

THE FREE WILL

In my review I shall look upon the theology of the Incarnation. The “mystery of Christ”, in the words of Polycarp, that created the centre and “stood at the very heart of the St. Maximus’ synthesis.”¹ Maximus’ stands within the Cyrillian-Chalcedonian situation.’ This situation is eminent by three main properties. First is the acceptance of the Theopaschite form of St. Cyril. Second is that there was no contradiction into St. Cyril and the Council of Chalcedon. Third and finally is the term of a consistent terminology into Triadology and Christology that is relevant to both.² We shall see later in this paper, the Chalcedonian theme of “precision” and “tautology,” with respect to Christ’s natures, similarly role in Maximus’ vision of the divine incarnation of the *logoi* or power with respect to each other and the divine essence. It is within this deduction that Maximum “was competent of establishing the orthodox solution of the Monothelite question.”³ I will outline the metaphysics of Monenergism, its three folds dialectic, Maximum break up of this dialectic, and conclude with Maximu’s overall matrix for a coherent doctrine of predestination absorb under Christology and Eschatology.

In order to analyze theology based upon first principles, one must first posit two key concepts. For Plotinus, ‘The One’ is utter transcendence, beyond all predications, and is absolute unity between all things.⁴ “The One” does not have one thing in quality or quantity in intellectual or soul. Is not in motion or rest. But in thought for there is no otherness in it, it is a motion and thought. And then it would ignorant before it thought and will need thought to know it self. none of it., can only be said behind them. For these thing are beings, and being. So it the One behind being. Is not its name, all in indicate that it is not this. This negation near the One listen back to Plato in *Republic*, that all human learning of the good can never pick out the good because the good in its essence is altogether on the other side of *esse* (i.e. existence) and beyond the minor boundary of human perception.⁵ Therefore, there is another debate to this originate for Plotinus’s conceiving of ‘the One,’ within the One all predications are wholly identical. Being, activity, and will are all uniform. He is his own act and is not by prospect but according to His own activity. So He is not ‘as He happened to be,’ but as he oneself will. This idea of clarity all predications being identical and identical is definite to the One’s total perfection. This leads to some interesting outcome. If the One is to *be* the One, abundance must stand over against the One, and the One could not be the One if it did not produce this abundance. Plotinus remarks that “everything which is multiple and not one is defective, since it is composed of many parts,” which in turn means that “difference is resistance.” We shall see in duo of these expositions that there

¹ Sherwood, *Byzantine, Theology*, ACW 21, pp.29,83.

² Meyendorff, *Byzantine, Theology* vol.1, p. 34-6.

³ Thunberg, the Main Theme Microcosm and Mediator, Vol.1, Gn..2-7.

⁴ Free, *Choice in Saint Maximus the Confessor* Chap, p.3-4, p. 40-44.

⁵ Plato, *Republic*, VI.509-B.

is a certain tension in Plotinus' view of 'the One.' However, it is this latter concept of God being identical to all act of Him, that one might employ, is inherent in Origen's *On First Principles*⁶ to which I now turn.

Thus Origen's in *Adamantius*, the difficulty of "free-choice" is centered on two oddities. The first one is a divine problem. As we have stated with Plotinus, God's essence has no multiplicity or distinctions. Existence, Will and Activity are wholly identical.⁷ Any distinction of these attributes is only in the cognition of the human subject. Since God's activity is wholly identical from his Being, we can say that he is a 'productive' agent. To be ever productive, the divine essence must create, since it has no distinction of being, essence, will and activity. The essence has but one object of willing to choose it has but one good thing to do.⁸ We can therefore say, for God's essence, true freedom is actually a "freedom from free choice". Thus, for Origen God was by 'Define' 'Maker and Omnipotent'.

To manifest that God is supreme we must assume premise the Being of the universe. If someone will have it that for certain times, or for anyway he cares to call them, carry on during which the present creation did not exist, he will certainly prove that in those times of ages God was not almighty, but later became power. So God will evidently have adapted a kind of progress, for there can be no doubt that it is better for him to be almighty so or not to be. Is it anything but idiotic that God should at first not overprotective something that is suitable to him and then should come to overprotective? But if there was not time when he was not almighty, there must always have existed the things in virtue of which he is almighty; and there must always have existed things under his sway, which own him as their king.⁹

Two some that are important from this passage; first we see that the will as the 'faculty of will' that is proper to nature is not distinguished from the will as the 'object of the will' that the natural will is directed to. Thus, the natural ability of will, which is identical to the essence, is the same as its object.¹⁰ This highlights confusion between Mother earth and being, which has consequences for Origen's doctrine of apokatastasis. For a mending of one's nature necessarily results in the mending of one's person as well. Moreover, since these two are not distinct, what is natural to an agent is absolutely necessary and not contingent. This 'define' presumption leads "free will" to be defined as between method dialectically against. Same as 'Plotinus's' fertilization of 'the One', creation stands over and against God, for the very purpose that God can be Creator. In different way, "he "Origen's" imagined an endless motion of ages which had to be classified. Any chronology in the divine predicates appeared to him under the form

⁶ Monotheletism, doctrine, 6,3, p. 44-52, Origen's *Adamantius*'s, p.c.8,-32-36.

⁷ Origen, *First Principles*, Book 1.

⁸ Origen, *Free choice in Saint Maximus the Confessor*, PG:91, cf. 16, p. 44.

⁹ *Ibi.*, Origen, II, 2, 10.

¹⁰ Thomas Aquinas makes same claim in *Summa Contra Gentiles*, (1222-74), 'the divine ontological is the object of the will'.

of real temporal change; and then having excluded change, he was inclined to deny any succession at all to, or dependent amid, those predicates taken as a whole; he asserted more than the just perpetuity of the world with God, he proclaims the necessity of the divine declaration ad extra, the necessity of the eternal realization of the fullness and of all the Divine of power."¹¹ Similarly, "the world was impossible without God, and God was impossible without the world."¹² Therefore, for Origen's, God cannot choose not to create, since such a choice is entangled with a dialectic, which would involve variety in Him, and given God's utter perfection, such would by definition be evil and difficult. In Origen doctrine of free choice is the Saint's in the Eschaton and this creaturely problem. Since we have just shown that for Origen God's freedom is really a freedom from free choice, Creation on the other hand, being composite, must therefore involve choice. This choice, however, must exactly be between objects of differing good value. The creature in its diversity must always have free volition, great deal, and moving.

"The will's freedom always moves in the direction either of good or evil, nor can the rational sense, that is the mind or soul, ever exist without some movement either good or evil."¹³ In this progress Origen logically ties mainly to free choice and motion, but because he cannot extract motion and plurality from his definition of free will as objects relating conditioned, this has some interesting consequences for the redeemed in the Eschaton. In God being totally simple, how many willing objects can there be? It can be just one metaphysical object in this logic, and Origen has ruled out all diversity or motion in the Eschaton for creatures absorption into the One. Therefore, Origen is not one to give up on the problem. Previously saw that motion, free will, and individual are tied together in his doctrine of free choice. The Save have but one single good object to will, the other option by definition must be evil, which brings us to the climax of this human problem as an eternal cycle of falls and savings. Therefore the soul is immortal and eternal, it is possible that in the many and endless periods throughout diverse and untold ages it may either descend from the Highest Good to the lowest evil or to be restored from the lowest evil to the Highest Good.¹⁴ "moreover we see how Origen's logically believes in the state of souls. The cycle was the only relating way he could stave off immersion into the divine essence since sin was a clear present principle between God and creatures. Sin then becomes the distinct sign of creatures and their free will is thought of in terms of between options of differing moral worth, as we have already mentioned. Since God is perfect nothing sinful could become God thereby forcing off divine immersion. The state of souls in God are in equilibrium. organism results in a fall from this unity resulting in Genesis of the corporeal world with a reversal of this process in a journey back to the One "organism, equilibrium".

Maximus and the Monothelite dispute, the continuity with history that Maximus has interrupt the 'Origenist issue.' This work being to first fall to St. Athanasius in the argument with the Arians over the divinity of Christ and his essence with the Father. Arius was the one who first picked up on Origen's dialogue that gives two opposed

¹¹ Creation and Redemption, Vol. III, p. 258f,

¹² The Collected Works, Ibi. 70., p. 55-56

¹³ Origen's, On First Principles, pp. 234, III, 3, 5

¹⁴ Ibid., III, 1, 23

choice, either assert the permanently of the Son and the forever of the kosmos or to deny the eternity of the Son and the kosmos.

As far in Saint Athanasius, the contrast between essence and will appears to be real, metaphysical one, a man by counsel construct a house, but by nature he create a son, and what is in building began to come into being at will, and is external to the maker, but the son is proper offspring of the father's essence, and is not external to him, wherefore neither does he counsel concerning him, lest he appear to counsel about himself. As far then as the Son transcends the creature, by so much does what is by nature transcend the will. And they, on hearing of Him, ought not to measure by will what is by nature.¹⁵ Moreover St. Athanasius's defense of the immortal of Christ and His essential from the Father, along with the free happening of the world depends on a real distinction between essence and will.¹⁶

The ongoing Origenist mater occurs in the Cappadocians's Fathers view of the proper knowledge of God through the process of conception "e/pi/noia" against the Semi-Arian Eunomians. In correspond to Eunomius, the Ovaia of the Father can be known through the precision of the wording applied to it. It was this idea of having knowledge of the divine essence that the Cappadocians Fathers.

He present himself known that he is by the greatness and beauty of his creatures accordingly to the things that are known, someone to our self the gift of faith by the operations of His hands, but not the conception of what He is.¹⁷ two distinction principality of the characterizing the definition of simplicity.

1) The principle of non-contradiction or that plurality cannot be free from moral opposition,¹⁸ and 2) What is natural is urged. With this method in place, we can now proceed on with an inquiry of "Monothelism".

I shall concerning Monothelism, we will not concern those historical or political developments or its relationship with Monophysitism but solely with the theology of Pyrrhus of Constantinople as its representative in Maximu's disputation with the Patriarch. As I have pointed out two underlying principles in the previous section, it is important to show how these two motivate a third. This third principle is that the will is hypostatic, "(If Christ be one person, then He willed as one person. And if He willed as one person, then doubtless He hath one will and not two).¹⁹ Therefore it is impossible to indicate some "willer" along with the will itself.²⁰ This is the inherent problem that we saw in Origen that we pointed out earlier: confusion between person and nature. The key text that focused the debate was Christ's agony and Passion in Gethsemane: "My Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from

¹⁵ Athanasius, Third Discourse Against the Arians, VI, III, p. 62, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers II, IV,

¹⁶ Aspects, p.166, p. 42-53

¹⁷ Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Answer to Eunomius's Second Book, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers II, 5. P. 250-52,(Vol.125),

¹⁸ Thomas Aquinas, the Trinity. *Summa Theologiae* q. I.28, A.3, (QQ27-33),

¹⁹ Maximus, Disputation with Pyrrhus p.10. pp. 2,4,

²⁰ Ibid. Maximus, p.14. p.5 - 6

me. Though, not as I will but as thou will be done.”²¹ The idea here by all parties was to eliminate the seemingly apparent denial between the human and the divine. Therefore because of the principle of “contrast is opposition,” this leads Pyrrhus to confess. It is impossible for two wills to exist in one person without resistance.²² It was the motivating factor of non-contradiction to maintain the integrity of Christ’s substance, and subsequently, to safeguard from any overture of opposing wills in him.²³ This concept even appears in none greater a Father than St. Gregory “Nazianzus” the Theologian that was appealed to by the regeneration.

The son is coming down from heaven not to do his own will, but the will of him who sent him. Definitely had these words not been spoken by the very one who came down. His will is not in the least degree opposed to God, is totally dependent upon God. Our just human will does not always follow the divine; it often resists and struggles against it. The way we interpret. “Father, if it be possible let this cup pass from me, but not what I will let your will prevail.” The alternative belief either he was ignorant of the thing’s possibility, or, he was opposing the Father’s will are both unlikely. No, given that the words come from what was assumed, we must meet this problem in the same way as the previous ones. The words there mean not that the Son has, but that he has not, a will over against the Father’s. This would give the sense: “‘Not to do my own will,’ for what is mine is not distinct from what is yours but belongs to both you and me, who have one will as we have one admired.”^{24 25}

This proposition is the first that gives traction to root the will in the substance, but there is also a second proposition that is related to the will being substance. (If thou sayest that the will is natural, and if what is natural is compelled, and if thou sayest that the wills in Christ are natural, thou dost in fact take away all his voluntary motion.)²⁶ Therefore very important to emphasize at this point that rooting the will in the substance is built on the back of these two proposition: 1) variance is opposition or the principle of non-contradiction and 2) what is natural is compelled. This leads Maximus’ back to confronting the problem that recollects the Origenist Problem that is not only “a monothelism problem, but a problem of theology as well.”²⁷ Some power to affirm a human operation in Christ for Pyrrhus that isolates him from the rest of the proponents of monenergism.

The contradiction at the Passion is a true human will, however, it is not one that is in Christ but in us. “some of the byzantium who place the natural wills in opposition to help other and who maintain that the fathers said to the Lord had a human will by assets only. It is ordinary that the relative assets is meant, why did not the father say that Christ formed himself in us. The Fathers referred, not to that which concerned to Him by mere nature, but to that which He took upon Himself for a special purpose.”²⁸

The doctrine disposition of Pyrrhus should be evident in this passage, if salvation is to be successful, it must be entirely moved by an irresistible movement of the divine will since the human operation is in opposition to it by the just fact that it is a creature. Christ is begin solely in his humanity by the divine Logos. This is so notable because it

²¹ Mt 26:39

²² Maximu’s Disputation with Pyrrhus. (PG91:297B); cf. 16, p. 7

²³ Free choice in saint Maximu’s the Confessor, Ambigua 7: (PG 91:1077C-C);f. p. 81

²⁴ Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Fourth Theological Oration*, (Cor 15:20; Col 1:12); (Oration 30, 12), pp.102-103

²⁵ On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, V, p. 658-718, (PG 91: 65A-68D); p. 174- 175,

²⁶ Maximu’s Disputation with Pyrrhus, (PG 91:308D); p.276, 24, 11,

²⁷ Free choice in saint Maximu’s the Confessor,(ca. 580-662); p. 82,

²⁸ Maximu’s Diputation with Pyrrhus, Greacorum IV, 56, 66, 68, pp. 23-27

increase the issue of state of being and free will in a Christological context and not an anthropological one.²⁹ With a mark of Monotheletism, beside To St. Maximus's doctrine "free choice of will" in "Christ" and his act of process.

"I shall see in the rich theory of the Confessor's doctrine on free choice of will, his disproof of Monenergism is dependent on a real variance between person and nature and between nature and energy. Maximus's doctrine of free choice of will, diverse most, starts from above rather than from below.³⁰ In sense, Maximus's looks at what properties are logically to free will and not the surprising relations that are outcome of the Fall to being his doctrine. It is one that is centered defined on Christ and the Saints in the Eschaton. It is a doctrine of free choice that is non-reasoning. The choices between objects, in Maximus's thinking for Christ and the Saints, are not interpret between objects of differing virtuous worth as they are for Origen and Monenergism."

Origen, Maximus is determined that organism and motion are proper to what it is to be a creature and have Origen. Thus, accordingly rational beings are created; they are doubtless subject to movement because they proceed from a source by virtue of the being proper to nature, and because they move themselves towards an end by virtue of that well being proper to gnome.³¹ Therefore Maximus is equally determined that organism does not produce the Fall, it is the movement ahead impurity.

The devine is fixed as filling all, and everything that passes from non being into being is portable indeed as constrain surely to some cause, then nothing moved has yet to come to an end, as not yet reposing its power of motion from desire in the final object of its passion for nothing else is apt to stop what is constrain except the appearance of that object of passion. No cause being, ever, in any method, stands fast while being moved by its natural power regarding the "End" actual to that power; neither does it cease from the energy proper to that end, "even: after it is exact it."³² Therefore it seems to be a slight problem with the Confessor's intelligent at first peek. If Adam was created ethical, how is he able to sin in the first place and what is Maximus's proposal of gnome? subsequent Chalcedon in Christ being "perfectly Man," Maximus infer that Christ must have a human natural faculty of will in both human natures a divine and a human vitality. If he has two natures, then he surely must have two nature wills, the wills and vital operations being equal in multiples natures. Thus just as the integer of natures of the one and the same Christ, correctly understood and explained, doeth not divide Christ but rather conserve the variance of natures in the union, so likewise the number of essential attributes, wills, and operations attached to those two natures doeth not divide Christ either.³³

²⁹ Luther, *De Servo Arbitrio*, WA 754, LW 33 244 1219,

³⁰ Origen. pp.178, - 190

³¹ Ambigua 7,

³² Ibid., Origen, pp. 134-135

³³ Maximu's Disputation with Pyrrhuss vol.7,p. 314, 14

Moreover, Pyrrhus took this passage as a denial of all of Christ's voluntary motion, because "what is natural is forced." For Maximus, Pyrrhus's audacity was too suggestive of the Origenist problem and its ideas opposition. The will as the 'faculty of will' which is the rational principle of the nature "logos" is distinguished from the 'mode of willing' or organism use of that faculty "tropos." Things of will and the method of willing, just as the power of sight and the mode of perception are not the same. Therefore the logical nature has the natural ability and logical passion true it. We name it the faculty of will of the logical soul. In fact according to this "faculty" that we consider when willing, and in considering, we choose the things, which we would. And these are not subject to obligation.³⁴ This response leads us back to our original question. What is Christ's mode of willing, and how does it differ from ours that gives him the incapacity to sin "non posso peccare".

The existing power of will is always directed concerning the good. A possible to say that it is tempted moved ahead some real or evident good. This is why even in sinful agents they take their wrong doings as goods for them, evident goods. The problem with a mugger, moreover, is not his Mother earth per se but his substance use "tropos" of the natural faculties "logos", which is why the guilt of sin is personal and not natural. Since the personal trade and the natural faculty are not "fixed" in virtue, the thief deliberates about proposed courses of actions. He is hesitant and uncertain about the good. This hesitancy and uncertainty about the good is not because he is composite and a created substance "and thus able to sin". So the fact per se is not the problem with the mugger. This apprehension about courses of movement and misgiving of the ends of those acts is eliminated in the Saints in the Eschaton so choice, is not essential to being human. The concern and apprehension about the good is due to the fact that for random beings virtue must be exercised through habit. Virtues for Maximu's are the rational principles and agencies of the Person of the Logos,³⁵ i.e. the uncreated logoi of God,³⁶ and they are not in human nature accidentally and afterward to constitution.

Pyrrhus: Virtues, then, are natural things?

³⁴ Maximu's Disputation with Pyrrhuss. Vol. VI, p. 23, 25; pp.10-12,

³⁵ Ambigua 7.,the substance of the virtues," *Gnostic Centuries*,1.50; 58 in *Berthold pp.137-138*, Thunberg, *Microcosm*, p. 323-327

³⁶ Thunberg, *Microcosm*, Notes, 247- 248 ref. p. 74. (The different Logoi pre-exist in God, who keeps all thing together).

Maximus: Yes, natural things. “(Pyrrhus: If they be natural things, why do they not exist in all men equally, since all men have an identical nature? Maximu’s: But they do exist equally in all men because of the identical nature! Pyrrhus: Then why is there such a great disparity “of virtues” in us? Maximu’s: Because we do not all practice what is natural to us to an equal degree; indeed, if we “all” practiced equally “those virtues” natural to us as we were created to do, then one would be able to perceive one virtue in us all, just as there is one nature “in us all,” and “one virtue” would not admit of a “more” or “less).” Pyrrhus: If virtue be something natural “to us”, and if what is natural to us existeth not through practices but by reason of our creation, then why is it that we acquire the virtues, which are natural, with practices and labour’s? Maximu’s. practices, and the pain that go with it, was conceive simply in order to ward off duplicity, which established itself through senses knowledge. It is not “as if” the virtues have been newly introduced from outside, for they inhere in us from creation, as received already been said. Therefore, when duplicity is completely expelled, the soul immediately exhibits the splendor of its natural virtue”.³⁷

Furthermore Adam did not start out “exercised” in virtue since he is a creature, although his faculty of willing is "naturally" directed towards virtue “either real or clear according to his mode of willing ‘tropos’”. This was the purpose in giving man such a simple command to obey in the garden. The idea was to Amalgamate Adam's faculty of willing “logos”, naturally directed towards the good, with his personal trade of the will. Once virtue is practiced with one’s substance trade through habit “possibly through more commands and obedience”, then Adam would become a properly immaculate agent and be like God unable to sin. But before created agents have exercised the natural virtues, their hypostatic trade of the will “tropos” has a distinct status which Maximu’s calls the gnostic desire. Gnome is nothing else than an act of willing in a particular way, in relation to some real or presumed good.³⁸ The gnostic will can be defined as the personal trade of the will ‘tropos’ that is not integrated with virtue, that is, "fixed" with the natural faculty of the will directed towards the good ‘logos’. This is why it was possible for ‘Adam’ created in innocence to sin. Theosis was open to him, but he was not created in theosis. but a state of potential deification. The devil and our first parents sinned by the gnostic will. Since the gnostic will ceases when a created substance is unified in the natural virtue, we can say that it gnome is accidental to human nature and not essential. Christ absence this personal 'mode of willing' since he is the divine uncreated ‘Logos’. Christ’s faculties of power are "fixed" with his hypostatic use of the power by his super fundamental mode of existence being the Word, In fact natural things of the will are present in Him, but not exactly in the same aspect as they are in us. He absolutely did hunger and thirst, not in a mode similar to ours, but in a mode which exceed it us, in briefly voluntarily. Therefore he was truly afraid in Gethsemane, not like us, but in a way over eclipse. Te be assured, all the things that are natural in Christ have both the rational principle proper to human nature, but a super natural mode of existence, in order that both the “human” nature, by means of its logical principle, and the Providence, by means of its metaphysical mode of existence, might be presumed.³⁹

Considering the gnostic will is unexpected to human nature and not fundamental, Christ does not need to consider this method of willing, nor could he being the Logos. Christ has an integrity of his nature and person with respect to his humanity that we loss “except in the Eschaton,” and we have a distance between our personal trade of our faculties and the Good that our natural faculties are directed to “gnomic” that Christ lacks. Maximum’s quantity.

³⁷ Lars Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*; Confessor, 2nd 91-95, pp. 32-33.(The Nestorian personality of Pyrrhus’ the conception of the incarnation of grace being),

³⁸ Disputation 2.85, Disputation .1. Argu. 7. p. 30,

³⁹ Ibid. Argu.9. 35, pp. 17-18,

Therefore, those who say that there is a gnomie in Christ, as this inquiry is demonstrating, are maintaining that he is a mere man, deliberating in a manner like unto us, having ignorance, doubt and opposition, since one only deliberates about something which is doubtful, not concerning what is free of doubt. By nature we have the passion simply for what by nature is good, but we gain experience of the goal in a particular way, through inquiry and counsel. Because of this, then, the gnostic will is fitly ascribed to us, being a mode of the trade of the will, and not a principle of nature, otherwise nature itself would change myriad times. But the humanity of "Christ" has a 'virtue' of his nature and person with respect to his humanity that we loss except in the Eschaton, our faculties and the Good that our natural faculties are directed to 'gnome' that Christ lacks. Maximu's sums it. The humanity of 'Christ' does not simply subsist an aspect similar to us, but divinely, for He who appeared in the flesh for our sakes was God. It is thus not possible to say that Christ had a gnostic will.⁴⁰

Christ's proclamation, "Not my will, but thine will be done," in the Gethsemane wording convey that Christ initially wills two good objects. Since he has two natural faculties, each one of them directed towards the good, the 'objects of willing' are self-protection of his life and the Salvation of humanity. Since the faculty of the will is entrenched in the nature as we have stated, and nothing natural is in opposition to God, then it is not possible on the just basis of Christ having a natural human will for him to sin in resistance to God for certainty of his own life as kindness.

Such things that occur came to be out of aught, and have thus power that impels that to hold fast to existence, and to non existence, which power is as one an inclination towards that which naturally preserve them in existence, and drawing back from things destructive to their original thereupon, thus the great One Word, by virtue of his humanity, had of his humanity this self-serve power which origin to existence. And in fact, He revealed both aspects of this power, willing the desire and the drawing back on account of his human spirit.⁴¹

Afterward Christ then freely wills the salvation of the world without any 'passivity', since the choice is between two good directions of deed. We see so far in this analysis of St. Maximu's that the natural will does not do the choosing, but it is the substance that instance or enhypositizes these things in a unique and condition manner. Maximus's answer to Monotheletism antiquated by the divine is not one sided, the will is not solely natural. Something else, Christ by taking on a natural human will would draw every person to an apokatastasis of ever well being in the same manner if the will is solely substance "i.e. if the will is rooted in the substance". This would collapse person and nature.⁴² The natural will presents possible courses of action to the hypostasis that then in the personal mode of willing chooses to employ the natural will toward an object that it the natural will is directed to. This precludes any form of acceptance for a hypostasis, but the third division of the will must be maintained. The will as the natural will, the will as the personal mode of willing, and the will as the object of the will. If Christ in Gethsemane and the Saints in the Eschaton are going to have true free choice, then there must be alternate courses of action that are

⁴⁰ Disputation. 2. 87, pp. 31-32

⁴¹ Ibid. 1. Argu.33, pp. 16-17

⁴² St. John of Damascus recalled, *An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* III.3, II,9 p.47b, Ambigua 7, The cosmic mystery of Jesus Christ, p. 61,

equally good, all the while excluding the possibility of sinning. It is the confessor view of the divine simplicity and the objects of choice that we now turn.

“St. Maximu’s accusation of the Origenist idea of ‘definitional simplicity’ is dependent on the correct empathetic of his doctrine of the logoi. Unlike Origen’s idea of the pre-existing “logikoi,” rational creatures in the ‘Henad’-“EQUAL”, Maximus’s logoi are logical ‘principles’ that pre exist in God. The logoi are states, “blue prints” in which God created the world, but are also the One Logos, which as “St John” notes places it in an important Christological context:⁴³ who then not able to see the one Logical Principle is in fact many Logical principles and that created things were decisive as one by the agency of this contrast which is undivided, because their aspect are distinct from each other and without confusion? Then again the many Logical principles are in fact one Logical principle existing without confusion by virtue of all things being offered up to him through him who is their intrinsic and their exhibit. This motion formed the idea of restating of the plurality of the logoi being offered up through the One Logos. The logoi are uncreated, real, and distinct; they are not to be identified with the divine essence of God or with any essence of created objects as indicated by ‘Hans Urs von Balthasar’ from the Confessor’s Ambigua.⁴⁴ Addition curious point we see in this passage is the Chalcedonian locus of “without division” and without confusion being applied to the many logoi to each other and to the One Logos. The logoi of God define the type of migration we are to have in Heaven which refutes the type of ‘state’ that Origen infer. We are silent before the sublime teaching about the logos, for he cannot be expressed in words or believe in thought. Although he is beyond being and nothing can engage in him in any way, nor is he any of the totality of things that can be known in relation to other things yet we affirm that the one logos is many logoi and the many logoi are One. The many Logical principles are one by being happily attached, led and offered up, to the One Logical Principle of the many, as to a source which possesses universal sovereignty, or as to a point which predispose and unites all the boundary derive straight out of it and that gather them altogether. One ardently traverses one’s course toward the beginning and source without alteration by means of one’s good will and choice. And through this course one becomes God, being made God by God. To the implicit goodness of the images is added the likeness acquired by the practice of virtue and the exercise of the will. He moves in God according to the Logos of his well being that pre existed in God when he lives equally finally one lives in God in accordance with the Logical principles of one’s consistently which also pre exists in God. In the future age when graced with divine, he will devotedly love and hew to the Logoi already mentioned that pre-exist in God, or rather, he will love God himself, in whom the Logoi of beautiful things are firm prevented.⁴⁵ The method of the divisor of a circle, in this passage, is close to the space imagery of the things moving “around” God in Plotinus’s *Enneads*.⁴⁶ The migration of the Saints in the Eschaton bestow to the logical principles is defined by St. Maximu’s as an “ever moving rest.”⁴⁷ This rest is a divine logoi of God’s nature⁴⁸ and one of the logoi of man’s passage in Ever Being:⁴⁹ He “God” rests when each being, having achieved the divine energy in due quota, will determine its own natural energy with dignity to God.⁵⁰

(This presence the intention of the creature’s gesture,⁵¹ the Confessor goes on to state that the power are the works of God which did not happen to begin to be in time are engage beings, in which engage beings creatures share according to grace, the precedent grace and all that the term honesty entail, that is, all life, immortality, modesty, persistence, and infinity and such things which are essentially envisage in regard to him, they are also God’s works, and yet they did not begin in time. Therefore in this work it is

⁴³ Origen, p. 136

⁴⁴ Hans urs Von Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy*, Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, Note, 347-349

⁴⁵ Ambigua 7, PG 91, Ambigua 7, p. 57-60, Farrell pp. 117-118,

⁴⁶ Origen, pp.138,143; *Enneads* II.2.3, (40),

⁴⁷ Gnostic Centuries (PG 90:1100BC), George C. Berthold in the *Classics of Western Spirituality*,

⁴⁸ The idea of rest in Maximus is closely connected with habit: “God never ceases from good things, because he never began them.” *Gnostic Centuries*; Berthold, Maximus, p.135).

⁴⁹ Origen, p. 148

⁵⁰ (PG 90, 1100 C; Berthold, p.136). 29, cf Amb, 22, (PG91,1257 A–B),

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 150

important to note the relationship the logoi have with the power of God. Thus we have analyzed the logoi as “Monophysite”, anticipation of power, and logical principles, they are also identified with the power of God which will stand the kind of divine purity to Saint Maximus has in genius).

Moreover Logoi that are in beings, in the infinity of which it envisage the power of God then, to convey truly, it portray the diverse and infinite differences in the divine power which it perceives. Then as regards the trade of experimental inquiry the ‘interpretation’ into that which is really true, for reasons that one may gladly appreciate, (the Meaning), it is the intellect will find the power of any such inquiry to define to be ineffective and its method useless, for it has no means of understanding how God who is truly none of the things that exist, and who in the strict sense is all things, and yet beyond them all, exists in each logos of all particular things and in all the logoi together whereby all things exist. Moreover in a proper sense, every divine power properly signifies God indivisibly, wholly and entirely and generally common to all and yet en mass particularly present in each of these realities, God is without part and division, without thereby being diversely distributed in the infinite differences of these realities in which he exists as being, and without thereby being consume according to the particular existence of each individual logos, and also without integrate the differences of these realities into the sole and unique totality of them all, but on the contrary that he is truly all in all, he who never abandoned His own purity which is beyond component?⁵²

This work is central of a set logic. The beginning Maximu’s cultivate that God is simple, but it is to be eminent from the ‘Idiom’ type of simplicity that we mentioned in Plotinus and Origen in the beginning of this work, the type of divine simplicity where all predications are identical in God. Also, it shows that the energies are in no way separate from each other being fully united to God’s essence but neither are they to be confused with each other either. Simplicity operates for Maximu’s as a way to safeguard God’s utter transcendence on one hand ‘Beyond Being’⁵³, and that God is fully manifested in each of His operations on the other.⁵⁴ These divine power are the ‘objects of willing’ for Christ and His Saints, and they are all of equally moral value which constitutes a genuine free choice for minister externally the circumstance of immoral.

What is the connection of viewing free ‘choice’ of will and God in his knowledge in a Christological context? I will complete this work with examination one further connection of the Confessor’s doctrine: the apokatastasis. The Patriarch of Constantinople rooting the will in the hypostasis not only was a reductio ad disproof to two different Triadological heresies,⁵⁵ but it also implied an apokatastasis reminiscent of Origenism with respect to one’s hypostatic state. A denial of a natural will in Christ was a denial of His full mankind, and Christ’s humanity being consubstantial with all men was moved fully by the divine mind.

⁵² Ambigua, 22, PG 91: Farrell, pp. 139-14;.Maximus and St. Gregory Palamas Triads III:2,7-8: (Ep.139, 6-7)

⁵³ von Balthasar, *Cosmic Liturgy 41-* p. 88-89, p 291-92

⁵⁴ Catechism (5,15), Purity also signifies as a means to safeguard that the Persons of Trinity are co equal, much like the Nicene homoousion.

⁵⁵ Disputation pp.15, 5-6: “ ”Arius,” “Willer”, is implied in the belief of the will.

“Pyrrhus. The flesh moved not by the decision of the Word Who is united with it.

But doesn't Maximus's view of the logoi being naturally in all men at creation and being epitomized in the One divine Logos also imply a determinism that is every bit as strong as Origen. Indeed it does. The difference between Origen and Maximus goes back to the robust distinction of nature and body logos and tropos that the Confessor holds in his doctrine of free-choice of will. The apokatastasis for Maximus—which is what his doctrine of ordinance is to all created nature and man having “ever presence.” This is God's purpose or fate for his creation to have eternal existence.⁵⁶ The Incarnation, Life, Death, and Resurrection of our Lord are a process that restrained the effects of Adam's sin that would've introduced corruption or a bias to go back into non-being in God's creation. It is a life of our Lord “that healed and restored with a certain compulsion, by the mighty power of God's omnipotence and invulnerable grace” in the word of Florovsky.⁵⁷ However, one's substance state, either to “ever-ill being” or “ever-well being,” is up to the personal use of that natural faculty and is not decided by God, but is utterly free.”

“The Church perceived three apokatastases. One is the [apokatastasis] of everything according to the principle (logos) of virtue; in this apokatastasis one is restored who accomplish the principle of virtue in himself. Second, The whole human nature in the resurrection. This is the *apokatastasis to* incorruption and immortality. Third, in the alleged words of Gregory of Nyssa, is the apokatastasis of the powers of the soul which, having lapsed into sin, are again restored to that condition in which they were created. Therefore it is necessary that just as the entire nature of the flesh desire in time to be taken up again into incorruption in the apokatastasis, so also the powers of the soul, having become perverted during the course of the ages had engendered in it a memory of evil, so that at the end of ages, not finding any rest, will come unto God Who enjoy no limit. And thus the distorted powers of the soul will be taken up into the pristine apokatastasis, into a merely discursive knowledge of, *but not into the participation in, the good things of God, where the Creator is known yet without being the cause of 'their imorality'.*”⁵⁸

God's praise is for all and will be communicated to all in “ever-being.” Those that have their substance united with the logoi by constantly encapsulate these virtues in this life by worship, asceticism, and sacramentally in the house of God, God's glories are “prosperity.” In the same manner, those that choose not to practice these virtues, God's glories are “lack of prosperity.” Because the damned have not integrated or brought back into peace their substance with their natural virtue, it is God's presence “averse to his absence” that is their suffering.

⁵⁶ Lars Thunberg. *Microcosm and Mediator*, p.418 -4 30,

⁵⁷ *Creation and Redemption*, p.147,

⁵⁸ *Ad Thalassium*, PG 90:;

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