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**A German exception: the translation of *On Interpretation* by Professor Gohlke.**

**His tenth note on indeterminate propositions.**

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Abstract

Professor Paul Gohlke Professor Paul Gohlke is the only translator to fully respect Aristotle’s own conception of indeterminates. He was the first to perceive the linguistic problem raised by the indeterminate negative. All the other translators of *De Interpretatione* mistakenly render Aristotle’s indeterminates, which are particulars, as universals. The origin of this mistake lies in one of the two Arab translations.

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 Key words

indeterminate proposition(s)- unquantified proposition(s)- indeterminate(s)- particular(s)-universal(s)- Arab translation(s)- translation(s) into Arabic- logical square- quantifying morpheme(s)- quantifier(s)- mark- particular negative- particular affirmative- logical universal(s)- logical particular(s)- particular(s) of natural language- marked universal of natural language- unmarked universal of natural language- logical contradictorie(s)-contradictorie(s) of natural language- referent- sense- meaning- specific power of contradiction- contradiction in natural language- logical contradiction- Gohlke- Aristotle- Isidor Pollak- De interpretatione- On interpretation- l’interprétation- Peri Hermeneias- Hermeneutik- definite article- generic article- Ibn Hunayn- object-language- metalanguage- saturated with information- logic- natural language

 Abstract

 Professor Paul Gohlke is the only translator to fully respect Aristotle’s own conception of indeterminates. He was the first to perceive the linguistic problem raised by the indeterminate negative. All the other translators of *De Interpretatione* mistakenly render Aristotle’s indeterminates, which are particulars, as universals. The origin of this mistake lies in one of the two Arab translations.

 In Peri Hermeneias, chapter 7, Aristotle mainly studies the four marked natural propositions, which are at the origin of the logical square:

#  Pas anthropos leukos Oudeis anthropos leukos

 *Everyman (is) white No man ( is) white*

#  Esti tis anthropos leukos Ou pas anthropos leukos

 *Some man (is) white Not everyman (is) white*

 He also studies two propositions said to be indeterminate in so far as they are devoid of quantifying morphemes like **Tis**-**Some** or **Pas-Every** : *Esti anthropos leukos*, *Ouk esti anthropos leukos*. Since Aristotle explicitly says that they are both true, he implicitly says that they are particular propositions. Therefore, they mean *There are white men, There are non-white men* respectively and are semantically equivalent to the **marked** particulars *Some men are white* and *Not everyman is white* (or *Some men are not white*). An attentive Hellenist cannot but recognize that the form of the negative indeterminate *Ouk esti anthropos leukos* with the negative adverb *ouk* bearing on an *esti* signifying *there is* conveys the meaning of a negative universal proposition *There is* ***not*** *any white man*, that is, *No man is white*. Aristotle himself confesses it. For the indeterminate negative to be interpreted as a particular negative, one must mentally replace *Ouk esti anthropos leukos* by *Esti* ***ou*** *leukos anthropos There is a* ***non****-white man* with the negation *ou* bearing on *leukos* and not on the verb *esti there is*. Gohlke’s attitude is exemplary. On the one hand, he renders the indeterminates by particulars as Aristotle wants. On the other, he courageously says that we have to do with a *fait du Prince* since Aristotle enjoins us to interpret a sentence which obviously has the meaning of a universal negative as if it were a particular negative. All translators, save Gohlke, render the indeterminate propositions of chapter 7, which according to Aristotle are particular propositions, that are true by universal propositions, that are false. The unmarked natural universal *Man is white* *L’homme est blanc* is used for translatinga sentence *There are white men* *Il y a des hommes blancs* that means *Some men are white Certains hommes sont blancs*; In the same way, the universal *Man is not white*, *L’homme n’est pas blanc*, which is the unmarked universal negative and has therefore the same referent as the marked universal negative *No man is white*  *Aucun homme n’est blanc*, is used for rendering a particular negative signifying that only some men are not white. The article explains this aberration.

There exists a system of three pairs of natural contradictories :

 a

 Men are white Man is white

 Men are **not** white Man is **not** white

 bc

 All men are white Some men are white

 Some men are **not** white **No** man is white

 First act of the drama : Aristotle removes Pair **a** where two natural unmarked universals oppose one another contradictorily: *Men are white* (or *Man is white Ho anthropos esti leukos*)versus *Men are not white* (or *Man is not white Ho anthropos ouk esti leukos*). The mutilation has disastrous consequences for linguistics and logic. Second act : to render the indeterminates, one of the two translators mentioned by I. Pollak, much embarrassed by the indeterminate negative, thinks it judicious to make use of the two unmarked universals removed by Aristotle and for this reason available.

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proposition(s) indéterminée(s)- indéterminée(s)- particulière(s)- universelle(s)- traduction(s) arabe(s)- carré logique- morphème(s) quantificateur(s)- marque- proposition particulière négative- proposition particulière affirmative- universelle(s) logique(s)- particulière(s) logique(s)- particulière(s) de la langue naturelle- universelle marquée de la langue naturelle- universelle non marquée de la langue naturelle- contradictoire(s) logique(s)- contradictoire(s) de la langue naturelle- référent- sens- pouvoir spécifique de contradiction- contradiction de la langue naturelle- contradiction logique- Gohlke- Aristote- Isidor Pollak- de interpretatione- l’interprétation- On interpretation- Peri Hermeneias- Hermeneutik- traduction(s) arabe(s)- article défini- article générique- Ibn Hunayn- langue-objet- métalangue-saturée(s) d’information- logique- langue naturelle

Résumé

Le Professeur Paul Gohlke est le seul à traduire les propositions indéterminées d’Aristote conformément aux vues du maître. Il fut le premier à percevoir le problème posé par l’indéterminée négative. Tous les autres traducteurs du Peri Hermeneias rendent les indéterminées d’Aristote, qui sont des particulières, par des universelles. La faute est imputable à l’une des deux traductions arabes.

 Le chapitre 7 étudie principalement les quatre propositions naturelles marquées à l’origine du carré logique :

# Pas anthropos leukos Oudeis anthropos leukos

 *Tout homme (est) blanc Pas un homme (est) blanc*

#  Esti tis anthropos leukos Ou pas anthropos leukos

*(il) est quelque homme blanc Pas tout homme (est) blanc*

Il étudie aussi deux propositions dites indéterminées parce qu’elles sont dépourvues de morphèmes quantificateurs comme **Tis**-**Quelque** ou **Pas-Tout** : *Esti anthropos leukos*, *Ouk esti anthropos leukos*. Disant explicitement qu’elles sont toutes les deux vraies, Aristote dit implicitement que ce sont des particulières. Elles signifient donc respectivement *Il y a des hommes blancs*, *Il y a des hommes non-blancs* et sémantiquement équivalent respectivement aux particulières marquées *Certains hommes sont blancs* et *Tous les hommes ne sont pas blancs* (ou *Certains hommes ne sont pas blancs*). Tout helléniste attentif reconnaît que la forme de l’indéterminée négative *Ouk esti anthropos leukos* avec la négation *ouk* portant sur un *esti* signifiant *il y a* induit le sens d’une universelle négative *Il* ***n****’y a* ***pas*** *d’homme blanc* donc *Aucun homme n’est blanc*. Aristote lui-même l’avoue. Pour que l’indéterminée négative soit interprétée comme une particulière négative, il faut substituer mentalement à *Ouk esti anthropos leukos* un *Esti ou leukos anthropos Il y a un homme non-blanc* avec la négation *ou* portant sur *leukos* et non sur le verbe *esti il y a*. Gohlke est exemplaire. D’une part, il traduit les indéterminées par des particulières comme le veut Aristote. D’autre part, il signale avec courage qu’on a affaire à un *fait du Prince* puisque Aristote nous demande d’interpréter un tour ayant le sens d’une universelle négative comme une particulière négative. A l’exception de Gohlke, tous les traducteurs rendent les indéterminées du chapitre 7 qui dans l’esprit d’Aristote sont des particulières vraies par des universelles fausses. L’universelle affirmative naturelle non marquée *L’homme est blanc Les hommes sont blancs*  traduit un *Il y a des hommes blancs* donc *Certains hommes sont blancs*; l’universelle négative naturelle non marquée *L’homme n’est pas blanc Les hommes ne sont pas blancs*, qui a le même référent que l’universelle négative marquée *Aucun homme n’est blanc*, traduit une particulière négative voulant dire que certains hommes seulement ne sont pas blancs. L’article explique cette aberration.

 Il existe un système de trois couples de contradictoires naturelles :

 a

 Les hommes sont blancs L’homme est blanc

 Les hommes **ne** sont **pas** blancs L’homme n’est pas blanc

 bc

 Tous les hommes sont blancs Certains hommes sont blancs

 Certains hommes **ne** sont **pas** blancs **Aucun** homme **n’**est blanc

 Premier acte du drame : Aristote élimine de son champ d’observation le couple **a** où deux universelles naturelles non marquées s’opposent contradictoirement : *Les hommes sont blancs* (ou *L’homme est blanc*)versus *Les hommes ne sont pas blancs* (ou *L’homme n’est pas blanc*). Cette mutilation a des conséquences fâcheuses pour la linguistique et la logique. Second acte : un des deux traducteurs Arabes mentionnés par I. Pollak, fort embarrassé par l’indéterminée négative, croit judicieux pour rendre les indéterminées d’utiliser les deux universelles non marquées *L’homme est blanc, L’homme n’est pas blanc* qui, évincées par Aristote, sont sans emploi et donc disponibles.

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 A German exception: the translation of *On Interpretation* by Professor Gohlke.

 His tenth note on indeterminate propositions.

 *A Jean-Marie Jacques*

 The seventh chapter of Aristotle’s *On Interpretation* is a text of exceptional importance for it is at the origin of the logical square. Scholars in logic and linguistics should pay attention to a text, which represents a sort of foundation for these disciplines. Any flaw in such a text may have lasting effects and may slow down and impede the progress of logical and linguistic thought, without our being conscious of it.

 In 1951, Professor Gohlke published a duly annotated translation of *On Interpretation* in Paderborn with publishing house Ferdinand Schöningh. This present article invites the reader to pay special attention to the tenth note on Aristotle’s indeterminate propositions. This note is found in Appendix I, accompanied by a translation and a commentary. To our knowledge, Gohlke is the only translator to render Aristotle’s indeterminates in accordance with the intentions of the Master. Furthermore, he might be the first to have perceived the grammatical problem posed by the indeterminate negative.

 Aristotle wants us to interpret his indeterminate propositions as particular ones; consequently, Gohlke translates them as particulars. All of the other translators give these propositions the form of universals. However, one must concede extenuating circumstances to these translators since what Aristotle says about the indeterminate negative cannot but provoke perplexity in conscientious Hellenists. The indeterminate negative, which we are invited to interpret as a particular and therefore must render as such, is in fact a universal proposition. Once again, Gohlke seems to be original: he is the first, it seems, to have observed this incredible fact.

**1- Indeterminates in Chapter 7**

Chapter 7 examines, above all, the four model sentences at the origin of the logical square. These sentences are presented below with their scholastic symbols. The letters A and I, the first two vowels in the Latin word *affirmo*, represent the universal affirmative and the particular affirmative respectively. The letters E and O, the first and final vowels in the Latin word *nego*, represent the universal negative and the particular negative respectively.

 A E

### Pas anthropos leukos Oudeis anthropos leukos

*Every man (is) white No man (is) white*

*Jeder Mensch ist weiss Kein Mensch ist weiss*

 I O

*Esti tis anthropos leukos Ou pas anthropos leukos*

*Some men are white Not every man (is) white*

#### Irgendein Mensch ist weiss Nicht jeder Mensch ist weiss

Chapter 7 also examines two propositions that are traditionally called indeterminate[[1]](#footnote-1) propositions. These propositions are presented below. Their interpretation being problematic, the sequences of French words that accompany them should not be regarded as the early stages of a translation. They are only used to allow the non-Hellenist to identify the Greek words.

*Esti leukos anthropos Ouk esti leukos anthropos*

*est blanc homme pas est blanc homme*

*is white man not is white man*

 For Aristotle, the word ***PAS*** *(every)* of *Pas anthropos leukos* and the word ***TIS*** *(some)* of *Esti tis anthropos leukos* indicate the universal quantity and the particular quantity respectively. Both indeterminates are thus termed because they are deprived of these marks. However, even though they are not marked, Aristotle regards them as particular ones. By saying explicitly that his indeterminates are true propositions, he says implicitly that they are both particulars. The indeterminate affirmative is thus equivalent to the marked particular affirmative *Some men are white* and the indeterminate negative is equivalent to the marked particular negative *Some men are not white* *Not every man is white*.

**2 - A surprising state of affairs**

 One must therefore avoid translating Aristotle’s indeterminates by sentences equivalent to universal propositions or by those susceptible to being interpreted as such. In his translation published with Vrin, J.Tricot renders *Esti leukos anthropos, There exists (a) white man* by *L’homme est blanc*, *(****The****[[2]](#footnote-2)) man is white*. Traduttore, traditore! Propositions that for Aristotle are true particulars are rendered by false universals. In fact, a sentence such as *L’homme est mortel*, *(The) man is mortal* conveys the same information as the sentence *Tout homme est mortel* *Every man is mortal*. If, on this model, one says *L’homme est blanc (The) man is white* with the generic article *le, the*, one affirms that all men are white. When we say *L'homme n’est pas blanc* *(The) man is not white*, on the model of *L’homme n’est pas une pierre* *(The) man is no stone*, we affirm that no human is white-skinned. Some will find our judgment on Tricot’s translation rather severe. We ask the reader to consider the two following facts:

 1 Criticism of Tricot’s translation is not new. We can find it in *La Logique de Port-Royal* and the reader is invited to have a look at the wonderful chapter, in which Nicole and the Great Arnaud as the French say, examine the question. To them, sentences such as *L’homme est blanc* and *L’homme n’est pas blanc* should not be considered as particulars but as “universals, which are false”.

 2 Tricot’s way of rendering Aristotle’s indeterminates reproduces a translation error more than one thousand years old, since it can be seen in the Arab translation of Ibn Hunayn, dead in the year 910. A translator, Ibn Hunayn himself or one of his predecessors, introduced a generic article into the indeterminates. This article, I insist, is absent from them in the original Greek text and I invite the reader to regard the discrepancy between the text of Aristotle and that of Ibn Hunayn as a tremendously important fact, considering the eventual consequences. Let us consider, for example, the indeterminate affirmative. The translation error represented by the ***Al*** *insan huwa abyad,* ***(The)*** *man is white* of Ibn Hunayn consists, so to speak, in substituting ***Ho*** *anthropos esti leukos* ***(The)*** *man is white* for *Esti leukos anthropos There exists (a) white man,* in other words, in substituting a universal for a particular.

 Aristotle’s *Esti leukos anthropos* has the meaning of a particular: the verb *esti is,* placed at the beginning of the sentence and used conjointly with the noun *anthropos man*, without the definite article *ho the* means *there exists*. Thus in Aristotle, we do not have at all *Ho anthropos esti leukos* with the definite article *ho* and the verb *esti* as copula. We cannot have this because in the Athens of the 4th century BC, this sentence conveyed the same information as the marked universal *Pas anthropos leukos* *Every man (is) white*. The well-known *Kouphon ho poietes Chose légère que le poète* *A light thing, the poet is* does not mean that certain poets only are light; it means that all of them are. This translation error, which first appears in Ibn Hunayn’s text, stayed in the Aristotelian tradition, Gohlke’s translation being a glorious exception.

 Let us add a last remark. Even in supposing that the sentence with the definite generic article may occasionally have the value of a particular proposition, and this remains to be seen, it is unacceptable to use it to translate *Esti leukos anthropos,* which in Chapter 7 has the status of a paradigm. Having the significance of a particular proposition, the example sentence must be translated by a sentence having the same meaning, whatever the context. Such is the virtue of translations like *Il y a des hommes blancs* *There are some white men* *Un homme peut être blanc A man may be white*. In order to exclude the aberrant *L’homme est blanc* as a translation of Aristotle’s indeterminate affirmative, it is not necessary to demonstrate that it always has the value of a universal. It is sufficient to show that it may have this meaning on occasion.

 We invite scholars to read Gohlke. He translates the indeterminate affirmative by *Es kommt vor, dass Mensch weiss ist* *It happens that man is white* and the indeterminate negative by *Es kommt vor*, *dass Mensch nicht weiss ist* *It happens that man is not white*. These sentences are not Goethe, of course, but they have the originality of being particular propositions. Tricot in French, Cooke in English and Ibn Hunayn in Arabic all translate Aristotle’s particulars, which are true, by universals, which are false. Gohlke’s translation has existed for some fifty years and yet it is almost unheard of. In 1963, twelve years after Gohlke’s publication, the Englishman Ackrill published a translation of De Interpretatione intended to replace Cooke’s, edited by Loeb publishing house in 1938. Ackrill does not mention Gohlke’s name, and to further aggravate his case, he praises the French translation of Tricot. In 1989, the American Horn published Natural History of Negation, a monumental work containing a copious chapter on Aristotle. Once again, Gohlke’s name does not appear. Italians do mention him, indeed, but they do not take the tenth note into consideration. We cannot but prize the translation by Professor Sanmartin of Madrid. Like Gohlke, mentioned in his bibliography, he says that the indeterminate negative of Chapter 7 is a universal. But, like Tricot, of whom he speaks in laudatory terms, he maintains the venerable tradition: he introduces the definite article into Aristotle’s indeterminates.

**3 - The linguistic problem posed by the indeterminate negative in Chapter 7**

 Aristotle asks us to consider his indeterminates as particulars. In consequence, Gohlke translates them accordingly. But, in his tenth note, he draws our attention to an incredible fact, evident for those who attentively read the Greek text. According to Gohlke and Professor Sanmartin of Madrid, nay, according to Aristotle himself, as we shall see, the form of the indeterminate negative does not agree with the meaning that the Master wants us to give it. This fact will later be examined. However, let us right now evoke the problem in a few words. Because the negation *ouk not* precedes the verb *esti*, meaning *there exists*, as found in the affirmative *Esti leukos anthropos*, Hellenists spontaneously translate ***Ouk esti*** *leukos anthropos* by ***There does not exist*** *(a) white man*. This sentence is equivalent to the marked universal *Oudeis anthropos leukos* *No man is white*. Nevertheless, Aristotle asks us to interpret it as if it were *Esti* ***ou leukos*** *anthropos* *There exists (a)* ***non-white*** *man*, a sentence equivalent to the marked particular negative *Some men are not white*.

**4 - A grammatical analysis of the indeterminate affirmative**

 Unfortunate consequences of a faulty translation

Let us first consider the indeterminate affirmative, which in itself does not pose a problem since its form agrees with the meaning that Aristotle gives it. On the one hand, the verb *esti* is placed at the beginning of the sentence. For this reason, it is accentuated and does not have its clitic form, required when it is employed as copula. On the other hand, *anthropos man* is not employed with the definite article *ho the*. In order to interpret the verb *esti* in *Esti leukos anthropos*, these two facts are of equal importance and must be taken into consideration together. *Esti* does not have the role of a copula and has the meaning of *there exists*. With such grammatical features, the sentence must be translated by *There exists (a) white man*. Obviously, Aristotle’s indeterminate affirmative has the meaning of a marked particular proposition.

 Let us say again, if we had *Ho* *anthropos esti leukos*, we would have a universal, not a particular. Still, this is the form that Ibn Hunayn unduly attributes to Aristotle’s indeterminate affirmative when he renders it by *Al insan huwa abyad*. This sentence consists of three elements corresponding to those of *Ho* *anthropos esti leukos*, namely:

 -The phrase, composed of the article *al the* and the noun *insan* *man*, corresponds to the subject *ho anthropos*

- The third person pronoun *huwa* corresponds to *esti* in its role as copula

- The adjective *abyad* *white* corresponds to the predicate *leukos*.

 This sentence is artificial because in Arabic a copula is not used to link the predicate to the subject. In his commentary on *De Interpretatione*, Al-Farabi simply says *Al insan abyad*, *(The) man - white*. One of my masters, Aziz Hilal, tells me that when an Arabic philosopher made it a point of duty to translate the Greek copula *esti*, he would use the pronoun *huwa* as a tentative equivalent. This purpose to render Greek grammar exactly is praiseworthy in itself but here it is pathetic. Mind, we do not have *Ho* *anthropos esti leukos* and in *Esti leukos anthropos*, *esti* is not employed as copula but with the sense of *there exists*. Once again, someone inopportunely introduced a definite generic article into Aristotle’s indeterminates. Hence, the tradition of rendering indeterminates, which are particulars, by universals. Ibn Hunayn’s translation instilled this erroneous opinion into Arabic commentators’ minds, that the indeterminate affirmative in Aristotle was *Ho anthropos esti leukos* and that, in spite of the definite generic article *ho the,* such a sentence could have the value of a particular in Greek. Al-Farabi expresses this opinion in his comments on *De Interpretatione*, which Zimmerman translated into English:

 **“The subject in opposite unquantified sentences is expressed by a noun with the definite article**, which is something common to every language. For the way to express an unquantified subject in Persian is to attach to its name a particle corresponding to the article *al* in Arabic. **Similarly in Greek. The Greek particle, which corresponds to the Arabic *al*, is known among Greeks grammarians as *arthron*.”**

This text clearly reveals that Al-Farabi was led into error by Ibn Hunayn’s translation. In his comments on the indeterminates, he would have been less embarrassed, if he had been in contact with the Greek text. Nothing shows more his intelligence than this very embarrassment. This is the gist of his thought: on account of the generic article *al the,* one spontaneously gives *Al insan abyad* the meaning of *Kull insan abyad* *Every man is white*. But at the same time, one must imagine another usage of the sentence since Aristotle gives it the sense of a particular. Here is what he writes about the definite article:

 “ In connexion with the subject of an unquantified statement, it signifies one of the two things first mentioned. If it is used to signify that the notion is plain and not delimited by quantification, the two sentences are not contrary. But if it is used in the meaning of *every*, then the sentences are indeed contrary. For whenever we say *(the) man* in the sense of *every man*, *(the) man is white* means *every man is white* and *(the) man is not white* means *no man is white*.”

 In the passage, Al-Farabi says that the pair of sentences *(The) man is white*, *(The) man is not white* can be used in two different ways. In the first usage, the two propositions are not contrary. Both can be true, both can be stated in the same act of speech. If we admit for a second that *(The) man is white* may mean *Some men are white*, then it is true that *(The) man is not white* may mean *Some men are not white*. On this beautiful model, one could say at the same time, *(The) man plays the trumpet* and *(The) man does not play the trumpet*, *The Frenchman likes vodka* and *The Frenchman does not like vodka* and so on. In the second usage, that of the man in the street of Damascus and Tunis, *(The) man is white* and *(The) man is not white* with the generic article signify *Every man is white* and *No man is white* respectively. In fact, only the second usage is real. The first is imaginary, born out of a monumental translation error.

**5 - Gohlke's translation respects Aristotle's own conception of indeterminates**

 Aristotle wants us to interpret *Ouk esti leukos anthropos* as a particular negative. Gohlke translates it as such, despite his firm conviction that this sentence has the value of a universal proposition in Greek. Let us recall the manner in which he renders the indeterminates:

*Es kommt vor, dass Mensch weiss ist.*

*Il arrive qu’ homme soit blanc.*

*It happens that man is white.*

*Es kommt vor, dass Mensch nicht weiss ist*.

*Il arrive qu’ homme ne soit pas blanc*.

*It happens that man is not white*.

 These complex sentences contain a principal clause *Es kommt vor, dass* *It happens that* and a subordinate clause as subject. They are artificial in that the sequences *Mensch ist weiss* and *Mensch ist nicht weiss*, which play the part of the subordinate clause, are ungrammatical in German. This point will be further examined in our comments about the tenth note. Let us briefly say here that the noun *Mensch* cannot be used without an article when assuming the function of subject. Yet, although they are ungrammatical, these sequences convey an understandable meaning if used in conjunction with *Es kommt vor, dass* *It happens that*.Then, *Mensch ist weiss* indicates that humanity and white skin may be associated, *Mensch ist nicht weiss* that the same qualities may be separated. The non-Germanist must know that if these sequences appear here under the form *Mensch weiss ist*, *Mensch nicht weiss ist*, it is because of a syntactic constraint in German, requiring that if a sentence becomes a subordinate clause, the verb must always be last.

 Gohlke proposes two other ways of rendering Aristotle's indeterminates: the first consists in using the adverb *bisweilen*, *sometimes*, the second in employing *es gibt* followed by an accusative, a *tour* which corresponds to *there is there are*. So one may find *Esti leukos anthropos* rendered by *Bisweilen ist Mensch weiss* *Sometimes man is white* and *Ouk esti leukos anthropos* rendered by *Bisweilen ist Mensch nicht weiss Sometimes man is not white*. The adverb *bisweilen* may be more elegant than *Es kommt vor*, *dass* but the drawback represented by the ungrammatical sequences *Mensch ist weiss* and *Mensch ist nicht weiss* remains. The non-Germanist must know that *Mensch ist weiss* becomes *ist Mensch weiss* because of the initial position of the adverb *bisweilen* in the sentence. The *tour es gibt* *there is*,in my opinion, is the most suitable. It allows us to avoid the ungrammatical sequences illustrated above and it engenders sentences that marry well with the form that Aristotle’s indeterminates have or should have: *Es gibt einen weissen Menschen* *There is (a) white man* exactly reproduces the original Greek sentence *Esti leukos anthropos*. *Es gibt einen nicht weissen Menschen There is (a) non-white man* adequately represents the *Esti ou leukos anthropos* that mentally one must substitute for *Ouk esti leukos anthropos* if one wants to respect Aristotle’s own conception of the indeterminate negative. These three different ways of rendering the indeterminates of Chapter 7 have a point in common: they all translate particulars by particulars.

**6 –Gohlke’s insight**

Morphologically, the indeterminate negative consists of two parts: the adverb of negation *ouk* and the indeterminate affirmative. Placed as it is, this adverb bears on *esti* *there exists*. Thus, the average Hellenist will spontaneously translate *There is no white man*. With good reason, he will think that ***Ouk*** *esti leukos anthropos* has the meaning of ***Oudeis*** *anthropos leukos* ***No*** *man is white*. Such is the opinion of the erudite Gohlke. Above all, such is the opinion of Aristotle himself. In a confession not lacking in artifice, he avows that his indeterminate negative *gives the impression* of signifying the same thing as the universal negative. The artifice lies in this *gives the impression*. ***Ouk*** *esti leukos anthropos* gives the impression of meaning ***No*** *man is white* in the same way as *it rains* gives the impression of meaning *it rains*. Let us decide. ***Ouk*** *esti leukos anthropos* means***No*** *man is white* and when Aristotle enjoins us to interpret it as if it were *Esti* ***ou*** *leukos anthropos Some men are* ***not*** *white,* we hear the air of *My will is law*. We must yield to the *fait du prince*, of course, as Gohlke does, but it would be a cowardly attitude not to recognize a fact that may have had serious consequences. It is the greatness of Gohlke to have dared to criticize Aristotle and at the same time to have been the only scholar to translate according to the Master’s intentions.

 Jean-François Monteil

**Appendix I**

The complete text of the tenth footnote:

10 Hier kommt der Übersetwer in die grösste Verlegenheit, Aristoteles sagt *ouk esti leukos anthropos*, und der Zusammenhang verlangt ganz eindeutig, dies als eingeschränketes Urteil aufzufassen. Dies wäre nicht erreicht, wenn man sagte, *‘es kommt vor…’*, *‘es kommt nicht vor…’*, man muss die Verneinung zum Argumentsatz setzen *‘es kommt vor, dass nicht’*. Und man darf ja auch nicht übersetzen *‘Mensch ist nicht weiss’*, weil dies für uns keine eingeschränkte Aussage bedeuten würde. Sie kann dies freilich auch im griechischen Wortlaut nicht, denn Aristoteles sagt 17b 35 ja selber, man müsse den Satz im ersten Augenblick für gleichbedeutend halten mit *‘Kein Mensch ist weiss’*. Wir stellen also fest, dass auf dieser Stufe lediglich das Fehlen von *pas* das Zeichen für die Einschränkung des Urteils ist, und wir erinnern an Erl.7 und an die Gruppe (4) im Kapitel, wo diesselbe Formel offenbar wiederum einen eingeschrankten Satz ausdrücken soll.

1. **Hier kommt der Übersetwer in die grösste Verlegenheit, Aristoteles sagt *ouk esti leukos anthropos*, und der Zusammenhang verlangt ganz eindeutig, dies als eingeschränketes Urteil aufzufassen.**

The translator is very confused here. Aristotle says *Ouk esti leukos anthropos* and the context clearly demands that this sentence be interpreted as a particular judgment *Certains hommes ne sont pas blancs*  *Some men are not white*.

## Comments

*The sequence* Ouk esti leukos anthropos *conveys the meaning* There does not exist white man, *that is, the sense of a universal negative judgment* No man is white. *Hence, the confusion of the translator*.

1. **Dies wäre nicht erreicht, wenn man sagte, *‘es kommt vor…’*, *‘es kommt nicht vor…’*, man muss die Verneinung zum Argumentsatz setzen *‘es kommt vor, dass nicht’*.**

The right interpretation would be impossible, if after rendering the indeterminate affirmative *Esti leukos anthropos* by *Es kommt vor*, *dass Mensch weiss ist* *It happens that man is white* *Sometimes man is white*, one translated *Ouk esti leukos anthropos* by *Es kommt* ***nicht*** *vor, dass Mensch weiss ist It does* ***not*** *happen that man is white* ***At no time*** *is man white*.

 The negation must be placed in a subordinate proposition, functioning as subject of the principal proposition in the affirmative form *Es kommt vor, dass… It happens that..*  *sometimes*. It is necessary, therefore, to render *Ouk esti leukos anthropos* by *Es kommt vor, dass Mensch* ***nicht*** *weiss ist It happens that man is* ***not*** *white Sometimes man is* ***not*** *white*.

## Comments

*Let us sum up:* Ouk esti leukos anthropos *must not be translated as* Il **n**’arrive **pas** qu’ hommesoit blanc, At **no** time is man white *but rather by* Il arrive qu’homme **ne** soit **pas**blanc, Sometimes man is **not** white. *Let us recall that to render* Ouk esti leukos anthropos *and give such a sentence the meaning of a particular proposition, Gohlke uses three different expressions*.

1 – Es kommt vor, dass Mensch **nicht** weiss ist.

 Il arrive qu’homme **ne** soit **pas** blanc.

 It happens that man is **not** white.

2 – Bisweilen ist Mensch **nicht** weiss.

 Quelquefois homme **n**’est **pas** blanc.

 Sometimes man is **not** white.

3 – Es gibt einen **nicht** weissen Menschen.

 Il y a un homme **non**-blanc.

 There are **non**-white men.

*To better understand what Gohlke does, let us use the expression* es gibt, il y a, there is (are). *The indeterminate assertion will be rendered by* Es gibt einen weissen Menschen Il y a un homme blanc there are white men *– a sentence which has the value of a particular proposition*. *The indeterminate affirmative therefore does not pose a problem*. *This is not the case for the indeterminate negative*. *If because of its place, the adverb of negation* ouk *bears on the verb* esti, il existe, there is (are), *then it is necessary to translate* Es gibt **nicht** einen weissen Menschen, *that is, in good German* Es gibt keinen weissen Menschen Il n’y a pas d’homme blanc There is no white man. *But then, the indeterminate negative has the value of a universal negative whereas Aristotle wants it to have the meaning of a particular negative*. *To conform to the intentions of the Master*, *one must therefore translate as if the adverb of negation* ouk *bore on the word* leukos, *as if one had* Esti ou leukos anthropos. *Therefore, one must render* Es gibt einen **nicht** weissen Menschen, il y a un homme non blanc, There are **non**-white men.

 *Let us sum up as we have done at the beginning of this commentary but using now the expression* es gibt, il y a, there is (are): *the sequence* Ouk esti leukos anthropos *must not be rendered as* Il n’y a **pas** d’homme blanc There is **no** man who is white *but as* Il y a un homme **non-**blanc, There are **non**-white men*.*

1. **Und man darf ja auch nicht übersetzen *‘Mensch ist nicht weiss’*, weil dies für uns keine eingeschränkte Aussage bedeuten würde.**

It is not allowed either to translate *Ouk esti leukos anthropos* by *Mensch ist nicht weiss Homme n’est pas blanc* *Man is not white*. For a German, the sentence *Mensch ist nicht weiss* cannot have the meaning of a particular negative *Einige Menschen sind nicht weiss, Certains hommes ne sont pas blancs, Some men are not white*.

## Comments

 *According to Germanists, the sequences* Mensch ist weiss, Mensch ist nicht weiss *are ungrammatical* : *the noun* Mensch *used without an article cannot have a syntactic function of subject*. *Nevertheless, Gohlke conjures up the sentence* Mensch ist nicht weiss. *In spite of its ungrammatical character*, *the* *ungrammatical* Mensch ist nicht weiss *induces a meaning one must consider*. *The sequence of these four words corresponds to the four words used in the original Greek sentence* Ouk esti leukos anthropos. *But in* Ouk esti leukos anthropos *and* Mensch ist nicht weiss, *the same four components are produced in a different order*. *The sequence* Mensch ist nicht weiss *represents the four words of the Greek sentence arranged in a order capable of producing an ungrammatical but understandable German sentence* Mensch ist nicht weiss. *If, despite its ungrammatical character, the sequence* Mensch ist nicht weiss *is produced, a German will interpret it* ***par défaut***. *He will interpret it, as if it was* Der Mensch ist nicht weiss *with the content of a negative universal proposition* Kein Mensch ist weiss. *He would interpret it as a* Der Mensch ist nicht weiss *in which a non-native speaker, somebody speaking German“ wie ein Franzose” might have dropped the article* Der. *Anyhow, it is certain that according to Gohlke, a German would never give it the meaning of a negative particular proposition* Einige Menschen sind nicht weiss, Certains hommes ne sont pas blancs, Some men are not white. *If Gohlke rejects* Mensch ist nicht weiss, *it is certain that he rejects as well* Der Mensch ist nicht weiss, *that is to say,* *the* L’homme n’est pas blanc *of Tricot*, *the* Man is not white *of Cooke*, *the* Al insan laysa huwa abyad *of Ishak ibn Honain*.

 **4 Sie kann dies freilich auch im griechischen Wortlaut nicht,**

To tell the truth, the indeterminate negative from the original Greek text *Ouk esti leukos anthropos* cannot have the meaning of a particular negative proposition *Einige Menschen sind nicht weiss, Certains hommes ne sont pas blancs, Some men are not white*.

## Comments

 *Placed as it is*, *the adverb of negation* ouk *bears on the verb* esti. *If* esti *signifies* Il existe, there is (are), *then* ouk esti leukos anthropos *signifies* Es gibt keinen weissen Mensch, Il n’existe pas d’homme blanc, there are not white men. *As a consequence*,Ouk esti leukos anthropos *signifies* Kein Mensch ist weiss, Aucun homme n’est blanc, No man is white.

 **5 denn Aristoteles sagt 17b 35 ja selber, man müsse den Satz im ersten Augenblick für gleichbedeutend halten mit *‘Kein Mensch ist weiss’*.**

For, as Aristotle says himself in 17b 35, one must at first sight consider the sentence *Ouk esti leukos anthropos* as synonymous with *Oudeis anthropos leukos, Kein Mensch is weiss, Aucun homme n’est blanc, No man is white.*

## Comments

*The evocation of what Aristotle himself says about his* Ouk esti leukos anthropos *is the culminating point of the tenth footnote*. *We will stop the translation at this point since it is necessary to pause on the image*. *So, according to Gohlke, the indeterminate negative of Chapter 7 is a universal that Aristotle asks us to interpret as a particular*. *Professor Sanmartin of Madrid shares this opinion*. *Other scholars also express their perplexity*. *Ackrill writes*: *“It is a pity that Aristotle introduces indefinite statements at all.” Gohlke’s opinion may shock some people but those whom his legitimate perplexities shock must also remember that he is also the only one to translate the indeterminate negative in accordance with the viewpoints of the Master*. *All of the other translators render the indeterminates in Chapter 7, which have the sense of particular propositions that are true, by universal propositions that are false*. *The work by Isidor Pollack published at Leipzig in 1913 can perhaps explain this error*. *An initial Arab translation rendered the indeterminates in accordance with the form they assume in Greek*. *They were then translated into sentences signifying in Arabic* Es gibt weisse Menschen, Il y a des hommes blancs, There are some men who are white *and* Es gibt keinen weissen Menschen, Il n’y a pas d’homme blanc, There is no man who is white. *Then, the translator saw that the sentence* Il n’y a pas d’homme blanc *cannot have the meaning of a particular negative*. *He should have noted the difficulty and, as Gohlke did, should have substituted* Es gibt nicht-weisse Menschen, Il y a des hommes **non** blancs, There are **non**-white men *for* Es gibt keinen weissen Menschen, Il n’y a pas d’homme blanc, There is no white man. *Instead of this, he remodeled Aristotle’s indeterminates by introducing a definite article and by making the verb* esti *a copula. This did not help anything for the* Der Mensch ist nicht weiss, L’homme n’est pas blanc *with the generic article is a universal proposition as well as* Il n’y a pas d’homme blanc. *Even things worsened*, *since the indeterminate affirmative* Esti leukos anthropos, *which means* Einige Menschen sind weiss, Some men are white *became itself a universal that is false* Der Mensch is weiss, Man is white. *For* Der Mensch ist weiss *and* Alle Menschen sind weiss *refer to the same state of things*.

 *These bad translations had bad effects which my paper of Damascus pointed to in 1996*. *They dissimulate a major fact in Chapter 7*:***Aristotle’s mutilation of a natural system***. *The sentences* Der Mensch is weiss, L’homme est blanc, (the) Man is white *and* Der Mensch is nicht weiss, L’homme n’est pas blanc, (the) Man is not white *are two great absentees from* On interpretation. *In Chapter 7*, *Aristotle did not describe them and yet it was necessary to speak of them*. *Do they not pertain to the natural system as much as the four marked propositions* *grouped into two pairs of mutually contradictory propositions* : All men are white *versus* Not all men are white Some men are not white *and* Some men are white *versus* No man is white?

*These absent sentences play a specific role in information and it is not legitimate to eliminate them*. *For example,* Men are white *does not convey the same meaning as* All men are white. *The proposition* All men are white *is what I call the* ***marked*** *universal affirmative whereas* Men are white *is what I call the* ***unmarked*** *universal affirmative*. *The marked universal contradicts* Some men are not white *whereas the unmarked universal contradicts* Men are notwhite. *Both universals affirmative of natural language, indeed, have the same referent in so far as they make known the same fact but they have not the same sense in so far as they do not exclude the same thing*. *For it is obvious that* Some men are not white *and* Men are not white *have not at all the same content. By contrast with the absent sentences, the indeterminates of Chapter 7 do not add anything to the four marked propositions considered by Aristotle*. *The indeterminate* Esti leukos anthropos, Il y a des hommes blancs, There are white men *is a sort of variant of the particular affirmative* Quelques hommes sont blancs, Some men are white. *This is also the case for the indeterminate negative* Ouk esti leukos anthropos*, however it may be interpreted*. *If it means* There are **non**-white men*, it has the meaning of the marked particular negative* Ou pas anthropos leukos Not all men are white Some men are not white. *If it means* There is no white man*, it has the meaning of the marked universal negative* Oudeis anthropos leukos, No man is white. *The Aristotelian mutilation has regrettable consequences. Because of it, one confuses natural propositions with the logical propositions that resemble them but which are radically different.*

 *If what is at stake were only a good translation of the indeterminates of Chapter 7, the translating mistake would not be something serious. The indeterminate propositions are useless. To what end would they be employed by the logician ? Aristotle’s indeterminates, we have seen, are semantically equivalent to marked propositions of the logical square. Once more, however the problematic indeterminate negative* Ouk esti leukos anthropos *may be interpreted, they add nothing to the four marked propositions of chapter 7*. *Therefore, an erroneous translation of them is of little importance in itself*. *But the drawback is that the incredible rendering hides the fact that Aristotle mutilates the system of natural language*. *How could people be aware that he eliminates* Ho anthropos esti leukos Man is white *and* Ho anthropos ouk esti leukos Man is not white*, when they see these sentences used for translating Aristotle’s indeterminates ?*

*The two sentences* Man is white, Man is not white *were not studied by Aristotle in On Interpretation, chapter 7*. *Still, they should have been closely examined like the four propositions, which, marked and explicitly quantified, constitute what is known as the square of Apuleius*. *Don’t they belong to the natural system as much as* Everyman is white, Not everyman is white, Some men are white, No man is white *?*

*The unmarked sentences Man is white, Man is not white represent what Jean-François Monteil calls the unmarked universals of the natural system.*

#####  *The system of natural language is both distinct from the underlying logical system and connected with it*. *Let us consider, for example, the universal affirmative of the underlying logical system* A or (x) f(x) → g(x) Whatever x may be, if x has the quality denoted by f, then x has the quality denoted by g. *If* f *represents the quality* man *and* g *the quality* white*,* A or (x) f(x) → g(x) *becomes* Whatever x may be, if x is man, then x is white. *It may be reasonably argued, I think, that the logical universal affirmative* A or (x) f(x) → g(x) *properly represents a referent common to two natural universals affirmative* All men are white *on the one hand and* Men are white( or Man is white) *on the other*. *They have the same referent, symbolized by* A or (x) f(x) → g(x)*, in so far as they make known the same reality*. *Still, they have not the same meaning, we have seen, in so far as they do not exclude the same thing*. *We say that they have not the same power of contradiction*.All men arewhite *apprehends what we call* totalityT *but its specific function is to contradict* Some menare not white *and exclude the content of it, that is, what we call* partial quantity *. .* Men are white *also apprehends* totality T *but its specific function is to contradict* Men are not white *and exclude the content of it, that is, what we call* zeroquantity Z. *Logicians and linguists illegitimately confuse the logical universal* A or (x) f(x) → g(x) Whatever x may be, if x is man, then x is white *and the natural universal* All men are white*, which is marked*. *This is illegitimate because the natural universal* Men are white*, which is unmarked also exists and also contains the referent symbolized by* A. *Our article*: *The logical square of Aristotle or square of Apuleius. The logical hexagon of Robert Blanché in Structures intellectuelle The triangle of Indian logic mentioned by J.M Bochenski treats of the topic at large*.

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Appendix II

##### Bibliography – Notes – Additional information

 By reason of its importance, the entry Aristotle precedes the entries Al-Farabi and Apuleius.

As expected, it is particularly ample. This special entry is composed of six parts:

 I Gohlke’s work and the standard editions of the Greek text.

 II translations of *On Interpretation* prior to Paul Gohlke.

 III translations posterior. In I, II and III is indicated how each of the mentioned translations renders the Aristotelian indeterminates of Chapter 7.

 IV grammatical remarks helping the reader to appreciate the different translations.

 V C. Sanmartin’s Spanish translation. Dating from 1988, it is relatively recent. Like Gohlke, his author perceives the problem posed by the indeterminate negative. And yet surprisingly he agrees with Jules Tricot’s bad translation.

 VI Olof Gigon’s judgement on Gohlke probably accounting for why beyond the Rhine Gohlke’s work is not recognized as it should be.

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###### I Aristotle

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 Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag, Berlin.

Aristotle, *Die Lehrschriften,* Translation, Commentary and Revision by P. Gohlke, Bande 1.9, 1947-1961.

 Bande 2, 1: *Kategorien und Hermeneutik*. Paderborn 1951.

*Es gibt einen weissen Menschen, Es gibt einen nicht weissen Menschen*.

Aristotle, *Opera*, Edition I. Bekker, Académie royale de Prusse, Reimer, 1932. Second edition revised by Olof Gigon, W. De Gruyter, Berlin 1960 (the *On Interpretation* in Vol. I).

Aristotle, *De interpretatione recognovit L. Minio-Palluelo*, Oxford, 1956.

II Translations of *On Interpretation* prior to that of Gohlke.

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**Al** insan huwa abyad, **Al** insan laysa huwa abyad

Zell, K., 1836: Aristoteles, Werke. *Organon,* oder Schriften zur Logik*.* Uebersetzt von K.Zell. Erstes Bändchen: *Kategorien, Von der Rede, als Ausdruck der Gedanken,* Stuttgart 1836

 Der Mensch ist weiss , Der Mensch ist nicht weiss

*The Organon I. On Interpretation*, H. P. Cooke, Loeb. 1938. Second edition 1973.

 *Man is white, Man is not white*

*The works of Aristotle* translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross, Vol. I: *Categoriae* and *De Interpretatione*, by E. M. Edghill, Oxford 1928, revised 1963.

 *Man is white, Man is not white*

*Organon II. De Interpretatione*, J. Tricot, Vrin, 1959.

 *L’homme est blanc, L’homme n’est pas blanc*

III Translations of *On Interpretation* posterior to that of Gohlke

Aristotle’s *Categories* and *De Interpretatione*, translated with notes by J. L. Ackrill, Oxford University Press, 1963.

 *A man is white, A man is not white*

Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, introduction, translation and notes by Antiseri, Minerva Italica, Bergamo 1969.

 *Uomo é bianco*, *Uomo non é bianco*

 Aristotle’s *Categories and Propositions (De Interpretatione)*, translation and Commentary

 by H. G. Apostle, The Peripatetic Press, Grinel, Iowa 1980.

 *Man is white* or *Men are white*, *Man is not white* or *Men are not white*

 Aristotle, *Tratados de Logica (Organon) II*:

 Sobre la Interpretacion…,Introduction, Translation and Notes by C. San Martin,

 Editorial Gredos, Madrid 1988. p. 45, note 53.

 *Es (el) hombre blanco*, *No es (el) hombre blanco.*

Aristotle, *Dell’interpretazione*, Introduction, Translation and Commentary by Marcello Zanatta, Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 1992.

 *Uomo é bianco*, *Uomo non é bianco*

Zekl, H.G, 1998 : Aristoteles, *Organon.* Bd. 2 : *Kategorien / Hermeneutik* oder *Vom sprachlichen Ausdruck (De interpretatione*) ; beigegeben sind Porphyrios : *Einführung in die Kategorien des Aristoteles in die Kategorien des Aristoteles (Isagoge),* Pseudo-Platon : *Begriffsbestimmungen (Definitiones).* Herausgegeben, übersetzt, mit Einleitungen und Anmerkungen versehen von H.G. Zekl. Griechisch-deutsch, Hamburg 1998.

 Mensch is weiss, Mensch ist nicht weiss

 Aristoteles Werke in deutsche Übersetzung, *Peri Hermeneias*, Band I Teil, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 2002, traduit par Hermann Weidemann.

  *(Ein) Mensch ist weiss*, *(Ein) Mensch ist nicht weiss*

###### Al-Farabi

*Kitab Isagogi ayy al-madhal* (Isagoge or Introduction)

In the logical works of Al-Farabi, edition Danechi Payouh, Qom, 1404 after Hegira.

*Kitab al-Huruf* (The Book of Letters)

Comparative translation of Aziz Hilal, Doctoral Thesis, University of Bordeaux 1997.

*Sarh Kitab Aristutalis fi-l- ibara* (Al-Farabi’s commentary on Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias),

edited by W. Kutsch and S. Marrow, Beirut, 1960, **pp. 68-69**.

*Al-Farabi’s Commentary and short treatise on Aristotle’s* De Interpretatione

translation, introduction and notes by F. W. Zimmermann, London Oxford University Press, 1981, **pp. 62-63**.

 The extracts of Al-Farabi in my article are taken from pages 62 and 63 of the English translation. One can advantageously read Zimmermann’s first note on Al-Farabi’s comments where he unduly attributes a definite article to the Aristotelian indeterminates (page 63):

**“In the Greek text, however, the example sentences at 17b 9f are without article.”** Considering the importance of the fact, the note is evidently a little short. Yet this is better than nothing. Impossible, for example, to find an equivalent in Tricot, in the notes accompanying his translation of *On Interpretation* or in his *Traité de logique formelle*. The other translators are not any more expressive on the absence of the definite article in the indeterminates of Peri Hermeneias, Chapter 7.

###### Apuleius *The Peri Hermeneias of Apuleius of Madaura*

Latin Text, English translation by D. Londey and C. Johanson in *The logic of Apuleius*, Philosophia antiqua, Volume XL VII, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1987, Part III, p. 83.

 Important for an understanding of Chapter II of Maimonides’ *Treatise on logic*.

 **IV Grammatical Remarks**

 Proverbs are universal propositions. They resemble the universal propositions of medieval philosophers such as L*’homme est mortel, L’homme n’est pas une pierre, Man is mortal, Man is no stone*. The grammarian invites the reader to observe the language of proverbs. This will help to understand the language problems raised by Aristotle’s indeterminates. Let us examine the proverb *Bon chien chasse de race*. This constitutes a universal proposition saying that all good dogs give good chase. In French, the subject is a noun without an article. This absence of an article in French proverbs characterizes the proverb as literary genre. The possibility to omit the article in noun phrases normally requiring it is linked to the systematically universal character of the proposition. If one translates the proverb into everyday language, one must then use an article with the subject. One observes then that in French, the article can be the definite article or the undefinite article: ***Un*** *bon chien chasse de race,* ***Le*** *bon chien chasse de race* are both universal propositions. In this situation, where either article may accompany the subject of the proposition, the use of the article does not influence the content of the proposition since it remains a universal in both cases. The presence of the article serves as a stylistic marker. It indicates that the register is that of everyday language, not that of the special language used in proverbs. The sentences *Souvent une femme varie, Souvent la femme varie* belong to ordinary language while *Souvent femme varie* reveals the use of a special register, that of the literary genre constituted by the proverb. Of these remarks, let us retain this: if the subject of a proposition which is systematically universal can be accompanied by either a definite article or an indefinite article, then it can be left without an article without changing its content. In such a situation, the sequence is interpreted as a universal proposition regardless of whether it is grammatical or ungrammatical in the language considered. This is illustrated in French and in German. To say that all men are mortal without using the word *all*, a native French speaker can say ***Un*** *homme est mortel* or ***L****’homme est mortel*. In the same way, whether he says ***Ein*** *Mensch ist sterblich* with the indefinite article *Ein* or ***Der*** *Mensch ist sterblich* with the definite article *Der*, the German speaker asserts that all men are mortal. What results from this is that the sequence *Homme est mortel* and *Mensch ist sterblich* will necessarily be interpreted as universals. In French, *Homme est mortel* is a grammatically correct sentence attributed to the register of the proverb whereas in German *Mensch ist sterblich* is understandable but ungrammatical because German proverbs do not use the form *Mensch ist sterblich*. Yet, in saying in the tenth footnote that the sequence *Mensch ist weiss* cannot be interpreted as a particular proposition, Gohlke suggests that *par défaut* it will be interpreted as a universal. The sentences envisaged here are fairly simple forms, associating a noun and an attribute. It seems that when the noun is placed in the position of a theme, it confers the meaning of a universal to the proposition of which it is the subject except if it is accompanied by an explicit quantifier, which gives the proposition the meaning of a particular. In *Quelques hommes sont justes, Some men are virtuous*, the word *quelque some* gives the proposition the value of a particular. Except for this case, if the noun is put in a thematic position, the proposition where it functions as subject naturally tends to be perceived as a universal. It is significant that Aristotle places the three elements of his indeterminate affirmative in the order *Esti leukos anthropos* and not in the order *Anthropos esti leukos*. In fact, it is probable that this second sequence would have been interpreted as a universal like *Ho anthropos esti leukos*. Does this affinity between the topicalization of the subject noun and the universal quantity of the proposition manifest itself in Latin? It seems to be yes. Saint Thomas Aquinas had two Latin translations of *De Interpretatione* at his disposal, one presented as being more ancient and qualified as *antiqua*, the other presented as modern and qualified as *recens*. The indeterminate *Esti leukos anthropos* from chapter 7, which has the sense of a particular, is translated in the *antiqua* by *Est albus homo* and in the *recens* by *Est homo albus*. The slight difference deserves being commented upon, of course, but I think that both renderings induce the same meaning, namely, that of a particular affirmative *There exist white men Some men are white*. If so, in this commentary I choose the form *Est albus homo* from the *antiqua* since this sequence exactly reproduces the Greek sequence *Esti leukos anthropos*. I think that the Latin translation *Est albus homo* respects Aristotle’s intentions: the *est* placed at the beginning induces the meaning of *Il y a, There are*. Therefore *Est albus homo* is to be interpreted as the particular proposition *Il existe des hommes blancs* *There are some white men*. In the lectiones X, XI, XII, XIII of his commentary, Saint Thomas replaces the *Est albus homo* of the translation by *Homo est albus*. By doing so, he aligns the form of this indeterminate with that of the universal *Homo est animal*. It is probable that this modification of the word order transforms Aristotle’s particular *Esti leukos anthropos*, which is true, into a universal, which is false. It is probable that the noun *homo* placed in the initial position tends to become the topic and the *est*, no longer in the initial position tends to assume the value of a copula. The Latinists I have consulted think that *Homo est albus* induces the meaning of a universal and that they would translate it by *L’homme est blanc, (the) Man is white* with a generic definite article *le* in French. After these remarks, I invite the reader to question if in all circumstances *Uomo è bianco, Man is white, A man is white* may have the meaning of a particular, as required by Aristotle telling us that his indeterminate affirmative is true.

 **V C. Sanmartin: p. 45, Note 53.**

 Sanmartin clearly sees the meaning that Aristotle’s indeterminates effectively have: *Il y a des hommes blancs There are some white men*, *Il n’y a pas d’homme blanc There is no white man*. This stimulates in us the feelings of estimation that one imagines. To swear that the indeterminate negative *Ouk esti leukos anthropos* from Chapter 7is a universal negative that Aristotle asks us to interpret as a particular negative is having won half the battle. But he does not dare to suggest, as does Gohlke, that the Stagirite misleads us. If it is necessary, let us repeat, to translate with perfect discipline, it must be done in all consciousness. The sequences *Es (el) hombre blanco, No es (el) hombre blanco have* reproduce the order of the Greek words, which is a good thing but why on earth does he introduce into these sequences the definite article *el* as Jules Tricot does in his wrong translation of the Aristotelian indeterminates ?

**VI Olof Gigon**

Aristotles, *Einführungsschriften*, eingeleitet, von O. Gigon, Zürich, 1961.

 The bibliography of Marcello Zanatta places this work amongst those that contain a translation of *De Interpretatione*. The directors of the University Library of Strasbourg tell me that it is not found within any of the volumes in their possession. Hermann Weidemann confirms that O.Gigon never translated “ die Hermeneutik” into German. This proves that Marcello Zanatta had a poor knowledge of the *langue tudesque* and that O.Gigon avoided translating *On Interpretation* which, of all the Aristotelian books, is the most difficult and at the same time the most *influential*. Nowadays, nobody thinks that in the literal sense of the verb *to engender*, a dunghill may engender mice and rats but nowadays logicians and linguists think that the words *affirmation* and *negation*,which belong to the object-language, which belong to the language to describe can be employed by the describing metalanguage. Nowadays, nobody believes that the sun turns round the earth but nowadays logicians and linguists confuse the sense of the logical universal *(x) f(x) → g(x) Whatever x may be, if x is* man, *then x is* white with that of the marked natural universal *All men are white Everyman is white* and thisbecause Aristotle neglected to consider the unmarked natural universal *Men are white Man is white*. Nowadays logicians and linguists confuse the sense of the natural particular negative *Some men are not white* with that of the logical particular negative *(∃x) f(x) & ~g(x)* *There exists at least one x that is* man *and* non-white and this although there is obviously more information in *Some men are not white* than in the logical particular *(∃x) f(x) & ~g(x)*. Mind, if you say *Some men are not white*, you imply that some other men are white and so exclude not only the content of *All men are white* but also that of *No man is white* whereas *There exists at least one x that is* man *and* non-white just excludes the content of *All men are white*.

 Under the heading *Texte und Literatur* (Tome I, p. 347.) O. Gigon writes in 1961: “In neuer Zeit hat P.Gohlke eine neue Gesamtübersetzung des Aristoteles in Angriff genommen und nahezu abgeschlossen. Sie hat ihre Verdienste, ist aber im einzelnen sehr unzuverlässig und von einer unrichtigen Gesamtauffassung des Aristoteles beherrscht.”

“P.Gohlke, of late, has tackled an integral translation of Aristotle and almost finished it. It is not without merit, however it is very unreliable on certain points and dominated by an erroneous general interpretation of Aristotle.” Le bon apôtre !

**Arnaud (A.) and Nicole (P.),** 1970, *La Logique ou l’Art de penser*, Flammarion, pp. 198-204, Chapter XIII of the Second section of *Logique*.

In the Observation VI of Chapter XIII, Arnaud and Nicole compare two indeterminates: *L’homme est raisonnable (The) Man is reasonable* and *L’homme est juste (The) Man is virtuous*. According to the average scholar of their time, the former is a universal, the matter of judgment there being “necessary” while the second is a particular, the matter of judgment there being “contingent”. Arnaud and Nicole are of another opinion. Both are universals, both have an identical form and particularly contain the generic article. The first is a universal, which is true, man being by definition a mortal animal endowed with reason whereas the second is a universal, which is false, human nature not being connected with justice but *by accident*. To speak as Gohlke, the attentive reader of Porphyrius and rigorous translator of Chapter 7, *Es kommt vor, dass Mensch gerecht ist, It happens that man is virtuous, Il arrive qu’homme soit juste*.

 Al-Farabi, Maimonides, Lulle and Saint Thomas Aquinas all represent the universal indeterminate by *L’homme est un animal Man is an animal* *Al insan hayawan Homo est animal*. As for the particular indeterminate, Saint Thomas and Al-Farabi commentator of Porphyrius represent it by *L’homme est blanc (The) Man is white* *Al insan abyad Homo est albus*, Lulle and Maimonides by *L’homme écrit (The) Man writes Al insan katib Homo est scriptor*. Tricot’s *Traité de logique formelle* gives an example of the universal indeterminate: *L’homme est mortel (The) Man is mortal*, but does not give any example of the particular indeterminate. Manifestly, Tricot did not want to give as an example of the particular indeterminate the *L’homme est blanc (The) Man is white* by which he renders –so badly- *Esti leukos anthropos*.

**Blanché (R.)**

- *Structures intellectuelles*, Vrin, 1966. Chapters III and IV

 Blanché substitutes the logical hexagon for the traditional square, adding to the four values A, I, E, O the value Y representing what I call **partial quantity** and the value U representing what I call **exclusion** of partial quantity. These two additions will have important effects in the domains of logic and grammar. Y symbolizes what natural particulars make known, that is, partial quantity .. A natural particular affirmative notoriously contains a greater amount of information than a logical particular affirmative. For instance, the natural particular affirmative *Some men are white* excludes both the content of a universal affirmative like *All men are white* and that of a universal negative like *No man is white* whereas the logical particular affirmative *At least one man is white* just excludes the content of *No man is white* but does not exclude that of *All men are* white. The second addition U represents the common meaning of the natural mutually contradictory propositions constituting the pair: *Men are white* versus *Men are not white*. These unmarked natural universals are those propositions that Aristotle did not consider in *On Interpretation*, Chapter 7, which results in mutilating a system of six natural propositions grouped into three pairs of contradictories. See diagram below.

#  a

*Men are white* (U) A

*Men are not white* (U) E

**b c**

*All men are white* (I) A *Some are white* (O) Y

 *Some men are not white* (I) Y *No man is white* (O) E

- *La logique et son histoire*, Armand Colin, Paris, 1970.

**Bochenski (J.M.)**, *Formale Logik*, Fribourg et Munich, Karl Alber, 1956.

Blanché translates the passage from this book in page 39 of *Structures intellectuelles*. To Y, that is, to what I call partial quantity, Indian logic gives the position it merits.

**Brunschwig (J.)**, “La proposition particulière chez Aristote”, in *Cahiers pour l’analyse*, cited by Blanché in *La logique et son histoire*, p. 34.

The author of this article insists on an important fact: the difference that exists between logical particulars and natural particulars. To employ my own terms, logical particulars are **not**-saturated with information and contain less information than the logical universals to which they are contradictorily opposed whereas natural particulars are **saturated with information** in that they contain as much information as natural universals to which they are opposed. The natural particular *Some students learn English* excludes the content of *No student learns English* but also that of *All the students learn English* whereas the logical particular ***At least one*** *of the students learns English* only excludes the content of *No student learns English*. Brushchwig writes: “La particulière ‘logique’ a eu quelque peine à tuer la particulière ‘naturelle’ mais elle a fini par y arriver.’’ “The logical particular had some difficulty eradicating the natural particular but it has finally done so.”

**Elamrani-Jamal (A.)**, *Logique aristotélicienne et grammaire arabe*, Paris, Vrin, 1983.

**Goichon (A. M.)**, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d’Ibn Sina* [Avicenne], Paris, Desclée de Brouwer 1938.

**Horn (Laurence H.),** *A natural history of negation*, The University of Chicago Press, 1989.

**Hugonnard-Roche (H.)**, “Une ancienne ‘Édition’ arabe de l’Organon d’Aristote : problèmes de traduction et de transmission“, in *Les problèmes posés par l’édition critique des textes anciens et médiévaux*, 1992, University Catherine de Louvain, Publication of the Institute of Medieval Studies.

A clear presentation of an exceptionally complicated matter.

**Jespersen (Otto)**, *The Philosophy of Grammar*, Norton Library, NY; 1965, p. 113, 152, 203.

Useful, as the work of Lyons indicated below, for an appreciation of the Anglo-Saxon translations of Aristotle’s indeterminates.

**Kant (I.)**

- *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Werke in sechs Bänden, Band II, Im Insel-Verlag, Ed. W. Weischedel, p. 453.

- *Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik*, Werke in sechs Bänden, Band III, Im Insel-Verlag, Ed. W. Weischedel, p. 443.

- *Logique*, translation by L. Guillermit and J. Vrin, 1966, p. 20.

**Kühner (R.) and Gerth (B.)**, *Ausführliche Grammatik der Griechischen Sprache*, Zweiter Teil: Satzlehre, Erster Band, Hannover und Leipzig, Hansche Buchhandlung, 1898, p. 589, 590, Anmerkung 3.

**Lambert (Johann-Heinrich)**, *Neues Organon*, Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1990, Erster Band, Dianoiologie, p. 74, paragraph 143.

 By reading John-Stuart Mill, one learns that the Republic of Mulhouse gave to the République des lettres one of its greatest minds. The French annexed Mulhouse in 1798 but always ignore Johann-Heinrich Lambert, which no one among them wants to translate. One sometimes questions why God gave Alsace to France! Lambert became famous in science and stood high in the estimation of Kant. The compliment is explicit in the *Kritik* but even more flattering for him is this irritation with which in the *Logik* Kant speaks of the *Neues Organon*. Kant thought that logic was born complete out of Aristotle’s brain and that what passes for progress in this area is just a pedagogical improvement in the manner in which it is taught. For Kant, the expression *New Organon* was a contradiction in terms.

 In logic, the Alsatian innovates. As Indian tradition and as Blanché in *Structures* *intellectuelles*, he perceives the importance of what I call partial quantity. Aristotle’s square represents what I call totality and zero quantity in its points A and E respectively. It does not represent the partial quantity explicitly. To have an explicit representation thereof, one had to wait for Blanché’s hexagon. In the logical hexagon, the “third quantity” is symbolized by Y.

**Lulle (Raymond)**, *Die Neue Logik* (Nova Logica), Edition and Critique by Charles Lohr, Latin Text, translated by All. De Vittorio Hösle and Walburga Büchel, Hambourg, Felix Meiner, 1985, p. 188-189.

**Lyons (J.)**, *Semantics I*, Cambridge University Press, 1977, Volume I, 7.2, Reference, p. 194.

Some may question if Ackrill’s translation *A man is white* represents a progress or not in comparison with Cooke’s rendering *Man is white*. I advise them to read John Lyons.

**Maimonides (M.)** *Traité de logique*, translation, presentation and notes by Rémi Brague, Midrash Collection, Desclée de Brouwer, Paris, 1996, p. 24-25.

**Makdour (I.)**, *L’Organon d’Aristote dans le monde arabe*, second edition, Paris, 1969.

**Mill (John-Stuart)**, *A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive*, Books I-III in the Collected works of John Stuart Mill, Volume 7, p. 170, Book II, Chapter ii, Paragraph 1.

**Monteil (J.-F.)**

* “De la traduction en arabe et en français d’un texte d’Aristote. Le chapitre VII du *De Interpretatione*“ in Bulletin d’Études Orientales, Volume XL VIII,, 1996, Institut Français de Damas.

The article shows the importance of the translation problems spoken of apropos of Gohlke. Inspired by a re-reading of Chapter 7 in light of Blanché’s *Structures* *intellectuelles*, these twenty pages are a thesis on the natural contradiction to be distinguished from the logical contradiction. What characterizes the natural contradiction is the fact that the propositions constituting a pair of natural contradictories, for instance *Some cats are gray* versus *No cat is gray*, are both saturated with information. What characterizes the logical contradiction is the fact that in the pair of two logical contradictories, one contains more information and therefore will be said to be saturated with information whereas the other contains less information and therefore will be said to be **not-**saturated with information. By saying *Some cats are gray*, one specifically excludes, of course, the content of *No cat is gray* but one also excludes that of *All cats are gray*. If you say that some cats are gray, you imply that some are not and if you imply that some cats are not white, you presuppose that the fact apprehended by *All cats are gray* is necessarily excluded.

Let us now consider the pair of logical contradictory propositions :

 Iversus E or *(∃x) f(x)**&**g(x)* versus *(x) f(x) → ~g(x)* to be read

 *There exists* ***at least one*** *x that has the quality denoted by* f**and** the quality denoted by g**versus** *Whatever x may be,* ***if*** *x has the quality denoted by* f, ***then*** *x has* ***not*** *the quality denoted by* g.

 If we replace *f* by *cat* and *g* by *gray*, the reading becomes: *There exists* ***at least one*** *x that is* cat ***and*** gray **versus** *Whatever x may be,* ***if*** *x is* cat, ***then*** *x is* **non**- grayor more simply

 ***At least one*** cat*is* gray versus *Whichever the* cat, *it is* **non**- gray.

 If one says ***At least one*** cat*is* gray, one does not affirm, of course, that all cats are gray but one does not exclude the possibility that all cats might be gray. I draw the reader’s attention to the importance of the ***At least one*** in the reading of the **logical** particular affirmative. It is obviously *peccaminous* to confuse the **logical** particular affirmative ***At least one*** cat*is* gray and the **natural** particular affirmative *Some cats are gray*. I say that the natural particular *Some cats are gray* is saturated with information in that it excludes both the content of *All cats are gray* and that of *No cat is gray* whereas the logical particular ***At least one*** cat*is* gray just excludes the content of *No cat is gray*. The logical particular is **not** saturated with information. If you are told that **at least one** cat is gray, you merely know that it is not the case that no cat is gray. Which, of the two remaining possibilities, is the case, you do not know. Are all cats gray or only some? You cannot answer this *crucifying* question!

 - “De la traduction en hébreu d’un texte arabe de Maimonide : le chapitre II du *Maqala fi sina at al mantiq* ou *Traité de logique*“. Version in Arabic published in December 2001 in the Journal *El Machriq* of the Jesuits of Lebanon, French version published in *Les* *Cahiers de Tunisie*.

 The article bases itself on the *Peri hermeneias* of Apuleius to explain Maimonides’ commentary on the indeterminate proposition.

**Pollak (I.)**, *Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles in der arabischen Übersetzung des Ishak ibn Honain* (*Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, XIII, Band, Number 1), Leipzig, 1913, p. 11, Notes 189 and 190.

To sum up, Isidor Pollak teaches us about the existence of two Arab translations of *On Interpretation* or *De Interpretatione*. The first is complete and is found in the Bibliothèque nationale in Paris. It is attributed to Ishak ibn Honain. *Esti leukos anthropos* is there rendered by *Al insan huwa abyad, L’homme est blanc, (The) Man is white* and *Ouk esti leukos anthropos* by *Al insan laysa huwa abyad, L’homme n’est pas blanc, (The) Man is not white*. The other is found in Berlin in the collection called Syrian Codex. *Esti leukos anthropos* is there rendered by *Yujadu insanun abyadan, Il y a un homme blanc, There is (a) white man* and *Ouk esti leukos anthropos* by *Laysa yujadu abyadan insanun, Il n’y a pas de blanc homme, There is no white man*. The translation in Paris does not conform to the linguistic data of the Greek text, which that of Berlin respects. Unfortunately, it is the first that is the object of Alfarabi’s commentary.

**Porphyrius***, Isagoge*, Translation and Notes by J. Tricot, Vrin, Paris, 1947.

**Saint Thomas Aquinas\***, *In Aristotelis stagiritae nonnullos libros commentaria*, Paris, 1989, L. Vivès, Volume XXII, Lectiones X, XI, p. 30-38.

**Strauss (Léo)**, “Note on Maïmonides’ Treatise on the Art of logic“, in Studies in Patonic political philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, 1983.

**Tricot (J.)**, *Traité de logique formelle*, Vrin, 1976. Chapter 4, p. 112-113.

In the fourth chapter is found a paragraph entitled **Reduction des indéterminées**.

Every scholastic discourse on the propositions contains such a paragraph. After having presented the four marked propositions, which must be used in the syllogism, one will say a few words about the indeterminates. They are embarrassing and, to get rid of them, one *reduces* them. Some are assimilated to universals and others to particulars. In his *Treatise on logic*, for example, Maimonides gives two examples of indeterminates: *L’homme est un animal, (The) man is an animal*, which corresponds to the marked universal *Tout homme est un animal, Every man is an animal* and *L’homme écrit, (The) man writes*, which corresponds to the marked particular *Quelques hommes écrivent, Some men write*. Tricot does not diverge from the rule. He writes: “La proposition indéterminée ne constitue pas une classe à part. Elle est ou universelle ou particulière, selon l’intention de celui qui l’énonce. Par exemple, si je dis *l’homme est mortel* en donnant au sujet la signification générale de créature raisonnable, c’est comme si je disais *tout homme.*” “The indeterminate proposition does not constitute a separate class. It is either universal or particular according to the intention of the speaker. For example, if I say *(The) man is mortal*, giving the subject the general meaning of reasonable creature, it is as if I said *every man*.” One expects the continuation “En revanche, si je dis *l’homme est blanc* c’est comme si je disais *certains hommes sont blancs*”, “On the contrary, if I say *(The) man is white*, it is as if I said *Some men are white*.” We expect Tricot to give as an example of particular indeterminate its awful *L’homme est blanc, (The) man is white*, by which he *renders* *Esti leukos anthropos*. This continuation does not follow. Tricot knows perfectly well that *L’homme est blanc, (The) man is white* is a universal, which is false, and not a particular.

 Jean-François Monteil

Maître de Conférence à

Université III de Bordeaux

33600 Pessac

Cestas, 25 mai 2001

 Monsieur,

 Bien que nous ne soyons pas à l’époque du grand Frédéric, je prends la liberté de vous écrire en français. Je lis très bien l’allemand mais je suis loin de le parler et de l’écrire avec la même aisance. L’œuvre de Gohlke est unique et il est urgent de lui rendre justice. Les Anglo-Saxons et les Latins l’ignorent, faute de savoir l’allemand. Quant aux germanophones, ils sont peut-être influencés par le jugement négatif que le Suisse Olof Gigon porte sur Gohlke et que vous trouverez à la page 12 de mon article.

 Je vous prie donc, respectueusement mais aussi d’une manière amicalement pressante, de me publier et de me publier en français. Ce serait un très grand honneur pour moi et pour vous un inconvénient mineur. André Monteil fut un des chefs de la Résistance en Bretagne mais aujourd’hui son fils aîné se bat un peu pour l’Allemagne.

 Je vous prie de bien vouloir agréer, Monsieur, l’expression de mes sentiments respectueux et amicaux.

 J F M

Hiermit sende Ich Ihnen einen Artikel, den Ich Professor Gohlkes Uebersetzung widme. Allein Gohlke hat, meiner Meinung nach, einen Text von grosser Bedeutung verstanden : das Kapitel VII in ‘’ die Hermeneutik ’’. Doch ist er bisher erstaunlicherweise in der philosophischen Gemeinschaft unterschätzt worden.

Jean-François Monteil

Université III de Bordeaux Bordeaux,

33600 Pessac

Bordeaux, den 21.Mai 2001

 Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

 Hiermit sende Ich Ihnen einen Artikel, den Ich Professor Gohlkes Uebersetzung widme. Allein Gohlke hat, meiner Meinung nach, einen Text von grosser Bedeutung verstanden : das Kapitel VII in ‘’ die Hermeneutik ’’. Doch ist er bisher erstaunlicherweise in der philosophischen Gemeinschaft unterschätzt worden.

 Mit freundichen Grüssen

 JF M

1. Zimmermann, the translator of Alfarabi’s *Commentary*, uses the term *unquantified*,which aptly indicates what indetermination is, as far as propositions are concerned. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. One says ***The*** *dog is a faithful animal* but *Man says that woman is frivolous*. In this paper, we follow the usage of the English-speaking Zimmermann, who before *man* writes the definite generic article in brackets. Thus to the translation of *Al insan abyad, L’homme est blanc*,hegives the form it should have, if *man* and *woman* were not the well-known exceptions. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)