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Thrown into the World, Attached to Love: On the Forms of World-Sharing and Mourning in Heidegger

Abstract

There is no established interpretation of Heidegger that gives an elaborate account of the phenomena of loss and mourning, let alone gauges its importance for our understanding and assessment of authentic existence in Heidegger. This paper attempts to do both. First, I give a detailed exposition of Heidegger's analysis of the phenomena of mourning and loss and show that Heidegger's analysis of mourning in his early and late work is strikingly in line with his collectivist understanding of Being-with. This demonstrates, contrary to what some of his proponents argue, that Heidegger does not follow the kind of dynamic understanding of Being-with that places the other within fine-grained spaces of possibility. Second, with reference to Heidegger's existential philosophy, I construct a phenomenology of mourning and grief. Though Heidegger himself fails to explain the relationships in which one mourns after a close other, we can develop a unique phenomenology of mourning with reference to Heidegger, which shows that each loss is singular and can be equiprimordial with one's own death in opening one to the possibility of an authentic existence. In this new understanding of authenticity, loss is regarded as a powerful force, akin to death, in leading one toward their self-owned existence.

Keywords: Heidegger · Being-with · Intersubjectivity · Community · Mourning · Phenomenology of mourning and grief · Friendship [p. 479]

1. Introduction

If one face of Being-in-the-world is one's relationships with other people (*Fürsorge*), things occupying one's world (*Besorgen*), and oneself (*Selbstsorge*¹), losing them and creating new relations is the other side of it. Since the cultivation of one's existence in the world is dependent on these precarious bonds one has with other humans, things, and oneself, one expects the phenomena of loss to be one of the central issues that Heidegger deals with and accounts for in his philosophy. However, to my knowledge, there is no established interpretation of Heidegger that gives an elaborate account of the phenomena of loss and mourning, let alone gauges its importance for our understanding and assessment of authentic existence in Heidegger.² This paper is an attempt to do both by giving a detailed exposition of Heidegger's analysis of the phenomena of mourning and loss on the one hand, and constructing of a unique phenomenology of mourning and grief³ with reference to Heidegger's existential philosophy on the other.⁴ How can we understand the [p. 480]

¹ Heidegger suggests "self-care" (*Selbstsorge*) as a possible term to delineate one's relationship with oneself but rejects this term as it is tautological (BT 366). Throughout the article, I will use the following abbreviations to cite Heidegger's works: BT: (Heidegger 1962), MFL: (Heidegger 1984), SGU: (Heidegger 1985), NHS: (Heidegger 2013), L: (Heidegger 2009), OHF: (Heidegger 1999), BTr: (Heidegger 2010), H: (Heidegger 2014).

² For a limited and quite unsatisfying literature on Heidegger's treatment of mourning, see (Dallmayr 1986; Earle-Lambert 2011; Ruin 2019). Though Dallmayr's reading of Heidegger's lectures on Hölderlin from 1934-5 is helpful in decrypting this arcane text, he just touches on the issue of mourning in passing. Ruin's brilliant book gives a good exposition of Heideggerian understanding of death. But he does not focus on the issue of other's death and mourning. Earle-Lambert's work remains the most direct and elaborate treatment of the issue of mourning in Heidegger in the literature. His analysis is mostly a thought exercise inspired by Heidegger on the experience of mourning rather than Heidegger's own treatment of the phenomenon. For this reason, he does not locate Heidegger's ideas on the death of the other within the broader scope of his theory of intersubjectivity. Though the same shortcoming is also found in Robert Stolorow (2007, 2011, 2021), he is the one who went farthest in meditating on loss through Heidegger. Stolorow also marks an important exception in the literature as he points out the irreducible role of loss in attaining a self-owned or authentic existence. Lou Agosta (2010, 65) follows Stolorow and uses this idea in his construction of a Heideggerian philosophy of empathy. In addition to these, Critchley's (2002, pp.169-170) criticisms against Heidegger also contain significant seeds for constructing a Heideggerian understanding of mourning.

³ Recently, Ratcliffe (2020, 2022) did brilliant works on the phenomenology of grief. However, his main source in phenomenological tradition is Merleau-Ponty rather than Heidegger. This article highlights Heidegger as an alternative source for the phenomenology of mourning.

⁴ As a terminological note, it bears noting that grief, mourning, and bereavement are generally distinguished in the literature (Cholbi 2022, 21-22; Ratcliffe 2022, 4). Grief is generally used to express the personal emotional response to a loss, which indicates a psychological phenomenon happening "inside someone," while mourning refers to the public expression of that private feeling. Bereavement, on the other hand, is generally viewed as a state of having lost a significant other. Though the distinction made between grief, mourning, and bereavement is useful in many cases and respects, I don't think that these definitions are definitive and relevant in all studies on loss. Maintaining a clear-cut distinction might especially be hard in the case of an Heideggerian phenomenology of mourning since in the Heideggerian framework, the personal and the social are inseparably intertwined. The distinction is not final or definitive because there are many blurry areas that remain between these terms. For instance, even though mourning generally comprises the social expression of loss, one can also mourn alone. Besides this, not all acts of mourning include grief as their main emotional tone. There can be more "cheerful"

phenomena of loss and mourning in the Heideggerian framework? I argue that Heidegger's analysis of mourning in his early and late work is strikingly in line with his collectivist understanding of Being-with. However, though Heidegger himself fails to explain the relationships in which one mourns after a close other, we can develop a unique phenomenology of mourning with reference to Heidegger, which shows that each loss is singular and can be equiprimordial with one's own death in opening one to the possibility of an authentic existence. In this new understanding of authenticity, the loss is regarded as powerful source as death in bringing one to his or her self-owned existence.

It has been argued that Heidegger's social ontology barely leaves room, if it does at all, for the contiguity of others without them being absorbed in a larger whole, that is, for the possibility of sharing the world with others without missing the constitutive significance of one-to-one relationships. This problem in Heidegger's configuration of Being-with has already been pointed out by several philosophers such as Nancy (2008), Levinas (1969, 46-47,67-68), Buber (2002, 190–215), and Sartre (2018, 543–66).⁵ In the authentic mode of Being-with-one-another, i.e., Being in a community (*das Volk*) united around a shared destiny, Dasein's individuality is preceded by the Being of the community whereas in the inauthentic way of Being-with, Dasein has no real individuality at all given that it acts and thinks like anyone (*das Man*).⁶ According to Levinasian critique, the reason why both in the inauthentic and authentic modes of Being-with-others Dasein's individual potentiality for existence slides directly into a totality of others is nothing but Heidegger's own understanding of Being-with in terms of the referential totality of involvements. In other words, in both inauthentic and authentic modes of Being-with-one-another, the Being of Dasein is fundamentally defined by its participation to a larger whole of others, with the only difference that in the former, this larger whole is an anonymous collectivity while in the latter, it is a community of a people tied to each other through the bonds of shared history and language.

ways of mourning, so to speak etc. Throughout the article, apart from a couple of instance where I use the term grief when I emphasize the unsharable and the personal dimension of mourning, I will generally use the word mourning in a generic sense, as a category that encompasses grief, and mourning, and bereaving. Mourning may include different forms of losses besides personal losses, such as an ended close friendship, the loss of an important job, the loss of a home country or land. All these personal and non-personal forms of losses may come with both private and social elements. Though I will mainly speak of losing a significant other here, it should be kept in mind that in some cases, the non-personal forms of loss can also be highly profound and, thus, can be as strong as losing a significant other person.

⁵ See also (Theunissen 1986) for a concise and critical treatment of the latter two philosophers' critiques of Heidegger's account.

⁶ Throughout this essay, I will use 'the anyone' as the English counterpart of Heidegger's notorious '*das Man*'. For the sake of consistency, I will modify Macquarrie & Robinson's translation of this term ('the they') when it appears in the quoted passages from *Being and Time*.

However, what is common to both is that the *anyone* and the *people* allow for no internal variance among its constituents, and in both cases, the collectivity has priority over singularity in Dasein's relationship to others, which may sound very strange to a usual reader of Heidegger given all the individualistic discourse on death and conscience permeating *Being and Time*.

In response to these criticisms, some authors (Agosta, 2010; Derrida, 1993b; Knudsen, 2020, 2023; Koo, 2016, McMullin, 2013) argue that Heidegger's category [p. 481] of Being-with is dynamic, that is, referential totalities are not necessarily fixed and course-grained but can allow for the particularity of the other by placing the other within rather fine-grained spaces of possibility. In other words, referential totalities are not mere general interpretative schemes that we apply indiscriminately to token entities; instead, they are responsive to those entities themselves. Derrida (2005, 241), for instance, argues that Heidegger's concept of authentic Being-with-others allows us to conceive the existential depth of other's death. He further contends that such an understanding is actually present in *Being and Time*, albeit in a discreet form. He (2005, 241, my italic) attempts "to follow the discreet lead of an unceasing meditation on friendship in *Heidegger's path of thinking*."⁷ His reading rests on an isolated sentence in the §34 of *Being and Time* where Heidegger, in his discussion of Dasein's relationship to discourse and language, mentions the hearing of the "voice of the friend" (*Stimme des Freundes*) that every Dasein carries (*trägt*) with it.⁸ Based on this reference, Derrida (1993b, 172) argues that "this voice is what permits Dasein to open itself to its own potentiality-for-Being."⁹

In this paper, through a close reading of his early and later texts, I demonstrate that Heidegger himself does not follow this kind of dynamic understanding of Being-with in his characterization of Dasein's Being-with other. To make my point evident, I focus on the ignored issue of mourning and loss in Heidegger and show that Heidegger's characterization of interpersonal relationships fails to account for the relationships in which one mourns after a close other that require the singularity of the other. I show that his analysis of mourning in his

⁷ See note 24 below.

⁸ The passage reads as follows: "Listening to . . . is Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it. Dasein hears, because it understands." (BT 206). Also, see (Fynsk 1993, 42–44) for another interpretation, which, as the author expresses in the acknowledgments, is strongly influenced by Derrida's interpretation of this passage.

⁹ Derrida (1993b, 164) justifies this interpretation through a close analysis of the passage that term "call" (*Ruf*) appears in *Being and Time* and in one of Heidegger's later work, *On the Way to Language*. See (Derrida 1993b, 167–68).

early and late work is strikingly in line with his collectivist understanding of Being-with. I conclude by arguing that even though Heidegger himself fails to explain the relationships in which one mourns after a close other, following the main insight of his defenders, we can develop a unique philosophical ground to understand the phenomenon of mourning in which mourning should be seen as equiprimordial with one's own death in opening one to the possibility of an authentic existence. Though the phenomenology of mourning I propose here with reference to Heidegger shares fundamental ideas with Derrida's interpretation – one being the idea that it is the experience of mourning that institutes my relation to myself (Derrida 1993a, 76), or as he eloquently puts “I mourn therefore I am” (Derrida 1995, 321) – it also differs from the one proposed by Derrida on a crucial point.¹⁰ My exposition stresses the contingent and singular *worldly milieu* that grounds the singularity of the other and mourning, [p. 482] whereas Derrida understands mourning as a part of the general ontological structure of human being and conceptualize it as “originary mourning” (Derrida 1993a, 65). In this respect, Derrida's philosophy of mourning deals more with the generality of mourning rather than the singularity of mourning, and it is dubious how it can account for the singularity of mourning. It is this idea of the singularity that the last section of the article foregrounds.

2. Dasein: An Ontologically Social Being

Heidegger contends that intersubjectivity is a fundamental part of human existence, without which the latter cannot be properly understood. This means that the world Dasein dwells in is always already a shared world. We do not need to first discover the existence of the other through an exclusive reflection focusing on it, but one's worldly existence is already a Being-with-others. Others are already there along with me in my everyday practical involvements. For instance, they are the listeners of the course I teach, readers of the article I write, helpers when I struggle carrying my bags, players in a card game I play, and so on. In other words, one's relations with other Daseins are already implied in one's practical engagements with worldly entities. Understood in this way, “Even ‘concern’ with food and clothing, and the nursing of the sick body, are forms of solicitude” (BT 158). Besides these direct practical relations, even when they are not readily present as a direct participant in my world, the world I dwell in is also imbued with the “traces” of others engrafted upon the things I am concerned with in my everyday life. The book I read is a trace of its author. The table I use is a trace of the carpenter who produced it. Hence, others are present, directly or indirectly, in my worldly

¹⁰ See note 21 below.

engagements. As Knudsen (2020, 733) puts it, “world happens in-being-with-one-another,” that is, one’s understanding of beings is at once an understanding of others.

However, according to Heidegger, one’s Being-with-others can either be authentic or inauthentic. When one’s relations with others are characterized by inauthenticity, Heidegger contends, he or she is doomed to be absorbed in the way others act and think and, thus, destined to be like *anyone*. In such a situation, properly speaking, the things one does are not *one’s own* doings, but it is this anonymous “anyone” (*das Man*)¹¹ that is the subject of those acts. That is to say, Dasein walks as *anyone* [p. 483] *else* walks. Dasein behaves in this or that situation as *anyone else* behaves. In this sense, “everyone is the other, and no one is himself” (BT 165), or more starkly put, “*Proximally*, it is not ‘I’, in the sense of my own Self, that ‘am’, but rather the Others, whose way is that of the *anyone*” (BT 167). Hence, as absorbed in the *anyone*, one blindly takes up the possibilities offered by his or her socio-historical context and acts, thinks, and interprets in accordance with them. In this situation, the possibilities shaping one’s life are mere accidents instead of one’s own chosen possibilities. Inauthentic Dasein lives in an undifferentiated and anonymous way. Hence, the *anyone* designates the anonymous and most immediate way of Being-with-others wherein one complies oneself to what is already handed down to him or her through mores and social practices. By hinging on that most proximate way of Being, Dasein gets a secure grip on existence at the expense of losing the possibility of living its own life.

3. The *Anyone* and the “Equipmentality” of the Social

A series of crucial questions arise at this point. Why does average everyday Being-with have the character of *anyone-ness* in the first place; that is, why is it that one’s proximal relations to others happen in an anonymous web of de-personalized and anonymized others? How and why does the encounter with other Daseins simultaneously slips into an impersonal totality? One reason we can pinpoint for the characterization of the primal sociality of Dasein as

¹¹ By the term *das Man*, as it is well-known by today, Heidegger misleadingly designates both the fundamental phenomenon of Being-with-others as constituting one of the existential structures of Dasein (BT 167-168; OHF 14) and the inauthentic mode of Being-with characterized by distantiality [*Abständigkeit*], levelling down [*Eninebnung*], and averageness [*Durchschnittlichkeit*]. Here, I will limit my use of *das Man* to the specific mode of Being-with, i.e., the inauthentic mode of Being-with-one-another. For the early discussions on this confusion in *Being and Time* see (Carman 1994; Dreyfus 1995; Olafson 1994a; 1994b). For some proposals for the solution to this problem, see (Boedeker 2001; Knowles 2017). In the context of this debate, it is also worth pointing out that Carman (2005, 286, 293) argues that besides Dasein’s authentic and inauthentic modes of Being, Heidegger also delineates a third mode, which is its “average everyday being,” itself “undifferentiated,” pure and simple, neither authentic nor inauthentic. Theunissen’s (1986, 193–98) reading rightfully challenges a clear-cut distinction between “the average everyday being” and the inauthentic mode of being we find in Carman’s reading.

others' dissolution into ubiquitous depersonalization is Heidegger's general understanding of Being in terms of the totality of involvements. Namely, just as the structure of Being-in indicates a referential totality of equipmental relations, the idea of Being-with implies a totality of involvements rather than specific singular encounters with a particular other. Just as a hammer refers to nails, nails refer to a blacksmith, and a blacksmith refers to an anvil, and at the end, one needs the whole toolbox and workshop to understand the nail; one makes sense of herself or himself as a professor thanks to students, shuttle drivers, security officers, minister of education etc. All these relationships are intelligible in so far as they define certain social relations among different persons, in which one takes up some practical roles without thinking about them and becomes absorbed in the totality of worldly relations that this role brings along with it. Proximally, a Dasein is just an *anyone*, that is, just a continuation of the referential whole of interrelated Daseins. Likewise, understood in terms of the *anyone*, the other is nothing more than *any other Dasein*. For, when related this way, a Dasein is completely *substitutable* by any other Dasein (BT 283-284).

Just as an item of equipment is understood through the referential totality of certain ready-to-hand involvements, a particular other is understood in terms of the *anyone* that signifies the referential totality of others primarily understood in terms of one's practical engagements. In this mode of Being-with, the other Dasein is not encountered in terms of *its existence as Dasein*, but instead, it is encountered in terms of *its worldly aspect*, that is, mainly in terms of *what it does*. In that sense, in this mode of Being-with, the other is not fully encountered. As Frederick Elliston (1978, 67) puts it, in the case of the inauthentic mode of solicitude in which one [p. 484] leaps in for the other, "the emphasis falls not on the person but on his world."¹² In other words, the emphasis in Heidegger's account of Being-with is on the *Being* part, rather than the *with* part. Thus, in this inauthentic way of Being-with-one-another, in a particular sense, the encounter with the other Dasein is primarily "equipmental," meaning that the others are understood essentially in terms of "what they do" (BT 163).

In this inauthentic mode of Being-with-one-another, the others are fundamentally encountered "at work (*in Arbeit*)" (BT 156) and along with "the work (*Werk*)" (BT 153). Just as one uses a hammer without reflecting on it, Dasein uses the rules, norms, and public standards of practical knowledge that are handed down to it by others without reflecting on them. By following those rules and norms, Dasein follows the *anyone*. Just as one is in a

¹² Figal (2005, 109) also aptly notes that "this 'concern that leaps in' is not an explicit relation to others." See also Theunissen (1986, 182)

certain “unity” with the equipment in a practical engagement, Dasein is absorbed in its relations with other Daseins as it is in a certain “unity” with the *anyone*. In its average everyday mode of Being-with, Dasein *is* anyone. For this reason, in this inauthentic mode of Being-with, in principle, a Dasein is completely substitutable with another Dasein. Strictly speaking, in this picture, the other has no character other than being *any other Dasein*; that is, as a Dasein, it has and may have no uniqueness as a singular and irreplaceable other (BT 283). In that sense, we can say that in this inauthentic mode of Being-with, others are encountered as “social equipment” because of the practical nature of this mode of relation wherein a Dasein is completely substitutable with another Dasein.¹³

One might oppose this point by arguing that Dasein’s understanding others through referential practical engagements does not necessarily entail that others are disclosed as substitutable members of a general type. We can imagine a technician or cook who is defined by his or her practical engagements within the work life. Imagine that this person has very rare expertise that makes him or her unique in the professional world. Would this person not be irreplaceable? In a certain sense, this would mean the non-substitutability of that Dasein. However, the point I make here is different from this. In delineating the others constituting the *anyone*, Heidegger argues that “These Others ... are not definite Others. On the contrary, any Other can represent them” (BT 164).¹⁴ This means that even if a Dasein may seem irreplaceable within a definite environment of practical relations, we can safely say [p. 485] that it is, *in principle*, replaceable with another Dasein. In the case of an allegedly irreplaceable professional, we can *in principle imagine another Dasein who is as good as the replaced one*, even if such a Dasein is not present at the moment. Since the other Dasein is understood merely in terms of its work, there is nothing that prevents us from conceiving of another Dasein who can do this work as competently as the others. We can conceptualize this difference as *particularity* of the other and the *singularity* of the other. Heidegger’s analysis of the inauthentic Being-with leaves room for the particularity of the other but it does not

¹³By designating others as “social equipment,” I mean neither that one simply uses other Daseins in his or her relations with them nor that other Daseins are simply ready-to-hand things that take their meaning through the totality of equipmental relations. Instead, in relating to others as “social equipment,” one does not simply use others but rather, as it is in the case of tools, one is a part of the equipmental whole, absorbed in the activity itself; one is a part of “the work” of others, understands himself or herself through the “works” of others. Stroh (2015, 248–49) also stresses this structural isomorphism between Heidegger’s analysis of Being-with and being of equipment in terms of the totality of involvements. However, by drawing attention to this parallelism between equipmentality and sociality, I do not only aim to emphasize that the other Daseins are encountered within a totality but also aim to show that in the inauthentic mode of Being-with, the other Daseins are encountered primarily through their “work” and practical aspect.

¹⁴ Also see (BT 283), where Heidegger lists “one’s occupation, one’s social status, or one’s age” under the situations in which one Dasein can be represented by another.

account for the singularity of the other. However, as I will show in the last section when I discuss relationship in which one mourns after an other, *the very possibility of one's mourning a close one rests on the impossibility of the replaceability of the other, i.e., the singularity of the other*. It is precisely this impossibility of replaceability that seems to be ignored in Heidegger's analysis of the authentic and inauthentic Being-with. Before coming to this point, we should first look at Heidegger's account of the authentic Being-with. What changes in Dasein's way of Being-with-others when Dasein exists self-owningly, i.e., authentically?

4. Becoming Authentic Through Others: From the *Anyone* to the Community

When it exists inauthentically, Dasein "is loaded down with the legacy of a 'past' which has become unrecognizable" (BT 444), given that Dasein has to be in conformity with what has been provided to it by others as the conditions of meaningfulness without necessarily making this "legacy" its own, be this "legacy" practical skills, social rules, roles, and manners. By ceasing to passively receive what is tacitly offered to it and choosing the choice by experiencing the anxiety engendered by death, Dasein re-appropriates this past through the lens of its resolute projection. What is changed in this new situation is the *manner* in which Dasein comports itself to those possibilities. Choosing the choice, Heidegger declares in a lofty manner, "makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated" (BT 437, also see 438). Interpretation is a repetition, but in this interpretation something new emerges. Resoluteness is a "*repetition* of a possibility of existence," i.e., "going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there" (BT 437). Hence, resolute Dasein sees what is bequeathed to it by the *anyone* in a new light. It re-appropriates traditional possibilities through a creative and critical reevaluation.

In this process of taking up the ownership of one's existence, not only does Dasein's understanding of its own existence and life change but also its understanding of other Daseins undergoes a radical transformation as well. What was previously with Dasein as a substitutable "social equipment" in its world gets understood as a distinct Dasein having its own potentiality for Being; thus, a totally new [p. 486] possibility of relating to it becomes possible.¹⁵ That is, Dasein's main mode of relating to other Daseins changes when it relates to them authentically. In Being-with them inauthentically, Dasein relates to other Daseins mainly through their work, i.e., through their worldly aspect. However, as Dasein's becomes more authentic, it starts to regard other Daseins as an inseparable and constitutive parts of

¹⁵ "As the non-relational possibility, death individualizes but only in such a manner that ... it makes Dasein, as Being-with, have some understanding of the potentiality-for-Being of Others" (BT 309).

one's own existence. This radical change in Dasein's understanding of other Daseins is decisive in becoming authentic. But why and how does death reveal others as having such a potentiality?

In its facing death, not only Dasein's own potentiality for Being is uncovered, but also other Daseins are revealed as having a certain potentiality for Being as well. This is the moment where the potentiality of becoming a *community or a people (das Volk)* appears. By virtue of this new mode of relating to others, Dasein does not simply relate to a collection of substitutable others that are encountered in indifferent modes of solicitude; for the authentic mode of solicitude "pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a 'what' with which he is concerned" (BT 159, original italic). What one *does* determines *what* one is. Yet, knowing what one is does not imply knowing who one is (H 54-55). *Who* one is, is defined not by what one does but by the *manner* one does what one does. The manner designates the other's distinctive way of Being. Given this distinction, we can say that in the authentic mode of Being-with, Dasein's understanding of the other shifts from the "what-ness" of the other to the "who-ness" of the other. Along with death and the question of *who I am*, the *ontological* question of *who the other is* becomes a question in one's Dasein (H 55). This change in Dasein's understanding of others is crucial for Heidegger's view of authentic Being-with, which I think is not sufficiently addressed and analyzed in the secondary literature.¹⁶

However, what is critical in Heidegger's characterization of the authentic mode of Being-with is that Dasein is still preceded by the unity and totality of a collectivity as in the case of the *anyone*. In the authentic mode of Being-with, individual Dasein is appropriated by a common destiny shared by its contemporaries and peers. Heidegger says, "Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make [p. 487] up the full authentic historicizing of

¹⁶ To mention just some of the most recent studies on this topic, see (McMullin 2013; Knudsen 2020; Thonhauser 2017; Weichold 2017; Stroh 2015). Though McMullin's discussion of Being-with as at once an intraworldly and world-constituting event is very helpful, I do not think that her claim that "the *entire Fürsorge* continuum involves a being-toward the other *qua Dasein*" (McMullin 2013, 145, italics in original) is textually well supported. I agree with McMullin that a more primordial relationship with other Daseins in terms of its existence must precede the sharp distinction between inauthentic and authentic Being-with (here, Carman's (2005) interpretation becomes more tempting). But Heidegger, in contradistinction to McMullin's idea, seems very straightforward in his claim that only when one faces the finitude of oneself through the anxious encounter with death, does one start to relate to others as world-bearing beings. Thonhauser and Weichold, in turn, disregard any such difference in Dasein's understanding of other Daseins between inauthentic and authentic modes of Being-with in their analysis of social authenticity. While Stroh's novel reading is in line with my reading in stressing the analogical similarity between equipmentality and sociality, his interpretation pays no attention to the radical modification in Dasein's understanding of other individual Daseins. Theunissen's (1984, 182f) classical treatment of the issue remains one of the most faithful interpretations of this issue.

Dasein” (BT 436). In authentic Being-with-one-another, the existence of individual Daseins is taken hold of as “they devote themselves to the same affair in common” (BT 159). Co-historizing is a community of Daseins’ projecting themselves to the future by listening to the call of the same traditional heritage and collective destiny that deliver them over their individual possibilities.¹⁷ In other words, the individual fate of a Dasein has already been shaped in advance because of its situatedness in a particular community and culture at a given time in history. “The full authentic historizing of Dasein” can only be achieved by letting the power of destiny that one share with its “generation” spring by virtue of struggle (*Kampf*, Heidegger’s rendering of the Greek term *Pólemos*) (BT 426). Thus, in Heidegger’s analysis of the authentic Being-with-one-another, the individual Dasein seems to be subordinated to the Dasein of the community. While one is not free in the inauthentic Being-with-others, freedom in Dasein’s authentically Being-together-with-others is regarded primarily in terms of Dasein’s capacity for giving itself over a communal goal.¹⁸

5. Heidegger and the Problem of Being-With A Singular Other

What is missed in these characterizations, as Nancy (2008, 10) aptly diagnoses, is no less than losing any possibility of a real Being-with that retains the individuality of the related terms while sustaining an essential bond between them. Neither a community of a generation of the same destiny nor one’s immediate sociality defined primarily by practical relations with others affords a significant role to more personalized forms of Being-with such as close friendship and partnership both in the constitution of these social relationships and in the process of one’s authentically Being-with-others. In Heidegger’s characterization, while in the inauthentic Being-with-one-another the other Daseins are related mainly through their worldly aspect instead of their world-constituting aspect, authentic and resolute living connection between Daseins indicates “sacrifice” and “service” (NHS 63). Hence, strictly speaking,

¹⁷ This idea of “co-disclosing” or “co-historizing” gains a more solid expression and overt political overtones in Heidegger’s lecture courses from the 1930s as he talks about the *people* and its relationship with the *Führer* in an overt manner. We find a more comprehensive exploration of these themes that are hastily treated in *Being and Time* in Heidegger’s two lecture courses from the subsequent semesters of 1933-1934 where Heidegger takes up the issue of the community more directly. See especially (NHS 57, 63-4; L 140-142; H 22, 198-9). For a selection of Heidegger’s writings, speeches, and letters showing his relationship with the nationalist socialist party, see (Wolin 1993). Among the vast literature on Heidegger and Nazism, maybe the most well-known, controversial, and vociferous is Emmanuel Fayé’s (2005) massive book. For a more moderate approach to this issue, also see (Karademir 2013).

¹⁸ According to Heidegger, one’s communal bonds designate one’s freedom, that is, one’s freedom to become true to one’s Being, freedom to resolutely give oneself over a goal (NHS 63). In that regard, it is not surprising that Heidegger, in his rectoral speech in 1933, despises “false academic freedom” marked by “lack of concern, [and] arbitrariness in one’s intentions and inclinations” in favor of true freedom dedicated to a greater goal, through which “the bond and service of the German student will unfold” (SGU 475-476).

Heidegger construal of intersubjectivity in *Being and Time* seems to remain unable to make sense of any genuine self-owned (authentic) way of Being-with-others that does not refer to or dissolve into a higher collectivity. [p. 488]

However, do we really encounter the other primarily as a part of a larger unity, or does our phenomenal intersubjective experience also involve an irreducible and constitutive encounter with Others in their singularity? Does not this characterization of intersubjectivity obviate the possibility of making sense of a genuine singular relation with a particular other as manifested in the experience of mourning, which is conditional upon the irreplaceability and uniqueness of the other? A fatal consequence of such failure would be to miss the essence of some social phenomena which are among of the most important social relationships constituting one's world, such as friendship, partnership and parenthood. How can we – if at all – understand the singularity of some social relationships through a conception of Being-with-others characterized mainly in terms of one's resolute devotion to extra-personal heritage? Does not Heidegger's characterization of intersubjectivity obviate any possibility of a genuine individual relation with a particular other found, for instance, in relationships of genuine love and friendship in which one mourns after the death of the other?

In response to these questions, Koo (2016, 101–2) argues that a more nuanced reading of *Being and Time* can show that Heidegger's ontology can make room for an “experience of distinctive otherness.” Though this claim by itself seems apt, Koo's argument for it remains unfinished in several aspects. Even if we concede that Being-with defined as anonymous shared rules and norms is the necessary condition of any account of the singularity of other, this claim, in itself, does not suffice to show that the singularity of the other *is* acknowledged in Heidegger's own account. In that regard, Koo's negligence of Heidegger's own characterization of the authentic mode of Being-with leaves his argument limited since, as I have shown in my exposition above, in Heidegger's characterization of Being-with, a genuine mutuality between Daseins is meaningful only within the context of broader community-size relationships determined by the historical being of a community; that is, one's self-owned way of Being-with requires situating oneself in a historical community. Hence, Koo's argument only shows that Heidegger's notion of Being-with gives us the minimum necessary condition for any account of the singularity of the other.

Knudsen's (2020) meticulous exposition of Heidegger's social ontology can be seen as filling this crucial shortcoming in Koo's argument. Though his argument does not directly concern Heidegger's own construal of the authentic mode of Being-with, Knudsen makes a

convincing case for how Heideggerian social ontology can explain the singularity of the other. He shows that because the “world happens in-being-with-one-another,” what is at stake in each relationship with the other is nothing but the world itself. With reference to Heidegger’s *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Knudsen demonstrates that the phenomena of world-sharing should be understood as a process of world-building. The world gains new configurations in every social relation in a way that “As inherently social, we cannot guard ourselves against the ontological significance of others because they have the power radically to reconfigure the world that we share with them. In this way, the very structure of the world is at stake in our social relations” (Knudsen 2020, 735). Thus, each relationship with the other must be understood as constructing the world itself.

The experience of mourning gives us one of the most riveting examples of the other’s power to radically reconfigure the world that we share with them. The [p. 489] phenomenological analysis of mourning I will present in the next section allows us to address the singularity of the other in concrete personal encounters without disregarding the worldly background of those encounters. However, it bears noting that given my exposition of Heidegger’s own way of construing the authentic Being-with, it seems appropriate to maintain that *Heidegger himself did not choose to explore this dimension of the Being-with*. Instead, as my exposition of his understanding of mourning will show, he is more interested in the anonymous aspect of the Being-with rather than the ways our social relationships are built upon the singular others. Thus, it would be helpful to distinguish what we can do with Heideggerian philosophy and what Heidegger himself does with his own philosophy. Hence, the question that will lead the investigation of the following section will be the following: How can we understand, if we can at all, the phenomena of mourning and loss of a close one by means of Heidegger’s analysis of intersubjectivity?

6. Mourning, Friendship, and Dasein

Before moving on to my take on the issue, it would be helpful to briefly look at how Heidegger himself approaches the experience of mourning. Two texts seem central for such a task: *Being and Time* and his lecture course from the 1934-1935 winter semester, *Hölderlin’s Hymns: “Germania” and “The Rhine.”* In *Being and Time*, Heidegger talks about mourning as a mood (*Befindlichkeit*) that emerges as a result of a strange sort of solicitude, i.e., one’s being-with-the-dead. He stresses that one’s Being-with-the-dead is not simply Being-along with a dead person [Gestorbenen] but being with a deceased [Verstorbenen], being “with him

in a mode of respectful solicitude” (BT 282, original italic). He further maintains that “we are always just ‘there alongside’” (Ibid) the dying other since we cannot participate in the event of dying that the other suffers. However, through this analysis, Heidegger does not aim to show the particularity of the deceased but instead that one’s being with a deceased is not equal to one’s concerned being alongside entities. The only significance attributed to mourning for the dead in this part of *Being and Time*, it seems, is it shows the “mineness” of the death in an essential manner. One’s Being-with-the-dead evinces that “The dying of Others is not something which we experience in a genuine sense; at most we are always just ‘there alongside’ [... *sind* ... ‘*dabei*’]” (BT 282). For this reason, he argues that the dying of the other cannot give us the proper existential meaning of death, which reveals itself as Dasein’s ownmost potentiality, which cannot be outstripped from it.

Besides this more apparent conception of mourning, I want to question if we can discern another notion of mourning in *Being and Time*, one which, albeit in a more discreet fashion, actually animates a large portion of this work. Dasein is completely lost and alienated from its ownmost potentiality for Being, and hence longs for itself. In facing death as its ownmost possibility, Dasein recognizes its own absence, its “death” in the anyone, so to speak. This existential longing for oneself on the way to authenticity discloses itself by the call of conscience (*Gewissen*) and as ordinary guilt (*Schuldigsein*). Can we see Dasein’s fundamental being guilty, which brings it [p. 490] before the essential “not,” the essential nullity at the core of its being as a peculiar form of mourning, a mourning for oneself? Can we say that one’s taking up ownership of one’s existence is a work of mourning, the work one undertakes as a result of the death of his or her *anyone-self*? In that sense, can we regard Dasein’s tearing itself apart from the *anyone* as a process of mournful re-creation? Can we argue that Dasein, being constantly before its own death, lives on the brink of mourning? The call of conscience that calls one out of one’s indulgence in *anyone* to one’s true self, can it be interpreted as a call for mourning? Obviously, Heidegger does not formulate the existential guilt and the call of conscience in terms of mourning and one’s longing for oneself. But would it mean a betrayal if we were to translate his ideas in this way? Though this question deserves a thorough treatment of its own, within the purview of this article, I will suffice to propose this reading as an attractive possible interpretation.

A third conception of mourning is found in Heidegger’s lecture course “*Germania*” and “*The Rhine*.” In this text, a still more intriguing and abstruse concept of mourning is at play. In line with the thoughts he started to develop at the beginning of 1930s, in these Hölderlin courses, Heidegger puts special emphasis on the role of poetry in the historical

constitution of the *People*. He seems to be convinced that the awakening of individual Dasein's potentiality for Being is at once "a true gathering of individuals into an original community" (H 7), which in turn is mediated by language and poetry (*Dichtung*). Heidegger's obscure ideas concerning mourning in this lecture course are shaped precisely around this idea. He speaks of the "fundamental attunement [*Stimmung*] of mourning [*Trauer*]," which "opens up beings as a whole [...] in an essential manner" (H 75). By designating it a fundamental attunement, he distinguishes this notion of mourning from any kind of transitory feeling or mere psychic phenomenon and further maintains that it discloses the Being of beings as a "readied distress" (H 147). From those two characterizations, the similarity between the anxiety of *Being and Time* and the mourning of the Hölderlin text might seem strikingly similar. However, to the extent that anxiety is characterized as a solitary experience in *Being and Time*, mourning in this text has an indispensable and direct relation to one's Being-with-others in a historical manner. Heidegger puts this point clearly when he contends that "The fundamental attunement of a holy mourning [*heilige Trauer*] in readied distress, out of which *it is no longer an 'I' who speaks, but a 'we'*" (H 97, my emphasis). This is a sort of mourning that "[determines] for us the locale from which beings as a whole can be experienced anew" (H 121). But this experience is at once preceded by the historicity of Dasein's Being-with, i.e., the fact that Dasein's existence is also bound to the destiny of a people. "[M]ourning" in this regard is "that fundamental attunement in which [...] destiny [...] can be experienced." *The essential attunement of mourning reveals itself as a historical call for the truth of a people*. For this reason, it is, above all, a "mourning 'with' the homeland" (H 80), which "takes root in the land" (H 84). Thus, we can say that we are speaking of a mourning in the absence of a potential *people* rather than a potential *self*. One longs for an absent community, not for an absent self. As Heidegger puts it, "The distress is grounded in a readiness to receive those who are coming as the truth of the Earth and of the homeland" (H 204). Hence, mourning delineates "a readiness that is an [p. 491] awaiting" (H 130) for such a people. Within mourning speaks the joyful awaiting of the gathering of a people.¹⁹

If we accept the possible reading that I proposed above as genuine, it becomes striking that even Heidegger's philosophy of mourning is riveted to two extreme edges, a mournful longing for oneself on the one hand, and a mournful yearning for the true community on the

¹⁹ The fact that Heidegger examines this calling for a people in terms of the fundamental attunement of mourning may provide indirect textual support for the reading of conscience's call as a call for mourning that I proposed in the previous paragraph.

other hand. Yet, regardless of the correctness of that reading, Heidegger's account still lacks a middle term, a more intimate or personal form of friendship, in which resides the possibility of a completely different sort of mourning. This lack is far from being a simple absence of the concept of friendship in Heidegger. Obviously, we can certainly furnish ourselves with such a conception of friendship within the purview of Heidegger's thought.²⁰ However, we would still lack in this concept a true appreciation of the far-reaching significance of mourning and the social relationships that bear its possibility.²¹ In the subsequent paragraphs, I will try to explain what I mean by the far-reaching significance of mourning-engendering social bonds.

7. A Phenomenology of Mourning

In Heidegger, death founds the possibility of Dasein's individuality and wholeness by individualizing it. But why does death individualize Dasein? Because it is its ownmost possibility. That is, the only thing that I cannot represent with another Dasein is my own death (BT 283-284), which reminds or shows me what is [p. 492] fundamentally my own. This is precisely the reason why, according to Heidegger, the dying of others cannot give us the true existential analysis of death (BT 284). Yet, is it not that, when one mourns, what reveals itself is also an un-sharable possibility? Is not the friendship between the survivor and the deceased for whom one mourns an un-sharable and completely unique experience for the survivor?²² It

²⁰ For such an exposition, see (Derrida 1993b, 172; 2005, 241, 236).

²¹ Derrida (2005, 241) argues that Heidegger's concept of Being-with-others allows us to conceive the existential depth of other's death, but such an understanding is actually present in *Being and Time*, albeit in a discreet form. Derrida argues that "the voice of the friend" can also be a source of the uprooting that brings Dasein to its ownmost possibility for existence. Thus, he (2005, 236) contends that what is at issue in Heidegger's idea of "the call of the friend" might be "minimal community" or "minimal friendship" as the ground of any other form of sociality. However, even if we understand Heideggerian Being-with as a sort of "minimal friendship" preceding any other form of sociality including both the harmonious ones such as friendships and disharmonious ones such as war and conflict, this basic and fundamental friendship would be purely ontological. As being purely ontological, this notion of friendship would be categorically different from the ontic notion of friendship which is precisely the one at stake in the experiences of mourning and loss. Even if we concede the existence of this concept of friendship grounding all other intersubjective relations, the impersonal "friends" that constitute it would hardly be the sort whom I can mourn. For, can we mourn such a friend, which seems to be so anonymous, i.e., a mere ontological condition shared by all Daseins? The friend in Derrida's reading is simply someone, an other Dasein, and not necessarily someone significant or close. In other words, "the friend" in Derrida's reading seems too figurative. After all, if all others are friends, does not the category "friend" become useless, empty without any concrete content? To be even sharper, it is hard to see what actually such an interpretation contributes to our understanding of Heidegger as it seems to simply replace the word "other" with "the friend" without suggesting what this reading would imply for Heidegger's problematic treatment of the *anyone* and the *people*. Thus, the friend Derrida finds in his reading of Heidegger seems still too general and ontological.

²² To be precise, here, my point here is not that there is no social dimension to the experience of dying or mourning. Instead, I argue that if we follow the Heideggerian characterization of death as having an unsharable existential significance, we should also make the same claim for mourning. In other words, the existential solitude, or as Heidegger somewhere else calls "metaphysical isolation" (MFL 137) that Dasein experiences when it confronts death can also be experienced due to the constant possibility of mourning and loss. However, this socially exclusive aspect of mourning and death is just a dimension of an otherwise thoroughly social

seems that the experience of loss and friendship are intelligible only in so far as the other after whom one mourns can stand outside the ubiquitous anonymity of others and be relatable in its singularity. We can even claim that this uniqueness is what makes mourning possible. What is left behind after the loss of a beloved one is not a simple lack, but rather the irreplaceability of the lost one is revealed in the most conspicuous way. One's sadness can be shared, but whether one's grief can be, is highly doubtful, if not impossible. "I share your sorrow," we can say, but not "I share your loss," or "I share your mourning." In that regard, mourning is what is one's ownmost, non-relational, and un-surmountable, if we were to use Heideggerian terminology. Thanks to this uniqueness of the lost other, mourning and grief has a fundamentally solitary dimension. In a certain sense, no one can take one's mourning and grief away from oneself. Every mourning must be different. Just as one cannot be represented by another at one's death, one cannot be represented by another in one's mourning and loss. One mourns alone, just as one dies alone. Hence, in a very similar manner that Heidegger speaks of one's own death, we can say that "mineness" and "existence" seems to be ontologically constitutive for mourning (BT 284).

The loss of an irreplaceable other may even lead us to question our own Being: Who am I that is here and now, left behind you who is no more? In an other's death, the Being of one's own may become an issue for oneself, a burden so unbearable that it may lead one to think of not-to-be. What is the meaning of to be, and in particular, to be after you? Does life deserve to be lived after you? Namely, with the death of a beloved, one may be called forth into his or her own possibilities, including deciding on being or not being. The death of the other may also bring to bear the question of Being in its utterly overwhelming weight. Sometimes, with the guilt and weight of having to be, having to live, existing itself may become a burden on one's shoulders after the loss. The other's death can be seen as the ultimate mode of conscience, for the one who survived may immediately be challenged by the death of the other: Why is it me who survived? Am I guilty of surviving after the other's death? Even if the essential shock one may find oneself in when experiencing a loss is not that strong to lead one to question the meaning of one's very existence, it [p. 493] can still disclose the nothingness of everything, their essential groundlessness, by severing one from its average everyday moorings. For instance, in some cases of the slow death of a terminally

phenomenon. Different aspects of the sociality of death have been analyzed through historical (Aries, 1977), anthropological (Seale 1998, 50-73), and sociological perspectives (Charmaz 1980, 162-165). Besides these, the essays in (Hagman 2016, 65-115) show the irrevocable intersubjective dimension of mourning in psychoanalytic treatment. Most recently, Nina Lykke (2022, 7-23) has shown that non-human actors can also be a part of the intersubjective dimension of mourning.

ill close one, the question “Why is it me who survived?” might be irrelevant. However, even in these cases, the loss can still loosen the grip of the average everyday and disrupt the assumption of the given significance of the everyday involvements. Upon the death of a close friend who had been suffering from cancer for a year, I may not find myself asking, “why is it me who is alive, rather than them?” as this question might be irrelevant. However, the loss could still cause the collapse of the received everyday significance and make me stumble upon the question concerning the authenticity of the everyday significance.²³

Hence, in face of the death of another, it is not simply that “at most we are always just ‘there alongside’” him or her (BT 282), but the death of the other may “undo” us in a fundamental way. By losing one of our beloved ones, for instance, with the death of our beloved partner, we do not simply observe a mere abolishing, but instead, we lose, as it were, a “part” of us. In losing someone, we neither simply lose some future possibilities, some memories that are not yet, nor only a particular life in the world. Rather, through the death of a fellow, we lose a world.²⁴

In the loss of a beloved, something is severed from our Being, leaving such emptiness behind it that at first seems irrecoverable, as if we come to the end of the world, as if we have no longer any other possibility. One’s factual possibilities relating to that person are gone for good. A lost close one cannot be brought back, whence the shocking possibility of impossibility. What one loses when he or she loses a friend is not simply something outside of, something totally other to Dasein. *The friend takes away the world along with its passing away.* Thus, what happens in the loss of a significant other cannot be simply characterized as that “The deceased has abandoned our ‘world’ and left it behind” and we as survivors can “still be with him” (BT 282, original italic). Heidegger maintains that “we are always just ‘there alongside’” (Ibid) the dying other since we cannot participate in the event of dying that the other suffers. If the deceased [Verstorbenen] is not simply a dead person [Verstorbenen], it is partly because the deceased is the one who takes away our world with them. With the loss of a significant other, we may lose our world and, in some sense, can die alongside the deceased. Were the lost one completely outside of Dasein’s existence, it would indicate the

²³ Stolorow (2011, 70; 2007), in his autobiographical narrative, emphasizes this aspect of death following the death of his beloved wife due to cancer.

²⁴ A similar point is made by Stolorow (2021, 2). Outside the context of Heidegger, the idea that a part of us dies with the death of a significant other has also been maintained by Butler (2004, 22) and Charmaz (1980, 17). In a eulogy upon the death of Louis Althusser, Derrida (2001, 115) also eloquently expresses a similar thought: “What is coming to an end, what Louis [Althusser] is taking away with him, is not only something or other that we would have shared at some point or another, in one place or another, but the world itself, a certain origin of the world his origin, no doubt, but also that of the world in which I lived, in which we lived a unique story.”

substitutability of what is lost, which could result in feelings of being sorry, sad, pitiful, merciful, and so on, but not mourning. In-so-far as mourning reveals “the ‘nothing’ of the world” where the world withdraws itself and things show themselves “in an empty mercilessness” (BT 393), we can say the mourning is an anxiety-engendering phenomenon *par excellence*. It is in this sense that death and loss can be existentially equiprimordial (Stolorow 2021, 1; Agosta 2010, 60). [p. 494]

To sum up, the loss of the other can be an appeal to my existence. It may withdraw Dasein from the flow of experiences and lead it towards itself, towards its own existence and potentiality for Being. With the death of the other, Dasein’s extant understanding of itself can be shaken.²⁵ It can be solicited to its own Being. Hence, what is traversed in exposure to loss is no less than one’s ownmost potentiality for Being. When the other is dead, I can be called to myself by this loss. For I can be “undone” by this loss, as a constitutive of my world, it indicates a collapse in my world, a collapse which reveals the nothingness lying at the core of my existence thanks to the crack it opens at the heart of my world. Through the crack, nothingness may show itself. Hence, the phenomenon of loss may disclose that one is thrown into the world but attached to it through love. The loss of those friends or relationships can call for mourning, which is, above all, a call for new relationships and a new kind of relationship with the lost one.

8. Conclusion

As a result, Heidegger’s analysis of intersubjectivity, by and large, remains tethered to a sort of collectivism. In this view, the individual Dasein is drifting along towards either a “they” or a “we.” In this characterization of Being-with-others, the primacy of collectivity over

²⁵ A similar point has been made by Levinas who argues that the “Death of the other” is “the first death” (Levinas 2000, 43). However, in Levinas, this affectivity (which he sometimes delineates by the term “trauma”) remains on the level of abstract transcendence that opens us to infinity. In tandem with this, we see a very limited interest in Levinas towards what we can regard as the “worldly” aspect of losing the other, that is, the experience of mourning and loss. The more “ontic” or “mundane” feelings are absorbed into a more primordial experience of responsibility. The other remains infinitely distant from me in its absolute singularity, inaccessible and nonmanifest. For this reason, my relation to the other can only be a “relation without relation” (Levinas 1969, 80). The other is out-worldly (in the Heideggerian sense), or beyond Being. In that regard, the death of the other, for Levinas, signifies the ethical demand of death for the other. Thus, though Levinas thinks a great deal about death, he rarely gives special attention to mourning and loss. It should come as no surprise that we even barely encounter the word in Levinas’ oeuvre. To further Tina Chanter’s (2001, 221) correct observation, we can say that Levinas devotes his life to the mourning of philosophy but barely to a philosophy of mourning. The experience of mourning allows us to demonstrate *the singularity of the other within a worldly milieu*, i.e., in a context of situational meanings, without disregard for the worldly aspect of those encounters as we find in Levinas’ argument. In that regard, my argument seeks to open a path between Levinasian account of the singularity of the other and the Heideggerian accounts of particularity of the other, and thus shows a compelling third possibility between them.

singularity already holds sway from the start. What is lacking in this analysis of Being-with, as I have argued, is an account of a form of sociality capable of explaining the relationship between Daseins without letting this relationship dissolve into a totality of a larger collective whole, be it a community or the anonymous nexus of practical social relationships. In keeping with this picture, Heidegger's philosophy of mourning is also riveted to two extreme edges, a mournful longing for oneself on the one hand, and a mournful yearning for the true community on the other hand. The fact that the dual analysis is also found in his [p. 495] understanding of mourning strongly suggests that this is not only the "content" but also "the path of thinking" that is taken by Heidegger.²⁶

However, even if such a path is not pursued by Heidegger himself, his existential analysis of human existence allows us to develop a philosophical ground to understand the phenomenon of mourning. Heidegger was unable, or perhaps unwilling, to push his concept of Being-with to its necessary conclusions. However, even if he did not focus on or take seriously the relationships in which one mourns after a near other, by using Heidegger's own philosophical framework, we can argue that facing loss can be equiprimordial with one's own death in opening one to the possibility of an authentic existence.

In so far as the others are constitutive of my world, the loss of a close one indicates the loss of a world. A friend can take away the world along with its passing away. The experience of mourning allows us to demonstrate *the singularity of the other within a worldly milieu*, i.e., in a context of situational meanings, without disregard for the worldly aspect of those encounters. Given this phenomenology of mourning and its anxiety-engendering nature, we can also conclude that the existential anxiety before one's own death is accompanied by an at least equiprimordial event of loss resulting in mourning. We are not only living at the horizon of our own death but also of the death of others. The death of the other may be the first place where death reveals its existential significance. It reveals itself as a loss.

In addition to this, I also suggested that a more discreet notion of mourning can be at play in *Being and Time*, one which animates a large portion of this work. According to that

²⁶ Here, my reference is to a passage appearing at the very beginning of Heidegger's (1969, 23) *Identity and Difference* and Derrida's (2005, 241) claim that there is "an unceasing meditation on friendship in Heidegger's path of thinking." It reads as follows: "When thinking attempts to pursue something that has claimed its attention, it may happen that on the way it undergoes a change. It is advisable, therefore, in what follows to pay attention to the path of thought rather than to its content." It bears noting that Derrida is sometimes more careful with his reading of Heidegger, as he asserts the problematic of mourning as he deals with it "has only a very limited affinity with that of Heidegger" (Derrida 1995, 321) and he contends that "In *Being and Time*, the existential analysis does not want to know anything about the ghost [revenant] or about mourning" (Derrida 1993a, 60).

possible interpretation, Dasein's self-less involvement in the *anyone* can be seen as a loss of self. In facing death as its ownmost possibility, Dasein recognizes its own absence, its "death" in the anyone, so to speak. This existential longing for oneself on the way to authenticity discloses itself by the call of conscience (Gewissen) and as originary guilt (Schuldigsein). In that respect, I argued that one's taking up ownership of one's existence may be regarded as a work of mourning, the work one undertakes as a result of the death of his or her anyone-self. According to this interpretation, Dasein's tearing itself apart from the anyone can be regarded as a process of mournful re-creation.

Thus, both in the case of facing one's own death and others, one is called for a work of mourning, to work through a loss. Given the phenomenology of mourning and the latter's anxiety-engendering nature, I have shown that the way to a self-owned (authentic) existence can be characterized as a labor of mourning. In this new understanding of authenticity, to the extent that one mourns, one becomes oneself. [p. 496]

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