The Emergence of a New Discipline in the Renaissance

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Abstract: The Formalist tradition in late-scholastic philosophy has gone unnoticed in standard historiography. This article’s overall objective is to add the Formalist tradition to what we know about Renaissance philosophy. I first show how the Formalist tradition was born out of some innovative considerations of hierarchies of distinctions in the wake of the Franciscan John Duns Scotus’s teaching on the formal distinction in the beginning of the fourteenth century (especially Francis of Meyronnes’s model of four distinctions and Petrus Thomae’s more elaborate doctrine of seven kinds of distinctions). I then trace how Formalist literature developed from being an exclusively Franciscan affair to becoming a much more widespread phenomenon. Thus, from the decades up to 1500 and onwards, authors from various late-scholastic schools (Thomism, Lullism, Averroism, and others) produced Formalist literature, i.e., treatises on multiple kinds of distinctions. I highlight particularly how one Franciscan philosopher of the sixteenth century, Jean Du Douet, proposed to view the Formalist preoccupation with distinctions as a discipline in its own right, a proper scientia formalitatum. I finally argue that while this proposal met with dismissive reactions, Du Douet’s idea does in fact reflect the role Formalism played in the scholastic curriculum in the late sixteenth century, at least in Franciscan milieus.

Keywords: Scotism; Renaissance philosophy; history of metaphysics; scholastic metaphysics; scholastic traditions; formal distinction.

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Introduction

The genre of the so-called Formalist treatises (Tractatus formalitatum, Formalitates etc.) flourished throughout the Renaissance. It originated in the early fourteenth century, when Franciscans under the influence of John Duns Scotus (1265/66–1308), himself a Franciscan, started writing short treatises or otherwise engaged in discussions about various kinds of distinctions, among them Scotus’s famous *formal distinction*, which then gave name to the genre. That the Scotists cultivated this genre is fairly well known. It is less known that they kept doing so until well into the seventeenth century, and that from the end of the fifteenth century other school traditions joined them. In addition to the Scotist treatises, we thus have a fairly large number of treatises on the theory of distinctions written by authors of Lullist, Thomist, Averroist, and still other backgrounds. Clearly, Wolfgang Hübener did not exaggerate when he, in a seminal article from 1987, called the Formalist tradition “die historisch am weitesten ausgreifende Diskursformation der neueren Metaphysikgeschichte.”¹ Antonino Poppi, in a likewise seminal publication from 1966, highlighted the long continuation of the Formalist tradition as reflected in sources from (primarily) the Scotist milieu at Padua.² In spite of these efforts, and those of a few others, the Formalist tradition has not received the scholarly attention a “discourse formation” of this dimension properly deserves, and in particular this is true of that part of the tradition which stretches beyond the scope of medieval studies, i.e., the Formalist tradition of the sixteenth century and later. One intriguing aspect of the development of

1 HÜBENER 1987, 329.
2 POPPI 1966. Other important publications include BOLLIGER 2003 (documents the Formalist influence on Huldrych Zwingli, with a long chapter devoted to the Formalist tradition up to the time of Zwingli), MARRONE 2006 (shows that the Formalist tradition is in the background of Descartes’s ontology), and ANDERSEN 2011 (traces the development of the Formalist doctrine of seven distinctions until the eighteenth century). I shall refer to further research literature in the course of this article.
this literature in the sixteenth century was that the question was raised, by
the Breton Franciscan Jean Du Douet (fl. 1570s–1580s), whether or not this lit-
erature in fact constitutes a discipline of its own, a scientia formalitatum. Du
Douet thinks that it does. Although his proposal was met with scepticism, it
bespeaks the fact that the vast literature on formalities and distinctions does
seem to have de facto assumed the character of a discipline of its own, with its
own textbooks and place in the scholastic curriculum.

The rise of a new discipline needs to be a part of what we know about
Renaissance philosophy. To advance this objective, I shall proceed in four
steps. I shall first provide an impression of what the Formalist literature, from
its beginnings in the fourteenth century, was about; in a second step, I shall
show how widespread it came to be during the Renaissance; thirdly, I shall
discuss in some detail Jean Du Douet’s innovative idea of a separate scientia
formalitatum; I shall then, fourthly, consider the criticism levelled against Du
Douet’s proposal by some later authors and contrast this criticism with some
evidence that the Formalist tradition indeed did constitute a discipline of its
own.

1. The Beginnings of the Formalist Tradition

Were it not for Duns Scotus’s assumption of a special “formal distinction,”
there would hardly have been such a thing as the Formalist tradition. It
would be wrong, though, to believe that the Formalist literature is only, or
even primarily, concerned with Scotus’s distinction. Therefore, without at
this time entering into any subtleties of Scotus’s thought on distinctions and
how it evolved over time, suffice it to recall that Scotus introduced the formal
distinction into metaphysics, psychology, and theology. It applies, e.g.,
between genus and species, the powers of the soul, and the divine perfec-
tions. At the risk of oversimplification, we may say that, according to Scotus,
the formal distinction is not one that is projected onto reality by an intellect,
i.e., it is not a rational distinction; but neither does it hold between real
things, i.e., it is not a real distinction either. It is rather to be situated between
these distinctions. It holds between real aspects, or formalities, of things.
These as such do not exist separately from one another, and yet are not form-
ally the same; an intellect can find a distinction in reality, even where there is
a real identity.\footnote{In lieu of many other publications on Scotus’s formal distinc-
tion, see the succinct treatment in \textsc{Noone} 2009, 129–134. For the development of Scotus’s thought on this distinc-
tion, see \textsc{Dumont} 2005. Scotus’s latest piece of writing on the subject has been edited un-
der the title \textit{Quaestio de formalitatibus}; see \textsc{Emery, Smith} 2014. Although this \textit{quaestio}
clearly sparked debate in the early fourteenth century, it did not yet (contrary to what
its title may lead some readers to expect) provide a model for later Formalist literature.}

But does the formal distinction genuinely constitute a middle between
the rational and the real distinction, or is it in fact reducible to one of them?
This question was debated among some of Scotus’s younger colleagues and
followers, resulting in realist and less-realist interpretations of the formal dis-
tinction.\footnote{For various early, partially contemporaneous, interpretations of the formal distinc-
tion, see \textsc{Dumont} 2005, 10–13, and \textsc{Noone} 2009, 134–148. Regarding the special case of Willi-
am of Alnwick, who reacted to Scotus’s late \textit{quaestio} on the formal distinction, see \textsc{Van
den Bercken} 2021.} Others chose a different approach, one that allowed for multiple
kinds of distinctions each with their field of application. For the Formalist tra-
dition, this step may be said to be even more important than Scotus’s original
discourse. The French Franciscan Francis of Meyronnes (1285–1328), one of
Duns Scotus’s immediate students at Paris, worked out a list of four kinds of
distinctions that may be applied on various levels of reality: \textit{distinctio essen-
tialis, distinctio realis, distinctio formalis, distinctio modalis}. According to
Meyronnes, there is a hierarchical order among these distinctions. The essen-

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tial distinction has the widest scope, since it holds between widely distinct items, such as God and creatures, which each possesses their own essence and existence. The real distinction rather holds between items that have one single essence in common but are otherwise distinct (this applies to the Trinity, where the Father and the Son participate in one and the same essence). The formal distinction holds between quiddities of things (such as man and donkey) that have one genus in common (living being). The modal distinction covers the narrowest scope, since it holds between a quiddity and its intrinsic modes.⁵

This idea of a hierarchy of distinctions was worked out in much greater detail by another early Scotist, the Galician Franciscan Petrus Thomae († 1340), who taught in the Franciscan Studium of Barcelona.⁶ Peter discussed distinctions in several works, including one long treatise (called De modis distinctionum) and a short one (with varying titles) dedicated to just this topic.⁷ The short treatise proved immensely influential and may be seen as the first Formalist treatise, albeit in competition with an excerpt from one of Meyronnes’s commentaries on the Sentences (the Ab oriente version, dist. 8), which circulated in manuscript under the title of a treatise on formalities.⁸ Peter’s short treatise is divided into a general presentation of various kinds of distinctions and a special consideration of how these distinctions apply to Aristotle’s ten

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⁵ FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS 1520, Conflatus, d. 8, q. 1, 43vb. For a more detailed treatment, see ANDERSEN 2011, 89–93. The examples given by Meyronnes at this place obscure the theological importance of the formal distinction in his thought. See MOHLE 2007, 74–113, with references to further literature.

⁶ For his life and works, see SMITH 2012. For his general doctrine of distinctions, see the classical study BRIDGES 1959.

⁷ This short treatise has come down to us in two different versions, both of which are available in modern editions (PETRUS THOMAE 2000 and 2011). Regarding the intricate problem of the relationship between the two versions, see ANDERSEN 2011, 47–81. Parts of the longer treatise were inserted into Peter’s Quodlibetal Questions (PETRUS THOMAE 1957, qq. 6 and 7); see ANDERSEN 2011, 43.

⁸ See HÜBENER 1987, 334.
categories. Peter presents no less than seven kinds of distinctions: *distinctio rationis, distinctio ex natura rei, distinctio formalis, distinctio realis, distinctio essentialis, distinctio se totis subjective, distinctio se totis objective*. He adds that these distinctions correspond with as many kinds of identities. He invests considerable effort into explaining the hierarchical order among the distinctions. To put it briefly, the order among distinctions is the reverse of that of identities, so that the strongest kind of identity corresponds with the weakest kind of distinction and vice versa. The intermediary levels are ordered accordingly. The “totally objective distinction” implies all the other kinds of distinction, whereas the “totally subjective distinction” implies all the others except the “totally objective” one.

Peter Thomae’s doctrine of distinctions contains an entire Scotist ontology. His “totally objective distinction” may be emphasised as particularly interesting. Peter, drawing on one key motif in Duns Scotus’s metaphysics, describes it as holding between items from which “one real univocal concept” cannot be abstracted. This real univocal concept corresponds with what Peter in other works calls “objective being.” There is a “totally objective distinction” between items that do not have objective being in common; and correspondingly, there is objective identity between such items that do have objective being in common, such as God and creatures. Peter only mentions “indi-
vidual and formal differences” as examples of items that lie outside of objective being and hence can be distinguished objectively from the items they qualify.\(^{13}\) This makes Peter’s objective distinction similar to the modal distinction proposed by Francis of Meyronnes (whose intrinsic modes exactly have the function of qualifying a quiddity). Peter, however, did not explicitly mention modes at this place, and so some writers in the Formalist tradition add the modal distinction to the list of Peter Thomae’s seven distinctions, or else subsume it under his *distinctio ex natura rei*.\(^{14}\) The later Formalist literature is basically occupied with spelling out the ontology implied by Francis of Meyronnes’s and Petrus Thomae’s lists of distinctions.

2. The Development and Reception of the Formalist Tradition

Though the early development of the Formalist tradition in the wake of Petrus Thomae and Francis of Meyronnes is murky, it seems safe to assume that a genuine tradition must have taken form during the course of the fourteenth century. Treatises on kinds of distinctions, often by unnamed authors, began to flourish.\(^{15}\) The material from the fifteenth century (and later) is abundant.

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14 For a discussion of this problematic, see *Andersen* 2011, 171–177. John Foxal (Anglicus) is an example of an author from the fifteenth century who adds Meyronnes’ modal distinction to Petrus Thomae’s septenary; see his *Tractatus de formalitatibus*: Ms. Angelica 563, 49r–81v: 49r, explicitly referencing both authors. The authorship of this treatise has been settled in *Smith*, *Croesdij* 2016, 337–338, 342.

15 I am grateful to Garrett R. Smith for sharing his inventory of this literature with me. As per February 2024, the inventory contains, besides treatises by known authors, no less than 18 different anonymous Formalist treatises, all preserved in manuscript (some of them in several manuscripts), from – as it seems – either the later fourteenth or the fifteenth century. The famous *Formalitates secundum doctrinam Francisci Maironis* (*Anonymous* 1490: 93ra–109vb in a volume with texts by Antonius Andreea and Francis of Meyronnes; two later prints in 1517 and 1520) is not included; it may be safely as-
The following survey is bound to be incomplete; the examples given, though, do convey an accurate impression of how the Formalist tradition developed. Giuliano Zardino di Lodi, Nicolai Lakmann, and Heinrich of Werl produced treatises on distinctions that have been edited in the twentieth century. They interestingly represent different positions within the Formalist tradition: Giuliano discusses Petrus Thomae’s seven distinctions plus the modal one (explicitly referencing both Petrus Thomae and Francis of Meyronnes), Lakmann may be seen as a “Mayronist” (discussing Meyronnes’s four distinctions plus the rational distinction while displaying particular interest in the modal distinction), and Heinrich rather experiments with his own alternative nomenclature and arrangement of the distinctions (distinctio rationis subiective, distinctio rationis obiective, distinctio ex natura rei modalis, distinctio ex natura rei formalis, distinctio modalis realis, distinctio modalis non realis). There are also examples of Formalist treatises that simply stick with Petrus Thomae’s septenary of distinctions. This is the case with the Formalist treatise (extant in just one manuscript dated 1440) composed by Franciscus de

16 Hübener 1987, 331, estimates that no less than 90 different editions of Formalist literature were printed from 1475 until the end of the seventeenth century. The high number is owed to the fact that many treatises had several printed editions. Hübener did not publish his list of printed editions. I am grateful to Stephan Meier-Oeser for granting me access to Hübener’s (1934–2007) unpublished catalogue (“Formalitates (Drucke, chronologisch)”), produced presumably around the time when he worked on his 1987 article. The four-pages list comprises 78 chronologically ordered entries in typescript and some handwritten additions (thus at least approximating the number 90). The following sketch of the development of the Formalist tradition is based on my own work-in-progress catalogue of printed Formalist literature.

18 Lakmann 1961. For a discussion of his approach to distinctions, see Bolliger 2003, 305–310.
19 Henricus de Werla 1954, 413. For a discussion of his approach to distinctions, see Bolliger 2003, 304–305.
Pertusa, a Franciscan from Valencia. This is also the case with the *Tractatus distinctionum* written by one of the Vienna university’s first professors, Johannes Meyger, in the early days of the university, i.e., in the 1380s; remarkably, this text was picked up and printed one hundred years later (in 1482), a fact that bespeaks the great importance of this literature in the Renaissance.

To judge from their many printed editions, Nicolas d’Orbelles’s Scotist commentaries on Aristotle were influential; he did not write a separate Formalist treatise, but instead incorporated a long discussion of Petrus Thomae’s seven distinctions into his work on Aristotelian natural philosophy.

D’Orbelles was, at least for some time, active in Paris, and his discussion of distinctions may form some of the background for other important Parisian writings on distinctions. In particular, two treatises were produced at Paris that came to be enormously influential, one of which, the *Formalitates moderniores* by Antoine Sirect (Padua and Bologna 1484), largely affirms the doctrine of the seven distinctions, but notably rejects the idea that all the distinctions can be inferred from (or are inclosed in) one distinction, thus implicitly discarding the very systematicity of Petrus Thomae’s original doctrine.

Another remarkable feature of Sirect’s treatise is that he does not only focus on the seven distinctions, but also includes a long introductory explanation of key metaphysical concepts, structured as a presentation of the divisions of being (*divisiones entis*). Sirect finally presents no less than twelve arguments for

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20 *Formalitates*: Ms. Tortosa 153, 3v–9r.
21 MEYGER 1482. On Meyger and his treatise, see SHANK 1988, 38, 56, 116, and the more detailed study in MACHADO FORTHCOMING.
22 NICOLAUS DE ORBELLIS 1485, *In Phys.*, lib. I, 16ra–19vb. See ANDERSEN 2011, 217–223. D’Orbelles’s section on distinctions was also incorporated into a Formalist treatise, albeit along with foreign material, rendering incoherent the doctrine presented. This treatise has been edited from two manuscripts in SOUSEDÍK 2011; for a discussion of its authorship, see KNEBEL 2012, 127–128.
23 SIRECTUS 1484, art. 3, pars 2, 19r–v. For discussion of Sirect’s approach to the distinctions, see ANDERSEN FORTHCOMING.
24 SIRECTUS 1484, art. 1, 2v–6r, discusses the following eleven divisions of being: *ens reale* –
the formal distinction, more specifically for not reducing the formal to the real distinction.\textsuperscript{25} The other Parisian treatise from this period, Étienne Brulefer’s \textit{Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti} (Paris ca. 1480), goes in the opposite direction and seeks to reduce the number of distinctions (though does not reduce the formal to the real distinction either). Brulefer applies the principle of parsimony (known as Ockham’s razor) that “no plurality should be assumed without necessity” to the distinctions, concluding that since most of the distinctions may be reduced to other ones, there is no need to assume seven different kinds. Besides the purely rational distinction, there are only two kinds, namely a real and a formal distinction.\textsuperscript{26} A similar criticism had already been articulated by Jean Gerson in his \textit{Centilogium de conceptibus} (1424).\textsuperscript{27} Brulefer’s

\textit{ens rationis; ens quantum – ens non quantum; ens finitum – ens infinitum; ens absolutum – ens respectivum; substantia – accidens; res de ratus, ratum – res a reor, reris; ens transcendentem – ens transcendentissime sumptum; ens simpliciter – ens secundum quid; ens simplex – ens compositum; ens necessarium – ens contingens; ens independentis – ens dependens.} See \textsc{Andersen} 2016, 623–625. A similar structure, with an introductory section on the divisions of being and then a main section on the seven distinctions, is also found in \textsc{Zerbius} 1482 (11 divisions), \textsc{Anonymous} 1490 (just three divisions), \textsc{Petrus de Castrovolo} ca. 1496 (13 divisions). This last work is said to have been composed (“compilavit”) in 1468, but appears to have been printed much later; see the entry in ISTC, URL: \url{https://data.cerl.org/istc/ic00254500} (accessed 19 March 2024).

\textsc{Sirectus} 1484, 1r–2r (presentation of 12 arguments for reducing the formal to the real distinction) and 19v–20v (Sirect’s reply to the 12 arguments); the list of arguments is at least partially found already in the anonymous material of the previous tradition.

\textsc{Burlifer} ca. 1485–1490, 10v: “[C]um pluralitas non sit ponenda sine necessitate, et non apparet aliqua necessitas multiplicandi distinctiones quae sunt praecedentes intellectum nisi in distinctionem formalem et distinctionem realem sequitur quod non sunt necessario ponendae aliae distinctiones constrictae proprie et per se et aliae ab istis dua-bus.” For the dating of the print here quoted, see the entry in ISTC, URL: \url{https://data.cerl.org/istc/ib01220400} (accessed 19 March 2024). Brulefer later reworked his short treatise on the distinctions and additionally authored a much longer auto-commentary on the short treatise; see \textsc{Burlifer} 1501. For details, see \textsc{Andersen Forthcoming} (with references to further literature). \textsc{Petrus Fermosellus} 1555 closely follows Brulefer’s reductive approach; he, too, cites the principle of parsimony (\textit{ibid.}, 8r); he nevertheless also incorporates elements from Sirect, namely his discussion of the 12 arguments for the formal distinction (\textit{ibid.}, 8r–12v). Fermosellus thus combines Brulefer’s reductive approach with Sirect’s position on the formal distinction.

\textsc{Gerson} 1973, n. 93, 515. \textsc{Andersen} 2011, 179–181. \textsc{Bolliger} 2003, 329 and 338–352 strongly emphasises Gerson’s influence on Brulefer.
aim was to return to the slimmer economy of distinctions found in Duns Scotus’s own works. Many critics of the seven distinctions followed this approach. Sirect’s treatise, however, also was quite successful. It soon became the object of a special commentary literature; its author came to be known as the Master of Formalities (*Magister formalitatum*). Both Brulefer and Sirect referred to the earlier tradition using the anonymous label *formalistae* (or *formalizantes*). In the subsequent tradition, these two authors were seen as the leading authorities on the subject. By contrast, Petrus Thomae was almost completely forgotten and Meyronnes mostly remembered just for his modal distinction. Until the beginning of the seventeenth century, Sirect’s and Brulefer’s works were often reprinted, and often together in one volume with additional material by other authors.

At Padua and Bologna, there was a keen interest in this kind of literature. Thanks to Antonino Poppi’s study mentioned in the introduction to this article, the development at Padua is fairly well known. There, the Franciscan master Antonio Trombetta wrote a commentary on Sirect’s treatise, while his confrere Maurice of Port wrote a short summary of the doctrine of the seven distinctions that was often included in printed volumes with other Formalist treatises. At Bologna, the eclectic metaphysician Gabriele Zerbi had already, before the publication of Sirect’s treatise, published a *Quaestio de pluralitate distinctionum* as an appendix to his *Quaestiones metaphysicae* (Bologna 1482). In the 1490s, the reader of logic at the university, Oliviero Jonto, wrote a substantial and critical *Libellus de distinctionum pluralitate* (Bologna 1494), while

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28 For their influence on the later tradition, see below; for further details, see Andersen Forthcoming.
29 Both of these writings are contained (along with Sirectus’s treatise and the shorter of Brulefer’s treatises) in Trombetta 1502, being a typical example of a collective volume containing Formalist literature. Trombetta’s own treatise was first printed in Venice 1493.
his own former teacher Stephanus de Flandria discussed the seven distinctions plus the modal one in his handbook of logic (Bologna 1495).\textsuperscript{31} It had indeed become quite normal to discuss the seven distinctions not only in treatises devoted to this special topic, but also in works treating of other matters, such as logic, physics, and theology.\textsuperscript{32} At Bologna, we also see another development: While Stephanus de Flandria was a member of the Servite Order, neither Zerbi nor Jonto were members of any religious Order. In other words, it now becomes normal for authors not affiliated with the Franciscans to discuss the seven distinctions and even write treatises about them. While there are cases of this phenomenon also in the earlier material (e.g., the above mentioned Meyger), the development in Bologna seems to testify to a new tendency. Alessandro Achillini, a well-known Bolognese eclectic Aristotelian, with Averroist leanings, had his treatise \textit{De distinctionibus} printed in 1510.\textsuperscript{33} Agostino da Treviso (Tarvisinus) from the Order of the Augustinians and an admirer of Giles of Rome (of the same Order) was also active in Bologna; he had his \textit{Tractatus de formalibus et modalibus distinctionibus} printed in 1524.\textsuperscript{34} His confrere from Padua Giovanni Benedetto Moncetti, likewise an admirer of Giles of Rome, had already had his \textit{Quaestio aurea de distinctione rationis}, a Formalist treatise with special focus on the rational distinction, printed in 1509 (probably at Venice).\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{31} JONTUS 1491; STEPHANUS DE FLANDRIA 1495, 30ra–b.
\textsuperscript{32} For other examples, see ANDERSEN 2011, 207–215 and 383 (Guillaume Vaurouillon), 223–225 (Agostino da Ferrara), 227–237 and 384–385 (Pierre Tartaret), and 241 (various authors).
\textsuperscript{33} ACHILLINI 1510. See MATSEN 1974, 32.
\textsuperscript{34} TARVISINUS 1524. His Aegidian approach to the distinctions was still being discussed in the seventeenth century (by Bartolomeo Amico, Bartolomeo Mastri, and some Scotists influenced by Mastri); see ANDERSEN 2016, 687–688.
\textsuperscript{35} MONCETTUS 1509. The full title of the treatise reveals that the author is particularly interested in the real foundation of the rational distinction – and that his text contains a critical comparison between Duns Scotus and Giles of Rome: \textit{Quaestio aurea de distinctione rationis quid sit, et an semper supponat aliquid distinctum ex natura rei, non ut sensit Scotus, immo ex hoc videbitur Scotum non bene posuisse, sed solum ut descripsit D. Egidius Romanus.}
A number of Thomists, all of them Dominicans, followed suit. The Bolognese Thomist Bartolomeo Manzoli had his *Formalitates secundum viam Sancti Thome* printed in 1518, and the more well-known Thomist Chrysocestomo Javelli, likewise active in Bologna, discussed the seven distinctions in one section of his *Quaestiones* on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* that he completed in 1532. The phenomenon of Thomists engaging with the Formalist tradition was not restricted to Bologna. Two prominent examples deserve to be mentioned: Andreas Karlstadt (in his youth a Dominican) had his *Distinctiones Thomistarum* printed at Wittenberg in 1508, and a similar work by the Neapolitan Thomist Mattia Gibboni from Aquara (Aquarius) was posthumously printed at Naples in 1605. Notably, these Thomists did not primarily write their treatises in order to refute Scotus or the doctrine of seven distinctions so popular among the Scotists, but rather used the Scotist discussions as a template for developing lists of distinctions that they thought were more adequate for the understanding of Aquinas. This kind of Thomist interest in distinction theory has gone unnoticed in historiography, and may hence come as a surprise. However, it may be even more surprising to some historians of philosophy that authors affiliated with the Lullist tradition too wrote treatises on distinctions and / or discussed the seven distinctions plus additional distinctions in their works on Lullist philosophy. The most prominent example is Pere Daguí (Degui), who was the first professor in the Lullist *studium* on Mallorca and author of two treatises on distinctions (available in modern edi-

See also the disposition of the text, 2r: “In ista quaestione videbimus primo quid sit distinctio rationis, et an semper supponat aliqua esse distincta ex natura rei. Secundo videbimus qualiter Scotus cum suis imitatoribus non bene et complete posuerunt talem distinctionem ex natura rei, et ut sic tota destruetur positio sua de attributis divinis. Tertio adducemus dubia contra positionem nostram et solutiones ad illa.” I warmly thank Alberto Casadei for turning my attention to this treatise.

36 Karlstadt 1508; Manzolus 1518; Javellus 1568, *Super duodecim Metaphysices*, lib. XII, q. 19, 892a–b; Aquarius 1605. See Andersen 2023, 160–164, with discussion of the Thomist works mentioned here.
tions), as well as a long section on distinctions in his work on metaphysics.\footnote{37} His student Jaume Janer (Ianuarius), a Cistercian who himself became the leader of a Lullist school in Valencia, composed one brief treatise on distinctions and, like his teacher, included long sections on this subject in his two works on metaphysics.\footnote{38} We find the same phenomenon in other Lullist works of the period.\footnote{39} Another highly interesting example of the reception of Formalist literature in the Crown of Aragon in the late fifteenth century is the Jewish philosopher Eli Habilo, who not only translated Scotist literature into Hebrew, but also, in the introduction to one of these translations, gave his own account of Petrus Thomae’s seven distinctions.\footnote{40}

Some seventeenth-century Italian Jesuits also contributed to Formalist literature. Bartolomeo Amico’s \textit{Tractatio de variis formalitatum et distinctionum generibus dilucida et exacta} (Naples 1638) and Giovanni Riccioli’s \textit{De distinctionibus entium in Deo et in creaturis tractatus philosophicus ac theologicus} (Bologna 1669) are examples.\footnote{41} While Amico offered a splendid historical over-

\footnote{37}De Gui 1489 (\textit{Opus divinum}) and 2018 (containing his \textit{Tractatus formalitatum brevis} and his \textit{Tractatus de differentia}). For a discussion of Dagui’s relationship to the Formalist tradition, see \textsc{Andersen, Ramis Barceló} 2018, 37–65.

\footnote{38}Ianuarius 1492 (\textit{Ingressus facilis}) and 1506 (\textit{Ars metaphisicalis}). \textsc{Andersen} 2022, 235–239 contains Janer’s \textit{Tractatulus de distinctionibus omnium rerum} from 1491. For more detailed references and a discussion of Janer’s relationship to the Formalist tradition, see \textsc{Andersen, Ramis Barceló} 2022, 186–194.

\footnote{39}See \textsc{Andersen, Ramis Barceló} 2022, 194–201 (discusses Bernard de Lavinheta, Valerio Valier, Francesc Marçal and others). For Bernard de Lavinheta, see in particular \textsc{Andersen, Ramis Barceló} 2018, 55–57 and 201–205.

\footnote{40}Eli Habilo’s remarkable interest in Formalism has received due attention. See \textsc{Zonta} 2006, 165–208 (see especially the English paraphrase of his discussion of distinctions at 178–199), \textsc{Andersen} 2011, 241–253, \textsc{Baum} 2020, 544–554 (Baum furthermore hypothesizes that interest in Scoto-Lullism might have entered into Jewish circles toward the end of the fifteenth century; see \textit{ibid.}, 554–557).

\footnote{41}Amicus 1638; Ricciolus 1669. For Amico’s treatise, see \textsc{Andersen} 2011, 241, and \textsc{Andersen} 2016, 409–411, 686, 688, 695, 711, 749. Riccioli’s connection with the Formalist tradition is less obvious; in his unpaginated introductory section called “\textit{Auctores de distinctionibus consulti},” he does, though, supply an impressive list of Formalist authors as well as contemporaneous Scotists; he likewise refers to a long list of Jesuit treatments of distinctions.
view of the discussion from Sirec until his own time, Riccioli, who is better known for his achievements in astronomy, instead gave a more systematic treatment of the subject of distinctions. It should be noted, however, that these two authors are exceptions from the rule that the genre of Formalist literature was generally not cultivated by Jesuits; their works on metaphysics, though, usually contained sections on various kinds of distinctions. The same goes for the Schulmetaphysik produced in Early Modern Protestant and Reformed milieus. Among the Franciscans themselves, Formalist treatises continued to be produced and printed at least until the 1660s. The Capuchins too produced Formalist literature, both in the sixteenth and in the

42 For a consideration of the locus of discussions of distinctions (usually after the treatment of unity as a passio entis) in the Jesuit Cursus literature, see Andersen 2016, 678 (considers Francisco Suárez, Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, Rodrigo Arriaga, and Francisco Oviedo; only the latter inserts his discussion of distinctions after his treatment of all the transcendentals).

43 See Bartholin 1629, 206–215. Caspar Bartholin is an important example, because his manual of metaphysics was the most often printed textbook of this discipline in Protestant Europe (according to Leinsle 1985, 288). Following upon his treatment of sameness and difference, he presents multiple kinds of distinctions: distinctio rationis ratiocinantis, distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, distinctio realis, distinctio formalis, distinctio essentialis, distinctio causalis, distinctio subiectiva, distinctio accidentalis, distinctio modalis simplex, distinctio modalis comparata. Though these distinctions derive from various sources, the Formalist tradition still seems to lie in the distant background of this preoccupation with kinds of distinctions. Bartholin’s textbook first appeared in 1608; later editions have a fuller, albeit not very extensive, account of distinctions. In the Reformed camp, Alsted 1610, 27–31, and Alsted 1613, 232–247, covers all of the Formalist distinctions and some additional distinctions. Bolli ger 2003, 424–459, discusses Formalist influences on Huldrych Zwingli’s theology. Further examples from Protestant and Reformed milieus are discussed in Müller forthcoming.

44 See Faber Faventinus 1602; Arretinus 1606; Picellius 1655; Bordonus 1662. More on the first two of these treatises below. Note that I am not here considering the extensive dissertation literature from the period, i.e., the kind of literature in which a praeses typically presented his view on a given topic which his students then, as their final exam, had to explain in public. In this literature too, distinctions were up for discussion. For just one example, see Catrin (praeses) 1698. However, if this example is representative, one will, in this kind of literature, rather find discussions of the formal distinction vis-à-vis contemporary criticism than a direct engagement with the old Formalist tradition. Interestingly, Catrin (praeses) 1698, passim, references the above mentioned Riccioli, among other Jesuits. The work also includes a critical discussion of the Jesuit doctrine of scientia media; see ibid., 83–111.
The general tendency, though, also among the Franciscans, was that matters formerly discussed in Formalist treatises gradually became adopted into their vast *Cursus philosophici*, the preferred genre of seventeenth-century scholastic philosophy. At least in some Scotist *Cursus* literature, in the sections pertaining to logic or metaphysics, we still find discussions of the seven distinctions well into the eighteenth century.

3. *Scientia formalitatum* as a Separate Discipline: Jean Du Douet’s Proposal

In all of the literature that I have mentioned, one finds detailed and subtle discussions of distinction, identity, and related metaphysical matters (intrinsic modes, kinds of predication, etc.). Surprisingly, what one rather seldom finds are reflexions on what this literature is about and what its purpose is. One might wonder whether scholastic Formalism is a part of metaphysics or

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45 See Pistoriensis 1570; Gesualdus de Bononiis 1652. Girolamo da Pistoia’s (Pistoriensis) treatise is written in the form of a dialogue, a format also employed in the Formalist tradition of the fifteenth century, namely by Robertus Anglicus; see Hübener 1987, 330.

46 This is the case with the influential Conventual Franciscans Bartolomeo Mastri and Bonaventura Belluto, who present and discuss the seven Formalist distinctions both in their disputations on logic published as a jointly authored work and in the disputations on metaphysics authored by Mastri alone. See the detailed discussion in Andersen 2016, 659–683 (referencing further seventeenth-century Scotist literature). Pich 2023, 269, argues that the long digression on distinctions in Alfonso Briceño’s *Controversiae*, a vast work on Scotist theology (Madrid 1639), constitutes something like an equivalent to a Formalist treatise. Briceño was born in Santiago de Chile and later, after a sojourn in Spain, taught in the Franciscan Convent of Lima, Peru. Roberto Hofmeister Pich confirmed to me that no Formalist literature properly speaking (separate Formalist treatises) is presently known to have been produced in Latin American scholasticism; however, with the rising interest in this branch of the history of scholastic thought, Formalist literature may be found there too.

47 As shown in Andersen 2011, 259–267 and 386–387 (documents Alipius Locherer’s discussion of the seven distinctions in his *Clypeus philosophico-scolasticus*, published in 1740). While the genre of Formalist treatises gradually came to an end with the adoption of Formalist discussions into the Scotist *Cursus* literature, a shift away from the traditional doctrine of distinctions toward a new tendency (from Jesuit scholasticism) to discuss distinctions under the heading of mental precisions took place. For this development, see Andersen 2016, 820–839.
of logic, or does it rather constitute a discipline of its own? The single most vocal author in favour of such a separate discipline was Jean Du Douet, an observant Franciscan from the Province of Touraine, Doctor Regens in the Faculty of Theology in Paris, and a Professor Ordinarius in the Grand Couvent of his order in the same city.

As the long title of his Formalist treatise suggests, Du Douet saw himself as an heir to an extensive tradition; his work draws on Scotus’s teaching, on Sirect’s Formalist treatise and Trombetta’s commentary on it, as well as Brulefer’s criticism of the formalistae: Formalitatum Doctoris Subtilis Scoti, Antonii Sirecti, Antonii Trombetae, et Stephani Bruleferi, eximiorum Theologorum, ordinis Minorum, Monotessera in philosophiae Aristotelis et Theologiae theoricae studiosorum gratiam adunata, ac in tres libros capitibus sectos ordine perfacili digesta.

Du Douet’s work thus bears testimony to the influence of Sirect and Brulefer on the Post-Medieval Formalist tradition. The work was printed twice, in 1579 at Paris and in 1587 at Venice. In the first edition, the work

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48I gather this information from the titulus of DOVETUS 1587a (“Vita Mauricii Hylareti”), unpaginated (c iii verso; Du Douet’s text actually dates from 1586): “F. Iannes Dv Dovet Armoricus Dinannicus, Ordinis D. Francisci, Almae Parisiensis Facultatis Theologiae Doctor Regens: & professor ordinarius, pio Lectori S.” Du Douet was a native from Dinan in the Bretagne. At the time of the publication of his Formalist treatise, he was a bachelor of theology; see the cover page of DOVETUS 1579. As already noted by SCHMUTZ 2008, 407, the biographic sketch in SERENT 1914 is insufficient; it must be complemented with information from Du Douet’s own writings (the two just mentioned). In recent literature, Du Douet has been treated in MARRONE 2006, 255–258 (key concepts of his ontology), SCHMUTZ 2008, 391, 401, 407, 424, 463 (his significance in the context of Parisian Scotism), and ANDERSEN 2016, 664–665 (his suggestion of a separate scientia formalitatum, also under investigation in this present article). SCHMUTZ, ibid., 407, gives the following estimate of Du Douet’s significance for the Scotist profile of the Grand Couvent of the Franciscans in Paris: “L’ouvrage de Du Douet peut être considéré comme le premier imprimé de la tradition moderne du couvent: mais au niveau du contenu, il est en fait le livre le plus en contact avec ‘l’ancienne’ tradition du scotisme parisien, à savoir le formalisme de la fin du XVe siècle.” This accurate observation is not affected by Schmutz’s mistaken identification of a work by François Leroy as simply a new edition of Du Douet’s treatise; see below. For a historical sketch of Franciscan education in Paris around the time of Du Douet, see ARMSTRONG 2004, especially 112–124.
comprises 286 octavo pages. It is structured in three books, *libelli*, the first of which introduces a series of both metaphysical and logico-epistemological key motifs from Formalist literature, the second discusses the divisions of being (as Sirect did), and the third presents Peter Thomae’s seven kinds of distinctions and their corresponding kinds of identities (note that Petrus Thomae is no longer mentioned as author of this doctrine). The first book clearly has an introductory function. It discusses the definitions and divisions of key concepts of this kind of literature (e.g., quiddity and intrinsic mode), the various kinds of predication employed in this literature, as well as the intellectual operations presupposed in all of philosophy. In chapters 3–5, all very brief, of this first book, Du Douet also discusses the very status of Formalism as a discipline, or indeed as a *scientia* in its own right. The entire third chapter, dealing with the “subject matter of the science of formalities” (*De subiecto scientiae formalitatum*) reads as follows:

> The subject of the science of formalities is being, taken as maximally transcendent (*ens transcendentissime sumptum*), as it is common to real being and rational being under the aspect of identity and distinction, since this science teaches how to distinguish real being from rational being. And this is not hindered by the common objection that a subject of any science must be incomple[49]x, from which it would appear to follow that being taken as maximally transcendent and under the aspect of identity and diversity is not the subject of any science. For such being, taken as maximally transcendent and under the aspect of identity and diversity, although it is indeed complex in regard to expression, is incomple[49]x in regard to meaning, because a single incomple[49]x concept corresponds to it in the mind. Nor does it need to bother anyone that a subject of a science is called transcendent, because this science is not only natural, but rather indeed metaphysical, since this [science] treats the divisions of being and hence is also physics, logic, and theology, and the subject of this theology is usually called God, and indeed [God] as transcending all the categories is not contained in their sphere. Perhaps you will say that something equivocal, indeed analogical, such as is being taken maximally transcendent, is not the subject of any science whatsoever, which I readily grant, if the science of formalities would only be about the transcendental or only limited things; however, since it is about such things that are included under the categories and about such things that tran-

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49 Dovetus 1579, praefatio, 1–2.
send them, namely beings of reason, which cannot exist without a collative act of some faculty, and about which being is said equivocally, it is not inappropriate that its subject is something equivocal.50

The central concept in this passage is that of “being, taken as maximally transcendent,” or *ens transcendentissime sumptum*, which of course we can also translate as “supertranscendent being” – it is being in the superlative mode of its transcendence.51 This supertranscendent being is common to both “real being” (*ens reale*) and “being of reason” (*ens rationis*). The science of formalities has this broad subject matter, because it teaches how to distinguish between

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50 DOVETUS 1579, lib. I, cap. 3, 17-18: “Subiectum scientiae formalitatum est ens transcendentissime sumptum, ut commune est ad ens reale & ens rationis sub ratione identitatis & distinctionis, cum doceat haec scientia, distinguere ens reale ab ente rationis. Nec obstat vulgaris obiectio, quod subiectum aliquius scientiae debet esse incomplexum, ex qua videtur sequi ens transcendentissime sumptum, & sub ratione identitatis & diversitatis, non esse subiectum scientiae aliquius. Nam tale ens transcendentissime sumptum, sub ratione identitatis & diversitatis, licet voce sit vere complexum, tamen sensu est incomplexum, quia ei respondet unicus conceptus incomplexus in mente. Neque aliquem movere debet, quod transcendens assignetur aliquius scientiae subiectum, cum haec scientia non tantum sit naturalis, utpote solummodo metaphysica, quod in ea tractat tur divisiones entis, cum etiam sit Physica, Logica, & Theologia, cuius theologiae subiectum Deus assignari solet, quamvis transcendens omnia praedicamenta in quorum ambitu non continetur. Dices forsitan, aequivocum, praesertim analogum, quale est ens transcendentissime sumptum, nullius scientiae esse subiectum, quod quidem tecum fat er, si scientia formalitatum esset solum de transcendentibus, aut solum de limitatis, sed quia est de his quae in cathegorii includuntur, & de his quae ipsas transcendentunt, imo de entibus rationis quae sine actu collativo aliquius potentiae esse non possunt, & de quibus ens aequivoce dicitur, non inconvenit eius subiectum aequivocum esse.” Instead of ‘Theologia’, the 1579 edition has ‘Tgeologa’ and the 1587 edition ‘Theologa’ (the latter edition is DOVETUS 1587b in the bibliography).

51 Notably, the presently first known use of the adjective ‘supertranscendens’ in order to describe the subject matter of a discipline is found in PETRUS DEGUI 2018, *Tractatus de differentia*, n. 4, 120. Dagüi, one of the Scoto-Lullists mentioned above, does not speak of supertranscendent *being*, but rather says that *differentia*, the subject matter of his treatise, is supertranscendent, because it intervenes between being and non-being, and also because it is said to obtain between formalities and between the interior aspects of formalities (by which he may mean the constituents of Lullist relations, such as, in the case of being, *entificatium*, *entificabile*, and *entificare*): “[S]ubiectum eius sit supertranscendens, quod non solum inter ens et non ens ingreditur, verum etiam inter formalitates ac etiam interiora cuisislibet formalitatis affirmatur.” There are no traces of such motifs in Du Douet’s consideration of *ens transcendentissime sumptum*, and so a direct influence from Dagüi may be excluded.
the spheres of real and mental being. Although ‘*ens transcendentissime sumptum*’ is a complex term, it has an incomplex meaning, and therefore can be the subject of a science. This science, however, does not only embrace real being and being of reason, but also, due to its treatment of the “divisions of being” (*divisiones entis*), transcendent being, i.e., God, and limited being, i.e., the created world. Supertranscendent being as such is understood as a concept spanning only real being and mental being, not (at least not immediately) divine and created being. Since it spans both real being and mental being, supertranscendent being is an equivocal concept, because mental being, which is entirely dependent on some intellectual activity, does not really qualify as being at all.\textsuperscript{52} For this very reason, the notion of supertranscendent being was indeed highly controversial among the Scotists.\textsuperscript{53} Du Douet however simply states that the science of formalities *de facto* treats both real and mental being and hence has an equivocal concept as subject matter. It does not disturb him that the equivocal character of this concept could be seen as an obstacle to his claim that supertranscendental being has an incomplex meaning in the mind; nor does it alarm him that he is setting aside the fundamental principle, enshrined in Duns Scotus’s own famous definition of univocity, that any scientific (syllogistic) reasoning must operate with univocal concepts.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{52} The equivocal character of *ens transcendentissime sumptum* is confirmed in Dovetus 1579, lib. II, cap. 4, 129, and lib. II, cap. 6, 131 (these chapters of the second book are devoted to the univocity of being and the division of maximally transcendent being into real being and being of reason). Du Douet’s immediate source for this view is Sirectus 1484, art. 1, 4v. See too Duns Scotus 2008, Reportatio I-A, d. 29, q. un., n. 9, 238: “[…] nihil sit commune univocum primae intentionis eiusdem rationis enti reali et enti rationis (quod destruct rationem entis, quia ens deminutum est […]).”

\textsuperscript{53} See Korusch 1996 (Scotus and the Scotist tradition), Mandrella 2009 (sixteenth- and seventeenth century Scotists and others), Cross 2023 (the early Scotist tradition).

\textsuperscript{54} Duns Scotus 1954, Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 26, 18: “Et ne fiat contentio de nomine univocationis, univocum conceptum dico, qui ita est unus quod eius unitas sufficit ad contradictionem, affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem; sufficit etiam pro medio syllogistico, ut extrema unita in medio sic uno sine fallacia aequipvationis concludan-
In the passage quoted above, Du Douet touches on the relationship between his science of formalities and other disciplines that seem to be incorporated within its sphere of consideration. The very title of the fourth chapter states the following: “The science of formalities is first of all metaphysics and about the subject of metaphysics” (Scientiam formalitatum prae- cipue esse metaphisicam & de subiecto metaphisicae). The text of the brief chapter explains the relationship between the science of formalities and metaphysics as follows:

Although it was said that the science of formalities is about transcendentals and limited things, real beings and [beings] of reason, one must yet know that it somehow belongs under a special [kind of] metaphysics, because it considers the divisions of being and in particular its distinctions and identities, which pertain to the contemplations of metaphysics. One must know, in regard to this metaphysics, what the subject is that in particular is considered therein. I therefore say that real being is the adequate subject of all of metaphysics, which in particular contemplates the abstract natures of things. Neither is the authority of Averroes the Commentator a hindrance, who says that God is the subject in metaphysics, because what he wants to teach is that God is the most perfect being, which is considered in metaphysics and there holds the first place according to the firstness of perfection. For since everything that is from God is finite, whereas He is infinite, it is inferred with manifest consequence that God is the most perfect of all beings, and when something draws nearer to this perfection the more perfect it is, and the more it draws back from it, it is held to be less perfect.

55 Note too that DOVETUS 1579, dedicatory letter (unpaginated, a ii v), emphasises that this science sheds light on both Christian theology and Aristotelian philosophy.

56 DOVETUS 1579, lib. I, cap. 4, 19–20: “Quanquam dictum sit scientiam formalitatum de transcendentibus esse & limitatis, entibus realibus & rationis, tamen scidendum est, ipsam quodam speciali iure metaphisicae attribui, quod divisiones entis, & eiusdem distinctiones & identitates maxime consideret, quae sunt metaphisicae contemplationis: scidendum est, quid sit ipsius metaphisicae subiectum, in eadem maxime consideratum. Dico ergo, quod ens reale est subjectum aequatru totius metaphisicae, quae rerum naturas abstractas maxime contemplatur. Nec obstat Commentatoris Averrois authoritas, qui dicit Deum in metaphisica esse subiectum, nam ipse vult docere, Deum esse ens perfectissimum, quod in metaphysica consideretur, & in ea primum prioritate perfectio- nis. Cum enim omnia a Deo sint finita, ipse vero sit infinitus, manifesto infertur consequio, Deum esse omnium entium perfectissimum, ad cuius perfectionem, quanto res...
The science of formalities clearly has a special relationship to metaphysics, indeed may be regarded a special kind of metaphysics. The science of formalities considers the divisions of being as well as “its distinctions and identities,” which no doubt refer to all those kinds of distinction and identity that apply to reality and are not mere products of intellectual activity. Metaphysics, however, too considers just this, and it does so in the “highest manner” (maxime). Its subject matter, or “adequate subject,” is real being, which includes the abstract natures of things. Du Douet only tackles one possible objection, namely that Averroes, the authoritative commentator on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, says that this science is in fact rather about God, i.e., not real being as such. Averroes, however, according to Du Douet, should be understood to mean that metaphysics considers God as the “most perfect being” (ens perfectissimum) or the “most perfect of all beings” (omnium entium perfectissimum), presumably leaving room for a metaphysical consideration of less perfect and finite beings.

This metaphysical aspect of the science of formalities, however, does not exhaust the potential of Du Douet’s science of formalities, which at the outset was characterised as being not only about real being, but rather super-transcendental being. Hence, he adds a chapter “On the subject matter of

57 A similar view is attributed to Averroes by, among many others, the contemporaneous Paduan Scotist MALAFOSSE 2009, n. 10, 455–456. For a discussion of Averroes’s actual, and more complex, view of the subject matter of metaphysics, see BERTOLOCCI 2007, 84–96.

58 Note that at least one Formalist author was, contrary to Du Douet, content with assuming the same subject matter both for metaphysics and for Formalism; see BRIXIENSIS 1537, 3r: “Quid autem sit subiectum. Licet varie sint opiniones circa hoc. Tamen probabiliter posset teneri quod ens inquantum ens. Et si dicatur, quod hoc non potest esse, quia in ista scientia sit mentio de entibus rationis, pari ratione dicam quod etiam propter hoc non erit subiectum meta[physicae], quia ibi Aristoteles facit mentionem de entibus secundarum intentionum, patet. […] Et quum hoc ibi non tollat quin sit subiectum, nec
Furthermore, since this science should absolutely belong within speculation, and speculation is the genuine operation of the intellect, one should note that the object of our intellect extends farther than that of metaphysics, and it is the same as that of the [science of] formalities, i.e., being according to its widest scope and taken supertranscendentally. For the intelligible is the adequate object of our intellect, just like the visible is the adequate object of sight.\(^\text{59}\)

Thus, contrary to metaphysics, the science of formalities falls within the scope of the human mind, which extends to all things intelligible, i.e., nothing that is intelligible falls outside of the scope of the intellect. It is, however, as we now learn, one thing to speak of the terminating object of the intellect, and another to speak of the object that moves the intellect (\textit{objectum terminativum} vs. \textit{motivum}):
can be apprehended one by one and separately from one another, although they cannot be cognized simultaneously and as united, except falsely so), such that they are included under the intelligible and may terminate an [act of an] intellect. The other object of the intellect is called moving, because it moves the intellect to its cognition, and this is the quiddity of a material thing, which indeed moves the intellect, not due to itself and per se, but accidentally (since our senses do not descend to the substance of a thing) due to the accidents that inhere in it, which affect the external senses, from which the intellect through mediation by the internal sense receives a cognition of extra-mental things. Indeed, it does not even cognize its very own [substance] without consideration of other things, from which it by way of comparison forms a notion of itself.60

This explanation of the terminating object of the intellect is at the same time a theory of how beings of reason and fictive beings may be objects of cognition. Such beings do not directly, but only indirectly, move the intellect. Fictive beings, such as chimera, may be reduced to their real parts (e.g., a goat and a lion) that indeed are objects of the external senses and may move the intellect after having been processed by the internal sense. Taken as such, fictive beings and beings of reason only terminate the intellect, which is to say that they constitute the end products of a cognitive process rather than are the factors driving the process. This notion of a terminating object is the one that is relevant for a comparison of the scope of human cognition with that of the

60 DOVETUS 1579, lib. I, cap. 5, 20–21: “At vero quoniam obiici poterit, quidditatem rei materialis, dici obiectum intellectus. Notandum est duplex esse obiectum intellectus, unum terminativum, cuiusmodi est intelligibile, cum nihil possit cognosci ab intellectu, nisi ipsum terminet. Et sub hoc intellectus obiecto (quod est intelligibile) comprehendo entia rationis (a fortiori realia) quae non movent intellectum, nisi in suo fundamento, & fictitia, quae in suis partibus movent (cum possint apprehendi partes Chimaerae, seorsim, & a se invicem separatae, quamvis non possint intelligi nisi falso simul unitae) sicque sub intelligibili comprehenduntur, & intellectum terminare possunt. Alterum nostrorum intellectus obiectum, dicitur motivum, quod ipsum moveat intellectum ad sui cognitionem, & illud est quidditas rei materialis: quae intellectum quidem movet, non ratione sui & per se, sed per accidens (cum sensus nostri non se profundent usque ad substantiam rei) ratione accidentium ipsi inherentium, quae sensus afficiunt externos, a quibus intellectus mediantibus sensibus internis accipit cognitionem rerum ad extra: imo suis suis cum se ipsa non cognoscat sine aliis consideratione, a quibus comparativi suis suis notitiam format.” The 1579 edition has ‘profundet’; I follow the 1587 edition’s correction to ‘profundent.’
science of formalities. Notably, in the quoted passage Du Douet takes only fictive beings as proper beings of reason. Second intentions are not included under this category. Elsewhere, he says that second intentions have being in (or are owing to) first intentions and exist as long as these are conceived.\textsuperscript{61} It seems that Du Douet would say that second intentions, while not moving the intellect themselves, are founded in first intentions, and these do move the intellect. Abstract items (or second intentions), such as genus and species, are properly speaking \textit{formalitates}.\textsuperscript{62}

In the above passage, Du Douet draws on the early Scotist Antonius Andreae’s definition of what a ‘formality’ is. According to Antonius, “A formality is an objective \textit{ratio} apprehended by the intellect in the nature of the thing; it must not always move the intellect, as long as it can terminate the act of the intellect.”\textsuperscript{63} In much Formalist literature, we find this definition reiterated without any mention of its origin.\textsuperscript{64} In this regard, Du Douet is not an exception. Although he does not mention Antonius Andreae, in fact the latter’s

\textsuperscript{61}DOVETUS 1579, lib. I, cap. 1, 8: “[... ] secundae intentiones, quae tandiub habent esse quando in primis intelliguntur.”

\textsuperscript{62}See DOVETUS 1579, lib. I, cap. 1, 5–6.

\textsuperscript{63}ANTONIUS ANDREAE 1477, lib. 4, q. 2, 37ra: “Formalitas est ratio obiectalis in re apprehensam ab intellectu ex natura rei, quam non oportet semper movere intellectum dummodo actum intellectus possit terminare.” Cf. POPPI 1966, 619; BOLLIGER 2003, 337; ANDERSEN 2016, 725–726 (considering too an alternative definition given by Francis of Meyronnes also circulating among the Formalists). The distinction between the moving and the terminating object of the intellect too played an important role in Nicolaus Bonetus’s doctrine of the subject matter of metaphysics; see MANDRELLA 2008, 185–187. It does not seem that Bonetus influenced Formalist discussions of the concept of ‘formality.’ Bonetus does, though, play an import part in the Formalist tradition; the third book of his compendium of metaphysics was printed as a separate Formalist treatise, albeit under the wrong name of Antonius Andreae; see BONETUS 1475 (ff. 52ra–59vb in a volume with Antonius Andreae’s \textit{De tribus principiis} and Thomas Aquinas’s \textit{De ente et essentia}).

BOLLIGER 2003, 282–283, refers to a further print of the third book from 1489 and a manuscript containing the third book under the title “Formalitates.” This may all be seen as evidence that Bonet was indeed read as a Formalist. See further DUBA FORTHCOMING.

\textsuperscript{64}See, e.g., NICOLAU DE ORBELLIS 1485, \textit{In Phys.}, lib. I, 17rb; IULIANUS DE LAUDE 1966, art. 1, 780; SIRECTUS 1484, art. 2, art. part. 2, 7v; BURLIFER 1501, commentary on his short treatise, pars 3, 31rb (criticises this definition).
definition is of central importance to him. His entire first chapter which precedes his chapters on the subject matter and status of a separate *scientia formalitatum* is devoted to the concept ‘formality’ (*De diffinitione formalitatis & multiplici acceptione nominis formalitatis*). The chapter is in fact nothing other than an original explication of Antonius Andreae’s definition. Du Douet opens the chapter with a statement that a formality is an objective *ratio* under which some *res* may be conceived; he later explains that such a formality must not “move the intellect” as long as it can “terminate” it; all things that are *per se* conceivable are formalities (care is taken to exclude the intrinsic modes from the category of *formalitas*, since they can only be conceived when joined to the things they modify, and thus not *per se*); a formality is called an ‘objective *ratio*’ because it, along with everything that is *per se* conceivable, is an object grasped by the acts of the reasoning faculty of the soul; the distinction between moving and terminating the intellect is added to the definition of ‘formality,’ because there are two kinds of objective *rationes*, one that is moving and another that is terminating.\(^{65}\) The latter distinction, of course, is the

\(^{65}\) DOVETUS 1579, lib. I, cap. 1, 3 (opening line of the chapter): “Formalitas est ratio obiectiva, sub qua una quaeque res, ex natura rei, concipi potest.” Ibid., 5: “Formalitas est ali- quid repertum in re, ex natura rei: quod non oportet semper intellectum movere, modo ipsum possit terminare.” Ibid., 6: “Formalitas ergo hoc modo sumpta, competit omnibus entibus conceptibilibus per se, & non eis quae sunt cum alio conceptibilibia: ut sunt prae- dicti modi qui coincidunt in eundem conceptum formalem rei, cuius sunt modi: ita quod sicut non habent realitatem & quidditatem, praeter realitatem & quidditatem rei quam inequuntur, sic etiam non habent aliam formalitatem.” Ibid., 7: “Sed ratio obiectiva est ipsum objectum, quod obicitur potentiae ratiocinativae, & attingitur per actum ipsius potentiae. Quia ergo formalitas est objectum intellectus, quod attingitur per actum ipsius, appellatur ratio obiectiva, sicut omne quod est per se conceptibile.” Ibid., 8: “Additur in descriptione formalitatis, quod non oportet formalitatem semper movere intellectum, modo ipsum terminet. Duae enim sunt obiecti rationes, una movendi, & altera terminandi actum ipsius potentiae.” This explication of Antonius Andreae’s influential definition of *formalitas* is an important aspect of the reception of Antonius’s thought in the sixteenth century and should be added to the broad picture of this reception as described by RAMIS BARCELÓ 2022. MARRONE 2006, 21–46, 76, 107–116, extensively quotes from Du Douet’s first chapter (partially along with parallel formulations in Trombetta), but does not seem to be aware his chapter is in fact an elaboration on Antonius’s classical definition; note, however, that Du Douet may not be aware of this
one Du Douet employs when discussing the object of the human intellect (in the last passage quoted above). To sum up, then, Du Douet’s science of formalities is about supertranscendentality, encompassing the scope of metaphysics in its subject matter, and corresponding to the adequate terminating object of the human intellect.

4. Dismissive Reactions to Du Douet’s Proposal Despite Formalities in the Curriculum

Intriguing as Du Douet’s conception of a separate scientia formalitatum is, it appears to have only met with rejection. French Observant Franciscan François Leroy († 1626) authored a work, published at Paris in 1603, very similar to that of Du Douet, who is mentioned, indeed praised for his erudition, in the title of the work:66 Formalitatum seu plurium scientiarum metaphysico coeuntium ordine scita commistio; tum ex Doctore subtili, tum ex Aristotele, aliisque clarissimis, & lectissimis Scoti sequacibus confecta, & reficta: atque methodo instructa, institutaque eleganti; primo quidem a summae eruditionis Doctore Hono. M.N. Ioanne du Douet Dinannico minore: tum rursum alio donata stylo, statu, studioque.

Leroy thus clearly sees himself in a line of continuity with Du Douet. Leroy’s work is most likely intended as a replacement of the latter’s Formalist treatise as a textbook on Formalities in French Franciscan education. Despite all similarities, Leroy’s work does display some features that set it apart from 

66 For basic information on Leroy, see SCHMUTZ 2008, 395, 449, 463, and (in particular) 467. Note, however, that Schmutz’s presentation of Leroy’s work as simply a new edition of Du Douet’s work is mistaken (ibid., 407, 463, 467). Schmutz’s brief summary of the content and structure of Du Douet’s work in point of fact concerns that of Leroy (ibid., 408). For Leroy’s reaction to Du Douet’s conception of a separate science of formalities, see also ANDERSEN 2016, 665.
that of Du Douet. The work comprises 365 numbered octavo folios (730 pages), and so is much longer than Du Douet’s work. Like the latter, Leroy’s work is divided into three books, but their content is distributed quite differently. The short first book explains a few basic concepts (‘formalitas’ and ‘quidditas’) and then discusses various epistemological matters. The long second book presents the core teachings of Scoto-Formalist metaphysics: the concept of being, the intrinsic modes, the transcendentals, and the divisions of being, notably subsuming the entire doctrine of the seven distinctions under the divisio entis of sameness and difference (idem – diversum). All Formalist issues pertaining to logic, e.g., various kinds of predication, are relegated to the short third book. With this new, presumably more pedagogical, arrangement of matters already discussed by Du Douet, the seven distinctions occupy a much less prominent place in the work (a subsection of a chapter rather than an entire book), which in turn makes the connection with classical Formalist literature less apparent. On the other hand, exactly with this manoeuvre, Leroy’s arrangement foreshadows a tendency in seventeenth-century Scotism, where the Formalist doctrine of distinctions is typically, if not always, treated under the division of being into sameness and difference, as seen, e.g., in Bartolomeo Mastri’s metaphysics as well as in Scotists under his influence. For a comparison of the content and structure of Du Douet’s and Leroy’s works, see Appendix 1 to this present article.

For our purposes, the most significant divergence from Du Douet, however, concerns Leroy’s view of the scientific status of Formalism. The shift is signalled in the very title of Leroy’s work, where we find talk of some “mixture” (commistio) of matters discussed in other sciences. In his prefatory first chapter, Leroy explicitly, and without doubt directed against Du Douet, ex-

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67 LEROY 1603, lib. I, cap. 2, 2r–5r, basically summarises Du Douet’s chapter on formalitas.
plains that Formalism – or whatever is treated in Formalist literature – does not constitute a separate scientia and, hence, does not even have a name of its own. This literature rather treats matters otherwise discussed in logic, physics, metaphysics, and theology. It would thus be in vain to try to make out one particular subject matter of Leroy’s book, as he himself states. The purpose of his book is not to discuss any one particular science, but rather to make Scotism accessible to students. Metaphysics, though, and here Leroy agrees with Du Douet (even borrowing his expressions), is of special relevance. Since Formalist literature in particular considers “the divisions, distinctions, and identities of being,” it may indeed be seen as a special kind of metaphysics. Somewhat surprisingly, Leroy has nothing to say about the most original part of Du Douet’s proposal, namely his tying the science of formalities to a consideration of supertranscendental being. Maximally transcendent being is not even touched upon in Leroy’s discussions of the object of the human intellect or of the univocity of the concept of being. One has the impression that he for some reason deliberately avoids this intricate topic, perhaps because Du Douet’s insistence that his science of formalities has an equivocal subject matter was regarded as overly strange, or else because Leroy thought the topic was too subtle for young students, his primary audience.

We find a by-and-large similar reaction to Du Douet’s proposal in the Italian Observant Franciscan Francesco Pitigiani d’Arezzo’s (Arretinus; ca. LEROY 1603, lib. I, cap. 1, 1v–2r: “[I]n nostris formalitatum qui in lucem emittuntur libellis, non distinctam aliquam, & peculiarem proponi scientiam, neque hunc libellum scientiae nomine appellandum esse, sed verius dici collectanea quaedam rerum Logicarum, Physicarum, Metaphys. & Theologicarum. Inferri inde potest non esse quaeendum determinatum aliquod huius operis subjectum, cum per varias, ut dictum est,currat scientias, ut faciliorem ad intellectum doctrinae Scotiae sternet viam. Speciali tamen iure hoc opus sibi vendicat Metaphysica, quia divisiones, distinctiones, & identitates entis praeceteris accurate discutit, quae omnia Metaphys. considerationis esse qui dubitet arbitror esse neminem.”
1553–1616) commentary on Sirect’s Formalist treatise. With its 339 numbered quarto folios (678 pages), Pitigiani’s commentary is, to my knowledge, the most comprehensive piece of Formalist literature that has come down to us from the entire Scotist tradition (Leroy’s book has more pages, but the format is in octavo). In contrast to both Du Douet and Leroy, Pitigiani was not only a prolific Scotist in both philosophy and theology, but also held high office in his order (Provincial Minister of Tuscany) and had important connections in local and ecclesiastic politics (the Grand Duke of Tuscany Ferdinand I and the Gonzaga family of Mantua are among his connections). The full title of this work, published in Venice in 1606, reads: *Expositio exactissima, atque absolutissima identitatum, et distinctionum (quas Formalitates vocant) M. Antonii Sirecti Doct. Paris. secundum doctrinam Doct. Subtilis Scoti, subtilium omnium Principis: in qua difficulitates quamplurimae, & controversiae, quae inter Scotistas versantur, facillime resolutissimeque explicantur.*

Pitigiani’s work closely follows the structure of Sirect’s treatise. Before he starts commenting on Sirect, though, he has an introductory section similar to the opening chapters of the treatises by Du Douet and Leroy. As they do, Pitigiani there provides his opinion about the scientific status of Formalism. He says the object of the science he is treating is “being in respect to identity and distinction or under the aspect of identity and diversity” (*ens in ordine ad identitatem et distinctionem, vel sub ratione identitatis et diversitatis*). This science is in fact just one part of metaphysics, and its object correspondingly is one part of the object of metaphysics, i.e., “being as being” (*ens quatenus ens*). To the objection that “being in respect to identity and distinction” is something complex

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70 Basic info on Pitigiani in *Sbaraglia* 1806, 279. Pitigiani’s biography is rather complex; in addition to being a Scotist philosopher and theologian, he was also an influential legist – and himself accused in a case of sexual abuse; for these aspects of his life, see *Lagioia* 2017, 88–95. For Pitigiani’s reaction to Du Douet’s conception of a separate science of formalities, see also *Andersen* 2016, 664–665.

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and therefore cannot be the object of any science, Pitigiani responds that it represents something incomple xen.\textsuperscript{71} This response is an indication that Pitigiani is familiar with Du Douet’s discussion of a separate \textit{scientia formalitatum} (recall that Du Douet said that the complex term ‘\textit{ens transcendentissimum sumptum}’ represented something incomple xen in the mind). Though he does not explicitly reject Du Douet’s proposal, it is clear from his adoption of Formalist matters into metaphysics (despite writing a long Formalist treatise rather than an exposition of metaphysics) that he is not in favour of Du Douet’s solution. Pitigiani’s introductory section includes a consideration of the concept ‘\textit{formalitas},’ but he does not link this concept with his view of the subject matter of Formalism.\textsuperscript{72} Only at a later place, in the course of his commentary, does he discuss the various elements of Antonius Andreae’s definition (notably, Antonius Andreae is referenced, but not as the author of the definition of \textit{formalitas}).\textsuperscript{73} Likewise, Pitigiani does not discuss supertranscendent being in his introductory section, but rather only later in his commentary and without linking this motif with the scientific status of Formalism.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Arretinus} 1606, prol., 1v: “Et si quaeratur quid sit huius scientiae obiectum, licet ab ali quibus ponatur hoc disiunctum idem, vel diversum, & ab aliis formalitas: Nos tamen huius scientiae obiectum ponimus ens in ordine ad identitatem, & distinctionem, vel sub ratione identitatis, & diversitatis. Nam cum haec quaecio sit Metaphysica, & idem sit totius, & partis obiectum: Metaphysicæ autem obiectum primum sit ens quatenus ens, erit etiam huius partis obiectum ipsummet ens sub ratione (ut diximus) identitatis, ac diversitatis, & licet idem, & diversum sit quoddam complexum, & ratio formalis obiecti debet esse incomplexa; hoc nihil est; quia per hoc complexum circumloquimur aliqaud incomplexum, sicut per corpus animatum circumloquimur aliqaud genus innominatum.” The one work from the Formalist tradition that resembles Pitigiani’s work the most is \textit{Vallonius} 1566 (first printed 1533). Giovanni Vallone’s work too is structured as a commentary on Direct (and includes passages from Direct’s treatise). Contrary to Pitigiani, Leroy, and Du Douet, Vallone does not have an introductory section for general considerations about Formalism. For some observations on Vallone’s work, see \textit{Perrone} 1985, 35–42.

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Arretinus} 1606, prol., 1v.

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Arretinus} 1606, 157v–159r. Antonius Andreae is referenced only for the view that privations and negations are formalities.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Arretinus} 1606, 86r–87v. One further author who explicitly addresses the question of the subject matter of Formalism is the Italian Conventual Franciscan Giovanni Battista
Although Du Douet’s proposal clearly was not successful and was rejected by authors even within his own tradition, his proposal may still be seen as de facto representing the teaching situation at the time, at least among the Franciscans. Marco Forlivesi, examining the educational policies among Conventual Franciscans in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, has shown that in the third year of their higher education, after having studied logic for two years and before studying natural philosophy and metaphysics, students attended classes on “universals” and “formalities” according to Duns Scotus. For this particular class, no specific textbooks are mentioned in the documents referenced by Forlivesi regarding education in Conventual schools. The collective work Gymnasium speculativum, a syllabus with teaching materials, repeatedly published at Paris by the Observant Franciscan Augustinus Gothutius in the first decade of the seventeenth century, fills this lacuna. The (to my knowledge) first edition of the syllabus (1604) contains the entire Tractatus de formalitatibus brevis, facilis, et necessarius in Scoti Formalitates by the Conventual Franciscan Filippo Fabri (1564–1630), Scotist metaphysician and theologian at Padua. The treatise was first published in 1602 as an appendix to Fabri’s Philosophia naturalis Ioannis Duns Scoti, ex quatuor libris Sententiarum et quodlibetis collecta and reprinted in this work’s later editions. Notably, Fabri himself explicitly announced his disinterest in

Chiodini; see Chiodinus 1617, 79. The work appears to have many similarities with those of Du Douet and Leroy. I have not yet been able to examine the work in any detail. I am grateful to Sylvain Roudaut for directing my attention to this work.

75 Forlivesi 2015, 260 and 311, referencing Filippo Gesualdi’s transitional regulations of education among the Conventuals (1594), the Viterbo general chapter’s decrees on this subject (1596), and the Constitutiones urbanae of 1628.

76 Faber Faventinus 1604. This edition has the appearance of a separately published work. It is however included in the list of contents on the title page of Gothutius 1604. Gothutius has enhanced Fabri’s treatise by including some additional material; see Faber Faventinus 1604, 67–81.

77 Faber Faventinus 1602. For the editions of this treatise, and the work it was attached to, see Andersen 2016, 870; see further the scattered remarks at ibid., 662, 667, 691. The editions of 1606, 1616, and 1622 have two new chapters added at the end of the treatise.
the issue of the subject matter of Formalism and the definition of ‘formality,’
calling these questions “of no avail” (qua omnia vanitates sunt). With this an-
nouncement and with the emphasis, in the title, of his treatise’s brevity, Fabri
not only distances himself from Du Douet’s very discussion of the subject
matter of Formalism, but also from the tendency toward ever more compre-
hensive treatments of Formalist matters. Fabri is cutting Formalism down to
size. Unsurprisingly, he subscribes to the reductionist approach advocated by
Brulefer more than a century earlier (though without mentioning Brulefer).79

For subsequent editions (1605 and 1607), Augustinus Gothutius re-
worked his syllabus. Fabri’s treatise was replaced by two classics of the Form-
alist tradition, Antoine Sirect’s and Étienne Brulefer’s treatises. They were
accompanied by Maurice of Port’s opuscule on distinctions, the Grammatica
speculativa (here still ascribed to Duns Scotus), and Cardinal Constanzo
Sarnano’s treatise De primis ac secundis intentionibus. These editions are, to my
knowledge, the latest prints of the Formalist treatises of Sirect, Brulefer, and
Maurice of Port. The list of contents of the volume corresponds with a study
programme organised into five classes.

The first class is devoted to logic, the second to natural philosophy, the
third to Formalism, the fourth to metaphysics, and the fifth to theology.80 For

78 As already noted by Poppi 1966, 711; see Faber Faquentinus 1602, Tractatus, cap. 1, 690a.
The treatise ends on a similar note, stressing the uselessness of many issues debated
among the Formalists; see ibid., 710b: “Multa alia dicta a diversis in illis formalitatibus
possunt revocari in dubium: sed quia sunt parvae utilitatis, & brevitas iuvat intelligen-
tiam hic finem impono.”
79 Faber Faquentinus 1602, Tractatus, cap. 9, 709a–710b.
80 Gothutius 1605 and Gothutius 1607, unpaginated front matter *40 (apart from the year
of printing indicated on the title page, the editions of 1605 and 1607 are identical, in
contrast to the 1604 edition). Teaching materials for the class on Formalism are found at
787–962. The volume, in these two editions, has a total of 1112 counted octavo pages.
the full list of contents of the volume, and the teaching materials allocated to each class, see Appendix 2 to this present article. The various editions of Gothutius’s syllabus witness that Formalism, at least among Franciscans in the first decade of the sixteenth century, constituted a discipline of its own, regardless of whether individual authors subscribed to the idea of a separate *scientia formalitatum*. Further material may be adduced to corroborate this impression. One last example I wish to mention is the small Formalist pamphlet *In Scoti formalitates absolutissima syntaxis* by the Conventual Franciscan Simon Thomazzetus (Rome 1591). With its extensive use of diagrams, this brief work of just 27 pages stands out from all other Formalist literature.\textsuperscript{81} The seven kinds of distinctions (and the modal distinction) and their corresponding kinds of identities, and related matters, are thus analysed in a series of diagrams. This pedagogical presentation of the Formalist core doctrine clearly testifies to the classroom relevance of Formalist literature toward the end of the sixteenth century. The main diagram, showing all of the Formalist distinctions and identities, is included as Appendix 3 to this present article.

**Conclusion**

I began this article by quoting Wolfgang Hübener’s statement regarding the highly branched diffusion of the Formalist tradition in the Early Modern period. In section 1, we saw how this tradition, in the early fourteenth century, was born out of Francis of Meyronnes’s and Petrus Thomae’s innovative reconsiderations of the multiplicity of kinds of distinctions in the wake of Duns

\textsuperscript{HÜBENER 1987, 331, mentions the 1607 edition. I am not aware of any further editions than the three editions to which I refer in this article.}

\textsuperscript{81 THOMAZZETUS 1591. In his dedicatory letter, the author emphasises the brevity and clarity of his work. The only authors named in this work are Duns Scotus, Aristotle, Averroes, and Thomas Aquinas; the latter two are said to hold the formal distinction; see *ibid.*, 21.}
Scotus’s teaching on the formal distinction. In section 2, we saw how this tradition indeed developed from being a Franciscan affair to becoming, from the decades up to 1500 and onwards, a much broader phenomenon, a subject common to several scholastic schools. Section 3 highlighted how one Scotist philosopher, Jean Du Douet, conceived of Formalism as a discipline in its own right, a proper *scientia formalitatum* with its own subject matter and place among the sciences. Section 4, alas, showed how little success this idea had (namely none), but also that Formalism *de facto*, at least in Franciscan milieus, constituted a discipline taught in special classes and hence certainly was one distinct discipline in the curriculum of scholastic disciplines.

Philosophically speaking, the Formalist tradition, with its subtle analyses of a multiplicity of kinds of distinctions and identities, was a seedbed of metaphysical innovation, and it was so over a long period of time. Historically speaking, it was indeed an important link – in the standard historiography of philosophy a *missing* link – between Late-Medieval and Post-Medieval scholastic metaphysics. If the link now has become less missing, then this article has fulfilled its purpose.

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Appendix 1

Comparison of the Contents of Jean Du Douet’s *Formalitatum monotessera* and François Leroy’s *Formalitatum commistio*

The number of chapters is identical in the Paris (1579) and Venice (1587) editions of Du Douet’s work. The work is divided into three books that are again subdivided into chapters with each their own heading. In neither of the two editions do we find a separate list of chapters (instead, both editions have an alphabetically ordered index of topics). Leroy’s work, printed only in one edition (Paris 1603), is structured in a similar way, with three books that are subdivided into chapters; in Leroy’s work, though, some chapters are further subdivided into sections, some of which carry a heading of their own, while others do not. This leaves on the reader a rather disorganised impression. Leroy’s work also lacks a separate list of contents. To facilitate a comparison of these two Parisian textbooks on formalities, the contents have here been collected into one synoptical table. Orthography and interpunctuation have only been slightly standardised.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Jean Du Douet</th>
<th>François Leroy</th>
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<tr>
<td><em>Formalitatum monotessera</em></td>
<td><em>Formalitatum commistio</em></td>
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<td>Praefatio</td>
<td>Liber primus formalitatum.</td>
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<td>Cap. 3. Qui differant quidditativum &amp; reale, &amp; quot modis suma-</td>
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Caput 2. Quiditatis descriptio & multiplicitas.

Caput 3. De subiecto scientiae formalitatum.

Caput 4. Scientiam formalitatum praecipue esse metaphysicam & de subiecto metaphysicae.

Caput 5. De subiecto nostri intellectus.

Caput 6. Intellectus duplex agens et patiens, & quomodo eorum debant intelligi descriptiones, & quot modis uterque dicatur, nec non cui conveniant.

Caput 7. Triplicem esse actum intellectus.

Caput 8. In divinis propositiones esse absolorum & relativorum praedicatorum quae sint absolu-tae, & respectivae, & quod habent acceptiones.

Caput 9. De modis dicendi per se, & de modis dicendi per accident.

Caput 10. De ente per accident nihil dicitur, nec de conceptu per accident, neque de ratione in se falsa, aut impossibili.

Caput 11. De divisionibus propositionum in sua membra, & de divisione eorumdem membrorum in partes suas minus communes.


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Caput 17. Modi prioris in genere & in speciali, de prioritatibus temporis, honoris & causae.

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Caput 26. Modus intrinsecus ab omni quiditate diversus.

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<tr>
<td>Caput 1. Ens est univocum.</td>
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<td>Caput 17. Res a Reor reris, &amp; a Ratus, rata, ratum, dicitur; &amp; ens per consequens cum synonima sint si accipiantur uniformiter.</td>
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<td>Caput 24. Angeli non sunt corporei, qui plures in eadem specie esse possunt; quaeque ab anima</td>
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<td>Cap. 13. Denuo &amp; quinto, ens reale in simplex &amp; compositum dissec-</td>
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specie differunt.

Caput 25. Quomodo Beatus Augustinus dixerit, Angelos esse corporeos.


Caput 27. Caeli a propria forma non ab intelligentis moventur.


Caput 29. Compositio sit ex his & cum his.

Caput 30. Ens necessarium, & contingens: Necessarium duplex, & contingens duplex.

Caput 31. Necessarium ex se & a se, & ex se, & ab alio apud Philosophos & Theologos.

Caput 32. Secunda intelligentia habet esse effective a Deo.

Caput 33. Filius divinus Theologis est necessarius quam Philosophis secundae intelligentiae.

Caput 34. Ens dependens & independens.

Caput 35. Omnia sunt ad aliquid denominative, & quae sint dependentia essentialis & accidentaria.

tur.

Capitis prima sectio.

Capitis sectio secunda.

Capitis tertia sectio.

Capitis sectio quarta. Multiplex formalitatum compositionis genus.

Capitis sectio quinta.

Capitis sectio sexta. Tertium & quartum componendi genus hic expeditur.

Capitis sectio septima. Compositio alia duplex cum his & ex his.

Capitis sectio octava. Quatuor elementarium qualitatum compositio, seu mixtio, atque ei opposita simplicitas.

Capitis sectio nona. Totum a partibus reipsa distinguetur.

Huius sectionis prima subsectio. In contrariam partem argumenta, quibus totum a suis partibus reipsa distinguunt fit probabile.

Huius sectionis secunda subsectio. Argumentorum explicatio, quibus suadebatur totum a suis partibus reipsa non differre.


Capitis prima sectio.

Capitis secunda sectio. In substantiam & accidens finitum ens dissputitur.
Capitis sectio prima.\textsuperscript{82}
Capitis secunda sectio.
Capitis tertia sectio. De naturis universis, & communibus.
Huius sectionis quarta.\textsuperscript{83}
Capitis sectio quarta. De accidente.
Cap. 15. Ens reale denique ac septimo in prius & posterius effunditur.
Capitis sectio prima.
Capitis sectio secunda. De prioritate naturae.
Huius sectionis subsectio.
Capitis sectio tertia. De prioritate originis.
Huius sectionis subsectio.
Capitis sectio quarta. De reliquis prioritatum generibus Generationis, Honoris, Perfectionis & Ordinis universe.
Capitis sectio prima. De causis omnibus.
Capitis secunda sectio.
Cap. 17. Ens reale nono & ultimo in contingens & necessarium distribuitur.
Capitis prima sectio.
Capitis sectio secunda. Necessarium ex se & a se, & ex se & ab alio

\textsuperscript{82}This and the following section are wrongly titled subsctions of chapter 14’s second section.
\textsuperscript{83}This heading stands for a subsection of the third section.
quid sit apud Theologos et Philosophos.

Libris tertiis formalitatum, qui de enuntiationibus instituitur praefatio.

Caput 1. De nomine.

Cap. 2. De verbo.

Cap. 3. De oratione & enuntiatione.

Cap. 4. De speciebus enuntiationis, quae ad substantiam, quantitatem & qualitatem quoad rem videtur attinere.

Cap. 5. De reliquis enuntiationum speciebus, quae ad modum substantiae attinere videntur ac primum de quidditativa, essentiali, substantiali, & identica.

Cap. quinti unica sectio. De substantiali & identica enuntiatione.

Cap. 6. De enuntiationibus ad modum qualitatis spectantibus Qualitativa, Formali, Denominativa & Modiuli incidenter.

Huius cap. sectio unica. De enuntiationibus modorum.

Cap. 7. De enuntiationibus, utrisque communibus Necessaria, Impossibili & Contingente, Signata & Exercita, atque Univoca & Aequivo.

Cap. 8. De quatuor per se, totidemque per accidentem dicendi modis.

Cap. 9. De ente per accidentes, nihil est quod dicatur, nihilque de con-

<p>| Libris tertiis formalitatum, qui de enuntiationibus instituitur praefatio. |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Cap. 3. De oratione &amp; enuntiatione. |
| Cap. 4. De speciebus enuntiationis, quae ad substantiam, quantitatem &amp; qualitatem quoad rem videtur attinere. |
| Cap. 5. De reliquis enuntiationum speciebus, quae ad modum substantiae attinere videntur ac primum de quidditativa, essentiali, substantiali, &amp; identica. |
| Cap. quinti unica sectio. De substantiali &amp; identica enuntiatione. |
| Cap. 6. De enuntiationibus ad modum qualitatis spectantibus Qualitativa, Formali, Denominativa &amp; Modiuli incidenter. |
| Huius cap. sectio unica. De enuntiationibus modorum. |
| Cap. 7. De enuntiationibus, utrisque communibus Necessaria, Impossibili &amp; Contingente, Signata &amp; Exercita, atque Univoca &amp; Aequivo. |
| Cap. 8. De quatuor per se, totidemque per accidentem dicendi modis. |
| Cap. 9. De ente per accidentes, nihil est quod dicatur, nihilque de con- |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caput 16.</th>
<th>Essentia divina est ex se singularissima.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caput 17.</td>
<td>Quomodo distinguantur concretum &amp; abstractum.</td>
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<td>Caput 18.</td>
<td>Rationis 5. investigandae distinctionis formalis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caput 20.</td>
<td>Identitas realis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caput 21.</td>
<td>Illa quae sunt in potentia obiectiva, nec sunt eadem realiter, nec distinguuntur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caput 22.</td>
<td>De distinctione reali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caput 23.</td>
<td>De identitate essentiali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caput 24.</td>
<td>De distinctione essentiali.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caput 25.</td>
<td>De identitate &amp; distinctione(^{84}) subjectiva.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caput 27.</td>
<td>De identitate &amp; distinctione obiectiva.</td>
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<td>Caput 29.</td>
<td>De illatione unius distinctionis ex alia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caput 30.</td>
<td>Solutiones quarundam objectionum, quae fieri solent contra identitatum &amp; distinctionum numerum assignatum.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{84}\) Both editions wrongly have ‘distinctionis.’
Appendix 2

List of Contents in Augustinus Gothutius (ed.), Gymnasium speculativum (identical in the editions 1605 and 1607)

The list of contents is organised according to a study programme of five classes. The copy of the 1605 edition here used is from, and has been digitised by, the Staats- und Stadtbibliothek, Augsburg. Shelf number Enc 1249. URL: https://www.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/view/bsb11246163?page=40 (accessed 15 March 2024).
Appendix 3

Diagram from Simon Thomazzetus’s *In Scoti formalitates absolutissima syntaxis*

Double page diagram giving an overview of all the kinds of distinctions and identities. The copy here used is from, and has been digitised by, the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich. Shelf number Ph.sp. 841. URL: [https://www_digitale-sammlungen.de/de/view/bsb00033089?page=14,15](https://www_digitale-sammlungen.de/de/view/bsb00033089?page=14,15) (accessed 15 March 2024).
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