On the Distinction between Moral Responsibility and Moral Appraisability

Abstract: The issues of moral responsibility and moral appraisability are different issues even though many philosophers fail to distinguish between them. This paper distinguishes between moral responsibility and moral appraisability in the following way: (i) an agent may sometimes be held morally responsible without being morally appraisable for a particular action and (ii) an agent may receive resentment when the agent performs a praiseworthy action; and, an agent may receive gratitude when the agent performs a blameworthy action. In addition, the distinction made in this paper solves an unspoken puzzle existing in various moral scenarios which is named as the Puzzle Concerning the Divergence between Responsibility and Appraisability (PCDRA). By solving this puzzle, moral conflicts that exist in various moral scenarios have been eradicated.

Introduction

Moral responsibility has always been considered a distinguishing mark between humans and non-humans. We, humans, are believed to have freedom and we are responsible for our actions. Being the most significant and essential part of a society, the implications of our actions are pervasive. As an impact of our actions, we receive various reactions, including resentment, love, hate, respect, indignation etc. People impose these reactions on us because they think us responsible for our actions. Apart from these reactions, some actions are tagged as praiseworthy, and some actions are marked as blameworthy. Praise and blame bear larger implications than those of some certain reactions; and, an agent is considered morally appraisable when her action is either praiseworthy or blameworthy. We praise or blame an agent because we believe that she is responsible for her actions. It appears that whenever we are responsible for our actions, we are either praised or blamed. But, can we find any action for what we are responsible but are not worthy to be praised or blamed? Or, can we be considered morally responsible for some of

our actions even though those actions are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy? I believe that moral responsibility is much broader than moral appraisability; and, people can be considered responsible for a morally significant action without being praised or blamed. In this paper, I envision showing that one can be held responsible without being praised or blamed. To do so, I will first provide an in-depth discussion on the concepts of moral responsibility.

The Concept of Moral Responsibility

The issue of moral responsibility has received so much attention that it has been explained by many philosophers. P.F. Strawson, R. Jay Wallace and Mariana Oshana are among the prominent philosophers who have not only emphasized the idea of moral responsibility but have also provided conditions based on what we can hold an agent responsible for her actions. According to P.F. Strawson, moral responsibility can well be understood by observing our social practices. If someone is an appropriate candidate to whom we can show certain reactive attitudes such as resentment, indignation, gratitude, love and respect for doing an action, then we can consider her responsible for that action.[1] Thus, we can say following Strawson's idea that being eligible to have these reactive attitudes is a condition for being responsible. The above described condition of moral responsibility suggested by Strawson can be presented in the following manner:[2]

> **Strawson's Condition of Moral Responsibility:** If *P* is an agent on whom we can apply certain reactive attitudes for *A-ing*, then *P* is morally responsible for *A-ing*.

Here, it can be said that an agent will be held responsible if she is an appropriate candidate to have some sort of reactive attitudes as mentioned earlier. In order to comprehend the idea, it is needed to elaborate the idea of the agent who is an appropriate candidate of receiving reactive attitudes. Such an agent should have: (i) the physical power to do the action; this power can be termed as *active power* and (ii) a sound mind to become an appropriate candidate, *i.e.,* the agent should be free from any type of hypnosis or manipulation. These are some necessary conditions of an agent who is an appropriate candidate for receiving reactive attitudes. And, this ability to become an apt candidate makes her responsible for her actions. Thus, by taking the core idea of Strawson, I can articulate some initial *conditions of moral responsibility* in the following way:

> **Initial Conditions of Moral Responsibility (ICMR):** An agent *P* will be an appropriate candidate for having reactive attitudes (resentment, love,

respect, indignation etc.) and in effect becomes responsible for *A-ing* if *P* has an active power and a sound mind while *A-ing*.

Thus, we can assert that being capable of having reactive attitudes is a sufficient condition for having responsibility. Whenever we find an agent capable of having any of these attitudes for her actions, we regard her responsible.

In order to give Strawson's view a more systematic approach, R. Jay Wallace contends that an agent will be responsible and susceptible to having these attitudes only if it is fair to hold her responsible.[3] In order to ensure fairness while holding an agent responsible, the agent in question should get the chance to explain her reasons for doing the action for what she is being considered responsible. Wallace thinks that an agent with her rational power is able to understand moral reasons; and, she does an action in accordance with her moral reasons. Since the agent in question is aware of her reasons for doing an action, she is able to provide an account for her action. So, we can write Wallace's condition of moral responsibility in the following way:[4]

Wallace's Condition of Moral Responsibility: An agent *P* will be responsible for *A-ing* if *P* can explain her reasons for *A-ing*.

Therefore, we can say that it will be fair to hold an agent responsible if the agent in question is able to explain the reasons for her action. When an agent has such an ability, she becomes susceptible to certain reactive attitudes such as indignation, love, respect, resentment etc. Following Wallace's idea, we can say this:

If it is fair to hold an agent *P* responsible for *A-ing*, then we can show certain reactive attitudes to *P* for *A-ing*.[5]

It appears from the above claim that in order to be a fit candidate for having reactive attitudes it is important that the agent is responsible for her actions. And, responsibility is imposed by ensuring fairness. Fairness is guaranteed by providing an agent a chance to explain her reasons which drives her to do a particular action.

To guarantee the fairness in judgment, another influential philosopher, Mariana Oshana offers an idea which is similar to R. Jay Wallace's. Oshana thinks that an agent is not responsible because we can ascribe reactive attitudes on her; rather, she receives reactive attitudes because she is responsible. Oshana asserts that an agent will be held responsible for an action if she can come

up with an explanation for that action.[6] So, an agent's responsibility is not determined by reactive attitudes; rather, the agent receives those reactive attitudes as she is responsible. In order to explain the idea of responsibility Oshana thinks that an agent will be considered responsible based on two types of conditions: one is *epistemic* and the other is *control*. Epistemic conditions include an agent's awareness concerning the relevant actions. That means that in order to be morally responsible an agent should know the circumstances and conditions while she does the relevant action. At the same time, she should be responsive so that she acts as per the required circumstances. The second requirement is Control which is concerned with an agent's authority over her actions. By satisfying both of these conditions, an agent can be considered responsible for her actions. Oshana maintains that when an agent is responsible, we can apply reactive attitudes which are accompanied by practices such as punishing, rewarding, praising and blaming. Now, Oshana's conditions of moral responsibility can be summarized in the following manner:[7]

> **Oshana's Conditions of Moral Responsibility:** An Agent *P* will be morally responsible for *A-ing* by satisfying (i) epistemic conditions that include the agent's awareness concerning the agent's relevant action and (ii) control condition that concerns the agent's authority over her actions.

Oshana's conditions of moral responsibility show that the agent's knowledge of the circumstances as well as her ability to direct the action in her preferred way is very important for holding her responsible for the germane action. Moreover, for a responsible action an agent receives respect, love or resentment. It is, thus, plausible to assert that the idea of responsibility and the idea of reactive attitudes are very much connected.

Now, in the light of the above discussion concerning Strawson's conditions, Wallace's conditions and Oshana's conditions of moral responsibility, my initial conditions of moral responsibility (ICMR) can be modified. I prefer to call this modified version the *Final Conditions of Moral Responsibility (FCMR)*. My FCMR can be stated in the following way:

> **The Final Conditions of Moral Responsibility (FCMR):** An agent *P* is responsible for *A-ing* if *P* is an appropriate candidate (possessing active power and a sound mind) who receives certain reactive attitudes such as indignation, resentment, love, respect etc. and can give an account of her action while *P* is well aware of the situation in question.

The FCMR contains the necessary and sufficient conditions of moral responsibility. That means that the failure to fulfill those conditions makes the agent 'not responsible for her action' while the fulfillment of them ensures the responsibility of the agent. Here, it is important to note that the FCMR does not contain the issues of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. In other words, moral appraisability seems to be absent in the list of the conditions of moral responsibility. Why is it so? We all know that if an action is morally praiseworthy or blameworthy, then that action is a morally responsible action. Thus, it brings forth a crucial question: is moral appraisability not a necessary condition of moral responsibility? An answer to this question requires an extensive discussion about the concept of moral appraisability.

The Concept of Moral Appraisability

From the previous discussion of the FCMR, it is plausible to assert that by satisfying the conditions of moral responsibility mentioned in the FCMR an agent becomes capable of having certain reactive attitudes. These attitudes bear great significance in the concept of moral responsibility. Besides, the ascription of praise and blame on an agent bears larger implications than those borne by reactive attitudes. According to Ishtiyaque Haji, an agent is morally appraisable for an action if and only if that action is either praiseworthy or blameworthy.[8] For a praiseworthy action an agent is praised whereas the agent is blamed for a blameworthy action. Haji has proposed some conditions which are required to be satisfied by an agent in order to have moral appraisability. The first condition is *control*. To be either praised or blamed, an agent needs to exercise control over her actions. To put the point clearly, an example of Haji will help:

> Imagine, to begin, that unbeknownst to Bond, a minute electronic device has been implanted in his brain. Xenia can use the device to induce desires and intentions in Bond without her electronic manipulations being "felt" or detected by Bond. Suppose Xenia implants in Bond a powerful desire to kill Smernof, a distant associate of Bond, together with the beliefs that the desire is irresistible and that Bond will be fulfilling his moral and professional duty by killing Smernof. Though the electronically induced desire is not in fact irresistible, Bond could resist it only with a great deal of difficulty and only at the expense of suffering considerable psychological damage. Bond, true to what he perceives to be his moral and professional calling, acts on his desire and does away with Smernof.[9]

Even though Bond does the action, he is not to be praised or blamed for that action. The reason is that Xenia, the manipulator, manipulates Bond to do the action by making Bond believe that killing Smernof is a duty for Bond. That is, the relevant action is directed by Xenia. As the relevant action is directed by Xenia, Bond lacks control over his action. As a result of lacking control over the relevant action, Bond's action is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy.

But, having control is not the only condition which is required to be satisfied by the agents to have moral appraisability. Haji thinks that an agent with control over his action may not be an apt target to be praised or blamed if the relevant action is done by ignorance. Haji has proposed an example which depicts that an agent lacks moral appraisability even though he has control in doing his action. His example runs in the following way:

> Suppose, unbeknownst to Sam, Ralph has replaced the sugar in the bowl with a sugar look-alike that is deadly. Sam invites Kate over for some refreshment, and drawing from the bowl, dissolves what he mistakenly takes to be a spoonful of sugar into Kate`s coffee. To his horror, Kate rolls over, stone dead after her first sip…[10]

By this example Haji shows that one cannot be blamed for one's action even though one has control over one's action. In the above stated example, Sam's action is unintentional which is done out of ignorance. Sam has no idea that the sugar in the bowl has been replaced with deadly particles. Thus, it appears from Haji's analysis that to be praised or blamed one requires control as well as awareness concerning the action. This latter condition is known as *epistemic condition*. When an agent satisfies these two conditions, the agent can be praised or blamed for her relevant action, according to Haji. The following picturizes the gist of Haji's conditions of moral appraisability:[11]

> **Haji's Conditions of Moral Appraisability:** An agent *P* is morally appraisable for *A-ing* if *P* possesses control and satisfies epistemic conditions while *A-ing*.

The aforementioned two conditions are individually necessary conditions of moral appraisability. That means that an agent cannot be eligible for having praise or blame when the agent fails to fulfill these conditions. The conditions Haji mentioned, however, are not enough for ensuring an agent's moral appraisability as they can also be a result of *covert manipulation*. In order to overcome the issue of covert manipulation, I take some insights from Susan Wolf's *reason view*.

Susan Wolf thinks that an agent is responsible for her action when she acts in accordance with her reasons. If an agent has the ability to act in accordance with the reasons, the agent is expected to be governed by her good reasons. When one is governed by one's good reasons, one does the right action. The ability to act in accordance with the right reasons can be described as the power to act in accordance with the true and the Good.[12] So, it is reasonable to say that one is praised for acting according to the true and the Good and blamed for failing to act according to the true and the Good. It seems from Wolf's contention that the idea of moral responsibility is closely connected to the idea of moral appraisability. By a close investigation, we can find another condition of moral appraisability from Wolf's idea. That is, Wolf's condition of moral responsibility can also be applied in the case of moral appraisability. In other words, to act in accordance with one's reasons can also be considered a condition of moral appraisability. An agent will be praised or blamed if she acts in accordance with her reasons. Thus, we can anticipate Wolf's condition of moral appraisability in the following way:[13]

> **Wolf's Conditions of Moral Appraisability**: An agent *P* will have moral appraisability for *A-ing* if *P* acts in accordance with his reasons while *A-ing*.

Wolf's condition is a necessary condition of moral appraisability. But the allegation that is faced by Haji's conditions of moral appraisability cannot still be overcome by Wolf's 'reason' view. An agent's reasons to act in accordance with the true and the Good can be manipulated or the agent's action can be a result of brainwashing. There are examples of teenagers joining various religious cults because of brainwashing. Consequently, members of a cult may form an extreme motive which may lead them to commit even mass suicide. Do they deserve blame for their grievous actions? According to Wolf's condition, they deserve blame since they fail to act in accordance with the true and the Good. I, however, think that this decision of blaming the teenagers is a hasty decision; for, it overlooks the matter that those teenagers' actions are the result of brainwashing. In order to make our judgment fair, it is important to include a qualifier to the reason condition. This qualifier is: the reasons of the agents need to be intentional in the sense that no one brainwashes or manipulates the reasons.

Thus, by reconciling the ideas of Haji and Wolf, the conditions of moral appraisability can, now, be reformulated in the following way:

The Conditions of Moral Appraisability (CMA): An agent *P* is morally appraisable for *A-ing* if and only if (i) *P* acts in accordance with his reasons, *i.e.*, *P*'s *A-ing* is intentional (neither blackmailed nor manipulated) (ii) *P* possesses required control and (iii) *P* satisfies epistemic conditions while *A-ing*.

These conditions are individually necessary and altogether sufficient conditions of moral appraisability. That is, lacking either of these conditions deters the agents from being morally appraisable; and, fulfillment of these conditions makes the agents morally appraisable. Now, I will present two cases the first of which will deal with a case where an agent is both morally responsible and morally appraisable for a particular action; and, the other will deal with a case in which the agent is morally responsible but not appraisable for a particular action.

The First Case: We have seen that our tendency to hold an agent morally responsible associates our tendency to express some attitudes with the agent in question. That means that holding an agent responsible largely depends on the condition of that agent's being an appropriate candidate to whom we can show resentment, gratitude, love, respect etc. Also, an agent gets praise or blame for an action for what the agent is morally responsible, *i.e.*, an agent becomes morally appraisable for an action for what the agent is morally responsible. An example can be given to show this tendency of holding an agent morally responsible and morally appraisable for a particular action in the following way:

> Suppose an agent named Annie, who works in a renowned company, is going for a drive to relax after passing a hectic week. She is physically fit and possesses a sound mind. On her way, she passes a pregnant woman who needs immediate help. Annie realizes the emergency and is able to help the woman. But, Annie ignores the woman and continues her drive.

Annie, the agent in question, is an apt candidate of getting reactive attitudes because she has the active power related to this case. That is, she is able to help the woman. She also possesses a sound mind which means she is capable of understanding the relevant situation. Since Annie has the active power and a mind capable of realizing the situation, she is an appropriate candidate of getting reactive attitudes. Annie's fulfillment of the required conditions of moral responsibility stated in the FCMR provides evidence for the phenomenon that Annie is morally

responsible for the relevant action. But, can we consider her morally appraisable for this particular action? In order to answer this question, I will look into my proposed Conditions of Moral Appraisability (CMA). The first condition states that in order to be morally appraisable an agent is required to act in accordance with the intentional reasons which are neither manipulated nor blackmailed. In the aforementioned case of Annie, no one forces or manipulates Annie in her reasoning. Whatever reasoning Annie makes in taking her decision is her own. Her omission from helping the pregnant woman is not influenced by anyone. So, the first condition of CMA is satisfied by Annie. The second condition of CMA concerns required control and epistemic conditions. Since Annie has not faced any obstacles or interruptions from anyone, she can choose either to help or not to help the woman. That is, she has control over her action. Additionally, she realizes the emergency in the given situation. But she overlooks the matter and omits to help the pregnant woman. Thus, Annie has satisfied the second condition of CMA. As Annie satisfies the conditions of moral responsibility (FCMA) as well as the conditions of moral appraisability (CMA), she is morally responsible and morally appraisable for that particular action. The phenomena that Annie is both morally responsible and morally appraisable in the aforementioned case can be proved in argumentative ways:

Argument- 1

1. If Annie is an apt candidate of getting reactive attitudes (C) and Annie can give an account of her action (A) and Annie is well aware of the situation in question(W), then Annie is morally responsible (R). By def. [FCMR]

2. If Annie has active power and a sound mind (M), then Annie is an apt candidate of getting reactive attitude (C).

3. Annie has active power and a sound mind (M).

4. Annie can give an account of her action (A).

5. Annie is well aware of the situation in question (W).

6. Annie is an apt candidate of getting reactive attitudes (C).

7. Annie is an apt candidate of getting reactive attitudes (C) and Annie can give an account of her action (A) and Annie is well aware of the situation in question (W).

8. Annie is morally responsible (R)

Symbolically:

1. $[(C.A).W] \supset R$ By def. [FCMR]
2. $M \supset C$ By def. [FCMR]
3. M Assumption
4. A Assumption
5. W Assumption
6. C [2,3 MP]
7. $[(C.A).W]$ [6, 4, 5 Conj.]
8. R [1,7 MP]   [QED]

By the definition of FCMR, premise 1 is true as Annie is an apt candidate who can give an account of her action and she is well aware of the relevant situation. By the definition of FCMR premise 2 is also true because Annie possesses active power and she is mentally a sound person who can think and act in her preferred way; as a result, Annie becomes an apt candidate of getting reactive attitudes. In the given situation, Annie possesses active power and she has a sound mind. Moreover, Annie is aware of the relevant situation. That means that premises 3, 4 and 5 are true. From premises 2 and 3, premise 6 has been drawn following the logical rule Modus Pones (MP). Following the logical rule Conjunction (Conj.), premise 7 has been drawn from premises 6, 4 and 5. Following the valid logical rule Modus Ponens (MP), conclusion 8 has been deduced from premises 1 and 7. Thus, the argument is a valid argument. As all premises of the valid argument are true, the conclusion must be true. So, it has been proved that Annie becomes morally responsible by satisfying the FCMR.

Argument-2

1. If Annie acts in accordance with her intentional reasons (*I*) and Annie possesses control (*C*) and Annie satisfies epistemic conditions (*E*), then Annie is morally appraisable (*A*). By def. [CMA]
2. Annie acts in accordance with her intentional reasons (*I*).
3. Annie possesses control (*C*).
4. Annie satisfies epistemic conditions (*E*).
5. Annie acts in accordance with her intentional reasons (*I*) and Annie possesses control (*C*) and satisfies epistemic conditions (*E*).
6. Annie is morally appraisable (*A*).

Symbolically:

1. $[(I.C). E] \supset A$ By def. [FCMR]
2. I Assumption
3. C Assumption
4. E Assumption
5. $[(I.C)]. E$ [2, 3, 4 Conj.]
6. A [1,5 MP]   [QED]

The first premise of this argument is true by the definition of CMA as Annie acts in accordance with her intentional reasons and possesses required control and she understands the situation in question. Here, in the given case, premises 2, 3 and 4 are assumptions. These assumptions are true as Annie acts in her preferred way, *i.e.*, her relevant decision has not been a result of manipulation or the decision has not been directed by any other person. Annie has required control over her action because she was able to choose either to help the pregnant woman or to omit from helping the woman; and, she realizes the situation that the pregnant woman really needs help. Premise 5 is derived from premises 2, 3 and 4 following the logical rule Conjunction (Conj.). And, finally, the conclusion of this argument has been derived from premises 1 and 5 following Modus Ponens (MP). In this valid argument, all premises are true. Therefore, the conclusion of this argument is obviously true. So, it has been proved that Annie becomes morally appraisable by satisfying the CMA.

So, I have successfully offered a case in which an agent is morally responsible as well as morally appraisable for a particular action. The phenomenon that an agent may be morally responsible and morally appraisable for a particular action is not a very crucial thing. I believe that most philosophers will have no disagreement on this issue. However, the case I am going to present now is comparatively crucial and may involve controversies; for, in this new case I will show that there may be a situation in which an agent may become morally responsible for her action even though she may not be morally appraisable for that particular action.

The Second Case: In the previous section, we have seen a case where the agent is morally responsible and morally appraisable for the relevant action. Cases like those may indicate that we have an inbuilt disposition which makes us believe that whenever an agent is responsible for an action her action is either praiseworthy or blameworthy. But, an exceptional case may

disprove this indication by showing that for some of our actions we can be considered morally responsible without being considered morally appraisable. An example is given below to present a case where an agent is responsible but is not worthy to be praised or blamed:

> Jill borrows $3000 from Jonathan and promises to return the money on Sunday afternoon. On Sunday, a hijacker forcefully takes away Jill's money on his way to return the money to Jonathan. Thus, Jill becomes unable to return the money on time. As a result, Jill fails to keep his promise. At first, Jonathan may blame Jill for not returning the money on time but after hearing the unfortunate incident Jonathan's reaction changes. In this case, Jonathan may show relevant reaction to Jill as Jill is an appropriate candidate who is capable of giving an account of what he has done and is aware of the situation. However, Jonathan cannot blame Jill for not returning the money.

In the above case, Jill is morally responsible for being unable to return the money on time. His failing to return the money cannot exempt him from his responsibility. Also, his responsibility is not likely to be cancelled by the wrong action of another person, *i.e.*, of the hijacker. Jill is physically and mentally a sound person; and, he understands the situation in question. That is, he possesses the active power and a sound mind and these make him susceptible to having certain reactive attitudes. Moreover, after the incident, Jill still remains capable of explaining why he fails to return the money on time. So, it appears from the above case that Jill has fulfilled all the required conditions of FCMR and by fulfilling them he becomes morally responsible for that relevant action. Even though Jill is morally responsible for the relevant action, he is not morally appraisable. The required conditions of CMA have not been satisfied, in this case; for, either Jill fails to act on his intentional reasons or he lacks control over his action or he fails to satisfy required epistemic conditions. In this given case, Jill fails to act in accordance with his intentional reason which is to pay the money on time; and, Jill also fails to have control over the relevant action. So, we see that Jill fails to satisfy the required conditions of CMA. As Jill fails to satisfy the conditions of CMA, he is excused from being morally appraisable for that action. On the contrary, we would have blamed Jill for his action if he lost the money in gambling or lost the money by being careless. Moreover, he would be blamed if he lied about losing the money or made a false promise of returning the money on Sunday. But, in the given

situation he did none of them. So, Jill will be excused from moral appraisability. Even though Jill is not morally appraisable for the relevant action, he is morally responsible for that particular action. The phenomenon of Jill's being morally responsible for the relevant action can be stated in an argumentative way:

Argument-1

1. If Jill is an apt candidate of getting reactive attitudes (*C*) and Jill can give an account of his action (*A*) and Jill is well of the situation in question(*W*), then Jill is morally responsible (*R*). By def. [FCMR]
2. If Jill has active power and a sound mind (*M*), then Jill is an apt candidate of getting reactive attitude (*C*).
3. Jill has active power and a sound mind (*M*).
4. Jill can give an account of his action (*A*).
5. Jill is well aware of the situation in question (*W*).
6. Jill is an apt candidate of getting reactive attitudes (*C*).
7. Jill is an apt candidate of getting reactive attitudes (*C*) and Jill can give an account of his action (*A*) and Jill is well of the situation in question (*W*).
8. Jill is morally responsible (*R*)

Symbolically:

1. $[(C.A).W] \supset R$ By def. [FCMR]
2. $M \supset C$ By def. [FCMR]
3. M Assumption
4. A Assumption
5. W Assumption
6. C [2,3 MP]
7. $[(C.A).W]$ [6, 4, 5 Conj.]
8. R [1,7 MP]   [QED]

By the definition of FCMR, premise 1 and premise 2 are true. In the given situation, premises 3, 4 and 5 are true because Jill possesses active power and a sound mind, a mind which is well aware of the situation in question and can give an account for the relevant action. From premises 2 and 3, premise 6 has been drawn following the logical rule Modus Pones (MP). Following Conjunction (Conj.), a logical rule, premise 7 has been drawn from premises 6, 4 and 5. The conclusion of this argument is deduced by following Modus Ponens (MP) from

premises 1 and 7. As all the premises of the valid argument are true, the conclusion must be true. Thus, it has been proved that Jill is morally responsible for his relevant action.

Even though Jill is morally responsible for the action mentioned above, the phenomenon of his not being morally appraisable can also be stated in an argumentative way:

Argument-2

1. If Jill is morally appraisable (*A*), then Jill acts in accordance with his intentional reasons (*I*) and Jill possesses control(*C*) and Jill satisfies epistemic conditions (*E*). By def. [CMA]

2. It is not the case that Jill acts in accordance with his intentional reasons (*I*).

3. It is not the case that Jill acts in accordance with his intentional reasons (*I*) or it is not the case that Jill possesses control (*C*).

4. It is not the case that Jill acts in accordance with his intentional reasons (*I)* and Jill possesses control (*C*).

5. It is not the case that Jill acts in accordance with his intentional reasons (*I*) and Jill possesses control (*C*) or it is not the case that Jill satisfies epistemic conditions (*E*).

6. It is not the case that Jill acts in accordance with his intentional reasons (*I*) and Jill possesses control (*C*) and Jill satisfies epistemic conditions (*E*).

7. Jill is not morally appraisable (*A*).

Symbolically:

1. $A \supset [(I . C).] E$ By def. [CMA]
2. $\smallfrown I$ Assumption
3. $\smallfrown I \lor \smallfrown C$ [2, Add]
4. $\smallfrown (I . C)$ [3, De M.]
5. $\smallfrown (I . C) \lor \smallfrown E$ [4, Add]
6. $\smallfrown [(I . C)] . E$ [5, De M.]
7. $\smallfrown A$ [1,6 MT]   [QED]

By the definition of CMA, premise 1 is true. Here, in the given case, Jill fails to act in accordance with his intentional reasons. So, premise 2, which is an assumption, of this argument is true. Premise 3 has been deduced from premise 2 by using a valid logical rule named Addition (Add). Premise 3 is true as, in this relevant case, Jill's action has not been

executed the way Jill wanted to execute, *i.e.*, Jill fails to act in accordance with his intentional reasons or Jill fails to possess control over his action. By using another logical rule in premise 3, premise 4 has been drawn which is also true in this above mentioned case. Premise 5 and premise 6 have been drawn following two logical rules, namely Addition (Add.) and De Morgan's theory (De M.). They are true rules of logic. The conclusion has been logically deduced from premises 1 and 6 by using a logical rule Modus Tollens (MT). In this valid argument, all the premises are true. Therefore, the conclusion is also true. This is how, here, it has been proved that Jill is not morally appraisable for the relevant action.

Up to this point, it has been adequately proved that Jill is morally responsible even though he is not morally appraisable for the relevant action. By "the action" I have meant the action done after the incident of hijacking. However, one may reasonably rise a question: is Jill not a worthy candidate for being blamed or praised before the incident? To answer this question, I will divide the case, based on the incident, in two time indexes: the first time index is the time before the incident, the time when Jill is morally responsible and morally appraisable; and, the second time index is after the incident, the time when Jill is morally responsible but he is exempted from moral appraisability. In other words, we can say that Jill is morally responsible and morally appraisable at time t; here, t indicates the time just before the incident of hijacking. At t Jill is morally responsible as well as morally appraisable because at time t Jill is able to receive reactive attitudes as he possesses the active power and a sound mind. At this time, Jill can explain the account for his action as well as he is aware of the circumstances. He can also act at t in accordance with his intentional reasons and satisfies the other conditions of CMA. Thus, it appears that at t Jill can satisfy both of the conditions of FCMR and CMA. Hence, Jill is morally responsible as well as morally appraisable at t. On the other hand, t^* is the time just after the incident of hijacking occurred. At t^* Jill is morally responsible but he is not morally appraisable because of failing to fulfill the conditions of CMA. For, at t^* Jill was not able to act in his preferred way. That means that he failed to act in accordance with his intentional reasons. Moreover, he lacked control over his action at t^*. Because of not being able to fulfill all the necessary conditions of CMA, Jill becomes unable to have moral appraisability. So, we can say that at time t^* Jill is not morally appraisable for the relevant action. These double time indexes depict the importance

of the conditions of FCMR and CMA which are crucial in deciding whether or not an agent is morally responsible and/or morally appraisable for a particular action.

The success of presenting a case in which an agent is morally responsible but not morally appraisable for a particular action provides an account for the phenomenon that sometimes an agent may succeed to satisfy the FCMR even though the agent may fail to satisfy the CMA. Accounting this phenomenon is important. For, this phenomenon helps us solve a relevant but unspoken puzzle lurking around.

Corollary

Most of the existing ideas of moral responsibility and moral appraisability make us think that for a praiseworthy action an agent always receives either respect or gratitude; and, for a blameworthy action the agent receives either indignation or resentment. Everyday phenomena make us hold this belief; and, we feel contentment by showing gratitude for a praiseworthy action and resentment for a blameworthy action, respectively. But in some cases, one may show gratitude to a person for a blameworthy action and can show resentment or hate for a praiseworthy action. For example, one may say to someone that "I am happy and thankful to you for the lies you have just said", even though one knows and is aware of the fact that lying is a blameworthy action. Likewise, one may say to someone that "I feel resentment for your habit of telling the truth", even though one knows and is aware of the fact that telling truth is a praiseworthy action. These sorts of judgments are not quite irrational even though there is a seeming contradiction as the agent who is judging is showing gratitude and blaming the actor for the action that has been judged by her. Similarly, the agent sometimes shows resentment for an action and at the same time praises the agent in question. In other words, sometimes an agent shows gratitude for an action that the agent knows blameworthy and sometimes an agent shows hatred for an action that the agent knows praiseworthy. This is the apparent contradiction. This contradiction can be named as *the Puzzle Concerning the Divergence between Responsibility and Appraisability (PCDRA)*. The PCDRA is not alien to our everyday life; still, we feel an internal conflict when we make such judgments. We think showing resentment for a praiseworthy action is a contradiction while showing gratitude for a

blameworthy action is a contradiction too. And, this apparent contradiction gives birth of the puzzle. Although this puzzle has not yet been addressed academically, the PCDRA exists in various moral scenarios. In order to elucidate the PCDRA, a hypothetical case can be presented in the following way:

> Suppose Emily is very close to David. Emily always shares every secret with David. One day, Emily confesses that she has stolen something and tells David not to disclose it if anyone asks about the matter. The next day their common friend Julie inquiries David whether or not he knows about the thing that has been stolen. David expresses his ignorance about the matter saying, "I know nothing about this matter." That means David lies here. Hearing this Emily says, "I am grateful that you have lied to Julie." David replies, "I understand your point." That does not mean that Emily is not aware of the fact that David's lying is blameworthy. In contrast, on a different occasion, David tells the truth about Emily's stealing to another of their common friends. This time hearing the matter Emily says, "David, I am sorry; your telling the truth has made me angry." David replies, "I understand your point." Here, Emily's showing anger does not mean that Emily was not aware of the fact that David's telling the truth is a praiseworthy action.

Now, we see, on the first occasion David receives gratitude and blame for the same action from Emily. Here, the PCDRA arises. Similarly, on the second occasion, David receives resentment and praise for the same action from Emily. Here, again, the PCDRA arises. However, on both of the occasions Emily's apparently contradictory judgments are quite understandable. David finds nothing puzzling here. What solves the puzzle? The solution to this puzzle can be found by applying my distinction between responsibility and appraisability. At this point, I will show how my distinction between responsibility and appraisability solves the puzzle.

The Solution to the PCDRA: As has been shown earlier, Moral Responsibility (MR) and Moral Appraisability (MA) are different; one may have MR without MA. While reactive attitudes such as love, respect, indignation, resentment, gratitude etc. are relevant to MR, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are relevant to MA. By fulfilling the FCMR, *i.e.*, by possessing active power and a sound mind and ability to give an account and by satisfying epistemic conditions, an agent becomes morally responsible for her action. But, fulfillment of

the FCMR does not ensure the fulfillment of the CMA. The conditions of CMA, as have been shown earlier, include: the agent's action must be intentional (the agent must not be blackmailed or manipulated), the agent possesses required control and the agent satisfies the relevant epistemic conditions. Now, remember in Jill's case Jill satisfied all the conditions of FCMR but failed to satisfy the intention-condition as well as the control condition of the CMA. That means that it is not unusual that in some cases an agent may fail to satisfy the CMA even if the agent may satisfy the FCMR in that case. Hence, there is nothing wrong in judging an action as praiseworthy and showing resentment for that action and judging an action as blameworthy and showing gratitude for that action. Thus, the puzzle is solved. The above mentioned puzzle originated because of our mistake in categorizing attitudes of moral responsibility and moral appraisability in the same group. Once we understand the reactions related to moral responsibility and approaches the agents get when they are morally appraisable, we find that no contradiction occurs by showing gratitude to an agent for a blameworthy action and resentment for a praiseworthy action. Thus, we can assert that the contradiction that roams around, in our society, is not a genuine puzzle; it is rather a result of our hasty judgment which makes us think that an agent who is morally responsible is always morally appraisable for an action. If instead of making such a hasty judgment we illuminate on what is stated in the FCMR and in the CMA, the Puzzle Concerning the Divergence between Morality and Appraisability (PCDRA) will be extinct.

Conclusion

It is not necessary that if an agent is morally responsible for an action, then that agent is also morally appraisable for that particular action. This is what I have attempted to show in this paper. I have shown it by making the distinction between the conditions of MR and MA, namely, by introducing the FCMAR and the CMA. After successfully showing the distinction between them, I have argued that this distinction helps us to solve a Puzzle Concerning the Divergence between Responsibility and Appraisability (PCDRA). The solution to this puzzle is significant as this puzzle exists in moral scenarios causing a conflict in our feelings. This corollary of my distinction between MR and MA solves the conflict in various moral scenarios.

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