



CHAPTER FIVE

Governmentality of Aid in Six Decades of Ghana-China relations.

Charles Amo-Agyeman

INTRODUCTION

China's revived interest in Africa has recently become the subject of increased global interest. This chapter critically examines the bilateral relationship between Ghana and China in the last sixty years. The chapter argues that analysis of the sixty years of bilateral relationship between Ghana and China offers critical insights into the discursive construction and configuration of power relations. Rather than pessimistic assertions about the "exploitative" aspects of Ghana-China relations, this chapter holds the view that governmentality rationality as conceptualised by Michel Foucault articulates a particular form of power relations embedded in Ghana-China engagement, particularly regarding the agency of Ghanaian elites.

Drawing on elite consensus theory to buttress my point, this chapter contributes to the scholarship on governmentality to examine the distinctiveness of the changing dynamic of power relations in Ghana-China engagement. My larger argument is that Ghana-China engagement is legitimised by a rationality that presents them as equals. Methodologically, the chapter draws on secondary literature based on both primary documents, namely, Bui Dam and Ghana Gas Project documents, which is by far the biggest diplomatic and bilateral agreements between China and Ghana. Bui Dam and Ghana Gas Project documents are analysed with an

infusion of perspectives from academic literature.

Elite Consensus and Governmentality

The increasing presence of China in Africa in recent years has attracted the interest and attention of policymakers, academics and researchers spawning a vast literature (Hodzi, 2017). A fast-rising China in the last three decades has managed to deeply strengthen its influence in Africa. Arguably, China is present economically and politically in every part of Africa (Wakesa, 2020). The most important element of Chinese influence in Africa is in the area of development aid assistance and overseas investment which take into account the interest of the marginalised African states in international arena (Mohan, 2015). The new policy frameworks of Chinese engagement with Africa issued in recent times is captured in FOCAC which emphasised equality and mutually beneficial cooperation in the realm of common development of Africa and China (Wakesa, 2020; Gadzala, 2015). The chapter interrogates elite consensus (i.e. political and economic relationships between elite) as the most important political process, rather than broader citizen-state relations and development aid within the context of Ghana-China relations. Taken to its furthest extent in elite theory, and embodied in the various critical political economy approaches, elites consensus as its basic determines power structure and institutional arrangements and governance that give legitimacy to any collective decision making (Azeez & Ibukunoluwa, 2015). Kifordu (2011) makes the point that this assumption from a policy viewpoint, materially and discursively) underlies the shaping of ideological and philosophical directions of societies. Elite consensus derives its legitimacy mainly from compliance with national priorities and policies (Ansoms, 2009; Ansoms et al., 2014b). During the course of 2000s, elite consensus emerged as a new and powerful research agenda (Abegaz, 2013, p. 1470; Behuria, 2015, p.417; Meyns & Musamba, 2010).

This literature has produced a wealth of insights about the changing roles and significance of states in governing the global which materially and discursively operate in the modern world. The symbiotic relationship between Ghanaian political elites and the Chinese has institutionalised monopolisation and personalisation of economic and trade engagements. Within his schemata, several authors have stressed the importance of existing consensus among political elites as the basis of development (Behuria, 2015; Huggins, 2014a; Gökgür, 2012; Ratcliffe, 2013). Huggins (2014a) points out that elite consensus provides political and discursive support for national development. A relatively long period of autonomy from the vested interests of state-centred elites coupled with substantial inflows of aid and consistent external support, (notably Ghana) have

helped to achieve an evident national growth and development. It is worth noting here that the relationship between regime types and elite structures in the view of scholars foster political and regime legitimacy (Hodzi, 2017).

According to John Higley and Michael Burton (2006, p.23.), liberal democracy is only possible with a consensually united elite, which is increasingly characterised by “dense and interlocked networks of communication and influence”. Since 1992 the pattern of engagements between Ghana and China has duly recognised the basic values and norms of political behaviour as well as bargaining as an acceptable mode of operation. In other words, united elites is closely meshed by structural political integration and deep sense of trust (Marat, 2012). Moreover, many authors have emphasised how political stability/regime types help to build mutual trust (Giddens, 1973; Kreps, 2010). By contrast, unstable and competing elite factions ultimately lead to a slow convergence toward shared norms of political behaviour. Compromises among elites provide the basis for a subsequent broadening of the scope of elite unity.

Political control notably through governing elites over their own societies is a critical element in socio-economic success. The key idea here is that interlocked webs of coalitions are a precondition for efficient and effective central decision making (Kreps, 2010). Indeed John Higley (2006) clarifies that economic development and democratic promise are largely based on elite consensus and regime legitimacy. Elite consensus of an institutional kind is evident from Ghana in which vigorous attempts have been made towards exploiting the geopolitical and geo-economic competition between China and the Western countries. Intensified competition as a result of transition to multi-party elections has only led to elite accommodation which is essential for socio-economic development. The elite consensus in Ghana and China can be explained as resulting from mutual accommodation, robustness of political society, basic institutions and the political compromises upon which they are based. The establishment of elite-to-elite relations (new ties with Chinese and Ghanaian elites) has led to an immediate change in Ghana’s and China’s positions in the world-economy. By this I mean Ghana’s new relationship with China has structurally restructured the core-periphery relations (Flint and Waddoups, 2019). As we will see, elite consensus in Ghana has shaped and conditioned Ghana-China bilateral relations (China-Ghana bilateral relations is a function of their elites’ cohesion). China’s preference for bilateralism and reliance on elite-to-elite relations makes it possible for political elites in Ghana to maintain control of both their respective states and economies.

The chapter accomplishes two broad objectives: first, it challenges the alleged assumption that African elites are weak in their relations with China; second it presents a case study of China-Ghana relations, particularly as they relate to aid and development practices. The conceptual anchor of the argument is Ghana-China engagement serves as a useful key in unlocking African assertive agency in Sino-African relations. It is also to re-evaluate how elite consensus chimes with contemporary mode of governing rationality (notably bargaining and patterns of interactions) and to reflect upon what can be learned in terms of aid and new development agenda. Critical questions examined by the chapter are the following: What can we learn from Foucauldian reinterpretation of elite consensus in Ghana-China increasing engagement? And what can we learn from Ghana-China relations from Foucauldian perspective? Answers to these questions must be sought in the analysis of Ghana-China relations, and as to whether there is anything to be said about the intricate relationship between state authority and autonomy, and economic management which render the state capable of performing their functions. Perhaps these answers must fundamentally rest on something more than the evidently self-serving perceptions of Africanist scholars (Hodzi, 2017) and their sympathisers of the “exploitative” aspects of the Ghana-China relations.

To grasp the processes of elite bargaining and strategic interaction associated with Ghana-China relations over the last sixty years and the practices and productive power implied in them, I draw upon the “governmentality” analytic originally conceptualised by Michel Foucault (Foucault, 2010). The analytical power of the governmentality framework lies in its ability to highlight processes of governance and institutionalisation of political authority and how elite structures are increasingly linked to successful economic development between Ghana and China. The distinctive nature of governmentality rationality is that it offers a powerful impetus to appreciate the intricate relationship between Ghana and China: what kind of governmental rationality characterises Ghana-China relations. Elite consensus contributes to a governmentality rationality in a way which, at the very least, provides a set of attitudes towards political authority on staying afloat rather than getting anywhere (Bayart, 1993). Governmentality rationality ascribes respect for political authority, sound government policies and interpersonal trust. It therefore allows the state to implement policies effectively since the process of implementation itself is discursively mediated; and makes it all the more necessary to have political autonomy. This chapter provides a particular contribution to the debate in its application of Foucauldian insights with regards to the disciplinary power of Chinese aid and its application to outcomes in Ghana-Chinese relations. Further, it provides an important

contribution to the burgeoning literature on the broader implications of China in Africa and specifically on Ghana-China relations.

SINO-GHANA BILATERAL RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXTS

In this section I explore the historical contours and contexts of contemporary Ghana-China bilateral relations. China's role in Ghana as a financier of large-scale investment programmes has received considerable attention in recent times. There is a long history between Ghana and People's Republic of China (hereafter China). Close Sino-Ghana interaction can be traced from the 1960s when the countries first established diplomatic relations under Chairman Mao Zedong and Ghana's first president Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (Chau, 2014; Odoom, 2017). Indeed chairman Mao Zedong and Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana laid a solid foundation for the development of the bilateral ties (Odoom, 2017). Since then, relations between the two countries have been deepened by strong personal relationships between the political elites of the two countries. Until the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, China was a strategic ally of Ghana. Despite the ideological commonalities between Ghana and China (common interest in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism), relations between the two countries were not mainly based on ideology: what bounded them together in those years were at the level of investments and trade.

After the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, there was a lull in the foreign/ diplomatic relations between China and Ghana (Odoom, 2017). Over the last decade and half Ghana has provided critical diplomatic support to China, while China has reciprocated with substantial material support for development. It is important to state that China's contemporary engagement with Ghana began with its support for the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) regime during the tenure of Jerry Rawlings as Ghana's Head of State. The government of China provided largely unconditional support to the PNDC regime especially in the mid-1980s. In the period of 1960 to the late-1990s China became one of the major development partners of Ghana. Under the framework of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum there have been various bilateral diplomatic relations between Ghana and China. In promoting and strengthening the development cooperation between the two countries, China has provided development assistance within its capacity mainly in the form of grants, loans and technical assistance. Further, China-Ghana cooperation on economy and bilateral trade have increased significantly over the years. China's investment pouring into Ghana in the last decades is quite instructive. For example, bilateral trade volume has increased to

US\$66.4 billion while a number of newly registered Chinese investment projects topped Ghana's Foreign Direct Investment list in 2016 (Dibie, 2017; Odoom, 2017). The Chinese government has engaged in exchanges and cooperation with Ghana in the fields of culture, education, medical health, trade, infrastructure and telecommunications. Historical ties between Ghana and China have strengthened and deepened in the years since 1960 and this has given China a fair understanding of local dynamics in Ghana (Aidoo, 2010; Amoah, 2018). Beijing has taken keen interest in giving financial assistance to Ghana which comprised almost a quarter of the Chinese aid programme by the 1980s (Zeitz, 2015).

China-Ghana interactions have undergone different development phases. To be clear Africa-China cooperation agreements was revitalised through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) established in 2000 (Amoah, 2018a; Gadzala, 2015). The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), is the centrepiece of China's strategy towards Africa (Wakesa, 2020). Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has been an important platform of collective dialogue between Africa and China (Amoah, 2018b). The Beijing Summit and the Seventh Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held on 3-4 September 2018 have served as the basis for deeper and broader cooperation between Ghana and China (Amoah, 2018a). In the spirit of *China's Africa policy* of 2006 and 2015, there have also been political exchanges between members of Ghana's Parliament and officials of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). China's intensifying engagement with Ghana has at least three critical pillars: namely, strategic and diplomatic relations, economic relations and social and cultural relations (Jiang & Jing, 2010; Mohan & Lampert, 2013; Rupp, 2013). The difference between this relationship and China's other bilateral relations lie in the internal balance of these pillars and this is not unique to Ghana, *per se*. In this context, cooperation between Ghana and China emerges from the political elites or representatives from both administration (For me, this type of collaboration or engagement guarantees the most benefits in terms of economic and political development, and involves active initiatives by state elites at different institutional levels [Zhao, 2014]).

Ghanaian elites have developed personal relationships with Chinese officials especially during the era of Nkrumah and Premier Zhou Enlai, and by high-level official visits, including several visits by Ghana's former president John Kufuor to China in 2002 and China's President Hu to Ghana in 2003 (Amoah, 2014b). It is significant to note that although Sino-Ghana cooperation has led to more personal relationships, these connections are borne out of and revolve around economic and political interests. China's development assistance packages to Ghana have been in

the form of technical support; grants; and interest-free, interest-subsidised and concessionary loans (buyers' and suppliers' credit) (Moyo, 2016; Lam, 2017). In recent times, China has become a major bilateral source of infrastructure investment in Ghana focusing its assistance especially on the development of roads, energy and telecommunications, sewage systems, bridges, and on technical cooperation (Rupp, 2013; Odoom, 2017). Most of Ghana's funded infrastructure projects are executed by Chinese construction firms, like China Railways and Sinohydro. A careful reading of Ghana-China bilateral framework in my view depicts a picture of equal partners thus far.

GOVERNMENTALITY, AID, AND DEVELOPMENTAL PRACTICES

In this section I mobilize Michel Foucault's insights to understand the unfolding Ghana-China relationship. My analytical framework discursively frames the 'freedom' and 'agency' of Ghanaian elites in its relations with the Chinese. It particularly seeks to highlight a more productive, empowering and constitutive analysis of power as opposed to a visibly repressive and centrally originated form of power. Foucault's work, on governing rationalities enables us to highlight how Ghana-China relations fundamentally inverts classical or traditional IR framings of 'agency' and 'freedom'. Michel Foucault's (1926-1984) seminal lectures on the history of governmentality delivered at the Collège de France have influenced a generation of the highly credentialed scholars (Foucault, 2008). Governmentality, for Foucault, meant "the conduct of conduct" or government of others working through their autonomy rather than through domination (Foucault, 2010). My central preoccupation with governmentality— or, more accurately the of arts of government is to show just how Foucault's analysis of manifestations of power relations work through autonomous "free" individuals and the processes of subjectification this involves rather than techniques of domination and subjugation (Foucault, 2004). Far from being a technique of domination, governmentality framework represents a differing modality of power that attempts to discursively facilitate and legitimise external interventions. This chapter seeks to canvas the view that contemporary aid and development practices are a carefully constructed rationality of governing through which donors seek to transform recipient countries as self-disciplined subjects.

Governmentality as patented by Foucault can refer to techniques and technologies deliberately employed, on the one hand, to govern subjects either directly or indirectly by structuring the field of possibilities, and

on the other, the configuration of subjectivity itself under the action of government (Foucault, 2004). Rose (2000, p.27) notes this arguing that, "to govern, one could say, is to be condemned to seek an authority for one's authority". His work on practices of disciplinary mechanisms, coupled with an exploration of technologies of normalisation, and stressing their interaction with discourse of "governmentality" enable us to analyse the intimate symbiosis between disciplinary discourses in the framework of aid and development practices. In this respect aid and development practices seek to mobilise idealised schemata of "social reality" to produce states and governments which construct themselves through their own autonomy, self-governance and self-subjectification or shape their own conduct through what Foucault calls the "technologies of the self" (2007, p.18); one in which states and governments voluntarily embrace particular economic choices. Such a reflection may help to destabilise and disrupt the paralysing idea of forms of domination; one in which the Chinese government imposes their priorities on poor Ghanaian people in order to analyse the subtle yet insidious ways in which power is exercised and rationalised through practices of freedom (Death, 2011, p.3). Governmentality perspective relocates freedom and agency within the realm of development practices and in so doing transcends the simplistic and simplifying understanding of Ghana-China relations in terms of typical hegemonic top-down model ; hierarchical and monolithic imperative.

For one thing 'Africa' is not a singular entity, and an outcome of these homogenising approaches is that African voices are silenced, which repeats the age-old assumption that African states lack meaningful agency, and so have to be spoken for. African elites in reality, have lots of agential capacity in dealing with the supposedly 'strong' Chinese. Within this configuration, African elites engagement with the Chinese, it can be argued, is instrumentalised to promote specific techniques of government as well as cooperation based on the desire for greater autonomy and freedom. I will argue that this framing is of vital importance to understand the discourse of African agency in relation to the imperatives of development and economic self-interest.

Governmentality, Foucault maintains, "retains and utilizes the techniques, rationalities and institutions characteristic of both sovereignty and discipline" but seek to rework and "recode" them (Dean, 1999, p.29). I would add that Africa is characteristic in that regard in that it works through the shaping of state institutions and the re-conceptualisation of national policies. Since the last decade and half Afro-Chinese interactions have increasingly been marked by techniques of cooperation, inclusion and consensual mentality of government. One clarification is needed. According to Dean (1999), Foucault did not really offer a theory of agency,

at least, not in any direct and unproblematised sense. Foucault tried to rebuff such accusations clarifying that in his view, his work appeared to have an “irritant” effect (Foucault, 2007, p.257). Therefore, for Foucault, power relations are primarily based on freedom, to the extent that “the “other” (the one over whom power is exercised) must be recognized and maintained to the very end as a subject who acts” (Foucault, 2010, p.10). This means that without the freedom and autonomy of the individual, contemporary governmentality as a mechanism of rule is unthinkable. In other words, processes of agency and autonomy increasingly characterise governmentality analytic: “to govern humans is not to crush their capacity to act, but to acknowledge it and to utilize it for one’s own objective” (Rose & Miller, 2010, p.12). Foucault’s own work, I will argue, evinces a recognition for co-operation rather than domination. In the light of this view, we can invoke Foucault to talk about Ghana-China relations. Indeed the whole discussion of the Ghana-China relations needs to be set in the analysis of Foucauldian governmentality in which Ghana’s position has been one of proactive and free agent. The advantage of such an account is that it provides a productive interrogative horizon to an understanding of a broader range of techniques and technologies more concretely rearticulated to historically altering complex governmental rationalities. Foucault’s richly nuanced conceptualisation of governmentality enables us to situate subjectivities, rationalities and techniques particularly as it coexists with the disciplinary rationale of power, and extend that to Ghana-China relations. The analysis of the intricacies of the following two case studies (the Bui Dam and the Ghana Gas infrastructure Project) highlights the critical agency of Ghanaian elites within the framework of China’s actions, strategies and activities to influence outcomes to their advantage.

THE BEIJING CONSENSUS

Here I deploy Beijing Consensus heuristically to draw out the distinctive characteristics of China-Ghana very close friendship within the context of governmentality framework. In broad terms, China’s development model-Beijing Consensus constitutes an alternative policy mix which is based on intensive intervention of government (Breslin, 2018; Galchu, 2018). ‘Beijing Consensus’ is essentially a contested concept. Arguably, there is no consensus on the Beijing Consensus to the extent that its boundaries are perceptive and not seen to be used by Chinese elites evokes and produces flexible and differentiated understanding by its users (Rebol, 2010). There has been a lot of academic and policy discussion over the ‘Beijing Consensus’ espoused by the Chinese elites which posit a more peaceful co-existence in their engagements across Africa. While

some of them consider the 'Beijing Consensus' a suitable replacement of the "Washington Consensus" (Chen, 2017), others question the viability of the Chinese model as an alternative approach to development (Hlaing & dan Kakinaka, 2018). 'Beijing Consensus' as a new model of development deviates/departs from neoliberal tendencies of the "Washington Consensus" in that it comes without the restrictive conditions and bureaucracy of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors. Hence, 'Beijing Consensus' development model marks a dramatic shift not only in the institutional structure of development assistance but also in the practices of development (Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 2019). While the Washington Consensus recommends a one-size-fits-all approach to nearly all developing countries, Beijing Consensus stresses the necessity for a new approach to development based on each nation's unique challenges (Ramo, 2004, p. 5).

In particular, the 'Beijing Consensus' frames China's alternative economic development approach—especially for developing countries—to the so-called "Washington Consensus" of neoliberal development policies incarnated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Therefore, the 'Beijing Consensus' reflects an alternative development approach based on the principle of non-interference in domestic politics and self-determination (Ramo, 2004; Reinhart, 2018b; Brautigam, 2011).

The institutional framework of 'Beijing Consensus' has become the focus for much of the policy dialogue as well as negotiations on official development financing between China and her development partners, not least Ghana. 'Beijing Consensus' is primarily a document outlining China's national economic policy with a focus on representation, consultation and engagement on participatory policy making (Galchu, 2018). It places emphasis on China's integrated aid strategy and scheme of financing. Equally, the 'Beijing Consensus' framework serves as a prerequisite for grant financing and lending from the Chinese government. It is formulated in a participatory manner and nationally owned, meaning the involvement of the government of the country it purports to serve and for whom these policies are directed. The 'Beijing Consensus' framework is prescriptive but not mandatory template for strategic policy making. In other words, the conceptual principles and operational directives underpinning the 'Beijing consensus' involve common prioritisation of policy dialogue and development of political institutional framework (Ramo, 2004; Kennedy, 2010). Furthermore, the rules and the policy design of the Beijing Consensus development model are primarily rooted in the "international" than in the "national". Its focus has consistently centred upon the underlying policy design of national economic strategies. The Beijing Consensus model does not seek the rolling-back of the post-colonial African states

which underpinned the modalities of Western development strategies based on free market theology and democracy. Rather it reconstructs and reconstitutes the state through participatory process and by rehabilitating the regulatory capacity of the state. The core of the Beijing Consensus development model thus reflects an effort to resolve economic problem rather than manage it (Zhao, 2014).

THE POWER OF GHANA'S ELITES

In international development it is claimed that the place of African political elites has been marginal and peripheral in its engagement with China (Moyo, 2016; Mohan, 2015; Chipaike & Henri Bischoff, 2018). However in the following I show that Ghanaian elites assert agency and broker dialogical relations with their Chinese counterparts and therefore should not be underestimated. It is my contention that Ghanaian elites are an unabashedly autonomous constituency whose engagements are defined by commonalities of strategic interests with their counterparts in the global arena. Indeed the economic aid offered by the Chinese are based on the established principle of non-interference that gives Ghanaian elites more freedom and autonomy to define its policy priorities and alternatives. The principle of non-interference is enshrined in the Beijing Consensus (Galchu, 2018). To that extent Ghanaian elites arguably have significant bargaining power and insert meaningful agency when engaging with their Chinese counterparts. Ghanaian elites have used their strategic resource endowments to exert control by making amendments and observations before the signature of contract engagement. Ghanaian elites have been the strongest in its engagement with China when it comes to negotiation. Several rounds of negotiation between Ghanaian elites and Chinese officials for instance, led to the imposition of several clauses which includes acquiring local material construction, respect of the national laws in regard to salaries, work accidents, social security and employment and in hiring local workers (Mohan, 2015). My view is that the options Ghanaian elites adopt are not merely crude impositions, but the result of negotiations and horse trading geared toward enhancing their agency. Ghanaian president Mr Akuffo-Addo, even at the risk of damaging the development of bilateral exchanges and co-operation, or losing the favour of the Chinese government reminded the Chinese to respect the laws of Ghana just as they do theirs (Flick, 2017).

This remark by President Mr Akuffo-Addo is equally telling in that it reflects how Ghanaian elites do not pander to the whims and caprices of China in their various aid agreements. It also provides an intake in understanding the relative autonomy of Ghanaian elites. In this understanding, states

governing elites are understood to be socially embedded within institutional frameworks – which is increasingly seen to be the sphere for governance interventions in aid and development practices. This chapter makes the point that Ghanaian elites have assumed a type of political subjectivity and critical agency that affirm their sense of self around the practices and imperatives of aid and development practices. Confirming this assertiveness shown by Ghana, a Ghanaian official and former Minister of Energy under the government of John Kufuor, Mr Ken Dapaah, reportedly stated that Ghana-China friendship and cooperation is based on the spirit of co-development (Habia, 2009). In fact, former Ghanaian president John Agyekum Kufour prior to the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2006 provides a poignant reflection on Ghana and China friendship over the years as a win-win to development cooperation and reciprocity. “we will talk openly and frankly to each other, with a view to explore better chances of getting benefits both on the African side as well as for the Chinese side” (Xinhua News Agency, 2006). Political elites as active partners, proactive and capable agents in the formulation and implementation of development policy in the main is reflected in the dynamics of Ghana-China increasing bilateral relations.

The real issue is that such an agency typically questions what have characterised conventional IR scholarship over the years and reveals major rifts in approaches to development cooperation and assistance in the context of Sino-African relations. There can be no doubt that Ghanaian elites play a central role both where agenda-setting and decision shaping are concerned in its relations with the Chinese. In this regard my analytical perspective challenges the predominant view that China has become more powerful at the expense of the poor African states. Ghana-China bilateral relations at least, theoretically suggests that there is transformation in governmental rationality implied in the increased emphasis on governing through free and capable agents. Ghanaian elites have always been fiercely protective of its sovereignty by leveraging its engagement with China which opens policy space for alternatives. I want to suggest that Ghanaian elites are agential decision-makers: they are constituted as active and capable subjects through contemporary development practices in their relations with Chinese counterparts to the extent that they have not allowed themselves to be trampled upon or their untoward wishes and demands to hold too much sway in the economy which challenges the prevailing view about China is exploiting Africa. It is in this light that the Ghana-China engagement requires further investigation.

THE BUI HYDROELECTRIC DAM PROJECT

Let me illustrate China-Ghana increasing interaction with particular reference to the Bui Hydroelectric Dam project construction in Ghana by Sinohydro (Chinese Company) with financing coming from the Chinese government through the China Export and Import Bank (Exim Bank) to demonstrate the agency of Ghanaian elites within Chinese development assistance and cooperation. The case of the Bui Dam project is important in the sense that when Ghana's development partners refused to commit themselves, it was the Chinese that executed the project, at a much lower cost (Obour et al., 2016). Ghana like most African countries faces significant development constraints in its energy sector. The Bui Hydroelectric Dam project construction had profound consequences for Ghana in terms of its ability to absorb large investment for economic growth and job creation; and to fill its infrastructure development gap. Undoubtedly the most significant Chinese engagement with Ghana has been the Bui Hydroelectric Dam (Chipaike & Henri Bischoff, 2018; Hensengerth, 2013). The Bui Dam project located on the Black Volta River at the border of Bole (Northern Region) and Bamda (Brong-Ahafo region) districts in the North-western Ghana is the largest Chinese investment in Ghana and the largest foreign investment in Ghana since the construction of the Atuabo Gas Project (Odoom, 2017; Akorsu et al., 2010). The Sinohydro agreement between Ghana and China was aimed at accelerating infrastructural development in Ghana (World Bank, 2008, p. 108). The construction of Bui hydroelectric Dam Project required huge amounts of social and infrastructural investment and so external financing was actively sought (Adisu et al., 2010; Bosshard, 2011; Odoom, 2017; Chipaike and Henri Bischoff, 2018). China's Construction Bank, the China Export and Import Bank financed the project through a concessional loan of \$270m, a commercial loan of \$292m, and \$60m in funding from the Government of Ghana (Asante, 2014; Chipaike & Henri Bischoff, 2018; Foster & Pushak, 2011). Additionally, the two loans were offered with a grace period of five years and an amortisation period of 20 years. Bui Dam project finance was guaranteed through export sales of cocoa beans (Chipaike & Henri Bischoff, 2018). Overall, the Bui Power project is strategic for boosting socio-economic development at the local and national levels (Hensengerth, 2017; Obour et al., 2016). Even though the China Export and Import Bank provided funding for the project, Bui Power Authority (BPA) as the public body was solely responsible for the supervision of the construction and for managing the performance of the main contractor, Sinohydro Corporation Limited (Otoo et al., 2013; Cooke et al., 2015). Strikingly, Sinohydro Corporation limited built the Dam but the project is owned by Bui Power Authority.

The Chinese approach to development assistance and economic cooperation enable Ghanaian elites to exercise agency in ways that transform hegemonic assumptions about the rationalities of free and autonomous subjects. In the sense of Foucauldian agency, the Bui Power Authority is an agent who acts to maintain its autonomy and redefine legitimacy. In this regard Ghanaian elites degree of control enables them to protect their own strategic interests even in dealing with powerful actors such as the Chinese. For instance, the Chinese loan terms were considered favourable for the Ghanaians. While China Exim Bank initially requested a payback period of 17 years, the Ghanaians succeeded in extending the time to 20 years (BPA, 2013). According to the Bui Power Authority, loan agreements of the Bui Hydroelectric Project were approved and signed following the completion of feasibility study and the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) study containing norms, standards and procedures with which the contractor- Sinohydro-had to comply in its execution (Hensengerth, 2017). Ghanaian elites made it explicitly clear that the ESIA's must be conducted and conform with Ghana's environmental legislation before loan agreements can be signed (ERM, 2007a). Specifically, Ghanaian elites directed and mandated Sinohydro to strictly comply with international best practice and procedures to ensure that environmental norms and human rights were not excessively affected by the project (BPA, 2018). Environmental and Social Impact Assessment required Sinohydro to adhere to a Construction Management Plan that would avoid negative consequences for local livelihoods (Management, Environmental Resources, 2006).

It must be noted that Sinohydro Corporation Limited was subjected to and made to adhere to a dense network of government planning procedures even though the Bui Hydroelectric Project was constructed and financed by China (Bosshard, 2011). Another area in which Ghanaian agency is evident is with regard to labour and union laws, the use of local materials and local employees which is a measure of freedom. Typically, Chinese corporations do not encourage labour and union laws however, the Government of Ghana made sure this was enshrined in the Bui Hydroelectric Project contract (BPA, 2018). Ghanaian elites exerted agency in a manner that allowed them to ensure that labour laws, the use of local materials and local employees are enforced and effectively elaborated (Chipaike & Henri Bischoff, 2018; Obour et al., 2016). This therefore profoundly underscores how Ghanaian elites exert power over negotiations process with their Chinese counterparts in accordance to their local regulations. It needs to be emphasised that respect of local standards, laying out of procedures, legal requirements indicate a major shift in the power balance in Sino-Ghanaian relationship and Africa as a whole.

Looking specifically at the case of Bui Hydroelectric project, Ghanaian elites were defined as responsible and, much more importantly, choice-making actors that perform vitally important governmental tasks by virtue of being defined as subjects of development. My contention is that any analytical perspective that only considers how the Chinese government controls and challenges the central role of African state actors misses a serious fundamental point. I hold the view that increasing interactions between China and Ghana essentially is derived from a much more political rationality of rule. The argument, by extension, is that within China-Ghana relations, political elites are interpellated as autonomous political subjects with a capacity for political will-formation. For me, the case of the Bui Hydroelectric project in many ways exemplifies how domestic governance space and institutional framework invariably determine the nature and scope of the involvement of state governing elites. The obvious reality here is that Chinese development practices and economic cooperation programmes are increasingly intricately embedded in a growing mutual political and economic ties.

In an important twist to the dominant narrative around Chinese firms importing their own labour, in the case of Sinohydro project, the majority of the workforce were Ghanaians (ERM, 2007b). Insistence on the employment of local workers reflects the fact that Ghanaian elites are not weak and docile but able to have an important influence over the supposedly 'strong' Chinese in the form of their local workers. As this case study amply demonstrates, Ghanaian elites were enrolled as actors rather than being acted on, in performing governance functions. It offers an enlightening critical account of how Ghanaian elites have increasingly carved out enormous autonomy and agency for their own advancement from generous Chinese aid and development (Grugel et al., 2008; Ramo, 2004). In my view, the case of Sinohydro project illustrates not only how Ghanaian elites exercise significant policy autonomy but also how they are able to enact agency as Foucault's work on the circulation of power indicates (Foucault, 2008). It can reasonably be argued that the ways in which the Ghanaian elites and their Chinese counterparts interacted and related to each other during the construction of the Bui Hydroelectric project is indicative of a radical shift whereby state elites are defined as both objects and subjects of government in the processes of governing.

THE GHANA GAS INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT

The Gas infrastructure project of the government of Ghana was constructed at Atuabo in the Western Region following Ghana's discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 2007 (Odoom, 2017). Ghana was in need of access to energy resources to fuel its own development. It was in this context that the Gas project was built. Ghana Gas Infrastructure Project is the state agency that has the mandate to ensure rapid industrialisation in Ghana. From this perspective, the Chinese-built gas processing entity was a critical piece of infrastructure to aid the country's economic transformation. The \$750 million Chinese-built gas project was constructed by the Chinese state owned enterprise Sinopec International Petroleum Corporation, China's largest oil refiner, and funded by the Chinese Development Bank (Odoom, 2017; Ghana Gas Company, 2013). Indeed the Ghana Gas Project brought some temporary relief to the energy shortage in Ghana. With regard to Sinopec International Petroleum Corporation contract institutional arrangements were put in place to ensure Ghanaians took over its full management and technical operations (Ghana Gas Company, 2013). Ghanaian engineers for instance, took over technical operations of the natural gas processing plant and consequently, dispensed with the services of expatriate engineers and Sinopec which are themselves constitutive of autonomy. This doubtlessly points to the institutionally embedded equalities at the level of locally produced liberal rationalities which becomes the starting point, the means and the end point for understanding the problematic of intervention and of policy responsibility.

It is instructive to note that the indigenisation of Ghana Gas Infrastructure Project operations saved the company some \$24 million annually in operational and management consultancy services rendered by Sinopec International Petroleum Corporation. The funding for Ghana Gas Infrastructure Project was collateralised by oil from the Jubilee field (Ghana Gas Company, 2013). The government of Ghana called for a renegotiation of the contract agreement and demanded the scrapping of its commitment fee, which was viewed as outrageously excessive in the light of the slow actual disbursement of Chinese funds (Odoom, 2017). Ghanaian elites ensured that the proper structures are in place before negotiating contracts that will result in a win-win outcome with the Chinese. In this way, Ghanaian elites were central in shaping official Chinese policy and development practices in the strategic interest of Ghana. This suggests that the government of Ghana was an important decision shaper where Ghana Gas project was concerned even though the Gas project was constructed and financed by the Chinese (BPA, 2013). Ghana-China engagement more

broadly highlights the ways in which policy interventions are more locally driven under local leadership: formed less hierarchically and based upon its contextual preferences and strategic interests. It also means Ghanaian elites use their agency to reform or guide policy intervention in the cause of development to shape the needs, social-economic and political frameworks with regard to the emancipatory potential of this shift (Chipaike & Henri Bischoff, 2018). And this is particularly evident in the Ghana Gas Project. Of course, rather than the 1990s frameworks of liberal internationalism, Ghana-China engagement focuses on the “bottom up” understandings of the importance of local agency, which maintain governmentality and the existing dynamics, structures and rationalities of power (Springer, 2016). Significantly, using Foucauldian governmentality rationalities we can identify ways in which Ghana-China model of friendship rebalances the power asymmetries inherent in apparatus of aid and development practices (Foucault, 2010). Put somewhat differently, the Ghana-China model of friendship is constructed in favour of the existing elites local balances of power. This chapter asserts that Ghana-China model of friendship radically heralds flatter ontologies of power with the emphasis on the increasing agency of the most marginalised and peripheralised. Ghanaian elites in the case of the Gas infrastructure project was enrolled not only as an objects, but also as a subjects of government, heavily involved in every step of the project. This has implications for governmentality rationalities concern with the indirect administration of the population through processes of subjectification—the creation of particular types of subjects—the discursive constitution of a specific form of political subjects, as in the increasing Ghana-China relations. That is, autonomous self-regulating agents (Ghanaian elites) that are governable — which by no means can be described as “technologies of the self” (Foucault, 2010) embedded within a broader conceptual framework of aid and development practices.

These discursive power dynamics, in my view, can be expanded to the intricacies of Ghana-China relations. Ghana-China relations mirrors and provides a fascinating view of the sheer transformative and the productive power of development discursive practices which precisely lie in the processes of subjectification without recourse to domination and control. In this way, Foucault’s approach to the analysis of constitution of subject formations provide the possibility, an escape route and the means of identifying how suitable subjects are produced and constructed (Foucault, 2008).

By following Foucault in seeing power as deeply imbricated and contained within each other in the production of subjectivity and its discursive nature, it has moved away from the fetishisation of aid and

development practices as an unproblematic instrumental concept simply obscured to entrench existing power relationships. In this conception, China-Ghana relations inaugurates and indicates a new era in which there is a far broader range of critical agency of the subject with the determination to improve its possibilities: and, indeed, it challenges the existing conceptualisation of African states actors as passive. To that extent, Foucault's work on governmentality analytic has to be seen as indicative of the success of subjects to exercise agency in terms of social relations and institutional reconfigurations. Governmentality rationalities thus offer an understanding of how population is self-governing and the way that subtle circulations of power produce forms of multi-layered and polyarchic networks (Foucault, 2008).

Foucauldian governmentality reasoning is also visible in the reshaping of a dominant framework for understanding governance practices most notably through the discourse of "localism" and participatory politics with significant degree of policy freedom for achieving economic development (Lam, 2017). From this perspective, 'Beijing Consensus' leads the way in the advocacy of "localism" over the liberal one-size-fits-all policies of the World Bank and the IMF in economic policy-making. In the case of Ghana, this is particularly evident in capacity enhancement model with a great deal of emphasis on grassroots empowerment in engagement with the Chinese counterparts. Chinese grassroots empowerment is achieved by consulting and actively involving the communities to be affected during the planning and implementation phases of projects (Lam, 2017) in order to ensure that community needs are addressed. This approach provides a rationale which is in sharp contrast to the paradoxical straightjacketing of Western style model which has been of a top-down, hierarchical ideal that reject any Indigenous participation within the radius of development (Rotberg, 2008; Grimm, et al., 2011).

Under the Chinese-style localism approach to economic growth and development, local communities are not directly managed and controlled, but rather become object of development aid programmes (Hensengerth, 2013; Ramo, 2004). Importantly, the emphasis on localism enables Ghanaian elites to identify the policies and solutions most responsive to the needs of its people. For instance, during construction, Sinohydro employed 3000 Ghanaian unskilled and semi-skilled workers: operation and maintenance was carried out solely by Ghanaian staff (Kirchherr et al., 2016). Chinese-style localism inheres in the fact of local institution-building specifically around engagement with local communities. Besides, local institution-building creates mechanisms for community engagement, which involves for example, pre-resettlement consultation with the construction contractor Sinohydro (Miine, 2014). Linked to this

is China's focus on local meetings, compensation, resettlement schemes, relocation of people who live within and around the proposed dam sites and monetary compensation which are vitally important as they allow for development of alternative livelihoods and needs (ERM, 2007a). Unlike the Akosombo and Kpong projects experiences in Ghana, the intervention by Ghanaian elites in the case of China ensured remarkable improvement in the housing compensation scheme for the Bui Dam project (BPA, 2011). In many senses, Chinese style localism approach supports living standards, provide services and infrastructure and social and cultural values of the local people (Obour et al., 2016). Chinese actors made public consultation with local communities a key component in the design of Bui Dam project creating room for engaging the Chinese. The Bui Dam case shows that Sinohydro followed Construction Management Plan laid out in the ESIA to avoid harming local communities. This local institution-building ensures the exercise of power and freedom of local the population which has the capacity of creating more inclusive development.

Chinese aid and economic cooperation programmes inject a measure of mutual accountability (downward rather upward accountability), a marked departure from the opaque and hierarchical decision making of the West. Or, put another way, a decisive move towards the axioms of what some have called more inclusive development framework. This deliberate policy of "local development" enables a more inclusive or distributive understandings (frameworks) for social and economic policy-making (Lam, 2017). This in many respects signifies a wider conceptual shift in development policy and practice allegedly ignored by liberal rationalist approaches. The prioritisation of country-owned development framework in the Chinese engagement with Ghana primarily engenders a broad-based participatory and emancipatory policymaking process as opposed to the gatekeeping function of the Bretton Woods institutions.

The point I am making largely is that the Chinese inclusive and partnership development model represents a marked shift itself as a tool of discursive parameters of the market-oriented economic policies of neoliberalism. But, and perhaps more importantly is the fact that Chinese aid and development practices are materially inscribed in a particular regime of macro-technologies of power and the concomitant constitution of subjectivities. This conceivably demonstrates the power enjoyed by the Ghanaian elites. Crucially, China-Ghana engagement is neither of coercion or technologies of domination but rather China prefers bilateral aid patterns while offering a 'no strings', no conditionality, non-interference, win-win and constructive approach in infrastructure development investment (Mohan, 2015) against the free-wheeling policies of the globalised discredited "Washington Consensus". While China's

increasing presence in Africa is enthusiastically welcomed, the established policy of Chinese non-conditionality and non-interference in contrast to the West's coercive approach has been challenged over the years with some intellectuals claiming that the current Sino-African engagement undermines long term African development agenda. The prevailing criticism is that China's non-adherence to aid conditionalities and non-interference is particularly problematic for good governance and the fight against corruption in Africa exemplified by its relationship with Angola and Sudan (Corkin, 2013). Commentators criticize Sinopec (China's state-owned oil company) for colluding with Sonangol (Angola's state-owned oil company) in opaque financial transactions and China's 'blind-eye' support for the National Congress Party (NCP) of Sudan (el-Tigani, 2006) just to mention a few. These are argued to present significant challenges to good governance and the fight against corruption in Africa.

Whereas I broadly agree that China's indifference to aid conditionalities may potentially impel good governance and the fight against corruption in Africa, it is exaggerated and, more importantly, China is non-ideological and pragmatic. I argue against such discourses suggesting that Chinese aid and development practices signify a radical paradigmatic shift from the prescriptive legacy of conditionality which has traditionally characterised the relationship between parties to such financing. I further argue that China offers countries opportunities for expanding domestic policy space enabling countries to choose from various macroeconomic and development policy options, to say the least. Or better yet, this may provide countries the space to develop their own national development strategies alternative to the policy prescriptions of the World Bank and the IMF.

And – this is the interesting point however – that the Chinese principle thereby seeks to reinsert African agency and advances a Foucauldian governmentality conceptual framework for understanding agency both within and beyond the state. The claim I would like to advance here is that China is a partner rather a predator in the heart of Africa. Thus Ghana and Chinese areas of strength complement each other rather than the neoliberal model of development aid assistance. This view is mirrored by Ghana's current president, Nana Akufo-Addo, who emphasises that Sino-Ghanaian relationship has been a creation of mutually beneficial partnership. For example, he said, "we want to build a value-added, industrialized economy with a modernized agriculture, which is neither victim nor pawn of the economic world order" (Taylor, 2017). President Akufo-Addo's statement again highlights a dramatic shift in the spirit of aid relationships which enables mutual respect and manoeuvre in the world-economy, and not the continuation of an established core-periphery

relationship. As indicated previously, China takes a cautious approach of non-interference in the domestic politics of the recipient states before arriving at certain key issues in the existing aid models. The argument is that China breaks away from economic reforms prescribed by Western-led institutions notably the World Bank and the IMF in aid governance regime (Mohan, 2015). China's development and economic cooperation strategies heavily rely on what I will describe as practical experience rather than the Western aid paradigm based purely on market forces and minimum state interference. My assertion is that China's aid structure has led to the establishment of a new development framework of state's engagement rather than the top-down analytic optic and the grossly essentialist view of the Africanist literatures (Hodzi, 2017).

DISCIPLINARY POWER

Here I discuss the concept of disciplinary power and its connection with Chinese deployment of disciplinary practices in the process of subjectivation in its development relations. Power relations is productive as much as it is constraining. The dynamics of Ghana-China engagement is not free from embedded conditionality. Inherent in Chinese aid and development practices is embedded conditionality which may be fraught with hidden strings. Chinese conditionality is not imposed as explicit policy conditions that require changes to national economic policies. China builds into its bilateral lending considerable use of Chinese inputs for example, the use of Chinese contractors and sub-contractors, labour etc. Structural conditioning effects of Chinese bilateral lending on recipient countries serves as disciplinary technology, and technique. Of course, China seriously adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of recipient countries and therefore respect their sovereignty, however, China looks after its own interests like any state. The pursuit of their own interests and strategies restrict or redirect national policy choices in the recipient country. In a broader sense, Chinese inputs and technocratic management imperceptibly discipline its recipients by ensuring that there are effective and legitimate state institutions for smooth running of modern business. In view of this, Chinese lenders utilise and re-inscribe disciplinary technologies and techniques via an interest in ensuring repayment of loans. One way to ensure repayment is by backing it with proceeds from the sale of the recipient country's main export commodity.

Disciplinary discursive practices and regulatory forms of power work to regulate the "conduct of conduct" through self-knowing and reasonable subjects (Springer, 2016). Actively reinstating states arising from self-regulatory principle through subjective freedom in discipline

manner (Dean, 1999) enhances and perpetuates the transplantation of development practices and discourses. This is true for Ghana -China relations to transform its environment by its own praxis. The concern here is not merely with the regulatory discipline but more crucially through the reproduction of omnipresence of a normalising model of development rationalities by the recipient countries (Ghanaian elites) within its own jurisdiction. Disciplinary technologies operate on a more routinised basis and function through control of particular spaces (Foucault, 2007).

My argument, therefore, is that the production of Chinese development assistance and economic cooperation depend heavily on disciplinary approaches where countries have to demonstrate the institutional discipline and capacity necessary to utilise the resources to deliver development and economic growth. As such, they embody the tensions between disciplinary and governmental modes of development assistance and economic cooperation in Ghana. In so far as Beijing framework rehabilitates the regulatory capacity of the state, it also constrains the state by subjecting it to an internal process of accountability and external scrutiny through accountability mechanisms. Internal processes of accountability, greater external scrutiny and the institutional presence of the Chinese officials legitimise policy interventions.

It is suggested that processes of accountability and greater external scrutiny powerfully reshape the modalities of Ghana's engagement with China. The internalisation of policy by the political elites of aid-dependent states in all appearances, is exactly what the ontology of global governance, *inter alia*, takes its inspiration and insidiously aims to encourage. And of course, it is within this orientation that development governance thus very much appears to govern without government which informs governmentality rationalities. Foucault's explication on the importance of the "normalising judgement" in the function of normalising power does not entail the use of coercion, but through the construction of normalised subjects. Against these views, however, the chapter has argued that the dynamics of Ghana-China interactions over the years has been one of equal partners. China's assistance is more of a development cooperation increasingly driven by political economy and diplomatic relationships, to be sure. Ghanaian elites willingly cooperate with Chinese counterparts; that is not following the neoliberal prescriptions of the international financial institutions notably the World Bank and the IMF. Indeed it may be argued that China-Ghana interaction is not that of a patient and doctor relation, it must rather be seen as strategic partners in pursuit of a common goal.

CONCLUSION

Using Ghana, this chapter has argued that Ghanaian elites despite negotiating in variegated cleavages of asymmetrical relations, are not passive, conforming and weak agents in the framework of infrastructure projects negotiation. The case study of the agency exhibited by Ghanaian elites in conventional asymmetrical relations peddled in IR demonstrate their influence in negotiation as modes of resistance with China (Mohan, 2015). The chapter showed that China vis-a-vis the industrialised countries, political elites in Ghana and Africa broadly have capacity for critical agency and there is enormous room for manoeuvre in domestic policies (Chapaike & Henri Bischoff, 2018). This line of thinking presents African governing elites as having minimum input and policy autonomy. For me, the deepest problem with this common view is that it is one-sided and naively presents a limited account of African experiences and realities which run much deeper than what the prevailing epistemological posture would make us believe. Such assertions seem oddly unaware of the contradictory and complex processes of mutual constitution of the making and breaking of boundaries, evinced in the contested flows and counter flows of practices, rationalities and discourses—derived from various spatial and temporal configurations – which specify the productivity of power as distinct from techniques of domination. While predominant narrative asserts that the Chinese model of aid and development practice create new forms of dependency and a debt trap in order to have its way with weak victims, I take a different perspective (Brautigam, 2019).

I have conceptualised Ghana-China bilateral relations not as a zero-sum game, but rather a win-win game. What I wish to emphasise here is that governmental logic more plausibly outlines that the Chinese government governs through “freedom” and disciplinary normalisation, producing self-governing aid-dependent political subjects who needed to conform to the imperatives and technologies of government. Conceived in this way, Ghana-China intense interactions create normalising field of interventions in the name of ‘development’ assistance, which comprises both governmentality and discipline. Ghana-China engagement turns on the application of Foucauldian analysis with regards to disciplinary power of Chinese aid and development practices. As far as I can see, the extent to which pervasive discourses can subjugate actors – whether states or individuals – and render them susceptible to the effects of power is by itself contingent on how they (elites) envision alternative discursive practices from “others” worldview or discursively resist them. It is the contention of this chapter that the pervasive aid and development practices more generally, must be examined and analysed within a broader discursive space – only then does it make sense to speak of critical space of contested,

restricted and often multiple confrontations. Upon sober reflection and after taking into account such empirical developments, it might be said that Ghana-China relations is more plausibly a terrain of agency than it is of domination and imposition.

Reflecting on the particular illustrative example of Ghana-China bilateral relations, I elucidated the ways political technology of development assistance emerges most pre-eminently as a mode or technique of governmentality. A Foucauldian lens of analysis established that development assistance in the context of Ghana-China interactions procreate and enable governable subjects and effective modes of behaviour and deploy technologies and techniques to produce the desired governmental objectives—forming discursive nodes and modes to firmly entrench, maintain and reinforce policy interventions. I have argued here that heavily enmeshed in development discourses of China are diverse combinations and productions of policy techniques not imposed which reflect a rationality of governing. It is worth some pause to reflect this idea that in considering the specific case of China-Ghana bilateral relations, the governmentality rationality is better at explaining practices, specific techniques and technologies of power framed through the notion of normalisation that underlie dominant forms of contemporary development governance.

I have offered a different perspective that challenges the predominant literature on China-Africa relations in general and Ghana-China relation specifically. Reading Foucault from Ghana-China relations, it strikes me that this line of thinking is more tenable and perhaps opens up new analytical possibilities and critical tools we can develop to re-conceptualise and offer fresh perspectives to undress or critique aid and development practices. Studying Ghana-China relations through the lens of governmentality analytic enables us to study how dynamics of power relations are defined by certain practices and techniques, and how such rationalities produce specific types of capable and free agents. In as much as Ghana cannot be adequately representative of the whole African continent; it is my contention that it provides some nuanced understanding of how African agency has been exerted by African states in their increasing engagements with China in the context of development assistance and economic cooperation. Importantly, the two cases discussed offer a critical entry point to understand the broader implications on contemporary Sino-African engagement and how Ghana-China interactions specifically suggests a new direction toward development assistance and economic cooperation.

REFERENCES

- Adisu, K., Sharkey, T., & Okoroafo, S. (2010). The impact of Chinese investment in Africa. *International Journal of Business and Management*, 5 (9), 3-9.
- Aidoo, R. (2010). *China-Ghana engagement: An alternative economic liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Unpublished PhD Dissertation. Miami University: USA.
- Akorsu, A., & Cooke, F. (2011). Labour standards application among Chinese and Indian firms in Ghana: Typical or atypical? *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 22(13), 2730-2748.
- Amoah, L. (2018a). #Notesofapatriot: On Ghana, Asia, China, Fela, Women, Zidane and more. Accra: University of Ghana Press.
- Amoah, L. (2018b). *Laying the foundations for "doing" the developmental state: Why and how Korea "did" it and Ghana "did not" but can*. Accra: University of Ghana Press.
- Asongu, S., & Acha-Anyi, P. N. (2019). A survey on the Washington Consensus and the Beijing model: Reconciling development perspectives. *AGDI working paper, no. WP/19/050, African Governance and Development Institute (AGDI): Yaoundé*.
- Azeez, A., & Ibukunoluwa, A. (2015). Elite theory and elite circulation in Nigeria politics. *International Journal of Banking, Finance, Management & Development Studies*, 3(1), 151-162.
- Bayart, J-F. (1993). *The state in Africa: The politics of the belly*. London: Longman. Johannesburg: African Labour Research Network.
- Bosshard, P. (2011). China dams the world. *World Policy Journal*, 26 (4), 43-51.
- Brautigam, D. (2011). *China in Africa: What Western donors can learn*. Oslo: Norfund.
- Brautigam, D. (2019). A critical look at Chinese 'debt-trap diplomacy': The rise of a meme. *Area Development and Policy*, 5 (1), 1-14.
- Breslin, S. (2018). Fitting China into the debate. Revisiting the developmental state. (7-8) *SPERI Paper no. 43*.
- Bui Power Authority [BPA]. (2011). *Bui hydropower project, background and proposed benefits* [leaflet]. Accra: Bui Power Authority.
- Bui Power Authority [BPA]. (2013). *Bui hydroelectric project*. Accra: Bui Power Authority.

- Bui Power Authority [BPA]. (2018). *Bui hydroelectric project*. Accra: Bui Power Authority.
- Chau, D. (2014). *Exploiting Africa: The influence of Maoist China in Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
- Chen, W. (2017). *The Beijing Consensus? How China has changed Western ideas of law and economic development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chipaike, R., & Henri Bischoff, P. (2018). A Challenge to conventional wisdom: Locating agency in Angola's and Ghana's economic engagements with China. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 53 (7), 1002-1017.
- Cooke, F., Wood, G., & Horwitz, F. (2015). Multinational firms from emerging economies in Africa: Implications for research and practice in human resource management. *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 26(21), 2653-2675.
- Corkin, D. (2013). *Uncovering African agency: Angola's management of China's credit lines*. Ashgate.
- Dean, M. (1999). *Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society*, 2nd edition. London: Sage.
- Dibie, M.I. (2017). China becomes largest contributor to Africa's FDI. Africa news. Available at: www.africanews.com/2017/05/04/china-becomes-single-largest-contributor-of-africa-s-fdi-report/ (accessed 7 January 2021).
- El-Tigani, M. (2006). China should revise policies on Sudan. *Sudan Tribune*, 22 April.
- Environmental Resources Management [ERM]. (2007a). Environmental and social impact assessment of the Bui hydropower project. Prepared by Environmental Resources Management, in association with SGS Environment for the Ministry of Energy/Bui Development Committee, Ghana.
- Environmental Resources Management [ERM]. (2007b). Resettlement planning framework of the Bui hydropower project. Prepared by Environmental Resources Management, in association with SGS Environment for the Ministry of Energy/Bui Development Committee, Ghana.
- Flick, M. (2017). Ghana crackdown on illegal Gold mining inflames tensions with Beijing. *Financial Times*, 1 May 2017. Available at: www.ft.com/content/cb032036-2a63-11e7-bc4b-5528796fe35c

(accessed 10 January 2021).

- Flint, C., & Waddoups, M. (2019). South-South cooperation or core-periphery Contention? Ghanaian and Zambian perceptions of economic relations with China, geopolitics, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2019.1659781.
- Foster, V., & Pushak, N. (2011). Ghana's infrastructure: A continental perspective. *World Bank policy research working paper series*.
- Foucault, M. (2004). *Society must be defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76*. London: Penguin Books.
- Foucault, M. (2007). *Security, territory, population. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978*. London: Penguin Books.
- Foucault, M. (2008). *The birth of biopolitics: lectures at the Collège de France 1978 -1979*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Foucault, M. (2010). *The government of the self and others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1982-1983*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Galchu, J. (2018). The Beijing Consensus versus the Washington Consensus: The dilemma of Chinese engagement in Africa. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 12(1), 1-9.
- Ghana Gas Company. (2013). *Atuabo gas project publication/materials*. Accra: Ghana Gas Company.
- Giddens, A. (1973). *The class structure of the advanced societies*. Hutchinson: London.
- Grimm, S., Rank, R., McDonald, M., & Schickerling, E. (2011). Transparency of Chinese aid: An analysis of the published information on Chinese external financial flows. Stellenbosch and London: Publish what you fund and centre for Chinese studies at Stellenbosch University.
- Grugel, J., Ruggirozzi, P., & Thirkell-White, B. (2008). Beyond the Washington Consensus? Asia and Latin America in search of more autonomous development. *International Affairs*, 84(3), 499-517.
- Hensengerth, O. (2013). Chinese hydropower companies and environmental norms in countries of the Global South: The involvement of Sinohydro in Ghana's Bui dam. *Environment, Development and Sustainability*, 15(2), 285-300.
- Hensengerth, O. (2017). Water governance in the Mekong basin: Scalar trade-offs, transnational norms and Chinese hydropower investment. In Pal Nyiri, P., & Tan, D. (Eds.), *Chinese encounters in*

Southeast Asia how people, money, and ideas from China are changing a region. (pp. 174- 191). Seattle: University of Washington Press.

- Higley, J. (2006). *Elite theory in Political Sociology*. University of Texas at Austin.
- Higley, J., & Burton, M. (2006). *Elite foundations of liberal democracy*. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, MD.
- Hlaing, S.W., & dan Kakinaka, M. (2018). Financial crisis and financial policy reform: Crisis origins and policy dimensions. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 55, 224-243.
- Hodzi, O. (2017): China and Africa: economic growth and a non-transformative political elite. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/02589001.2017.1406191.
- Jiang, W., & Jing, J. (2010). Deepening Chinese stakes in West Africa: The case of Ghana. *China Brief*, 10(4), 2-5.
- Kirchherr, J., Disselhoff, T., & Charles, K. (2016). Safeguards, financing, and employment in Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa: The case of Ghana's Bui dam. *Waterlines*, 35, 37-58.
- Lam, K, N. (2017). *Chinese state owned enterprises in West Africa: Triple embedded globalization*. Routledge.
- Management, Environmental Resources. (2006). Environmental and social management plan for the Bui hydropower project.
- Marat, E. (2012). kyrgyzstan: a parliamentary system based on inter-elite consensus. *Demokratizatsiya*, 20(4), 325-344.
- Miine, L. (2014). Sustainability of Bui resettlement scheme in Ghana. MSc Thesis submitted to the school of graduate studies, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, <http://ir.knust.edu.gh/bitstream/123456789/6918/1/LICARION%20MIINE.pdf> (accessed 3 January 2021).
- Mohan, G. (2015). Queuing up for Africa: The geoeconomics of Africa's growth and the politics of African agency. *International Development Planning Review*, 37 (1), 45-52.
- Moyo, S. (2016). Perspectives on South-South relations: China's presence in Africa. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 17(1), 58-67.
- Obour, P., Owusu, K., Agyeman, E., Ahenkan, A., & Madrid, A. (2016). The impacts of dams on local livelihoods: A study of the Bui hydroelectric project in Ghana. *International Journal of Water Resources Development*, 32, 286-300.

- Odoom, I. (2017). Dam in, cocoa out; pipes in, oil out: China's engagement in Ghana's energy sector. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 1–23.
- Ramo, J. C. (2004). *The Beijing Consensus*. London: Foreign Policy Centre.
- Rebol, M. (2010). Why the Beijing Consensus is a non-consensus: Implications for contemporary China-Africa relations. *Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies*, 9, 1.
- Reinhart, C. M. (2018b). Exposing China's overseas lending. *Project Syndicate*. Retrieved November 12, 2018, from <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-opaque-foreign-development-loans-by-carmen-reinhart2018-10>.
- Rose, N., & Miller, P. (2010). Political power beyond the state: problematics of government. *he British Journal of Sociology*, 43(2), 173–205.
- Rotberg, R. I. (2008). *China into Africa: Trade, aid, and influence*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.
- Rupp, S. (2013). Ghana, China, and the politics of energy. *African Studies Review*, 56(1), 103–130.
- Springer, S. (2016). *The anarchist roots of Geography: Toward spatial emancipation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Taylor, M. (2017). Akufo-Addo now believes in China than Ghana-Exton cubic PRO. Pulse, last modified December 11. Accessed January 12, 2021.
- Wakesa, B. (2020). A call for an African policy framework towards China. *Africa-China cooperation*, 11–29.
- Zeit, A. (2015). A new politics of aid? The changing international political economy of development assistance: The Ghanaian case. *Global economic governance working paper no. 104. Global economic governance programme*.
- Zhao, S. (2014). A neo-colonialist predator or development partner? China's engagement and rebalance in Africa. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 23(90), 1033–1052.