

A Comprehensive Understanding of Free Will

Abstract: A proper examination shows that the existing definitions of free will are incomplete and implausible as, in addition of being partial, they involve various problems for why they fail to capture the idea of freedom in a true sense. In the present paper, the loopholes and incompleteness of these existing definitions have been identified. Besides, it has been argued in this paper that a complete and plausible definition of free will must contain both the surface freedom and the deeper freedom. Even though such a complete and plausible definition of free will has not been found in the existing literature concerning free will and moral responsibility, this paper ends up with the expectation that such a definition of free will can be found soon.

Key Words: surface freedom, deeper freedom, Genuine Freedom, active power, cognitive capacity, Self-Forming Actions (SFAs), *causa sui*, responsibility required freedom, manipulation.

Introduction

We, intuitively, think that we are free in doing our actions. We have options before us from which we can choose our desired ones. That means that it is up to us what to choose and desire. Moreover, our practical reason shows us the necessity of having responsibility required free will. Generally, a free action can be considered a responsible action. In order to have a moral life, we believe free will is a pre-requisite. Philosophers of the relevant field have offered numerous conditions whose fulfillment are supposed to guarantee us free will. For some, free will requires alternative possibilities while others assert the necessity of being the Ultimate Originators for being free. Determinism is a theory that asserts that humans cannot have free will since whatever they do is determined by their relevant past and laws of nature. Unlike the idea of free will, determinism blocks our options and leaves only the relevant path open for us. Thus, it seems that determinism stands in the opposite direction to human free will. If whatever an agent does is never up to her and determined by her relevant past and laws of nature over which she has no control, then she is clearly

not free. All these pose a threat to responsibility required free will. If any of these is correct, then no one seems to be responsible for her action. A debate, thus, arises from both of the idea of freedom and determinism. This debate of freedom and determinism prevails by introducing other ideas. One extreme idea asserts that humans not only lack free will of any kind but also they are not responsible for their actions; the so-called moral responsibility, according to this idea, is simply an illusion of mankind. In my opinion, a theory that denies the existence of human freedom stakes the justification of our everyday actions. When none is free in doing her actions, none seems to be responsible for her actions. In fact, denying human freedom is denying human responsibility which is intuitively an implausible philosophical idea. So, the exercise of human freedom is very important to have a moral life. In the present paper, I will show that we have free will even if the idea of determinism is true.

Existing Concepts of Free will

The above debate concerning freedom and determinism has given birth to many theories such as *compatibilism*, *incompatibilism*, *indeterminism*, *libertarianism* and *hard determinism*. These theories differ in explaining as well as in providing conditions of free will which are required to be satisfied by agents to be free. Even supporters of a certain theory have provided different conditions for being free. According to the supporters of *classical compatibilism*, freedom requires alternative possibilities and an agent should be unhindered in pursuing her desired options. Having alternative possibilities has been regarded as a required condition for being free until we encounter with such cases where agents do not have alternative possibilities but are free in doing their actions. Harry Frankfurt has introduced a version of compatibilism named *Hierarchical motivational theory*. According to this version of compatibilism, an agent can be considered free if her first-order desire conforms to her second-order desire even though the agent may not have alternative possibilities.¹ Frankfurt tries to prove that an agent may have these two required conditions provided by classical compatibilists while she is not free. An agent may be free

¹ Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," *The Journal of Philosophy* 68, no.1 (1971): 5-20. Also in Robert Kane, *Free Will*, ed., (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 127-44 & Gary Watson, *Free Will*, ed., 2nd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 322-36 & Laura Waddell Ekstrom, *Agency and Responsibility: Essays On the Metaphysics of Freedom*, ed., (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 2001), 77-91.

from external constraint; however, she may be internally constrained while the above conditions provided by classical compatibilists are satisfied. A reasonable question is raised here: what are the requirements of free will, then? Frankfurt claims that when an agent's first-order desire conforms to her second-order desire, the agent is free. Suppose, an agent, *A*, wants to kill *X*. Here, the agent's first-order desire is to kill or not to kill *X*. Her second-order desire is a certain desire of the first-order. From second-order desire an agent forms her second-order volition. Frankfurt has given an example in the following manner:

Suppose, an agent has a first-order desire to drink alcohol at the same time she has another desire about her first-order desire that is called her second-order desire. This second-order desire reminds her that drinking alcohol is injurious to health and may cause serious problem in her life. If her second-order desire moves her not to act according to her first-order desire, then she has free will. Second-order desire is also called second-order volition. Because of this second-order volition an agent does not act impulsively on her desires without reflecting on what she actually should want or do.²

Thus, it seems that an agent is free when she moves by her second-order volition. But this second-order volition cannot be considered a required condition of free will as it also faces some problems which make this condition untenable to many. One apparent problem of Frankfurt's version of free will is that an agent's second-order volition can be a result of manipulation. Someone may have manipulated agent, *A*, to form a certain *desire* and converted into her *will* to kill *X*. So, it seems reasonable to claim that an agent can have free will in Frankfurt's sense while her action is a result of manipulation.

Supporters of compatibilism such as Gary Watson, Susan Wolf have also offered required conditions for being free. In order to explain conditions of free will, Watson distinguishes between two systems of which one is *the valuational system* and the other one is *the motivational system*.³ On one hand, in the valuational system an agent considers all the relevant things to reach to the best judgment. On the other hand, the motivational system of an agent are those considerations out of which an agent motivates or desires for

² Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," *The Journal of Philosophy* 68, no.1 (1971): 10-13.

³ Gary Watson, "Free Agency," *The Journal of Philosophy* 72, no.8 (1975): 215.

a particular action. Suppose, Jenny is a philosophy student who is going to sit for her final exam in a few days while a concert is going to happen in her town. All her friends from other disciplines are planning to attend the concert. Now, it is important for Jenny to think about her situations to make a decision which is supposed to be her best judgment. She decides to concentrate on her upcoming exam. In this example, Jenny is motivated by her consideration of study; therefore, she values study. Here, we see a synch between Jenny`s valuational and motivational system. According to Watson, when an agent`s valuational and motivation systems coincide, she is free. But, this synchronization does not always occur. Sometimes it happens that an agent motivates or desires something for which she has no value. A drug addict desires for drug even though he has no value for it. Or, sometimes it may happen that the desire or motivation for a particular action does not arises from the agent but from other factors. That means that an agent`s values as well as desires or motives can be conditioned by many factors and she may have no role in forming those desires and values. Therefore, Gary Watson`s concept of free will involves serious problem.

Susan Wolf, another defender of compatibilism, offers a view named *reason view* to describe free will and humans` responsibility. According to Wolf, an agent is free when she acts in accordance with good reason. Wolf thinks that our reasoning ability will help us to form true beliefs and good values. When our actions are in accordance with the good reason, we do the right thing. For this reason, Wolf renames her reason view as the ability to act in accordance to the True and the Good.⁴ This theory of Wolf can face a similar objection as Frankfurt`s. In order to point out the problem, we can think of the case of *mass suicide*. In a case of mass suicide, a group of people commits suicide mostly in religious settings. They believe in their respective cults so much that committing suicide seems to them a good reason for betterment. In this type of cases, people are manipulated in such a way that sacrificing life becomes a way to please God. That shows that like Frankfurt and Gary Watson`s concept of free will, Susan Wolf`s concept of free will cannot avoid the problem arising from manipulation.

⁴ Susan Wolf, *Freedom within Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 70-71.

The view contrary to compatibilism is known as incompatibilism. According to the idea of incompatibilism either freedom or determinism can exist but they both cannot exist at the same time. Supporters who affirm the existence of determinism deny human freedom. As every event of ours is determined by our past and laws of nature, we lack freedom. This concept of affirming determinism and denying freedom is known as *hard determinism*. Galen Strawson, Saul Smilansky, Derk Pereboom are the prominent hard determinists.⁵ Galen Strawson has introduced a famous argument named *The Basic Argument* in which he attempts to prove that humans cannot have freedom in a deterministic world. He claims that humans are not able to be the cause of themselves. To have responsibility required freedom, agents are supposed to be the cause of their every action. Being the cause of our actions, however, is an impossible task to achieve. Because if we are the cause of our earlier action and that earlier action has an earlier cause, then to have freedom we have to be the cause of that earlier action and so on. Thus, it seems that in order to have responsibility required freedom we have to be the Ultimate Originators or the *causa sui* of our actions which is impossible. Thus, according to Strawson, freedom of this kind is impossible to achieve. As a result humans are not responsible for their actions. The above claim of Strawson regarding humans' responsibility required freedom can be presented in the following manner:

1. Nothing can be *causa sui*— nothing can be the cause of itself.
2. In order to be truly morally responsible for one's actions one would have to be *causa sui*, at least in certain mental respects.
3. Therefore, nothing can be truly morally responsible.⁶

But a life without freedom is difficult to live. We cannot imagine a world where we lack freedom and every action of ours springs from factors over which we may have no control. Such cases make us perplexed in holding people responsible for their actions. In my

⁵ Galen Strawson, "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility," *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* 75, no. ½, Free Will, Determinism and Moral Responsibility (1994): 5- 24 & Saul Smilansky, *Free will and Illusion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2000) & Derk Pereboom, *Living Without Free Will*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁶ Galen Strawson, "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility," *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* 75, no. ½, Free Will, Determinism and Moral Responsibility (1994): 5- 24.

opinion, setting *causa sui* as a condition for freedom makes the condition beyond our limits and inconvenience as well.

Derk Pereboom, another incompatibilist, asserts that determinism and free will are inconsistent and given the facts of physical science determinism has been proved true; thus, humans` do not have free will. All of our actions, according to Pereboom, are caused by factors beyond our control. But Pereboom thinks that in order to be responsible, we must be the Ultimate Originators of our actions. Pereboom`s condition of Ultimate Originator, known as *Principle O*, has been expressed in the following way:

(O) If an agent is morally responsible for her deciding to perform an action, then the production of this decision must be something over which the agent has control, and an agent is not morally responsible for the decision if it is produced by a source over which she has no control.⁷

Since our actions are caused by the factors beyond our controls, we cannot be the Ultimate Originators of our actions at all. Thus, following Pereboom it may be said that since we are not the Ultimate Originators of our actions, we are not morally responsible for those actions. He also claims that we lack free will when indeterminism is true. When our actions are uncased, which may happen if indeterminism is true, our actions are result of luck or chance. Luck or chance involving actions are responsibility subverting. Thus, according to Pereboom, freedom of any sort is incompatible not only with determinism but also with indeterminism. Hence, in accordance with Pereboom`s theory, it does not matter whether determinism is true or indeterminism is true, humans are not morally responsible for their actions.

But, this approach of excusing people from all types of responsibility required free will is opposite to our intuition. We believe ourselves as deliberative rational being. We desire for praise and at the same time we desire blame for our misdeeds. Praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are not mere concepts, they are social reality. We cannot simply deny them. But, Pereboom`s theory unwarrantedly denies these very significant phenomena of our moral life. For that reason, I find it an implausible theory regarding the matter.

⁷ Derk Pereboom, *Living Without Free Will*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 47.

Saul Smilansky, another supporter of incompatibilism, goes even further by saying that we do not have freedom in our life at all. The truth of determinism has nullified humans' freedom of any kind, he thinks. He is a hard determinist who believes in the truth of determinism and thinks that free will is absent. Since free will is absent, humans do not have any kind of moral responsibility; for, as an incompatibilist he thinks that free will is a required condition of moral responsibility. The absence of free will causes the absence of moral responsibility. But, Smilansky admits that if humans have the feeling that they are not morally responsible for their actions, they may want to do anything without thinking about praise, blame, resentment, guilt, etc. In other words, if humans know that they are not morally responsible all of their values of life will be worthless to have to them. As a result, the difference between good and bad actions, blameworthiness, praiseworthiness, resentment, guilt, appreciation, etc. will have no meaning to them. That situation will create an anarchy in our moral life as well as in our society. Smilansky has proposed a solution to that anticipated situation. He recognizes that that situation does not occur because of an illusion of free will that exists in common people's mind. He considers this illusion of free will a positive as well as a beneficial thing for us. To lead a better life by valuing our moral attitude we are required to foster this idea of freedom. Smilansky has presented the above point by saying:

Illusion, I claim, is the vital but neglected key to the free will problem. It is not claimed that we need to induce illusory beliefs concerning free will, or can live with beliefs that we fully realize are illusory—both of these positions would be highly implausible. Rather, my claim is that illusory beliefs are in place, and the role they play is largely positive.⁸

Therefore, it appears that freedom may exist as an illusion. This illusion not only helps us to reach a peaceful state of mind from where we can consider ourselves as free agents but also aids us valuing our dignity as a person. Thus, according to Smilansky, having the illusion of freedom plays a significant and positive role in our moral and social life.

Although this illusion of free will mentioned above apparently helps us leading a better life, living with an illusion is not the type of life one may desire. Humans' freedom

⁸ Saul Smilansky, "Free Will, Fundamental Dualism and the Centrality of Illusion," appears in Robert Kane (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, Oxford University Press (2002): 489-505.

and moral responsibility are not something that we have made, we need them because we believe we actually have them. Having the illusion of free will may pacify one to some extent but cannot give one the satisfaction in a true sense. In order to guarantee humans` dignity and moral worth, Smilansky brings his idea of illusion. But the phenomenon of forcing people to live in an illusion is simply a phenomenon of disrespect to them. People value freedom because they tend to believe that they are truly free in doing their actions. In our society, we praise or despise someone based on their actions. We punish through legal process if anyone does anything illegal. Punishment cannot be done properly if we believe in a continuous illusion of free will. This illusion of free will actually does bring a negative impact to the moral life as well as to the society in general.

Libertarianism, another version of incompatibilism, asserts that determinism is false, thus, humans have freedom. The idea of accepting humans` freedom and denying determinism is known as libertarianism. Libertarianism has been divided into two types: one is known as the *event-causal libertarianism* and the other is known as the *agent-causal libertarianism*. In event-causal libertarianism, an action is free when the action involves some states or events. In the idea of event-causal libertarianism, an indeterministic causal relation develops between events.⁹ Carl Ginet and Robert Kane are the influential proponents of event-causal libertarianism. Ginet thinks that every free action of ours begins with a mental event that is not caused by any other factor. A mental event results an action if it has a certain intrinsic quality which Ginet calls *actish phenomenon quality*. A simple mental event`s having this intrinsic quality is sufficient for its being an action.¹⁰ Similarly, Robert Kane believes that determinism is false and humans have freedom. For Kane, freedom means having opens options to the future from which agents are able to choose their options. Since the idea of open options to the future cannot exist with determinism, according to Kane, free will entails indeterminism. Kane asserts that to have freedom in doing actions, some of our

⁹ Randolph Clarke and Justin Capes, "In compatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2000, accessed on 10 July, 2022, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/incompatibilism-theories/>.

¹⁰ Ibid.

actions must lack sufficient conditions.¹¹ But an uncaused action cannot be considered free that assigns responsibility, for, an uncaused action is the outcome of luck or chance. Luck and chance involving actions neither ensures humans` freedom nor it ensures human`s responsibility. Many philosophers have criticized libertarianism because it brings forth the problem of luck or chance by including the idea of indeterminism. Van Inwagen has formulated the problem of incorporating indeterminism in the following way:

If one`s acts were undetermined, they would be “bolts from the blue”, they would no more be free acts than they would if they had been cause by the manipulation of one`s nervous system by a freakish demon. Therefore, free action is not merely compatible with determinism; it entails determinism.¹²

Thus, it seems that the idea of libertarianism cannot prove the existence of responsibility required free will. An agent lacks control over her action when her action is uncaused. When agents` actions lack causes whatever happen, merely happen by luck or chance in an indeterministic world. So, because of the problem of luck or chance, event-causal libertarianism appears as an implausible theory in explaining humans` freedom.

According to the idea of agent-causal libertarianism, agents can cause their actions by themselves. The causes of actions are not determined by any factor such as circumstances, events or states of affairs, according to the supporters of agent-causal libertarianism. Rather, it is the agent who causes her actions. Thomas Reid, Roderick Chisholm, Richard Taylor, Randolph Clarks and Timothy O`Connor are among the supporters of agent-causal libertarianism. In order to support the idea of agent-causal libertarianism Roderick Chisholm, a well-known defender of agent-causal libertarianism, has asserted following:

If we consider only inanimate natural objects, we may say that causation, if it occurs, is a relation between events or states of affairs. The dam`s breaking was an event that was caused by a set of other events— the dam being weak, the flood being strong, and so on. But if a man is responsible for a particular deed, then . . . there is some

¹¹ Robert Kane, “Responsibility and Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 96 no. 5 (1999): 218-19.

¹² Peter Van Inwagen, “On Two Arguments for Compatibilism,” *Analysis* 45, no. 3 (1985): 161-62.

event, or set of events, that is caused, not by other events or states of affairs, but by the agent, whatever he may be.¹³

Hence, to be responsible for any action an agent is required to be the cause of that particular action. Suppose, an agent hijacks a bus. He will be considered responsible for his deed if the cause of his hijacking the bus is the agent himself. No prior reason or states of affairs beyond the agent should be considered as the cause of the agent's misdeed. The idea of agent-causal libertarianism attempts to uphold humans' role in causing actions by claiming that humans are the causes of their actions. Unlike inanimate natural object, the causes of humans' actions are not caused by prior events or states of affairs. But, the aftermath of agent-causal libertarianism is problematic as it seems to demand an agent be the cause of her every action. But one cannot be the cause of one's birth. It seems to bring the problem of *causa sui*. It may also happen that sometimes we are in confusion in finding out which one is the real cause of an action. With these unlikely consequences, the agent-causal libertarianism seems unacceptable.

Thus, from the above discussion it appears that none of the existing theories has succeeded to account for human freedom given that determinism is true. Theories that deny the existence of free will, as we have seen, are not plausible theories. And, theories that deny the existence of determinism are not successful either, for, they involve luck and chance problem. In a nutshell, so far, we have not found any theory regarding the matter that can unquestionably be accepted. Considering this situation, the concept of freedom will be revisited in the following section.

The Concept of Freedom: a Revision

In accordance with one of the most intuitive definitions of free will, free will provides us with an ability to choose from a number of options.¹⁴ That means that an agent is considered

¹³ Roderick M. Chisholm, "Human Freedom and the Self," *University of Kansas* (1964): 7.

Also in Robert Kane, *Free Will, ed.*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 47-58 & Gary Watson, *Free Will, ed.*, 2nd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 24-35 Laura Waddell Ekstrom, *Agency and Responsibility: Essays On the Metaphysics of Freedom, ed.*, (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 2001), 126-37.

¹⁴ Timothy O' Connor, "Free Will," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2002, accessed July 20, 2019, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/>.

free if she can freely choose from several options. Suppose, an agent named Jack has the options to go either to the shopping mall or to the library; and, there is nothing that can deter him choosing any of these two. Now, according to the above definition of free will whatever option he chooses will be the result of his free action. This freedom is actually a freedom in a partial sense which Robert Kane addresses as *surface freedom*.¹⁵ In our everyday life, in many cases we enjoy this kind of freedom; for, in our daily life normally none constrains us in doing our desired actions— we can go anywhere we like, we can do anything we want. This exercise of freedom is actually an exercise of surface freedom. Thus, it seems that surface freedom means freedom from external constraints. Even though surface freedom can give us freedom from external constraints, it cannot make us free from internal constraints. Internal constraints can make us unfree as they can control the wills behind our actions. When the wills that determine our actions are internally controlled, we lack free will. In order to be free from internal constraints, *deeper freedom* is required. The idea of deeper freedom is also coined by Robert Kane. We can use the example of the Brave New World which appears in Aldous Huxley`s novel and nicely represented in Kane`s *A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will*. Kane illustrates:

This problem is nicely illustrated by twentieth century utopian novel, Aldous Huxley`s Brave New World. In the futuristic societies described in this classical work, people can have and do what they will or choose, but only to the extent that they have been conditioned since birth by behavioral engineers or neurochemists to will or choose what they can have and do. In Brave New World, the lower-class workers are under the influence of powerful drugs, so that they do not think about things they cannot have. They are quite content to play miniature golf all weekend. They can do what they want, but their wants are limited and controlled by drugs.¹⁶

The above example shows that there may be a case in which an agent is free in choosing an option and no one is constraining her in choosing that option causing a feeling of free will. This is the surface freedom. When people have surface freedom, they are able to

¹⁵ Robert Kane, *A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will* (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. 2005), 2 & also in Robert Kane, *The Significance of Free will* (Oxford University Press, 1998).

¹⁶ Robert Kane, *A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will* (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. 2005), 3.

choose; they can carry out their desired actions in the way they want; no one is supposed to tie them while they go for pursuing their desired actions. Deeper freedom is different. It demands that in order to be completely free and responsible, an agent has to have control over choosing her options. An agent's decision needs to be made by the agent. People in the above scenario of the Brave New World can do whatever they want but their desires are controlled by some other factors. They have freedom in the surface level but deeper freedom is absent there. The wills behind their actions are determined by other factors about which they are unaware. They believe that they have freedom and freedom in its surface sense is present there. But without having deeper freedom, people in the Brave New world are not supposed to be considered free agents. Thus, it appears that deeper freedom is also required to be considered free agents.

Now, it is important to see whether deeper freedom can alone guarantee us freedom in its true sense or we are required to have surface freedom as well. To clarify the point, I modify the Brave New World scenario of Aldous Huxley's and give it the name the Brave New World- 2. It goes in the following way:

Suppose, people of the Brave New World-2 are able to determine the wills behind their actions. If an agent in this world wants to do a certain action, the will of her action is made by her and not by any other factor. Besides, there is no neurochemist in this world who can manipulate or determine agents' wills. But for an unfortunate reason, people in this world lack surface freedom.

Even though people in the Brave New World-2 can have the wills of their actions, they lack freedom in carry out their actions. It shows that having deeper freedom will not suffice. An agent also needs surface freedom. When agents have both surface and deeper freedom they can will and do their actions. Having surface freedom cannot guarantee that the will of an action is determined by the agent. At the same time, having deeper freedom to determine the wills of our actions will not work either as this cannot ensure that an action will definitely occur.

Conditions of Surface and Deeper Freedom

We have seen that we can have freedom in its true sense if surface and deeper freedom are ensured. Now, one may reasonably ask: what are required to be satisfied by an agent to

have both surface freedom and deeper freedom? In order to have surface freedom, an agent should have the chance to choose from several options. That means that an agent is supposed to be able to choose her desired option. Moreover, executing a desired action, an agent needs to be free from others` constraints and obstacles. Or, when someone forces an agent to do a certain task, the agent will not be considered free in doing that action. We can clarify this point by imagining a scenario:

Suppose a situation where an agent named *X* has been forced to do an action on gun point. Let`s suppose that, for the sake of life, *X* does that action. Here, although *X* does that action, *X* is not considered free in doing that specific action.

So, an agent will not be considered free when something forces the agent to do a certain task. An agent`s actions are required to be free from external constraints. Also, to ensure surface freedom, we need to have an ability to perform our desired actions. This required ability can be named as *active power*. With active power an agent is supposed to have related physical power to carry out her desired action when no one physically constrains her in doing that action. This power is required because sometimes it may happen that no one is constraining us, still, we are not able to do our desired action. A person with physical disabilities may desire to go for hiking. His desire in going for hiking may not be hindered by other person but he is still not able to execute what he desires. Because of his lacking of related physical ability to carry out this specific action, he cannot enjoy his surface freedom.

In addition to active power, an agent needs cognitive capacities. Cognitive capacities include reasoning, thinking, and thinking reflectively over actions. Here, Harry Frankfurt`s view of Wanton can be used as an example to show the necessity of having cognitive capacities. Wanton can possess the power to act as its own to fulfill its desired action but it does not have reflective power; as a result, whatever it does is arbitrary. It cannot reflect on its decision or cannot think of the options. Based on this criterion, Frankfurt makes the distinction between a person and a Wanton.¹⁷ Since we have cognitive capacities, we can think over our actions. All the above conditions help us to ensure surface

¹⁷ Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," *The Journal of Philosophy* 68, no.1 (1971): 5-20.

freedom which is required to be free. Now, we can sum up the requirements of surface freedom in the following way:

1. To have surface freedom, an agent needs to have the chance of choosing from several options.
2. To execute the opportunity of choosing from several options, no one should constrain or hinder the agent.
3. In addition to (1) and (2) an agent needs active power to actualize her desired action.
4. Cognitive capacity is required so that the agent can think reflectively over her action.

By satisfying all the above conditions of surface freedom, agents can enjoy the type of freedom that we mostly exercise in our everyday life. Freedom of this type makes us free from external constraints. In other words, when an agent satisfies all these conditions of surface freedom, she is considered free in doing her actions even though she is free in a partial sense.

To have freedom in complete sense, one needs to have deeper freedom too. In order to have deeper freedom, we need to be the determiner (to some extent) of our actions. While an agent has deeper freedom, she not only does what she wants to do but can also will what she wants to will. Robert Kane has tried to account for the idea of deeper freedom. To do so, he has introduced his famous idea of Self-Forming Actions (SFAs). According to Kane, free will is “the power of agents to be the ultimate creators (originators) and sustainers of their ends and purposes.”¹⁸ Kane thinks that to have free will in its deeper sense all of our actions should derive from us. When all of our actions are derived from us, the wills behind those actions are decided by us and not by any other factor. To have this power, we have to take part in forming our character from which our actions are supposed to derive. If we can take part in forming our character with all other background conditions, we can have the authority of making decisions. Kane has presented his idea of SFAs in the following way:

To be ultimately responsible for an action, an agent must be responsible for anything that is a sufficient reason (condition, cause or motive) for the occurrence of the action. If, for example, a choice issue from, and can be sufficiently explained by, an agent's character and motives (together with background conditions), then to be

¹⁸ Robert Kane, “Free Will and Responsibility: Ancient Dispute, New Themes,” *The Journal of Ethics* 4 (2000): 317.

ultimately responsible for the choices, the agent must be in part responsible, by virtue of choices or actions voluntarily performed in the past, for having the character and motives he or she now has.¹⁹

It appears from the above words that to be free in a deeper sense is to be the originator or determiner of our actions. Kane has an extensive discussion over the process of SFAs. In the present paper, I am not bringing the discussion of SFAs in detail because that goes beyond the focus of my paper. Instead, I have been keeping myself focused throughout this paper to the conditions of *Genuine Freedom*. From the discussion that appears in this paper so far shows that in order to have Genuine Freedom an agent must have both the surface freedom and the deeper freedom discussed previously. If the agent lacks any of these two freedoms, *i.e.*, the surface freedom and the deeper freedom, then the agent fails to have Genuine Freedom. That means that if an agent lacks surface freedom, then the agent has a partial freedom which is not Genuine Freedom. Similarly, if the agent lacks deeper freedom, the agent fails to have Genuine Freedom. In short, both types of freedoms are necessary conditions of Genuine Freedom.

Conclusion

In the present paper, I have discussed various definitions of free will from *Compatibilist*, *Incompatibilist* and *Libertarian* point of views. It has been identified in this paper that while defining free will all of these views have focused either on surface freedom or on deeper freedom. So, their definitions can be considered as partial definition of free will. A complete and plausible definition of free will must include both of surface and deeper freedom. We do not find such a complete and plausible definition of free will in the existing literature concerning free will and moral responsibility debate. That is, a complete and plausible definition of free will is yet to be offered. In this paper, I have not attempted to offer a new complete and plausible definition of free will but that does not mean that I have given up the hope of offering such a definition of free will in near future. I, rather, end up this paper with the hope that by making a combination between surface freedom and deeper freedom an acceptable definition of free will can soon be offered.

¹⁹ Robert Kane, "Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth," *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, ed., (2002): 407.

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