3
Intending, Settling, and Relying

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3.1 INTRODUCTION

Philosophers of action of different persuasions have suggested that there is a tight connection between the phenomenon of intending and the phenomena of "being settled on" and of "settling" a course of action. My intention to attend a conference this weekend settles in my mind the issue of what to do then. It also settles that issue in fact, since it leads me to attend the conference this weekend. Many have suggested, in addition, that the cited connection supports an important constraint on intention. The constraint, to put it simply, is that one may only intend what one takes one's so intending as settling. Thus, one cannot intend to win the lottery if one does not take one's so intending as settling the issue of one's winning it, as being efficacious in causing that result. This condition has traditionally been understood as a doxastic constraint on intention: what one takes one's intention as settling is what one believes one's so intending as settling.

In this paper I propose an alternative conception of such a constraint. I suggest that we conceive of it in terms of the attitude of reliance, rather than of belief. My aim in the paper is three-fold: to clarify the connection between intending to act and the phenomena of being settled on and of settling a course of action; to provide support for the reliance conception of the cited constraint; and to show that this conception drives a wedge in the familiar dispute, between doxastic and conative accounts of intention, as to whether intending to act necessarily involves the belief that one will so act.

3.2 INTENDING AND SETTLING

In his 1976 article, "Practical Reasoning," Gilbert Harman calls attention to the connection between the ideas of intending and of settling an issue

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in the following way. "Forming the intention to [φ]," Harman maintains, "settles in one's mind the question whether one is going to [φ]" (1976: 438). Intending to act in a certain way settles the issue of one's so acting in one's practical reasoning. It fixes it in one's thoughts. Harman also maintains that being settled on a course of action in one's mind can be pragmatically advantageous. First, it disposes one not to continue considering the question of whether to pursue that action or not, thus allowing one to direct one's attention to other practical matters. Second, it allows one to "take for granted" that one will perform that action in any further practical or theoretical reasoning (1976: 438); it allows one to do this, Harman thinks, since being settled on a course of action involves believing that one will carry it out (1976: 432).

The connection between intention and settling is at the core of Michael Bratman's planning theory of intention. For Bratman intention is a distinct conative attitude. It is a plan-like attitude that involves "an appropriate sort of commitment to action" (1987: 29). This commitment has two dimensions: "reasoning-centered" and "volitional" (15). The first, Bratman says, is partly captured by our ordinary "talk of being *settled* on a certain course of action" (1987: 16, his emphasis). Like Harman, Bratman thinks that the connection between intention and being settled helps to explain the role that this attitude plays in one's practical reasoning. It helps to explain, for example, why in intending to act in a certain way one is disposed both to see the issue of one's so acting as a fixed point in one's deliberations and to engage in further reasoning on the basis of that intention—where this includes forming additional intentions concerning means to executing one's intended end, eschewing from further deliberation options believed to be incompatible with one's intention, and so on (1987: 16–17). The "volitional commitment" of intention concerns, in Bratman's view, the relation between intention and action. If I now intend to perform a certain action later, and my intention persists until then and nothing interferes, Bratman says, I will normally act then—or, at least, I will try. Thus, my intention to act in a certain way tends to settle that I so act. In contrast, Bratman argues, if I merely desired now to perform that action later, I might typically not even try to satisfy my desire then—and all the while my desire may be functioning properly. While intentions are "conduct-controlling" attitudes, Bratman concludes, desires are only "potential influencers" of action (1987: 15–16).[1]

J. David Velleman also has called attention to the existence of a close connection between the ideas of intending and of settling in different writings. In *Practical Reflection* (1989), Velleman expresses his agreement with

[1] For a conception of intention along similar lines, see Mele (1992).

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Bratman that intention is a "mental commitment to act" that "settle[s] our course" of action (1989: 111). Velleman thinks that it is with respect to practical deliberation –the conscious process of forming intentions–that it is most natural to talk of a connection between intending and settling. Thus, Velleman says that intention "is typically formed at the close of deliberation," where "it settles the practical question, leaving us nothing further to deliberate"[2] or, similarly, that it can be understood as an "attitude toward outcomes that are settled, from [our] perspective, at the close of deliberation" (1989: 111). In more recent work (1997), Velleman elaborates further on the connection between intending and settling. He claims that intention is "an attitude that settles [an] issue both actually and notionally" (32). One's intending to φ "actually" settles the issue of one's φ-ing in that it tends to cause one to φ. And it "notionally" settles that issue in that in so intending one becomes "resolved" upon φ-ing in one's mind—one becomes resolved in one's mind with respect to that issue, Velleman maintains, by "representing" the issue as being resolved in the world.[3] Velleman regards this issue-settling (or "issue-resolving") feature as distinctive of intention. Other motivational states, such as the state of having a goal, Velleman contends, settle an issue neither in the "actual" sense nor in the "notional" sense. One's having the goal of getting a fellowship may motivate one to pursue the means one believes are necessary to attain that goal, Velleman illustrates, but it "doesn't settle whether [one] will in fact get it, nor does it constitute [one's] viewing this issue as settled" (1997: 33).

According to the cited authors, then, intention connects to settling phenomena in two ways. First, one's intending to φ tends to settle the issue of one's φ-ing in the world in that it tends to be causally efficacious—though, of course, it may fail to be. This is captured in different ways by Bratman's characterization of intention as a "conduct-controlling attitude" and by Velleman's talk of this attitude as "actually settling" an issue. It is also captured by Harman's remarks elsewhere in the cited paper (to which I return below) that "in the normal case" intention leads to action (1976: 441–2). Second, one's intending to φ settles the issue of one's φ-ing in one's mind in the sense of its serving as a fixed point on the basis of which one is disposed to further deliberate, plan, and act. This is what Harman's talk of "settling an issue in one's mind," Bratman's talk of "being settled," and Velleman's talk of "notional" settling all seem to get at.

[2] Velleman also says that when an intention is unconsciously formed "it *fore*closes deliberation rather than closes it" (1989: 111, his emphasis).

[3] Velleman's basic idea is that one's intending to φ involves a special belief that one will φ, and that it is this belief that (partly) resolves the issue of one's φ-ing in one's mind by representing that issue as being resolved in the world. I briefly return to Velleman's idea below.

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Despite agreeing on the existence of the cited two connections, the authors disagree on what the second connection exactly involves. Both Harman and Velleman maintain that the phenomenon of settling the issue of one's φ-ing in one's mind involves believing that one will φ, whereas Bratman denies this. The disagreement is reflected in, and might also help explain, how the cited authors conceive of the seemingly more general relation between intention and belief. Both Harman and Velleman adhere to what we may call a "doxastic account of intention,"[4] according to which the attitude of intending to φ is a special kind of belief that one will φ or necessarily involves such a belief.[5] Harman maintains that "[t]he intention to [φ] is the intention that, because of that very intention, it is guaranteed that one will [φ]" (1976: 441),[6] where (a) this (self-referential) intention is—or, at least involves—the (self-referential) belief that one will φ (453, 432); (b) this "intention-belief" is "a conclusion of practical reasoning" (453);[7] and (c) practical reasoning aims, in a way that theoretical reasoning does not, at "the satisfaction of intrinsic desires" (442, 450).[8] In a somewhat similar vein, Velleman claims that intentions "are self-fulfilling mental representations that are adopted out of a desire for their fulfillment and that represent themselves as such" (1989: 137). Therefore, since Harman and Velleman conceive of intention as involving belief in success, and since they also conceive of it—as we saw above—as involving the settling of an issue in one's mind, it is not surprising that they conceive of the latter as involving belief in success as well. Most interestingly, Velleman notes that it is precisely this conception of what it is to settle an issue in one's mind that motivates his doxastic account of intention. Thus, he declares that "[his] reason for thinking that intention entails belief is that it is an attitude from which we view an outcome as settled" (1991: 282). Unlike Harman and Velleman, Bratman adheres instead to what we may call a "conative account of intention," according to which intending to φ is a conative attitude that need not involve believing that one will φ (1987: 37–41). In Bratman's view, intention is a conative attitude that involves a distinctive two-dimensional commitment to action, a commitment that can be independent of belief in success. It is constitutive of this conative account of intention, then, that one's "being settled" on a course of action does not entail believing that one will succeed in its pursuit.

[4] Cf. Langton (2004: 244).

[5] There are of course important differences between the doxastic accounts by Harman and by Velleman, but we do not need to address them here.

[6] Harman uses the terms "guaranteed" and "settled" interchangeably in his 1976 paper. However, in later work (1986b: 368) Harman goes on to associate the term "guaranteed" exclusively with what he calls "positive intentions," discussed on pp. 58–59 below.

[7] Talk of this special belief as an "intention-belief" comes from Harman (1986b: 374).

[8] For further elaboration on this interpretation of Harman's view of intention, see Bratman's (2009) thorough discussion. Cf. Harman (1986b: 375–6).

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3.3 FROM THE CONNECTION BETWEEN INTENDING AND SETTLING TO A CONSTRAINT ON INTENDING

The cited disagreement notwithstanding, Harman, Velleman, and Bratman all seem to think, along with many others, that the connection between intending and settling establishes—or, at least, is associated with—an important constraint on that attitude. Velleman elaborates on this constraint thus. An agent can settle "only . . . issues that are (or at least appear to be) up to him" and this sets a restriction, given the cited connection between intending and settling, on what he may intend (1997: 32, fn. 9). If an issue is, or appears to be, up to the agent, then he has the "power to settle" it in deliberation; he is able to do it or to not do it as a result of what he decides (1997: 37). But if an issue is not, or appears not to be, up to the agent, then he can settle it neither in his mind nor in the world. In other words, he cannot intend it (1997: 33). Things are otherwise with motivational states that lack a tight connection to the settling feature described above. You may aim to win a research fellowship, Velleman exemplifies, but "you probably cannot intend . . . to get [it], since you're well aware that whether you get [it] isn't up to you" (1997: 32). Similarly, Velleman illustrates, an unskilled marksman may have the desire or goal of hitting a target, and fire his gun in order to attain that goal, but "he cannot be decided upon hitting it, because the issue of his hitting or missing is not sufficiently within his control to be settled by his deliberation" (1989: 112).[9]

Velleman's interpretation of this constraint is influenced, as he acknowledges,[10] by Annette Baier's early discussion of the objects of intention (1970). There Baier proposes what she calls the "principle of the delimited sovereignty of intention," that is, the principle that one may intend only what one can do (649, 652) or "initiate" (658, fn. 5). Baier returns to the cited principle in later work (1997), but this time she reads it as the principle that "[one] cannot intend what [one] *believe*[*s*] to be beyond [one's] power or control" (1997: 25, my emphasis), rather than as the principle that one cannot intend what *is* beyond one's power or control.

Velleman and Baier are not alone in thinking that an agent's beliefs about control set a constraint on what he may intend. Harman endorses this idea as well. "One cannot intend that something will happen," Harman avers,

[9] Velleman uses the expressions "up to you," "within your control," and the like interchangeably. See, for example, (1997: 32, fn. 8). It is likewise with Baier (1970: 649, 652, 1997: 25) and Harman (1976: 434), cited below. Alternatively, Bratman distinguishes between the constraints that relevant ideas of settling and of control set on intention, but still sees them as tightly connected (1999a; 2014).

[10] Velleman (1997: 32, fn. 9, 1989: 112, fn. 5, 159, fn. 11).

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"if one thinks that whether it will happen or not is entirely outside of one's control" (1976: 452). More positively, Harman points out that "when someone intends that something will happen he thinks of his intention as guaranteeing that it will happen" (452). His point, more precisely, is that one may intend to φ only if one believes that one's intention to φ will lead one to φ, or, as he also puts it, only if one believes the "conditional proposition" that if one intends to φ, one will φ in fact (1986b: 374, cf. Grice 1971: 278–9). The idea that intention is constrained by belief in one's ability to settle an issue is indeed central to Harman's doxastic account of intention (1976; 1986a; 1986b). Notably, it is a key—if somewhat implicit—premise in one of Harman's arguments in favor of his "thesis that intention involves belief," that is, the thesis that "[i]f one intends to do something, it follows that one believes that one will do it" (1976: 432). That is his argument from intentional action (1976: 434). Harman thinks that we cannot always derive conclusions about what one intends to do from what one intentionally does, but that in some cases we can. If we look closely at these latter cases, Harman argues, we find support for the thesis that intention involves belief. We know that intentional action is constrained by belief in ability, and in the cited cases we observe that the intention behind intentional action is subject to such a constraint as well. As Harman writes:

> [O]ne intentionally wins at chess or intentionally shoots a bulls-eye only if it is up to oneself whether one will do it, only if one can do it at will, only if it is something that one knows that one can do if one chooses to do it. One intentionally wins a chess game or shoots a bulls-eye only if one does so knowing that one is going to do so. But knowing involves believing. In such cases, then, one intends to win or to shoot a bulls-eye only if one also believes that one will win or shoot a bulls-eye (1976: 434).

Harman's argument in this passage is not fully explicit, but might be plausibly interpreted as follows. Harman claims that (a) one intentionally φ-s only if one believes that were one to intend to φ, one would φ in fact.[11] Moreover, he seems to make two implicit assumptions. First, he assumes that a constraint parallel to (a) applies to intention as well, namely, that (b) one intends to φ only if one believes that if one intends to φ, one will φ. Second, he assumes that intention is transparent to the mind, namely, that (c) if one intends to φ, one believes that one intends to φ.[12] Let us next assume for the purposes of a conditional proof that (d) one intends to φ.

[11] I think we can safely replace Harman's talk of "knowledge" in the argument by talk of "belief."

[12] As we will see later, this is an assumption Harman makes at various places (1976: 442, 1986b: 374).

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It follows from (b) and (d) that, (e) one believes that if one intends to φ, one will φ. It also follows from (c) and (d) that, (f) one believes that one intends to φ. Then, we get from (e) and (f) that, (g) one believes that one will φ. Therefore, by conditional introduction on (d)–(g), we arrive at the conclusion that one intends to φ only if one believes that one will φ, as desired. Thus, in this interpretation, Harman's assumption concerning the cited belief constraint on intention, (b), is key to his argument in favor of the thesis that intention involves belief.

From this discussion, then, we see that according to Velleman, Baier, and Harman intention is subject to an important constraint that is associated with the connection between intending and settling noted in section 3.2. But what is the constraint exactly? The cited authors seem to offer two different formulations of it. One formulation says that one may intend only what one may settle or control; the other that one may intend only what one takes oneself to (be in a position to) settle or control—where "taking" is a placeholder for a relevant cognitive attitude. The former formulation establishes an objective or external constraint on intending, one that connects the possibility of an agent's intending an action with the possibility of his performing it. The latter sets, in contrast, a subjective or internal constraint on intending, one that connects how an agent sees an issue, as up to him or not, with the possibility of his intending it. The constraints are in principle independent of one another. An issue may be up to oneself for one to settle it by forming an intention, but one may fail to see it that way. Conversely, one may regard an issue as up to oneself for one to settle it by forming an intention, but the issue may not in fact be so.

Ambivalence notwithstanding, it seems to me that it is the subjective formulation of the constraint that Velleman, Baier, and Harman primarily have in mind when discussing the restrictions that the feature of settling establishes on intending.[13] It is also the one Bratman focuses on when discussing the "settle condition" on intention within the context of shared agency (1999b: 149), a discussion to which I return below. That is the constraint I want to investigate in this paper. My concern is whether some

[13] Some authors suggest that this is the only plausible formulation of the constraint. See, for example, Davis (1984: 134). Even if the suggestion is correct, there is still a question as to how to conceptualize the idea of control associated with intending. Here I follow Harman (1976, 1986b) and others in conceptualizing it in terms of the conditional proposition that if one intends to φ, one will φ; but I also acknowledge that this might be a simplification. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to clarify this point.

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version of (to use Bratman's terminology) the settle condition is in effect a plausible constraint on intending. Two points need emphasizing from the outset. The first is that the aspect of the settling feature of intention that is crucial to the settle condition is that of settling an issue (not just in one's mind but mainly) in the world. The second point is that the settle condition has traditionally been conceived of as a doxastic constraint on intention, as the remarks by Velleman, Baier, and Harman above testify. More precisely, according to the doxastic conception of the settle condition, we have that:

Settle Condition–Belief (SC_B): One may intend to φ only if one believes that if one intends to φ, one will φ in fact.[14]

I think it is initially plausible to suppose that intention is subject to a relevant settle condition. But I think also that there is a question as to what exactly explains that intention be so constrained, for it is not obvious what grounds the passage from a feature considered central to intending—namely, that in intending one settles an issue, as noted in section 3.2—to a cognitive constraint on intending associated with such a feature—namely, that in order to form an intention, one must take this attitude as settling an issue. So, our question is the following: how or why does the settling feature of intention get into one's mind, so to speak, and constrain one's intention-forming processes?

Harman offers an answer to this question. He argues that what allow us to move from the idea that intention normally settles issues in the world to the further idea that intention is subject to an appropriate settle condition are basically three assumptions about the nature of intention and practical reasoning. One of them is Harman's "first thesis" that "intention involves belief." A second, and related, assumption is Harman's idea that practical reasoning aims (in part) at "explanatory coherence" (431, 434–5). Harman thinks that since intention involves belief, practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning are guided by the same norm. Just as in theoretical reasoning one aims at increasing the explanatory coherence of one's overall view of the theoretical world, where one such view "is more coherent than another to the extent that the first leaves less unexplained than the second" (435), Harman argues, in practical reasoning one aims at increasing the explanatory coherence of one's overall view of one's practical life. Finally, a third assumption, implicit in Harman's argument, is his idea that intention is

[14] Note that although Velleman endorses a doxastic conception of the settle condition, his own formulation of it is, as we saw above, a bit stronger than SC_B. Compare Baier (1970: 657), and Harman on "positive" intentions, below.

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transparent to the mind in that if one intends to φ, one believes that one intends to φ.[15] Harman summarizes his argument thus:

> As the result of practical reasoning, one forms the positive intention of [φ-ing]… [P]ractical reasoning and theoretical reasoning overlap and…considerations of explanatory coherence are relevant to both sorts of reasoning. Furthermore, one's intention to [φ] involves the belief that one will [φ]. Since one's intention is a positive intention, one's practical conclusion has explanatory coherence only if it involves the supposition that one's intention to [φ] will lead to one's [φ-ing]. Without that supposition, one has no reason to think that one will [φ]. So, for reasons of explanatory coherence, one can form the positive intention to [φ] only if one can also conclude that one's intention will be instrumental in one's [φ-ing] (1976: 442).

To be in a position to flesh out this argument, we must elaborate on some notions by Harman. In this passage, Harman talks of a "positive" intention to do something—although he thinks the cited argument applies to all intentions, "positive" or otherwise (441). Harman maintains that one has a "positive" intention to φ only if "in the normal case" one's intention to φ "is a means to" one's φ-ing (440). Here Harman understands the expression "is a means to" (and its cognates) in a special way, as denoting sufficient and necessary conditions. So, in Harman's view one has a "positive" intention to φ only if in the normal case one φ-s because, and only because, of this very intention (441). Harman contrasts "positive" with "negative" intentions.[16] A "negative" intention to φ is normally a sufficient—but not a necessary—condition for one's φ-ing. Suppose, Harman illustrates, that one intends to stay home tonight (439). One may stay home tonight as a result of that intention, but one need not have intended to stay home tonight to achieve that result. In the normal course of events, one would have stayed home without having formed an intention to that effect, so long as one did not intend to do something else (439). Thus, Harman concludes, a negative intention "is not so much a means…to doing what one intends to do, as it is a way of ensuring that one will not do something else" (440). For Harman, then, both "positive" and "negative" intentions to φ normally settle the issue of one's φ-ing in the world (440); they are both normally a sufficient condition for one's φ-ing.[17]

[15] Harman makes this last assumption explicit in a second, related argument he provides for the settle condition. This second argument says, roughly, that "rational" (1976: 442) or "justified" (1986b: 374–5) intention entails justified belief in the relevant conditional—and thus must satisfy the settle condition as well.

[16] He also contrasts these two with "conditional" intentions (1976: 440–1), but to keep things simple I will not consider the latter here.

[17] Compare Velleman's interpretation of Harman on "negative" intentions (1989: 96–7, fn. 15).

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Now we can tackle Harman's argument above. We may usefully interpret it as comprising two parts. The first part applies to "positive" and "negative" intentions alike. It says that since intending to φ involves believing that one will φ, one cannot "coherently" form the intention to φ unless one forms the belief that if one intends to φ, one will φ in fact. Only then will one have a "coherent" explanation of the fact that one will φ. For in such a case one will (a) intend to φ; (b) believe that one intends to φ; (c) believe that if one intends to φ, one will φ; and from these last two premises, (b) and (c), one will be able to infer and thus (d) believe that one will φ.[18] The second part of the argument "concentrate[s] on positive intentions" (441). It says that, given the sort of creatures "positive" intentions are, one cannot "coherently" form a "positive" intention to φ—that is, one will not have a coherent explanation of the fact that one will φ—unless, in addition to having the aforementioned attitudes (a)–(d), one (e) believes that one will φ only if one intends to φ.

Velleman advances an alternative, and apparently simpler, argument for the settle condition. As we saw in section 3.2, Velleman articulates the connection between intending and settling with an eye especially to practical deliberation. He claims that intention is an attitude "typically formed at the close of deliberation," whereby "it settles [a] practical question" (1989: 111). In like manner, Velleman argues that it is a feature of practical deliberation that imposes the settle condition on intention. As he says:

> [D]eliberation is a process of settling issues that are open from our perspective, in the sense that they are up to us. If an issue isn't up to us, then there is no point in our deliberating about it; if it is up to us, then we are in a position to deliberate about it, in order to reach a conclusion from which we view the issue as settled (1991: 282).

In effect, Velleman maintains here that it is in the nature of practical deliberation that one may deliberate only about issues one takes oneself to be able to settle through the formation of an intention. Velleman's argument is, on the face of it, appealing, but also requires elaboration. One such an elaboration might go as follows. In deliberating about whether to φ, one uses the concept of an intention to φ, that is, the concept of an attitude that, among other things, normally settles the issue of one's φ-ing in the world. So, when one is engaged in practical deliberation about whether to φ, and thus has the concept of intention in mind, one is aware that in order for one to intend to φ, the issue of one's φ-ing has to be such that were one

[18] In other words, the fact that one will φ is "coherently explained" by the fact that one intends to φ and the fact that one's intention to φ will lead to one's φ-ing. Here I am assuming that, for Harman, what really does the work in the direction of explanatory coherence is limited to one's relevant beliefs.

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to intend to φ, one's would φ in fact—at least, in the normal case. And it is this awareness that somehow impels one to form the intention to φ within deliberation only if one believes that one will φ as a result of this very intention. Or so it might be suggested.

The arguments by Harman and Velleman raise many interesting questions. One of them is whether the settle condition applies to all intentions, to those formed through deliberation and to those formed through nondeliberative processes alike, as Harman seems to think, or whether it applies only to the former, as Velleman's argument seems to presuppose. I will not attempt to answer this question in this paper. Nor is my aim here to assess the force of the cited two arguments. I mention such arguments mainly to highlight that despite its strong initial plausibility, the case for the settle condition on intention is neither straightforward nor uncontroversial. As suggested above, Velleman's argument is appealing but underspecified, whereas Harman's argument, even if successful, rests on assumptions about contentious questions such as the doxastic elements of intention, the transparency of this attitude, and the aims of practical reasoning. My main goal in the remainder of this paper is to argue for the claim that if intention is subject to the settle condition, this condition is better understood as framed by a cognitive attitude other than belief—though, as we will see in section 3.8, our discussion will also lead us to an alternative argument for the truth of the antecedent of that conditional claim. To see what that other cognitive attitude is, it is useful to consider how the settle condition applies in a different context, one in which the question of whether one is in a position to settle or control a relevant issue by forming an intention is particularly salient to oneself. This is the context of shared agency.

3.4 THE SETTLE CONDITION AND SHARED AGENCY

It is a familiar idea that we may explain my intentionally doing something in terms of mainly my intention to do so. In like manner, it has been suggested, we may explain our intentionally doing something together in terms of our "shared" or "collective" intention to do it. But what is it for you and I to share an intention to act together? According to Bratman's influential account, our shared intention to act together is basically a complex structure of intentions of each of us in favor of the joint activity (1999a, 2014). If you and I share an intention to dance the tango, it will be true, among other things, that I intend that we dance the tango and you intend that we dance the tango. In reaction to this account, Velleman has incisively argued that the settle condition on intention poses however a serious challenge to the coherence of the idea that *I* may intend *our* activity (1997). In order

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for me to intend that we act, Velleman notes, I must think of myself as settling the matter of our acting, which involves my seeing myself as settling not only what I am going to do in our acting but also what you are going to do in it as well. The problem, Velleman argues, is that this seems to be incompatible with my thinking of you as also intending that we act, and thereby, as also settling the matter of our acting. For, Velleman avers, "one person's exercise of discretion over some issue would seem to exclude any other person from exercising discretion over the same issue" (1997: 34).[19] Simply put, Velleman's worry is that it is not clear that in intending that we act I may see myself as settling the issue of our acting, since it is not clear that my so intending may settle that issue in a way that is compatible with your intention's settling it as well.

Bratman offers an ingenious response to the challenge. Like Velleman, Bratman thinks that the settle condition is "a plausible constraint" on an individual's intention in favor of joint activity and sees it as "related" to the settling feature of intention mentioned in section 3.2. If you and I share an intention to *J*—where *J* is a joint activity—and thus each of us intends that we *J*, Bratman says, "it seems that each of us needs to believe that his intention really does settle whether we *J*." But then, Bratman notes, it also seems that to establish that each of us could "coherently" intend that we *J*—that is, intend that we *J* in a way that is responsive to Velleman's worries about "shared discretion" above—it must be shown that we "could both be right" in having the cited belief (2014: 65). To this purpose, Bratman invites us to think of a scenario where the following conditions hold: (a) each of us intends (or will intend) that we *J*; (b) there is "persistence interdependence" of our intentions in (a), that is, each continues to so intend if and only if (he recognizes that) the other also continues to so intend; and (c) if each of us intends as in (a), we will *J*, by way of those very intentions and in the right way (2014: 65–6). In that scenario, Bratman argues, "each of our intentions in (a) will settle whether we *J* in part by way of its support of the intention of the other" (2014: 66). That is, our intentions in (a) will each lead to our *J*-ing, by way of their mutual support as described in (b) and in the way specified by (c). But then, Bratman notes, it seems that we "could both be right" in believing that his own intention settles whether we *J* just in case we each believe that conditions (a)–(c) hold and such beliefs are true (2014: 76–7). In such a case, each of our "interdependent" intentions that we *J* will

[19] The challenge is formulated in slightly different terms by Baier (1997: 25). Both Velleman and Baier note that the challenge does not arise for cases of shared intention in which a member of the group has authority or control over the others (Velleman 1997: 34, Baier 1997: 25).

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settle in the world an issue that is up to us—our *J*-ing—and each of us will see the intentions of each as settling that issue.[20]

It is important to call attention to the structure of Bratman's response. In showing how we "could both be right" in believing that each of our intentions settle that we *J*, Bratman is in fact providing an answer to two (related but still) different questions. First, he is explaining how intentions that we act can satisfy a relevant settle condition. We "both can coherently intend that we *J*, where these intentions satisfy the settle condition," Bratman says, if we both believe that conditions (a)–(c) hold (2014: 66, 76–7). Thus, in contrast to the larger question of "how we could both be right," the satisfaction of the settle condition by the intentions of each does not require that our beliefs about conditions (a)–(c) be true. After all, intentions sometimes fail to be executed without this undermining their status as genuine intentions; intentions in favor of a joint activity are no exception. The further condition that our beliefs about (a)–(c) be true connects to a second question Bratman is giving an answer to with the cited response. This has to do with a worry that affects intentions that we act in particular. The worry is whether such intentions could ever be executed—that is, could ever settle an issue in the world—and Bratman's answer is that they are executed (roughly) when conditions (a)–(c) are met.

I agree with Bratman that it is a theoretically fruitful strategy to understand the shared intention of a group of individuals to act together partly in terms of the intentions of each in favor of the joint activity. And I have myself pursued a similar strategy in developing an alternative view of the nature of shared intention (Alonso 2009, 2016b). I also think that the general structure of Bratman's response to Velleman's incoherence challenge is along the right lines.[21] Notwithstanding all this, I disagree with a central aspect of Bratman's response. I think that understanding the relevant settle condition on the intentions of each individual in terms of belief is too strong and thus rules out many genuine cases of intending a joint activity as "incoherent."[22] For in some cases I lack or cannot form the belief that my intention settles whether we act—that is, the belief that if I intend that

[20] For further discussion, see Bratman (1999b: 148–60, 2014: 64–78).

[21] Velleman agrees as well (1997: 33–4, fn. 11).

[22] It is worth noting that Bratman is not himself committed to understanding the settle condition on intention—in favor of either a joint activity or one's own action—in terms of belief, and in fact suggests an alternative interpretation of that condition elsewhere (1999c: 32), an interpretation that is in the spirit of the proposal I offer below. However, Bratman's strategy in responding to Velleman's incoherence challenge is to argue that an individual's intention in favor of a joint activity can meet a relevant settle condition, even when the latter is interpreted in the challenge's terms, that is, in terms of belief. Here I benefitted from personal communication with Bratman.

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we act, then we will act—because I lack one or more of the other beliefs from which I can normally derive it—that is, the beliefs that conditions (a)–(c) hold—[23]and it seems that I may intend that we act in such cases nonetheless.[24]

Consider the following example. I very much want to dance the tango with Maria, an excellent tango dancer, and I invite her to a tango party next Saturday. She tells me that she will think about it and will let me know. I am not surprised by her response. I know Maria to be an indecisive person. She usually has trouble making up her mind. So, given what I know about her character, I do not now believe on reflection that she will intend that we dance. But I do not believe that she will not so intend, either. My evidence on that matter is neutral. Here we may ask: Can I form the intention that Maria and I dance the tango on Saturday under such circumstances? If we adopted the belief conception of the settle condition (SC_B) as our relevant standard, our answer would be negative. For in such circumstances I lack the belief that Maria intends (or will come to intend) that we dance—I lack the belief that condition (a) holds—and so do not believe on reflection that my intention will settle the issue of whether we dance. I think, however, that SC_B gives us the wrong answer here. In order for me to intend that Maria and I dance the tango on Saturday I do not need to believe that my intention will settle the issue of whether we dance. It suffices that I *rely* on my intention's settling that issue, and that seems possible even in the absence of belief. Therefore, in order for me to intend that we dance, I need not believe that conditions (a)–(c) hold; it suffices that I rely on such conditions to hold. It is likewise for Maria.[25] Two questions immediately arise here: What is reliance? And how does it differ from belief?

3.5 RELIANCE AND BELIEF

In my view, reliance is, like belief, but unlike desire, a cognitive attitude, rather than a conative one.[26] Reliance and belief have as a function to *cognitively guide* (or *frame*) one's thought and action. Each of relying on *p* and

[23] For the purposes of our discussion, I assume that a relevant settle condition on intentions that we act must be (cognitively) responsive to conditions (a)–(c) above.

[24] In what follows I build partly on ideas discussed in previous work (Alonso 2009).

[25] Certainly, if Maria and I each eventually form the intention that we dance, partly in reliance on conditions (a)–(c) to hold, and if those conditions do hold, then both our intentions that we dance will have settled the issue of our dancing the tango in fact—that is, they will have led us to dance the tango together in an appropriate way.

[26] In this section I appeal to a view of reliance I have developed in greater detail elsewhere (Alonso 2014, 2016a).

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of believing that *p* disposes one to deliberate, plan, and act on the basis of *p* under relevant conditions. Suppose that I want to climb down a rock and that I am wondering about whether a piece of rope will hold my weight. If under such conditions I relied on the rope's holding my weight, then I would be disposed to, for example, form the intention to climb down the rock, deliberate about what strategy to employ in my descent, and make certain moves, all based on the premise that the rope will hold my weight; it is likewise if in those circumstances I believed that the rope would hold my weight. Despite such similarities, however, reliance differs from belief in many ways. A central difference for our purposes has to do with the norms of correctness for such attitudes and, thus, with the grounds on the basis of which such attitudes are justified. Belief is correct—at least, according to a familiar conception—just in case it is true. One's belief that *p* is correct if and only if *p* is true.[27] In contrast, reliance is correct, as I have suggested elsewhere (2014, 2016a), just in case it provides "sensible guidance," that is, just in case it cognitively guides one's reasoning in a way that is instrumental to one's relevant ends and values.[28]

To get at this idea of sensible guidance, we need first to consider some aspects of the descriptive, factual relation between reliance and truth. It seems clear that in some cases one's reliance is directed at—that is, it functions so as to track—the truth. Roughly, to say that one's reliance on *p* is directed at the truth in some cases is to say that in those cases one is disposed to rely on *p* only if *p* is the case. For example, my reliance on the rope's holding my weight is directed at reflecting whether the rope actually holds my weight, and thus I am disposed to continue to so rely as long as I do not find (perhaps conclusive) evidence that the rope will not hold my weight. However, there are some other cases in which reliance is not directed at the truth. In those cases, one is not disposed to rely on *p* only if *p*. Rather than being directed at representing some actual state of affairs, in those other cases reliance is directed at picturing—or presenting to one's mind—some non-actual state of affairs as obtaining. Imagine a mathematician who assumes that *p*—that is, relies on *p*—for the purposes of a *reductio* (Velleman 2000: 112–13). It seems clear that in the context of constructing such a proof, the mathematician may rely on *p* without much concern as to whether *p* is true or, even, while thinking that *p* is false.

[27] See, esp. Williams (1973), Wedgwood (2002), and Shah (2003). Note that to conceive of truth as the norm for belief is compatible with acknowledging that this attitude is, as a matter of psychological fact, sometimes influenced by pragmatic considerations. On the connection between the normative and the descriptive aspects of belief (and of reliance), see Alonso (2014).

[28] I argue elsewhere that a normative contrast between reliance and belief remains even if we reject the claim that truth is the norm for belief (Alonso 2016a: 332).

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The next point to note is that reliance can play its characteristic role of cognitively guiding one's reasoning irrespective of whether it is also playing a truth-tracking role. When one's reliance on *p* is directed at the truth, it guides one's reasoning on the basis of *p*, but when it is not directed at the truth, it guides one's reasoning on the basis of *p* all the same. In both cases, one is disposed to deliberate, plan, and act on the basis of *p*. When I rely on the rope's holding my weight, my reliance frames my reasoning accordingly. I intend to climb down a rock, deliberate about different climbing strategies, and make certain moves, in light of the premise that the rope will hold my weight. But when the mathematician relies on *p* for the purposes of an indirect proof, her reliance guides her reasoning accordingly, too. She draws conclusions from and structures her proof on the premise that *p*.

It follows from the previous points, then, that there are two basic ways in which reliance may provide sensible guidance—that is, cognitive guidance that is instrumental to one's relevant end. First, reliance may provide sensible guidance in part by being successful in tracking the truth. More precisely, one's reliance on *p* may sensibly guide one's reasoning only if (i) one relies on *p* only if *p* and (ii) *p* is true. My reliance on the rope's holding my weight may frame my deliberation, planning, and action in ways conducive to my end of climbing down the rock only if the rope actually holds my weight and my reliance accurately reflects that fact. I call this form of sensible guidance, "truth-directed sensible guidance." Second, reliance may provide sensible guidance without being responsive to the truth. Specifically, one's reliance on *p* may sensibly guide one's reasoning even if it is the case neither that (i) one relies on *p* only if *p* nor that (ii) *p* is true. The mathematician's non-truth-directed reliance on *p* may guide her reasoning in ways conducive to her end of constructing the desired proof, irrespective of the question of whether *p* really is true. This is because the attainment of her end does not require that *p* be true. Call this, "non-truth-directed sensible guidance." Thus, for reliance not only the question of cognitive guidance but also the question of sensible cognitive guidance can be independent of the question of truth.

Having laid down the main ideas concerning the norm for reliance, we must consider next what the justification of reliance basically involves. Given the cited norm, we may say that one is justified in relying on *p* in a certain context only if (i) one has a relevant end in that context, and (ii) one has good reasons for believing that one's relying on *p* is a means to attaining such an end. Further, given our earlier distinction between truth-directed and non-truth-directed sensible guidance, we may say that one's reliance is justified in the former cases only if it satisfies in addition an evidential constraint. For present purposes, let us assume that a plausible candidate for this constraint is that one should not have sufficient evidence to believe that what one relies on is false (Wright 2004, cf. Alonso 2016a). This brings us

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back to the settle condition on intention. For it seems that they are cases of truth-directed reliance that are especially relevant to it—that is, cases in which one's reliance will be instrumental to one's end only if it succeeds in tracking the truth. Thus, my reliance on Maria's intending that we dance the tango may guide my reasoning in ways that lead to our dancing the tango together only if she does in fact so intend and my reliance accurately reflects that fact.

Return now to the contrast between reliance and belief. We may say that these attitudes articulate the functions of tracking the truth and of providing sensible guidance quite differently. Belief's primary function is to track the truth, although in some cases this attitude also provides sensible guidance in virtue of playing such truth-tracking role. In contrast, reliance's primary function is to provide sensible guidance, although in order to do this it must in some cases track the truth. What is more, we may say that the norms of correctness for such attitudes establish a two-fold contrast with respect to how they are justified: while belief can be justified solely by evidence for its truth, reliance can be justified on the basis of both evidential and pragmatic considerations; and while belief justification requires one to have sufficient evidence for its truth, reliance justification (in cases of truth-directed guidance)[29] requires one to lack sufficient evidence for its falsity.

3.6 INTENTION, RELIANCE, AND THE SETTLE CONDITION

In section 3.5 I specified how I conceive of the attitudes of reliance and of belief. Let me now briefly note how I conceive of intention. I subscribe to a conative account of intention of the type mentioned in section 3.2. As we saw, conative accounts share with doxastic accounts the idea that intention is an attitude that settles a course of action in one's mind and—if all goes well—in the world, but the former reject the further idea embraced by the latter that settling a course of action in one's mind entails believing that one will succeed in its pursuit. On a conative account, to be settled on a course of action in one's mind is to be determined to act or to be resolved upon acting, and this is to be in a distinctive conative state that involves a robust commitment to action (Bratman 1987, cf. Mele 1992).

With these basic ideas about intention, reliance, and belief in mind, let us go back to our discussion of an appropriate settle condition on intentions in favor of a joint activity. Recall our tango example. In such a case, we

[29] I drop the qualification in what follows.

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said, I have neither the belief nor sufficient evidence to believe that Maria intends (or will intend) that we dance at the party, but may nonetheless rely on her so intending. Now we see that such reliance may well be justified. For, in that case I have a relevant end (dancing the tango with Maria is something I value or care about), my reliance satisfies the evidential constraint for reliance justification (I do not have sufficient evidence to believe that Maria will not eventually form her relevant intention), and I may have good reason to believe that my reliance on her intending that we dance will cognitively guide my thought and action in ways that lead to that end. To put it in terms of Bratman's conditions (a)–(c) noted earlier, I may rely on condition (a) to hold in that case and such reliance may be justified. Similar considerations would apply if I relied on conditions (b) and (c) to hold in such a case. Once this is acknowledged, it becomes clear that I may form the intention that Maria and I dance the tango on the basis of my reliance on conditions (a)–(c) to hold and that this reliance may be justified even if belief in such conditions is not. These remarks support the conclusion that reliance on conditions (a)–(c) satisfies an appropriate settle condition on intending a joint activity and thus the proposal that we conceive of this very condition in terms of reliance. In order for me to intend that we act, I must rely on my intention's settling the issue of our acting.

I want to suggest now that a parallel argument exists in favor of a reliance-based conception of the settled condition as applied to intentions about one's own actions. A first point to note is that the doxastic conception (SC_B) is too strong with respect to these intentions as well. There are various cases in which one intends to do something but has neither the belief that one's intention will settle one's action nor sufficient reasons (evidence) for having such a belief. A smoker may now intend to quit smoking, even though he has tried and failed in the past, and at the moment does not believe, reasonably or not, that he will succeed this time. More generally, it is apparent that sometimes we embark upon difficult projects where it is not clear to us whether we are going to succeed, and it is not far-fetched to think that we intend some of those projects. But if it is true that intention must be cognitively framed by an appropriate settle condition, in such cases the cited condition will have to be conceived of in terms of a cognitive attitude other than belief. My suggestion is that it will have to be conceived of in terms of reliance. To state this conception more precisely:

Settle Condition–Reliance (SC_R): One may intend to φ only if one relies on the conditional proposition that if one intends to φ, one will φ.[30]

[30] For the sake of simplicity, here I have stated SC_R for the case of intentions about one's own actions.

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The smoker may continue to harbor serious doubts as to the causal efficacy of a prospective intention to stop smoking. But he may also now realize that irreversible consequences for his health will soon ensue if he does not stop smoking immediately and thus may now feel more pressure to stop smoking than he has felt before. Under these circumstances, the smoker may decide to rely on the causal efficacy of the cited intention and proceed to form it on the basis of such reliance. Furthermore, his reliance may be justified in the circumstances. After all, he has very good pragmatic reasons to stop smoking and may lack sufficient reason to believe that he will fail. In like manner, to appeal to a version of Velleman's example given earlier, an unskilled but yet determined marksman may lack a belief in the conditional proposition that if he were to intend to hit a target, he would succeed, and yet it is plausible to think that he may form such an intention in that case. He may intend to hit the target so long as he relies on the cited conditional proposition to hold; what is more, his reliance may well be justified.

My suggestion, then, is that if intention is indeed subject to an appropriate settle condition, it is more plausible to conceive of such a condition in terms of reliance than in terms of belief. There are two arguments that support this suggestion. The first has to do with explanatory scope, and it stems partly from our earlier reflections. Since reliance is subject to a less stringent epistemic (evidential) constraint than belief is, conceiving of the cognitive constraint on intending in terms of reliance, as suggested by SC_R, allows us to make room for, and also make sense of, many ordinary instances of intending that are ruled out by the doxastic conception of the constraint, SC_B. For in many cases the relevant belief cannot be (reasonably) had, and yet it seems that one is in a position to form an intention to act in such cases. But, in addition, and here we go beyond our earlier reflections, the reliance conception of the constraint, SC_R, accounts for all the instances of intending that are accounted for by the doxastic conception, SC_B. This is because belief brings about reliance in such cases. When I frame my intention to φ by the belief in the conditional proposition that if I intend to φ, I will φ, this belief gives way to a corresponding attitude of reliance. In this context, my belief is not merely satisfying an intellectual curiosity, but is primarily framing my intention-forming process. It is cognitively guiding my reasoning. But as soon as my belief starts playing this framing or guiding role, it gives rise to a mental state that can be appropriately assessed in terms of, and is typically guided by, its instrumentality in playing such a role; that is, it gives rise to an attitude of reliance. This suggests that the settle condition on intention

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not only can be conceived of in terms of reliance, but also that it must be so conceived.[31]

We think and act in light of a cognitive framework. The idea that SC_R can explain all the cases that can be explained by SC_B and, in addition, that SC_R can explain other cases which SC_B cannot, is an instance of a more general point that reliance is more tightly connected, both descriptively and normatively, to the cognitive framing of our thought and action than belief is. The point is partly captured by the contrast, drawn earlier, between the primary functions of such attitudes: while the primary function of belief is to track the truth, we said, the primary function of reliance is to provide sensible cognitive guidance.[32] Accordingly, SC_R construes the settle condition as pointing not so much to an epistemic constraint on intending, but to a cognitive one. Its role is to cognitively frame one's intention-forming processes. Furthermore, since according to SC_R the settle condition is itself a form of reliance, we know that this condition can stably play this framing role irrespective of whether it is also playing a truth-tracking role. Therefore, on this conception, it is the cognitive framing of intention, rather than the search for a certain truth, that the settle condition primarily seeks to track.

The second argument for favoring SC_R over SC_B connects to the "thesis that intention involves belief."

3.7 INTENTION, RELIANCE, AND THE ANTICIPATION OF ONE'S FUTURE ACTION

According to the doxastic account of intention, we saw in section 3.2, intending to act is a special kind of belief that one will so act, or necessarily involves such a belief. For supporters of this account, this connection between intention and belief promises to elucidate a myriad of important issues in the philosophy of action and practical reasoning. Among others, it promises to shed light on the Anscombian suggestion that the mark of intentional action is given by the knowledge one has of one's action while performing it (Velleman 1989, Setiya 2007a, 2008), on the grounds for the norms of practical reasoning (Harman 1976, Davis 1984, Setiya 2007b,

[31] Here it might be pointed out that there are other cognitive attitudes, other than belief and reliance, which could play this framing role. My intuition, however, is that any such other cognitive attitude, if it did play such a role, would give rise to an attitude of reliance as well. But I cannot argue for this here.

[32] I provide additional support for this general point in Alonso (2014, 2016a).

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Velleman 2007), and on the role that intention plays in the coordination of one's thought and action (Harman 1976, Velleman 2007).

Despite its explanatory potential, some versions of the doxastic account—namely, those that regard intention as being itself a kind of belief—have nonetheless been charged with portraying intention as involving a criticizable form of "wishful thinking" (Grice 1971) or "faith" (Langton 2004). Paul Grice famously argued that an account that equates intention with a kind of belief falters, because such "intention-belief" could never be justified by the evidence. If my intention-belief that I will φ is to be causally efficacious in my φ-ing, then having satisfactory evidence that I will φ will involve having evidence that I intend-believe that I will φ. But then I cannot come to intend-believe that I will φ on the basis of satisfactory evidence, since to have such evidence it must *already* be the case that I so intend-believe (1971: 274). Furthermore, Grice noted, it is plausible that my only motivation for my having an intention-belief that I will φ—that is, what explains why I have it—is that I want to φ or think I ought to φ. But then, Grice concluded, it seems that the cited account "represents having an intention as being a case of licensed wishful thinking" (1971: 262).[33] Going a step further than Grice, Rae Langton has recently contended that such doxastic accounts assimilate intention to a form of "faith" (2004).[34] Not only do such accounts assume that the relevant intention-belief is caused by a desire for its fulfillment, which makes that attitude a form of wishful thinking. They also presuppose that the intention-belief is causally efficacious in leading one to action, which makes it a self-fulfilling attitude. Therefore, on such accounts, intention is a form of self-fulfilling wishful thinking, that is, a form of faith. To have faith that one will φ is to have a belief that one will φ that is (i) created by one's desire to φ (wishful) and that (ii) causes one's φ-ing (self-fulfilling) (Langton 2004: 243). But this is also what to intend-believe that one will φ involves, according to such accounts. Or so Langton argues.

Supporters of the doxastic account have responded to such type of objections in different ways.[35] But I will not focus on this dispute here. I want instead to argue that the reliance conception of the settle condition on intention (SC_R) proposed above affords conative accounts of intention resources to help explain the tight connection that exists between intention and the anticipation of one's future action, but in a way that sidesteps the epistemological worries that threaten to beset the aforementioned doxastic accounts. It portrays intention

[33] Here I have greatly benefitted from Harman's discussion of Grice's work (1986b).

[34] Langton's objection is directed primarily to Velleman's account (1989). But the objection applies in principle also to other accounts that assimilate intention to a kind of belief, such as the ones provided by Hampshire and Hart (1958), Harman (1976), and Setiya (2007a, 2008).

[35] See, among others, Harman (1986b), Velleman (1989), and Setiya (2008).

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as involving a species of neither "wishful thinking" nor "faith." This is the second argument for favoring SC_R over SC_B mentioned in section 3.6.

The argument comprises two steps. The first is to note that SC_R allows us to explain why one's intending to act is tightly connected to the anticipation of one's future action or, to put it more precisely, why in intending to φ one will normally rely on one's φ-ing. When one intends to φ, one also relies on the conditional proposition that if one intends to φ, one will φ. But if one is conscious of all this, one will also normally conclude that one will φ (where this conclusion need not involve belief) and will be disposed to use such a conclusion as a premise in further deliberation, planning and action. In short, one will normally rely on one's φ-ing.[36] The second step is to note that once we put together a conative account of intention with the just cited conception of the connection between intention and the anticipation of one's future action, we arrive at a view of intention that portrays this attitude as involving neither wishful thinking nor faith. According to this view, intending to φ is a conative attitude that need not involve believing that one will φ, but that normally results in one's relying on one's φ-ing. Is the latter attitude a form of wishful thinking or faith that one will φ? Wishful thinking, as understood by Grice and Langton, is belief created by desire. However, reliance is not this. For, while reliance may be created by desire, it need not involve belief.[37] Nor is reliance what Langton calls "faith," that is, self-fulfilling wishful thinking. For, in addition to not necessarily involving wishful thinking, reliance need not be self-fulfilling, either. As suggested earlier, reliance is a cognitive attitude, rather than a conative one. Its role is to cognitively guide action, not to motivate it. In the present view, it is the conative attitude of intention instead that moves one to act. Therefore, since this view represents intention as involving neither wishful thinking nor faith, it avoids the epistemological worries mentioned earlier.

3.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper I have argued that if intention is subject to a relevant settle condition, this condition is better understood in terms of reliance than in

[36] Here it is important to highlight the contrast between the condition that one rely on one's φ-ing and the condition that one rely on the conditional proposition that if one intends to φ one will φ. The latter points to a pre-condition on intending to φ—namely, to the settle condition; the former to a cognitive element that normally emerges as a result of, or together with, one's intending to φ. The latter has to do with a cognition necessary to support intention; the former with a cognition about one's future action that intention normally supports, once formed.

[37] In section 3.5 I distinguished reliance from belief mainly on normative grounds. For discussion of some of the psychological differences between such attitudes, see Alonso (2014).

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terms of belief. I want to conclude with some remarks on the question of whether intention is, in fact, subject to such a condition. Return to the preceding discussion of the connection between intention and the anticipation of future action. Doxastic accounts usually regard the connection they posit between intention and belief in future action as pointing to the epistemic role that the latter attitude is assumed to play in one's practical thought and action. For example, doxastic accounts inspired by Anscombe—such as those by Velleman (1989) and by Setiya (2007a, 2008)—stress the epistemic role that the cited belief plays in securing knowledge of one's own actions, which constitutes in their view the—or, at least, a—mark of intentional agency. In contrast, the suggested connection, which resulted from putting together SC_R with a conative account of intention, between intention and reliance on future action does not point to the epistemic role that the latter attitude could play in securing the cited knowledge. It points rather to the cognitive role that such reliance can play in one's thought and action. Most importantly for our purposes, it points to the cognitive role that reliance on future action plays in framing further intentions, and thus in facilitating the coordination of one's intentions and actions. In intending to φ, we saw, one normally relies on one's φ-ing. But since to rely on one's φ-ing is in part to be disposed to form further intentions on the premise that one will φ, it is not difficult to see how reliance on future action may assist intention in the coordination of one's planning and action, both over time and interpersonally. Thus, the reliance conception of the settle condition (SC_R) affords conative accounts of intention with useful resources for explaining the coordinating role of intention and for doing so in a way that is compatible with their rejection of "the thesis that intention involves belief."[38] This is the alternative argument for a properly understood settle condition on intention I anticipated in section 3.3.[39]

[38] This suggests a response to a recent objection raised by Velleman (2007: 204ff) against conative accounts of intention such as Bratman's (1987), according to which in order to make sense of the coordinating role of intention we must assume that the latter attitude involves belief.

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