

Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Asocialism

In this paper we will look at three versions of the charge that liberalism's emphasis on individuals is detrimental to community—that it encourages a pernicious disregard of others by fostering a particular understanding of the individual and the relation she has with her society. According to that understanding, individuals are fundamentally independent entities who only enter into relations by choice and society is nothing more than a venture voluntarily entered into in order to better ourselves.

Communitarian critics argue that since liberals neglect the degree to which individuals are dependent upon their society for their self-understanding and understanding of the good, they encourage individuals to maintain a personal distance from others in their society. The detrimental effect this distancing is said to have on communities is often called "asocial individualism" or "asocialism." Jean Bethke Elshtain sums up this view: "Within a world of choice-making Robinson Crusoes, disconnected from essential ties with one another, any constraint on individual freedom is seen as a burden, most often an unacceptable one."¹

In the first three sections, we look at the first version of the charge that liberalism is detrimental to community. This concerns the "distancing" discussed above: the claim is that liberalism encourages individuals to opt out of relationships too readily. In the fourth section, we briefly discuss the second variant: that liberalism induces aggressive behavior. Finally, in sections five and six, we address the third version of the charge: liberalism does not provide for the social trust that is necessary for cooperation and the provision of communal goods.

1. Disregard for Others as a Social Pathology

We need not look far for evidence that asocialism is at the heart of communitarian fears of liberalism. Charles Taylor tells us that "opponents of atomist views argue that a truly atomist polity would be utterly devoid of civic spirit."² Communitarians believe

that liberalism is truly atomist. For them, liberals advocate an each-for-his-own attitude wherein society is seen as a voluntary association, a "society of self-fulfillers, whose affiliations are more and more seen as revocable, [and which] cannot sustain the strong identification with the political community which public freedom needs."³ Civic spirit and public freedom are hindered by liberalism's supposed asocialism. The liberal individual is without irrevocable ties and this is thought to imply that the individual will have no communal sentiment, will feel no tie to others around him. "Liberalism ... tends to dissolve traditional human ties and to impoverish social and cultural relationships."⁴ "The philosophical difficulty lies in the liberal conception of citizens as freely choosing, independent selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties antecedent to choice."⁵

The charge here is that the liberal ability to distance ourselves from our ends leads to a lack of communal sentiment or civic spirit, since without irrevocable ties to others we will not feel connected to them in a way that will make us consider their lives to be worthy of our assistance. We will have no regard for their successes, failures, or feelings. In so disregarding them, we do not consider ourselves to be one of them. We consider ourselves to be separate from and independent of them. This sort of criticism is, however, unfair to liberalism.

In arguing against the liberal ability to distance ourselves from our ends, communitarians "are usually reluctant to take in the fact that individualism redefines human bonds; it does not foolishly try to eliminate them."⁶ The liberal is not saying that our ties to others are eliminated but that they are seen as in principle revisable. Far from indicating a weakness in bonds to others under an ideal liberal regime, the liberal argues that such bonds are *more* valuable than bonds we cannot but have. Liberalism allows for a morally richer understanding of emotional ties. Liberals maintain that such ties have more moral depth when due to the agent's voluntary choice. A liberal sees her bonds to others as important specifically because *they are removable and yet she chooses not to remove them*. Her endorsement of the continued relation imbues it with meaning. The

relation is not maintained simply because of birthright, but because it is seen as valuable to the bonded individuals. Still, communitarians express concern about this liberal ideal.

[I]f the business of life is finding my authentic fulfillment as an individual, and my associations should be relativized to this end, there seems no reason why this relativization should in principle stop at the boundary of the family. If my development, or even my discovery of myself, should be incompatible with a long-standing association, then this will come to be felt as a prison, rather than a locus of identity.⁷

The motivating fear described here is that a true liberal individual will be able to opt out of any relationship she happens to find herself in, including relationships with spouses, siblings, and children. The liberal individual, it is feared, will find such relationships to be imprisoning, will thus want out of the relation, and will be able to opt out.

There can be no doubt that individuals *can* opt out of any sort of relationship. We need only flip through afternoon talk shows on television to hear stories of parents leaving or killing their children, children leaving or killing their parents, siblings leaving or killing each other, and of course, spouses separating or killing one another. It is only too apparent that the ability to opt out of the closest relationships is prevalent in contemporary society. This is what drives critics of liberalism so forcefully. They realize we *can* opt out of close relationships and see people doing so in what seem to be perverse ways. The ability to opt out, critics claim, is pathological. If society were healthy, we would not see so many cases of people opting out of relationships that should remain loci of identity. This, of course, is the fault of liberalism. Even if the opting-out of relationships, of which we have ample empirical data, is not, strictly speaking, evidence that we can fully distance ourselves from our ends, that ability seems to make opting out possible.

To blame the ills of society on liberalism is, we should note, to conflate existing liberal society with the society of liberal theory, as if the former were an adequate realization of the latter. Although some philosophers do claim specifically that liberal

theory itself encourages individuals to opt out of a relationship the moment that it seems to be more of a burden than a benefit, this is simply an unfair characterization. Liberal theory encourages us to see ourselves as capable of opting out of any relationship, but this does not mean liberals believe that we should not try to maintain relationships with people with whom we are currently involved. Seeing ourselves as capable of opting out, on the contrary, should give some indication of the high esteem and value we do have for those with whom we remain in relationships. We *can* opt out, but *choose* not to do so, and this may indicate the high value we place on the relationship. The ideal liberal individual recognizes her need for others and seeks to maintain the relationships she has which are beneficial—not only economically, but also emotionally. Indeed, even Taylor seems to realize that liberalism is not to blame: “we should see this culture as reflecting in part an ethical aspiration, the ideal of authenticity, but one that doesn’t itself license its self-centred modes. Rather, in the light of this ideal, these appear as deviant and trivialized modes.”⁸ The ideal is liberalism, the deviant and trivialized modes are what currently exist. As should be clear, “self-fulfillment, so far from excluding unconditional relationships and moral demands beyond the self, actually requires these in some form.”⁹

2. Durable versus Intense Relations

As already admitted, it is a troubling fact of our times that people seem to opt out of relationships too readily. There may be something in contemporary society that encourages this, but to assume without argument that it is liberalism is to fall prey to a genetic fallacy. It is not enough that a society is committed to some form of liberalism before the onset of a problem to blame the problem on liberalism. Indeed, it is far from clear that there is evidence even for such a faulty argument. A strong case can be made that relationships have been made *stronger* under liberalism.

Ian Maitland has suggested that the evidence from social science with regard to relationships under liberal and non-liberal regimes seems to indicate that relationships are

actually stronger under liberal regimes than those they replace.¹⁰ As evidence he cites recent work by Gertrude Himmelfarb, Viviana Zelizer, and Robert Lane, as well as Alexis de Toqueville's *Democracy in America*.¹¹

Toqueville found early America lacking in many respects, but not in respect of the strength of its citizens' relationships. He claimed, for example, that "of all countries in the world America is the one in which the marriage tie is most respected and where the highest and truest conception of conjugal happiness has been conceived."¹² According to his perspective, democracy "loosens social ties, but it tightens natural ones. At the same time as it separates citizens, it brings kindred closer together." "[F]eelings natural to man [for example, parental feelings] ...are always stronger if left to themselves."¹³ Freedom to opt out of relationships does not, on his view, weaken relationships. More recently, Himmelfarb has argued that in Victorian England, the family was elevated, "revered," and "sentimentalized to a degree never known before."¹⁴ Similarly, Zelizer has shown that after the instantiation of liberal child-labor laws, children became more valuable to their parents even though no longer useful as a means of income. She claims they became "sacralized." That is, the relationship between parent and child became stronger.¹⁵ Finally, Lane provides evidence that a market, which is meant to embody liberal principles, encourages supportive relationships among workers.¹⁶

The evidence that relationships are stronger under liberalism than under non-liberal regimes is not definitive. There is no doubt that much evidence supports the view that individuals in liberal societies find it easier to opt out of relationships than individuals in other societies. No-one can deny, for example, that the divorce rate has increased. We must note, though, that the ability to opt out of any relationship does not *cause* people to do so pathologically. Ian Maitland's work indicates an ambiguity about the strength of relationships. What is indicated is a distinction between the intensity and the durability of a relationship. While communitarians are interested in durability, the evidence Maitland draws together concerns intensity.¹⁷

In their talk of traditions and communal authority, communitarians are conservative.¹⁸ What they fear is a society changing too rapidly for individuals to understand their place from day to day. In the past times that they romanticize, people supposedly knew who they were and what their roles were because the roles did not change often. Indeed, they often did not change within a person's lifetime. Divorce rates were lower than they currently are. Children respected their parents and cared for them in their old age, often following them in their careers. Communities were more stable and accorded more authority simply because mobility was low. Today, mobility is high and people often opt out of their community, both geographically and otherwise. Relationships are less durable than they once were. At the same time, as the authors Maitland cites point out, often the relationships are more intense, even if shorter-lived.

To the communitarian, then, a liberal may respond that she is unbothered by the lack of durability in contemporary relationships. Such durability, after all, often led to the oppression of some individuals by others—wives by husbands, for example. In a world where relationships are not seen as having to be durable, individuals may be more able to protect themselves by opting out of self-endangering situations. Bonds to others that we can break but do not are important from a liberal standpoint specifically because they are removable and we *choose* not to remove them. Our endorsement of the continued relationship imbues it with meaning. Such bonds are more genuine than those we simply find ourselves with. Combining the claims that a person's choice imbues a relationship with meaning and that durability may not be something to favor, a liberal can claim that she is more interested in the intensity than the durability of relationships. If this does not provide for the long-term stability sought by communitarians, so much the worse for communitarians. Durability has had negative consequences for the less powerful and intensity does allow for support of individuals as well as some stability.

Not only may durability have a negative impact on oppressed individuals, but, more generally, durability may often conflict with individual happiness, even if no one is

being oppressed. We can easily imagine cases where a married couple have stayed together because that is what was expected of them, even though they were both unhappy. Franz Josef Haydn's marriage illustrates this point well. His wife had no interest in his music. He had no interest in her concerns. They had little to do with each other for an extended period up to her death. How much happier they each could have been had they amicably separated.

Communitarians are wrong, then, if they insist that liberalism does not allow for strong, intense relationships. They are right, though, that these relationships may not be lasting. They are wrong to lament the loss of durability in relationships. In their misguided concern for durable relations, they mistakenly believe that liberalism does not encourage the proper sorts of relationships, because they think "proper relationships" must be durable and allow for lasting communities via so-called "constitutive attachments."

3. Turning the Tables

Someone might argue that it is not liberal, but illiberal and even communitarian policies that cause the pathology of the extreme willingness among individuals to opt out of relationships. The suggestion might be that as a society and its government surpass their liberal responsibilities and take from individuals the burden of responsibility that is properly theirs, it becomes easier for individuals to walk away from relationships. Indeed, Wilhelm Von Humboldt tells us that "the pernicious influence" of extensive government aid to individuals is that it "weakens sympathy and renders mutual assistance inactive."¹⁹ Individuals no longer feel that opting out of a relationship is a personal loss or that they are responsible for the loss. The blame for the loss is placed instead on the community and its traditions. The attitude promoted is one where the society or its government is thought to be at fault for poor behavior and responsible for putting things

right. A parent, for example, can opt out of a relationship with a child because he believes the society will take care of the child.

It would be wrong to insist that solidaristic or communitarian inclinations in our society are definitively responsible for the above-described pathology. We can make such a claim with no more certainty than communitarians can make the claim that liberalism is responsible for it. It is, though, just as plausible and indicates that communitarianism is amenable, not only to less intense relationships than liberalism, but also less durable ones. In this regard, a statistical study correlating the increase in government services in the last thirty years and the increased fragility of social bonds during that time might be enlightening.

4. Aggression Toward Others?

The second variant of the asocialism charge can be discussed—and dismissed—quickly. According to this variant, ideal liberal individuals would knowingly engage in activity harmful to others if it would better their own conditions. In this, its least plausible form, the charge of asocialism is that since liberal individuals are not constitutively tied to others, they may be willing to harm others whenever doing so benefits themselves. Thus, one communitarian exhorts: "Look what happens when you have rapid change in the character of the community—people come to feel uprooted, community identification is replaced by alienation, and you have an increase of antisocial behavior such as crime, vandalism, and excessive drinking."²⁰ This sort of communitarian objection is, however, egregiously misguided.

We have already seen that liberals do not completely disregard social ties. But even if they did, it would not matter here. To suppose it otherwise is to make an unwarranted and odd maneuver from "is" to "ought." The communitarian launching this criticism seems to claim that if an individual is truly devoid of ends then she ought not care about others and in fact ought to be willing to harm others whenever that is thought to benefit

herself. Perhaps the first part of this move is sensible. If I am not connected to you in any way, there is no reason for me to care about you. This is the grain of truth behind the asocialism charge. Liberals should admit that we may be best off if we are indifferent to people we do not have special relationships with. There is much empirical data to support this claim. One need only think of the Milgram experiments. If the subjects in those experiments were indifferent to people they had no special connection to, they would not have heeded the directions of the confederate researcher to give the confederate second volunteer shocks of high voltages. They would have had no animosity to the confederate volunteer and no loyalty to the supposed researcher. The Milgram experiments provide a metaphor for the liberal view of traditional, authoritarian communities. The confederate researcher has influence over the subject, much as the community does, and causes the subject to engage in morally problematic behavior. Indifference to the researcher, or to the community of others to whom one is not related, may better serve morality.

Indifference, of course, is no more malevolence than it is benevolence. On this score, it amounts only to a fact that liberals have the good sense to recognize the downside of too much good will toward others. Such good will and the beneficent state-endorsed aid which it justifies is often misguided and uninformed. Some old adages should still be heeded: the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

Perhaps we ought to be indifferent to unrelated individuals. But the second step of the critic's syllogism, that because we do not care about unrelated individuals we ought to be willing to harm them whenever it helps ourselves, is wholly unsubstantiated. There may be factors other than constitutive attachments that are reasons for me not to harm others. I may, for example, recognize that although *I* do not care about a particular individual, someone else does. I may recognize that my refraining from harming an individual is likely to encourage that person to refrain from harming me. I may want something from others that I cannot get if I harm them—perhaps their cooperation. I may

simply be indifferent to their well-being, as I am indifferent to them. In all, "social duty (or civil behavior) and political liberty are by no means incompatible."²¹

5. Social Trust and Communal Goods

With the introduction of liberalism in the Scottish Enlightenment,

'The individual' was from now on conceived of as one of the fundamental, if not the most fundamental, categories of social thought and practice. Individuals are held to possess their identity and their essential human capacities apart from and prior to their membership in any particular social and political order.²²

Liberals endorse individual autonomy. Individuals are who they are apart from membership in the social order. For communitarians, this hinders the attainment of communal goods by discouraging communal sentiment and, importantly, social trust. To promote such trust, communitarians find virtue in the being with and helping of others.

Alasdair MacIntyre claims that to avoid a pernicious subjectivism, we must accept the authority of given standards. Liberalism, he argues, encourages a pernicious neutrality of the state toward the Good which, in turn, encourages subjectivism by not providing individuals with authoritative confirmations of any beliefs. In contrast, he believes that acceptance of an authority within a community requires a degree of trust and associated characteristics.

[T]he kind of cooperation, the kind of recognition of authority and of achievement, the kind of respect for standards and the kind of risk-taking which are characteristically involved in practices demand... fairness in judging oneself and others... a ruthless truthfulness without which fairness cannot find application... and willingness to trust the judgments of those whose achievement in the practice give them an authority to judge which presupposes fairness and truthfulness in those judgments, and from time to time the taking of self-endangering and even achievement-endangering risks.²³

But this is no simple feat. For it is always open for an individual to question authority, to *not trust* the judgments of those in power.

Trust is a necessary element in a society. Individuals must be able to trust at least some other individuals, and all must have some modicum of trust in the society as a whole and the government, which is the first and most obvious thing anyone notices about a society. As Virginia Held makes clear, if a citizen does not trust her society to treat her fairly and in some way to insure at least the possibility of her survival, she has no reason not to act in a manner detrimental to it or to its other citizens.²⁴ Social trust is necessary, she argues, because great human achievements require cooperation among several or even many individuals and cooperation requires trust. We are able—in theory—to educate our children better because we trust municipal governments, educational administrators, and teachers to do their jobs properly. We are able to build cities because financiers trust building contractors to do the work agreed upon and the contractors trust the financiers to pay them as agreed. We are able to continue our daily lives with relative peace of mind, secure that we can trust our employers to pay us, the military to protect us, others to perform the services we pay for, and everyone not randomly to violate our basic rights. If we can live in such peace, we will have no cause to violate the peace of mind of others. We can all live in peace with one another. Facilities to educate children, cities that provide various cultural and practical desiderata, and social peace, are all communal goods.

The question is whether a communitarian or individualist polity better promotes trust which allows for communal goods. Communitarians and many liberals influenced by the communitarian critique of liberalism believe that a society in which the community is given authority promotes trust better than a society adhering to more liberal ideals.

Held argues that the liberal tradition takes government to be justified only when it serves the interests of its citizens, that this is primarily a theory of self-interest and thus takes individuals to be egoistic, and, finally, that “trust and cooperation cannot be built on egoism.”²⁵ She concludes that traditional liberalism cannot support trust and

cooperation. The question of social trust is not, though, of no concern to liberals. Despite its critics' claims, it is not the case that liberalism "in all its forms ... fails to take account of the degree to which the free individual with his own goals and aspirations, whose just rewards it is trying to protect, is himself only possible within a certain kind of civilization."²⁶ Liberals easily admit that individuals would lack freedom to do many things if not in a civilized society. Indeed, liberals are concerned to better their society and to offer ideals that others might be encouraged to attempt to actualize. They often write specifically in order to help bring about the best sort of civilization they think possible.

It is simply unfair to characterize liberals as unconcerned with social cohesion and social welfare. Liberal policies and liberal theory are certainly believed by liberals to support and encourage progress within a society. As Taylor recognizes, a liberal individual is, ideally, "an independent being with his own capacities and goals" who sees the "aims of association ... [as] the combination of our capacities which allows each of us to be much more productive than we would be alone."²⁷ Liberalism encourages individuals to take responsibility for their relationships and favors policy that furthers societal interests by allowing each individual to be as productive as she could be.

We must recognize that communitarians and liberals are both fairly consistent on this point. Communitarians see society as of more normative import than individuals and as ultimately responsible for all; correspondingly, the communitarian individual is a person who sees himself as irrevocably bound to others and who sees society as responsible for his sustenance. In contrast, liberal individualists see individuals as of more normative import, with the state being designed to make possible the pursuit by individuals of whatever project they deem worthy; correspondingly, the liberal individual is a person who has a large degree of control over her life, who can choose her projects, and who can opt out of any of her relationships should she find them self-damaging.

The line of thought presented by nominal liberals like Held is, as I've said, influenced by the communitarian critique, and like communitarianism, sees society as responsible for providing some level of sustenance for its members. This strong appeal to a communal bond is an interesting addition to liberalism. It may be seen as attempting to add an element of communitarianism to the otherwise individualist theory found in Rawls's theory of justice as fairness. It is not a classically liberal view.

6. Fostering Trust and Cooperation

Are we more likely to provide for social trust by communitarian or by liberal means? We can take social trust to be trust that exists between citizens and between citizens and their government. A government can be trusted or distrusted as can its citizens. Held's suggestion is that in order for society to be trusted, government must be involved by redistributing welfare goods to people in need. If they do not get what they need, they have no reason to trust society. Yet, redistribution which betters one person often makes someone else worse off. The government that redistributes to one person must take from another and thus risks losing the other person's trust. It must, then, attain a careful balance—some might say an impossible balance. Communitarians, in fact, might not endorse Held's approach. When Taylor and Michael Sandel favor decentralizing governmental power, this presumably includes limiting federal welfare programs.²⁸ As there is independent reason to think that liberal individualism succeeds better than communitarianism in promoting social trust, we may ignore this and turn our attention directly to liberalism.

Classically, liberals believe that individuals will and ought to avoid situations where their interests would completely conflict with the interests of others, that individuals would not and should not cooperate with people they do not trust. If I know, for example, that a particular instance of cooperation requires that my proposed partner's duties or obligations would be diametrically opposed to her interests, it would be unwise

for me to join the venture, expecting and trusting her to cooperate. If she cannot gain from cooperation, she should not be expected to participate or trusted to do so. Though we may not be able to avoid all such situations, we can surely avoid most of them and surely avoiding them is the right thing to do.

That we should not cooperate with people who have nothing to gain from the cooperation is not surprising. It is simply a recognition that they are unlikely to cooperate against their own interests. In order for us to trust people we *do* choose to cooperate with, on the other hand, there is no need for our interests to perfectly coincide with theirs. This may be nice, but Held is surely right that such occasions are rare and that we will want to cooperate even when our interests only partly coincide.²⁹ As long as there is some overlap, we can cooperate. In such cases, we can work together, keeping in mind the limitations of what we each want. Indeed, in such cases, it is in our interest to participate since we benefit from the cooperation and so do our partners. Knowing this, we cooperate and trust our partners to cooperate because it is to their advantage to do so as well.

Cooperation is valuable if it means we get assistance where we need it without harming ourselves. A correlate of this is that we can expect others to live up to their side of an agreement with us if they gain from it. This is, in fact, how the world seems to work. Thus, although Held is right that "joint ventures for mutual benefit between persons will not get started without trust," the fact is that such trust exists—if it did not we would not have the ventures we do—and it exists because we know we gain from it and know others do as well.³⁰ Similarly, although "it is by no means clear that social cooperation can be secured on the strength of autonomy rights alone absent some measure of agreement on the moral possibility of the practices at issue," there is such agreement.³¹ We must now ask if liberalism allows for trust between individuals and their governments. We have just seen that it does allow for trust between individuals.

In a liberal society, disagreement about various issues is allowed a public hearing and is not hidden from view where it might fester. Disagreement exists side by side with wide-spread agreement about at least some fundamental issues of justice such that all of us are allowed to maintain our own beliefs and to disagree with others and the state without fear of reprisal.³² This is why "[a]lthough a well-ordered society is divided and pluralistic ... public agreement on questions of political and social justice supports ties of civic friendship and secures the bonds of association."³³ In a liberal order, all individuals can trust their society to recognize that there will be disagreement and that this is acceptable. In contrast, a communitarian society requires submission to the authority of the tradition. Disapproval is not allowed a hearing. With this we do have experience. In all societies where disapproval was forbidden air, the reigning powers have eventually had to capitulate.

When ruling powers consistently allow individuals in a society to disagree with them and the tradition they represent, trust between the individuals and the powers can be improved. Because the rulers are willing to listen to the citizens, the citizens come to believe that their voice matters. They come to believe that the rulers are listening and that they want to do what the populous wants. The public discourse that is thus made possible provides a forum for trust to develop. Within this forum, moreover, a standard mode of political discourse evolves. Even more, within the public forum, all or most members of the public at large come to have an idea of what counts as an acceptable rationale. This is the point of what Rawls calls "public reason."³⁴ By enabling political disagreement it helps to create social trust. In a liberal order, "citizens share not only substantive principles but a public form of reasoning and a common rationale for the basis of their political order as well."³⁵ The public form of reasoning and common rationale allow the mode in which disagreement can take place. That such disagreement takes place gives the citizenry some reason to trust their leaders.

In addition to providing for a forum for the development of discourse and trust, "political liberalism generates trust from its simplicity."³⁶ The liberal order maintains simplicity by having individuals responsible for their own lives. This does away with a need for a complex hierarchy—and a defense thereof—that would be required, for example, by a communitarian state and makes it easier for individuals to understand the workings of the government. Such understanding promotes trust in the state since people tend to fear less what they understand and if the workings of the government are really understandable to citizens the state will not be able to hide improper activity from its citizens and will be understood as not hiding such activity. This is why liberals have consistently pressed for a transparency of the state and its machinations. What its citizens can easily see and understand they have little reason to distrust. Whenever a state proceeds to hide its workings, there is ground for mistrust.³⁷

None of this requires the complete absence of hierarchy in a liberal order. The complete absence of hierarchy does not require liberalism, but utopian communism. In a liberal order, some hierarchies would naturally develop. On this score, the difference between a liberal and a communitarian polity is in the value placed on the hierarchy. In a liberal order, the hierarchy can change as need be. In a communitarian order, the hierarchy is valued such that change is resisted not only by individuals with power, who of course would resist change even in a liberal order, but by everyone.³⁸

Conclusion

We saw above that liberalism does not cause the social pathology whereby we too easily sever our ties to others and that it does not cause us to be aggressive toward others. We also saw reason to believe communitarianism may be a contributing factor to the former. We have just seen, moreover, that liberalism allows for trust between individuals and even promotes trust between individuals and the state. Combining these, it should be

clear that liberalism—with its insistence on the normative import of individuals—is not detrimental to communities, but can actually foster strong communities.³⁹

NOTES

1. Jean Bethke Elshtain, "The Communitarian Individual" in Amitai, Etzioni, ed., *New Communitarian Thinking: Persons, Virtues, Institutions, and Communities*. (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1995 (99-109)), 104.
2. Charles Taylor, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers*, Volume 2 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.110.
3. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.508.
4. Alasdair MacIntyre in Giovanna Borradori, *The American Philosopher: Conversations with Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell MacIntyre, and Kuhn*, tr. Rosanna Crocitto, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p.143.
5. Michael J. Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Political Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), p.322.
6. George Kateb, "Individualism, Communitarianism, and Docility," *Social Research*, Volume 56 No. 4, Winter 1989, p.926.
7. Taylor, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, p. 283.
8. Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), p.55.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-3.
10. Ian Maitland, "The Communitarian Critique of the Market," presented at a meeting of the Connelly Ethics Seminar, Georgetown University, March 22, 1996. (Draft.)
11. Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The De-Moralization of Society* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995); Viviana Zelizer, *Pricing the Priceless Child* (New York: Basic Books, 1985); Robert E. Lane, *The Market Experience* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Alexis de Toqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. J.P. Mayer, tr. George Lawrence (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1969).
12. Toqueville, *Op. cit.*, p. 291.
13. Toqueville, *Op. cit.*, p. 589.
14. Himmelfarb, *Op. Cit.*, p. 53.
15. Zelizer, *Op. Cit.*, p. 11.
16. Lane, *Op. cit.*, 205-288, esp. 231, 235, 252, 258; but also see 555-6.
17. When I suggested this to Professor Maitland, he readily agreed.
18. See Jean Hampton, *Political Philosophy* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1997), p. 190.
19. Wilhelm von Humboldt, *The Limits of State Action* (ed. and trans. J.W. Burrow (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1993), p. 21. For empirical evidence of this, see David T. Beito "Mutual Aid For Social Welfare: The Case of American Fraternal Societies" *Critical Review*, Volume 4, No. 4, Fall 1990 and Leslie Siddeley "The Rise and Fall of Fraternal Insurance Organizations" *Humane Studies Review*, Volume 7 No. 2, Spring 1992.
20. Daniel Bell, *Communitarianism and Its Critics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 110.
21. Stephen Holmes, *The Anatomy of Antiliberalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 229.
22. Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 210.
23. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: Second Edition* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 193.
24. Virginia Held, *Rights and Goods* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), esp. 69-81. See also Charles Fried, *Right and Wrong* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), esp. p. 118 ff.
25. Held, *Ibid.*, p. 63.
26. Taylor, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, p. 309.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 305.
28. See for example Taylor 1991, op. cit., esp. 112-118 and Michael J. Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self"(*Political Theory*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Volume 12 No. 1, February 1984. (p. 81-96)).
29. Held, *Rights and Goods*, p. 67.

30. Ibid., p. 68.
31. Sandel, 1966, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
32. I am not claiming that all fundamental issues of justice enjoy this widespread agreement. This point is made in Charles Larmore, *Patterns of Moral Complexity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), see especially 70-77.
33. John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980", *Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 77 No. 9, September 1980, p. 540. See also Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory," *Ethics* Volume 104 No. 2, January 1994, esp. pp. 376-7.
34. John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). See also Onora O'Neill's "The Public Use of Reason" in *Constructions of Reason: Explorations in Kant's Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
35. Stephen Macedo, "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?," *Ethics* Volume 105 No. 3, April 1995, p. 493.
36. Ibid., p. 493.
37. See Jeremy Waldron, "Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism," *The Philosophical Quarterly* Volume 37 No. 147, April 1987, esp. pp. 134-5 and 146-50.
38. Will Kymlicka has given reason that transparency is not available to communitarians. See his *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 62-63.
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