want to briefly introduce Gorman's speculative suggestion of how Aquinas might have thought about consistency in Christology, even if "there is no way to be sure" (152).

Gorman suggests that Aquinas might have distinguished two ways of predicating attributes to Christ: a "weak" and a "strong" one. Weak predication is an elliptic or incomplete way of talking of Christ. To illustrate: "From the fact that impassibility can be predicated weakly of Christ *qua* divine, it does not follow that Christ is impassible; it would follow only if we added the premise that Christ is only divine, i.e., that he has no other nature" (153). Thus, inconsistent features can be weakly predicated of Christ without inconsistency, not because weak predication allows anything to be predicated of anything, as if it were a free lunch with no ontological implications, but rather because weak predications are opaque with respect to their subject.

In the book, Gorman argues for the merits of an interpretative method that avoids the Scylla of "stop[ping] at the words and miss[ing] the chance to grasp fully the ideas behind them" and the Charybdis of "jumping too quickly to struggling with the Big Ideas without dealing with nitty-gritty of historical analysis; these miss the chance to learn something new from their authors" (6–7). "If we really want to engage in a historically accurate reading of Aquinas, we will have to be as sharp as we can speculatively" (6), and speculatively sharp he surely is. Even if there appear to be still more issues left unaddressed by Aquinas than the ones Gorman identifies, Gorman does an excellent job at explicating Aquinas's texts, reconstructing his ways of thinking, and engaging the modern reader in a nimble and argumentative book that will remain a touchstone for years to come for students and researchers in medieval philosophy, philosophy of religion, and the history of metaphysics.

Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen, edited by John A. Keller. Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. xii + 401. $99.00 (hardcover).

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John A. Keller's *Being, Freedom, and Method* is a 401-page volume consisting of sixteen chapters (excluding the introduction and a lengthy concluding meditation) divided into five parts. The chapters include contributions from some of the best philosophers in the field (twenty in all) in a very well-organized festschrift to Peter van Inwagen. The parts include Being, Freedom, God, Method, and Afterword. With the exception of van Inwagen's

afterword, there are four to six chapters devoted to each part. Every chapter engages arguments, areas, and themes to which van Inwagen has made major contributions in some well-known and groundbreaking articles, chapters, books, and reviews (183 in total) since 1972. In addition to their critical insights on van Inwagen's work, the papers collected in this volume make substantive contributions to all of these areas. It's an extremely well edited collection.

In the space provided I'll try to give a better sense of the content of the chapters, or at least a better sense of the content of the parts. There's no room for lengthy critical assessment—though the papers raise a number of fascinating and intriguing questions—I do note in passing a few questions and concerns. Except for noting its substance and detail, I leave Keller's introduction (a fascinating one) and van Inwagen's concluding meditation for the reader to review.

In "Theories of Character" Michael Loux describes the problem of universals and rival positions contemporary metaphysicians might take. There is, expectedly, no such thing as *the* problem of universals. There is instead a plurality of more or less overlapping philosophical debates (14). Loux argues that all of the issues are in fact issues of character.

> Philosophers who claim to be responding to the problem of universals sometimes tell us that they are interested in what, following Russell, we might call the character of familiar particulars, that is their having the properties they do, their belonging to the kinds they do, and their being related to each other in the ways they are. This talk of character is meant to be understood prephilosophically; it is supposed to be theory neutral. Indeed, on this story, the problem of universals just is that of providing the right theoretical account of the commonsense fact that a given particular has this or that form of character. (12)

Among the rival views contemporary metaphysicians take on properties Loux distinguishes, following Wolterstorff, constituent (immanentist) ontologies and relational (non-immanentist) ontologies. Relational ontologies deny that particulars might have anything abstract as a part, and so deny that there is any part of a particular that is not a commonsense spatial part. The character of particulars is accounted for via their relation to these abstract objects. Constituent or immanentist ontologies, on the other hand, hold that particular objects have two mereological structures. They have commonsense spatial parts, and they have non-spatial parts, the latter accounts for the character of particulars (e.g., their being of the kinds they are). Among the defenders of constituent, immanentist ontologies, we find David Armstrong (particulars = underlying subject + universals predicated of it), John Locke (particulars = underlying subject + tropes), and Bundle theorists (particulars = bundles of compresent universals). Among the well-known relational, non-immanentists, we find Plato, Chisholm, van Inwagen, Plantinga, and P. F. Strawson (19).

Laurie Paul defends an immanentist position that includes the view that there is a single fundamental ontological category in "A One Category

Ontology." On Paul's view, the world is fundamentally properties. And objects in the world are built in a simple way: by composition alone. There is no instantiation or exemplification relation, no primitive bundling compresence and no co-instantiation relation.

The most serious problem for Paul's theory is the most serious problem for any bundle theory and that is the individuation of qualitative duplicates. But what is that problem? According to the indiscernibility of identicals, objects that are qualitatively indiscernible are identical. Version (i) is uninteresting. Here's version (ii) of that principle.

> (ii) x and y share all of their pure intrinsic and extrinsic properties, then x = y.

Pure properties are what we might call non-qualitative properties: these are properties which, roughly speaking, 'involve' singular terms, *being identical to Jones, being this cup, being Bob, being that blue shirt* (49). The Supervenience of Identity Thesis (SIT) states that the property of being identical to x supervenes on x's pure properties. This is to say, effectively, that numerical identity depends on qualitative identity.

The bundle theorist can reject the supervenience thesis and reject haecceities, but I'm sure she would also have to reject the principle of sufficient reason. Objects that are indiscernible with respect to their pure properties are such that, for instance, there is no explanation for their diversity, and that is a violation of the principle of sufficient reason. It's just a primitive fact that they are diverse. But the rejection of the SIT might coincide with accepting haecceities. This is what substance and substratum theorists do. Qualitatively identical objects might differ in substrata. Isn't that also a violation of the principle of sufficient reason, supposing one cares about that principle? These are all more or less appealing ways—less appealing, mostly—for bundle theorists (and austere nominalists, for that matter) to handle problems of identity and individuation.

In "Properties as Parts of Ordinary Objects," Eric T. Olson provides some very helpful ways to distinguish constituent and relational ontologies including six basic principles of constituent ontologies. Olson offers a very interesting argument that constituent ontologies lead to substance dualism. This, Olson believes, is bad news. According to Olson, given a constituent ontology, there will exist *quasi-abstract* objects, for instance, the thing composed of my constituent properties except my physical properties. That thing will be wholly immaterial. Yet all of my mental properties will be constituents of it. It will be psychologically indistinguishable from me. It will be, in short, an immaterial mind (72). It would mean that there are both material and immaterial human thinkers, and that for every human being there is one of each. The result is a bizarre amalgam of dualism and materialism.

On van Inwagen's growing block model of time travel, a time traveler removes herself to an earlier location in the existing growing block and annihilates the part of the block between her temporal point of departure and

her point of arrival. From the point of arrival in the past, according to van Inwagen, a new paradox-free block is generated (81). In "Time Travel and the Movable Present," Sara Bernstein generalizes van Inwagen's model to several views that include a movable objective present (MOP). The distinctive feature of van Inwagen's model of time travel is the traveler's control over the location of the objective present. When the time traveler moves in time, she changes the location of the objective present for the entire manifold. Consider Bianca who travels from 2017 back to Woodstock and thereby annihilates the portion of the world existing from Woodstock to 2017. There literally is no such temporal segment anymore and there does not exist anything that existed in that temporal segment. Bianca also annihilates that portion of time during which, first time around, she did not attend Woodstock (82). But we might wonder how? Perhaps she goes back prior to the Woodstock event. If so, how does it happen that Woodstock occurs all over again? Maybe it wouldn't occur, since the past is changed and the future is occurring over again. And what about the Bianca who did not attend Woodstock. Is the time traveling Bianca her 2017-stage, or is the new 2017 Bianca her 2017-stage? The time traveling models Bernstein discusses are interesting and ingenious and raise some fascinating questions.

Mark Heller advances a version of the luck problem for libertarians, in "The Disconnect Problem and the Influence Strategy" in Part II, "Freedom." If an event is undetermined, then it is not determined by the agent's reasons and this disconnection has the consequence that it is just luck when an undetermined event corresponds to the agent's reasons (95). The standard libertarian response is the "influencing without determining" response according to which an agent can control her actions by reasons influencing her decisions to act. But according to Heller, if a little influencing is good, then more influencing is better, so the libertarians have no answer for why influencing is good and determining is bad. Heller urges that libertarians ought to abandon the influencing but not determining strategy. If the influencing strategy is the only way to respond to the luck problem, then we ought to abandon libertarianism.

In "Reviving the *Mind* Argument," Alicia Finch revisits van Inwagen's thesis about the *Mind* argument and the consequence argument. Van Inwagen argued that the *Mind* argument is valid if and only if the consequence argument is valid. If it is held that the consequence argument is valid then libertarians must hold that the *Mind* argument has one or more false premises (118). It's fairly well known that the original Beta is invalid. It is also widely known that several—more or less formal—revised versions of Beta are suitable for a revised consequence argument. Finch aims to show that there is another Beta-like principle—the transfer principle—that the anti-libertarian can use in a valid mind argument. Finch's argument is frequently couched in quasi-English representations of complex, technical notions in free will. The formalizations are not always helpful. To offer an example, one premise in Finch's argument is (23) $\Box((Dw \ \& \ Ptw \ \& \ pw) \longrightarrow \Box((Pt \ \& \ L^w) \longrightarrow p))$ is labeled "consequence of determinism." But (23) does

not appear to be a necessary truth, since even if w is deterministic ("Dw" is necessary, if true), P is the state of the world at t in w ("Ptw," too, is necessary, if true at all), and p is true in w ("pw" again, is necessary, if true), it might be the case that Pt and L^w and not p. But if (23) is false, then we cannot derive the targeted conclusion. There are similar formal worries arising elsewhere in the discussion. Perhaps these are all remediable, but they do affect the initial cogency of the anti-libertarian argument.

There is an excellent symposium on the principle of the fixity of the past whose contributors are John Martin Fischer, Neal Tognazzini, and Wesley Holliday (140). Fischer and Tognazzini consider an argument against the stalemate between those who defend fixity-of-the-past (FP) incompatibilism, and those who reject it. Wes Holliday offers an ingenious argument in favor of FP, and against the stalemate. Very roughly FP states that an agent cannot perform an action that is inconsistent with the past. The argument, in brief, goes this way: (i) necessarily, no one ever performs an action that is inconsistent with the past and (ii) if there is no possible world in which an action of type X is performed, then necessarily, no one can perform an action of type X. So, (iii) necessarily, no one can perform an action inconsistent with the past. (iii) just states that FP is true. It's an intriguing argument as Holliday further develops it, and it doesn't make any obvious mistakes. There is certainly the sense that this conclusion cannot be correct, but locating that mistake is another matter (142).

There are six chapters included in Part III, "God," each of which deserves and repays close reading. Here are a few words on some important themes in this section. In "Defenseless: A Critique of van Inwagen's Response to the Argument from Evil," Louise Antony argues that van Inwagen's defense against the evidential argument depends on moral and modal mysteries (175). For instance, van Inwagen's defense includes a discussion of the Fall and resulting evil, but he does not tell us why the consequences of the Fall were somehow unavoidable for God. In what sense were those consequences necessary? Antony says that the consequences cannot be merely nomologically necessary, since God is not bound by physical law. Presumably this means that natural laws are contingent and not that anything or anyone—including God—could violate an exceptionless regularity.

Both Eleonore Stump in "The Problem of Evil and Atonement" and Peter van Inwagen accept that something about suffering conduces to the ultimate good for human beings—union with God. But according to Stump, the doctrine of atonement and a theologically acceptable explanation of suffering in the world ought to have a connected place in one grand unified theological theory of everything in God's providential plan of salvation (187). The thought is to say what this connected place could be. The aversion to suffering—which results from willing against God's will—is one motivation we have for freely accepting God's grace and the desire to will God's will. The Thomistic will is thereby elicited in us—God allows the suffering for this reason. Contemplation of the Passion can also lessen resistance to God's grace. This is one way in which the atonement and the

Thomistic response to suffering are connected. The role of suffering in salvation is explained by evoking, along with the Passion, the Thomistic will and greater union with God. Stump's account is lucid and interesting.

In "Swing Vote," Frances Howard-Snyder focuses on cases where it makes no difference whether or not I perform some action. It makes no difference whether or not I vote, drive an SUV, participate in protests, overfish, use public transportation and so on. And it appears to make no difference (to the achievement of God's goals) whether or not God allows every instance of suffering. Howard-Snyder proposes (tentatively) that there might be a difference in probability between the following two counterfactuals.

(1) If God had not prevented suffering S, then the results for achieving his purposes would be total success.

(2) If God had prevented suffering S, then the results for achieving his purposes would be total success.

The argument is that (2) might have been slightly less probable than (1). It does seem to matter that (2) will not be less than (1) for every instance of actual evil, and, in cases where there is a difference, it does matter whether it is sufficiently large to make the expected value of permitting evil sufficiently high. Howard-Snyder is not unaware of these issues. She opens up new and interesting avenues of defense against many arguments from evil.

In "Theism and Allism," Alex Rosenberg is keen to show that Darwinism is incompatible with Theism, contrary to van Inwagen's position. The initial criticism of van Inwagen's account of natural selection is the role of objective probability or chance in the process (230). Chance plays an important role in genetic drift, when less fit individuals survive longer and reproduce more. Exogenous causes such as earthquakes, forest fires, lightening strikes, etc. sometimes result in less fit individuals surviving longer. One problem for Rosenberg's argument is that everything we observe in the actual world—every appearance of objective probability—is perfectly consistent with every event occurring as a matter of metaphysical necessity. So, obviously Darwinism is consistent with everything in the actual world occurring as a matter of metaphysical necessity. For all we know, we are in a Spinozistic world. And so obviously God might have caused the actual world to occur in exactly the way it did, and it would appear just as it does appear, with every measurement being exactly what they actually are. But, setting that metaphysical worry aside, objective probability does seem consistent with causal determinism via an objective probability distribution over initial conditions (I owe this point to Tim Williamson). Either way we seem to have a way to make compatible Darwinism and Theism, but there is certainly a great deal more to discuss here.

Daniel Howard-Snyder argues against Paul Draper's thesis that evolution provides significant evidence against (some fundamental features of) theism in "The Evolutionary Argument for Atheism." The main argument against the Draper's thesis aims to establish that we might have maximally

good reason to believe that, as a matter of necessity, God would not exercise his power to specially create. The numbers work out right. It is a problem for the probabilistic argument if Howard-Snyder can show that $P(\sim S | T) = 1$ (epistemic probability that God does not create specially is certain), despite granting that it is not beyond God's power to create specially. But this is not easy to show. A power that is necessarily not manifested is a necessarily finked or masked power. Can there be such a power? Well, only if God has the power to do the impossible. The maximally good reason we are given to believe in this maximally finked power is a Leibnizian one: a God that interferes with nature would be one that doesn't plan so well. Probably not everyone will find that reason maximally good.

Lynne Rudder Baker argues that there is an Anselmian ontological argument that does not commit Anselm to a Meinongian ontology in "Must Anselm be Interpreted as a Meinongian" (263). She offers a non-Meinongian Anselmian argument based on a "cognitive ability to talk about non-existing objects." The argument is ingenious. Baker assumes that the greatest conceivable being b exists *in intellectu* and b does not exist *in re*. Beings existing *in intellectu*—including all manner of non-existent beings—fail to have causally unmediated powers and so fail to be as great as qualitatively indiscernible beings existing *in re*. It does seem to be an obstacle to the inference that we could also argue that b (the greatest conceivable being) is a round square existing *in intellectu* and b does not exist *in re*, and quickly prove that there is a greater round square with unmediated causal powers. Perhaps the objection is avoidable, but it is an instance of the pretty standard parodic response to Anselmian ontological arguments, and it looks troubling.

David Chalmers argues in "Why Isn't there More Progress in Philosophy?" that there is progress in philosophy but takes the glass-half-empty position—there is not as much progress as we would like. The central thesis is that there has not been large collective convergence to the truth on the big questions in philosophy (278). The big questions include things like: is there a god, what is the relationship between mind and body, what are the basic principles of morality, and so on. If we drop, consecutively, "large," "collective," "big," and "convergence to truth" from the thesis, we of course get interestingly different sorts of convergence.

Why isn't there more progress in philosophy? Why is there less convergence than in the hard sciences? Chalmers offers an interesting answer: the hard sciences have methods that have power to compel agreement on the big questions in those areas. Philosophy has a method too—the method of argument. But the method of argument does not compel agreement (286). It is in general true that one or more of the premises in virtually any interesting philosophical argument can be rejected without much controversy. This is not true for the axioms of mathematics or the widely confirmed premises in the physical sciences. But I'd urge that the problem is worse. It doesn't take a longitudinal study to observe that philosophical arguments are not in general—maybe not even typically—carried out

in good faith. This makes the rejection of uncongenial premises a casual exercise, and progress very elusive.

Both "Philosophical Individualism," by John A. Keller, and "Are There any Successful Philosophical Arguments?," by Sarah McGrath and Thomas Kelly, are direct challenges to van Inwagen's view of successful philosophical arguments. According to van Inwagen, a successful philosophical argument would be convincing to an audience of ideal neutral agnostics about a substantive philosophical question, when ideally presented in the presence of an ideal opponent (299). Van Inwagen argues that there are no philosophical arguments that satisfy this public criterion. Keller argues against van Inwagen's standard and in favor of a private criterion on the basis, in part, of his meta-criteria. The argument with van Inwagen is essentially moved up one level, since Keller's meta-criteria select philosophical individualism as the standard for philosophical success. Keller's brand of philosophical individualism states that an argument is successful for an individual just if she knows that it is sound (and non-fallacious) (306). It does seem open whether an individual S can know p in cases where ideal neutral agnostics who share S's evidence and reason better and more dispassionately than S do not know p.

Contrary to van Inwagen's criterion of success, McGrath and Kelly offer three successful arguments for philosophical conclusions: (i) van Inwagen's argument that metaphysical nihilism is false, (ii) an argument that inductive skepticism is false, and (iii) an argument that act consequentialism is false. Each rebuts a substantive philosophical thesis, and each is such that many philosophers would find them compelling. Each of the rebuttals goes by way of counterexample (327). McGrath and Kelly nicely and, I think, successfully, engage the question of what constitutes a substantive thesis. They offer in addition a general problem for the application of van Inwagen's criterion. Consider any valid argument for a substantive philosophical conclusion p with generally known premises. This should count as a successful argument. But it doesn't, since our ideal agnostics could not be agnostic relative to p. They would have inferred that p from those known premises long before we presented our argument. There are no ideal agnostics relative to p. The objection is intriguing, but there is a concern about whether the objection is question-begging. Why believe that there are such arguments as the one described prior to such arguments being tested in van Inwagen's method? He might respond that such an argument would have to pass the test of an ideal opponent, who's aim is to show that the premises are not all obviously true. If it does pass that test, then of course they would no longer be agnostics relative to that proposition.