Experience, evaluation, and faultless disagreement[*]

Alex Anthony[†]

In the last decade there has been a torrent of work at the intersection of philosophy and linguistics on PREDICATES OF PERSONAL TASTE (PPTs), subjective expressions like *fun* and *tasty* that are (often) used to express opinions rather than matters of fact.[1]

In each section of this paper I discuss a phenomenon that has been largely overlooked in the literature on PPTs: (§1) a neglected ambiguity in expressions like *fun*, (§2) the evaluative content of bare *fun* claims, and (§3) the pervasive variability of judgments about fault and faultlessness. Together these phenomena present a serious challenge to the status quo on PPTs, and motivate a radical reconception of how expressions like *fun* and *tasty* work semantically and why they are philosophically interesting and important.

1 Experience (or: a *fun* ambiguity)

(1 a) is ambiguous between a reading that reports an episode of someone enjoying the Texas Giant, as in (1 b), and a reading that ascribes to the Texas Giant a certain standing property of characteristically or typically causing enjoyment, as in (1 c).

(1)	(a)	*The Texas Giant was fun.*	AMBIGUOUS
	(b)	*Ben went to Six Flags yesterday. The Texas Giant was fun.*	EXPERIENTIAL
	(c)	*I can't believe they replaced the wooden track with a steel one. The Texas Giant was fun, but it probably isn't anymore.*	NON-EXPERIENTIAL

[†]Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University

[1]Some important works in the PPTs literature include KÖLBEL (2004), LASERSOHN (2005), STEPHENSON (2007), STOJANOVICH (2007), CAPPELEN AND HAWTHORNE (2009), SÆBØ (2009), EGAN (2010), MOLTMANN (2010), SCHAFFER (2011), PEARSON (2013), BARKER (2013), KENNEDY (2013), MACFARLANE (2014), and GLANZBERG (ms). *Predicates of personal taste* is LASERSOHN (2005)'s influential coinage; other authors use *aesthetic vocabulary* (EGAN (2010)) or *subjective predicates* (SÆBØ (2009), KENNEDY (2013), BYLININA (2013)). I will talk about a category of expressions I call *fun adjectives* (rather than *predicates of personal taste*); see fn 2 for diagnostics and fn 3 for a brief explanation why I prefer this nomenclature.

Call this alternation THE *fun* AMBIGUITY. It was noted by CAPPELEN AND HAWTHORNE (2009), whose terminology I'll depart from in calling the reading in (1 b) EXPERIENTIAL (or the E-reading) and the reading in (1 c) NON-EXPERIENTIAL (or the N-reading). There are a number of adjectives that exhibit the *fun* ambiguity, including *boring*, *difficult*, and *tasty*. Let's call them *fun* adjectives.[2],[3]

With the exception of CAPPELEN AND HAWTHORNE (2009), the E-reading has been entirely overlooked or ignored in the PPTs literature. And even CAPPELEN AND HAWTHORNE (2009) throw it into the pragmatic wastebasket.[4]

I'm going to argue that it is actually the overlooked E-reading that is represented in the primitive lexical meaning of *fun* adjectives. The much-discussed N-reading is a derived GENERIC.

Let's unpack this a little bit by using the operative semantic gadgets to gloss the two readings. The central moving part in my account is an EVENT OF EXPERIENCE — in the case of *fun*, an experience of enjoyment. It is typically assumed[5] that *fun* adjectives have an argument place for a STIMULUS — the cause of enjoyment — and also one for an EXPERIENCER — the agent experiencing enjoyment.

(5)   *The Texas Giant   was fun   for Ben   to ride.*

       STIMULUS   EXPERIENCER   EVENT

Here's the view. The E-reading of (5) says that there exists a certain event of experience — an event of Ben riding the Texas Giant and experiencing enjoyment. The N-reading

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[2]The adjectives I have in mind are a subset of gradable adjectives and can be characterized using three diagnostics. They (*i*) exhibit the *fun* ambiguity, (*ii*) license experiencer PPs (2), and (*iii*) license non-finite clauses (3).

(2)   *The Texas Giant was fun **for Ben***.

(3)   *The Texas Giant was fun **to ride***.

Though adjectives exhibiting all three of these properties are paradigmatic *fun* adjectives, I am inclined to think (for reasons beyond the scope of the paper) that some adjectives that don't satisfy (*iii*) should nonetheless count — in particular, sensory adjectives like *tasty*, *delicious*, and *smelly*.

[3]I use the term *fun adjective* rather than *predicate of personal taste* primarily because PPTs — characterized (as they typically are) as predicates that (*i*) give rise to faultless disagreements and (*ii*) license experiencer PPs — are simply not a semantically or syntactically unified category. Some candidate PPTs that are not *fun* adjectives (see fn 2 for diagnostics): *ugly*, *sexy*, *handsome*, *attractive*, *sucks*, *rules*.

[4]CAPPELEN AND HAWTHORNE (2009) assume that PPTs are semantically non-experiential and suggest in passing that the E-reading may be a CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE. There are several reasons why this hypothesis is not particularly attractive. (*i*) It's not clear in the first place what sort of Gricean derivation could be available. (*ii*) If *fun* adjectives were semantically non-experiential, then they would invariably express the N-reading. But that doesn't seem to be the case. For instance, in (4) the speaker explicitly disavows any non-experiential meaning.

(4)   *When I was drunk, those cheese puffs were delicious. But those cheese puffs are (and always have been) disgusting, not delicious.*

(*iii*) As we'll see in detail in §1.1, the distribution of the two readings is sensitive to composition: the ambiguity systematically interacts with (*inter alia*) tense and aspectual marking. This is the stuff of compositional semantics, not Gricean pragmatics.

[5]STEPHENSON (2007), GLANZBERG (2007), CAPPELEN AND HAWTHORNE (2009), SCHAFFER (2011), a.o.

expresses quantification over these events; it means roughly that Ben experiences enjoyment in all events of him riding the Texas Giant. The experiential lexical meaning gets you the E-reading; for the N-reading, we just need to add quantification.

There isn't any overt quantifier over events in (5). There is, however, excellent evidence that N-readings have covert GENERIC QUANTIFICATION. It is already orthodox to posit a covert generic quantifier GEN in the semantic representation of a verbal alternation that looks rather like the *fun* ambiguity — the EPISODIC / HABITUAL ALTERNATION of eventive Verb Phrases.[6]

(6) (a) *Mary swam gracefully.*   AMBIGUOUS

   (b) *A few of us went to the lake yesterday.*   EPISODIC
        Mary swam gracefully.
        ("There exists a graceful swimming of Mary.")

   (c) *It's a shame Mary had to have knee surgery.*   HABITUAL
        She swam gracefully.
        ("Typically / characteristically, Mary's swimmings are graceful.")

There are pervasive similarities between the *fun* ambiguity and the episodic / habitual alternation. For the same reasons it is orthodox to think the habitual (6 c) has a covert generic quantifier, we should also think that N-reading *fun* sentences have a covert generic quantifier.

You might be wondering at this point whether this non-experiential / experiential alternation is relevant to what makes *fun* adjectives so philosophically interesting — that they are characteristically used to express subjective or perspectival judgments. It is. In §2 I argue that the existing theories in the PPTs literature fail to capture a fundamentally important fact about the subjectivity of *fun* claims: the fact that OVERT EXPERIENCER (OE) *fun* sentences like (7) express (non-perspectival) disposition ascriptions, but bare *fun* sentences like (8) express EVALUATIONS.

(7)   Andrei Rublev *is boring for* $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} me \\ Amanda \\ most people \\ ... \end{array} \right\}$.   OE   NON-EVALUATIVE

(8)   Andrei Rublev *is boring.*   BARE   EVALUATIVE

The central dialectic in the PPTs literature — the debate between CONTEXTUALISTS and RELATIVISTS — is founded upon a mistake. Neither contextualists nor relativists can capture the evaluative content of bare *fun* claims. They are both ways of trying to

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[6]The papers in CARLSON AND PELLETIER (1995) are the locus classicus of the habituals literature. For our purposes see especially (*i*) the introduction of KRIFKA ET AL. (1995) [whence most of the off-the-shelf formal basics in §1.2] and (*ii*) the Davidsonian account of STAGE-LEVEL VS. INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL PREDICATES in KRATZER (1995) (which I appropriate without discussing how *fun* adjectives might or might not cross-cut the stage-level / individual-level distinction). CARLSON (1977) is also worth singling out as a pioneering work on genericity phenomena. See the papers in MARI ET AL. (2013) for the state of the art.

approximate the meaning of bare *fun* claims without positing a distinct kind of evaluative content.

The dispute between contextualists and relativists dissolves once we espouse genuine evaluative content. The *fun* ambiguity enters the scene because it is only the N-reading of *fun* claims that exhibits the evaluative / non-evaluative contrast. Since the N-reading is a derived generic, and generics are implicitly modal, we get an independently motivated account of evaluative content. The evaluative content of sentences like (8) is built from implicit NORMATIVE MODALITY: (8) means that *Andrei Rublev* merits boredom — that boredom is the correct or appropriate response. The theoretical resources necessary to capture the *fun* ambiguity — an experiential lexical meaning and covert genericity — are also the central mechanisms responsible for *fun* sentences' subjective evaluative meaning.

There is a residual worry that implicit modality does not address. Relativists argue that non-relativist approaches cannot account for FAULTLESS DISAGREEMENTS: they cannot predict that in a discourse like (9) (*i*) Amanda and Ben express contradictory contents (*disagreement*) but (*ii*) neither is wrong (*faultlessness*).

(9)   **Amanda**: Andrei Rublev *is boring.*
        Ben: *Nuh-uh!* Andrei Rublev *is not boring.*

In §3 I argue that the relativist's demand for a semantic account of faultlessness is misguided. Judgments about fault and faultlessness do not track linguistic form. For example, there is no relevant difference in form between (10) and (11). Yet the former looks like a faultless matter of taste and the latter does not.

(10)   Andrei Rublev *is better than* Finding Nemo.   FAULTLESS

(11)   *A golf score of 73 is better than 74.*   NON-FAULTLESS

The relativist picture, according to which faultlessness can be read off of denotations, is mistaken. It is our non-linguistic world knowledge — not our semantic competence — that guides our judgments that (10) is a subjective matter but (11) is not.

1.1   Interpretational and distributional parallels
(or: 3 pages of data)

Let's consider the evidence in favor of the experiential approach to *fun* adjectives, according to which the lexical meaning is experiential and the N-reading is a derived generic. The primary source of evidence for this account comes from distributional parallels with the episodic / habitual alternation. I'll cover that in §1.1.1, but let me start by pointing out a few independent motivations.

First, the N-reading of *fun* adjectives passes (and E-reading doesn't) a standard diagnostic for verbal generics.[7] If we insert a quantifier with strong quantificational force like *always* or *usually* into a habitual, we get only a slight change in meaning; but with an episodic, the change is much more significant.

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[7]Cf. KRIFKA ET AL. (1995), p. 9 for the details of the diagnostic.

(12) (a) *Mary always swims gracefully.*

    (b) *A few of us went to the lake yesterday. ?? Mary always swam gracefully.*

In just the same way, observe that (13 a) means something quite similar to a variant without *always*, but (13 b) does not.

(13) (a) *The Texas Giant is always fun.*

    (b) *Ben went to Six Flags yesterday. ?? The Texas Giant was always fun.*

Second, there is some (closely related) evidence that comes from restrictor *when*-clauses. Some *when*-clauses receive an existential interpretation; e.g. (14) introduces a single occasion of the speaker being drunk. But *when*-clauses can also restrict the domain of a quantifier: e.g. (15) says that on all occasions of the speaker being drunk, he makes a fool of himself.[8,9]

(14) *When I was drunk, I made a fool of myself.*

(15) *When I^i am drunk, I^i always make a fool of myself.*

    ALWAYS$'$ [DRUNK$'(i, e)$] [MAKE.A.FOOL.OF$'(i, i, e)$]

Obviously *when*-clauses can only restrict the domain of a quantifier when there's a quantifier around to restrict. In the habitual sentence (16), there's no overt quantifier, but the *when*-clause appears to be restricting a quantifier domain. This is one of the reasons it is orthodox to posit a covert generic quantifier GEN in the representation of habituals. Now notice that in N-reading *fun* sentences without overt quantifiers (like (17)) it is also possible to get restrictor *when*-clauses.

(16) *When I^i am drunk, I^i make a fool of myself.*

    GEN [DRUNK$'(i, e)$] [MAKE.A.FOOL.OF$'(i, i, e)$]

(17) *When I^i am drunk, those cheese puffs^c are delicious.*

    GEN [DRUNK$'(i, e)$] [DELICIOUS$'(c, i, e)$]

(16) provides evidence for the hypothesis that habituals have a null GEN quantifier; (17) provides evidence that non-experiential *fun* sentences have it too.

Third, most *fun* adjectives (*boring, frightening, interesting* and their ilk) are actually morphologically related to eventive verbs: in particular, they are PARTICIPLE ADJECTIVES derived from OBJECT-EXPERIENCER PSYCHOLOGICAL VERBS (*bore, frighten, interest*, etc).[10]

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[8]LEWIS (1975), HEIM (1982), FARKAS AND SUGIOKA (1983)

[9]Notational footnote: all lowercase English letters <u>except</u> *e* are individual constants; x_1 ... x_n are individual variables; *e* is an event variable. For readability, I adopt the standard convention of annotating sentences with the corresponding representation language constants and variables.

[10]See HUDDLESTON AND PULLUM (2002) (pp. 78 - 81) for more on participle adjectives. SCHAFFER (2011) (with attribution to Peter Ludlow) and GLANZBERG (ms) both observe this connection between PPTs and Obj-Exp Psych Verbs. This connection helps underscore why I avoid the term *predicates of personal taste*: by *fun adjectives* I mean essentially *whichever adjectives work like (paradigmatic) Obj-Exp derived (present) participle adjectives*. There are plenty of subjective (or evaluative or ...) expressions — *good, bad, sexy, ugly, sucks, rules, masterpiece* — that don't work like these. It's easy to lose sight of this fact if we lump them all together under the *predicates of personal taste* label.

As eventives, these verbs exhibit the episodic / habitual alternation. The relevant bit of evidence for the GEN-theory comes from the interpretation: the episodic interpretation of Obj-Exp verbs is very similar to the experiential interpretation of *fun* adjectives, and *mutatis mutandis* for habitual / non-experiential:

(18) (a) Andrei Rublev *was boring for Amanda.*   EXPERIENTIAL

    (b) Andrei Rublev *bored Amanda.*   EPISODIC

      ("*Andrei Rublev* caused Amanda to experience boredom.")

(19) (a) Andrei Rublev *is boring for Amanda.*   NON-EXPERIENTIAL

    (b) Andrei Rublev *bores Amanda.*   HABITUAL

      ("Amanda is disposed to be bored by *Andrei Rublev.*")

The similarity of the interpretations again points to an underlying shared explanation of the two phenomena.

1.1.1 Distributional parallels

Now for the distributional evidence — facts about how the availability of the two readings of *fun* adjectives (and the two readings of eventive VPs) varies systematically with grammatical marking. The generalization is that *fun* adjectives get the N-reading in habitual-friendly environments and the E-reading in episodic-friendly environments. The distributional facts are summarized in the table below.

SENTENTIAL ENVIRONMENT	*fun* ADJECTIVES	EVENTIVE VPs
Past Tense	AMBIGUOUS	AMBIGUOUS
Future "Tense"	AMBIGUOUS	AMBIGUOUS
Present Tense	NON-EXPERIENTIAL	HABITUAL
used to	NON-EXPERIENTIAL	HABITUAL
Progressive	EXPERIENTIAL	EPISODIC
Existential *when*-clauses	EXPERIENTIAL	EPISODIC
Existential non-finites	EXPERIENTIAL	EPISODIC
Characteristic non-finites	NON-EXPERIENTIAL	HABITUAL
Restrictor *when*-clauses	NON-EXPERIENTIAL	HABITUAL
Focused tense	NON-EXPERIENTIAL	HABITUAL

Let's look at a few of these cases. We've already seen that the alternations are both ambiguous in the Past Tense. In Present Tense, however, it is very hard to get non-generic readings.

(20) (a) *Mary swims gracefully.*   HABITUAL

    (b)   *The Texas Giant is fun.*   NON-EXPERIENTIAL

In addition, both get a generic interpretation under the imperfective marker *used to*.

(21) (a)   *Mary used to swim gracefully.*   HABITUAL
       (b)   *The Texas Giant used to be fun.*   NON-EXPERIENTIAL

Though adjectives generally have a lot of difficulty embedding under Progressive aspect — and *fun* adjectives are no exception — the attested examples are (like eventives) interpreted non-generically.

(22) (a)   *Mary is swimming gracefully.*   EPISODIC
       (b)   *You're being annoying.*   EXPERIENTIAL

One final example. An important property of *fun* adjectives is that they license non-finite clauses. Non-finite clauses can receive generic or non-generic interpretations (CARLSON (1977), CHIERCHIA (1984)). With both *fun* adjectives and eventives, there is a strong tendency for the genericity (or lack thereof) of the non-finite clause to match the verbal predicate.[11]

(23) (a)   *Mary tried to attend church.*   EPISODIC
       (b)   *Mary tries to attend church.*   HABITUAL

(24) (a)   *The Texas Giant was fun to ride.*   EXPERIENTIAL
       (b)   *The Texas Giant is fun to ride.*   NON-EXPERIENTIAL

In summary: the N-reading of *fun* adjectives likes habitual-friendly environments, and the E-reading likes episodic-friendly environments. This is a compelling reason to think that the two alternations share an underlying explanation — that the *fun* ambiguity is, like the episodic / habitual alternation, a VERBAL GENERICITY PHENOMENON.

1.2   The semantics of *fun* adjectives and habituals
(or: 4 pages of formalism)

The orthodox approach to habituals utilizes a framework introduced by LEWIS (1975) that spawned an enormously productive and wide-ranging semantic tradition.[12] LEWIS (1975) was talking about ADVERBS OF QUANTIFICATION (AdvQs); we'll start there and proceed to habituals and finally to *fun* adjectives.

(25)   *When I'm drunk, I always make a fool of myself.*   AdvQ

(26)   *When I'm drunk, I make a fool of myself.*   HABITUAL

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[11]Cf. BHATT AND IZVORSKI (1997)
[12]Most notably through KAMP (1981) and HEIM (1982).

(27)   *When I'm drunk, those cheese puffs are delicious.*   *fun* ADJECTIVE

On the Lewisian approach, adverbially quantified sentences like (25) introduce TRIPAR-TITE STRUCTURES consisting of a quantifier (*always*), a restrictor clause (*when I am drunk*), and a matrix clause (*I make a fool of myself*).

While at first blush it may appear that AdvQs quantify over times or events, Lewis observes that they actually UNSELECTIVELY BIND free variables of any type and thus can be treated as quantifiers over *variable assignments*.[13] This is illustrated in (29), in which *always* binds both an event argument and an indefinite DP.

(29)   *When a man^{x_1} is drunk^e, he^{x_1} always makes^e a fool of himself^{x_1}.*

QUANTIFIER	RESTRICTOR	MATRIX
always	*when^e a man^{x_1} is drunk*	*he^{x_1} makes^e a fool of himself^{x_1}*
ALWAYS$'$	$[\text{MAN}'(x_1) \wedge \text{DRUNK}'(x_1, e)]$	$[\text{MAKE.A.FOOL.OF}'(x_1, x_1, e)]$

Here's a simple LEWIS (1975)-style denotation for ALWAYS$'$:[14]

(30) $[\![\text{ALWAYS}'[\phi\{x_1...x_n\}][\psi]]\!]^g = 1$ iff
        For all g': $g[x_1...x_n]g'$ and $[\![\phi]\!]^{g'} = 1$, $[\![\psi]\!]^{g'} = 1$

Thus (29) will be true just in case every assignment which takes e to an event of a man x_1 being drunk also takes e to an event of x_1 making a fool of himself. Or more simply: every event of a man x_1 being drunk is an event of x_1 making a fool of himself.

I assume (following VON FINTEL (1994), a.o.) that sentences without overt restrictors may be pragmatically restricted; e.g. the natural reading of (31) ("Tai eats with chopsticks *when he eats*") can be represented as we see below.[15]

(31)   *Tai^t always eats^e with chopsticks.*
        ALWAYS$'$ $[\text{EAT}'(t, e)]$ $[\text{EAT.WITH.CHOPSTICKS}'(t, e)]$

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[13]It's well known that unselective binding faces THE PROPORTION PROBLEM: for example, (28) has a "most roller coasters are fun" (rather than "most episodes of riding a roller coaster are fun") interpretation that won't come out correctly if you tell the sort of Lewisian story I like.

(28)   *Roller coasters are usually fun to ride.*

I agree that the flat-footed way in which I use unselective binding here can't be right. However, the proportion problem does not rule out unselective binding operators in the representation language. Rather, it motivates a more nuanced approach to information structure and quantifier scope — topics well beyond the scope of this paper.

[14]Notational footnote: $\phi\{x_1...x_n\}$ represents an expression ϕ with at least one free occurrence of $x_1...x_n$, and $g[x_1...x_n]g'$ holds just in case g and g' are assignment functions differing at most in what they assign to $x_1...x_n$.

[15](31) is from QUINE (1966), p. 90.

To keep things simple, I'm just going to write suitable representation language expressions into the restrictor clause (as I did with $\text{EAT}'(t,\ e)$ in (31)) rather than using a more principled gadget (like a domain restrictor variable).[16]

On to habituals. GEN often has strong quantificational force similar to *always* or *usually*. But a fun aspect of generics that will feature prominently in what follows is the fact that they can receive interpretations that appear to be IMPLICITLY MODAL.[17]

(32) (a) *The OrangeTasticTorquenator crushes oranges.*   ABILITY

     (b) *Mary smokes.*   HABIT

     (c) *A gentleman doesn't peel bananas in the company of ladies.*   NORM

(32 a) means that crushing oranges is a function or ability of the OrangeTasticTorquenator. This maybe be true even if it has never actually crushed an orange (e.g. because it's never been turned on). We don't get that interpretation if we assume GEN just means ALWAYS'.

This feature of habituals (and other generics) presents an enormously difficult problem for compositional semantics. It is not at all straightforward to tell a story that explains why (32 a) expresses an ability, (32 b) a habit, and (32 c) a norm.

We can nonetheless at least approximate the attested truth-conditions by using the tools of modality, evaluating the restrictor and matrix conditions relative to possibilities other than the actual world. Let's formalize this with an ACCESSIBILITY RELATION R.[18] The denotation for GEN in (33) is just like the one for ALWAYS' save for this additional modal component.[19]

(33) $[\![\text{GEN}[\phi\{x_1...x_n\}][\psi]]\!]^{g,w,R} = 1$ iff
     For all g', w': $g[x_1...x_n]g'$ and $R(w,\ w')$ and $[\![\phi]\!]^{g',w',R} = 1$, $[\![\psi]\!]^{g',w',R} = 1$

The difference between generics expressing abilities, habits, and norms can be captured with different accessibility relation. For example, we might evaluate (32 a) relative to possibilities in which the OrangeTasticTorquenator is performing its function. Here's a simplistic representation of (32 a) that illustrates this use of the accessibility relation:[20,21]

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[16]Simply writing in pragmatic restrictors is not an innocent move. Since tripartite quantifiers like ALWAYS' and GEN are treated as unselective binders, it matters a lot which variables are free in the restrictor — you shouldn't just pull that out of thin air.

[17](32 a) and (32 c) are adapted from KRIFKA ET AL. (1995) pp. 54, 53. For simplicity — to avoid the complications of *reference to kinds* (another genericity phenomenon) — I have in mind an interpretation of (32 a) in which *The OrangeTasticTorquenator* refers to a particular, concrete instance of the device, and not to the kind of device.

[18]I adopt the accessibility approach here merely for simplicity; complexities beyond the scope of this paper militate in favor of the now-orthodox MODAL BASE + ORDERING SOURCE approach developed in KRATZER (1981).

[19]The denotation in (33) is adapted from the one given in KRIFKA ET AL. (1995), p. 52.

[20]The doubly quantified nature of the representation ("<u>all</u> worlds are s.t. <u>all</u> events in them...") is awkward and should be unified. This would be very natural to implement in a SITUATION SEMANTICS. Situation semantic approaches to tripartite structures are more popular and better developed (BERMAN (1987), HEIM (1990), VON FINTEL (1994)) than the Davidsonian event semantics I use here. I go Davidsonian here because it greatly simplifies many aspects of the presentation — in particular, the question of when we do or don't have generic quantification.

[21]$\text{DO.SOMETHING}'(o,\ e)$ is a pragmatic restrictor. What I have in mind is is that the OrangeTastic-Torquenator counts as doing something only if it isn't just sitting there inoperative. This is another issue

(34) $[\![\text{GEN}[\text{DO.SOMETHING}'(o,\,e)][\text{CRUSH.ORANGES}'(o,\,e)]]\!]^{g,w,R} = 1$ iff

For all g', w': $g\,[e]\,g'$ $[\![\text{CRUSH.ORANGES}'(o,\,e)]\!]^{g',w',R} = 1$
                                           $R(w,\,w')$
                                           $[\![\text{DO.SOMETHING}'(o,\,e)]\!]^{g',w',R} = 1$,

$R(w,\,w')$ just in case the OrangeTasticTorquenator performs in w' its function in w

"In all possibilities where the OTT performs its (actual) function, all events of it doing something are events of it crushing oranges."

The truth-conditions for this representation language expression are reasonably faithful to (32 a). The combination of tripartite structures, pragmatic restrictors, and implicit modality is powerful enough to represent the interpretation of a wide variety of generics in natural language.[22]

What about the episodic interpretation of eventives? We don't need any of the fancy gadgets we used for habituals; we can represent (35) as follows.

(35) *Mary^m swam.*
    $\text{SWAM}'(m,\,e)$

We want an existential interpretation of the free variable e — (35) means that there exists an occasion of Mary swimming. There are different options for implementing this — I take no position here on which is preferable.[23]

Now we're ready for *fun* adjectives. For an account that runs parallel to eventives, we'll need the lexical meaning to be *experiential*.

(36) *boring* $\rightsquigarrow$ $\lambda x \lambda y \lambda e.\text{BORING}'(y,\,x,\,e)$ where $[\![\text{BORING}'(y,\,x,\,e)]\!]^{g} = 1$ iff

$g(e)$ is an event of $g(y)$ causing $g(x)$ boredom

The lexical entry I give here is a simplification — see the Appendix for some complications and choice points. Here are the things that are essential. The experiential satisfaction condition is fundamental to any sort of quantificational explanation (like the GEN story) about the *fun* ambiguity — quantification can get you from an experiential to a non-experiential meaning.[24] So is the Davidsonian event argument — or some other argument

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that would easily be resolved in a situation semantics — by restricting to situations rather than worlds in which the OrangeTasticTorquenator performs its function.

[22] In fact way *too* powerful — we'd like a story about why how accessibility relations are selected. That problem is beyond the scope of this paper — perhaps even beyond the scope of semantic theory, as LESLIE (2008) has argued. Note however that interpretational variability is simply a fact about generics, not just a feature of this particular account.

[23] The two main options are (*i*) a discourse-level operation of EXISTENTIAL CLOSURE and (*ii*) a suitable truth-definition — e.g. as the *existence* of a satisfying assignment function.

[24] In contrast, I can't think of any standard semantic gadget that could get you from a non-experiential to experiential meaning.

(like a situation or location) that can play the same role. And there's lots of evidence for the experiencer argument in the PPTs literature[25] — so I believe in the experiencer argument too.

Given the experiential lexical entry, it is trivial to represent experiential readings.[26]

(38) I^i *watched*^{e} Andrei Rublev^a *last night. It*^{a} *was*^{e} *boring.*
       $\text{WATCH}'(i,\,a,\,e) \wedge \text{BORING}'(a,\,i,\,e)$

(38) will be true just in case there exists an event of the speaker watching *Andrei Rublev* and *Andrei Rublev* causing the speaker to experience boredom, which is the truth-condition that we want.

What about the non-experiential reading? In §2 I'll argue that there are actually two different N-reading interpretations: an evaluative interpretation (when there's no experiencer PP) and a non-evaluative or dispositional interpretation (when there is an experiencer PP). For now, let's just consider the non-evaluative dispositional interpretation that we get in a case like (39).

(39) Andrei Rublev^a *is*^{e} *boring for Ben*^{b}.

We're looking for a formal representation of (39) which is true just in case Ben is *disposed* to experience boredom watching *Andrei Rublev*; this will incorporate the modality of GEN. We can capture the interpretation with a dispositional flavor of modality: our accessibility relation R will take us to possibilities in which experiencers always manifest their (actual) dispositions, as in (40).

(40) $[\![\text{GEN}[\text{WATCH}'(b,\,a,\,e)][\text{BORING}'(a,\,b,\,e)]]\!]^{g,w,R} \quad = 1$ iff

       For all $g',\,w'$: $\quad g\,[e]\,g'$ $\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad [\![\text{BORING}'(a,\,b,\,e)]\!]^{g',w',R} = 1$
       $\qquad\qquad\qquad\quad R(w,\,w')$
       $\qquad\qquad\qquad\quad [\![\text{WATCH}'(b,\,a,\,e)]\!]^{g',w',R} = 1,$

       $R(w,\,w')$ just in case experiencers in w' respond in the way that manifests their dispositions in w

       "In possibilities where experiencers respond in the way that manifests their (actual) dispositions, all events of Ben watching *Andrei Rublev* are events of *Andrei Rublev* causing Ben to experience boredom."

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[25] See SCHAFFER (2011) §2 for a nice overview.

[26] There's a question how the experiencer argument in the second condition of (38) gets set to i. Clearly it depends on the fact that the first sentence in (38) introduces i, but it's not obvious whether (i) the experiencer argument is genuinely anaphoric or (ii) is contributed by a null referential proform. Note that there is a significant (and insufficiently appreciated) asymmetry between the E- and N-readings here: anaphoric values for the experiencer argument are easy with the E-reading but very hard (if possible) with the N-reading. For example, I don't think it's possible to get an interpretation of (37) that means boring *for Amanda.*

(37) *Amanda doesn't like Russian films.* Andrei Rublev *is boring.*

This appears to be a satisfactory representation of the meaning of (39); I'll say much more about the evaluative vs. non-evaluative meanings in §2. This case also illustrates the indispensability of the event argument: if BORING′ had only two arguments, for a stimulus and experiencer, there would be nothing for GEN to bind, resulting in vacuous quantification.[27]

We've now seen how to capture the two readings of *fun* adjectives by applying the machinery from an orthodox account of verbal generics. This experiential approach to *fun* adjectives has the advantages — which no other existing theories can claim — of (*i*) representing both the E- and N-readings in the semantics, and at least starting to make sense of (*ii*) the distributional parallels with eventives, (*iii*) the possibility of *when*-restrictors sans overt quantifiers, (*iv*) the AdvQ-insertion diagnostic behavior, and (*v*) the truth-conditional similarity to the two readings of Object-Experiencer Verbs.

In §2 we'll see another important motivation for this account. We can use the modality of GEN to capture a difference in meaning between bare *fun* claims (which express evaluations) and those with experiencer PPs (which ascribe dispositions) — a difference that eludes standard contextualist and relativist approaches.

2   Evaluation (or: the autocentric picture and the problem of evaluative content)

My aim thus far has been to offer an approach to the semantics of *fun* adjectives that can represent both the E- and N-readings. From this point on, we will be concerned only with the N-reading, since it is only the N-reading that exhibits the evaluativity of principal interest in the PPTs literature.

I have to this point said essentially nothing about FAULTLESS DISAGREEMENT CASES (FDCs), the topic of foremost attention in the PPTs literature.

(41)   **Amanda**: Andrei Rublev *is boring.*
       Ben: *Nuh-uh!* Andrei Rublev *is not boring.*

In this section my central claim will be that there is a fallacy at the heart of the two main accounts of FDCs — CONTEXTUALISM and RELATIVISM.[28] The fallacy is that the meaning of bare *fun* claims is on par with the meaning of their overt experiencer (OE) counterparts.

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[27]This argument is similar to and influenced by KRATZER (1995)'s argument for a Davidsonian argument in *stage-level predicates*. Vacuous quantification would at least render the interpretation of (39) trivially true. While this would be bad enough, I follow KRATZER (1995) in assuming that there is a PROHIBITION OF VACUOUS QUANTIFICATION in natural languages. Then, if we were without the event argument, there could be no reading of *fun* adjectives with GEN when both the stimulus and experiencer arguments are filled by constants. We'd then be at a loss to capture the *fun* ambiguity.

[28]My discussion gives short shrift to FIRST-PERSONAL GENERICITY (MOLTMANN (2010), PEARSON (2013)) and METALINGUISTIC NEGOTIATION (BARKER (2002), BARKER (2013), PLUNKETT AND SUNDELL (2013)) accounts. There are some close affinities between the experiential approach I defend and first-personal genericity accounts: I agree with MOLTMANN (2010) and PEARSON (2013) that evaluative *fun* sentences have absolutist (rather than contextualist or relativist) truth-conditions, and that genericity plays a central role in their meaning.

(42) Andrei Rublev *is boring.*   BARE

(43) Andrei Rublev *is boring for* $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} me \\ Amanda \\ most\ people \\ ... \end{array} \right\}$.   OE

Contextualists take bare *fun* claims to have contents that are logically equivalent to some OE counterpart's content (which one depends on the context of utterance). Relativists have argued (and I agree) that this is a major shortcoming; the content of bare *fun* sentences cannot be logically equivalent to the content of OE sentences. Though relativists claim bare and OE sentences have distinct contents, they do not go far enough. According to relativists, bare and first-personal OE (OE-1P) sentences have distinct but cognitively equivalent contents; judging that *Andrei Rublev* is boring is no different than judging that *Andrei Rublev* is boring for me. But as I will show, this is also a mistake. I illustrate the problem with FUN BUT NOT FOR ME CASES: relativists incorrectly predict that discourses like (44) must be inconsistent.

(44) Andrei Rublev *is not boring.*   BARE   EVALUATIVE

      But since I've seen it like a million times,   OE-1P   NON-EVALUATIVE
      it is boring for me.

The experiential approach provides a straightforward and independently motivated account of these cases: the evaluative and non-evaluative interpretations express different flavors of implicit modality.

2.1   Relativism and the autocentric picture

Relativist theories are often motivated by the failure of a simple contextualist theory we'll call AUTOCENTRIC CONTEXTUALISM. Relativism and autocentric contextualism share the view that there is a close connection between judging that *Andrei Rublev* is boring and judging that *Andrei Rublev* is boring for me. I'll call this (deliberately rather vague) conception THE AUTOCENTRIC PICTURE.

Autocentric contextualists claim that bare and OE-1P *fun* claims have the same content. (For relativists, the close connection is slightly more complicated — as we'll see, they take bare and OE-1P *fun* sentences to be DIAGONALLY EQUIVALENT.)

The autocentric picture is widely endorsed throughout the PPTs literature; here are some representative quotations.

> ...[I]n calling something tasty, one expresses one's liking for its flavor.
> MACFARLANE (2014) p. 141

> When we're using aesthetic vocabulary committedly, our willingness to assert,
> and to assent to assertions of, "the dead fish smells better than the lilacs" does

hinge on (our views about) our own reactions, or dispositions to react to, the objects in question.

Egan (2010) p. 252

When I say This cake is tasty, *I commit myself to finding the cake tasty.*

Pearson (2013) p. 121

Let's take a look at autocentric contextualism. Like all other existing accounts (apart from the experiential approach), the lexical meaning of *fun* adjectives is non-experiential.[29] Contextualists claim that *fun* adjectives have an experiencer argument which is saturated by the PP in OE sentences and determined by the CONTEXT OF UTTERANCE in bare sentences.

(45)   *boring* $\leadsto$ $\lambda x \lambda y.\text{BORING}'(y,\, x)$ where $[\![\text{BORING}'(y,\, x)]\!]^g = 1$ iff

$$g(x) \text{ is disposed to be bored by } g(y)$$

(46)   Andrei Rublev *is boring for Ben.*   OE   EXPERIENCER $= [\![Ben]\!]$

(47)   Andrei Rublev *is boring* $[x]$.   BARE   EXPERIENCER $= [\![x]\!]^c$

On an <u>autocentric</u> contextualist theory, the experiencer is always fixed by the context of utterance to the speaker. For concreteness, I'll represent this with a null proform pro_S that refers in a context of utterance c to the speaker $s(c)$.

The problem for autocentric contextualism arises in FDCs; the autocentric contextualist story about FDCs is illustrated in (48). For convenience I'll call the sentence Amanda asserts BORING, the sentence Ben asserts ¬BORING, and their contents (relative to their respective contexts of utterance c_1 and c_2) $[\![\text{BORING}]\!]^{c_1}$ and $[\![\neg\text{BORING}]\!]^{c_2}$.

		CONTEXT	$[\![\cdot]\!]^c = 1$ iff
(48)	**Amanda**: Andrei Rublev *is boring* $[pro_S]$.	c_1	Amanda is disposed to experience boredom watching *Andrei Rublev*
	Ben: *Nuh-uh! It's not boring* $[pro_S]$*!*	c_2	Ben is not disposed to experience boredom watching *Andrei Rublev*

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[29]In point of fact, most theorists have been vague about primitive satisfaction conditions. However, it's pretty clear from context that everyone has a dispositional rather than experiential satisfaction condition in mind — first because almost no examples in the literature exhibit the E-reading, and second because a experiential satisfaction condition would be ludicrous without the verbal genericity needed to get the dispositional reading, and no one else posits such verbal genericity.

Relativists claim that there are two things you want your theory to capture about FDCs: (*i*) that the interlocutors *disagree* but (*ii*) neither is *at fault*. Autocentric contextualism does great on the second and poorly on the first.

Let's start with faultlessness. The standard judgment is not that agents are *invariably* faultless in asserting or accepting *fun* claims, but rather, that they are faultless just in case they correctly represent their own preferences or dispositions. In (48), for example, Amanda is faultless if she really is bored by *Andrei Rublev* and Ben is faultless if he really isn't bored by *Andrei Rublev*.

Autocentric contextualism gets this right: Amanda expresses the proposition that *Andrei Rublev* is boring for her, and Ben expresses the proposition that *Andrei Rublev* is not boring for him. Let's assume they're right about their own dispositions. Then each asserts a proposition that is true.

But autocentric contextualism founders on disagreement: Amanda and Ben assert propositions that are completely compatible, not contradictory. It looks like a simple case of talking past each other. They express the exact same contents (according to the autocentric contextualist) in (49), a case in which Amanda and Ben are clearly talking past each other.

		CONTEXT	$[\![\cdot]\!]^c = 1$ iff
(49)	**Amanda**: Andrei Rublev *is boring* **for me**.	c_1	Amanda is disposed to experience boredom watching *Andrei Rublev*
	Ben: *#Nuh-uh! It's not boring* **for me!**	c_2	Ben is not disposed to experience boredom watching *Andrei Rublev*

Enter relativism. Relativists want to preserve what autocentric contextualism got right — the autocentric bit about speakers being accountable only to their own preferences or dispositions — but to fix what autocentric contextualism got wrong — the part about Amanda and Ben talking past each other.

The core idea of relativism is that there is a single content, $[\![\text{BORING}]\!]^{c_1}$, that Amanda asserts and Ben denies, which is in some sense true *relative to* Amanda and false *relative to* Ben. There are a number of ways of implementing this idea; I'm going to focus on MacFarlane (2014)'s ASSESSOR-SENSITIVE approach.[30]

The crucial element of MacFarlane (2014)'s implementation is a CONTEXT OF ASSESSMENT (C_A). Just as a single sentence may be used in multiple contexts of utterance (C_U), a single use of a sentence may be evaluated in multiple C_As. To assess a (propositional) content ϕ is roughly to evaluate whether ϕ is true or false. Just as any C_U has a unique speaker, any C_A has a unique ASSESSOR.[31]

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[30]See Lasersohn (2005), Stephenson (2007), and Egan (2010) for other relativist accounts.

[31]I'll sometimes talk as though contents are true or false relative to an assessor, since for our purposes, all a context of assessment does is determine an assessor.

The core relativist thesis about *fun* adjectives is that the value of the experiencer argument is determined by the context of <u>assessment</u> (and set to the *assessor*) rather than the context of <u>utterance</u>. On the other hand, SEMANTIC CONTENT is fixed by the context of utterance and does not vary with the context of assessment. It will thus turn out that Ben denies the same content Amanda asserts — a content that is true in Amanda's C_A just in case *Andrei Rublev* is boring for Amanda, and true in Ben's C_A just in case *Andrei Rublev* is boring for Ben.

Here's an assessor-sensitive lexical entry for *boring* and the predictions for the faultless disagreement case:

(50)   *boring* ⤳ $\lambda x.\text{BORING}'(x)$ $[\![\text{BORING}'(x)]\!]^{g,c_U,c_A} = 1$ iff

$\text{A}(c_A)$ is disposed to be bored by $g(x)$

where $\text{A}(c_A)$ is the *assessor* in c_A

			CONTENT	C_A	$[\![\cdot]\!]^{c_U^1 c_A^n} = 1$ iff
(51)	**Amanda**:	Andrei Rublev *is boring.*	$[\![\text{BORING}'(a)]\!]^{c_U^1}$	c_A^1	Amanda is disposed to experience boredom watching *Andrei Rublev*
	Ben:	*Nuh-uh!*	$[\![\neg\text{BORING}'(a)]\!]^{c_U^1}$	c_A^2	Ben is not disposed to experience boredom watching *Andrei Rublev*

Technical gadgets aside, relativism represents a rather minimal tweak to autocentric contextualism: $[\![\text{BORING}]\!]$ is true just in case the <u>assessor</u>, rather than the speaker, is disposed to experience boredom watching *Andrei Rublev*. Amanda and Ben are faultless in (51) because each speaks the truth relative to their own context of assessment.

The autocentric picture is validated by the relativist account. There's a close connection between judging that *Andrei Rublev* is boring and finding *Andrei Rublev* boring because an agent who judges that *Andrei Rublev* is boring is setting the value of the experiencer argument to herself. There's a concomitant close connection between the meaning of a bare *fun* claim (Andrei Rublev *is boring*) and its OE-1P counterpart (Andrei Rublev *is boring for me*). Those sentences will **not** express logically equivalent contents, since the latter has the experiencer set to the speaker (and thus gets the same truth-value in any context of assessment) and the former set to the assessor (so may vary in truth-value depending on the assessor's dispositions). But they will be DIAGONALLY EQUIVALENT: if we consider a case where the context of utterance and context of assessment are <u>the same</u>, their denotation will be the same (since in such a case the speaker is identical to the assessor).

2.2 *fun but not for me* cases and the problem of evaluative content

Though FDCs provide the principal evidence for relativist accounts of *fun* adjectives, I'm going to argue that the relativist's story about them cannot be correct. The autocentric picture at the heart of the relativist's account is simply mistaken: it may be that an individual, say Amanda, believes that *Andrei Rublev* is boring, but nonetheless does not believe that *Andrei Rublev* is boring <u>for her</u>. I'll call these examples FUN BUT NOT FOR ME CASES.[32]

(53) (a) Andrei Rublev *is not boring. But since I've seen it like a million times, it's boring for me.*

  (b) *This haunted house is so frightening. But since I work here, I know all the surprises, and so it isn't frightening for me.*

  (c) *Jake's raving about Ron Paul is annoying, although it's not annoying to me anymore because I've learned to tune it out.*

  (d) *Problem #17 is difficult, but it's not difficult for me because I spent all week practicing problems like it.*

Let's spell out the details of a particular case to make sure it's clear why these raise a problem for relativism. A speaker who asserts a sentence in a context of utterance c_U^n assesses it relative to an identical context of c_A^n. Suppose that Ben asserts (53 a) in a context c_U^1; the denotation of the first sentence and the second will be incompatible, as we can see below, since the speaker $A(c_A^1)$ is identical to the assessor $S(c_U^1)$.

	DENOTATION	$[\![\cdot]\!] = 1$ iff
(54) Andrei Rublev[a] *is not boring.*	$[\![\neg\text{BORING}'(a)]\!]^{c_U^1, c_A^1}$	Ben is not disposed to experience boredom watching *Andrei Rublev*
...it's[a] boring for me.	$[\![\text{BORING}'(a)]\!]^{c_U^1, c_A^1}$	Ben is disposed to experience boredom watching *Andrei Rublev*

If the relativist semantics is correct, discourses like (53 a) are inconsistent, and anyone who produces them must be linguistically incompetent or confused.

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[32] There are a few existing non-autocentric bare *fun* claims in the literature; e.g. STEPHENSON (2007) discusses an example like (52).

(52) *The cat food must be tasty. Nico gobbled it up in thirty seconds.*

There are two significant differences between this sort of case and *fun but not for me* cases. First, the cat food case sounds much better with the indirect evidential *must*. Second — and more importantly — the cat food case involves setting the experiencer to some highly salient value ($\neq$ the speaker). In *fun but not for me* cases, the experiencer is not set to some individual other than the speaker; the speaker is expressing her own perspective. The crucial observation is that expressing your own perspective — your evaluation — is not the same thing as self-ascribing a disposition.

But these discourses aren't inconsistent. I'm going to argue that bare *fun* sentences (like Andrei Rublev *is boring*) have an EVALUATIVE CONTENT — they express EVALUATIONS, e.g. that *Andrei Rublev* <u>merits</u> boredom, that boredom is a correct or appropriate response.[33] These have a normative component that overt experiencer (OE) *fun* sentences (like Andrei Rublev *is boring for Amanda*) lack. OE *fun* sentences merely ascribe dispositions — e.g. that Amanda is disposed to experience boredom watching *Andrei Rublev*. An agent's evaluations may differ from his dispositions, as we see in *fun but not for me* cases: Ben thinks *Andrei Rublev* doesn't merit boredom, but he's disposed to experience boredom (because he's seen it like a million times).

We can get a better grip on these examples by observing that bare *fun* claims are very similar in meaning to *consider*-embeddings, and OE very similar to *find*-embeddings. For example, (55 a) and (55 b) appear to be quite good paraphrases of (53 a) and (53 b).[34]

(55) (a) *I don't consider* Andrei Rublev *boring. But since I've seen it like a million times, I find it boring.*

(b) *I consider this haunted house to be so frightening. But since I work here, I know all the surprises, and so I don't find it frightening.*

The meaning of the *find*-embeddings looks dispositional - α finds x boring or frightening just in case α is disposed to be bored or frightened by x. Though the disposition-counterfactual connection is no longer held in the esteem it once was, *if α were to ϕ then α would ψ* constitutes good (though defeasible) evidence that *α is disposed to ψ when ϕ*. Let's suppose Ben sincerely asserts (55 a) and (55 b); given the reasons he appeals to in the second sentences, it looks as though if he were to watch *Andrei Rublev*, he'd be bored, and if he were to go through the haunted house, he would not be frightened.

On the other hand, the *consider*-embeddings seem to express a sort of *evaluation*. The justifications in the second sentences of (55 a) and (55 b) suggest that while the truth-values of the *find*-embeddings depend on the vicissitudes of Ben's own history and circumstances, the *consider*-embeddings do not — they abstract away from particularities of his situation. Our evaluations are accountable to standards beyond our own preferences or dispositions.

Further evidence for the claim that there's a close connection between bare / *consider*-embedded and OE / *find*-embedded *fun* sentences comes from the fact that it's much easier to have "contrary" bare + *consider* pairs and OE + *find* pairs than vice versa.[35]

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[33]This use of *evaluative* is unconnected to either the *evaluative / dimensional* distinction of BIERWISCH (1989) or the class of *evaluative adjectives* (*stupid, clever, silly*).

[34]I have in mind with (55 a) the Neg-raised interpretation ("I consider *Andrei Rublev* not to be boring") which seems to be the most natural interpretation. I'd have put the negation where it belongs but for the fact that it sounds a little funny in most English small clauses.

[35]

(56)	Andrei Rublev *is not boring.* *But since I've seen it like a million times, I* **find** *it boring.*	BARE *find*	CONSISTENT
(57)	Andrei Rublev *is not boring.* *But since I've seen it like a million times, I* **consider** *it boring.*	BARE *consider*	WEIRD / INCONSISTENT

18

It looks plausible that bare *fun* claims express the sort of evaluations we see with *consider*-embeddings, and OE *fun* claims ascribe dispositions of the sort we see with *find*-embeddings. We've seen that this creates trouble for relativist theories: because speakers can express evaluations contrary to their own dispositions, bare and OE-1P (*for me*) sentences cannot be diagonally equivalent.

Contextualists have their own problems with evaluative content. Consider a contextualist theory according to which the experiencer argument can take values other than the speaker. The contextualist would then say that *fun but not for me* cases are consistent because the experiencer of the bare claim is fixed by context to someone other than the speaker.

$$[\![\cdot]\!]^c = 1 \text{ iff}$$

(60) Andrei Rublev *is not boring* [*pro*].

$[\![pro]\!]^c$ is disposed to experience boredom watching *Andrei Rublev*

But it's boring for me.

Ben is disposed to experience boredom watching *Andrei Rublev*

The question, then, is what possible value could $[\![pro]\!]^c$ get to capture the evaluative interpretation? One issue that relativists already press has to do with FDCs: evaluative *fun* claims can occur in FDCs, but OE sentences cannot. But what value could $[\![pro]\!]^c$ get that would make sense of FDCs — make sense of the fact that each interlocutor expresses their own evaluation?

The close connection between bare *fun* sentences and *consider*-embeddings raises another issue. What value could $[\![pro]\!]^c$ possibly take that makes sense of the fact that the speaker in (60) expresses the fact that he considers *Andrei Rublev* not to be boring? The only plausible option would appear to be that $[\![pro]\!]^c$ is the speaker, but that is exactly what *fun but not for me* discourses rule out.

The only way I can see that a contextualist might make sense of evaluative content is to introduce a distinguished value for the ideal judge or God or Clement Greenberg or whoever one might think must necessarily have *the right* point of view. This is of course completely *ad hoc* and not very explanatory. But it also faces other problems — let me mention just one. If the lexical satisfaction condition is about *dispositions* it's not clear that our stipulated experiencer will get the job done. An ideal judge is one who makes the right *evaluations*; it's not obvious that our idealized experiencer would have *dispositions* that mirror the right evaluations. It seems like we just need to *stipulate* that

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| (58) | *I don't **consider** Andrei Rublev boring.* *But since I've seen it like a million times, it's boring **for me**.* | *consider* OE | CONSISTENT |
| (59) | *I don't **find** Andrei Rublev boring.* *But since I've seen it like a million times, it's boring **for me**.* | *find* OE | WEIRD / INCONSISTENT |

the distinguished judge has dispositions that reflect true evaluations; this is on top of the (already stipulative) posit of the idealized value in the first place. So I'm skeptical.[36]

2.3 Evaluative content in the experiential approach

In contrast to relativist and contextualist theories, the experiential approach presents a very straightforward way to account for the evaluative / dispositional contrast. We need something in the ballpark of *normative modality* to capture the evaluative content of bare *fun* claims; lo and behold the experiential approach provides an independently motivated source of implicit modality, GEN. We saw various flavors of modality at work in habituals like (61 a) - (61 c).

(61) (a) *The OrangeTasticTorquenator crushes oranges.* ABILITY

    (b) *Mary smokes.* HABIT

    (c) *A gentleman doesn't peel bananas in the company of ladies.* NORM

I claimed earlier that OE *fun* claims (like Andrei Rublev *is boring for Amanda*) required dispositional modality. You might have thought you could just quantify over actual cases — that this sentence means Amanda has always or usually been bored when she watched *Andrei Rublev*. That can't be right because of cases like (62).

(62) *Since I've seen it like a million times,* Andrei Rublev *is boring for me.*

The speaker may have lost her patience for *Andrei Rublev* only on the $999,999^{th}$ viewing, but in view of her current dispositions, (62) nonetheless seems true. So we already needed modality in these cases.

Now for the bare evaluative contents. I've suggested that BORING is interpreted to mean that *Andrei Rublev* merits boredom — that boredom is an appropriate or correct response.

This can be captured if we assume that our accessibility relation R takes a world w to w' just in case agents in w' have experiential responses that are *correct, appropriate,* or *merited* given the facts at w; this comes together in (63).

(63) $[\![\text{GEN}[\text{WATCH}'(x_1, a, e)][\text{BORING}'(a, x_1, e)]]\!]^{g,w,R}$ $= 1$ iff

       For all g', w': $g \,[x_1 \; e]\, g'$ $[\![\text{BORING}'(a, x_1, e)]\!]^{g',w',R} = 1$

                            $R(w, w')$

                            $[\![\text{WATCH}'(x_1, a, e)]\!]^{g',w',R} = 1$,

     $R(w, w')$ just in case experiencers in w' respond in the manner that is correct,

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[36]There is an option that I do not discuss here: we could assume that the evaluative rather than dispositional meaning is basic. For example, EGAN (2010) proposes an account on which it is not an agent's actual dispositions but her idealized dispositions that are relevant to the truth and falsity of *fun* claims. You might think that considering (as opposed to finding) *Andrei Rublev* boring is a matter of your idealized (rather than actual) disposition to be bored. The primary problem for such an approach would be to explain why we *don't* get idealization with experiencer PPs (that is, how to get the non-evaluative dispositional interpretation) — e.g. why Andrei Rublev *is boring for Ben* is about his actual, not idealized, dispositions.

appropriate, or merited in w

"In possibilities where experiencers respond to things in the manner that is (actually) merited, all events of someone watching *Andrei Rublev* are events of *Andrei Rublev* causing them to experience boredom."

This is a reasonably accurate representation of the evaluative interpretation we've been looking for. The flavor of modality in this example is broadly NORMATIVE: the accessibility relation takes us to possibilities where agents do things the *correct* way, the way they *should*. There is one other difference with the non-evaluative representation — the experiencer is a variable x_1 bound by GEN. Since GEN is universal, this means that *anyone* who responds in the right (appropriate, merited) way would be bored. But the heavy lifting is done by the implicit normative modality.

While it is a welcome fact that an independently motivated feature of the verbal genericity framework necessary to capture the *fun* ambiguity can also be straightforwardly applied to the evaluative / non-evaluative contrast, we might worry about this unconstrained appeal to modality. Let me try to mitigate that concern with the following observation: there are habituals that exhibit the exact same normative / dispositional pattern of modal variation, and do so in a way that shows the same connection to argument structure exhibited by *fun* adjectives.[37]

(64) (a)   *Ben spells* fuchsia *f-y-u-s-h-i-a.*   DISPOSITIONAL

    (b)   *The Texas Giant is fun for Ben.*   DISPOSITIONAL

        "The way Ben's disposed to do it is..."

    (c)   *Fuchsia is spelled f-u-c-h-s-i-a.*   NORMATIVE

    (d)   *The Texas Giant is fun.*   NORMATIVE

        "The <u>right</u> way to do it is..."

(64 a) tells us how Ben is disposed to spell *fuchsia* and (64 c) tells us the correct way to spell it. Just as with *fun* adjectives, the interpretation with all the (non-event) arguments saturated is dispositional; when an argument for an agent goes missing (the speller / the experiencer), the interpretation flips to a normative one. In the absence of a convincing general story about modal variation in generics — and nobody has one on offer — this seems to be about as compelling evidence as you could get that the dispositional / normative variability is plausible.

3 Faultless disagreement (or: faultlessness without semantics)

In §2 I argued that existing accounts of faultless disagreement — with special attention to the relativist approach — could not be correct. They fail to capture the evaluative

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[37]Thanks to Matthew Stone for example (64 c).

meaning of bare *fun* claims occuring in FDCs. Does the experiential approach offer a viable alternative explanation of faultless disagreement?

Not exactly. There's no problem on the disagreement front: there's a single, shareable content for sentences like Andrei Rublev *is boring*, and a contradictory content for their negations.

But there's nothing in the theory which is supposed to represent or explain the judgments that certain disputes about taste are *faultless*. In the PPTs literature, getting faultlessness into the semantics of subjective expressions has been regarded as an important (perhaps the most important) desideratum.

I'll argue that this is a mistake and defend the view that a semantic theory has no business trying to explain or formally represent faultlessness. The relevant sorts of judgments about fault and faultlessness — let's call them F-JUDGMENTS — are doubly idiosyncratic. These two degrees of idiosyncracy militate against (different) precisifications of the hypothesis that our F-judgments are determined by facts about semantic contents.

3.1   The first degree (or: domain knowledge over linguistic competence)

The first degree of idiosyncracy (INTRA-LEXICAL IDIOSYNCRASY) is the fact that our F-judgments may diverge between two sentences even if they have (*i*) the same *fun* adjective (or other subjective expression) and (*ii*) no relevant difference in linguistic form.[38]

Here's the sort of case I have in mind. (Note that the root of *better* (*good*) is not a *fun* adjective. We'll see some cases with *fun* adjectives later.)

(67)   Andrei Rublev *is better than* Finding Nemo.   FAULTLESS

(68)   *A golf score of 73 is better than 74.*   NON-FAULTLESS

I would imagine that most people consider (67) faultless but no one thinks that (68) is faultless.[39] It is very hard to make sense of this if we assume that something in our

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[38]Let me flag what I mean by "no relevant difference in linguistic form". Though (65) and (66) both have predicative occurrences of *fun*, it shouldn't worry anyone that (65) is faultless and (66) isn't — they *do* have a relevant difference in form.

(65)   *The Texas Giant is fun.*   FAULTLESS

(66)   *The Texas Giant is fun for Ben.*   NON-FAULTLESS

Suppose you go in for a MACFARLANE (2014)-style assessor-sensitive account of *fun*. You are of course going to have to tell a story about how the assessor-sensitivity of ⟦*fun*⟧ gets "washed out" in composition in an example like (66) (presumably due to the contribution of the PP *for Ben*). It isn't hard to tell a story about the denotation ⟦*for*⟧ that will indeed deliver that prediction that (66) isn't assessor-sensitive.

[39]I am using *faultless* in a rather loose way. Strictly speaking it is *agents* who we judge faultless (or not) in accepting or asserting particular contents. Assessor-sensitive relativists, for example, think Amanda is faultless in accepting *The Texas Giant is fun* just in case it's fun for her. When I call a sentence or content faultless, I mean the sort of sentence or content which it may be faultless for one agent to accept and faultless for another to deny. So Andrei Rublev *is better than* Finding Nemo is plausibly a faultless sentence, because someone who judges *Andrei Rublev* better might be faultless to accept it, and someone who judges *Finding Nemo* better might be faultless to deny it.

semantic competence determines F-judgments — some feature present in certain *denotations* in virtue of which we judge them faultless (and absent in other denotations, in virtue of which agents judge them non-faultless).

For concreteness, let's see why this case is problematic for the assessor-sensitive relativist approach discussed in §2. Suppose *better* works the same way the relativist treated *boring*: relative to a context of assessment c_A, it takes two entities x (the worse one) and y (the better one) to the true just in case the assessor $A(c_A)$ evaluates y more favorably than x. We can then tell the same story about faultless disagreements over (67) that we told before. Suppose Amanda prefers *Finding Nemo* but Ben prefers *Andrei Rublev*: then (67) is true as assessed by Ben, and false as assessed by Amanda. Which seems to be just what we want.

Except that we don't want it for (68). But we seem to be stuck with it. There's no apparent difference in linguistic form between the two cases — nothing we can point to and say *That's why (67) is faultless and (68) isn't!* Any substantive feature the denotation of (67) has (in virtue of which it's faultless), the denotation of (68) should also have. So the assessor-sensitive relativist seems to be stuck with the prediction that (68) is also faultless.[40]

Let's consider an alternative non-linguistic explanation. Informed agents know that there is a unique, objective, factual measure for evaluating golf scores. We judge (68) non-faultless because that sentence is accountable to this objective, factual standard.

In contrast, most informed agents do not believe that there is a unique, objective, factual measure for evaluating films. We judge (67) faultless because there are candidate measures that cut either way — a measure concordant with (67) is defensible, but a measure contravening (67) is also defensible. So who is really to say?

I want to point out that while my non-linguistic explanation here may or may not get every detail exactly right, it seems undeniable that our divergent F-judgments in (67) and (68) involve an application of non-linguistic DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE rather than linguistic competence. Whatever exactly underlies our judgment that (68) is non-faultless, it has something to with what we know about *golf scores*, not about language.

For this reason, I have little sympathy for the following story you might tell to get out from under the first degree problem. You might concede that *good* can't have some faultless-making feature (e.g. assessor-sensitivity) baked into the lexical meaning. But *good* is a gradable adjective, and gradable adjectives are associated with SCALES, so why not try out the hypothesis that *good* can take two kinds of scales — an assessor-sensitive kind, and a vanilla, assessor-insensitive kind. We can now represent the difference in judgments between (67) and (68): competent linguistic agents know that evaluating golf scores takes a vanilla scale, but evaluating aesthetic matters takes an assessor-sensitive scale.

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[40]I have no objection here to the epistemic approach to faultlessness of MOLTMANN (2010) and PEARSON (2013), the "metalinguistic negotiation" approaches of PLUNKETT AND SUNDELL (2013) and BARKER (2013), or approaches like EGAN (2010) that take faultlessness to be determined not by semantics alone, but by a combination of semantics and broadly metaphysical considerations. That said, I'm skeptical that one *needs* any explanation of this sort, according to which semantic theory interacts in robust ways with whatever is responsible for faultlessness.

There's a lot wrong with this picture, but the point I want to emphasize is about explanation. We don't put stuff into a semantic theory because we *can*; we put stuff into a semantic theory when we think a semantic theory will help *explain* it. The assessor-sensitive scales do nothing to explain our F-judgments, because there needs to be a story about when *good* sentences do or don't get the assessor-sensitive scale. But why not just tell that story — a story about our domain knowledge — in the first place? The extra layer of assessor-sensitive scales is otiose.

Adjectives of "pure" assessment or evaluation like *good*, *bad*, *terrible*, *great*, and *excellent* provide no shortage of examples of the first degree of idiosyncrasy. It's clear that many evaluative judgments look subjective and non-factual, like (69), and that many others are unquestionably factual, like (70).[41]

(69) *Parachute pants are terrible.*

(70) *Orange juice is an excellent source of Vitamin C.*

What about *fun* adjectives? I can produce examples with *fun* claims that *I* certainly think are non-faultless, although (as we'll see in detail shortly) agreement on that judgment may not be universal. It's very natural to regard normatively loaded *fun* claims with high political, social, or moral stakes as non-faultless.

(71) *The climate for women in many philosophy departments is **concerning**.*

(72) *It's **disturbing** how frequently police officers shoot and kill unarmed young black men.*

(73) *The recent wave of voter ID laws in the country is **upsetting**.*

(74) *Global warming is **frightening**.*

If you showed me an example discourse in which two interlocutors disputed these claims, my judgment would certainly not be the autocentric one that each is correct so long as he accurately represents his own dispositions. I suspect that at least some relativists would view it as an unwelcome consequence if their view required them to admit that all judgments of this sort are true only in an assessor-relative sense. It is appealing to think that there *must* be a semantic difference between the relatively frivolous evaluations we make with *fun* or *tasty* and the comparatively grave ones using *disturbing* or *upsetting*. But the four examples above are all paradigmatic Obj-Exp derived participle adjectives that distribute just like *fun* and do everything *fun* does that we've talked about to this point. I don't think there's a compelling case to be made that the compositional semantic contribution of *fun* and *disturbing* are significantly different.

It might be compelling if it were impossible to get disagreements that appear faultless with *disturbing* or *upsetting* — but I don't think that's true.

(75) *Furbies are disturbing.*

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[41]Thanks to Lucy Jordan for example (70).

(76) *It's upsetting that they cancelled* Arrested Development *after only the third season.*

Which is just to say that *fun* adjectives also exhibit the first degree of idiosyncrasy. I don't deny that *disturbing* disputes are less likely than *fun* disputes to appear faultless, but the reason — once again — has to do with our domain knowledge or beliefs: we're more inclined to think there's a fact of the matter about what merits being disturbed and less inclined to think there's a fact of the matter about what merits enjoyment.

3.2   The second degree (or: it's just a matter of taste what's a matter of taste)

There's a version of the thesis that faultlessness is semantic that doesn't fall prey to the objection raised by examples like (67) and (68). The argument crucially relied on the assumption that it is the lexical denotations of subjective predicates (like *better*) that are assessor-sensitive and thus responsible for the faultlessness of sentences like (67). But an alternative, proposed by STEPHENSON (2007), traces faultlessness to something other than predicate denotations — to the denotation of a relativist null proform PRO_j. It is open to STEPHENSON (2007) (but not e.g. MACFARLANE (2014)) to claim that the faultless-making PRO_j is present in (67) and absent in (68). Even if we don't press the concern that a principled story must be told why PRO_j occurs in (67) but not in (68), we can clearly demonstrate that this hypothesis is incorrect.

That's because of the SECOND DEGREE of idiosyncrasy: the fact that even if we fix upon a particular sentence S (relative to a context of utterance c), competent linguistic agents need not agree in their F-judgments about $[\![S]\!]^c$. But if faultlessness is something that can be read off of denotations, then agents' shared linguistic competence should yield convergence in F-judgments: anyone who knows the meaning of S in c should be able to see that it is faultless, and thereby correctly judge that it is faultless.[42]

We can see this by noting that in a case like (77), it perfectly open to Ben to respond in the hard-line blame-ascribing manner (a), and it is also perfectly open to Ben to respond in the concessive no blame-ascribing manner (b).

(77)   **Amanda**: Andrei Rublev *is boring.*

  (a) **Ben**:   *Nuh-uh! That's false! You're wrong.*   NON-FAULTLESS BEHAVIOR

  (b) **Ben**:   *Really? I don't find it boring. I didn't know*   FAULTLESS BE-
              you find it boring. It's really just a matter   HAVIOR
              of taste, though.

I claim that in (a) Ben's REVEALED F-judgment is that he regards Amanda as non-faultless (at fault), and in (b) his revealed judgment is that he regards Amanda as faultless. If Amanda's claim had (in virtue of its denotation) a faultless content, then Ben's response

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[42]This argument is similar to one given in STOJANOVICH (2007) (pp. 696 - 697) and MOLTMANN (2010) (p. 194).

in (a) would be inappropriate and confused; if Amanda's claim had (in virtue of its denotation) a non-faultless content, his response in (b) would be inappropriate and confused. But for almost any evaluative claim, competent speakers will diverge — some will be inclined to take the hard-line, and some will be concessive. This makes no sense if the denotations determine faultlessness and non-faultlessness.

The basic observation here is that for almost any evaluative claim, some people will regard it as faultless, and others will not. The epicure takes *tasty* judgments very seriously; the cineaste won't tolerate the claim that *Andrei Rublev* is boring; the roller coaster enthusiast does not regard Ben as faultless in his assertion that the Texas Giant is not fun. All of us hold dear some evaluations that we treat as though they were objective matters of fact. We dismiss others as frivolous matters of taste. But which evaluations fall into which class is not fixed for all English speakers by our shared linguistic competence; it is a product of each agent's own idiosyncratic interests, values, and beliefs.

Here's another way to put it. In his famous discussion on "the standard of taste", HUME (1757) introduced MOLEHILL / TENERIFFE CASES: aesthetic judgments (e.g. that there is "an equality of genius between Ogilby and Milton") that are simply wrong, as wrong as erroneous judgments about factual matters, as in *false* wrong. But then there are other aesthetic judgments — or better, *polar questions* — where there is no right answer. Which are matters of mere taste. (You might think an example of the latter is *Is there an equality of genius between* Andrei Rublev *and* Finding Nemo*?* but I would take issue with that.)

If faultlessness is baked into the denotations, then our semantic competence tells us which ones are the molehill / Teneriffe cases — the ones that don't have that sort of denotation. But everybody has his own idiosyncratic view about which are the molehill / Teneriffe cases, and which are the *mere* matters of taste. So it can't be baked into the denotations.

3.3   A methodological hypothesis (or: *Verfremdungseffekt*)

Before concluding, I want to mention one reason why non-faultless F-judments have been largely overlooked in the PPTs literature. There is a significant difference between the disinterested perspective of the theorist and the perspective of an agent actually involved in an evaluative dispute. As a theorist considering an imagined discourse in which Amanda and Ben disagree about whether some roller coaster (that I've never even been on!) is fun, it is very easy to reach the conclusion that there's no fact of the matter who is correct, that the disagreement is faultless. The case is so nicely symmetrical: each sincerely expresses her own point of view. Who am I to say to break the symmetry and say one is correct and the other mistaken?

But when I'm in a dispute about a matter dear to *my* taste, disagreement typically does not seem quite so faultless. Producing a sample discourse and consulting our intuitions can in this case create an artificial distance uncharacteristic of actual discourses. This distance lends undue support to the judgment of faultlessness. When we make actual evaluative claims, we typically mean them, and do not regard dissenters as faultless.

Conclusion

I mentioned at the outset that the experiential approach defended here is a radical departure from the status quo in the PPTs literature. Let me conclude by highlighting the three main points of departure.

First, most of the work in the existing literature focuses on the question of what value the experiencer argument takes in bare *fun* claims. Contextualism and relativism are simply two different stories about how this value is fixed — is it fixed by the context of utterance, or the context of assessment? But none of the three phenomena discussed here can be explained by reference to the value of the experiencer argument. You don't get an explanation of the *fun* ambiguity, or the evaluative / non-evaluative contrast, or the variability of F-judgments just by telling a story about the value of the experiencer argument.

Second, faultless disagreement cases have been at the center of almost all the discussion in the PPTs literature. But the idiosyncratic nature of F-judgments provides compelling evidence that faultlessness isn't something a semantic theory should explain. Whether a given claim is faultless or not rests on primarily non-linguistic factors.

Finally, there is the issue of classification — of PREDICATES OF PERSONAL TASTE. There has been little attention paid in the PPTs literature to the question of how best to define and circumscribe the category of PPTs. *Predicates of personal taste* is essentially just a shorthand for "predicates that look hopelessly subjective." But it may turn out — I think it does — that subjective evaluation can be grammatically realized in different ways. I have focused on *fun* adjectives because they (unlike PPTs) have well-defined distributional and compositional properties. For this reason, I am an eliminativist about predicates of personal taste: there's no place for them in our best semantic theory.

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Appendix: Prolegomenon to a more nuanced experiential semantics

There are a number of ways in which the simple semantics for *fun* adjectives presented in §1.2 would need to be revised in a more comprehensive theory. I'm going to touch on four of them and say a little about what sort of refinements are necessary.

(*i*) Eventive vs. stative

Though there are different ways of representing the eventive / stative distinction, one of them uses the Davidsonian argument: eventives have an event argument and statives don't, or perhaps statives have a state argument instead. The approach in §1.2 might suggest that *fun* adjectives just are eventive. But they aren't.

It's easy to use the closely related eventive Obj-Exp Verbs to highlight some ways in which *fun* adjectives behave like statives rather than eventives.

(*a*) They don't push the topic time forward.

(78) (a) *Ben put the DVD in the machine and pressed* Play. Andrei Rublev *bored him for the next hour.*

    (b) *Ben put the DVD in the machine and pressed* Play. ? Andrei Rublev *was boring for him for the next hour.*

(*b*) They don't easily support existential interpretations of bare plurals.

(79) (a) *[Footsteps]$_\exists$ outside the door frightened Amanda.*

    (b) *? [Footsteps]$_\exists$ outside the door were frightening for Amanda.*

(*c*) It's hard to get interpretations with repeated instances of the experience.

(80) (a) *Ben enjoyed the Texas Giant six times yesterday.*

    (b) *? The Texas Giant was fun for Ben six times yesterday.*

(*d*) They do not love embedding under Progressive aspect.

(81) (a) *This television show is boring me.*

    (b) **This television show is being boring for me.*

So we'd like to have a more nuanced story here. An approach that seems promising to me is to treat *fun* adjective denotations as introducing states that are *predicated* of events. Eventives introduce event arguments; my claim is that *fun* adjectives introduce states that are predicated of events.

(*ii*) Variable argument realization

It's natural (if a bit naive) to think that the three argument places I've posited in *fun* adjective denotations closely correspond to three elements realized in the surface structure: the stimulus argument to the subject nominal, the experiencer argument to (the object of) experiencer PPs, and the event argument to non-finite clauses (or event anaphors). It's difficult to get composition to go smoothly with a single lexical entry once you observe that all possible combinations of these are realized, except those that without either the event argument or stimulus argument:

(82) *[The Texas Giant]$_{ST}$ was fun (for me)$_{EXP}$*   [+ EVENT, + STIMULUS]
    [to ride]$_E$.

(83) *That$_E$ was fun (for me)$_{EXP}$!*   [+ EVENT, − STIMULUS]

(84) *[The Texas Giant]$_{ST}$ was fun (for me)$_{EXP}$.*   [− EVENT, + STIMULUS]

My hunch is that we could ditch the stimulus argument and treat stimulus constructions as CAUSATIVE. This would also help explain asymmetries like this one:

(85) (a)   *It was fun to walk to the park.*

(b) ?? *The park was fun to walk to.*

But there are certainly other alternatives — e.g. we could ditch the stimulus argument and assume individuals that appear to be stimuli are COERCED into events.

(*iii*) Presupposition

The material contributed by non-finite complements appears to be presupposed. BARKER (2002) makes a similar claim about the non-finite complements of evaluative adjectives (*stupid adjectives* in his terminology).

(86) (a) *It was fun to ride the Texas Giant.*

(b) *It was not fun to ride the Texas Giant.*

(c) *Was it fun to ride the Texas Giant?*

(d) *If it was fun to ride the Texas Giant, I'll ride it too.*

This is consistent with the observation that conditions contributed by non-finites map to the restrictor in the N-reading: presupposed material typically maps to the restrictor in tripartite structures.

(*iv*) Non-predicative occurrences

We've only looked at predicative occurrences of *fun* adjectives here. But of course they can appear attributively. Claim: the systematic way the *fun* ambiguity distributes disappears with attributive uses.

(87) *John is the guy who is annoying. The annoying guy was being a real jerk yesterday.*   N-reading in generic-unfriendly environment (Progressive)

(88) *John is the guy who was annoying yesterday. The annoying guy is no friend of mine.*   E-reading in generic-friendly environment (Present)

This supports the hypothesis that the alternation is a verbal genericity phenomenon. But on the other hand, how can we get both readings? Do we need to think there can be implicit genericity inside the DP?