NIETZSCHEAN *WILL TO POWER* AND THE POLITICS OF PERSONALITIES IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

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Abstract

The task of understanding and perfecting international and diplomatic relations is becoming more crucial, given the frequency of political disputes and intimidation via public diplomacy. At the root of this trend is the dominance of political personalities in international relations, dictating the direction and progress of conflict control on the international scene. With increasing technological, biological, chemical and nuclear weaponry, ignorance of and any mistaken decision on the diplomatic terrain can come at a huge cost of war and anarchy. At the heart of personalities and human relations, however, Nietzsche argues, is the will to power, that singular striving of each individual to assert his individuality and uniqueness, most times, to the detriment of collective interest. The objective of this paper is to expose what Nietzsche means by will to power in order to allow us have a handle on its influence on politics and social relations. The research question, therefore, addresses the relationship between will to power and the nature of political relationships in public diplomacy. The paper will achieve this by an expository and analytical method of research. The paper finds out that it is apposite that we gain control over the tendency for political persons to exploit public diplomacy to dastardly ends. This is to prevent a consequent descent into anarchy, one that Hobbes describes in grotesque clarity as the war of everyone against everyone, with life being "nasty, brutish and short."

Keywords: Nietzsche, will to power, diplomacy, power, human relations.

Introduction

The nature and direction of international and diplomatic relations in modern times has become pointedly delicate and under intense pressure, akin to the Hobbesian description of man's endless posturing for war. The fragility of dialogue and peace building has never been more pertinent in our age, where nations are sovereign, and some others, in Orwellian characterization, are more sovereign than others, with the proliferation of nuclear arsenal and sophisticated weapons technology. Humanity is on the verge of wiping herself clean

from the brittle slate of history. The necessity of understanding international relations, and particularly, human relations is at the core of defusing this global keg of gunpowder. This is because each nation-state exercises a personality under international law (PIL), which itself domesticates politics between the states. For every state possess territorial strength, population density, an effective government and the capacity to relate with other PILs as a basis of natural human instinct. Still, to properly grasp relations among PILs, it is important to understand the composite elements of State will – the human person.

This becomes even more crucial when one realizes that at the fore of international relations and public diplomacy is the use of power. Good media, image cultivation and propagation represent some significant form of power over opinion that is disseminated through the media, and even faster these days, through the social media (Melissen, 2005). These represent some form of soft power that Nye (1996) argues is not much distinguished any longer from hard power. This is because a good part of the interaction between states is the assertion of their personalities over boundaries. While this assertion comes traditionally through hard power, of which Cooper (2004) is quick to attribute wholly to American public diplomacy, soft power marks a remarkable deal of subtlety and influence that nations use in communicating their national interests and extending extra-state boundaries. This romance with power and its use is at the heart of human desire – the roots of which are the human person's quest to put a handle on experience and make meaning of his/her world, both interior and exterior. As Francis Bacon (1597) rightly asserts, "Knowledge is Power." It is this power in meaning that each human person seeks after which either can bring humanity to encounter peace, or if not handled properly, be the very anarchy that humanity avoids. And so, the question of the human person and meaning stands out as a most essential step in deciphering the progress to be made on the diplomatic front and the way of stifling a regress into political anarchism.

Human intellectual development from the Ancient to the Modern era, tried to answer this important question of the human person and meaning, through philosophical questioning and contemplation of forms. But these intellectual forays have led the questioning mind, further and further away from the external world of perception and social relations to the four-walled consciousness of the self. The early Greek Philosophers of the Ancient era were first preoccupied with a cosmocentric perspective of human life, as subordinate to the world, before the supersession by a theocentric standpoint that preferred the subordination of human existence to a divine supremacy. The Modern era of Philosophy, however, birthed a revolution of perspectives that marked a distinction between God, the world and human reason, formally synthesized in the medieval epoch. This anthropocentric stance enthroned man as 'the centre and the point of departure for every philosophizing' (Mondin, 1985). At its core was a philosophy of suspicion that Ricoeur (1987) highlights, lumping together Marx, Nietzsche and Freud as protagonists of this school of suspicion.

Suspicion, because these theorists put to rigorous questioning the basic assumptions of the other historical schools and develop a new appreciation of the human person.

This new awareness is expressed in the will to meaning as the primary motivational force in human life and relation, for Nietzsche points out that 'He who has a *why* to live for, can bear with almost any *how*' (Frankl, 2006). However, humans are undeniably beings in relation, with an innate desire for social interaction. This dimension of social participation implicates a political consciousness, which Plato recognizes man to represent – living in the city, *polis*. We are political beings, because we relate with each other to align interests and achieve goals – common goals. While some philosophers have been positive about the nature and direction of this political dimension of man as an indispensable need for meaning and purpose, others have criticized this as a necessary evil. Sartre had exclaimed in grotesque clarity – "Hell – is other people." Golding (1954) paints a dramatic picture of this realization in his *Lord of the* Flies, where social relation is the natural instinct of man. However, in spite of the good will of individuals coming together to pool resources, ideas and purpose, there emerges, alongside, conflict and disorder. Still, politics and diplomatic relations remain a crucial element of self-growth and communal development, because unless we work together to realize common ideals, the frictions of cultural difference and ideological diversity will only serve to restrict our growth. This is the later victory of Golding's book.

Nietzsche's contribution is remarkable, nonetheless, for he proposes that the meaning of human life, or any attempt to put a handle on the nature of political interaction and public diplomacy is to be found only in the '*will to power*'. His contribution far from being only remarkable is as well markedly controversial, as his pithy summations on human life and meaning, are characteristically labeled by most post-Nietzsche thinkers as anarchistic or in yet more vivid terms, as representative of Aristocratic radicalism. This is so, because however abstruse Nietzsche might seem, his doctrine of *will to power* puts forward a blunt picture of a Hobbesian age of the human society where 'every man is an enemy of every man' (Russell, 1996). Yet, Nietzsche's submission rings true in modern dynamics of diplomatic and international relations.

The aim of this paper, therefore, is to offer a critical exposition of Nietzsche's doctrine of the *will to power* and then, the application of this doctrine to the politics of personalities that characterizes modern politics and public diplomacy. Finally, it is our aim to expose the mistakes of blindly furthering the aristocratic radicalism and political realism in the face of an expanding global front. To enable ordered international relations between countries, and most especially, peace, there is need as the paper prescribes on a final note of an arbitrary body of global interests and unity across national boundaries that can curb excesses and establish joint goals.

Roots of Nietzsche's Anarchism

Arising from a deeply religious cultural and family background, Nietzsche's development in philosophical studies saw the display of an attitude of strong antagonism to the Christian values that were ingrained in his early formative years. He points out, in this regard, in very caustic language:

> I condemn Christianity...To me, it is the extremist thinkable form of corruption...I call Christianity the one great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity, the one great instinct for revenge, for which no expedient is sufficiently poisonous, secret, subterranean, and petty – I call it the one immortal blemish of mankind (Nietzsche, 1968: 1).

In the afore-stated text, Nietzsche clearly outlines his attitude towards Christianity and to the Christian God, whose death he later mock-proclaims with an unearthly relief. In both his atheistic and ironically pious undertones, Nietzsche's early pietistic Christian formation impacted greatly on his philosophical outlook. Despite the former's expression in his declamation of the Christian God, and strong criticism of Christian morality, the latter point of a rather unmistakable pious influence emerges, in his persistent fixation on the renewed need for redemption (a recurring theme in Christian soteriology) even in a post-theistic age (Fraser, 2002). It is this attempt at redefining human morality in the absence of a Christian God, which forces Nietzsche to proffer a radical understanding of human life and its meaning. Hence, his Christian background was a springboard for the development of his doctrine of the "will to power".

With this radical 'religiosity', Nietzsche's academic life introduced him to an impressive deal of influence from his predecessor-philosophical outlooks. The most notable philosophic influence came from the Ancient Greek School, whose preoccupation was mostly with art and myth. Art represented for Nietzsche, man's truly 'metaphysical activity', which he held in contrast to the modern fascination with science. He held two competing forces in both art and life, presented in the coinages, the *Apollonian* and the *Dionysian*. The former represented, for him, "the rational desire to order and control experience..., represent(ing) reality through forms or ideas", while the latter was held to be the "non-rational desire to go beyond these forms, and to directly experience reality in its raw state" (Southwell, 2009). The ancient Greek tragic drama therefore, offers the highest form of art, which unites these two conflicting modes to bring about balance (Southwell, 2009). At the heels of this romanticizing with Hellenic culture, also, was his subsequent disparagement of modern European philosophical culture.

Further to this, Nietzsche was strongly influenced by Heraclitus, the great Greek thinker, famous for his saying that "You can never step into the same river twice" (Thonnard, 1956). Heraclitus' doctrine of change against the illusion of permanence, which he ascribed to the element of fire, is what Nietzsche espouses, though qualifying this element of fire as *force*

(Steinhart, 2000). Nietzsche says that there are no unchanging beings, rather, there are only 'be comings', for as he says, "continual transition forbids us to speak of 'individuals', etc.; the 'number' of beings is itself in flux" (Nietzsche, 1968). For Nietzsche, there is a constant flow of flux. Also, together with this Hellenic bias, Nietzsche also is accused of developing an idea of continuity, of smoothness or gaplessness, from the great German metaphysician, Leibniz. Steinhart (2000) tells us that Leibniz's idea that the universe is continuous is the platform on which Nietzsche builds his notion of continuity. Together with this notion of continuity, is the idea of possibilities striving to be actual, as "everything possible demands that it should exist, and hence, will exist unless something else prevents it, which also demands that it should exist and is incompatible with the former" (Rescher, 1991). Importantly too, Nietzsche espoused considerably, the ideas of Schopenhauer, whom Russell, avidly describes as his rightful predecessor (Russell, 1996). Schopenhauer pioneers the emphasis on 'will', as the striving and mostly unconscious force of the whole world. He expresses this in a *pessimism,* which argues strongly that the most powerful source of human behavior was not the intellect, but the will (Southwell, 2009). Human life was shaped and orientated by a conscious and fundamental willing. However, Schopenhauer presents his concept of will in pessimistic undertones as intrinsically wicked (Russell, 1996). Nietzsche builds on this unitary conception of human life, in a singular essential will, though he deviates from his mentor, by ascribing to his notion, the harmony of ethical as well as metaphysical primacy. Hence, Nietzsche creates through this philosophic masterpiece, a human world of anarchy characteristically marked by the natural drive (*triebe*) (Jenkins, 2013) that makes every man strive to dominate. This striving, this powerful and most fundamental drive, is what he terms the 'will to power'. This is what accords meaning to the entire context of human existence and social and political relation.

The Will to Power: The *Zeitgeist* of Modern Public Diplomacy

Theoretical Origins of the Will to Power. Nietzsche's *Will to Power* emerges from more important shadows cast by Hobbes and later Darwinism. In the case of the former, the Hobbesian state of nature saw humanity in a perpetual posture of war (Russell, 1996). The enduring cardinal virtues of this society were witnessed in the paradox of force and fraud, as men were unable to engender trust in themselves, and neither were they able to cooperate with themselves (Russell, 1996). The result of such a society is what Darwin's sums up, as a survival of the fittest (Darwin, 1993). Hence, every creature is driven (*triebe*) by a will to survive (Southwell, 2009). However, Nietzsche does not simply subscribe to survival as man's main driving force. As he points out: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to *discharge* its strength – life itself is *will to power*; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent *results"* (Nietzsche, 1966).

Nietzsche seems to subordinate the superficial political striving as suggested by Hobbes, to a deeper biological striving, however, noting carefully that these were mere expressions of the underlying desire and striving that was the essential animation of life (Steinhart, 2000). This desire or striving seems to be represented by a 'mathematical striving for victory over number' (Steinhart, 2000). A *will to power* characterized by a striving to be greater, to exceed, to surpass every limit. This *will to power* of Nietzsche is set to defy all limitations. It is omnipotent, as it possesses the power to make every possible being exist.

Following Leibniz's thought concerning the striving of possibilities towards actuality, Nietzsche colorfully presents the assertion of Heraclitus: "The world is a game Zeus plays", pointing to existence as a divine dice game, where there stands 'the heaven of chance', 'the heaven of accident' (Leibniz, 1697). These chances are the possibles of Nietzsche, all the possible sequences of events *without selection according to any rule*. With this, Nietzsche's determinism offers the understanding that our lives are governed by fate, by the particular physical universe in which we live. However, his denial of freewill is not a denial of freedom. This is so, because the *will to power* is the principle that drives each of these possibilities to their actuality. Hence, his espousal of Leibniz's doctrine is done with the exclusion of the moral negativity of the Christian-Platonic God, whose death he had already proclaimed. There is, rather, a *Dionysian* theodicy, which he points to, that is tragic in affirming pain and suffering. This is not however, masochism, for Nietzsche holds that though one were to flee from the ascetic option of condemning the pain and suffering and imagining a world of *utopia* in heaven, one ought to find beauty in the ugliness of the pain. Hence, his world is both tragic and yet aesthetic (Steinhart, 2000). Hence, in this new *Dionysian* age, a fall-out from the *Apollonian* era, in place of an ascetic culture and 'religiosity', Nietzsche offers the option of *amor fati*, love of fate, or better put, fatalism. As he says: "My formula for greatness in a human being is *amor fati*: that one wants nothing to be other than it is, not in the future, not in the past, not in all eternity. Not merely to endure that which happens out of necessity, still less to pretend it isn't real – but to love it" (Nietzsche, 1983: 714).

Furthermore, the notion of *will to power* presents us in its character of omnipotence, with the synonymous reference to absolute power, which is god. However, this does not represent the Christian-Platonic God or the God of the Old Testament. Nietzsche's god-concept is bereft of the 'goodness' as is understood in Christian nuance. Rather it denotes a superiority of soul. As he draws etymologically, the 'good', 'bonus' is culled from the closer Latin word, 'duonus', 'war', and refers to "a warrior, a man of war" (Nietzsche, 1956), rather than the morally-prejudicial Christian conception of the term. Hence, the idea of goodness points to a spirit of greatness. The *will to power* expresses the 'tyrannical egotistical desire[s] that people have to dominate or master other people' (Steinhart, 2000). His idea, far from suggesting the idea of celebrating only the strong and fit, but is rather advocating the survival of the weakest. As he points out:

What surprises me most when I survey the broad destinies of man is that I always see before me the opposite of what Darwin and his school see or want to see today: selection in favor of the stronger, better-constituted and the progress of the species. Precisely the opposite is palpable: the elimination of the lucky strokes, the uselessness of the more highly developed types, the inevitable domination of the average, even sub-average types…Strange though it may sound, one has always to defend the strong against the weak; the fortunate against the unfortunate, the healthy against those who are degenerating and afflicted with hereditary taints (Nietzsche, 1968: 93).

On this note, Nietzsche emphasizes strength over weakness, demonstrated in the *will to power*, not as mere physical strength, but rather as the intellectual superiority amongst others. He offers us a picture of the individual of greatness, whom he describes as being 'carved from wood that is hard, delicate and at the same time smells good'. This individual has 'a taste only for what is good for him; his pleasure, his delight cease where the measure of what is good for him is transgressed'. To this effect, he 'guesses what remedies avail against what is harmful; he exploits bad accidents to his advantage; what does not kill him makes him stronger' (Nietzsche, 1983).

One other important characteristic of the *will to power*, for Nietzsche, lies in the fact of its omnipresence (Jenkins, 2013). Nietzsche expresses the fact of its pervasiveness and ubiquity in all activities of the human person. Basically then, the 'entire instinctive life, as the development and ramification of one basic form of the *will to power*' (Nietzsche, 1966), has its very foundations in it. So also, all organic functions find expression therein. The *will to power* could be conceived of in a plethora of instantiations: as the animating principle that causes a plant to grow and spread its seed; so also, as that which places a wild animal as head of its pack and enables it to maintain its position. In the final instance, also, it is as 'the most spiritual *will to power*'; this is evident in a philosophy of life that highlights a personal ideal (Southwell, 2009). Summarily, therefore, "the world viewed from inside, the world destined and determined according to its 'intelligible character' – it would be 'will to power' and nothing else" (Nietzsche, 1966), for "only where life is, is there also will; but not will to life, instead – thus I teach you – will to power!" (Nietzsche, 1969)

Furthermore, the *will to power* has the characteristic of overcoming. It overcomes for the 'power and delight' of mastery (Jenkins, 2013). Nietzsche believes that the drives, which have their root in the *will to power*, compete amongst themselves, as each of these drives in the human person would intend to represent as the ultimate purpose of existence and the legitimate master of the other drives (Nietzsche, 1966). This striving and competition, even within man, is seen in the conflict of 'his passions, his good and bad inclinations, in so far as they have the *will to power* want to play master' (Nietzsche, 1966). This opens up the theme

of a winning dominance, as life is overcoming and the *will to power* is life. Hence, as Nietzsche observes, 'whenever I found the living, I found the *will to power*; and even in the will of the serving, I found the will to be master' (Nietzsche, 1969). Just as the small gives way to a greater leverage, in order to also be accorded superiority over those lesser in strength than it, there is a constant theme of overcoming.

In a remarkable paradox, Nietzsche points out that even the *will* itself requires overcoming itself for the sole purpose of growth. Hence, he says, "and this secret life spoke to me: 'Behold,' it said, 'I am that *which must always overcome itself*'" (Nietzsche, 1969). There is here an "unexhausted begetting of life", as the individual grows ontologically, "creating greater units of power". He opines on this basis, that he considered the fact of life itself as an 'instinct for growth, for continuance, for accumulation of forces, for *power*: where the *will to power* is lacking there is decline' (Nietzsche, 1968). In *précis*, therefore, Nietzsche proposes the necessity of resistance and the ability to turn suffering into one's own advantage as required for the realization of meaning. In this vein, he does not express the condemnation of the evil character in life, on the contrary, he offers the exact opposite: "'I' seize the hope that one day things will be still more evil and painful than they have been until now" (Vattimo, 2002). Hence, resistance and suffering are possible challenges that offer humankind the prop to expand their horizons, their strengths and give opportunity to conquer both oneself and the world. It is in this light that Nietzsche's doctrine of the *will to power* offers serious implications for diplomatic relations and our modern world.

Public Diplomacy in our modern world: An age of political realism. Public diplomacy is a fast emerging field of international relations and diplomacy because of the importance of building communication over distances. This has taken greater focus with the proliferation of news via the internet and the globalization effect of connected peoples and boundless interaction. As such, the dissemination of propaganda over the media has become more forceful and influential. The United States Center for Public Diplomacy (USCPD) defines public diplomacy as the "public, interactive dimension of diplomacy which is not only global in nature, but also involves a multitude of actors and networks." This definition takes into cognizance the contributory agencies of actors and of networks. While the networks are diverse and defined, the actors differ in their force of influence and sway based on the personalities behind each action. At the core of public diplomacy therefore are individual actors or personalities capable of driving propaganda and policy, across the limits of geographical borders. Simon Anholt echoes the importance of public diplomacy for international relations and politics, when at the 2010 COP summit, held at Cancun, he stated categorically that there was but only one super-power left on planet earth – public opinion (Adams, 2014).

But, how is public opinion driven? How is public diplomacy achieved? Cull (2009) highlights some salient points to the development of public diplomacy. Firstly, public diplomacy started with listening. The importance of listening cannot be overemphasized,

because it through such listening that the ideas disseminated are assimilated. In our interconnected world, listening is accomplished through a variety of facets, via radio and television, social media, adverts, speeches, government and non-governmental agencies, etc. Listening is not only the role of the assimilator, but also of the actors in public diplomacy. They listen to the target population, their fads, concerns and philosophical tempers and decide what, when and how to drive propaganda. The next point is advocacy. The actors then decide on an active means of advocating ideas and beliefs. This can be achieved through embassy relations, media campaigns, etc. Nowadays, there are varied creative and wide-reaching means for achieving advocacy. Another facet is cultural diplomacy. This point of public diplomacy occurs, when the actors decide to make known overseas, their cultural resources and achievements. One palpable example is the propaganda of fear that the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) use in publicly airing and announcing their successes in nuclear weapons' testing and technology. Yet another means of public diplomacy is through exchange diplomacy, wherein a country or actor decides on exchange study programs between partner nations to enable sharing and propagation of ideas. Then, there is also the aspect of international broadcasting, which is of particular relevance, given the fact of stereotyping and subliminal influence. In a post-truth age like ours, many argue that there is hardly objectivity in international news reportage; rather, there are intentions and hidden agendas in pushing forward ideas and steering the course of public opinion. These debates have gone on and on and are best seen in the Trump-CNN debacle of 2017, where in peddled lies and half-truths are christened with a new euphemism of "alternative facts", or how each side seems to emphasize a partisan aspect of incomplete facts to suppress an opposition-idea. The last point Cull (2009) makes is that of psychological warfare. Here, actors use communication to achieve an objective in wartime, usually through communication with the enemy's public. It could be overt in white propaganda, or covert in black propaganda. Relevantly, in public diplomacy, actors utilize a combination of one or many of these tactics to achieving their objective of superiority of ideas and vantage base.

Most proponents and theorists of public diplomacy underscore the importance of relationships of value, nation-branding and win-win situations in the goal of public diplomacy. However, political realism makes us realize that we are far from this ideal. The fact of nations being in constant posture of war and seeking to subvert the other at the slightest chance is the most real scenario in the world of international relations. Lord Palmerston, British Prime Minister was noted for declaring strongly that there were no permanent friends or enemies, in nation-state relations, only permanent interests. Like the prisoner's dilemma of Merill Flood and Melvin Dresher, when applied to international relations, shows, nations, just like the two prisoners in that game theory, are mostly content with self-interest.

The dilemma paints a picture where two prisoners are arrested for a crime they are both guilty of, but of which no substantial evidence is available to convict them. The criminal

prosecutor holds them incommunicado and separate from each other, and wisely offers them two options: First, confess to the crime committed or, second, remain silent. If any of them confesses to the joint crime and the other remains silent, the one who confessed would be set free and the other sentenced to a long jail term of possibly 10 years. If both of them confess, they would both be sentenced to mitigated jail terms of 5 years each. If, however, both prisoners jointly remain silent, refusing to confess, they would be charged with lesser crimes and sentenced to a single jail term each. Now, the best option would, in both their interests would be to cooperate in keeping silent and serving only a year. However, to safeguard their personal interests in distrust of the other's intentions, they would choose an option that harms the other person. The reality of our world and human relations show that we are often intoxicated with the power of choice and use it to decide in our very best interests, even if it means to the detriment of the interests of the other party. Consequently, there are often no real win-win situations. Instead, there is a prevailing winner-takes-all approach with each nation and international actor poised to outwit others to its benefit.

From the gory intensity of the World Wars that have caused innumerable people untold suffering and led to the decimation of scores of innocent lives, we continually realize that this *will to power* that Nietzsche describes in shocking lingo is the *zeitgeist* of our contemporary era. The rampant disregard for human life and the outgrowth of terrorism in many parts of the globe highlight the degeneration of our world into some grotesque plague of pain and evil. This happens due to the fact that people are easily drunk on power, in a world that boasts of sophistication in technology that almost blesses humans with quasi-omnipotence, global consciousness and a growing obsession to overcome and spread influence. As such, nations want, more than ever, to control larger influences than the narrow limits of geographical jurisdictions. We witness this *will to power* in the jostle for global sovereignty and world power status between the United States, Russia, North Korea, etc. with each nation threatening the other to extinction to salvage its influence and domination in the most aggressive power-play of a neo-Cold war era. Most importantly, at the forefront of this new politics are the personalities that represent national interest and pride. These individuals rightly embody the peace or devastation that each of their respective heavyweight countries can achieve just with a wave of the wand or the press of a button. However, understanding the dynamics and delicacy of this essential aspect of public diplomacy is germane to resolving humanity's descent into political anarchy.

The Politics of Personalities: *Will to Power* in Public Diplomacy

Nearly 7.3 billion people live on planet earth. A number so outstanding, that the seconds in 100 years, would not be enough to round half that population. To this extent, scholars argue that humanity is an abstraction, for we only experience but a fraction of humanity in each individual lifetime. But why do I come from this perspective. It is the case that people seek relations with others. We align under common interests and due to geographical

closeness. States are formed and given territorial and jurisdictional boundaries. But conflicts flare and happen when those communalized interests of different groups clash. With the peace treaties of Osnabruck and Münster, in 1648, to end the 30-year war in the Roman Empire, modern international law was born. This law serves to regulate the relations between sovereign states, but as Blaise Paschal (1941) opines, "Unable to make what is just, strong; we make what is strong just."

Herein lies exactly the truth of modern public diplomacy that nations seem to enthrone might as right and physical strength for virtue. To this effect, the politics of intimidation is prevalent in today's world, with the nuclear arms race and the jostling for political supremacy between economically wealthy nations. At the forefront of this invigorated current are political personalities, wielding power like one wields a sword in the heat of battle. Today, the political arena is suffused with significant contributions from political personalities and the muscle-flexing of the Trumps, the Merkels, the Putins, the Kim Jong-Uns, the Xi Jinpings etc. that dictate the tide of modern political understanding. The demand of overcoming the political landscape is dictated by the force of character of individual personalities, and this in turn will drive the path of modern international relations and public diplomacy. This is evident in Nietzsche's theoretical analysis.

The *will to power* is the very drive of individuals to survive, to overcome and to conquer. It is the primary character of the *Übermensch*, the Superman, as Nietzsche describes, as the very justification of the human race. The very defiance of herd belief is the audacity of willing against the status-quo. The world of public diplomacy had been preparing grounds for the entrance of this new diplomacy of power and personalities with the spread and growth of moral and cultural relativism. This heralds a strange "uniqueness" of ideas and character that is both appalling as well as assertive. It celebrates a new sense of nationalism that defies the desire for global unity and oneness. Thus, the very antithesis of globalization is achieved, that in spite of global inclusiveness, nations are feeling more apart, national opinions are differing and becoming more selfish. This new power and force of personality is broadcast over opinion, which according to Carr (1983) is no less essential for political purposes than military and economic power. In a global information age like ours, actions, words and gestures communicate power, intimidation and confidence over the political arena more than ever. And, political personalities are exploiting this possibility to its maximum. A good example of this is seen in the use of twitter by the presidency of most nations to pass and maintain public opinion about presidential actions and inactions, even when that may mean tampering with the veracity of core issues. In more recent news, the United States is found to have taken a stance, albeit, a position dictated by the personality of its political representative on the global scene, to back out of a united climate accord, an action which carries with it all the semblances of devastating national and individualistic pride. Some other nations are particular about deliberately intimidating other nations with the broadcast of nuclear weapons' testing and the crow of hard power capabilities.

This political personalism, most succinctly, is an abbreviated expression of the nationalism that affronts the task of globalization and unity of ideals, one that reinvents the soft power of public diplomacy, making it even more overt, yet subtle, arrogant, yet fiercely appealing. Understanding public diplomacy therefore has to be about understanding *will to power* and how this conscious willing of individuals can affect the political sphere of relations. The necessity of guiding international relations and public diplomacy by checkmating the insatiable thirst for power and influence of individual political players is more important than ever. To achieve this, there is a resonant requisite for global cooperation and pooling of ideas and strategies, thereby reducing the tendency for personalities in the political arena to usurp the position and responsibility of power. This is needed crucially in our world of increasing global connectivity and technological power, without which we may witness a neo-Hitler holding the world by the grasp of global technological influence. If this is not the direct result of the growing media power of political personalities, an indirect consequence may be social anarchy. The unity that we get through media technology and connectivity should be not just left to face-value or statistical evidence of a broadening web of relations but should be a voiced and lived commitment of shared values, shared ideals and dedication to unity amidst diversity and love in spite of divisive power.

Nietzsche's *will to power* advocates a world of chaos and anarchy, with each individual seeking only the furthering of his / her personal or national interests. While interests should not be ignored, character should be placed above whims, virtue above selfishness and human rights regarded greater than allegiances.

Is Nietzsche wrong? The problem with anarchy

Many philosophers have voiced difficulties in a political reading of Nietzsche's philosophy. Still, one can observe that with the benefit of newer and more rigorous methods of hermeneutics in political philosophy, the task of finding qualities of Nietzsche's philosophical thought that produce his politics becomes increasingly easier (Voegelin, 1944). This is because Nietzsche's texts strongly suggest that he considered himself a political philosopher, given sufficient political content in his creative philosophical writing (Warren, 1985). Yet, there is serious debate as to whether or not Nietzsche has a political philosophy (Detwiler, 1990; Nussbaum, 1997; Shaw, 2007; Leiter, 2009). But, this is not our concern with this paper. It is clear that Nietzsche's doctrine of *will to power* is a realistic picture of our political age – the paradox of force and fraud. By amplifying the power of the individual qua individual, Nietzsche affirms a creativity that is conceived without social or political limits, instituting a politics without care (Stern, 1979). When such political universe is removed from social and moral foundations, it is degrades itself (Sokel, 1983). It is difficult to argue that Nietzsche is wrong about the human person's desire for power and control. Nietzsche is credited as one philosopher bold enough to diagnose the cancer of our age and spell it out

in vivid language (Warren, 1985). Nonetheless, Nietzsche is mistaken about certain things. His theory of *will to power* is not right on all accounts.

Firstly, the theory equivocates on the concept of 'world'. The *will to power* is reflective of a world that is cruel and meaningless, with individuals elbowing away each other for superiority. Nietzsche's perspective on life changes drastically the image of the world, for he expresses that from the point of view of the *will to power*, the consoling opposition between a real and an apparent world disappears. He says:

> There is only one world and it is false, cruel, contradictory, seductive, meaningless...A world so constituted is the real world...*We need lies* in order to conquer this reality, this 'truth', that means in order to *live* [...] Metaphysics, morality, religion, science – these are considered merely as various forms of lying: with their aid, life can be believed in. 'Life *should* inspire trust': presented in these terms, the task is immense. In order to solve it, man must naturally be a liar; more than anything else, he must be an artist [...] Metaphysics, morality, religion, science – all simply monstrous products of his will to art (Vattimo, 2002: 135).

This picture of a cruel world is a description of anarchy. But how can cruelty and deception inspire trust? We also learn from observing our 'world' that there is an order to the universe – physical laws that govern the cycles of nature and balance causal interactions. This natural world of order contrasts with Nietzsche's world of humans, one, united, and the other, depicted as in chaos. It is the case that in spite of the tilt towards entropy, that is, disorderliness in any system, there is always an ordering force that balances it. This is the second point that exposes Nietzsche's mistake about human relations.

William Golding's political satire (1954) expresses this reality, in the story of kids shipwrecked on an island. Their very first impulse was to community – coming together to pool resources and work as a unit. However, with this genuineness of purpose came friction and dissent. Like Schopenhauer (1851) describes in his porcupine paradox, in extreme cold weather, porcupines feel the need to huddle together to get warmth. Despite this noble intention, they get hurt from the prickly spines of other porcupines. Even when disagreement and chaos tries to set in, humans are still impelled to advocating order. As such, in Golding's novel, *Lord of the Flies* (1954), the kids develop a system of government and a set of rules, all signified by the conch, to order and guide their new community. Self-interest and preservation actually unites individuals rather than setting them against each other. This is because an individual realizes that a group is generally stronger than an individual, and so, the interests of a group are better preserved than the interests of a single individual. Unity benefits more than anarchy.

Lastly, in the application of *will to power* to the politics of personalities, one realizes that while personalities are key to nation-branding and the political muscle of nation-states, they

are not indispensable. The state always outlives the individual. The history of forceful political personalities and their miserable demise are lessons on the temporality of human power. The Bismarcks, Churchills, Thatchers, Mussolinis, Hitlers, Osamas, etc. all passed away with their grip on the world left only to memory. These were all charismatic and powerful leaders with a *will to power* beyond even the limitations of their political jurisdictions. While some of these personalities used the force of their political influence for positive actions, others may have abused such power in causing conflict and war. As is touted, "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Our world is becoming increasingly aware of the need to check and balance power and the influence of the strong and also achieve the task of supporting the weak – in sum, building an inclusive global political society.

Quo vadis? Projecting a better future for diplomatic relations

Nietzsche's doctrine of *will to power* has dire implications for our modern world. The basic character of man's actions was tainted by pure *hubris* and godlessness. This character is what he proposes, without the "deception" of Christian morality that sought to control it, as the defining principle of man's life and growth. The obvious implications of his theorizing, is that his philosophy describes a society of elitist authoritarianism, where the elite few thrive over the weak majority, and fate favors the continual thriving of the strong above the weak and the unrelenting striving of the weak to overpower the strong. To this effect, his idea of society seems to present anarchism.

To aid better international relations, there is the necessity of a united effort, a united front, which would act as a check and balance to power among individual nations. This is important to curb the trend of independent political power, political personalities and an exaggeration of national sovereignty. Political leaders must be held accountable to larger committee of nations, not headed by a single individual but by a collective mandate and body of rules. The United Nations (UN) seems to embody this ideal. However, the UN is largely handicapped, especially against heavyweight nations. The body is also unclear about its mandate and how it can achieve a unilateral effort at peace, understanding and diplomatic relations. It is important that while power is decentralized to individual nations, there must be greater global cooperation and unity to arrest whatever tendencies to conflict and chaos that emerge from national arrogance and chauvinism. A lot of criticisms have come against the UN, with many hinting that the UN would collapse into irrelevance if not careful, just as the League of Nations did in its day (Ross, 2016). From North Korean sanctions to Libya to the Syrian war, the UN seems unable to get a good grip on the actions and inactions of power-wielding personalities. Worse still, they are losing considerably the battle on the public diplomacy front, as these tyrants exert a strong and significant psychological advantage with their audacious impunity and use of the media to brag and vaunt weapons sophistication. Also, within the caucus of the UN, there are powers that be, unspoken vetoes

and taboo issues, such as Chechyna or tensions in the South China Sea that the big-dog nations forbid any discussion about. These issues prevent any real progress.

A global world order is required now, more than ever, because of growing insecurity and increasing power of personalities in the political arena. Unless this is achieved, international relations would basically remain a higgledy-piggledy mêlée of ideas and superiority. We must be willing to align self-interests, both personal and national, and find where they coincide under the ideals that we all share. Regulations must be in place on a global scale to check the power accorded representatives of nation-states and their use of the media and public diplomacy to force and steer public opinion, so as to avoid abuse and misuse of the prerogative of power, for with great power always comes an even greater responsibility.

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