



The free will defense is a particular type of consistency proof.<sup>2</sup> I briefly discuss the free will defense in section 2. The defense aims to prove that the existence of evil is broadly logically consistent with the existence of God.<sup>3</sup> More specifically, it aims to show that the existence of evil is consistent with the existence of a God that instantiates the traditional profile of divine attributes.<sup>4</sup> So, a successful free will defense would show that there is at least one metaphysically possible world in which God coexists with evil. If there is such a metaphysically possible world, then the free will defense resolves the consistency problem presented in the logical problem of evil.<sup>5</sup>

Free will compatibilism presents a problem for the free will defense *only if* the conjunction of God's existence and compatibilism entails that there are *no metaphysically possible worlds* in which there exist both evil states of affairs and God.<sup>6</sup> So, free will compatibilism presents a problem *only if* the conjunction of God's existence and compatibilism entails that it is metaphysically impossible any moral agent brings about moral evil. It is certainly true that free will compatibilism entails that God can cause each possible world in which there are free agents to be morally perfect.

2. See Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 165ff.

3. Plantinga's proof is not intended to be as strong as a demonstration. But some have argued that Plantinga still has not met the epistemic standards necessary to show that his version of R is consistent with proposition (1); see section 2. Compare John Hawthorne and Daniel Howard-Snyder, "Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 44, No. 1 (1998): 1-21.

4. The traditional attributes of God include at least essential omniscience, essential omnipotence, essential perfect goodness, and necessary existence.

5. It is sometimes urged against the free will defense that it does not show the existence of God is consistent with the sorts of actual evil that exists. But compare John Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," *Mind* 64, New Series (1955): 200-12. Mackie's objection is that the existence of any evil is inconsistent with the existence of the traditional view of God. This objection is what the free will defense addresses. It should be noted that Plantinga also addresses the former objection in his *Nature of Necessity*, chap. 9, section 11.

It should additionally be noted that Mackie seems to replace the logical argument from evil with what he called "the problem of unabsorbed evils," in *The Miracle of Theism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 150-76. The problem of unabsorbed evils is not obviously a version of the logical problem.

6. Recall that John Mackie's aim in "Evil and Omnipotence" was to show that the existence of evil is inconsistent with the traditional view of God. Among the adequate solutions to the logical problem of evil, according to Mackie, is to abandon the traditional view of God. There are other senses in which we might say the free will defense fails. We might say it fails if some premise in the original formulation of the argument is false. But this is a very weak sense in which the free will defense might fail, since Plantinga has offered so many distinct versions of the argument. My claim is that if some version of the argument succeeds, the free will defense succeeds.

But the relevant question is whether free will compatibilism entails that God can cause every possible world in which there are free agents to be morally perfect.<sup>7</sup> The conclusion of this essay is that God cannot cause every possible world in which there are compatibilist free agents to be morally perfect. Indeed, it is metaphysically impossible that God should do so. Free will compatibilism, therefore, presents no problem for the free will defense.

In section 3, I consider the thesis that, necessarily, if God creates any free moral agents, then God creates moral agents that are strong compatibilist free. Strong compatibilism does entail that, necessarily, God *can* actualize a world in which every significantly free person always freely goes right.<sup>8</sup> So strong compatibilism entails that no limitation on divine power to actualize a morally perfect world can explain why God might fail to actualize a morally perfect world.<sup>9</sup> But I show that if strong compatibilism is true, then there must be morally imperfect worlds: there must be worlds in which God exists along with moral evil. It is impossible that God strongly actualizes a morally perfect world in every world that includes strong-compatibilist free agents; there must be at least one world in which God exists and some strong-compatibilist free agents go wrong. A successful free will defense can accommodate strong compatibilism.

In section 4 I consider the thesis that, necessarily, if God creates any free moral agents, then God creates moral agents that are weak compatibilist free. Weak compatibilism entails that, necessarily, God can actualize a world in which every significantly free person always freely goes right.<sup>10</sup> So

weak compatibilism entails that God can actualize a morally perfect world. If God actualizes a morally perfect world, then there must be morally imperfect worlds in which God exists along with moral evil. Weak compatibilism entails that God can actualize a morally perfect world in every world that includes weak-compatibilist free agents; there must be at least one world in which God exists and some weak-compatibilist free agents go wrong. A successful free will defense can accommodate weak-compatibilism. (see section 5).

2. THE ALL

The free will defense aims to show that the following propositions are broadly logically consistent if and only if there is some world in which these propositions are true.

- 1. God is omnipotent, omniscient, essentially good, and essentially necessarily existing.
- 2. Evil exists.

According to the free will defense, the conjunction of (1) and (2) is consistent with (1) and such that R and (1) are consistent and R and (1) and (2) are inconsistent. These propositions are true. Proposition (1) is true in all worlds.

R1. God is omnipotent and omniscient in all worlds containing moral good but not in worlds containing moral evil.

If R1 and (1) are themselves consistent, then God exists, and it is not necessary that there be moral good and no moral evil.

One notable problem with this defense is that R1 is consistent with (1) and (2).

11. See note 8 above. If weak compatibilism is true, then there must be morally imperfect worlds in which God exists along with moral evil. It is necessarily true that God cannot strongly actualize a morally perfect world in every world that includes weak-compatibilist free agents.

12. See Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 180-90.

7. An intrepid free will compatibilist might urge that the conjunction of compatibilism and God entails that God must cause every possible world to be morally perfect. In fact, God cannot cause every world in which there are compatibilist free agents to be morally perfect.

8. I'm assuming throughout that God is essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient, essentially perfectly good, and essentially necessarily existing. I understand "significant freedom" here in a sense consistent with strong-compatibilist views of freedom.

9. The best known version of Plantinga's free will defense appeals to the possibility that God's creative power is limited by (i) the impossibility of strongly actualizing a morally perfect world, and (ii) a distribution of true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom that preclude the weak actualization of a morally perfect world. It is worth noting that every version of the free will defense that Plantinga advances depends on condition (i). See Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity*, 180-90, and his "Self-Profile," 36-55. If strong compatibilism is true, then condition (i) is false. It is necessarily true that God can strongly actualize a morally perfect world. And that is perhaps the reason Plantinga believes that the free will defense must assume incompatibilism.

10. I understand "significant freedom" here in a sense consistent with weak-compatibilist views of freedom. Significant freedom for weak compatibilists does not require satisfaction of PAP or PSF (see section 3).



weak compatibilism entails that no limitation on the divine power to actualize a morally perfect world can explain why God might fail to actualize a morally perfect world.<sup>11</sup> But I show that if weak compatibilism is true, then there must be morally imperfect worlds. So, there must be worlds in which God exists along with moral evil. It is impossible that God strongly actualizes a morally perfect world in every world that includes weak-compatibilist free agents; there must be at least one world in which God exists and some weak-compatibilist free agents go wrong. So, a successful free will defense can accommodate weak compatibilism. I offer some concluding remarks in section 5.

## 2. THE AIM OF THE FREE WILL DEFENSE

The free will defense aims to show that the propositions in (1) and (2), following, are broadly logically consistent. Thus, (1) and (2) are consistent if and only if there is some metaphysically possible world in which both propositions are true.

1. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good.
2. Evil exists.

According to the free will defense, there is a proposition R that is consistent with (1) and such that R and (1) together entail (2). If there is such an R, then that of course would show that (1) and (2) are consistent. If R and (1) are consistent and R and (1) entail (2), then there is some world in which all these propositions true. Plantinga proposes R1 as a worthy candidate for R:

R1. God is omnipotent and it is not within God's power to actualize a world containing moral good but no moral evil.<sup>12</sup>

If R1 and (1) are themselves consistent, then there is a world W at which God exists, and it is not within God's power to create a world containing moral good and no moral evil.

One notable problem with Plantinga's formulation of the free will defense is that R1 is consistent with there being no on-balance good actualizable

11. See note 8 above. If weak compatibilism is true, then condition (i) in note 8 is false. It is necessarily true that God can strongly actualize a morally perfect world.

12. See Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity*, p. 184, and his *God, Freedom and Evil*, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 44>



worlds that contain moral evil. If there were no such actualizable worlds, then God would presumably actualize a world with no significantly free beings at all. So, for all we know from R1, there is no moral good or moral evil in W. So R1 and (1) do not entail (2).

Plantinga is certainly aware that there are many other candidates for the proposition in R.<sup>13</sup> Consider the proposition in R2: R2 and (1) do entail (2):

R2. God actualizes a world that is on balance good and it is not within God's power to actualize a world containing moral good but no moral evil.

It's consistent with God's perfect goodness that he actualizes a world with moral evil if some actualizable world with moral good and moral evil is better than any actualizable world with no moral evil. And if God cannot actualize a world that is, on balance, good with no moral evil, then some world containing moral good and moral evil is better than any world containing no moral evil.<sup>14</sup> So, R2 seems consistent with both God's omnipotence and his moral perfection. Thus, R2 and (1) seem consistent, and R2 and (1) entail (2). If God actualizes an on-balance good world, and it is not in his power to actualize a world with moral good but no moral evil, then God actualizes a world that contains some evil.

The compatibilist challenge to the free will defense advances the thesis that, necessarily, God can actualize any morally perfect world he wishes. If, necessarily, God can actualize a morally perfect world, then our candidate for proposition R is false. God's failure to actualize a morally perfect world cannot result from God's lacking the power to do so. It is necessarily within God's power to actualize a world that is, on balance, good and contains no moral evil.

But, as we have noted, there are many possible candidates for R. If there is a proposition R such that (i) R is consistent with both (1) and compatibilism, and (ii) R and (1) entail (2), then R, (1), and compatibilism entail that (1) and (2) are consistent. Of course, any candidate for proposition R would have to be consistent with the traditional attributes of God, including his essential omnipotence and his essential moral perfection.

13. See Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity*, 189-93.

14. Of course, it might not be true that some world that is, on balance, good is at least as good as any world that is, on balance, good. There might be better and better on-balance good worlds, all of which include some moral evil. I don't think this presents a serious obstacle to God's actualization of some world. But I don't address the worry here.

### 3. STROUPELL THE

Strong compatibilists hold that the existence of free will is necessary for free will and moral responsibility with causal determinism.<sup>15</sup> I will call the Principle of Moral Significance what I will call the Principle of Moral Significance: that a moral agent is significant for a morally significant action only if it is morally right to perform that action, or vice versa:

PSE. A moral agent S is significant for an action A only if S could have gone wrong (right) with respect to A.

Further, a person is significant for a morally significant action in the sense relevant to the Principle of Moral Significance if and only if compatibilists also endorse the Principle of Possibilities (PAP):

PAP. An agent S is morally significant for an action A only if S could have gone wrong (right) with respect to A.

Thus, PAP ensures that a morally significant action A is obligatory for a moral agent S only if the agent could have gone wrong (right) with respect to A. According to causal determinism, a moral agent S could have gone wrong (right) with respect to A only if the agent could have gone wrong (right) with respect to A.

15. For further discussion see Campbell, "A Compatibilist Defense of the Principle of Moral Significance" (1997): 319-30.

16. There are interesting discussions of this issue. See Keith Lehrer, "Can't in the Theory of Action," ed. Myles Brand and Keith Lehrer, "A Compatibilist Defense of the Principle of Moral Significance" (1997): 319-30.

17. Compare Plantinga, "The Nature of Necessity," differently from the way I have argued over the sort of freedom that a person is significantly free to perform (and right to perform).

### 3. STRONG COMPATIBILISM AND THE FREE WILL DEFENSE

Strong compatibilists hold that alternative possibilities (of action) are necessary for free will and moral responsibility, and that free will is compatible with causal determinism.<sup>15</sup> So, strong compatibilists endorse a version of what I will call the Principle of Significant Freedom (PSF).<sup>16</sup> We will say that a moral agent is significantly free with respect to action A only if A is a morally significant action. And we'll say that A is morally significant if and only if it is morally right to perform A and morally wrong not to perform A, or vice versa:

PSF. A moral agent S is significantly free with respect to A only if S could have gone wrong (right) with respect to A.

Further, a person is significantly free relative to action A only if S is free in the sense relevant to S's being morally responsible for A.<sup>17</sup> Strong compatibilists also endorse a version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP):

PAP. An agent S is morally responsible for morally significant action A only if S could have gone wrong (right) with respect to A.

Thus, PAP ensures that a moral agent is responsible for performing an obligatory action A only if the agent could have gone wrong with respect to A, and a moral agent is responsible for performing a forbidden action A only if the agent could have gone right with respect to A.

According to causal determinism, whenever two possible worlds obey the same laws perfectly, they are exactly the same for all time, or they are

15. For further discussion of strong and weak compatibilism, see Joseph K. Campbell, "A Compatibilist Theory of Alternative Possibilities," *Philosophical Studies* 88 (1997): 319-30.

16. There are interesting questions on the conditions under which someone could have done otherwise or someone was able to do otherwise. Among the famous sources, see Keith Lehrer, "Can' in Theory and Practice: A Possible Worlds Analysis," in *Action Theory*, ed. Myles Brand and Douglas (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel, 1976). But see also Campbell, "A Compatibilist Theory."

17. Compare Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity*. Plantinga uses "significant freedom" differently from the way I'm using the term. I'm bringing attention to the disagreement over the sort of freedom that is necessary to moral responsibility. For Plantinga, a person is significantly free if he is free with respect to an action that it would be wrong to perform (and right not to perform), or vice versa.





ly deterministic possible world past history and laws in the tates the actual future. In short, at branch from the actual past

sal determinism is compatible ose futures are causally deter- native futures. Strong compat- ere are no possible (nonactual) ere might be significantly free rom the future of W. These sig- le to actualize a past divergent s strong compatibilism:

oken beforehand. The course of use of events a little while before re there would have been a law- re called it. But this divergence sing my hand. . . . Nor would it er or later.<sup>21</sup>

to raise my hand, and I do not erwise. Had I raised my hand, ome law of nature in W is not a r the future in W' is the same as s laws that W does not include, the time I raise my hand is not e past in W does not duplicate

dence and Time's Arrow," in his rsity Press, 1986), 37. Of course, and are the same throughout long

ranch from one past depends on the past. Lewis, for one, maintains ith respect to some universals. But t to the analysis of PAP. One could pasts. nge the past or future of any world ing the strong compatibilists, that o do so, the past would be different

?" in his *Philosophical Papers Vol. II*

the past in W'. The past of W', for instance, includes some events that violate the laws of W and these, of course, do not occur in W. Since W and W' do not even share the same laws, they are not the same over any stretch of time. But according to strong compatibilism, I freely fail to raise my hand in W since it is true in W that I am able to actualize the nonbranching future in world W' in which I do raise my hand.

Strong compatibilism entails that R2 and (1) are inconsistent. If strong compatibilism is true, then God can actualize a world in which every significantly free person always goes right. But strong compatibilism is true only if it is necessarily true.<sup>22</sup> So, necessarily, God can actualize a world in which every significantly free person always goes right. There are, then, no possible worlds where it is not within God's power to actualize a world containing moral good and no moral evil. So, R2 is necessarily false.

As noted above, morally significant actions are such that it is morally right to perform them and morally wrong not to perform them, or vice versa.<sup>23</sup> According to strong compatibilism, necessarily, God can actualize a world in which every significantly free moral agent goes right with respect to every morally significant action. But these moral agents are strong compatibilist free *only if* they able to do otherwise with respect to these morally significant actions. So, they are strong compatibilist free only if they can fail to perform these morally significant actions. But, then, those agents are strong compatibilist free only if, possibly, God actualizes a world in which some significantly free moral agents sometimes go wrong. But, if God can actualize a world in which every significantly free agent always goes right, and strong compatibilism is true, then (1) and (2) are consistent.

The strong-compatibilist objection to the free will defense is that R2 is false. It is false that, possibly, it is not within God's power to actualize a world containing moral good and no moral evil. And, indeed, R2 is false under the assumption of strong compatibilism. But the free will defense is extremely resilient. It does not follow from the falsity of R2 that the free will defense fails.

Note that strong compatibilism does not entail that, necessarily, God *does* actualize a world in which every significantly free agent always goes right. Moral agents are strong compatibilist free and causally determined to go right only if they able to do otherwise. Strong compatibilists endorse PSF and PAP. So, morally perfect worlds include strongly compatibilist free agents that go right with respect to every morally significant action only if

22. This does assume a sort of metaphysical necessitarianism—that metaphysical theses are necessarily true, if true at all. I don't aim to dispute the thesis here.  
23. See Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity*, 166ff.

there are possible worlds in which those moral agents freely go wrong with respect to those actions. Conversely, if there are no worlds in which those moral agents freely go wrong with respect to those actions, then those agents in morally perfect worlds are not strong compatibilist free.

The main aim of the free will defense is to establish that (1) and (2) are consistent. We are assuming that strong compatibilism is necessarily true. Let R3 state the following:

R3. God actualizes some extremely valuable, morally perfect worlds in which every strongly compatibilist free person always goes right.

R3 certainly seems consistent with (1) and, as we have seen, R3 and (1) entail that there is some possible world in which God exists and some strong-compatibilist free persons freely go wrong. Recall, that agents are strong compatibilist free and always go right with respect to morally significant actions only if there is some world in which those agents go morally wrong with respect to those actions. So, under the assumption of strong compatibilism, there must some world in which God exists and there is moral evil. So, R3 and (1) entail that (1) and (2) are consistent. But, then, the free will defense succeeds under the assumption that strong compatibilism is true.

#### 4. WEAK COMPATIBILISM AND THE FREE WILL DEFENSE

According to weak compatibilism, free will is compatible with causal determinism, but free will does not require alternative possible actions. Weak compatibilists agree with strong compatibilists that in deterministic worlds there are no possible (nonactual) futures branching from the actual past. But, unlike strong compatibilists, they do not maintain that significantly free persons are in general able to actualize a future that diverges from the actual future. So, weak compatibilists reject PSF above.

Weak compatibilists also reject PAP. An agent can be morally responsible for performing A in cases where the agent could not have gone wrong (right) with respect to A. If PSF and PAP are false, then an agent might be significantly free with respect to an action A and morally responsible for A, even if the agent is not able to go wrong (right) with respect to A.

It is characteristic of weak compatibilism to reject PSF and PAP. But weak compatibilists do affirm a control condition on significant freedom. Some weak compatibilists affirm guidance control conditions, for instance, which require that one's actions be the product of a mechanism that is, in some

sense, one's own and responsible for. Such conditions do not require one to endorse alternative sourcehood. Such conditions require the agent to be the source of the action. Such conditions require compatibilists in general to endorse that moral agents have the sourcehood

CC. A person S has significant control with respect to A relevant to A's freedom.

The control condition in CC is satisfied if and only if an agent S might satisfy the condition. An agent S might satisfy the condition if and only if the fact that S does not have the condition does not prevent S from being significantly free.

But no significantly free agent is morally responsible only if there are alternative possibilities (PGP):

PGP. A moral agent S has the sourcehood with respect to morally significant actions only if there is some world in which S exists and S is significantly free.

PGP ensures that a moral agent is morally responsible for an action A only if it is metaphysically possible for S to have performed A with respect to A, and a moral agent is not morally responsible for an action A only if it is metaphysically necessary for S to have performed A with respect to A.

24. See J. M. Fischer, "Frankfurt-style Cases and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities," *Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, ed. E. Sosa and M. Tooley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 281–308. See also his "Freedom of the Will and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities," in J. Fischer, R. Kane, D. Pereboom, and M. Ravizza (eds.), *Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Fischer is well known for defending compatibilism, as I'm using the term.

25. There are numerous ways of being significantly free. It is not necessary that one is the source of one's actions. One can be significantly free with one's second-order volition. One can be significantly free if one has a sourcehood condition. Some might regard that as a sourcehood condition. See J. M. Fischer, "Freedom of the Will and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities," in *Care About* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Kane, *The Significance of Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

26. But see Joel Feinberg, "The Problem of Moral Responsibility," in *The Boundaries of Liberty: Essays on Liberty and Responsibility* (New York: Basic Books, 1980). Feinberg argues that the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is satisfied if and only if there is some possible world in which S exists and S is significantly free.

sense, one's own and responsive to reasons.<sup>24</sup> Other weak compatibilists endorse alternative sourcehood conditions on significant freedom that require the agent to be the source of her action in other senses.<sup>25</sup> Weak compatibilists in general endorse the general condition in (CC) requiring that moral agents have the sort of control relevant to moral responsibility:

CC. A person S has significant freedom in performing A only if S has the sort of control with respect to A relevant to free will and moral responsibility.

The control condition in CC aims to be consistent with causal determinism. An agent S might satisfy the control condition with respect to A despite the fact that S does not have the power or ability not to perform A.<sup>26</sup>

But no significantly free person has the kind of control relevant to moral responsibility unless she satisfies the Principle of Genuine Possibilities (PGP):

PGP. A moral agent S has the sort of control relevant to moral responsibility with respect to morally significant action A only if there is a metaphysically possible world in which S exists and S goes wrong (right) with respect to A.

PGP ensures that a moral agent is responsible for performing an obligatory action A only if it is metaphysically possible that the agent goes wrong with respect to A, and a moral agent is responsible for performing a forbidden action A only if it is metaphysically possible that the agent goes right with respect to A.

24. See J. M. Fischer, "Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semi-Compatibilism," in *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, ed. Robert Kane (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 281–308. See also his "Compatibilism," in *Four Views on Free Will*, ed. J. M. Fischer, R. Kane, D. Pereboom, and M. Vargas (Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 44–84. Fischer is well known for defending semi-compatibilism, but he is also a weak compatibilist, as I'm using the term.

25. There are numerous ways to develop the notion that an action has its source in the significantly free agent. It is consistent with such a view to argue, for instance, that one is the source of one's actions, provided that one's first-order volitions mesh with one's second-order volitions—that is, provided one has the will that one wants to have. Some might regard that as a degenerate control position. See Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," in his *The Importance of What We Care About* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Of course, not everyone who endorses a sourcehood condition is a weak compatibilist. See, for instance, Robert Kane, *The Significance of Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), esp. 73ff.

26. But see Joel Feinberg, "The Interest of Liberty on the Scales," in his *Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). Feinberg argues that moral agents are in control only if the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is satisfied.



Of course, PGP does not entail that *S* has control only if *S* has the power or is able to do  $\sim A$ . Rather, PGP entails that moral agents have the kind of control relevant to moral responsibility with respect to an action *A* at time *t* only if their performance of *A* at *t* is not metaphysically necessitated.

Consider the implicit role of PGP in a typical Frankfurt-style counterexample to PAP:

Eleanor and her father Roscoe plan to contribute a large sum to charity. Roscoe fears that Eleanor might change her mind at an inopportune moment and not fulfill her duty to contribute. To insure that Eleanor will proceed with the plans, Roscoe secretly implants a mechanism in Eleanor's brain. Should Eleanor give any indication that she is unwilling to go along with the charitable donation, Roscoe will use the device to render Eleanor unable to do anything other than contribute. As it happens, despite self-interested reservations, Eleanor willingly donates to the charity with her father. The device is never activated.<sup>27</sup>

Suppose the counterexample is modified in a way that violates PGP. Suppose Roscoe knows that God creates Eleanor only in those deterministic worlds where the laws and circumstances cause Eleanor to never go morally wrong with respect to any morally significant choice. We are supposing it is metaphysically impossible that Eleanor exists and does not contribute to charity in the situation above. It is not merely that Eleanor does not have the power or ability to contribute to charity; there is literally no metaphysically possible world in which Eleanor goes wrong with respect to giving to charity, and so there is no metaphysically possible world in which she goes wrong with respect to contributing to charity with her father. There are no self-interested considerations against contributing to which Eleanor is even possibly responsive. There are no possible weaknesses in her character that might keep Eleanor from contributing. Eleanor has no control at all with respect to contributing to charity, since it is metaphysically impossible that Eleanor exists and goes wrong with respect to contributing in the situation above. Eleanor is not significantly free with respect to contributing to charity because Eleanor's condition violates PGP.<sup>28</sup>

Frankfurt cases support the weak-compatibilist intuition that we might be free and morally responsible in situations where we do *A* and we are not

able, or do not have the power. Frankfurt cases do not support the intuition that we are morally responsible in situations where it is metaphysically impossible for us to go wrong.

Suppose that, necessarily, God creates all compatibilist free moral agents in worlds where they have compatibilist free and causally determined control with respect to their actions. This is the right sort of control with respect to which it is not metaphysically impossible for us to go wrong with respect to those actions. So, there are no possible worlds in which those agents lack the right sort of control, though there are possible worlds in which they lack the sort of control with respect to which it is metaphysically impossible for them to go wrong.

The main aim of the free will defense is to show that theism is consistent. We are assuming that theism is consistent. Let R4 state the following:

R4. God actualizes some extent of compatibilist free will in every weak compatibilist free world.

R4 certainly seems consistent with (1) and (2). (1) and (2) entail that there is some possible world in which compatibilist free agents freely choose to do *A*. (2) is consistent. So, the free will defense shows that weak compatibilism is true.

## 5. CO

The compatibilist challenge to PAP is that, necessarily, God can actualize a world in which we do *A* and we are not necessarily, God can actualize a world in which we do *A* and we are not

27. This is a much modified version of an example in Joseph Campbell, "A Compatibilist Theory," 2-3.

28. As the case is described, Eleanor has the property of being a bank robber essentially. So, there's not even a metaphysical possibility of her existing and not robbing a bank.

29. Note that the possible world in which we do *A* and we are not free with respect to morally significant choices might be nothing they can do in any possible world for weak-compatibilist free will control condition.

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y of her existing and not robbing

able, or do not have the power, to go wrong (right) with respect to *A*. But Frankfurt cases do not support the intuition that we might be free and morally responsible in situations where we do *A* and it is metaphysically impossible for us to go wrong (right) with respect to *A*.

Suppose that, necessarily, God can actualize a world in which every weak-compatibilist free moral agent always goes right. Agents are weak compatibilist free and causally determined to go right only if they have the right sort of control with respect to what they do. But moral agents have the right sort of control with respect to their morally significant actions only if it is not metaphysically impossible that they go wrong (right) with respect to those actions. So, there are morally perfect worlds in which every weak-compatibilist free moral agent always goes right only if there are possible worlds in which those agents freely go wrong.<sup>29</sup> As a minimal condition on the right sort of control, then, we put it that a moral agent has the right sort of control with respect to a morally significant action *A* only if it is not metaphysically impossible to go wrong (right) with respect to *A*.

The main aim of the free will defense is to establish that (1) and (2) are consistent. We are assuming that weak compatibilism is necessarily true. Let R4 state the following:

R4. God actualizes some extremely valuable, morally perfect worlds in which every weak compatibilist free moral agent always goes right.

R4 certainly seems consistent with (1), and as we have seen, R4 and (1) entail that there is some world in which God exists and some weak-compatibilist free agents freely go wrong. So, R4 and (1) entail that (1) and (2) are consistent. So, the free will defense succeeds under the assumption that weak compatibilism is true.

### 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The compatibilist challenge to the free will defense advances the thesis that, necessarily, God can actualize any morally perfect world he wishes. If, necessarily, God can actualize a morally perfect world, then our candidate

29. Note that the possible worlds in which weak-compatibilist free agents go wrong with respect to morally significant actions need not be worlds they can actualize. There might be nothing they can do to bring about such a world. But there must be such a world for weak-compatibilist agents to even approximate satisfaction of a suitable control condition.

for proposition R is false. It is necessarily within God's power to actualize a world that is, on balance, good and contains no moral evil.

The challenge concisely is the following: compatibilism is true only if, necessarily, God can actualize a morally perfect world and R is false. But we have found that the compatibilist challenge to the free will defense requires an additional thesis. The compatibilist must show that, necessarily, God *can* actualize a morally perfect world only if God *does* actualize a morally perfect world. If the additional thesis is true, then there are no possible worlds in which both God and evil exist.

But we have shown that the additional thesis is false. We showed, first, that strong compatibilism does not present a genuine challenge to the free will defense. We found that R3 is consistent with strong compatibilism. And, R3 is the proposition that God actualizes some extremely valuable, morally perfect worlds in which every strong- compatibilist free person always goes right. Then, R3 is consistent with (1), and R3 and (1) entail that there is some world in which God exists and some strong-compatibilist free persons freely go wrong. Strong compatibilism presents no problem for the free will defense.

Weak compatibilism also presents no genuine challenge to the free will defense. Weak compatibilism is consistent with R4. That is, R4 is the proposition that God actualizes some extremely valuable, morally perfect worlds in which every weak-compatibilist free moral agent always goes right. R4 is consistent with (1), and R4 and (1) entail that there is some world in which God exists and some weak-compatibilist free agents freely go wrong. So, weak compatibilism presents no problem for the free will defense.

A genuine compatibilist challenge to the free will defense must show that, necessarily, God actualizes an extremely valuable, morally perfect world in which it is *metaphysically impossible* that any moral agent go wrong with respect to any morally significant action. But this is just to show that, necessarily, God actualizes morally perfect necessitarian worlds or morally perfect fatalistic worlds, and the prospects for establishing either of these theses are not good.

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