

The functions of shame in Nietzsche

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Abstract

Nietzsche talks about shame [*scham**, *schmach**, *schand**] in all of his published and authorized works, from *The Birth of Tragedy* to *Ecce Homo*. He refers to shame in over one hundred passages – at least five times as often as he refers to resentment/*ressentiment*. Yet the scholarly literature on Nietzsche and shame includes just a handful of publications, while the literature on Nietzsche and resentment includes over a thousand. Arguably, this disproportionate engagement has been driven by the fact that English translations of Nietzsche’s writings systematically italicize and transliterate ‘*ressentiment*’ rather than treating it as the normal word it is. In any case, this chapter aims to fill the gap in the secondary literature by using digital humanities methods to systematically investigate the functions of shame in Nietzsche’s writings. I argue that Nietzsche is ambivalent about shame, depending on the function that it serves. There are four main functions. First, in a society of near-equals, it regulates interactions and incentives in ways that preserve game-theoretic equilibria. Second and relatedly, Nietzsche associates the capacity to experience nuanced and appropriate feelings of shame – and to anticipate them in others – with the pathos of distance, a virtue that he associates with nobility. Third, when shame is directed towards fixed aspects of human nature, it transforms those aspects into vices; by contrast, when it is directed towards malleable aspects of human nature, it may foster self-improvement and virtue. Nietzsche frequently laments the way that shame targets immutable aspects of ourselves. Finally and relatedly, Nietzsche casts counter-shame on those who would direct first-order shame on fixed aspects of human nature, as well as a paradoxical form of uplifting shame on their victims. If this is right, then Nietzsche does not offer a univocal verdict on shame. Instead, like many other emotions and emotional capacities, shame is inescapable, complex, and function-relative.

Keywords

Shame, Nietzsche, Emotion, Pathos of Distance, Virtue, Vice

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Introduction

Nietzsche talks about shame [*scham**, *schmach**, *schand**] in all of his published and authorized works, from *The Birth of Tragedy* to *Ecce Homo*. He refers to shame in over one hundred passages – at least five times as often as he refers to resentment/*ressentiment*. Yet the scholarly literature on Nietzsche and shame includes just a handful of publications, while the literature on Nietzsche and resentment includes over a thousand. Arguably, this disproportionate engagement has been driven by the fact that English translations of Nietzsche’s writings systematically italicize and transliterate ‘*ressentiment*’ rather than treating it as the normal word it is.¹

In any case, this chapter aims to fill the gap in the secondary literature by using digital humanities methods to systematically investigate the functions of shame in Nietzsche’s writings. These methods were pioneered in Alfano (2018, 2019a, 2019b, forthcoming) and made accessible to scholars with no coding background in Alfano & Cheong (2019). For that reason, I do not explain them at length in this chapter.

Substantively, I argue that Nietzsche is ambivalent about shame, depending on the function that it serves. I identify four main functions in his writings. First, in a society of near-equals, shame regulates interactions and incentives in ways that preserve game-theoretic equilibria, which Nietzsche seems to regard as a positive good.² Second and relatedly, Nietzsche associates the capacity to experience nuanced and appropriate feelings of shame – and to anticipate them in others – with the pathos of distance, a virtue that he associates with nobility. Third, when shame is directed towards fixed aspects of human nature or the self, it transforms those aspects into vices; by contrast, when it is directed towards malleable aspects of human nature or the self, it may foster self-improvement and virtue. Nietzsche frequently laments the way that shame targets immutable aspects of ourselves. Finally and relatedly, Nietzsche casts counter-shame on those who would direct first-order shame on fixed aspects of human nature, as well as a paradoxical form of uplifting shame on their victims. If this is right, then Nietzsche does not offer a univocal verdict on shame. Instead, like many other emotions and emotional capacities, shame is inescapable, complex, and function-relative.

Methodology

I first use hierarchical clustering to compare the language used in Nietzsche’s published and authorized manuscripts, as shown in Figure 1.

¹ This is not to claim that the English word ‘resentment’ perfectly translates the German, which sometimes connotes envy. However, such slight mismatches are common in translation and certainly not unique to *Ressentiment*.

² In game theory, an equilibrium exists when no one can unilaterally make themselves better off by acting differently.




Figure 2: lexical dispersion of shame in Nietzsche's published and authorized manuscripts

These figures provide some context and demonstrate Nietzsche's ongoing concern with the moral psychology of shame. Delving deeper, I next examine all passages in which the relevant terms occurred and organized them around the functions that Nietzsche assigns to shame.³

Social regulation

The first function that Nietzsche associates with shame is social regulation among (near-)equals, especially elites in societies that may have escaped only recently from a quasi-Hobbesian state of

³ Not all of these passages are explicitly discussed in this chapter. I leave out those passages that don't reveal much about Nietzsche's understanding of shame, those in which he merely vents his misogyny, those in which he uses '*schamhaft*' (typically translated as 'modest' or 'bashful'), and a few in which he simply emphasizes that the phenomenology of shame involves an intense awareness of being *seen*.

nature. For instance, in HH WS 22, while discussing the *lex talionis* (eye-for-an-eye, tooth-for-a-tooth), he remarks:

Within a community in which all regard themselves as equivalent there exist *shame* [Schande] and *punishment* [Strafe] as measures against transgressions, that is to say against disruptions of the principle of equilibrium: shame as a weight placed in the scales against the encroaching individual who has procured advantages for himself through his encroachment and now through the shame he incurs experiences disadvantages which abolish these earlier advantages and *outweigh* them.⁴

In this passage, shame is conceived of not as an occurrent emotional attitude but as a social status of disgrace. Naturally, these two are often connected. People who endure disgrace are likely to feel shame, and people can also feel shame without suffering disgrace, but disgrace characteristically aims to induce feelings shame. The loss of social status or approbation that comes with shame ensures that ill-gotten gains cannot be leveraged to further advantage. Moreover, when all members of such a society are aware that their ill-gotten gains will be met with proportionate shame or punishment, they realize that pursuing such gains is pointless, which in turn reduces the amount of actual conflict in the society and contributes to a stable equilibrium.⁵

Moving to the mature works, Nietzsche says in BGE 265 that this recognition of equality can be so well instilled that people become comfortable with it. The “noble soul,” he says admits that “there are others with rights equal to its own. As soon as it is clear about this question of rank, it will move among these equals and ‘equally righted’ with an assured shame [*Scham*] and a gentle reverence equal to how it treats itself.” As we will see below, this shame is not actually felt but rather dispositional. The noble soul is not ashamed of her actions or her self. Rather, she knows how to comport herself among equals in such a way that she does not bring shame down upon herself.

In a later passage (GM 2.5), Nietzsche returns to the theme of inflicting shame in order to regulate social interactions among people who see themselves as capable of both inflicting harm on and suffering harm from one another. Again, he seems to be envisioning a society that has only recently escaped from a state of nature, and in which relationships of trust are at best fragile. In this imagined pre-history, he says, “the creditor could inflict all kinds of shame [*Schmach*] and torture on the body of the debtor” should the debtor fail to repay. While this scenario surely involves plenty of distrust, the key for Nietzsche is that it remains one in which conditionally-trusting contractual relationships such as borrowing and lending are at least possible. If the creditor were not assured that they could extract value from the debtor in the form

⁴ Details on translations are at the end of the chapter, though in some cases I have made minor modifications for the sake of clarity. For instance, in this passage, *Schande* is translated as ‘disgrace’, but to preserve continuity I have changed it to ‘shame’.

⁵ Nietzsche’s speculative argument here has been borne out by game theoretic work on reputation in iterated games, e.g., Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982).

of the pleasure of shaming and torturing in the case of non-payment, they would not be willing to enter into the relationship in the first place. And for that to be possible, society must be organized in such a way that the creditor can be reasonably confident that these alternatives to remuneration are guaranteed. In other words, the creditor-to-be must have enough social power that they can't be completely steamrolled by a shameless debtor. And, in all likelihood, the debtor must be aware of this as well, inducing caution in the seeking of loans. In such a society, only those who are very likely able to repay their debts will seek credit in the first place, and creditors will therefore infrequently need to exercise their awful powers of shaming and torturing. In other words, Nietzsche is again describing how shame can contribute to social equilibria.

Pathos of distance

The dispositions that people end up developing in the sorts of societies described in the previous section often end up coalescing into a nuanced sensitivity to hierarchy and rank – what Nietzsche sometimes calls the pathos of distance – which both informs them about shame-relevant situations and behaviors and motivates them to avoid such situations and behaviors.⁶ The pathos of distance is a disposition – indeed, a virtue – that attunes its bearer to status and rank, which one would need to negotiate the fraught social world in which shame is constantly one misstep away. Like contemporary authors such as Adam Morton (2013; see also Alfano 2016), Nietzsche understands shame and contempt correlatively: shame is the emotion one experiences when one imagines and endorses a point of view from which one is the object of contempt. This can occur concurrently (being ashamed) or prospectively. In the latter case, one experiences what Van Fossen (2019) calls protective shame – shame that motivates its bearer to avoid the action or omission that would occasion occurrent shame.⁷ The pathos of distance subsequently develops into a fine-tuned sense for the contemptible, and those who lack it are – in Nietzsche's view – bound to end up doing shameful things even if they don't realize it.

For example, in SE 4, he contends that “Whoever is seeking to answer the question of what the philosopher as educator can mean in our time has to contest this view” – optimism about the German Reich – and “must declare: it is a downright scandal [*Schande und Schmach*] that such nauseating, idolatrous flattery can be rendered to our time by supposedly thinking and honourable men.” The idea here is that among those allegedly of a high spiritual rank (“thinking and honourable men”) the pathos of distance should be sufficiently prevalent to prevent such shameful displays.

⁶ For more on this disposition, see Alfano (2019a, chapter 8). This disposition has also been studied by contemporary social scientists, such as Fessler (1999).

⁷ For more on the history of prospective shame – and its connection to both conscience and guilt – see Sorabji (2014). Contemporary researchers such Deonna et al. (2012) also theorize what they call the “sense of shame,” which serves a similar purpose.

Later, in HH 1.100, which is entitled “*Shame* [Scham],” Nietzsche remarks that feelings of shame extend not only to social relations but also to embodied markers of rank and hierarchy, such as religious spaces and kingship. Such spaces are typically forbidden to those of lower rank, and so mystery, as well as intrusions into mysterious spaces, comes to be associated with shame. He goes on to claim that “The whole world of interior states, the so-called ‘soul’, is likewise still a mystery to all non-philosophers; through endless ages it has been believed that the ‘soul’ was of divine origin and worthy of traffic with the gods: consequently it is an adytum and evokes shame.” He expresses a similar idea in HH 1.461, saying that “Men traffic with their princes in much the same way as they do with their god.” What he calls an “almost uncanny mood of reverence and fear and shame [Scham]” attaches to anything and anyone of high rank. Thus, for example “The cult of the genius is an echo of this reverence for gods and princes.” These passages suggest that the sense of prospective shame can be mis-attuned and hyper-vigilant. This is a theme that crops up in several other passages, including HH WS 69, which is titled “*Habitual shame* [Scham].” Reiterating the association between shame and mystery, Nietzsche says that “Whenever we feel shame [Scham] there exists a mystery which seems to have been desecrated, or to be in danger of desecration, through us.”⁸ He then goes on to suggest that “all *undeserved grace* engenders shame” because it involves the sense that one has received benefits that were reserved for those of higher rank. But, he points out, if we consider that “we have never ‘deserved’ anything at all, then if one acquiesces to this proposition within the Christian total view of things the feeling of *shame* will become *habitual*.” The sense that one has violated a space that is set aside for those of higher rank engenders shame. When one’s pathos of distance is well-tuned, such shame may be appropriate, but when it is hyper-sensitive, it becomes pathological.

Turning next to the mature works, we see Nietzsche’s continued reflections on the nature and functions of a sense of shame. In BGE 40, he addresses the prospective shame of those who would be ashamed to put others to shame, saying “Everything profound loves masks; the most profound things go so far as to hate images and likenesses. Wouldn’t just the *opposite* be a proper disguise for the shame [Scham] of a god?” The “shame of a god” may seem like a very strange phrase. What Nietzsche is talking about here is a powerful being who confers significant benefits on another, and is aware that receiving such benefits may put the beneficiary to shame. The shame of a god is thus prospective *other-oriented* shame: a disposition to be sensitive to the shame one may cause in others through one’s actions. Such sensitivity is not possible unless one has a finely-tuned pathos of distance, such that one is keenly aware that another will be put to shame by receiving an unearned or extravagant benefit. Nietzsche goes so far as to suggest that “There are acts of love and extravagant generosity in whose aftermath nothing is more advisable than to take a stick and give the eye-witnesses a good beating: this will obscure any memory traces.” And the eye-witnesses very much include oneself: “Many people are excellent at obscuring and abusing their own memory, so they can take revenge on at least this one accessory: – shame [Scham] is inventive. It is not the worst things that we are the most ashamed

⁸ For more on the association between shame and mystery, see GS P4.

[*schämt*] of.” The emerging picture is one in which shame makes one sensitive to facts and considerations of rank, and thus can be apt or inapt in various ways. When it is apt, it motivates actions that forestall both one’s own and others’ occurrent shame. When it is inapt, it can lead either to shamelessly ignorant actions and omissions, on the one hand, or undue shame, on the other.

These impressions are further borne out by BGE 263, which is another passage about the pathos of distance. Nietzsche first remarks that, “It is a great achievement when the masses (people of all kinds who lack depth or have speedy bowels) have finally had the feeling bred into them that they cannot touch everything, that there are holy experiences which require them to take off their shoes and keep their dirty hands away.” He goes on to make an invidious distinction between the masses and scholars (with whom he of course also identifies): “what is perhaps the most disgusting thing about so-called scholars, the devout believers in ‘modern ideas’ is their lack of shame [*Scham*], the careless impudence of their eyes and hands that touch, taste, and feel everything.” He ends by suggesting that, in a certain sense, there is more “nobility of taste and tactfulness of respect within a people these days, within a lower sort of people, namely within the peasantry, than among [...] the educated.”⁹ This ambivalence towards scholars is echoed in GS 358, in which Nietzsche gives the Lutheran reformation a backhanded compliment, saying that if “one wanted to give it the credit for having prepared and favoured what we today honour as ‘modern science’, one must surely add that it also shares the blame for the degeneration of the modern scholar, for his lack of reverence, shame [*Scham*], and depth.”

Finally, in EH Wise.4, Nietzsche returns to the topic of shame-sensitivity, saying, “My problem with people who pity is that they easily lose any sense of shame [*Scham*] or respect, or any sensitivity for distances.”¹⁰ Once again, his criticism is that those who have no pathos of distance or an ill-tuned pathos of distance inevitably bring shame either on themselves or others (in this case, the latter). Those who pity are so intrusive with their attentions and concerns that they are liable to put to shame the very people they allege to help. Perhaps if they had the “shame of a god” discussed in BGE 40, they would be in a position to help anonymously or without bringing shame down on their beneficiaries. But because they lack this disposition, they compound injury with insult. The same idea also crops up in GS 273-5, in which in which Nietzsche asks himself three questions and answers each in a single sentence: “*Whom do you call bad?* – He who always wants to put people to shame [*beschämen*]. *What is most human to you?* – To spare someone shame [*Scham*]. *What is the seal of having become free?* – No longer to be ashamed [*schämen*] before oneself.”

Vicious shame

⁹ For more on the relentless and shameless curiosity of scholars in Nietzsche’s thinking, see Alfano (2019a, chapter 6).

¹⁰ The same criticism also crops up in Z 2.Pity: “Indeed, I do not like them, the merciful who are blissful in their pitying: they lack too much in shame [*Scham*].”

Shame becomes especially pathological when it is directed towards a fixed aspect of the self or (perhaps equivalently for Nietzsche) is counter to one's nature. In one of his most extensive discussions of the nature and dynamics of drives, Nietzsche catalogs a range of strategies one may employ to modulate one's own drives. One pathological approach that he explores is described thusly: "he who can endure it and finds it reasonable to weaken and depress his *entire* bodily and physical organisation will naturally thereby also attain the goal of weakening an individual violent drive." Doing so weakens all of one's drives en masse. Nietzsche compares the person who employs this strategy to the ascetic, who "starves his sensuality and thereby also starves and shames [*zu Schanden*] his vigour and not seldom his reason as well."

While this strategy of self-shaming may be successful in the short term, Nietzsche worries that it risks overall degeneration and frequently cautions against it. For example, in Z 1. Warriors, Zarathustra encourages the warriors to not be ashamed of their hatred because it is a fixed aspect of their character. Likewise, in Z 4. Ugliest, Zarathustra encounters the ugliest man, the murderer of God, who acted out of shame at his fixed traits. Zarathustra overcomes his own revulsion and shame, rather than falling into ineffectual pity (*Mitleid*).¹¹ Importantly, Zarathustra does not get stuck in shame but rather *overcomes* the temptation to wallow in it. Nietzsche reiterates this point (with an oblique reference to the shamefulness of scholarship mentioned above) in BGE 65: "Knowledge would have little charm if there were not so much shame [*Scham*] to be overcome in order to reach it." Shame that can be overcome is shame that does not attach to fixed aspects of oneself. Instead, it is shame over malleable aspects of oneself that can then be given up and gotten past.

By contrast, Nietzsche laments it when shame attaches to fixed aspects of oneself or of human nature more broadly. In BGE 195, he says that during the slave revolt in morality the priests "melted together 'rich', 'godless', 'evil', 'sensual' and for the first time coined an insult [*Schandwort*] out of the word 'world'." Nietzsche returns to this theme in GM 2.7, saying that he doesn't want to "provide our pessimists with new grist for the discordant and creaking mills of disgust with life," and that, on the contrary, "at the time when mankind felt no shame towards its cruelty, life on earth was more cheerful than it is today, with its pessimists. The heavens darkened over man in direct proportion to the increase in his feeling shame [*Scham*] *at being man*." One cannot change one's species. To be ashamed of being human is clearly to be ashamed of fixed aspects of oneself. For Nietzsche, this is the making of vice and degeneration.¹² He goes on in GM 2.7 to decry the "tired, pessimistic outlook, mistrust of life's riddle, the icy 'no' of nausea at life" that arises from "the mollycoddling and sermonizing, by means of which the animal 'man' is finally taught to be ashamed [*schämen*] of all his instincts." Later, in a discussion of "men of resentment" (GM 3.14), Nietzsche says that they will only be satisfied when they have "succeeded in *showing* their own misery, in fact all misery, *on to the conscience* of the happy: so that the latter eventually start to be ashamed of [*zu schämen begönnen*] their happiness and perhaps say to one another: 'It's a shame [*Schande*] to be happy!'" Once again,

¹¹ For more on this particular passage and its relation to shame, see Bamford (2007).

¹² For more on this notion of vice in Nietzsche, see Alfano (2019a, chapter 4)

Nietzsche laments not shame itself but shame that runs counter to human nature by condemning as shameful something so fundamental to us as the pursuit of happiness, on which even Aristotle, Kant, and Mill agree.

Finally, turning to the late works, as mentioned above Nietzsche refers multiple times in *The Antichrist* to the Luther translation of Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians. The key line is one in which Paul says "God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to shame [*Schanden*] the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to shame [*Schanden*] the things which are mighty." Once again, Nietzsche objects because Paul is casting shame precisely on things that humans cannot help but desire: wisdom, knowledge, and power. To follow Paul is to guarantee that you end up feeling ashamed of desires and drives that you cannot help but embody. This, for Nietzsche, is vicious and paradoxical. And he goes on to castigate Paul for seeking to induce such shame. For example, in A 59, while discussing the slave revolt in morals and lamenting the loss of ancient culture and science, he exclaims that these were not lost in military conflict or natural disaster but "instead shamed [*Schanden*] by sly, secretive, invisible, anaemic vampires!" As we will see in the next section, Nietzsche responds to Pauline shaming of human nature with a sort of counter-shame.

Counter-shame

One central case in which Nietzsche seems to think it appropriate to cast shame on others is when they are promoting or victims of the sort of vicious shame identified in the previous section. For instance, in RWB 11 (which he also quotes in GS 99), Nietzsche proposes several evaluative contrasts: "that passion is better than stoicism and hypocrisy, that to be honest, even in evil, is better than to lose oneself in the morality of tradition; that the free man can be good or evil but the unfree man is a shame [*Schande*] to nature and is excluded from both heavenly and earthly solace." It's debatable what exactly Nietzsche means by "the free man" (both when he originally wrote the passage and later when he quoted himself!), but the basic idea seems to be that a certain kind of unfreedom is contrary to human nature and thus a matter of deep shame. The same sentiment crops up in GM 1.11, where Nietzsche says that resentful individuals, "These bearers of oppressive, vindictive instincts [...] represent the *decline* of mankind! These 'instruments of culture' are a shame [*Schande*] to man"

Nietzsche does not use counter-shame indiscriminately only for expressions counter to human nature. He also distinguishes cases in which it is shameful only for certain people to engage in certain actions and expressions. We already saw this above in the passage from SE 4 condemning "supposedly thinking and honourable men" for their flattery of the German Reich. Others may be ignorant, Nietzsche thinks, but they ought to know better. In particular, he shames them because they are *better* than they've shown themselves to be. This is the opposite of Pauline shaming, which insists that everyone is equally sinful and in the gutter. What Nietzsche castigates is instead the failure to live up to potential that he thinks is still there, if only dispositionally. We see the same sort of counter-shaming in Z 3.Apostates2, where Zarathustra

tells those who have gone back to religion that “it is a shame [*Schmach*] to pray! Not for everyone, but for you and me and whoever still has a conscience in his head. For *you* it is a shame [*Schmach*] to pray!”¹³

Finally, in *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche reaches the apex of his counter-shaming. In A 26, he laments the depths to which, through the slave revolt in morals, Jewish religion was sunk in Pauline Christianity:

The concept of God falsified; the concept of morality falsified: – the Jewish priesthood did not stop at that. The whole *history* of Israel proved useless: get rid of it! – These priests performed a miracle of falsification and we have large portions of the Bible to prove it: in an unparalleled act of scorn for tradition and historical reality, they translated the history of their own people *into religion*, which is to say they made it into an idiotic salvation mechanism of guilt before Yahweh and punishment, of piety before Yahweh and reward.

Nietzsche then goes on to cast counter-shame on the instigators of the slave revolt in morals, saying, “This is the most shameful [*schmachvollsten*] act of historical falsification that has ever taken place.” In A 62, his ultimate indictment of Christianity, Nietzsche ups the ante, declaiming, “I call Christianity the one great curse, the one great innermost corruption, the one great instinct of revenge that does not consider any method to be poisonous, secret, subterranean, *petty* enough, – I call it the one immortal blot [*Schandfleck*] on humanity.”¹⁴

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have systematically reviewed Nietzsche’s discussion of shame in his published and authorized works. I argue that he conceives of shame as the emotion one feels when one is or imagines oneself as the object of contempt. Shame can be felt occurrently, but it can also be encountered prospectively – leading one to avoid the shameful action. This more dispositional understanding of shame also extends to other people and may dispose us to avoid actions or omissions that put others to shame. Nietzsche seems to think that shame is an inevitable emotion

¹³ See also A 38, in which he exclaims, “what *miscarriages of duplicity* modern people are, that in spite of all [their clearly non-Christian actions] they are *not ashamed* [schämt] to call themselves Christians!”

¹⁴ There is one noteworthy exception to Nietzsche’s use of counter-shame, namely HH WS 211: “*In the ground of shame* [*Schmach*]. – He who wants to rid men of an idea usually does not halt at refuting it and drawing out the worm of illogicality that resides within it: he then, after the worm is dead, goes on to hurl the entire fruit too into the *mud*, so that men will find it indecent and experience disgust at it. He believes that in this way he has found the means of preventing that ‘resurrection on the third day’ so common among refuted ideas. – He is in error, for it is precisely in the *ground of shame* [*Schmach*], among the filth, that the kernel of an idea germinates new seeds most speedily.”

Given his pronouncements in *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche seems to have changed his mind on this matter.

in humans, and so our aim should be to regulate it rather than simply promote or eradicate it. In some social conditions, the sense of shame – what Nietzsche sometimes associates with the pathos of distance – helps to regulate incentives and interactions so as to promote game-theoretic equilibria. Because of its value in promoting such equilibria, people tend to develop nuanced senses of shame that help them regulate their behavior. However, not everyone's sense of shame is well-tuned, and things can go wrong in multiple ways. Being disposed to feel shame when it is inapt is deleterious, but so is being disposed not to feel shame when it is apt. Nietzsche is also keenly aware of the potential to induce shame in others, and he thinks that we are often not cautious enough about doing so.

The sense of shame can easily become pathological in circumstances where it is directed at fixed aspects either of human nature writ large or at fixed aspects of oneself. These represent cases in which the pathos of distance is severely mis-attuned. Nietzsche thinks that such misalignment has been systematically promoted by Christianity (especially Pauline aspects of Christianity). To oppose this hypertrophied shame, Nietzsche sometimes (especially in his mature and late works) casts counter-shame. His counter-shaming takes two forms. First, and more directly, he casts counter-shame on those who would promote first-order shame that targets fixed aspects of human nature or of individual humans. Second, he casts counter-shame on individuals whom he considers *better than* they've shown themselves to be through their acceptance of Pauline Christianity. Thus, paradoxically, Nietzschean counter-shame can be *uplifting* ("You're better than this! You're capable of so much more!"), whereas shame is commonly thought to be *downputting*.

List of abbreviations of Nietzsche's works and translations

A	<i>The Antichrist</i>
AOM	<i>Assorted Opinions and Maxims</i> (in part two of HH)
BGE	<i>Beyond Good and Evil</i>
BT	<i>The Birth of Tragedy</i>
CW	<i>The Case of Wagner</i>
D	<i>Daybreak</i>
DS	<i>David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer</i>
EH	<i>Ecce Homo</i>
GM	<i>On the Genealogy of Morals</i>
GS	<i>The Gay Science</i>
HH	<i>Human, All-too-human</i>
HL	<i>On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life</i>
KSA	<i>Kritische Studienausgabe</i>
NCW	<i>Nietzsche Contra Wagner</i>
RWB	<i>Richard Wagner in Bayreuth</i>
SE	<i>Schopenhauer as Educator</i>
TI	<i>Twilight of the Idols</i>
WS	<i>The Wanderer and His Shadow</i> (in part two of HH)
Z	<i>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</i>

I have used the following translations of Nietzsche's works.

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Nietzsche, F. (2006). *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*. Edited by A. del Caro & R. Pippin. Translated by A. del Caro. Cambridge University Press.

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