Abstract

I argue that The Metaethical Moral Relativism has been being used as a form of support in order to commit desire–belief actions against Human Biology Principia. The lacking of Moral Epistemology allows me illustrate and explain practical downsides in the Ontological part of Moral Knowledge. I recommend a departure from The Biological Basis of Morality in favor to avoid contemporary misuses in the Justification of The Metaethical Moral Relativism.

Views of Methaetical Moral Relativism (MMR) have been found along history in order to support traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons (Francen 2007). In many times, Moral Judgements making ask us ourselves if these actions be in agreement with some particular cultures or if they could be universal accepted for the whole earth. More important, in nowadays we have many facts already proven thanks to science about what must be consider truth as part of our knowledge in Human Biology Principia (HBP), even if some group of people pretend to relativize these concepts to defend their desire–belief actions, the lacking of natural facts in the Ontological part of Moral Knowledge based on the
Biological Basis of Morality (BBM), permit us to recognize these unfunded actions which attend with the HBP.

1 Methaetical Moral Relativism

In (de Sa 2011), investigates the plausibility of relativism in metaethics, where there are common forms of relativism, which are usually defended on two grounds. The first is the observation that, when it comes to questions about what we are morally allowed or not allowed to do, people just do not seem to be able to agree. This is true of people situated in different societies with different cultures, but also of people within the same society and with similar social backgrounds. Relativists have argued that the nature of moral disagreement gives us reason to doubt that moral statements and thoughts have the same content regardless of who makes and has them. If different people actually spoke and thought about the same thing, could not we expect their moral views to converge, at least to a larger extent than they do? On the other hand, if, perhaps contrary to first appearance, statements and beliefs about, say, the moral wrongness of acts are about different things when made and had by different people, it is quite natural that different people reach different conclusions about which actions are wrong. Roughly, then, the view that such considerations have been taken to support is that moral judgements made by different people have different content depending on their different moralities.

The second aspect of moral practice sometimes adduced in support of this form of moral relativism is the connection between moral judgements and motivation. Thinking that an action is right normally makes us more inclined to do it and when we find an act morally wrong we are normally to some extent
discouraged to do it. This is often thought to be hard to explain on theories according to which moral judgements are beliefs about objective facts. Such beliefs, it is thought, cannot suffice to motivate us. But suppose that what someone’s moral judgements are about, depends on what she likes and dislikes, in such a way that her moral judgements are in line with her likings and dislikings. (We can still think of this view as saying that the content of moral judgements depends on people’s moralities. Which morality a person has, then, is determined by her likings and dislikings.) If this is so it is not at all surprising that I’m inclined to avoid doing what I think is wrong these actions are, after all, actions that I dislike.

2 Human Biology Principia

Based on (Specker 2014), is proposed the fundamentally misunderstood in the idea of moral enhancement, where scientific progress helps to understand The Biological roots of Morality (Ayala 1987), in order of the power to accept some moral norms and to reject others, independently of any natural inclinations. A natural predisposition may influence our behavior, but influence and predisposition are not the same as constraint or determination. This observation deserves attention because authors such as Konrad Lorenz (Sarkissian 2014) and Robert Ardrey (Gairdner 2008) have presented aggression and the territorial imperative as natural tendencies, which might therefore be futile to try to resist. Whether or not aggression and the territorial imperative are ingrained in our genes is neither obvious nor needs to be explored here. What needs to be said, however, the morality of the behaviors in question is to be assessed in any case by the accepted norms of morality and not by recourse to biological evidence, and that if such
tendencies or imperatives would exist, people would still have the possibility and
the duty of resisting them (even at the expense of a fitness reduction) whenever
they are seen as immoral Sturgeon and Sayre-McCord (2012). A second
observation is that some norms of morality are consistent with behaviors prompted
by natural selection, but other norms are not so. The commandment of charity,
often runs contrary to the inclusive fitness of the genes, even though it promotes
social cooperation and peace of mind. If the yardstick of morality were the
multiplication of genes, the supreme moral imperative would be to beget the
largest possible number of children and (with lesser dedication) to encourage our
close relatives to do the same. But to impregnate the most women possible is not,
in the view of most people, the highest moral duty of a man. Moral norms are not
determined by biological processes, but by cultural traditions and principles that
are products of human history. The evaluation of moral codes or human actions
must take into account biological knowledge. But for deciding which moral codes
should be accepted, biology alone is palpably insufficient.

3 Ontological part of Moral Knowledge

According to this, the Moral knowledge is about moral reality. The way in which
this is constituted is about three general possibilities present themselves.

(1) Moral reality might be theological in nature, pertaining to (say) the will of God.

(2) It might be a non-natural realm that is neither theological nor natural, but sui
generis.

(3) It might be comprehensible as a part of the natural world studied by science.
Each of these possibilities, however, is beset with difficulties, and no viable fourth alternative has been conceived.

In order to match the scientific progress with the Moral Epistemology, I decide to develop the natural facts of this.

The Moral naturalism (as a form of cognitivism) maintains that, while a distinction can be drawn between moral facts and other kinds of facts, moral facts are among the natural facts of the world. An advantage of this position for explaining the possibility of moral knowledge is that nearly everyone who rejects global skepticism grants that knowledge of natural facts is possible. The moral naturalist, therefore, is in a position to argue that moral knowledge should not be more problematic than other kinds of knowledge of the natural world. A moral naturalist can, moreover, reply to the charge that moral facts are redundant for explaining the facts of the natural world by pointing out that the burden of proof is on the critic to demonstrate that those natural facts that are also moral facts have no explanatory power. Certainly they cannot be said to lack explanatory power for the reason that they are not part of the natural world. Nor can they be said to be inaccessible to empirical study, since as part of the natural world they are knowable through experience Copp (1995).

Moral facts are said to be natural facts in that they are discoverable empirically and provide causal explanations of events in the natural world. At the same time, they are a unique category that defies identification in non-moral terms. As such, they raise again the issue of redundancy. Do we really need this special category of natural facts in order to understand the HBP? In this view some natural facts are supposed to supervene on others. That is to say, moral facts are
dependent on distinct natural facts specifiable in non–moral terms in the following way: if the moral facts were otherwise, necessarily the distinct non–moral facts on which they depend would have to be different. Take a deliberate act of cruelty done just for fun. This act is wrong in virtue of being a deliberate act of cruelty done just for fun. The fact that it is a wrong act and the fact that it is deliberately cruel done for fun are distinct facts, but the first depends on the second. Necessarily, if what was done had not been wrong, it would not have been a deliberate act of cruelty done for fun. Once this relation of supervenience is recognized, it is possible to defend the non-redundancy of moral facts by pointing out parallel relations of supervenience in the non–moral natural world and arguing that the redundancy objection proves too much, asking us to reject other non-moral categories that appear ontologically sound.

Either ethical principles, such as justice and human rights, are independent of human experience, or they are human inventions. The distinction is more than an exercise for academic philosophers. The choice between these two understandings makes all the difference in the way we view ourselves as a species. It measures the authority of religion, and it determines the conduct of moral reasoning. The two assumptions in competition are like islands in a sea of chaos, as different as life and death, matter and the void. One cannot learn which is correct by pure logic; the answer will eventually be reached through an accumulation of objective evidence.

4 Conclusion

The roots of Biological proofs reveals us that there is not relativity based on the functionality of Human Body according to science, this also telling us that the
decisions we *may* choose against oneself, does not have to affect to another one, this is, BBM can not be justified with MMR and less when a lacking of Moral Epistemology is present in these statements.

**References**


