Negative Epistemic Exemplars


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Abstract
In this chapter, we address the roles that exemplars might play in a comprehensive response to epistemic injustice. Fricker defines epistemic injustices as harms people suffer specifically in their capacity as (potential) knowers. We focus on testimonial epistemic injustice, which occurs when someone’s assertoric speech acts are systematically met with either too little or too much credence by a biased audience. Fricker recommends a virtue-theoretic response: people who do not suffer from biases should try to maintain their disposition towards naive testimonial justice, and those who find themselves already biased should cultivate corrective testimonial justice by systematically adjusting their credence in testimony up or down depending on whether they are hearing from someone whom they may be biased against or in favor of. We doubt that the prominent admiration-emulation model of exemplarism will be much use in this connection, so we propose two ways of learning from negative exemplars to better conduct one’s epistemic affairs. In the admiration-emulation model, both the identification of what a virtue is and the cultivation of virtues identified thusly proceed through the admiration of virtuous exemplars. We show that this model has serious flaws and argue for two alternatives: the envy-agonism model and the ambivalence-avoidance model.

Keywords
epistemic virtue, epistemic exemplar, admiration, envy, ambivalence, epistemic injustice

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Introduction

In this chapter, we address the roles that exemplars might play in a comprehensive response to epistemic injustice. Fricker (2007) defines epistemic injustices as harms people suffer specifically in their capacity as (potential) knowers. While recognizing that distributive epistemic injustice is rampant, insofar as members of disadvantaged groups tend to receive worse educations, in this paper we are especially interested in addressing what Fricker calls testimonial epistemic injustice, which occurs when someone’s assertoric speech acts are systematically met with either too little or too much credence by a biased audience. The bias in question could be explicit or implicit (or both). In either case, a society in which testimonial epistemic injustices are commonplace is one in which some people’s assertions are unjustifiably ignored, met with excessive skepticism, or never solicited, while other people’s assertions are solicited even when they have nothing valuable to add, echoed and amplified without warrant, and accepted without the application of sufficient critical scrutiny. Various epistemic harms are likely to be endemic to such a society, afflicting not just those whose testimony is quashed but also audiences (and audiences of audiences) that fail to learn as much and as well as they otherwise could -- not to mention the difficulty of reality-testing when surrounded by yes-men (sometimes referred to in popular culture as a symptom of ‘affluenza’).

Fricker recommends a virtue-theoretic response to the problem of testimonial epistemic injustice: people who do not suffer from biases should try to maintain their disposition towards naive testimonial justice, and those who find themselves already biased should cultivate corrective testimonial justice by systematically adjusting their credence in testimony up or down depending on whether they are hearing from someone whom they may be biased against or in favor of. Sherman (2015) has argued that this injunction is hopeless. If I believe that I’m putting too little credence in what you have to say, I’ll already have adjusted my credences, and if I think I’m putting just the right amount of credence in what you have to say, I’ll regard any adjustment as epistemically unwarranted. Perhaps when it comes to asking questions, I could realize that I’ve sought too much testimony from one party and not enough from another, but in Fricker’s core case of adjusting one’s credence in testimony that one has already received, there seems to be a serious problem.

Sherman argues that this problem is so intractable that we should abandon the project of correcting testimonial epistemic injustice by cultivating corrective virtues. In this chapter, we

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2 Medina (2012) and Yap (2017) have convincingly argued that, while credibility deficits may be more obviously problematic, credibility excesses deserve a place in the epistemic rogues gallery.
contend that this move is premature: while a purely individualized virtue-theoretic response to epistemic injustice is a non-starter, there remains room for community-level cultivation of corrective dispositions and eradication of biases.3 That said, we argue that the leading community-level approach to corrective dispositions—identifying exemplars through admiration and emulation—is problematic. Instead, we propose two ways of learning from negative exemplars to better conduct one’s epistemic affairs.

Here is the plan for this paper: in section 1, we sketch the most popular exemplarist framework in contemporary philosophy, the admiration-emulation model, in which both the identification of what a virtue is and the cultivation of virtues identified thusly proceed through the admiration of exemplars. We show that this model has serious flaws regardless of whether exemplars are assumed to embody naive testimonial justice or corrective testimonial justice. Next, in section 2, we spell out an alternative framework: the envy-agonism model. Then, in section 3, we articulate the (mutually compatible) ambivalence-avoidance model. Both count as negative exemplarisms because they are rooted in negative emotional reactions to imperfect exemplars. We conclude by speculating about future directions for research using the envy-agonism and ambivalence-avoidance models.

1 The admiration-emulation model

Exemplarism has a long history in both Christian philosophy (emerging especially in Augustine, on which see Kondoleon 1970) and Chinese philosophy (most notably in Confucianism, on which see Olberding 2012). In both traditions, the basic idea is to start not with abstract principles that guide the cultivation and expression of virtue, but with admired individuals, whom one imitates or emulates. In the Christian tradition on which Zagzebski’s (2004) exemplarism is based, the prime exemplar is God. Becoming divine may seem like a tall order, so this version of exemplarism comes with a bridge: the incarnation of Jesus Christ. While emulating the disembodied Father may be intimidating, modeling oneself on the embodied Son is expected to be less daunting. The WWJD meme has its origins in the Bishop of Hippo.

In this model, one begins by admiring the exemplar. Admiration, if it survives reflective scrutiny, motivates the admirer to both understand better the psychic economy of the exemplar and to emulate the exemplar’s (inner and outer) life. In her more recent work, Zagzebski (2017) expands the range of exemplars worth emulating to include non-divine and non-Christian individuals, laying out a taxonomy of three types: the saint (who exemplifies compassion), the sage (who exemplifies wisdom), and the hero (who exemplifies courage). It is not a straightforward task to translate this taxonomy to the epistemic realm. Is someone who practices

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3 A comprehensive approach would, among other things, evaluate and modify the structure of social epistemic networks with an eye to amplifying messages that need to be heard and dampening testimonial sources that are unreliable or otherwise objectionable (Alfano & Skorburg 2017a).
epistemic justice a saint? Intuitively not, since the saint goes beyond what justice demands. But practicing epistemic justice does not seem to be a matter of heroism or sagacity, either.

While Zagzebski does briefly note that an epistemic exemplar might be a genius, even geniuses do not necessarily exemplify the dispositions associated with testimonial justice. Their epistemic excellences are, in the first instance, self-regarding rather than other-regarding: the genius excels at creativity and discovery, which furnish the genius herself with epistemic goods (though these could be subsequently conferred on others as well). Someone who embodies testimonial justice, by contrast, manages to refrain from harming others in their capacity as knowers.

What would an exemplar of testimonial justice look like? Fricker (2007) helpfully distinguishes two types of testimonial justice: naive and corrective. The exemplar of naive testimonial justice would be someone uncorrupted by sexist, racist, and other prejudices that lead people to place too little epistemic trust in women and minorities while lending too much weight to the utterances of white men. Such a person might resemble Prince Myshkin in Dostoyevsky’s *The Idiot* (1874 / 2004). In any event, there is an essential difficulty in emulating or imitating such an epistemic naïf: once innocence is lost, it cannot be regained. We cannot return from our postlapsarian world to epistemic Eden, no matter how much we might admire those who never tasted the forbidden apple.

Fricker (2007) recognizes this problem and suggests that, rather than trying to restore our epistemic innocence, we should self-consciously aim to correct the biases that we know we embody. In the admiration-emulation model, this translates to identifying -- through the sentiment of admiration -- people who have managed to corral their biases, then following in their footsteps. This raises five thorny problems. First, exemplars of corrective testimonial justice are likely to be invisible. Second, visible exemplars -- if they are too close to perfection -- are liable to provoke resentment rather than admiration. Third, admiration may be unreliable, especially in this context. Fourth, the admiration-emulation model seems to be a recipe for the (epistemically) rich getting richer, which seems contrary to the ideal of epistemic justice. Finally, the admiration-emulation model only makes use of a sliver of one’s social network, *presuming that it’s impossible to learn from (deeply) epistemically imperfect people*. We summarize each of these problems before turning to our alternative envy-agonism and ambivalence-avoidance models.

Exemplars of corrective testimonial justice are likely to be invisible for two reasons. In general, humans are better at noticing and attending to deviations from norms than consistency with them (Rozin & Royzman 2001). Someone whose behavior and credence-fixing accords with the norm of justice is therefore unlikely to catch enough attention to become the object of admiration. This is a problem for the admiration-emulation model in connection with any justice-related virtue, as opposed to virtues that motivate supererogatory (norm-deviant) actions. Corrective epistemic justice in particular is likely to be invisible for another reason, though. Someone who signals -- either explicitly or through their facial expression and body language --
that they are making an effort to take an interlocutor seriously thereby fails to live up to the standards of corrective testimonial justice. Ostentatiously signaling that you’re making an effort to believe someone against whom you harbor prejudices is not a good way to treat them with the epistemic respect that is their due as a knower. If this is right, then exemplars of corrective testimonial justice must be self-effacing about their corrective strategies. Doing so protects the people against whom they have biases, but it also makes them undetectable and difficult to emulate.

Supposing, though, that you knew someone’s history in such detail that you could conclude that they must now be practicing corrective testimonial justice (e.g., because they used to be openly prejudiced and now show no sign of bias), the problems don’t stop. As Florien Cramwinckel and her colleagues (2015, 2016) have shown, role models are admired only when they don’t deviate too much from social norms. Especially virtuous exemplars of corrective testimonial justice are therefore as likely to be derogated as admired. This point relates to the third problem: despite Zagzebski’s insistence to the contrary, there is ample reason to doubt the reliability of admiration. It seems to suffer both from systematic false negatives and systematic false positives. False negatives crop up when too-perfect exemplars provoke resentment and derogation rather than admiration. Zagzebski does mention this possibility, but she is not sufficiently perturbed by it. Indeed, it is striking how many of the exemplars listed in her book (e.g., Jesus, Gandhi, the Trappist monks of Tiburine) met violent ends. False positives may be even more problematic. Admiration has a tendency to spread from a single aspect to the whole person, leading people to ignore or even imitate serious flaws in those they admire (Archer et al. forthcoming; la Caze forthcoming).

The fourth and fifth problems are related. Virtuous exemplars are neither prevalent nor evenly distributed (Alfano 2017). This means that any given person is likely to have direct access to just a few exemplars, and that people in more epistemically just communities are likely to have access to many more exemplars than those who find themselves in deeply epistemically unjust communities. The uneven distribution of exemplars means that those who stand most in need of corrective epistemic justice are least likely to have role models worth emulating, while those who are already relatively well-off enjoy an abundance of exemplars ready-to-hand. In addition, epistemically vicious people in epistemically vicious communities are especially liable to respond in problematic ways to exemplars. As Alessandra Tanesini argues, people who are the furthest away from intellectual virtue are precisely those who are less likely to pay attention. Exposure to exemplars might work only if it stimulates emulation. It is counterproductive if it leads to demoralisation or if it fans an already inflated conception of the self. Sadly, those [...] who have developed non virtuous habits are most likely to react to models in precisely these ways. (2016, p. 524)
This is not, in itself, an objection against the admiration-emulation model; maybe life is just unfair. But it does indicate that we should make an effort to find additional models for the cultivation of moral and epistemic virtues that don’t exacerbate existing inequalities. Doing so will require us to find ways to learn from flawed exemplars, increasing the proportion of one’s social network that one benefits from. If there are ways to cultivate epistemic justice that employ emotions other than admiration (even negative emotions) and exemplars other than saints, sages, heroes, and geniuses, we would all benefit from knowing about them.

If our arguments in this section are on the right track, then admiration-emulation exemplarism is unlikely to be much help to those wishing to cultivate testimonial justice. In the next two sections, we spell out alternative models that do not suffer from the drawbacks articulated here.

2 The envy-agonism model

In this section, we explore our first alternative to admiration-emulation exemplarism: the envy-agonism model. Whereas, in the admiration-emulation model, the admired exemplar is evaluated with a wholly positive emotion, in this alternative framework the crucial emotion is envy. Like admiration, envy is a socially upward-looking emotion; to admire or envy someone you must see them as superior on some valued dimension or as possessing a good that you lack. It borders on absurdity to contemplate either admiring or envying oneself (at least, one’s current self). As Sara Protasi (2016, forthcoming a, forthcoming b) has argued, envy differs from admiration on a number of further dimensions. First, whereas admiration is pleasant, envy is painful. Second, admiration is affiliative; it tends to be accompanied by identification with the admired. Envy, by contrast, is competitive; it carries no affiliative sentiments and may even sunder people who were previously connected. Third, admiration tends to motivate either passivity or emulation of the admired, while envy is more multifarious. Protasi (forthcoming b) helpfully distinguishes four types of envy depending on whether the envied good is perceived as obtainable and whether the envier focuses primarily on the good itself or the envied individual, as indicated in Table 1.

Table 1: Protasi’s taxonomy of envy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>focus on the good</th>
<th>focus on the envied</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>good is obtainable</td>
<td>emulative envy</td>
<td>aggressive envy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>good is unobtainable</td>
<td>inert envy</td>
<td>spiteful envy</td>
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</table>

We are especially interested in what Protasi calls emulative envy, though we prefer to call it agonistic envy for reasons that will become clear below.
What first comes to mind when one thinks of envy is most likely one of the other varieties. Protasi argues that aggressive envy may motivate the envier to steal, while spiteful envy motivates her to spoil and inert envy motivates her to sulk. Agonistic envy, by contrast, tends to motivate competition and leveling up (or one-upmanship) rather than leveling down. While painful, agonistic envy leads the envier to think (and to try to show), “I can do better than that.”

Agonistic envy thus makes sense only in some axiological contexts involving infinite or fungible goods. If I envy your possession of a non-fungible good (e.g., a painting or a child), then the only way for me to obtain it is to take it from you, while the only way for me to become your equal is to destroy or ruin the good. However, if I envy your achievements, honors, skills, or virtues, it is possible for me to do as well as you (or even better) without you losing anything other than relative rank or position. Indeed, one-upping someone by tearing them down is hardly sporting, and in agonistic cultures such underhanded methods are frowned upon (Burckhardt 1872 / 1999). The point of the agon, in other words, is to establish the conditions for the possibility of demonstrations of excellence. Exemplars serve, in this context, as milestones to surpass or worthy competitors. Besting an unworthy opponent is not a cause for celebration but its own form of humiliation. If this is right, then resentment is inconsistent with agonistic envy.

This may seem like an ugly portrait of the development of virtue, calling to mind Freudian (1913 / 1990) patricide and Bloom’s (1973) “anxiety of influence.” In addition, contemporary philosophers are squeamish about competitive notions of virtue (Annas 2015, p. 16). Perhaps the clearest articulation of the agonistic model occurs in the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche (Alfano forthcoming). As Anthony Jensen (2016, p. 145) has shown, in the second Untimely Meditation, Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life (Nietzsche 1874 / 1997), Nietzsche argues for an agonistic approach to historical exemplars in which history is a “selective construction out of only that which in the past was [epistemically] ‘justly’ judged worthy to serve as an . . . [other] which, by its opposition, can sharpen and strengthen the qualities in the reader that best serve life.” Jensen calls this approach to historical exemplars affirmative (as opposed to the monumental, antiquarian, and critical approaches Nietzsche criticizes in this work), suggesting that it is about “neither recognition nor emulation, but both legislation and competition” (p. 146). In this way, affirmative history serves life better than monumental history, which closely aligns with the admiration-emulation model, and which tends to erect idols that shout, “Here and no further!” In an agonistic setting, even the highest exemplars are not perfect and can, in principle, be outdone.

While Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life is an early and flawed work, Nietzsche continued to theorize about the value and use of envy in his middle works. For instance, in Human, All-too-human section 170, he argues that

Hesiod’s good Eris, ambition [Ehrgeiz], gave [Greek artists’] genius its wings.
Now this ambition demands above all that their work should preserve the highest excellence in their own eyes, as they understand excellence, that is to say, without
reference to a dominating taste or the general opinion as to what constitutes excellence \[....\] It is thus they aspire to victory over their competitors as they understand victory, a victory before their own seat of judgment, they want actually to be more excellent; then they exact agreement from others as to their own assessment of themselves.

It should be clear that someone who competes with exemplars in this fashion will not partake of aggressive or spiteful envy, let alone inert envy, since none of these would lead them to actually be more excellent than the exemplars with whom they compete. Nietzsche continues his reflections on Eris in section 29 of the “The Wanderer and His Shadow,” which was appended to Human, All-too-human in 1880. In this section, titled “Envy and its nobler brother,” he writes, “The envious man is conscious of every aspect in which the man he envies exceeds the common measure and desires to push him down to it -- or to raise himself up to the height of the other: out of which there arise two different modes of action which Hesiod designated as the evil and the good Eris.” This distinction maps directly onto Protasi’s taxonomy. What Nietzsche here calls “good Eris” is emulative or agonistic envy, which prompts the envier to rise to or above the height of the envied.

Finally, in Daybreak section 38, Nietzsche observes that the older Greeks felt differently about envy from the way we do; Hesiod counted it among the effects of the good, beneficent Eris, and there was nothing offensive in attributing to the gods something of envy: which is comprehensible under a condition of things the soul of which was contest; contest, however, was evaluated and determined as good.

Such contests could be staged between the living and the dead, as Nietzsche envisions in his discussion of historical exemplars in The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. Direct competition may be more effective, however, since both (or all) competitors can dynamically interact -- treating one another as exemplars to be surpassed. Such ongoing interactive feedback loops have been hypothesized to build and extend character traits into social networks (Alfano 2016; Alfano & Skorburg 2017b). Alas, the rich-get-richer problem mentioned above may only be exacerbated by such feedback loops.

As Nietzsche notes, the envy-agonism model works best in a culture that values contests and victories, in which striving to excel and wanting to be recognized as excellent are not considered shameful motives. In such a culture, exemplars are highly visible rather than invisible. Moreover, such a culture would not automatically frown upon bragging or induce its members to engage in paradoxical humble-bragging (Alfano & Robinson 2014). Such a culture provides the infrastructure for agonistic competition; it establishes what we called above the conditions for the possibility of demonstrations of excellence, which, to be effective, must reliably signal both when someone has demonstrated excellence on some valued dimension and
when they have not. We doubt whether many contemporary communities celebrate excellence in epistemic justice in this way. This does not mean that it would be impossible to construct them, but it does mean that we have our work cut out for us.

Two additional concerns with the envy-agonism model relate to right-reason criterion and the modal robustness (or not) of envy. Many, perhaps most, virtue theorists agree that an act only counts as fully virtuous if it is done for the right reason. One might wonder whether envy-based reasons ever satisfy this condition. Our aim in this section has been to establish that, while many stereotypical cases of envy (e.g., aggressive, spiteful, and inert envy) are clearly problematic, agonistic envy is not. If this partial rehabilitation of envy succeeds, then acting out of agonistic envy does not violate the right-reason criterion. Regarding modal robustness, one might worry that someone who practices epistemic justice out of agonistic envy would easily cease to do so in nearby possible worlds where they no longer felt envious. There are multiple ways that envy might be obliterated. For example, the target of envy could turn out not to be so impressive after all; or the target of envy could develop vicious epistemic habits; or the target of envy could be decisively bested. Whatever the reason, someone who no longer felt envious would no longer be spurred to better themselves. We recognize this is a serious concern, and that it emphasizes the need for the sorts of ongoing interactive feedback loops mentioned above.

In the meantime, it would be helpful to have a different negative exemplarist model. In the next section, we articulate one: the ambivalence-avoidance model.

3 The ambivalence-avoidance model

The envy-agonism model involves a negative emotion that motivates an agent to act in a similar way to an exemplar in the community. On the ambivalence-avoidance model a negative emotion motivates an agent to act in a dissimilar way to the exemplar.

To be ambivalent is to have mixed emotions toward an object or action. Ambivalence is uniquely characterized as an agent having incompatible desires and unable to decide which of these desires she ultimately should act on. Most notably, Harry Frankfurt (2001) argues that ambivalence negatively affects the agent and keeps her away from the ethical ideal of wholeheartedness.

There is a particularly negative aspect to ambivalence that is not present with other mixed emotions. The ambivalent agent has no clear way to reconcile the emotion because he has a strong desire for incompatible goods. One desire will always be frustrated. To illustrate, Table 2 outlines how Amelie Rorty (2014) helpfully distinguishes ambivalence from other mixed emotions. For other emotions agents have the potential to get clear on one’s ordering of preferences or to seek new evidence; however, endorsing incompatible options leaves the agent frustrated. Given the nature of ambivalence it is not clear how one can use this emotion to better his position, as Frankfurt argues ambivalence threatens the very nature of autonomy. However,
we argue that ambivalence can serve epistemic agents seeking exemplars to combat testimonial injustice.

Table 2: Rorty’s taxonomy of mixed emotions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude / Emotion</th>
<th>Internal Logic</th>
<th>Why the attitude arises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>uncertainty</td>
<td>Neither / Nor</td>
<td>Lack of evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indecisiveness</td>
<td>Maybe this / Maybe that</td>
<td>Unclear ordering of preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vacillation</td>
<td>Now this / Now that</td>
<td>Erratic shifting of preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambivalence</td>
<td>Both / And</td>
<td>Endorsing all options and thinking them incompatible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this paper we are not so much concerned with ambivalence with regard to what to do, but ambivalence in regard to particular exemplars. We saw that one of the central problems with the admiration-emulation model is that exemplars worthy of admiring are invisible. One reason they remain invisible is because it is easier for humans to notice and attend to deviations from norms than consistency with them. The ambivalence-avoidance model takes this tendency as a starting point. Agents look to exemplars that engage in practices that are off-putting and actively avoid those behaviors. It is not simply that one sees a behavior that is off-putting, but that the agent has a mixed feeling relationship with the exemplar. The agent takes the exemplar as having valuable epistemic qualities, but also at the same time housing epistemic qualities that are undesirable and can lead to acting in epistemically unjust ways. To resolve the attitude of ambivalence the agent avoids the undesirable epistemic behavior and engages in correcting his own biases, while at the same time holding on to the things the exemplar does well.

For example, in order for someone to become a better public speaker, one approach is to seek to emulate a good public speaker. However, starting from zero, this is not necessarily a winning strategy. It is not very telling exactly what it is a good public speaker does that makes the speech enjoyable to listen to. At the same time, it is not very helpful to see a terrible public speaker either. Since there are many things that are going wrong with the speech it is hard to pinpoint exactly what to avoid. However, a public speaker that has good qualities and bad qualities one can more clearly learn what to avoid. It is much more telling why it is important to give eye contact to an audience by seeing a speaker who looks down the whole time, but is generally OK, than it is to see a seasoned speaker. It is the emotion of ambivalence toward the speaker that allows one to use the speaker as a negative exemplar to understand which actions to avoid.

This ambivalence-avoidance model can also serve for combating corrective testimonial injustice. Ambivalence helps to identify exemplars that engage in acts of epistemic injustice.
This identification can lead to a correction of behavior through avoiding the behavior of the negative exemplar. Consider a commonplace example of epistemic injustice in the workplace. In many professions meetings offer a platform—through testimony—for individuals to show their value to the company and their epistemic merit more generally. One all too common phenomenon is that ideas of women are ignored or co-opted by other male colleagues as their own idea. On the ambivalence-avoidance model this male colleague can serve as a negative exemplar. First, the “idea stealer” presumably has epistemic strong suits that many in the company recognize. Second, a woman whose idea was co-opted will have a negative emotional reaction to the unjust act, leaving her in a state of ambivalence toward the male colleague. She will then seek to avoid this type of behavior as a way of correcting her own biases toward others. The recognition of testimonial injustice through ambivalence can also happen on a collective level. For example, women on President Obama’s staff, feeling ambivalent toward the male-dominated environment, engaged in the practice of amplification. Whenever a woman made a valuable point the other women repeated it, giving credit to its author. This served as a method to prevent others from engaging in testimonial injustice through ignoring or co-opting the ideas of others (Hatch, 2015). The women sought to avoid the behavior of co-opting ideas and in the processes identified a corrective strategy that would help others who were the victim of such testimonial injustice. In this sense corrective testimonial justice can lead to collectives adopting burdened virtues (Tessman 2005) that otherwise would not be formed if they lived in an already epistemically just community.

While it is no doubt the case that those on the receiving end of epistemic injustice are more likely to recognize it through ambivalence and use avoidance to resolve the feeling and correct for injustice, so long as the negative exemplar has some good epistemic qualities, anyone can learn to correct their own credences and behavior to be closer to what is epistemically just. Thus, the ambivalence-avoidance model helps with Sherman’s objection to a virtue theoretic response to testimonial injustice. Recall, Sherman argued that if someone believes she is putting too little credence in what another says, then she already would have adjusted her credences. Interestingly, on the ambivalence-avoidance model, an agent could believe that her practices surrounding testimony are appropriate, with it still being possible for this belief to be shaken by a negative exemplar. The case is when a reflective agent sees a negative exemplar engage in a practice similar to what she would have done and feels ambivalence toward the exemplar as a result. For example, seeing someone else commit acts of testimonial injustice to oneself or a friend, creates the space needed to begin reflective engagement. What is it that this negative exemplar did that left me feeling ambivalent? What behavior should I avoid to resolve this feeling? A reflective agent can then begin to realize that there are certain behavior she best avoid in hearing and weighting testimony from others.

The ambivalence-avoidance model also helps with some of the other problems plagued by the admiration-emulation model. First, it helps with the rich-getting-richer problem. Agents can draw on a larger network of possible exemplars, besides geniuses, sages, or heros. Exemplars
do not need to be those who engage in the epistemic supererogatory. Exemplars can be those who fail. Second, ambivalence does not spread like admiration: You aren’t looking at negative exemplars through rose colored glasses. One possible worry is that once you start to doubt some aspects of the agent, then other aspects that might be good are questioned. However, this feeling is less ambivalence and more uncertainty. You begin to doubt the exemplar and resolve it by seeking more evidence about whether these are epistemically good or bad behaviors. Ambivalence is the mixed feeling that endorses incompatible aspects of a thing, in this case one is endorsing that the exemplar has both bad and good epistemic qualities. Thus, unlike the admiration-emulation model you are not taking the individual as a whole package, avoiding all of their behaviors. Instead, you have ambivalent feelings regarding who they are an epistemic agent. There are attributes about the person that you like, but have mixed feelings about them precisely due to problematic epistemic behaviors that they engage in.

Lastly, the ambivalence-avoidance model satisfies the right-reason criterion. One can still be thoroughly motivated to avoid engaging in particular behaviors in line with the way a virtuous agent would be motivated to avoid behaviors. Avoidance is done through the desire of obtaining corrective testimonial justice. The model is still a case of negative exemplarism because the exemplar is not one that is virtuous and the agent comes to recognize the person as an exemplar through a negative—though epistemically and virtuously justified—emotion.

4 Conclusion

In this paper we made three central claims. First, we argued contra Sherman that a virtue-theoretic account of corrective testimonial justice is possible so long as it is based in a community-level approach. Epistemic agents do not simply look inward to correct credences, but look to exemplars within their broader epistemic community to cultivate corrective behaviors. Second, we argued that the leading account of epistemic exemplarism, the admiration-emulation model, does not help to resolve Sherman’s worry and has problems of its own. These problems were regarding the visibility of exemplars, the reliability of admiration, the epistemic rich getting richer problem, and the problem of only learning from very few people in the community. We then outlined two additional models where agents can learn from negative exemplars that avoids some of the problems of the admiration-emulation model.

The envy-agonism model and the ambivalence-avoidance model most straightforwardly help with broadening one’s epistemic community to more than a few individuals. This helps to solve the problem of the epistemic rich getting richer. Those who are entrenched in an epistemic community with few epistemically virtuous agents can still learn through negative exemplars. That said, there are still a few lingering worries one might have with the approaches we are offering. Epistemic exemplars can still remain invisible to those who are already completely epistemically unjust. Furthermore, emotions generally are not necessarily reliable. So envy and ambivalence aren’t any more or less reliable than admiration. Lastly, it is not clear that negative
emotions like envy or ambivalence are epistemically robust enough to sustain corrective behaviors in line with virtuous behavior. We addressed some of these worries throughout the paper, but there is a more general theme worth highlighting.

It is important to note that the exemplar models we have outlined are not meant to be mutually exclusive. We do not think a single exemplarist model will help to establish a surefire route to correct for testimonial injustice or to cultivate other epistemic virtues more generally. We take it that these models are to be used in tandem with each other and help the agent reach a sort of reflective equilibrium by cycling through several emotions and taking an emotional perspectivism on one’s epistemic behaviors.

Zagzebski herself advocates for this kind of approach to avoid problems of reliability (2017, 42). However, the problem is that Zagzebski does not give any examples of how other emotions could possibly figure into this reflective equilibrium. Instead, she focuses on the single emotion of admiration. We have shown here how relying on admiration alone is quite problematic. As an alternative, we broadened the emotional spectrum for exemplarism. Precisely by including negative emotions an agent will have a rich tapestry to be reflective in a way that achieves perspectivism and an awareness of kind of biases that lead to epistemic injustice. With a more diverse set of exemplars admiration can still play a role in exemplarism so long as its negative effects are curtailed by other exemplarist emotions, such as envy and ambivalence.

If what we have said here is on the right track, there is a new promising research opportunity. What other emotions could help to identify exemplars, both positive and negative? How is it that agents should weigh these different exemplarist models in becoming better epistemic agents to ensure reliability and robustness? We have only scratched the surface.

References


