

## Systemic Barriers to the Fight against Corruption by Anti-Corruptions Institutions in Ghana

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### Abstract

The fight against corruption has become increasingly sophisticated and such demands a well-integrated, multi-disciplinary strategy. This has necessitated the establishment of anti-corruption institutions, agencies or commissions which invariably have one or more of three functions: investigation and enforcement; corruption prevention; and awareness and education. However in Ghana, despite the existence of anti-corruption institutions, the perception of corruption has steadily increased to overwhelming levels. Why the increase in corruption in the face of these anti-corruption institutions is the subject matter of this study. This study brings to fore the systemic barriers, their frequency of occurrence and magnitude. This study aimed at identifying the challenges that affect the effectiveness of these anti-corruption institutions in Ghana. The study was purposely carried out within anti-corruption institutions in Ghana. A simple random probability sampling was employed in sampling nine (9) anti-corruption institutions in the Ashanti Region of Ghana and questionnaires administered to their administrative heads. Relative importance, frequency and severity equations were used to analyze and rank the challenges affecting the work of these institutions. Lack of political will and inadequate leadership and management with Relative importance Index RII of 0.9778 respectively were the two (2) most critical challenges affecting the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana. Lack of donor initiatives with RII of 0.6667 was considered as the least challenge. The most frequent challenge identified by the anti-corruption agencies was the lack of budget and fiscal autonomy, with an index of 0.8148. In the face of these challenges, the government of Ghana should improve upon its efforts at fighting corruption as it strengthens the various anti-corruption institutions financially and logistically.

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**Keywords:** corruption, anti-corruption institutions, ghana, effectiveness, barriers

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### INTRODUCTION

One problem among the global phenomena being addressed with greater focus is the issue of corruption. In most African countries, the situation has become endemic. Corruption has gained its roots into public institution, its office holders, private social organizations and even in some instances among the clergy. Sub-Saharan Africa is not different in terms of the corruption menace. Within the sub-Saharan African region, corruption has been considered as one of the key factors undermining development (Gray and Kaufman, 1998, Meagher, 2004, Dionisie and Checchi, 2008, Uneke, 2010) and the public sector has been noted as the place where corruption is relatively endemic. Fighting corruption in the Public sector has become difficult hence the need for anti-corruption institutions. Anti-corruption

Institutions (ACIs) are therefore complementary institutions that assist governments in fighting corruption. (De Sousa, 2009).

Anti-corruption institutions, agencies or commissions have various names but invariably have one or more of three functions: investigation and enforcement; corruption prevention; and awareness and education (Doig et al., 2006). Very few can be said to have succeeded at making any significant impact in the fight against corruption. In Ghana for instance, as reported by Ghana Anti-corruption Coalition (GACC) and National Anti-corruption Action Plan (NACAP, 2011), there are governmental anticorruption agencies like the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), Ghana Journalists Association (GJA), Economic and

Organised Crime Office (EOCO), Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Audit Service (AS), Judicial Service (JS), Attorney General's Department (AGD), Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), Ghana Police Service (GPS), Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), Public Procurement Authority (PPA) and Parliament. The Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), Forum of Religious Bodies (FORB), Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF), Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana (CDD) and many others form some of the non-governmental and private anticorruption institutions. The Corruption Perception Indexes (CPI) on Ghana by Transparency International has indicated that Ghana has always performed below average, scoring below 50 out of 100 points over the past years (TI, 2002-2013). Ghana ranked 63<sup>rd</sup> earning a minimal 46 points out of 100 performing less than six other African countries (TI, 2013). Ghana had a relatively poor performance in the index Economic Freedom (2010) report scoring 39%. In Ghana it has been estimated that as much as 10% of the total expenditure on infrastructural projects is committed annually to bribery and corruption (Short, 2010). Why Ghana has Ghana come this far with corruption in the face of all the anticorruption agencies and institutions, why does it look like all the anti-corruption institutions are proving ineffective in dealing with corruption in terms of living to their visions and missions?. This glaring problem is the concern of this study.

## REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

### Conceptual Definitions of Corruption

The definitions of corruption are varied. Within the African perspective, the traditional principle of reciprocity makes it sometimes difficult in defining what constitute a gift, a present and or a bribe. According to Søreide (2002) corruption must be understood firstly as the act that is intentional and in conflict with the principle of objectivity in public service performance. Secondly, the person who breaks the rule must derive some recognizable benefit for him/herself, his family, his friends, his tribe or party, or some other relevant group for the act to be classified as corruption. Thirdly, the benefit derived must be seen as a direct return from the specific act of "corruption".

The World Bank (2007) defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. This is a widely used definition which includes various forms of interaction between public sector officials and other agents. Money is often involved, such as in bribery or kickbacks for public procurement contracts. It has notwithstanding been acknowledged that private gains through corrupt acts can also be non-monetary, as in cases of patronage or nepotism (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006; Chabal & Daloz 1999; Olivier de Sardan 1999). The definition also covers acts where there is no interaction with external

agents or external agents are not explicitly implicated, such as the embezzlement of government funds, or the sale or misuse of government property. (Global integrity, 2009; Kokutse, 2010)

Corruption can also take place among private sector parties. Hence, an alternative definition of corruption used by Transparency International (TI) is the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. In contrast to the former definition which includes only acts involving public sector officials, TI's definition also includes similar acts in the private sector. In addition to public sector corruption, the latter definition thus includes private-private corruption. This type of corruption is understudied, despite the fact that it may reduce private sector efficiency and hence hamper development.

### Anti-corruption Institutions (ACI)

An ACI is defined as a specialized entity established by government or non-governmental bodies for the purpose of combating corruption (Tamyalew, 2010). A review of the literature on ACIs indicates that there is no standard model or definition for what constitute ACIs. Johnston and Kpundeh, 2004; De Sousa 2009 opine that while some ACIs are created from scratch, others are established based on ombudsman offices, special units within police departments, or justice departments. Despite the heterogeneous nature of these agencies, they can be broadly categorized into two types of approaches (Meagher 2004; Doig et al., 2007,): single- and multiple- agency approaches to the anti-corruption mandate. The single-agency approach is the most popular among newly created ACIs worldwide characterized by a centralized, powerful agency that focuses specifically on anti-corruption responsibilities but requires interaction with other public bodies. A classic example is the line ministries and courts. The Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) and the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) both use this type of approach and are widely viewed as role models for the establishment of successful strong, centralized anti-corruption agencies. Unfortunately, the replication of these models in their entirety, without taking into account countries' specific political, social and economic conditions has not been successful or efficient (Doig et al., 2007).

In contrast to the single-agency approach, the multiple-agency approach spreads anti-corruption mandate and responsibilities among different bodies, agencies, or departments. Under a multiple-agency approach, the anti-corruption authority shares its responsibilities with the Offices of the Ombudsman, Auditors General, or the Comptrollers General, Commissioners for Human Rights, and the Ministry of Education. The multiple-agency approach is currently used in the U.S., Brazil, France and other

countries. Regardless of whether a single- or multiple-agency approach is adopted, most ACIs have one or more of the following three universal functions: Investigation and prosecution; Corruption Prevention; Public awareness and education on the issue of corruption (Doig et al., 2007; Meagher 2004, Quah, 2009, De Speville, 2008).

#### **Challenges That Influence the Effectiveness of Acis in the Fight Against Corruption**

The effectiveness of ACIs requires a systemic and strategic partnership with other government agencies, civil society organizations, the private sector, donors, the media, and other relevant actors. Furthermore, it is important to have an effective legal framework in place as the effectiveness of ACIs is challenged when government institutions underperform and there is an adequate legal framework to address it (Doig et al., 2007).

In addition, the credibility and effectiveness of ACIs depend on the behavior of the anti-corruption agency itself. However, despite the different characteristics of various ACIs according to the contemporary literature on ACIs, there are certain factors that need to be in place for an ACI to function effectively (Johnston 1999, De Sousa 2009, Quah, 2009, De Speville, 2008; Doig et al., 2007; Johnston 2005; Dionisie and Checchi 2008). These factors can be broadly classified into two categories: exogenous and endogenous factors. Exogenous factors are external issues that affect the agency's institutional effectiveness, while endogenous factors are internal conditions that affect an ACI's ability to fight against corruption successfully.

#### **Exogenous Factors**

Exogenous factors include external factors that impede the performance of ACIs. These challenges broadly include lack of political will, unfavorable economic conditions, and lack of donor initiatives, lack of public trust and confidence, the media, and ACIs' relationship with civil society actors. In order for ACIs to be fully effective, top-level political backing and commitment is critical. This is called political will (Kpundeh and Johnston 1998). If there is political will, an incumbent government can, through legislation, empower ACIs and implement anti-corruption laws. Furthermore, the government can also provide ACIs with regular funding, assist them by working closely through various agencies, grant them access to government data, and continuously give political support to achieve concrete results. At the same time, it is also important to recognize that besides political will demonstrated at the highest levels of government, there are bottom-up sources of political will as well.

In some cases, these sources may be "street level bureaucrats," who are public officials that actually

deliver the final services to the general public and who are strongly committed to controlling, preventing waste, fraud, and abuse (Brinkerhoff, 2010). The role of these groups in whistle-blowing, voicing concerns and demands, and putting pressure on public officials is an important factor in strengthening political will. The NACAP (2011) puts it that corruption presents a nation with many very awful consequences. A problem with corruption identified by Søreide (2005); Samura (2009) is that there is little political will to combat the menace. They further opine that there are instances where corrupt officials ignore projects with real development priorities in favour of projects of less developmental consequence because of their intention to maximise personal gains. The same view is shared by (Omeje, 2008; Samura, 2009; Mustapha, 2010;). Unfavourable Economic Conditions is a major challenge. This factor has to do with macroeconomic stability and poverty, which can undermine the effectiveness of ACIs. An example of the impact of unfavorable economic conditions on an ACI is the Argentine experience. While the institution began with very good prospects for success, the deep economic crisis in the country caused shortfalls in funding, which resulted in underpaid staff and diminished morale (Meagher 2004). Other exogenous factors include lack of Donor Initiatives – which in most situations donors determine which ACI components to fund mostly based on donors' choices rather than ACIs' needs assessment (Doig et al., 2007). The lack of Public Confidence and Trust in ACIs is another factor– ACIs must command public respect and credibility given that they operate on behalf of citizens. The decline in confidence in Anti-corruptions institution's function to nib corruption in the bud causes many to fail in their bid to report corrupt officials. Another challenge is Lack of good Relationship with Civil Society Actors .An important factor impacting the effectiveness success of ACIs is building cross sectional-sectorial support to create a significant mass of public official, civil society groups, and private firms (Johnston and Kpundeh, 2004)

#### **Endogenous Factors**

Endogenous factors are the internal conditions that affect an ACI's ability to fight corruption effectively. Among others, these factors include the ACI's independence in performing its functions, the specificity of its objectives in terms of the context of the country, permanence, sufficiency of financial resources, and staff capacity (human capital).

There is the challenge of lack of institutional Independence. Independence basically refers to the ability of an ACI to carry out its mission without political interference. However, it does not mean the absence of reporting to external control. Rather, it refers to an ACI's degree of independence to freely

investigate corruption whenever it suspects it may be occurring without the punishment being cancelled or modified because of the interests of powerful individuals or groups (Johnston 1999). In order to function efficiently, the ACI should have a broad mandate without restrictions on its investigation of suspected corruption. However, at the same time, the ACI should also be held accountable for its actions, investigations, and general comportment as a government agency. In this regard, it is expected that anti-corruption institution integrate a system of checks and balances in order to maintain transparency and accountability. Another equally challenging problem has to do with poor institutional placement, inappropriate appointment and removal of the head of the ACI together with lack of budget and fiscal autonomy. In the case of ACIs, complete financial independence is not possible given that by and large the budget for these entities is prepared by the parliament and in many cases the government. Nevertheless, there needs to be a law in place that prohibits a decrease in the budget from the previous year's budget. In addition, the budget of the ACI should be reflected separately in the government's budget. This is often absent in Ghana.

There is also lack of Permanence- An essential factor in the effectiveness of ACIs is long-term durability. In particular, regular funding and continuous political and popular support is critical (De Sousa 2009). This provision averts mistakes and generates advanced technical capacity to combat corruption (Johnston 1999). Furthermore, it takes time to select and train personnel and, establish both operational and functional systems (De Speville, 2008) but permanence lack does not make the provisions available. There is usually insufficient Resources, and Inappropriate Staffing coupled with the lack of country specific objectives ,occurring in situations where ACIs are created by copying "successful models" without taking into account the country's political environment, social and economic conditions and available resources in the context where the ACI will carry out its functions (De Speville, 2008, De Sousa 2009).

The problem of insufficient internal coordination and Inadequate Leadership management constitute a challenge. Weak leadership or an inadequate or lack of a management strategy affects the performance and efficiency of ACIs (De Sousa 2009). In this regard, ACIs need to have a management team in place to lead day-to-day operations and a technical team to carry out specialized aspects of operations. Insufficient leadership results in institution's inability to implement ideas which ultimately impact the effectiveness of the ACI (Samura 2009). Leaders with high integrity are scarce to identify because in several instances corrupt officials may ignore projects with real development priorities in favour of projects

of less developmental consequence. This is done to maximize personal gains (Mustapha, 2010; Samura, 2009; Omeje, 2008).

## **METHODS**

### **Research Setting**

The study was carried out in the Ashanti region which is an administrative region in Ghana centrally located in the middle belt of Ghana. It lies between longitudes 0.15W and 2.25W, and latitudes 5.50N and 7.46N. The region shares boundaries with four of the ten political regions, Brong-Ahafo in the North, Eastern region in the east, Central region in the South and Western region in the South west. Most of the region's inhabitants are Ashanti people, one of Ghana's major ethnic groups. It is the region where most of Ghana's cocoa is grown, also a major site of Ghana's gold-mining industry. Specifically the study was situated within the Anti-corruption institutions that had their offices within the Ashanti Region of Ghana were studied

### **Research Design**

Research is a systematic method of finding solutions to problems. Vanderstroep and Johnson (2010) emphasizes that it constitute an investigation, a recording and an analysis of evidence for the purpose of gaining knowledge. The paradigm could either be quantitative or qualitative or mixed method involving the combination of the two. This research makes use of the quantitative research approach. The research design was a descriptive cross sectional. This design is relevant since its observational nature enables researcher to record information about their subjects without manipulating the study environment.

### **Population of the Study**

The population for the study included all staff of the anti-corruption institutions in the Ashanti region. There are twelve (12) public and four (4) private ACIs identified in Ghana. The public ones include; Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), Ghana Journalists Association (GJA), Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO), Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Ghana Police Service (GPS), Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), Audit Service (AS), Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), Parliament, Judicial Service (JS), Attorney-General's Department (AGD) and Public Procurement Authority (PPA). The Private anti-corruption institutions identified in Ghana include; The Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), Forum of Religious Bodies (FORB), Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF) and Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana (CDD).

### **Target Population /Unit of Analysis**

The target population of the study was heads of nine anti-corruption institutions in Kumasi that were sampled.

**Sampling procedure and Sample Size Determination**

The researcher adopted a non-probability purposive and quota sampling techniques in selecting both the Anti-corruption institutions and the research participants.

**Quota Non-Probability Sampling.** The researcher allocated a quota sample size proportional to the number of Public anti-corruption institutions and private anti-corruptions institutions. Out of the total of twelve (12) public ACIs, eight (8) representing 66.7% of public ACIs whose offices were founds in the Ashanti region was purposely selected. One out of the four privates ACIs was selected.

**Purposive Non-Probability Sampling.** This sampling technique was employed by the researcher in choosing purposely the administrative heads of the sampled anti-corruption institutions in the Ashanti region. This decision was informed by the fact that the administrative heads in the sampled institutions were deemed to have ample knowledge in responding to the research question. In total, the study was carried out in nine anti-corruption institutions that have offices in the Ashanti region of Ghana. Table 1.1 provides the names of the institutions that were engaged in the study

Table 1.1: Names of Anti-corruption institutions selected for the study

ITEM	NAME OF INSTITUTION	NUMBER SAMPLED	
		HEAD OF INSTITUTION	TOTAL
<b>A. PUBLIC ACAs</b>			
1	Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ)	1	1
2	Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO)	1	1
3	Ghana Police Service (GPS)	1	1
4	Audit Service (AS)	1	1
5	Judicial Service (JS)	1	1
6	Attorney-General's Department (AGD)	1	1
7	Public Procurement Authority (PPA)	1	1
8	Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA)		
<b>B. PRIVATE ACAs</b>			
9	Forum of Religious Bodies (FORB)	1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>

**SOURCES OF DATA**

The study used both primary data derived from the administration of questionnaires to various administrative heads and secondary data elicited from documentaries of the anti-corruption institutions as well as scholarly publications in journals, books and library search engines. Questionnaires were used to collect data.

**Measurement**

The questionnaire for the study was largely closed-ended with some response options to all attitudinal questions fully anchored on 5-point Likert scale to determine the relative importance of the challenges affecting the effective operation of ACIs (i.e., “very unimportant”, “unimportant”, “neither important nor unimportant”, “important”, and “very important”). There shall also a 3-point Likert scale to determine the frequency of occurrence of the various factors. An ordinal measurement scale, which is a ranking of rating data that normally use integers in ascending or descending order, was used in this study. The numbers assigned to the importance scale (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and the frequency scale (1, 2, 3) do not indicate that the intervals between the scales are equal, nor do they indicate absolute quantities. The respondents were asked to rank the challenges affecting effectiveness according to the degree of importance (1= very unimportant, 2= unimportant, 3= neither important nor unimportant, 4= important, and 5= very important). For analysing data by ordinal scale, an importance index (I) was used. This index was computed by the following equation:

**Equation 1.**  $RII = \frac{\sum W}{A \times N}$

Where;

$\sum W$  is the summation of the weight of each factor multiplied by number of responses

A is the highest weight

N is the total number of respondents

RII is the relative importance index

The respondents were then asked to rate the frequency of occurrence of the challenges affecting effectiveness (1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high). This was analysed using an index computed by the following equation:

**Equation 2.**  $FI = \frac{3n_1 + 2n_2 + n_3}{3(n_1 + n_2 + n_3)}$

Where;

$n_1$  is the number of respondents who answered high

$n_2$  is the number of respondents who answered medium

$n_3$  is the number of respondents who answered low

FI is the frequency index

Further analysis using a severity index was used to determine which of the challenges were the most frequent and most important relatively at the same time. The equation below was used to identify the severe challenges that affect the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana.

**Equation 3. Severity Index (SI) = RII × FI**

**Data Analysis**

The data was analyzed using relative importance, frequency and severity indexes equations and ranked

in order of importance, severity and frequency .The findings of the research are presented descriptively using tables. The researcher measured the Relative Importance, Frequency and Severity Indexes of the challenges identified with the activities of the anti-corruption institutions.

**RESULTS**

A total of nine (9) questionnaires were sent out and sorted using various demographic data. A response rate of 100% was obtained. The study identified that eight(8) institutions out of the total nine studied had male heads except the Commissioner for administrative justice whose head was a female. Only one person was a head of an institution with an HND certificate as more than half of the heads 5(56%) were Master degree holders with the remaining 3(33%) being first degree holders. Surprising, all the heads were seasoned persons with ample working experience as nobody had worked less than five years in the present capacity. The greatest majority 6(67%) had worked between 6-11 years while one third of the participants 3 (33%) had worked more than two decades (24yrs).

**Analysis and Identification of Challenges Affecting the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions in Ghana**

The aggregate analysis for challenges affecting effectiveness from all the research participants is as follows;

Table 1.2: Relative Importance Index

CHALLENGES AFFECTING EFFECTIVENESS	NO. OF RESPONDENTS					COMPUTATION			
	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL	ΣW	RII	RANK
<b>A. External Factors</b>									
1 Lack of political will	0	0	0	1	8	9	44	0.9778	1
2 Unfavourable economic conditions	0	0	0	5	4	9	40	0.8889	3
3 Lack of donor initiatives	1	1	2	4	1	9	30	0.6667	8
4 Lack of public confidence and trust in anti-corruption institutions	0	1	1	1	6	9	39	0.8667	4
5 Lack of good relationship with civil society actors	1	1	1	4	2	9	32	0.7111	7
6 Inaccessibility to information	0	1	0	6	2	9	36	0.8000	5
<b>B. Internal Factors</b>									
7 Lack of Independence	0	0	0	2	7	9	43	0.9556	2
8 Poor institutional placement	0	0	1	3	5	9	40	0.8889	3
9 Non-constructive appointment and removal process of heads of anti-corruption institutions	0	0	1	4	4	9	39	0.8667	4
10 Lack of budget and fiscal autonomy	0	0	0	5	4	9	40	0.8889	3
11 Lack of permanence	0	1	2	3	3	9	35	0.7778	6
12 Lack of country-specific objectives	0	0	3	3	3	9	36	0.8000	5
13 Insufficient resources	0	0	0	2	7	9	43	0.9556	2
14 Inappropriate staffing	0	0	0	2	7	9	43	0.9556	2
15 Lack of well-defined strategy	0	0	1	4	4	9	39	0.8667	4
16 Insufficient internal coordination/inter-agency relations	0	0	0	5	4	9	40	0.8889	3
17 Inadequate leadership and management	0	0	0	1	8	9	44	0.9778	1

With RII of 0.9778, lack of political will and inadequate leadership and management were identified as the two (2) most important challenges affecting effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions

in Ghana. This to a large extent suggests that government has a very important role to play in the work of anti-corruption institutions. The will of government becomes the will of the people. If government has a good will to combat corruption, then the fight against this menace is largely won. The top five (5) relatively most important challenges identified are; Lack of political will (0.9778), Inadequate leadership and management(0.9778),Lack of institutional independence, ( 0.9556)Insufficient resources(0.9556) , Inappropriate staffing( 0.9556). Lack of donor initiatives, with RII of 0.6667 was ranked as the least important challenge. The 5 least ranked factors by the respondents in descending order are; Inaccessibility of information (0.8000) Lack of country-specific information (0.8000), Lack of permanence (0.7778 ) ,Lack of good relations with civil society actors(0.7111), Lack of donor initiatives(0.6667 )

Table 1.3: Frequency Index

CHALLENGES AFFECTING EFFECTIVENESS	NO. OF RESPONDENTS			COMPUTATION	
	1	2	3	FI	RANK
<b>A. External Factors</b>					
1 Lack of political will	2	3	4	0.7407	3
2 Unfavourable economic conditions	1	4	4	0.7778	2
3 Lack of donor initiatives	3	5	1	0.5926	8
4 Lack of public confidence and trust in anti-corruption institutions	2	4	3	0.7037	4
5 Lack of good relationship with civil society actors	2	5	1	0.6250	7
6 Inaccessibility to information	2	5	2	0.6667	5
<b>B. Internal Factors</b>					
7 Lack of Independence	3	5	1	0.5926	8
8 Poor institutional placement	3	5	1	0.5926	8
9 Non-constructive appointment and removal process of heads of anti-corruption institutions	3	2	4	0.7037	4
10 Lack of budget and fiscal autonomy	1	3	5	0.8148	1
11 Lack of permanence	2	5	2	0.6667	5
12 Lack of country-specific objectives	1	6	2	0.7037	4
13 Insufficient resources	1	4	4	0.7778	2
14 Inappropriate staffing	1	4	4	0.7778	2
15 Lack of well-defined strategy	0	7	2	0.7407	3
16 Insufficient internal coordination/inter-agency relations	1	6	2	0.7037	4
17 Inadequate leadership and management	2	6	1	0.6296	6

The most frequent challenge identified by the respondents is the lack of budget and fiscal autonomy, with an index of 0.8148. This is due to the dependence of anti-corruption institutions on government, in that the annual budgets of these institutions are vetted and approved by government. By this government dictates the spending options of these institutions. This certainly is a challenge to the effectiveness of their work. The top five (5) most frequent challenges identified are; Lack of budget and fiscal autonomy, Unfavourable economic conditions, insufficient resources, Inappropriate staffing, Lack of political will. Here it is observed that although lack of political will is the relatively most important challenge but it is not as frequent as lack of budget

and fiscal autonomy, Unfavourable economic conditions, and insufficient resources. This highlights that anti-corruption institutions in Ghana frequently are faced with inadequate financial, human and other resources. Thus anti-corruption institutions in Ghana are most often than not under-resourced.

Lack of donor initiatives, lack of independence, and poor institutional placement with RII of 0.5926 was ranked as the least important challenges. These challenges are neither very important nor very frequent. This observation suggests that anti-corruption institutions in Ghana do not largely depend on donor initiatives and are also dependent from external influences. These institutions are also properly placed such that they are not departments within institutions of selected ministries. The five (5) least ranked factors by the respondents in descending order are; inadequate leadership and management, Lack of good relations with civil society actors, Lack of donor initiatives, Lack of independence, Poor institutional placement

Table 1.4: Severity Index

CHALLENGES AFFECTING EFFECTIVENESS	COMPUTATION			
	RII	FI	RII x FI	RANK
<b>A. External Factors</b>				
1 Lack of political will	0.9778	0.7407	0.7243	2
2 Unfavourable economic conditions	0.8889	0.7778	0.6914	3
3 Lack of donor initiatives	0.6667	0.5926	0.3951	14
4 Lack of public confidence and trust in anti-corruption institutions	0.8667	0.7037	0.6099	7
5 Lack of good relationship with civil society actors	0.7111	0.6250	0.4444	13
6 Inaccessibility to information	0.8000	0.6667	0.5333	10
<b>B. Internal Factors</b>				
7 Lack of Independence	0.9556	0.5926	0.5663	8
8 Poor institutional placement	0.8889	0.5926	0.5267	11
9 Non-constructive appointment and removal process of heads of anti-corruption institutions	0.8667	0.7037	0.6099	7
10 Lack of budget and fiscal autonomy	0.8889	0.8148	0.7243	2
11 Lack of permanence	0.7778	0.6667	0.5185	12
12 Lack of country-specific objectives	0.8000	0.7037	0.5630	9
13 Insufficient resources	0.9556	0.7778	0.7432	1
14 Inappropriate staffing	0.9556	0.7778	0.7432	1
15 Lack of well-defined strategy	0.8667	0.7407	0.6420	4
16 Insufficient internal coordination/inter-agency relations	0.8889	0.7037	0.6255	5
17 Inadequate leadership and management	0.9778	0.6296	0.6156	6

The five (5) most relatively important and most frequent challenges identified by the study are: insufficient resources, Inappropriate staffing, Lack of political will. Lack of budget and fiscal autonomy, Unfavourable economic conditions

**LIMITATION**

The study involved only anti-corruption institutions that had their offices in the Ashanti region. That is the findings of other national anti-corruption institutions which do not have their offices in the Ashanti region and were not sampled could differ. Generalising the findings of this study to all anti-corruption institutions in Ghana is therefore not possible.

**DISCUSSIONS**

The challenges that face anti-corruption institutions are severe since they are both important and frequent. These are the challenges that great impede the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana. Leading in the factors that greatly impede the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in the fight against corruption was lack of political will (Gray and Kaufman, 1998; Dionisie and Checchi; 2008; World bank, 2007Global integrity report 2009).Non constructive appointment and removal of heads of Public Anti-corruption institutions continues to be a challenge though a relatively less frequent challenge. In all such instances, abuse of public office for personal gains makes it difficult for political leaders to show much commitment. (Kokutse,2010)

There is limited commitment by government in that despite the creation of the public Anti-corruption institutions, much desires to be realised. A case in point is that despite the existence of the Public holders Act, very little is known of public office holders who have declared their assets. Anti-corruption institutions in Ghana are under-resourced and also do not have appropriate staffing fit for their tasks, set goals and objectives making them seem almost toothless in fighting corruption to the core. This supports NACAP (2011) argument that the Anti-corruptions institutions, due to under-resourcing seemed not have made any impact. Further, governments over the period are said to have a lack of good will towards the fight against corruption, hence government’s ill attitude towards partnering the work of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana (Søreide (2005; Samura (2009) with the rigour that it deserves. The research also identified lack of budget and fiscal autonomy as a challenge affecting the work of these institutions. Anti-corruption institutions, especially the public ones, do have their annual budgets vetted and most often trimmed down before approval by government. For this reason, the institutions are unable to finance projects they have planned to undertake for that year. This eventually will result in ineffectiveness. An unfavourable economic condition is among the top five challenges. The economic climate in Ghana does not seem to favour the work of the anti-corruption institutions. Laying credence to this finding is the absence of persons who De Soussa (2009) call” street level

bureaucrats” to support the crusade against corruption. Ghana has so many anti-corruption legal frameworks(Criminal code, Anti-money Laundering Act (2008);Public Procurement Act(2003);Act 663;Public Holders Act(Act 720);Whistle blowers Act, signing to the UN convention.

The political economy of Ghana has made it difficult for such middle persons to join the crusade against corruption. The absence of a complete legal framework (Doig et al 2007) guiding and protecting whistle blowers possibly accounts for the public middle class low level of involvement in crusading against corruption for genuine reasons other than for partisan political reasons as mostly characterise the few anti-corruption crusaders.

The five (5) least severe challenges identified by the study in ascending order are: inaccessibility to information, Poor institutional placement, Lack of permanence, Lack of good relationship with civil society actors, Lack of donor initiatives. In contrasting Doig et al (2006) appreciation of the scope and relationship that should exist between and among single agency Anti-corruption institution; inter-agency/internal coordination and interaction among corruption fighting institutions, this study identified lack of a good relationship with and among anti-corruption institutions as being included in the severe challenges, though it was considered least severe in relative terms to other factors.

## CONCLUSION

This study brings to the fore the challenges, their relative importance and severity to the effective operations of anti-corruption institutions. Stakeholders and government should undertake periodic audit and needs assessment of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana to identify the needed resources for the efficient operationalization of these institutions. In respect of inappropriate staff, it is hoped that appointment of heads and other staff of the institutions should be constructive, dispassionate and free from any form of unhealthy influence. Government and other stakeholders should stir up and arise with good willingness towards the fight against corruption and thus rendering the needed support to anti-corruption institutions in Ghana. Further research is expected to be conducted to look into the role civil servants and technocrats in public anti-corruption institutions play in the fight against corruption.

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