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(eds.)*

COGNITIVE ISSUES IN THE LONG SCOTIST TRADITION

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Short Introduction to a Long Tradition – And to this Volume

Claus A. Andersen

1. The *Long Scotist Tradition*: Historiographical Observations

The Scotist tradition is transepochal in nature. It originates in the early fourteenth century, when the early followers and Franciscan confreres of John Duns Scotus (1265/66–1308) trotted in his proverbial footsteps, studying, interpreting, and in many cases significantly transforming his philosophical and theological doctrines – and it lasted well into the eighteenth century, when the traditional scholastic schools, including the Scotist one, declined and ultimately vanished from the scene. In some places, though, namely in such places where the Franciscan Order maintained its position in the local educational system, Scotist university training continued even subsequently. One example of this phenomenon is the University of Mallorca which had Scotist philosophical and theological chairs until as late as 1824.¹ In addition, the Neo-Scholastic movement of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries displayed a Scotist current independent of the dominant and much more well-known Thomist one. On top of this, of course, comes Duns Scotus’s influence on authors not affiliated with the Scotist tradition proper, but rather adhering to other traditions of thought, be they scholastic or not.

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¹ As documented in Ramis Barceló, “Las cátedras escotistas,” 317. Here and throughout this section, I draw on the historiographical discussion in Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 3–82. For the history of the shifting (though mostly negative) attitudes toward Scotus outside of the Scotist tradition, up until the time of Gilson, see Pomplun, “John Duns Scotus in the History of Medieval Philosophy.”

The Scotist tradition, however, not only stretches across the accustomed periodization of the history of philosophy, but indeed also challenges our established fields of research that by and large correspond with that periodization. Long intellectual traditions are, as such, bound to escape scholarly notice in an “age of departmentalized minds,” to borrow Arthur O. Lovejoy’s apt expression.² The continuation of scholastic culture far beyond the Renaissance, the Reformation, the spread of the printing press in Europe, the discovery of the New World etc., is an obvious case in point, and Scotism plays an integral role in that continuation. Scholars working with a focus on post-medieval scholastic thought are increasingly aware that their work is not reflected in the institutional division in university departments focusing either on medieval or early modern philosophy; it is an undeniable fact that the way the history of philosophy is taught and studied in most universities hardly yields any room for a perspective on the scholastic tradition that squares with its real historical – genuinely transepochal – development.³

In the predominant historiographical scheme that continues to enjoy institutional support, scholasticism is something exclusively medieval. From such a perspective, Parisian intellectual life in the second quarter of the fourteenth century may already be seen as representing “the trailing end of the Zenith of Philosophical Theology,” to quote one recent scholar whose merits in the exploration of the early Scotist tradition are beyond dispute.⁴ The majority of scholars working on the usual suspects of Early Modern Philosophy, be they the empiricists or the rationalists, will hardly protest; certain sections of Early Modern Philosophy are usually studied without much background knowledge of that period’s scholastic thought. But from the perspective of relevance for this present book, a view of the fourteenth century as in any way embodying the final spurt of scholasticism is just chimeric. For anyone familiar with Early Modern (or “Baroque”, or “Second”) scholastic culture and this culture’s vast literary output, it would seem far more plausible to place that zenith of philosophical theology here, somewhere in the (first half of the) seventeenth century.⁵ It would not even be partic-

2 Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, 22.

3 Cf. Forlivesi, “A Man, an Age, a Book,” 103; Knebel, *Suarezismus*, 253–55; Novotný, *En rationis from Suárez to Caramuel*, 14.

4 Duba, *The Forge of Doctrine*, 233, referencing a phrase in Schabel, “Reshaping the Genre,” 72–73 (“the first quarter of the fourteenth century was the zenith of scholasticism in terms of numbers of extant works”). In the same category belongs the statement in Courtenay, “Early Scotists at Paris,” 220, that Scotism is “one of the most important currents of scholastic thought in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries.” Given the manifest Scotist tradition of the seventeenth century and later, such a statement comes across as just odd, but of course does not lessen the merits of its author as regards fourteenth-century scholastic thought.

5 Cf. the discussion of nomenclature in Novotný, “In Defense of Baroque Scholasticism,” 212–18.

ularly controversial to claim that it is not the Scotists or any other scholastics of the fourteenth century who are at the long trailing end of the scholastic synthesis of philosophy and theology, but rather Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, and Leibniz, or even Kant.⁶ A younger contemporary of the latter, Wilhelm Ludwig Gottlob Freiherr von Eberstein (1762–1805), himself an old-guard critic of Kant, correctly saw Scotism as one of the essential ingredients of this late-scholastic tradition:

Do not believe [...] that they [i. e., the scholastics] went extinct after Gabriel Biel. Whoever thinks this should just take a look at the chairs of the Monks, where the disputes between the Thomists and the Scotists were continued for a long time by the Dominicans and the Franciscans, yes indeed, where many a classroom until this day resounds with scholastic quarreling. We may say that after his time they were not that common any more, but rather primarily dominated the convents.⁷

This brief report from Eberstein's two-volume *Versuch einer Geschichte der Logik und Metaphysik bey den Deutschen von Leibnitz bis auf gegenwärtige Zeit* (1794) is, of course, incomplete. How could he possibly overlook the dominant role of the Jesuit Order within Early Modern scholasticism?⁸ The passage from Eberstein may nevertheless be read as one reminder not to view the time of Gabriel Biel, one of the main sources for (even) later scholastic Nominalism, as the endpoint of scholastic culture. Despite the title of Heiko Augustinus Oberman's influential monograph on Biel, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology* from 1963, the fruits of scholasticism were not all harvested in Biel's time. To exploit Oberman's metaphor, scholarship on Late-Medieval thought may rather be seen as uncovering the seeds and growth of what were only to ripen in later times.

Or, one may prefer the imagery of waves: in Scotism proper, we have a strong first wave in the first half of the fourteenth century and a second, most likely larger one in the seventeenth century; in between these two main waves, Scotism had never quite disappeared, thriving as it did in Scotist hotspots such as various universities with chairs in theology, and in rare cases also meta-

⁶ Of these authors, Leibniz is the one who most openly displays interest in, and knowledge of, immediately preceding scholastic thought; cf. his instructive enumeration of scholastic novelties since the Council of Trent in *Essais de Théodicée*, Discours préliminaire, n. 6, 53. For a recent reading of Descartes and Spinoza from a scholastic perspective, see Schmaltz, *The Metaphysics of the Material World*; for Locke, see Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, and Specht, *Das Allgemeine bei Locke*; for Kant, see Honnfelder, *Scientia transcendens*, 443–63. Note that most of this literature takes Suárez as representative of Early Modern scholasticism and thereby ignores the long Scotist tradition proper.

⁷ Eberstein, *Versuch einer Geschichte der Logik und Metaphysik*, vol. I, 2 (my translation).

⁸ To be fair to Eberstein, note that other works of his, *Über die Beschaffenheit der Logik und Metaphysik der reinen Peripatetiker* (1800) and *Die natürliche Theologie der Scholastiker* (1803), do display some knowledge of the Jesuit tradition.

physics, *in via Scoti*, and in many local Franciscan educational institutions across Europe. The exact contours of the waves would be a matter of statistics (e.g., based on Scotistic literary output), and since such statistics are not available let us leave the issue here – although note that a corresponding graph representing the amount of modern scholarly attention would rather have a huge wave concerning the beginning of the fourteenth century and a disproportionately small one concerning the seventeenth century.

The first phase of the Scotist tradition, the one that falls within the scope of traditional medievalist scholarship, has of course attracted most attention, growing as it does out of natural interest for one of the greatest medieval thinkers and the immediate reception of his doctrines. Leaving aside the advanced scholarship on the Subtle Doctor,⁹ a wealth of recent editions and studies have thrown new light on the first generations of his followers, among them Antonius Andreae, William of Alnwick, Henry of Harclay, John of Reading, Francis of Meyronnes, Petrus Thomae, Francis of Marchia, Nicholas Bonetus, and others. This current state of research is reflected in a number of articles in this present volume.¹⁰ In spite of the notoriously incomplete state of all of his major works, and in spite of the equally notoriously demanding style of his thought, Scotus soon emerged as an intellectual authority within the Franciscan Order.

Already within one decade after Scotus's premature death in 1308, there appears to have been talk of "Scotists" (*Scotistae*).¹¹ Petrus Thomae mentioned a "Scotist school" (*schola Scotica*) in a work from around 1325 that has only recently been edited.¹² Petrus, who elsewhere claims to have access to Scotus's own manuscripts¹³ and who himself gave birth to a doctrine of seven kinds of distinctions (the formal distinction being just one of them) that became a household doctrine throughout the Scotist tradition,¹⁴ surprisingly distances himself from

9 The current state of research is reflected in the collective volume edited by Pini, *Interpreting Duns Scotus*; cf. further Hoffmann, *Duns Scotus Bibliography from 1950 to the Present* (10th edition of 2022).

10 Cf. the contributions by Pini, Fedeli, Park, Cross, and Fiorentino; cf. further the fairly recent survey studies Pini, "Scotus's Legacy" (introduces a row of early Scotists and explains how they dealt with Scotus's incomplete works and challenging doctrines), and Courtenay, "Early Scotists at Paris" (with focus on institutional, rather than doctrinal matters) – these two studies, with their different approaches to the earliest Scotist school, may be read as complementing one another. Cf. most recently Goris, *Scientia propter quid nobis*.

11 Cf. Courtenay, "Early Scotists at Paris," 183 and 217, referring to the Augustinian Dionysius de Borgo San Sepulchro, who was a Bachelor reader of the *Sentences* at Paris in 1317.

12 Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de ente*, q. 2, dist. 1, 13. For the date of this work, see Smith, "Introduction," CLXXI.

13 Petrus Thomae, *Quodlibet*, q. 3, 52–53.

14 Cf. Andersen, "Introduction," 177–267, with evidence that Petrus Thomae's doctrine was still discussed until as late as the 1740s.

the named school. Add to this the example of Antonius Andreae, who explicitly professed loyalty to Scotus, but nevertheless left his own mark on what would later become recognized as Scotist metaphysics by, among other things, significantly transforming his master's famous doctrine of the univocal concept of being into a doctrine of various degrees of univocity.¹⁵ These examples, out of many, nicely illustrate how uncoordinated the formation of the Scotist school was and how important Scotus's rather independent-minded followers eventually came to be within that school. One cannot grasp the history of Scotism without taking account of the doctrinal adjustments and innovations of the early Scotists.

Whereas the Scotist school of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, what one could call Renaissance Scotism, has – with notable exceptions – received undeservedly scarce attention in recent scholarship,¹⁶ the same does not hold true for the later tradition. Much of the attention Baroque Scotism has attracted centers on the *Cursus philosophicus* jointly authored by the Conventual Franciscans Bartolomeo Mastri and Bonaventura Belluto as well as their clash with the Irish Observant John Punch over the true meaning of a number of Scotus's doctrines. Other Baroque Scotists, such as (among many others) Filippo Fabri, Hugh McCaghwell, Francisco Macedo, Claude Frassen, and some of those Scotist authors who were active in the New World have received attention as well.

15 For this example, see Pini, "Scotus's Legacy," 510–15; Pini further mentions Antonius Andreae's explanation of the subject matter of metaphysics in accordance with Scotus's teaching in the *Ordinatio* that Scotus himself had not yet developed when writing his own *Quaestiones* on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; Antonius thus creates a Scotist manual of metaphysics in accordance with Scotus's mature thought. Antonius's approach to Scotus's teaching on univocity had a parallel in Franciscus de Marchia's similar transformation of the same doctrine. Both Antonius and Franciscus had a lasting influence on Scotist discussions of the concept of being, as documented in Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 362–70; cf. further Smith, "The Analogy of Being in the Scotist Tradition." For other aspects of Antonius's lasting influence, see Andersen, "Scotist Metaphysics in Mid-Sixteenth Century Padua," 72–74 and 87–88. For the current state of the art on Antonius Andreae, see the essays in Cabré Duran and Mensa i Valls, *Antoni Andreu y la filosofía escotista*.

16 Cf. the survey studies Hoenen, "*Formalitates phantasticae*" (historiographical essay on the broad reception of Scotism, primarily in the fifteenth century), Forlivesi, "*Quae in hac quaestione tradit Doctor [...]*" (with focus on metaphysical literature), and Zahnd, "Easy-Going Scholars" (with focus on theological literature); the case study Andersen and Ramis Barceló, "Jaume Janer OCist [...] and the Tradition of Scoto-Lullist Metaphysics," explores the understudied influence of Scotism on Renaissance Lullism in the Crown of Aragon. Cf. further the contributions in this present volume by Fiorentino and Zahnd. Critical editions of this period's Scotist output are rare; for one recent example, see Gomes de Lisboa, *Scriptum super Quaestiones Metaphysice Antonii Andree*, a meta-commentary on Antonius Andreae's commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

Again, the current state of research is reflected in several of the articles in this present volume.¹⁷

The testimony of the famous polymath Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz that “the school of Scotus is more numerous than all the others taken together” (*Scoti Schola numerosior sit omnibus aliis simul sumptis*)¹⁸ is often cited as evidence of an extraordinary florescence of Scotism in the seventeenth century. It is not entirely clear, however, whether Caramuel is speaking of the long Scotist tradition as a whole or rather only has in mind contemporaneous authors; note too that his testimony is not the result of an objective analysis, but rather serves as a premise in a probabilistic argument: since the Scotists outnumber the members of the two other “classic” schools, the Thomists and the Nominalists, any opinion that is supported by the Scotists must at least be considered probable. At any rate, the Scotist school of the seventeenth century was quite different from the one of which Petrus Thomae spoke.

In 1500, the General Chapter of the Franciscan Order at Terni had for the first time officially encouraged the Order’s theologians to follow Scotus when teaching Peter Lombard’s *Sentences* (though alternatively, and clearly as a second choice, they were allowed to follow Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Francis of Meyronnes, or Richard of Mediavilla). This decision was the beginning of a development that only peaked during the time of Caramuel, especially subsequent to the General Chapter at Toledo in 1633, when Franciscan educators were compelled to follow Scotus not only in their theological, but indeed also in their philosophical teaching.¹⁹ Lucas Wadding’s edition of Scotus’s *Opera omnia* from 1639 and the plan to produce a “modern” Scotist *Cursus philosophicus* after the model of those used in other religious orders, a text that would eventually replace Pierre Tartaret’s old Scotist textbooks composed in the 1490s and reprinted several times since then, were significant parts of this endeavor.²⁰

This institutionalization of Scotism, however, quite unintentionally did not do away with all diversity, and in this respect, at least, the late Scotist tradition

17 Cf. the contributions by Heider, Ginocchio, Tropia, Pich, Novák, and Andersen; cf. also the overview in Schmutz, “L’héritage des Subtils,” and the extensive discussion of older and recent literature in Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 45–64.

18 Cf. Bağ, “*Scoti schola numerosior est omnibus aliis simul sumptis*,” 159, extensively quoting Caramuel’s *Theologia intentionalis* from 1664. For other aspects of Caramuel’s view of, and indeed engagement with, the Scotists, see Schmutz, “Was Duns Scotus a Voluntarist?,” and Andersen and Ramis Barceló, “Jaume Janer OCist [...] and the Tradition of Scoto-Lullist Metaphysics.”

19 For this development, see Etzi, “Duns Scoto e lo scotismo nell’antica legislazione dell’Ordine dei Frati Minori,” and Forlivesi, “The *Ratio studiorum* of the Conventual Franciscans.” Cf. further Schmutz, “Les normes théologiques de l’enseignement philosophique,” especially 140–42 (with the salient documents in French translation).

20 Cf. Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 10–19.

resembles the situation in the early fourteenth century. The aforementioned clash between Mastri/Belluto and Punch is just one example illustrating this lack of doctrinal homogeneity. Notably, their disagreement to a considerable extent had to do with the degree of influence they accepted from Jesuit scholasticism. One cannot, of course, import methods of education and presentation from other traditions and then expect that all the doctrinal details remain just as they used to be. John Punch openly admitted that, since he had studied with the Jesuits, it was difficult to “unlearn” (*dediscere*) their principles.²¹ For their part, Mastri and Belluto clearly also learned a lot from the Jesuits – in their case especially from Francisco Suárez – but nevertheless managed to maintain a more critical distance from this predominant force in contemporaneous Catholic intellectual culture.²²

Things become additionally blurred if one considers that Jesuit scholasticism itself draws on the rich heritage from Late-Medieval scholastic philosophy and theology, including that of the Subtle Doctor. Scholarship on Early Modern Scotism accordingly distinguishes between an *internal* or *explicit* Scotism and an *external* or *implicit* one.²³ The former is the kind of Scotism that enjoyed support from the Franciscan Order and that may best be exemplified by Mastri and Belluto, whereas the latter speaks to the broader influence of Duns Scotus’s thought in milieus outside the Scotist tradition proper. This broader influence is not restricted to Catholic scholasticism, but rather extends to Protestant and Reformed milieus. It may be worth mentioning at this place that especially the Reformed tradition was rich in terminological innovations; thus, it did not only provide us with the term ‘ontology,’ but also – of special relevance for the present volume – with that of ‘psychology.’²⁴ Three articles in the present volume explore various aspects of the presence of Scotist philosophical psychology in the Reformed and Protestant intellectual traditions.²⁵

21 Cf. Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 881–82, with a quote from Punch as reported by Mastri and Belluto.

22 Cf. in this present volume the contributions by Heider and Andersen, both with references to further literature. Suárez’s relative affinity with Scotus and the Scotist tradition has often been stressed; cf., for instance, Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens*, 200–94, here especially 205, and Heider, *Universals in Second Scholasticism*, 11 and 312.

23 Cf. Honnefelder, “Zum Begriff der möglichen Welt,” 280, and Schmutz, “Le petit scotisme du Grand Siècle,” 429; critical discussion in Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 49–55.

24 Lamanna, “On the Early History of Psychology,” 301.

25 Cf. the contributions by Zahnd, Huiban, Gellera; cf. further the groundbreaking monograph Bolliger, *Infiniti Contemplatio*, on the reception of Scotism in Reformed theology (Zwingli), and Cross, *Communicatio Idiomatum*, with instructive examples of Scotus’s direct or indirect influence on Reformation authors in the realm of christology.

2. Cognitive Issues in the Scotist Tradition – And in this Volume

In his contribution to the *Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus* from 2003, Robert Pasnau, somewhat provokingly, downplayed the level of originality in the Subtle Doctor's thought, and not only in regard to his view of cognitive issues:

As in most matters, John Duns Scotus does not distinguish himself in cognitive theory by adopting a radically new perspective. [...] Scotus is interesting, then, not because he offers any startlingly new ideas about cognition, but because he gives a careful and penetrating analysis of the field as it stood at the end of the thirteenth century.²⁶

Only in the case of Scotus's criticism of Henry of Ghent's doctrine of illumination (with its assumption of direct divine intervention in the human cognitive process), does Pasnau readily admit that Scotus's approach "marks a turning point in the history of philosophy, the first great victory for naturalism as a research strategy in the philosophy of mind."²⁷ Peter King only slightly later retorted that Scotus's cognition theory is indeed quite original, in fact a "revolution [...] in the philosophy of mind."²⁸ The novelty in Scotus's approach lies, according to King, in his distinction between mental acts and mental content and in his attempt to grasp the ontological status of that content, the problematic consideration being that – as Scotus came to see after having experimented with the term "diminished being" (*ens diminutum*) – this content as such does not represent any kind of being and thus does not properly speaking possess any positive ontological status of its own.²⁹ Richard Cross, whose *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition* from 2014 may, despite some criticism, be regarded as expressing the present *status quaestionis* on Scotus's contribution to cognitive theory, by and large supports King's view of Scotus's idea of mental content,³⁰ but nevertheless ends his book on a note that much more resembles Pasnau's general view – Scotus, in cognition theory, is a transitional, by no means a revolutionary figure:

²⁶ Pasnau, "Cognition," 285.

²⁷ Pasnau, "Cognition," 303.

²⁸ King, "Duns Scotus on Mental Content," 88; King, *ibid.*, 66, refers to Pasnau's article. Other recent reassessments of the originality of Scotus's cognitive theory include Ginocchio, "Scotus on Sense, Medium, and Sensible Object," and Novák, "More Aristotelian than Aristotle. Duns Scotus on Cognizing Singulars."

²⁹ King, "Duns Scotus on Mental Content," 77.

³⁰ Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition*, 189–95 and 198; cf. also Richard Cross's contribution to this present volume. For criticism of Cross's book (especially his internalist explanation of intentionality), see Pini, "Duns Scotus on Material Substances and Cognition," 776–78; interestingly, Pini adds one more detail to his criticism (again concerning intentionality) in his contribution to this present volume.

[...] Scotus represents something of a transition position, adopting many aspects of thirteenth-century psychology while at the same time inventing, or anticipating, many aspects of fourteenth-century psychology.³¹

We, Daniel Heider and I, did not choose the topic of this present volume, and of the conference in its background, in order to weigh in on this ongoing debate of how to estimate the originality of Scotus's contribution to the history of cognitive psychology. Much more important for us was the fact that cognitive issues, though certainly interesting in their own right, are of relevance for many, if not in fact all, aspects of philosophy as well as for a good deal of scholastic theology, owing to Duns Scotus's interest not only in that kind of cognitive psychology that is relevant for human earthly life, but rather also in human cognition both in the pre-lapsarian state and in the hereafter, as well as in angelic and divine cognition. The common focus on cognitive issues might thus, we thought, yield an interesting framework for discussions of a wide range of subjects. Accordingly, this book is divided into four sections that deal with, respectively, sensory cognition, intellectual cognition, the metaphysical and theological implications of cognitive psychology, and cognitive and psychological issues in the broader reception of Duns Scotus's thought.

This volume's primary historical focus on the Scotist tradition, rather than on Scotus, is not at all irrelevant for an estimation of Scotus's own contribution to the history of cognitive theory. Just to elaborate upon Peter King's argument for Scotus being a revolutionary contributor to cognitive psychology, the distinction he detects in Scotus's thought between cognitive acts and mental content manifestly squares with a distinction well-known to any scholastic in the Early Modern era, namely the one between a formal and an objective concept (*conceptus formalis* vs. *conceptus obiectivus*) – a distinction that according to the Scotist John Punch is indeed accepted by *everybody*:

Note that, according to everybody, the formal concept is an act of the intellect with which we apprehend something, whereas the objective concept is the object of that concept, namely the one we apprehend through it.³²

Around 1600, the distinction is not seen as being particularly Scotist. Francisco Suárez rather calls it a "common distinction" (*vulgaris distinctio*). Only some Scotists, citing a passage in Scotus's *Theoremata*, traditionally insist that the dis-

31 Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition*, 203.

32 Poncius, *Integer phil. cursus, Tract. in Met.*, disp. 69, q. 2, n. 7, 882a: "[A]dvertendum cum omnibus, conceptum formalem hic esse actum intellectus, quo apprehendimus aliquid; conceptum vero obiectivum esse obiectum illius conceptus, quod scilicet per eum apprehendimus." I follow the 1659 edition's emendation of 'quo scilicet' to 'quod scilicet,' as in Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 270.

inction was in fact an invention of the Subtle Doctor.³³ Since the terminology itself clearly arises later, the question is not whether it can be traced back to Scotus, but rather whether he knew of the distinction although describing it in other terms. If we agree with King, Scotus clearly did. The simple point I wish to make, without delving further into this particular issue, is that Scotus's contribution to cognitive psychology must not only be measured against that competition for originality that took place in his own time and that is first of all relevant for placing Scotus on the map of intellectual history between, say, Henry of Ghent and William of Ockham; it is rather also a matter of who most decisively influenced the later scholastic tradition – and Scotus even had his own long tradition. This point can easily be broadened so as to reply to Pasnau's dismissal of any startling originality on Scotus's part "in most matters" (cf. above), for now leaving aside whether that statement does any justice to the Subtle Doctor himself. In most matters, Scotus undisputedly did leave a significant mark on the history of philosophy and theology. Our focus on the later scholastic tradition, and here in particular the Scotist one, is one way, possibly the best, to appreciate this fact.

2.1 Sensory Cognition

Duns Scotus's account of sensation, the starting point of all cognition in this present life (*pro statu isto*), is closely linked with his fundamental support of the doctrine of sensible species. Two contributions to the present volume discuss the details and limits of this doctrine. The first one addresses the problem of how, by which mechanism, sensible species are processed in sensation. In his contribution, "Suárez vs. Mastri and Belluto on Species in the Internal Sense," Daniel Heider contrasts two divergent views in the Baroque age about interior sensation. The disagreement concerns how the exterior sensible species are converted into interior species necessary for sensory cognition, and do so even in the case of the perceptual awareness of one's own sensory acts. Whereas Francisco Suárez assumes that interior species are the products of an agent internal sense conceived as an activity of the soul, Mastri and Belluto on the contrary deny the very existence of such an agent sense. The interior species, they hold, are efficiently caused by the exterior ones. Heider argues that Suárez's model of percep-

33 Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 2, sect. 1, n. 1 (*Opera omnia* XXV), 64b. Ample documentation of this discussion in Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 268–75; cf. also Forlivesi, "La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif," and Ashworth, "Antonius Rubius on Objective Being and Analogy."

tion has an Augustinian bent,³⁴ whereas Matri and Belluto adopt an Aristotelian view – which may be surprising, given that Scotus is often seen as a thinker with Augustinian-Avicennian tendencies. Notably, Suárez’s view was adopted by the Scotist Hugh McCaghwell. Heider further illuminates the background of the disagreement between Suárez and Matri/Belluto. The Jesuit advocates a real distinction between the soul and its powers and among these powers themselves. Matri and Belluto rather opt for a merely formal distinction and therefore do not need to assume any particular agent sense responsible for bridging the “ontological gap” between the various powers needed for the perceptual process.

Are there any *unsensed* species (*species non sensatae*) at work in sensation? In his contribution, “The Estimative Faculty in Scotus and Scotism,” David González Ginocchio shows that, on Scotus’s account, this cannot be the case. Ginocchio reconstructs Scotus’s theory of the estimative power and investigates its influence in seventeenth-century Scotism. Opposing a widespread doctrine of unsensed species (found in Avicenna and Aquinas), Scotus and the Scotists, here Matri/Belluto and John Punch, agree that such intentions as those of hostility or utility may be explained without assuming any separate kind of species. Animal behavior that rests upon estimation is rather explicable through the mechanisms of memory, learning, and instinct. Estimation as such thus is reduced to a *modus loquendi*, a way of describing cognitive acts, albeit properly speaking they are not estimative. Ginocchio highlights the non-biologist, in fact rather theological, character of the Scotist approach and argues that this approach lies behind what he identifies as a “modern deflationary presentation of the internal senses.”³⁵

2.2 Intellectual Cognition

One of the arguably most fascinating and certainly defining features of scholastic epistemology, and here in particular Scotist, is that it accounts not only for human, but also for angelic and divine forms of knowing. This implies that there

³⁴ Heider, *Aristotelian Subjectivism*, 270–74, nevertheless maintains that Suárez’s philosophy of perception, globally seen, still belongs under the wide umbrella of Renaissance Aristotelianism.

³⁵ It may be worthwhile to add, in support of Ginocchio’s deflationary reading, that John Punch in this context explicitly appealed to the principle of parsimony, also known as Ockham’s razor, in order to argue against the assumption of any unsensed species: One should not increase the number of real items without necessity – and since there is no need for unsensed species, such items do not exist. Cf. Poncius, *Integer phil. cursus, Tract. de anima.*, disp. 59, q. 10, n. 95, 773a: “[N]on sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate; sed nulla prorsus est necessitas specierum insensatarum: ergo non datur.” Notably, Poncius, *ibid.*, disp. 63, q. 3, nn. 22 and 25, 810a–11a, uses the same tool to do away with the *intelligible* species too; cf. also Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis*, II, 342.

may likely be more to cognition as such than is applicable to the specific human condition. In his contribution, “In God’s Mind – Divine Cognition in Duns Scotus and Some Early Scotists,” Giorgio Pini focuses on Scotus’s view of divine cognition in order to distinguish between what essentially belongs to cognition as such from what only pertains to human cognition. Pini’s finding is that human cognition is characterized by the relation of being *about* something, but this is not true in the special case of divine cognition, which is not related to any object; in Pini’s words, “divine cognition is a purely internal affair.” Pini investigates the variations of Scotus’s position. According to Scotus’s first account, there is only a non-mutual relation – one of “measurement” – between divine cognition and its objects (the latter are measured by the former, not vice versa as in the case of human cognition). According to the second and more radical account, no relation at all is involved in divine cognition. In either case, cognition as such does not presuppose any relation from the knower to the known. Pini (elaborating on findings presented in an article by Garrett Smith)³⁶ contends that some of Scotus’s early followers, William of Alnwick and Petrus Thomae, altogether missed this crucial point and rather saw human cognition, where an object is indeed presupposed, as the paradigmatic one.

Not all disagreement among Scotus and his early followers, however, is reducible to misunderstanding. There were also cases where real convictions clashed. Marina Fedeli’s contribution, “The *Species Intelligibilis* in the Cognitive Process in Early Scotism – The Case of William of Alnwick,” uncovers one such instance. Whereas Scotus sought to restore the Aristotelian doctrine of intelligible species out of concern that phantasms cannot represent both singular and universal things, Alnwick, in his early *Commentary on the Sentences*, rather followed Henry of Ghent and rejected the need for any separate intelligible species. The phantasm sufficiently represents both singular things and the universals that include singulars. Later in his development, after having moved from Paris to Oxford, Alnwick changed his mind and now defended the view that the agent intellect enables intellectual cognition by producing intelligible species. Fedeli suggests that this change of mind resulted from Alnwick’s encounter with the loyal Scotist John of Reading at Oxford.³⁷

³⁶ Cf. Smith, “The Origin of Intelligibility.”

³⁷ Let me add that Alnwick, in a newly edited text associated with, but presumably not belonging within the prologue of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, explicitly rebukes Reading for not being loyal to Scotus (Reading’s “own master”) in regard to the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition, another contested aspect of Scotus’s cognitive theory (Reading is criticized for diverging from Scotus’s view that intuition necessarily is about existing things); cf. Alnwick, *Utrum scientia possit causari in intellectu nostro a Deo immediate sine obiecto praeostenso*, art. 4, n. 91, in *id.*, *Questions on Science and Theology*, 700. It seems that future scholarship will be occupied with Alnwick and Reading and their respective reasons for diverging from Scotus.

A somewhat similar case is explored in the contribution by Damian Park, O.F.M., “The Non-Beatific Vision of God in the Present Life – Franciscus de Mayronis’s Relational Theory of Cognition,” only that Meyronnes, in his development, does not move toward Scotus, but rather away from him, partially due to the influence of Ockham. A celebrated aspect of Scotus’s cognitive psychology is the distinction between abstractive and intuitive cognition, just mentioned. Park shows that Meyronnes early on, in his *Conflatus* (one version of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Book I), follows Scotus’s causal explanation of the distinction: abstractive cognition is caused by the representation of a being, whereas intuitive cognition is caused by the being itself in its own existence and presence. Later in his development, in his *Quodlibet*, Meyronnes rejected this causal explanation in favor of a relational account. His development marks a shift away from viewing cognition as a quality (Scotus’s position), toward viewing it as a relation – and (as is commonly assumed) knowing a relation implies knowing its *terminus*. This is the background for Meyronnes’s view that God, in this life, may be intuitively known as existent and abstractively known as a *quid*, God being the *terminus* of a cognitive relation in both cases. This earthly cognition has nothing beatific about it, being rather just, in Park’s words, “an encounter with God.”

The success of Duns Scotus’s distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition is often illustrated by referring to its presence in later fourteenth-century discussions of cognitive psychology. However, it remained a topic for discussion throughout the Scotist tradition. Anna Tropia’s contribution, “Francisco Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” showcases how the distinction continued to play an important role in seventeenth-century Scotism. Macedo, a Portuguese Scotist who studied under Francisco Suárez at Coimbra and later taught at the University of Padua, authored a three-volume doctrinal comparison of Scotus and Aquinas. Tropia investigates how Macedo in this work gives a somewhat paradoxical – according to Tropia, in fact “confused” – account of angelic intuitive cognition that is modelled after human abstractive cognition. Particularly problematic in Macedo’s account is the concept of species that remains so undetermined that it is even hard to tell whether it plays any role in angelic cognition or not. Tropia hypothesizes that Macedo’s views were formed through his acquaintance with Jesuit discussions of the topic; besides Suárez – for whom the assumption of intelligible species plays an important role – Juan Maldonado and Girolamo Dandini are mentioned as likely sources. Contrarily and somewhat surprisingly, Macedo does not appear to have engaged much with the more orthodox systems of Scotism of his day.³⁸

³⁸ Tropia, *La teoria della conoscenza di Francisco Macedo*, 169, similarly says that Macedo’s understanding of Scotus has “passed through the filter” of the Jesuit views of Scotus. For a remark on Macedo’s knowledge of Matri’s works, see the contribution by Andersen to this

2.3 Metaphysical and Theological Implications

Scotist cognitive psychology is interwoven with both metaphysics and theology. As for metaphysics, this tight relationship becomes particularly palpable if one considers the notion of “intentional being” (*esse intentionale*). In his contribution, “*Esse intentionale* in Some Early Scotists – At the Origins of the So-called ‘Supertranscendental’,” Richard Cross lays bare Scotus’s somewhat wavering stance on the ontological status of that kind of being, namely being known, that the eternal objects of divine knowledge owe to this knowledge. As Cross points out, Scotus’s doctrine has a number of “loose ends” that all have to do with the status of intentional being: it is not clear how exactly Scotus conceives of the dependence of the objects of divine knowledge on this very knowledge; unclear too is whether this very broad notion of being is univocal or analogical, a question that Scotus explicitly leaves open. Not only modern scholarship is bewildered – the early Scotists and their “fellow-travelers” were in no better situation. Cross thus shows how Scotus’s loose ends occasioned a variety of positions on the status of intentional being, ranging from the acceptance of intentional being, exclusive of second intention concepts; having a genuine ontological status of its own (James of Ascoli, the early Ockham) as compared to the denial of any kind of being over and above real being (Alnwick, the later Ockham); and finally to the extreme position of allowing the widest notion of being, one that includes second intention concepts, an ontological status of its own (Francis of Marchia). In the terminology of later times, this widest notion of being is a “supertranscendental” concept.³⁹

This same story is continued in Francesco Fiorentino’s contribution, “*Esse cognitum* and Divine Ideas in the First Two Centuries of Scotism.” Fiorentino starts out with the various conceptions of ideas available to Scotus and shows how the Subtle Doctor chose the Augustinian interpretation of the Platonic ideas as noetic entities in the divine mind. Contrary to Henry of Ghent, Scotus rejected that ideas in any way precede the acts of divine knowledge which, on the contrary, lend intentional or cognized being to the ideas in a cognitive process of four steps (called, by Scotus, “instants of nature”) through which the divine intellect moves from knowing the divine essence itself toward establishing and knowing the ideas. Drawing on a wide range of sources, largely subsequent to

present volume. For discussions of intuition and abstraction in other seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Scotists, see further Andersen, “Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition.”

³⁹ Let me add that the earliest presently known use of this term to describe the subject matter of a metaphysical treatise is in Pere Dagui’s *Tractatus de differentia*, n. 5, 120, from 1500. Dagui is a proponent of the aforementioned Scoto-Lullist tradition; cf. note 16. For supertranscendentality in the later scholastic tradition, see Doyle, “Between Transcendental and Transcendental.”

the ones examined in the previous contribution, Fiorentino investigates how Scotus's approach and its early interpretations were received within the Franciscan tradition of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It turns out that Alnwick's dismissal of any being over and above real being was not very successful, whereas James of Ascoli's was. Francis of Meyronnes, on the contrary, developed an original and nuanced position that inspired John Wyclif's realist view of created beings' eternal *esse intelligibile*. The four-step doctrine was only rarely defended. In the long run, Scotus's view of the divine essence as the primary object of the divine intellect with the essences of creatures as its secondary objects was a much more popular motif. The Scotist tradition of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as portrayed by Fiorentino, is thus one that has considerable room for individual originality.

Another two articles, both with a focus on seventeenth century Scotism, demonstrate the link between cognitive psychology and the Scotist doctrine of distinctions. In his contribution, "Alfonso Briceño on Cognition, Distinction, and the Knowledge of God," Roberto Hofmeister Pich investigates one particularly relevant aspect of the Latin American Scotist Alfonso Briceño's discussion of distinctions. In his vast (yet incomplete) commentary on Scotus's *Ordinatio* I, published in Madrid during his long stay in Europe, Briceño discusses what kind of distinction may be compatible with intuitive cognition. This kind of cognition is seen as grasping its object such as it is in reality. When the object in question is the divine essence, one might expect that intuition does not detect any distinction there. Contemporaneous Thomists indeed held that any distinction in that object rather is imported by a human intellect incapable of grasping the divine essence such as it is; in other words, only a distinction of reason can apply. Briceño does admit the relevance of the Thomist notion of a distinction of reason with a foundation in reality, though only when it comes to Trinitarian speculation. Regarding the divine essence and its attributes he has another solution ready, one that rests on the insight that intuition must not be comprehension, i. e., intuitive cognition need not always grasp an object in its entirety, but may rather focus on certain aspects of the object while leaving other aspects out of consideration. Intuition, then, does yield room for a certain "precising distinction" (*distinctio praecisiva*), a distinction that Briceño does not explicitly equate with the Scotist formal distinction, but which clearly must be situated in its vicinity. Pich regards Briceño's discussion of this precising distinction as an indirect defense of the formal one. Interestingly, we learn that the precising distinction is operative both in perception and in intellectual cognition.

Bartolomeo Mastri may be seen, and to some extent saw himself, as a proponent of orthodox Scotism in the seventeenth century. Occasionally, however, even Mastri departs from Scotus's solutions. In his contribution, "Making Room for the Virtual Distinction – Bartolomeo Mastri between Scylla and Charybdis," Lukáš Novák shows that his theory of distinctions is one such case. The formal

distinction, of course, is Scotus's key innovation in this area. It is his alternative to Henry of Ghent's assumption of a merely intentional distinction. From all of Scotus's arguments against Henry's view, Novák singles out one as being particularly important. This "Final Blow Argument," to use Novák's term, interestingly centers on the notion of objective or cognized being. Scotus critically points out that an intentional distinction based on this notion does not sufficiently distinguish between real items, such as a genus and a differentia that are (formally) different in a thing even before being cognized. Now, Mastri accepts the formal distinction at the level of categorial being, but not at the level of transcendental being: genus and differentia are formally distinct, but not being and the transcendentals – these are only virtually distinct, since this kind of distinction is identical with the intentional distinction. According to Novák, this differentiation is highly flawed, for how can Mastri accept the force of Scotus's argument in one context, while rejecting it in another?⁴⁰

Foreknowledge, of course, is one important aspect of divine cognition. My own contribution, "*Decretum Concomitans* – Bartolomeo Mastri on Divine Cognition and Human Freedom," investigates Mastri's Scotist doctrine of concomitant decrees against the backdrop of the prevalent positions in seventeenth-century scholastic theology, i. e., the Thomist doctrine of physical predetermination and the Jesuit doctrine of middle knowledge. This latter doctrine was fairly popular among Baroque Scotists, and Mastri's project is to show that a more genuinely Scotist approach is possible. Mastri teaches that God through the medium of his own decrees grasps the future events as secondary objects of his intellect, and does so infallibly due to the extrinsic determination which God's own will bestows on them. According to Mastri, this doctrine does not contradict, but rather is in perfect coherence with free choices of created wills, due to the relation of concomitance that holds between decrees of the divine will and those of free creatures. In debate with proponents of the Thomist and the Jesuit doctrines, Mastri translates this doctrine of foreknowledge into conditional language: not only God's knowledge of future events, but also of future conditionals, is posterior to free divine decrees. Future conditionals, on Mastri's account, have their own kind of conditional real being in God's eternal conditional knowledge.

⁴⁰ Let me again add a point of my own: Mastri's fondness for the virtual distinction (also called the distinction of reason with a foundation in reality), analyzed by Novák, clearly testifies to his interest in the metaphysics of Suárez and other authors under his influence; in the realm of transcendental being, Suárez's metaphysics parsimoniously operates only with a virtual distinction. For Mastri's interest in the rational distinction with a foundation in reality, see Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*, 781–839; for the role of this distinction in Suárez's metaphysics, see Darge, *Suárez' transzendente Seinsauslegung*, 121–23. With their theories of distinction and precision, Mastri and Briceño, each in their own way, respond to developments in contemporaneous scholasticism outside of the Franciscan Order.

2.4 The influence of Scotism

An understudied aspect of the Scotist tradition's broader impact is its influence in Protestant and Reformed milieus. Three contributions in the present volume seek to fill this lacuna. In his contribution, "The Epistemological Limits of Religious Images – On the Scotist Sources of a Reformed Theological Tenet," Ueli Zahnd undertakes to show that Scotism, and in particular Scotus's metaphysics of the infinite, was in the background of Reformed iconoclasm. Though Scotus did not develop a position on the veneration of religious images, his view of divine infinity did have consequences for his position on the veneration of Christ, whose created human nature should not be adored in the same elevated manner as his divine nature. Drawing on a vast range of sources, Zahnd observes that whereas most Franciscans in the immediate wake of Scotus ignored this differentiation, in the fifteenth century a number of Scotist theologians, Orbellis, Vorillon, and Brulefer, returned to Scotus's position, which especially Brulefer radicalized so as to reject all images of anything divine. Images pertain to the created world and do not yield any true cognition of God. This stance came to be adopted in the Reformed branch of the Reformation, where Brulefer's works had a rather significant reception (Zwingli is known to have owned and studied them).⁴¹

Protestant circles too were familiar with Scotist thought. Arthur Huiban's contribution, "Melanchthon and the Will – An Early Protestant Reception of Scotist Psychology?," aims to show how Melanchthon, despite overt criticism of Scotus and the Scotists in the first edition of his *Loci communes* (1521), nevertheless can be said to pursue, even to radicalize, certain Scotist motifs in his psychology, especially in regard to the freedom of the will. Melanchthon defines the will as an indetermined potency and as the very capacity to will and not to will; he rejects the ability of the intellect to determine the will in its choices; he understands self-love (*affectio commodi*) as an intrinsic determination of the will, not as a sensitive appetite. What in spite of all that radically separates his thought from that of the Subtle Doctor is his rejection both of any natural affection for loving God and of man's ability to make himself worthy of grace. Huiban assumes that Melanchthon always has Johannes Eck's clash with Luther in mind when he talks of Scotus in connection with grace, Eck thus clearly being one of his sources for Scotus. Additionally, Melanchthon – like Eck – was influenced by some Scotist professors at the University of Tübingen. All these observations attest to a "broad and diffuse reception" of Scotus's thought in early sixteenth-century Germany.

Giovanni Gellera's contribution, "Univocity of Being, the Cogito and Idealism in Johannes Clauberg (1622–1665)," supplies an interesting aspect to the

⁴¹ Cf., again, Bolliger, *Infiniti Contemplatio*, here 380.

seventeenth-century continuation of the story of Scotist influence in non-Catholic Europe. The Calvinist Cartesian Clauberg famously authored a manual of metaphysics called, in its last edition (1664), *Metaphysica de ente, quae rectius ontosophia*. Clauberg's knowledge of the Subtle Doctor's thought most likely stemmed from other authors, such as Jacopo Zabarella and Christoph Scheibler. Accordingly, Gellera is not out to enlist him in the long row of Scotists properly speaking. Gellera rather aims to demonstrate how Clauberg employs certain motifs normally associated with Scotism (among them the univocity of being, the objective reality of ideas, common nature and degrees of nature, the primacy of the individual, the concept *haecceitas*, and internalism) in his metaphysics and that he does so all along in dialogue with Descartes – and that this dialogue resulted in a kind of metaphysics that cannot be reduced to *Schulmetaphysik*, to Cartesianism, or to Scotism, but rather should be seen as an original contribution to Early Modern idealism, where idealism comes to replace nominalism as the antipode to realism.

Scotism is a tradition, not a position. Not everyone who happens to agree with Scotus on a particular issue must therefore be a Scotist. The Scotist tradition moreover has considerable room for internal disagreement, even disagreeing with Scotus, over particular issues. In written correspondence subsequent to the conference behind this volume, Giorgio Pini observed that the contributions to the conference had made it even clearer than before that Scotism is “said in many ways” and perhaps should be described in terms of “family resemblance” rather than an adherence to a specific set of doctrines. I see no reason to doubt the accuracy of this characterization. The present volume may thus be seen as a collection of components assembled in order to work toward a comprehensive and differentiated family genealogy of Scotism, here viewed through the prism of cognitive theory taken broadly.

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