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2. See Alvin Plant
1974), 165ff.

3. Plantinga's proo
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4. The traditional a
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5. It is sometimes u
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CHAPTER 4



Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense

MICHAEL ALMEIDA

1. INTRODUCTION

There is an intuitive and intriguing argument that the free will defense is inconsistent with compatibilist views of free will. Plantinga himself claims that it's obvious the free will defense must assume an incompatibilist view of free will:

[T]he Free Will Defense obviously presupposes a libertarian or incompatibilist conception of freedom. If freedom were compatible with causal determinism, then God could have his cake and eat it too: he could create significantly free persons and cause them always to do only what's right. . . . Many philosophers endorse a compatibilist analysis of freedom, according to which it is perfectly possible that some of my actions be free, even though all of them are causally determined by causal chains extending back to events entirely outside my control. And of course if compatibilism is correct, the Free Will Defense fails.¹

1. See Alvin Plantinga, "Self-Profile," in *Profiles: Alvin Plantinga*, ed. James E. Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel, 1985), 45.

