the pre-Socratic *pragmata* to the Platonic and modern conceptions of *Vorhandenheit*, the “original forgetfulness” occurred (Ruin, 2010: 186). It is forgotten that there is a mutual belonging between Being and human beings and Being is approached in a manner of *Bestand*.

*Bestand* and *Gegenstand* are defined in contrast. Whatever is in the manner of *Gegenstand* is standing opposite or against. *Gegenstand* is authentic in the sense that its relation to something outside is not ruined



but, at the same time, it can stand on its own. It has a relative autonomy, stability and permanence. On the contrary, *Bestand* has been forced to show itself in a way that abolishes its independent aspect, eradicate its autonomous aspect. Therefore, it is completely disposable. *Bestand* is completely without reserve and subordinated to human demands.

In the technological era, to be means to be an object in nature and nature reveals itself mainly as commodity. In other words, according to modern technology, the mode of being for everything is *Bestand*, standing reserve. Therefore, the essence of modern technology, *Gestell*, is “the challenging claim that gathers human beings with a view to ordering [*bestellen*] the self-revealing [*Gegenstand*] as standing reserve [*Bestand*]” (Heidegger, 1993, as cited in, Ruin, 2010: 183).

In *Gestell*, entities are pushed beyond their own intrinsic limits. Regarding the notion of intrinsic possibilities of living things, examples of laboratory animals and human foetuses can be considered since these are mistreated or disclosed inappropriately by the technological *understanding*. In this sense, Heidegger sees the technological world as an un-world as this *way* of *disclosing* things lacks the insight into the intrinsic possibilities or limits of things which makes the world a genuine historical world (Zimmerman, 1990: 227).

Heidegger criticizes the 20<sup>th</sup> century claims that “absolute truth is attainable” through reason and “science is the only valid methodology for attaining that truth” for the *hubris* underlying these generalizations. They miss the point that “the hidden law of the earth” is an impenetrable *mystery* (Zimmerman, 1990: 227). According to his view, “science was genuine only if it succeeded in taking the measure *from* things, instead of imposing a measure *upon* them” and the “finitude of human existence” should refrain us from efforts to gain an “absolute” or total understanding of things (228).

Nevertheless, in Heidegger's philosophy, Being as “presencing through/in another” prevails over “self-emergence of entities in themselves” because Being of entities in the sense of artefacts is a phenomenal event dependent upon the existence of humans (Zimmerman, 1990: 225). This is because self-manifesting “requires a *clearing* or an absencing ... constituted by” *Dasein* (225). Heidegger “defines the openness of *Dasein* as



being ‘appropriated’ (*ereignet*) as the site through which presencing occurs” (226). In other words, it is not the case that the being of an entity is really nothing more than its appearing; entities “give themselves” to us; they are *discovered*, not “projected” or “invented” by us (226). In this reading, humans are given quite an important role in their interrelation to Being. Heidegger never emphasizes this role from the perspective of modern subjectivity or Platonic anthropocentrism but, still, he describes Being in a way that encapsulates human being as an indispensable actor of the self-disclosing event of Being. Therefore, it is evident that Heidegger’s philosophy can be regarded as a peculiar kind of humanism.

### The Danger

By shedding light on the notions of ‘destiny’, ‘history’, ‘freedom’ and ‘danger’, we might gain an insight into Heidegger’s view of humanism and make it clearer how he relates the essence of modern technology to the essence of human being, that is, *freedom* in a certain sense.

First of all, Heidegger indicates that, in modern technological era, the way everything is revealed as standing reserve is neither completely a human doing nor totally isolated from the human realm (Heidegger, 1993: 329): There is an interplay of Being and *Dasein*: The essence of human being—freedom to place itself in relation to the self-showing of Being; and thus, being the site through which Being can come to its own; i.e., giving an ear or showing a response to the *aletheic* movement of *physis*—is quite a necessary element for Being to show itself, for the completeness of the *physis*. In *Gestell*; however, humans regard themselves as masters, while everything else become objects of their making. Nevertheless, there is a point where humans cannot be differentiated from other beings or secure their essence as a free being because, in *Gestell*, human being is also regarded as standing-reserve. The concept of “human-resources” is a typical example of this situation (Heidegger, 1993: 323). Furthermore, in modern technology, the Greek conception of matter, that is, lying ready and lying before, turns out to be “presence at hand” and, thusly, becomes an invitation to the brutal abuse of nature. In this conception, “Nature” becomes a calculable phenomenon (i.e., growing things and other beings turn into raw material and/or objects of scientific research) and nothing can remain *authentic*.



In light of the modern technological mode of production, both the authenticity of *Dasein* and that of producing is endangered because we experience ourselves properly as property of this outlook while, at the same time, we are deceived by subjectivism according to which we are the doers, masters, of all that is happening (Heidegger, 1993: 329).

In reality, *Gestell* is a sending of Being; itself. With regards 'destining', history means the history of Being and *Gestell* is only the current name for the destining in the overall history of Being (1993: 329).

At this point, we begin to see that Heidegger's notion of freedom is opposed to the subjectivist understanding of freedom—'free will'. Whereas the theory of agency defines human freedom as the complete independence or indeterminacy of human beings in their decisive activity and; thus, in their *will*, Heidegger sees freedom both in the capability that human beings *realize* their "attachment" to Being—in the sense that *Dasein* becomes the open site, the clearing, wherein Being shows itself—and in that, only freedom "starts a revealing on its way," *a free revealing* (Heidegger, 1993: 330). Therefore, we are but slaves of Being unless we can establish a free relationship with it. Once more, in these sentences it is apparent that Heidegger's main concern is the essence of human being, human freedom and; hence, he constructs a peculiar sense of humanism. This version of humanism is far fairer to Being and entities but still it involves a certain amount of anthropocentrism.

Another important term is '*the mystery*', but it should be understood together with 'freedom' and 'the danger': "...that which frees—the mystery—is concealed and always concealing itself. All revealing comes out of the free [*Dasein*,] goes into the free, and brings into the free" (Heidegger, 1993: 330). The danger lies in humans' misunderstanding their position in the interplay of the concealment-unconcealment of Being; i.e., not seeing what they are already experiencing—the destining of revealing—because even in the event of unconcealment human beings are *deceived* in that they cannot see the authority of Being. Humans can remain free only through willingly accepting a partnership with Being; i.e., by being neither a slave of the destining nor pretending to be the Lord of it (Heidegger, 1993: 329-332). Therefore, what is primarily endangered by *Gestell*, the ordering of everything (including human beings) as *Bestand*, is



the “*ek-sistence*” of human being; i.e., the possibility that they essence themselves as *Dasein* (332). In the mode of enframing (*Gestell*), our possibility to see the danger as a danger is “blocked” (333; Heidegger, 1962: 27).

### Conclusion: The Saving Power

Although it is not a subjectivism in the Kantian sense, Heidegger (1993)’s humanistic consideration is evident throughout his questioning of technology. It is true that he underlines the priority and authority of Being and argues that the danger is also a threat to Being itself because in the absence of a free being, Being can no more come shining-forth, and Truth cannot happen (333). In other words, *Dasein* provides the clearing for the completion of the *aletheic* movement, but the movement itself is prior to the human response to it. However, the endurance of human essence as a free being is, in some sense, dependent upon the continuity of the relation between human being and Being. I think, anthropocentrism reigns in the circularity of the argument from *aletheia* because we can still go one step further and ask why it would be a matter for Being to disclose itself in the clearing provided by *Dasein*. To ask differently, why are we supposed to accept Heidegger’s ontological claim that it is *physis* itself who *decided* to divide itself into two different regional ontologies; i.e., ‘the natural’ and ‘the artificial’?

When it comes to ‘the saving power’, Heidegger (1993) defines the phrase “to save” something, as bringing it back into its essence, into its proper appearing (333). Therefore, in questioning technology; i.e., realizing that the essence of modern technology is revealing everything as standing reserve—especially by looking carefully into the danger in it—we can see the saving power of which root is the danger itself (334). Nevertheless, it is not easy to see this fact, suddenly, in a glimpse. Only through careful consideration and thinking with a view to stand open to Truth, and by meditating on the essence of modern technology we can see the saving power growing in the danger. “... [Human being] may be the one who is needed and used for the safekeeping of the essence of truth. Thus, the rising of the saving power appears” (338). Therefore, only when we start regarding *Gestell* as a danger we may see the growth of the saving power in it.



Furthermore, Heidegger states that our reflection upon technology must happen in a realm which is quite different from *Gestell*, that is, Art, as long as its eyes are open to the constellation of truth (Heidegger, 1993: 340).

There was a time when it was not technology alone that bore the name *techne*. Once revealing that brings forth truth into the splendour of radiant appearance was also called *techne*...the *poiesis* of the fine arts was also called *techne* (Heidegger, 1993: 339).

In the age of pre-Socratic philosophy, Art was not an activity of a privileged sect, and it was simply named as *techne* because it belonged within *poiesis*; i.e., bringing forth and making present (Heidegger, 1993: 339). At that time, art was concerned with safekeeping of truth in the sense of *aletheia* and devoted itself to the *aletheic* movement, *poiesis* (339).

I think, Heidegger's interpretation of the Ancient Greek conception of Being is constructed in a way to centralize the notions of *techne* and art. All in all, *techne* belongs to the human realm and art, the highest form of *techne*, is constitutive of the human world. Nevertheless, in a world where it is so apparent that the destruction of nature is at its peak, dwelling so much and mainly on the possibility of authentic art; i.e., seeking for a salvation in this deed, is a hidden eulogy of the productive aspect of human being.

In this sense, I have regarded Heidegger's philosophy or, at least, this major work, as a questioning *about* technology *concerning* human being. A residue of anthropocentrism and a certain type of humanism have been discovered in Heidegger's thinking of Being. This is called a 'discovery' because it is Heidegger's own thinking which regards humans as an inseparable correlate of Being which is already lying before and lying ready for *Dasein*'s response. With this regard, the overriding reason for claiming that there is a residue in Heidegger's philosophy is that, while rejecting a Platonic anthropocentrism or an enlightenment-humanism, he follows his own sense of humanism, and regards the deterioration of the essence of *Dasein* as the worst thing that can happen to *Being*. This is an *ipso facto* prioritization of human being whose essence must remain free *vis-à-vis* other beings.



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**Öz:** Heidegger, *Tekniğe İlişkin Sorgulama* metninde, Dasein'ın insan özülü ve diğer varlıkların özleriyle ilişkisini belirleyen şeyin aslında Varlığın kendi kendine biçtiği kader olduğunu, ancak fail neden olma yanılgısı içindeki modern zihnin bu durumdan haberdar olmadığını iddia eder. Böylesi bir körlük, yalnızca insanın özsel özgürlüğünü tehdit etmekle kalmayıp, doğal varlıkları da otantikliklerini yitirme riskiyle karşı karşıya getirir; çünkü modern üretim biçimi doğayı insani edimler için her an hizmetimize amade, edilgen bir kaynak biçimde algılar. Batı metafiziğin temelinde yatan bu bakış açısına eleştirel yaklaşmasına karşın, Heidegger'in kendi felsefesinde insan-merkezcilik sorununu aşip aşamadığı ise bu makalede yürütülecek olan tartışmanın konusudur.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Heidegger, insan-merkezcilik, doğa, Dasein, teknoloji, teknik, sanat.

