Finality

I argue that the Bradley of the 1883 *The Principles of Logic* marks and separates contents under tension in judgments. The separation comes in attending to content as a device for recuperation of scale. For Bradley that involves scaling material of immediate presentations under limits. As unrealised commitments of so-called real and ideal are an exclusionary condition of singular comprehension, singularity of judgments is mark of singular reflex with privative force; not some singularity in objects taken in episodic correspondence forming distinctively in singular judgment. The distinguishing input, as it were, to judgment forms is via content in some consequential and fact-like limitive facing of the real.

I want to approach Bradley in this slightly negative sense as imposing via inversion some sensible restrictions under some conditions of scaling rather than in direct contact with materials to which one stands in some act of obversion, finally.

I

Bradley, at the end of that tradition that sees form of judgments in direct form of correspondence
in direct transcription of realities so corresponding, unusually, is willing to assign to judgment a merely supervenient status as product of formal relations limited as to the reality of materials actually taken up with. 'Content' in Bradley is some position put into the context of that which is obverted to. Interest lay—in Bradley's shorthand, in a form "S – P" to include (I interpolate) "S ( ) – P" *in* which material to stand within the brackets was a qualifying term—in the modulation. In Bradley's systematic transitioning of all judgments to the categorical-hypothetical (conditional) involving conditioning, his third place "( )" works to secure; rendition—equivalent formally or in linearity of form to inference across the conditional forms that he has judgment assimilate to—some qualitatively conditioned material shaped by the real in place of content.[1]

For Bradley, again, whose argument wants to subsume all judgments to the case of the universal, the categorical then to the hypothetical or conditional, subject predicate form is subject to mediation and validation via acts, or bracketing, productive both of limitation proper to individual presentations, and a kind of modesty in respect of the (for Bradley) scale or scope of those facts inferentially secured as fact attempted.[2]

Conditionals it was thought 'referred' their content across conditional form. Elements, the 'if' or related part, the 'then' or related part, were set in the relation determinant|determinable taken in citational form. The process in terms of reasoning to consequences was a matter of reaching across sets of existing connections to confirm whether or not some further item was nested among those connections.

In contrast conditionals in Bradley are the preferred form for judgment in having limited content parts appearing *either* side subject to univocal *qualified* connection. Judgments project from qualified contents some condition on a realisation of those contents (in that sense that contents now are genuinely inferable or appear almost as arguments, paramaterized even, as constitutively related in some constituted whole reflected in analysis). (Realisational) conditions force a referral to the real anticipating even contemporary arcania, descriptive or quantificational suspensions or logistic or syntactical reorganisation.©

The idea develops in the direction of analogy for various forms as containers, in Bradley's logic and elsewhere. With some implication that, a correct formal analysis *matches* internal and discrete elements in type of judgment form (certain traditional finessings remain in play), with a content achieved in analyses confirming elements both sequentially and internally related (as per the form).3 Something like this compression of form to content presentation works throughout the discussion of judgment. Bradley, as a result, finds himself faced with an issue of the expression of the limitive function of qualitative judgments in some cases taken as purely adjectival where a factual—in Bradley's limited sense—account of the expression of such would be cause for limited expansion only, composing with some possible arbitrariness in shaping extractions from and of the real *with* limiting force.

One problem here for Bradley is in closing down those senses of seeming non-contributory incompatibilities in his preferred type for judgments—the conditional or hypothetical has no, as it were, absolutive case—and allowing contribution from base (regulated attributions from some base—the experienced; the particular fact alluded to (as under some pragmatic presentation not quite written off by Bradley, see ETR, 328-30); the absolute or non-contingent, the negative).

Bradley tends to want to see the particular, superficially present in immediacy in singular content, as equivalent to material in—as in some further equivalence in which particulars are merely abstractive equivocations on final, theoretically realisable forms in judgments both responsive to and provoked in that positioning—its casework. This sense of content established in and privy to the senses of its uses varies the situation of whatever is its final referentiality as appearing as cohesively responsive by way of conditioning of the perceived particular by the real or the situating of ideals. It's easier (but not easy) to see apparent singularity of materials presented in conscious awareness to judgment as provoked by form of attention to content associated to judgment which, as it were, captures all (in that sense that would trivialise anything like a contemporary theory of referring).

There is anyway, according to Bradley, no redundant position in respect of some representation of reality, one problem given to content then, is that separate part of the situational, reflexive component present to immediate consciousness taken reservedly *as* content of the real. Bradley's system attends to this in focusing on the inevitability of the breaking of links and then fusing of contents with some remnants in respect of some gross whole as subject-matter of presentations. So that there is a connection, say, a de-linking and re-linking, at the level of subject-matters, between positioned reflexes, and contents of reflexes repositioned in terms of productivity of judgments respecting ideals ('ideals' again construed in Bradley's sense).4

But then Bradley's sense of the real is unremittingly expansive; and ideals will themselves expand as coordinates according to *any* degree of involvement in the real, which, according to Bradley, militates against any personalisation of criteria as other than personally inflectional.

Is there some approximate analogy here to make between Bradley's use for expansively disciplined contents, and continuations, taken in the sense of analytic extension, involving exposure of contents to mechanisms of attachments (and their failures), and then theories of referring taken as literalising positions in construction?

If one can think of a content arising in construction as a product of particular construction and then matched according to its evaluative force immediately in terms of a theorised use, say, in a theory of referring, then, despite differences in motivation, there might be.

Of course that might be merely in that sense as anticipated by Bradley, that the thought is a part of its thinking in the scheme, or it can be in the sense that the thought encased among its connections runs connections through the scheme. If one takes the idea of the continuant content working through theory as encased entirely by its productivity there, one approaches, tentatively again, I suggest, a theory of the theoretical that is a little like a theory of the real, in *some* analytic closure.

I believe that Bradley's assessments of his own materials suggests an analogy to semantically limiting treatments in philosophical and linguistic guises, in some more or less contemporary sense of 'content' as determining and as determined by scope of arguments. For which arguments in terms of scopes give the characteristic forms of theories. Theories are explained in terms of their groundings as consequences of contrasting groundings; subject-matters are co-extensive with the limitations or exclusions of theories assimilated to principled idiom. And then in which, as to how one calls reference in invoked contrasts, or even if one doesn't, there is *some* substantive in some calling *or* not-calling.

Directly, in disentangling some idiomatic entanglements internal to use and to a subject matter continuous with theoretic engagements, methodology, as I read Bradley, properly constrained as assumptively constrained, is productive in subject matter-formation *at least equal to* attempted visualisation of involved contrastive constraints as contents under the Bradleyan constraints of ideal modification and real realisation.

Because Bradley's points are sometimes received, bracketed, as reversed out of some period damage, I should here emphasise that there is something serious and contemporary in using anticipations involved in analysing as constrained (as idiomatic) stretches of theorising in stretches invoking in contrasts more than locally recognisably natures of practices. That instructive contrast is behind, at least, the welter of current contextualising theorising in linguistically orientated theories and in various connected disciplines associated with self-consciousness about commitments as natures of various operative typologies. There is no contrast that relegates a merely theoretical artefact as excluded from theorising as merely about theorising.[5]

II

So the Bradley of *PL* makes a kind of separation in content under tension in judgments. The tension relates to some 'literal' composition of elements in adjustment in universal exclusionary form so that for some presentation some correspondence must mediate in forms in contents, conditioned as anticipatory, suited in conditional, hypothetical representation in a subject's coverage of reality. The nature of that reality, and linkage, as I've described, via 'content' as matter of conditioning in judgments, takes, according to Bradley form in conditionals (or hypotheticals). Contents in that way are anticipatory.[6]

There is some different additional awkwardness in structurally visible anticipations in Bradley focused in judgment's simulating attention on the real. In Bradley, as for some of his contemporaries, the determinative force of judgments was assessed as relating to compounding of forms, sometimes (in Bradley, dismissed as incoherent) in relations backed by some reality.7 Bradley, in his writings on judgment involving reals, immediate; psychic, presentational, and otherwise realities of content, juxtaposes contrasts at levels internal to contents as approximating theoretically a structuring of anticipations, where subject matter was jointly provoked in attending to realities.

Relations, as above, are limit on content's variability, a modern notion.8 I too would want to nullify complexities criticised in being only associated with archaisms in theories of component parts of judgments and in forms for parts amalgams from philosophical tradition, especially when inaccurately taken as almost exclusive interest in Bradley thought of as heaving under weight *of* associational complexities—his dis-inheritance.9 The identified interest is rather seen as embedding theorised thoughts as complex thought with linking to origination of content in contextualising productions and phraseologies. I argue that Bradley stages a kind of preparation in relation to much more recent reconsideration of conceptually and referentially continuous constituents, with some psychic element in association with finiteness seen as a type of straining of contained materials, issued in terms of contents even (and here is an originality) functionally conceived as functionally effective.10

Obviously I will need to tighten any proposed analogy to operate in terms of sets of terminologies. In developing analogies I could be constrained to connect such as 'intelligible bonds', 'characters of the universe', (Bradley, ETR 145), 'appearances' etc., to devices of content retainment, containment and assessment as themselves constrained in alien operation. For instance, to operate in grid-like typologically effected structures involving universalising stricture as real on some content (semantic structure, schema; set-theoretic, semantic or phonological tableaux etc). It's part of the connecting claim that I make that a natural way to reduce (a) origination of claims associated to effected judgments as naturally constrained either by limits of the finiteness of thinking in respect of an absolute (which origination may be a conjunct from formal or logical apparatus in origin) or some totality of modifications, (b) production of structure in theories commensurate with the disciplined production of significance portioned out to entities capable of discretely summing theoretical significance, is to see some melding of affective resources with absolutely restricted treatment as effected across subject-matters. Content being the material under and output of manipulation.

Bradley at least appeared unalarmed by apparent matchings riddling the even merely theoretical. Instead, in the remarkable character of 'pragmatic Bradley' he counters corresponding correlated formal mis-steps; inseparable attempted abstractions; junctures involving negatives; contradictories, disputed formal reliances taken as formally exposed or culpable in matchings, as products of and pointing to a necessarily and sensibly/sensorially affectively-limited functioning discursive realism.

And, acknowledging that, as Bradley reassesses his views, in fact evaluates his views in terms of additive contingencies (reality, appearance) imposed on his own stock of theories, his views, as pattern for others, were

part reformed in illustrative accumulation stepping aside from limitations derived as merely formally illustrative. They become—not in his words—of the type of endless attempts at securing, trialing, other than endless contingency; were an acknowledging of an involved fluidly limitive imposing—as he sometimes refers to a kind of pre-emptive hardening-off in some accident of form (of course in judgment for instance)—of a nearly fulsome as suggested finishing of content in respect of (his words) reality, appearance etc. not entirely closed to thought.

The essential form is then, part of the essential back-and-forth. In relation to that the issue of suitably securing some content is regulated in theory by that host of foreseeable and unseen inadequacies initiated in attempts to mesh as not debased or poor, rational contingencies in terms of something like presentations as they are also part- and over-formed in psychic rivetings. A problem of too much, and some antithetical, content for a mesh that's too narrow as well as shallowly productive.

Typically in blending reassessments in assessments of terminological continuities as he picks them out, in Bradley I associate type of adjectival differentiation with a deferred contextual responsiveness in locating ideas typed as responsive. I see Bradley's metaphysic/epistemic enterprise in deriving values from adjustment posed in (fomented in) systematic adjustments as closing on something like the—slightly less full-throated— systematic contemporary interest in contextual specification or derived values, taking, in some cases, the topic of serial theorising closed by subject-matters as a type of goal in itself. In part concerned with structural relevation; respectfully—in part conniving in some loop of determinate relevancy.

III

Of course one can take as starting point in a discussion at least of Bradley's logic,11 some disentanglement of the grammar around singularities in for instance propositional form relating to formalities (not stipulation, e.g. Mill's observations regarding conjunction of singular propositions in general forms).

I've described Bradley's interest in the above as formed from a limitive set of contents as equivalent continuant forms for derived presentations. Here I'm speaking loosely: by 'continuant', as I've already discussed, I'm aiming at that level at which there is some intersection between materials and materials subsumed under some content relation in which, other than in that sense of linking given below, there is some standing for such materials holding place in form, such as form of judgment, resolution of applicabilities of which I think of as Bradley's outstanding issue.

An, for instance, Hegelian type of gesturing toward the relevance of a whole working through means of conceptual involutions present in the knowing subject is, in Bradley, decimated, atomised, in the limiting structuring of content as *exclusionary* form of availability, of linked tensioning of some associational representational functioning under that limit of containment in theory as reflexively productive of limited, as I say, fact-like productions.

'Standing' of such contents though is not wholly resolved in that picture of notional reflex to segment, as, again as partly discussed. Bradley sees uses (deferring to commonalities in conceptions of uses) merely as such, and standings must be equivalent to compounding of uses in various uses, out of which there is some composite sense as derivation and implication of further standings.12 The compression, depression of standings in theory is a type of implicational (again) reversion. 'Fact-like' production is connectedly something like a point analyses on some line out of connected position (in this way Bradley would use 'Arbitrary' in connection with selection).13

What of the grammar and syntax of contents set as standings outside of immediate theoretic-systematic register? There is no call to refer to any shift in regular presentational *types*, say, characterised so: for some c, 'c' will appear in connection with its familial type, say '**c**'; and familiarly c will fill for c, however determined —in and around_____s too, and multiples of slots and various data arrangements of other standings and so on. These contents though are essentially linked back to separate standings in spaces of worldly attachment; properly limited, and significant detachment; world determinative. So the entities corresponding to contents; or which they reflect or redirect to, are objects determined out of sets of consequence of real and abstract strata, despite their presentational link to compressed and personalised presentations. These items are propositionally additive, active atomic constituents of filters, individual significances of which mount personally repressed analyses of their worldly references.

Does Bradley's systematic recoil from specifiable content ranging across contents (other than as type) militate against referring and or shared uses? This was hardly Bradley's concern, I discuss it because I think Bradley's standings, as I've described one sense of his use for contents, looks something like precursor for work in the deflationary contexts which informed late C20th thinking in philosophy of language (which itself linked interestingly to work on types of available reduction in terms of meaning, reference and (in logic) semantic and syntactic consequence). The Bradleyan contribution is odd though as it starts with a conception of an emptied content place subject to private determination and builds almost no systematic relationally from the consequence (philosophically speaking) of that, rather reversing the protocol by which the deflationary content is secured by posting places in *substitutional* nexus *of* correspondence.

Content of content, so to speak, as a consequence of a missed whole, is not content in terms of its very placement and in uses amounting to some suggestion of that whole. There could be no deferral relating to the denuding and absenting of deflations; there is nothing consequential in place to deflate other than the place of content in formal structure. Sometimes (as I've already mentioned) placement is all in some schema; so, for instance as again mentioned, the inferential scheme of the conditional judgment enacts content applied across the scheme commodifying its parts. Again, no directly specificational corollaries are implied; no correspondence other than item to item taken as posed directionally.

Could there be a physicalist or psychological rewrite procedure for items so dwelling, in network or in mind or in graphic capping, topping off some tokened reasoned structure, with directional, mechanical, neurological, analogical bias or information about processings of stock unanimities *however in formation* (something other than Bradley's great stock of destructive analogical simile)? I think that would be missing

the point. I think the point in Bradley is to do with the dismissal of cohesive unitary items exploitable in the service of systematically itemisable units positively biased in thought in any relation with reality. Other than that 'relation' sucked as though from its referred to bones by mandibled creatures of experience on par with strippings of the theorist.

There's a nice phrasing in which Bradley likens disconnected sensing of moment to continuous spectral movement for one disembodied over surface with view beneath extending back and forth, he says

> Let us fancy ourselves in total darkness hung over a stream and looking down on it. The stream has no banks, and its current is covered and filled continuously with floating things. Right under our faces is a bright illuminated spot on the water, which ceaselessly widens and narrows its area, and shows us what passes away on the current. And this spot that is light is our now, our present.
>   We may go still further and anticipate a little. We have not only an illuminated place, and the rest of the stream in total darkness. There is a paler light which, both up and down stream, is shed on what comes before and after our now. And this paler light is the offspring of the present. Behind our heads there is something perhaps which reflects the rays from the lit-up now, and throws them more dimly upon past and future. Outside this reflection is utter darkness; within it is gradual increase of brightness, until we reach the illumination immediately below us.
>
> (PL, 54-5)

Bradley is dealing with that selection from reality available via perception and in the moment. His targets are the unreality of chaining of events (in his metaphor the reality of 'links') and our hardening in superstitions giving us some sequence or other. The sequence may be lit, pallidly, by 'reflection' for and aft and from present to future and past, for what that's worth. There is no great edifice, or countable stock, in singularities in sight, no commodities counted in singular experience other than under a kind of massing delusion of connection.

Reverting now to the handling by Bradley of form of content in connection to judgments *as* a matter of form, we see some reason for the inoperability of thought as thought formed in direct realisation of items stripped from external succession; whereas itemisable affects of reasoning productive of consequential and deployable unitary connection motivate in the various formal types in reasoning, their own reasoned itemised deployments. Consequential contents are implacable yet consumable items determined in places in argument structure relatable to the natures of particular and particularising structure, invoking, in some sense 'mirroring', more largely consequential passage of thought in thing to thing as selection.

Of course this is far too much but too little to say of Bradley in any sense. The antique sense of forms of reasoning that would have been background at some stage of development for Bradley (and for Bosanquet, Venn, Russell, Stout, Moore etc. etc.) gave one only those squares and oppositions as sighting for some interest or other in connectedness of derived thought in absolutes or under convention. The innovation in Bradley is the seeing of derived thought as consequentially derived in respect of a reality it would grossly fail to match with. To put into tensions, other than as collocation of inversions, mass correspondence with items in exact correlation with explicit and singular representations, other than by some extract from inversions

determining through their own particular forms, acts of particular inversion. So, for an example, a psychic content has its content in act in consequence in turning *of the real* to the mind in an inversion of the process typically thought of (according to Bradley's criticism).

The sense of scale which I referred to in opening is that modifying force productive of some accurately reduced feeling one takes from contents so taken; any production involving a reconstitution, reintegration from those senses is only acute in determining one, private, privative aspect of one interface. Where, as I've emphasised, the facing is backwards in effect.

There are (formally) occasions for Bradley of back and forth; these are times or places of reasoned association with a complete reduction of content to placement in stretch; of inferential, conditional, and perhaps known abstractive modes modifying passage across place. Under that conception, content, I've argued is a total reduction in place to mark either selective quality (the registered quality of being *that* selection), or some quantity a product of reasoned determination as subjected to determinations, again in place.14

IV

Changing tone somewhat, what if Bradley's standings/contents were assessed in rough usage in roughly contemporary senses as approximating kind of interfacing condition? For example, outrageously reflectively constitutive or associatively paradigmatically operative processings or parsings as used with zero regulatory semantic force as separately individuated, building to correctional layer (like LF) for corrected derivation in the syntax or the form (responsive to and under the usual lists of technocratic associative plethora—ancient and modern—marking deviation in linguistics and philosophy as via its grammars/logics as displayed). Bradley's resulting mystiques of content-wise resultant sackcloth and ashes is unaffected; material building to affect parses just as individual glittering motes of imagined soot under associational strictures on their proper representation; that is all.

I'm asking that the reader allows—with Bradley—that there is no external clausal contributory cap on relevance even in semi-outrageous construction; no direct semantics in compelling construction with a syntax or formal constitution, no grammar of parsing subject to external pressures out of the real. There are operations of an associative syntax on the one hand and the merely informative recoil from absolute specifications as grounded in the real in extraneous effects available in itemisation.

James Allard in his book on Bradley's logic quotes Bradley on the 'this' of the given as follows

> The this contains a complex of detail, either times or spaces (or both) in series, which we may call *c. d. e. f.* The idea, on its side, contains a series of particulars *a. b. c. d*. The identity of *c. d.* in each extends the perception *c. d. e. f.* by the ideal spaces or times *a. b.*, and the whole is given by synthetical construction

as a single fact *a. b. c. d. e. f.* The whole series now is referred to the real, and by the connection with unique presentation, has become a series of events or spaces, itself unique and the same as no other senses in the world.

(PL, 73)

Bradley, I mention, follows with an illustration from 'mental pathology' (73). Allard (LFBM, 93) gives the following breakdown.

> [The] elements *c. d. e. f.* … represent reality as it is immediately given to the judger.* In addition, the judger is aware of a series of ideas that Bradley represents as the elements *a. b. c. d.* I take these ideas to form the explicit content of the synthetic judgment of sense that is somehow to be connected with reality as it is given. The judger then assumes that there is an overlap between the two series—that is, the judger assumes that the elements *c. d.* in the two series are qualitatively and numerically identical.** Because the elements *c.* and *d.* are connected with *a.* and *b.* In the series of ideal elements and with *e.* and *f.* In the series of given appearances, the judger infers that *a.* and *b.* are connected with *e.* and *f.* This inference connects all of the elements in both series (i.e., it forms the series *a. b. c. d. e. f.).* This series is what Bradley refers to as the ideal construction.

Allard footnotes at *, **. In the first he says "This serial representation [*c. d. e. f.*] is only a device that Bradley uses for explaining how synthetic judgments of sense are connected with immediate experience." And he clarifies that Bradley thinks that "immediate experience is given as a presentational continuum, *not* as a series of discrete elements" (my emphasis). In the second he quotes Bradley, "Continuity of contents is taken to show identity of element" (PL, 72). I have some problems with the first comment, especially in the context of the Bradley remark that is the second.

Bradley is rather explicit about working contents out in terms of their diminished but direct if incomplete connection to the real, and in the above is saying something only about discreteness of elements inside wholes (perhaps that's the qualification Allard wants), that 'elements *c. d. e. f.* are in complex organisation'. Organisation is completed in introducing elements expanding on elements' organisation (or series as Bradley says) in which original elements subjected to matching now composing with additional elements provide grounds for 'continuity of contents', as was observed by Allard.

But I think what is offered up here is the exactly real contributory quality of organised elements (identified *in* the '*c*'s, the '*d*'s, …) even if constituted in analysis as type in type manipulation, in grasping sameness (identities) and as part *in their part in* the precisely timed nature of capture with additive implied specific referentiality. But Bradley works by disintegrating perceptual tokening of singularities as indirection (in presentation) as he favours 'real' symbolic content.

Organisational part, syntactic dependence on item in immediate presentation, is *really* constituted in the promotions involved in productions of content. And content is subject to characterisation involving predication; the characterisations *initiated* in attachments independently given, in associative complex can sum characteristic extension from matches, 'identities' across the various dimensions in some predicative analyses as implying at least extensive subect-matter; which, we, I think, can identify with the real.

In order to suppress directly psychologistic reading, Bradley must reverse the content relation in formation to one in which parts are essentially qualificational in the results of limited access; where access limited to, as associated to, identification, collapses to 'some point'.

I give a longer quote from Bradley, the end of which in particular reinforces this collapse in identity to point of identification

> The real then itself transcends the presentation, and invites us to follow it beyond that which is given. On the other hand, we seem to find contact with reality and to touch ground nowhere, so to speak, outside the presented. How then is a content to be referred to the real, if it can not be referred to the real as perceived? We must answer that the content is referred *indirectly*. It is not attributed to the given as such; but, by establishing its connection with what is presented, it is attributed to the real which appears in that given. Though it is not and can not be found in presentation, it is true because it is predicated of the reality, and unique because it is fixed in relation with immediate perception. The ideal world of spaces beyond the sensible space, and of times not present but past and future, fastens itself on to the actual world by fastening itself to the quality of the immediate this. In a single word continuity of content is taken to show identity of element.
>
> But such continuity, and the consequent extension of the "this" as given, depend, like every other ideal construction, on identity. An inference always, we shall see hereafter, stands on the identity of indiscernibles. Sameness of quality proves real sameness (vid Book II. Part I. Chap. VI.). And the identity here has a double form (i) In the first place the symbolical content must have "thisness." (ii) In the second place it must share some point with the "this."15
>
> <div align="right">(PL 72, §31, §32)</div>

We have reality active over and above presentation, in limited implicational sense. In the presented we were grounded as in contact with reality as *that* referred to, 'the real' taken then in indirect association with appearances associated to presentations implying an *of*. And, by continuities of presentational associations, we had fixation of content standings (in themselves immediately secured) as also implicationally underwritten, and underwriting further content enchained standings, 'extensions', all dependent on immediate settings (securing the immediate adjectival compression to a 'this' as a consequence of a reading, in Bradley given above, 'fastening to the quality of the immediate') as grounding further processings, continuant matchings.

It's as though analysis was run through the word 'appearance', which, in implying some complement to 'of' of associational prior standings of some real, was as though constantly trailing conscious application to it that was otherwise derived in speculative ephemera. That is, unless one sees a more categorical type of application, the function of a suspended evaluation by way (sometimes in Bradley) of manipulation of identity (consolidated as + predicated of reality,+ fixed in relation with immediate perception,+ schematically matched in terms of identities) in the products of applications to reality, rounded off as informative in sequence as corresponding array in applications each implying a 'to'.

What we have, suggested by Bradley (I paraphrase) in between extension, co-extension, independent and dependent characterisation—dependents taken in order as sequenced—is in some ways reminiscent of a

semantic, syntactic rendering in analysis. There is then that degree of reality sustained by a judger in entertaining or accessing schemas for involved serial representation; I contend that Bradley had in mind at least that much that would make attributions of matched identities of (even) representational, content-invoked identities, capable of absolute and supportive attributions suited in judgments as active taken as such then fed judgments extending identities.

One rephrases: contents sit with entities in schemas as set up either side of *any* wanted equivalence (there is no directional requirement in terms of definition with content and analyses in terms of precedence or preordering given in anything other than theory). Bradley's duplicative identities show something like interdependence. Nevertheless, 'Content' is worked into definition in terms of or within a preexisting schematic in terms too of preexisting identities, or circumscribing or attributional-involving underpinnings of elements taking form in contents. Or content is taken under analyses as independently support for existents with resolvable, degree registering dependents, so in their formal analogues. Or, equally, again of course, analyses, given some understanding of analytic analyses, can be examined as consequentially the contents holding in them.

I want to take as constitutive in the way I've described a reality as minimal as those points of contact of theoretically resolved individuations; and I want to refine that conception only in terms of the also described commitments of point by point identification as so underwritten discussed by Bradley. So that there are no extraneous effects other than those stemming in the particular contacts discussed.16

V

In the final statement above I may seem to be disengaging from that conception of real as transcending limited experiences founded in that sense in which limits are inflationary, foundational in some whole. Admittedly, any way baldly put that argument feels like a philosophical gew-gaw, a slightly twinkly toy argument for repurposing deflationary contents that (under that contemporary characterisation) would depopulate the Bradley confines, restrict the relational, defer the what floats to other worlds' realisations.

I refer back to the introductory remarks on my first page. There I talked about Bradley's separation of contents under tension. I go now to that dual functioning of content under pressure to account for stabilities in contents. That is as, other than in notional consistencies, continuant function; and, under a relatively contemporary characterisation of content, with a content relativized to reflex associated to a possible world as argument and a possible world as value. And where functionality is further associated to evaluation of the matrix supporting continuant values across worlds.

By which I mean, these mentioned functions contribute to further functional assessment of the evaluational model as it distributes its own materials. This is a skeletal assessment of that privative network of content interactions that I initially discussed as a *facing of* reality to singularities in judgments in *Principles.*

There singular content in judgment was a kind of productive interfacing condition in its parts directly associated to the real. Conditional form was that connective-associative form worked back from the deposits of evaluative correlates in proper place. As we saw in the last section, proper place could be parts in something like a jig, illustrated (let's say) with places pre-fitted to elements matched according to step-wise pattern for both immediate source of and procedural origin in involving identifications; to sources of world in multiplying sense as in its patterning correlates (above, Bradley PL 27, 'share some point with the 'this'').

But I think the pallidity of content drawn off under pressures in matching is not so strongly suggestive. On page 4 above I talk about 'linking to origination of content in contextualising productions and phraseologies', setting aside weighting of consecutiveness in appearing in matching contents (according to jig) I want to test that idea of corresponding reality in matching, limited now in terms of contextual variation.

In phonetics allophones are variations in pronunciation of a single phoneme (class of sound form) in a language. Theoretically allophones can pick out dialects, in fact dialect can be viewed as system of allophonic use on some metric of frequencies identifying variant use. Under one pattern of measure of usage, tiny variation in sound production might be excluded in the metric as associated to physical cause, and under a particular criterial measure also invoked in matchings, even marginally too great a variation in sounding of one phoneme would suggest either collapse of particular allophonic equivalence as distinctive or different language.

The point is, there is a continuum (often not directly expressed) in which variations function to identify contents in distinction *and* appropriateness of distinctions under characterisation (with say recognisable variation of sounding of phoneme (pronunciation) associated with dialect variation under a measure in contrast to a garbling suggesting gross inapplicability of measure). Anyway, measure and measured constitute a type of conspiracy.

I come back to this but want to go back to the 'worlds' analogy on content distributions discussed just previously in this section. First of all, if we were considering paraphrases for contents in an account explicatory of some holding of contents, then the mechanisms, if that's what they are, that could come into play in discovery of realities of modals: consistencies, identities, grammatical projections, partial models, allophones etc. simply lie alongside whatever material is constituted in a content under its paraphrase. So there is some orthodox sense in taking a grammatical projection of some content as prescribed thoroughly as a function of its grammaticality; and, so far as treatment is concerned, an expression involving modals can be treated as continuous with that content appearing under grammatical extension via the various forms of its modals that way acceptably contributing to its expression now as a modal.

Taking 'grammar' as active in ordering parts of speech, in word or phrase construction, or as extending semantic contents across stretches in which they were identifictional even under any expressive restriction or expansion on descriptive capacity or form, we can tabulate, under any wanted restriction subject to consistent application, results in identifications *figuring* as explicational termini. But the termini are consequentially of that restriction.

'Pallidity' of content, again as above, is related to over-bright contexts of appearing. There is a way in which one could regard Bradley's prose as simply sophisticated in terms of settling its own contexts for appearances taking in analogies. It is, let's say, more correctly productive by way of its being intended, than is, for one example, David Lewis's detailed settling of reproductions for stand-ins for contents under his complex delineations of variant forms of modal restriction and addition. So, in Bradley, analogy works in activating some colossal stock of phrasal variation consistent with some recognisably moderated choice on an even larger correct-English-stock-list; whereas Lewis's list (gesturally suppressed) is *towards something like that list* as subject to curling or retraction subject to potential analogical wastage of items not meeting some further contractual obligation in matching involving additional constancy-identifying paraphernalia.

If that way of putting things seems excessive, I point out that virtually all technical assessments (choose your discipline) are accompanied by natural language descriptions in explication. We, are, I'm arguing, in the realm of acceptable glossing.

Part of Bradley's originality is in his repurposing of singularities proscribed in evaluative characterisations. Seeing that characterisations as such contain informational strata linking contents to sources in derivation as so limited. The facts of limited reformational concurrence available are to Bradley strongly suggestive; unequivocally so, (they are his facts; or they are our facts as pointed to under implicit, or one might almost say, stylistic variation, in correspondence in the determinations of his facts).

How one handles, even if one dislikes suggestion, *that type of* squashes in corresponding containments is fully revealing under availability of appropriately typed recoveries, airings, is matter of what weighting one wants to give to Bradley's attachments, real, ideal, abstract, series, thisness, etc., set over against some predilections of different cast. As we're referring to Bradley's thought, that cast must be at least sympathetically subjected to what we know of Bradley's formative accessing of that as involved elsewhere__ (not simply set aside as bracketed) as immediately inherent__ . That is, using his repercussive solo form for content__of.

VI

Perhaps I should have added to my introductory comments 'the distinguishing input, as it were, to judgment forms is via content in some consequential and fact-like limitive facing of the real.' '*And that it's in limitive facings' product taken in consequence of uses elsewhere—in reproductions, in continuations, that my interest lies*'.

Allard, in his study of Bradley's Logic, goes straight to an argument that he sees in Bradley against a 'philosophy of experience', Bradley's term as Allard says that identifies a claim that 'distinctions in thought indicate differences in reality'. Allard sees this as a rephrasing of Hume's claim that things that are distinguishable in thought really are different' (*LFBM* 97). Allard then refers to Bradley's seemingly eliminative response involving a destructive extraction *in* analysis from the given whole, Allard takes this as

occurring in Bradley's negative assessment of analytic judgements of sense (presumably under characterisation that would identify particular analyses with particular contents of subtractions). I think, especially following Bradley in his tendency at this point to subsume judgment all to one categorically conditional type, that Bradley's point here would rather have been to do with (in language admittedly to which he would have no doubt objected) inappropriateness of content formations secured on wayward but absolute extractions (part of the argument I've been making for the content of Bradley's critique of an opposed formula in assessing of content as in matches secured (as category blind) between items in thought and parts in reality (a whole)).

Correspondence, if meaningful at all, is, according to Bradley, run from selection *in* selection. I've been dealing with that exceptive part of judgment as theorised by Bradley as it problematises further analyses requiring an explicit correspondence with the real (true) in full sense. *PL* is concerned, largely, with the details of various attempts to enlarge, in regular form, on the detail of an appropriate correlative correspondence in the face of failures of identification involved in attempting just that described therein.

In special circumstances—relevant, as we've seen, to occasion in experience; the given in its 'thisness', and in movements to the particular—one has some means of making, on the limited and limitive basis of orientation around particularities or identifications, in quotient in some comprehensive grasp (identified peculiarly enough with the immediate), under log of relativized positional presentation, some excerpt involving representation of reality. And as I keep insisting that is the most that is, according to Bradley, available.

On the basis of that limitation in interest then I develop the following account. Theoretically there are acceptable identities associated to working figurations in places where figuration to figuration there stand adjustments finessing one figure against another still associating with one identification. Let's call that finessing. Finessing is not merely a kind of interleaving of information relevant to uses of theoretical parts, which may themselves be woven, laminated out of, interlinked stuff composed of shell-like and inner parts, like contents, but can be a result in itself; a refinement on the sandwiching of contents.

Even under that expressly limitive characterisation, theories with accepted practical force, make use of materials subject to transformations on materials implicit in their identification in uses. For instance the phonologist or theorist working in phonetics, of course takes contents in theoretic identification as subject-matters as reliably informative in stretches of uses covering instances also supporting division in contents appropriate to revisions in theory. Division is immediately productive in terms of settling courses for research involving extension or contraction of a theory's coverage or revision of explanatory capacities even formed in terms of extensions of original theorised entities' ranges under implied totals in coverage.

Even that type of characterisation is probably inadequate to the convulsive power of reassessment of terminologies associated (perhaps vulgarly) with distinctively theoretically raised re-assessment (witness the

evolutionary almost combustible internal re-organisations of theory motive powers of the programme of Optimality Theory in phonology and beyond).

Only here two things are at stake; two different realisms. Taking the first, tracing conspicuous characterisation would be a matter of tracing back among uses of types and forms under some senses of emergent characterisation (i.e., determined as in usefulness of evolved character types) to some prototype embodying subject-matter essential connection. Evolved forms are just that, evolved, and they preserve, distinctly in products of theorising involving them, subtleties of theorising distinguished in terms of contents of theories taken as organisations of their tokening.

The second sees tokening as primarily an affectation of systemic correlations. Under further associated sets of interaction, the correlations can be realistically an implementation of a theory's sensitivities to pressures existing between and on theories (in terms, say, of capacity, or realities of representation).

In examples of the first type there would be dependence on multiple characterisations singled-out in naming phenomena taken *as* discrete and capable of implying result in very much more than trivially nominalistic sense. Even though labelling as such might be (within limits) arbitrary, entities named in the theory were named as minimally place-holders for the entities described (they can't be the actual entities that descriptions would be intended as referring to as that would involve a modally sensitive symbolic re-presentation that is not intended; or at least subject to closing representational gap as between items in one modality in alienation from items in another crossing in some extension from reasoning necessitating productive representation, in a a trivialising analogy with a counterpart identity problem). Nevertheless such component identifications are real in that they imply the reality of adjustment on the real (sticking with Bradley's usage) in their use in theories.

Keys to notation in such a theoretical use of tokens would be worked on entries with a listed associative range related to or in connection with entries amongst an entirety on a list, so the representation of that list's entries is made in representational form. The representational form governing uses may be described conjoined with uses redescribed, as in a *rule*. The rule now embodies the independent function of listed entries to the rule (rather than represents them). (I give a semi-technical example of an annotated rule and representation at * immediately preceding Notes.)

To example the second type above—remember, tokening may be seen as an affectation of systemic correlations—I need an expression with and of content attaching in theory directly as theory product. I apologise to the reader (and authors) for the length of the extract

> It is the second alternative that is of most interest here, for in addition to meeting the specific inadequacies raised by McCawley, this proposal differs radically in its approach to well-formedness:
>
> In the other proposal, to my knowledge first suggested by Richard Stanley (personal communication July 1965), the notion of 'derivation' is dispensed with entirely: the base component is a set of node

admissibility conditions, for example, the condition that a node is admissible if it is labelled A and directly dominates two nodes, the first labelled B and the second labelled C.

It will be apparent that this proposal does for syntactic rules just what the proposal of morpheme structure conditions does for morpheme structure rules. And since the notion of a derivation is dispensed with, so the possibility of extrinsic ordering is removed (McCawley 1968:248): 6

the admissibility of a tree is defined in terms of the admissibility of all of its nodes, i.e. in the form of a condition which has the form of a logical conjunction

The notion of node admissibility conditions was adopted by Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar. As Gazdar (1982:137) writes:

There are many ways of interpreting the formalism of a phrase structure grammar but only two of these ways need concern us here. One way, adopted in The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory (Chomsky 1975), interprets a phrase structure rule as a rewriting rule, a rule which maps strings into strings. Thus the rule:

$$S \longrightarrow NP\ VP$$

is a function which maps strings of the form X-S-Y into strings of the form X-NP-VP-Y. The derivation of some terminal string is the set of all the strings that arise in the mapping from the initial symbol to that terminal string. Given certain restrictions [...] a tree may then be defined on the basis of a derivation.

The second way of interpreting PS rules, due originally to Richard Stanley (see McCawley 1968:39), is to treat them as node admissibility conditions. A node labelled S in a tree is admitted by the rule [above] if and only if that node immediately and exhaustively dominates two nodes, the left one labelled NP and the right one labelled VP. A tree is analyzed by the grammar if and only if every non-terminal node is admitted by a rule of the grammar. Under this interpretation, then, phrase structure rules are well-formedness conditions on trees. There is no notion of a derivation and it makes no sense to order the rules.

This notion of 'admissibility' was to become pervasive in GPSG: phrase structure conditions were simply the first of a whole body of constraints whose satisfaction was required in order to successfully admit a local tree (Gazdar et al. 1985).[17]

So I'm obviously occupied by the account of admissibility condition and with that restrictions' working to admit or restrict origination under local representation (within trees for instance) and exemplified in the above in rules as 'well-formedness conditions on trees'. I want to argue that there is a type of explosion in interpreting explicitly as condition for instance a rule.[18]

Granting that there could be (weakly or even trivially 'modalised') content-parts shareable across element preserving theories, there would be some issue of how one elicited parts in comparisons or analogy.[19] But, back to the rule, the function, you might describe it as, of a rule, could be, that product in analogy that conventionally preserved selected contents in analogy available to analogy—that absorbed difference under rearrangement say.

Or even if one took that winnowing effected on axioms in statements of or refining on associational commitments recognising some topicality in enlargement on, there is still some selective sense in which contents drawn off are a product of selection. Before one got into niceties though, there are rather familiar

ways in which we think of (sometimes) refinement of contents even in the places of their tokenising and even in the structure of related token variabilities as not entirely constitutive in diagrammings *of* their being so effected. (This, I think, is a criticism that might be related (for instance in John Perry's work) to the non-necessity of, even contentful-hindrance in, correlative awareness in indexical application to oneself.)

Reflecting on availability, division invoking, say, content-part hood or sum even resolved according to the interpretation of conservative dependencies in axiom based explosion, will still want to recognise the standardness in associated philosophical thinking of unsecured carry over of implementations of ascriptions poorly represented in the newly topologised forms even adapted to make formally tolerable representation of some formally presentable part of that. The problems is Bradley's as much as it is Fine's.[20]

VII

In passages in PL contrasting (often unstated in judgment) bases as Bradley understands them of negative judgments, Bradley sees 'latent hindrances' as in position of x where x is content-involved ground of rejection of associated rejected content. The rejection is of two principled types: privation and opposition, Bradley goes on to characterise differences

> The distinctions of 'privation' and 'opposition' (Sigwart, 128 foll.) do not alter the essence of what
> we have laid down. In a privative judgment the predicate 'red' would be denied of the subject simply
> on the ground that red was not there. The subject might be wholly colourless and dark. But if 'red'
> were denied on the ground that the subject was coloured green, it would be the presence of an
> opposite quality that would exclude, and the judgment would then be based on positive opposition.
>
> (PL, 117)

And on the following pages he offers clarification and a further division internal to the type 'privation'

> [And] (i) first, when we have a case of 'opposition,' there the subject repels the offered predicate
> because it has in its content a positive quality, filling the space which the predicate would occupy,
> and so expelling it. If a man has blue eyes, then that quality of blueness is incompatible with the
> quality brown. But (ii), when we come to privation, two cases are possible. In the first of these
> (a) within the content of the subject there is empty space where a quality should be. Thus, a man
> being eyeless, in this actual content lies the place where his eyes would be if he had them. And this
> void can not possibly be a literal blank. You must represent the orbits as somehow occupied,
> by peaceful eyelids, or unnatural appearance. And so the content itself gets a quality, which, in contrast
> to the presence of eyes, may be nothing, but which by itself has a positive character, which serves
> to repel the suggestion of sight.
> But privation can rest on another basis (b). The content of the subject may contain no space
> which could possibly be qualified by the presence of the predicate. What rejects the predicate is no other
> determination of the content itself, but is, so far as that content itself is concerned, an absolute blank.
>
> (PL 118-9, §9, §10)

One type of void content is exampled by Bradley in appearing as content in geometric figure in the guise of an exclusionary content as content of the abstract

> But we can find an example of the privation we want in the abstract universal. The universal idea (cf. Sigwart, 130), if you keep it in abstraction, repels every possible extension of its character. Thus 'triangle,' if you mean by it the mere abstraction, can neither be isosceles nor scalene nor rectangular; for, if it were, it would cease to be undetermined.
>
> (PL, 119)21

Even though the very idea is subject to immediate slighting (in terms of a 'stupid' reductio ad absurdum (119) Bradley will hold fast to two involved contrasting ideas developing out of it. There is negative judgment involving abstraction (or rather *of the* abstract, though that phrasing is grammatically awkward here); and otherwise there are those contents we know in fillings, which come to us as subsidiaries of the functioning of our mental faculties, or 'wilful abstraction' under condition in some part of our 'psychological state' (119). But the set up is essentially this, there is some gross incomplete whole part of the completion of which is in some effective facings of resolved representations called up in values which may be assessed (as Bradley does) as associative. In one case (involving the abstract) the call is voided of affective association (say of the type picturesquely invoking substitution or exclusion) is run on something like a syntactic representation with place__holding (as per some representation for place in abstract schema *not* as tree) ; the other is, almost trivially, a matter of the effecting of the call-up procedure which is otherwise blind (in something like a process computing terms only pending in valuations).

In that last line (of mine) there is some suggestion of the sinking of psychological awareness in its uses and substitution of a parsing based on running values associated to the running of values initiated in contacts productive of values; or even in using awareness glosses on productivity drawn off from contact. Here there is direct analogy with the running of theories and the nature if any of the materialities which they deploy, especially as they deploy retrospectively and (in some way) reflexively content intendedly associated to originals in contents by preference. That would be the theory scruple.

I see a Bradleyan burgeoning world as inclusive by way of complement to a paradigmatically restrictive theory of content; I see it as acting on consciousnesses in terms of producing singularities in a way in line with Bradley's more general metaphysic. But I think, and I think this is primitively productive too, that one can conceive of a resultative world, biased toward the entry of minds within associational complexes, as something like an extra-informative theory, one such that it would encapsulate and detail worlds as operations on clusterings of combinable associative sympathies in intellects as a theory of those affected.

I see scaling or 'scale', as I originally mentioned, now as an effect of a reformulation in Bradley of some part of an assumed connection between original thing and its instances. I see Bradley's attention here in part as

opening for a recuperation of content placed into forms, in for instance the form of the conditional, in such a way as to reproduce itself in realisation conditions on its recurrence; and in his theory *in* minds *and* as some object even wildly varying according to listable variation. I see some sort of possible concordance amongst variations as being a prime or index on some theory. And I think Bradley in his thought and his prose reconnects to the ordinarily grammatical and imaginary dispersals and consolidations of theorising even as an improvement—as it's richer—on projective manoeuvring among worlds or contexts. Scale finally is that thing that can be produced quite reasonably inside a referentially relativised context as internal to a theory.

M. Arnatt, 2024

*I reproduce below a phonological rule for change in sounding consonants t/ and /d/ in intervocalic alveolar flapping, with an explanatory key to notation, excerpted from a Wikipedia article on 'Phonological Rule'

In most dialects of American English, speakers have a process known as intervocalic alveolar flapping that changes the consonants /t/ and /d/ into a quick flap consonant (⟨ɾ⟩) in words such as 'bu**tt**er' (['bʌɾɪ]) and 'no**t**able' (['noʊɾəbl]). The stop consonants /t/ and /d/ only become a flap in between two vowels where the first vowel is stressed and the second is stressless. It is common to represent phonological rules using formal rewrite rules in the most general way possible. Thus, the intervocalic alveolar flapping described above can be formalized as

$$
\begin{bmatrix} +\text{stop} \\ +\text{consonantal} \\ +\text{alveolar} \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow [\text{ɾ}] \ / \ \begin{bmatrix} +\text{vowel} \\ +\text{stressed} \end{bmatrix} \ \underline{} \ \begin{bmatrix} +\text{vowel} \\ -\text{stressed} \end{bmatrix}
$$

Format and notation
The rule given above for intervocalic alveolar flapping describes what sound is changed, what the sound changes to, and where the change happens (in other words, what the *environment* is that triggers the change). The illustration below presents the same rule, with each of its parts labelled and described.

1 *Intervocalic alveolar flapping*

$$
2 \begin{bmatrix} +\text{stop} \\ +\text{consonantal} \\ +\text{alveolar} \end{bmatrix} \underset{3}{\rightarrow} \underset{4}{[\text{ɾ}]} \ \overset{5}{/} \ \begin{bmatrix} +\text{vowel} \\ +\text{stressed} \end{bmatrix}_6 \ \underline{}_7 \ \begin{bmatrix} +\text{vowel} \\ -\text{stressed} \end{bmatrix}_8
$$

9 */t/ and /d/ are flapped when they occur between a stressed and an unstressed vowel*

1 Title of the rule

2 The underlying sound that is changed. In this example, the brackets represent all the features the changed sounds have in common; /t/ and /d/ are both stop consonants and both articulated with the tongue touching the alveolar ridge. Therefore, this rule applies to all sounds that share those features (in English, only /t/ and /d/). Rules can be written with just the individual sound to be changed, but using square bracket notation allows the rule to apply to a class of related sounds.

3 The arrow represents that the sound on the left changes to have the features on the right.

4 The sound that /t/ and /d/ (in this example) change to, or the individual features that change.

5 The slash is a shorthand notation for 'in the environment where…'. It means that the notation to the right describes where the phonological rule is applied.

6 The sound, or the features of the sound, that precedes the one to be changed. In this example, the /t/ or /d/ that becomes flapped must be preceded by a stressed vowel.

7 The location of the sound that is going to be changed. In this example, the underline means that the /t/ or /d/ that becomes flapped must be in between two vowels (where the first is stressed and the second is not).

8 The sound, or the features of the sound, that follows the one to be changed. In this example, the /t/ or /d/ that becomes flapped must be followed by an unstressed vowel.

9 A prose description of the rule, specifying when it applies and what it changes.

(From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phonological_rule)

Notes

1. The backdrop here being the conditional representation of the real against the universal conditional form of judgment as Bradley develops that idea. The problem of type of content runs deep in that it engages a question how facts appear at all in judgments stating conditionality '*Given* one thing you will *then* have another .. .' (PL, 48). As a primer on Bradley's conception of difficulties surrounding any amalgam in contents of contributions of fact; the real; momentary appearance or sequence, see PL 51, and around

The subject which appears in the series of time, and to which we attribute our ideas as predicates, must itself be real. And, if real, it must not be purely adjectival. On the contrary it must be self-existent and individual. But the particular phenomenon, the momentary appearance, is not individual, and is not the subject we use in judgment.
The Principles of Logic, second revised edition, Vol 1, London, Oxford University Press, 1922.

Separately, I should note that the 'conditional' is that form in judgments so-called, 'conditioning' is that qualification of the ideal or mixed (synthetic) in judgments showing adjectival adjustments at the level of presentations. I pick up on this in connection with James Allard's discussion of Bradley's argument for matching elements as symbolic in content presentations, which symbols integrate and renew contents across types of judgments in using matches.

2. There is a suggestion almost in Allard's discussion of modal arguments for Bradley's intensional understanding of contents of realities of that stricture on contents. See James Allard *The Logical Foundations of Bradley's Metaphysics,* Cambridge University Press, 2005, 78-79

© Actually, not that arcane. There are all sorts of possibilities for configuring relations (and I presume any correlative commitments) amongst just the clausal components of a construction, and even for giving just the correct form of the construction. In this light see the primer on syntactical orientation in William Lycan's first chapter of his *Real Conditionals*, OUP, 2001; and for comments on Lycan's analysis, see Brian Weatherson's review of that book. http://brian.weatherson.org/Lycan.htm

3. Analytic and synthetic etc.

4. 'Ideal', some perfective aside of and on the real. See ETR, 11, 'On Some Aspects of Truth', 343

5. Starting with, say, the early 20th century preoccupation with a principled semantics which can be seen as a predilection for formalising process by which the character of specified contents could be regulated (modelled) in a way both internal and external to a formal system approximating a resource of valuations built from constrained operations. Or implemented as failing that in certain respects, Tarski's project was such an implementation. Arguments in current linguistic theorising seem to be about degrees of and placement of information types relevant to the flexing of components as built into components in question as they determine as essentialised ranges of valuation. They (arguments), in both general and formal senses, are expansive in that they allow reformations and re-evalautions in the technical scopes of arguments affecting formal representation and identity of intersecting component parts.

Donca Steriade characterises an historically recent distinction in phonology (between component and entry)

One of the functions of the phonological component is then to supply the nondistinctive information missing from the underlying forms. Lexical Minimality requires that the maximal amount of phonological features be left out of the lexical entries, whereas Full Specification dictates that they be present in the input to phonetic interpretation. One way to extract dispensable information from lexical entries is to rely on syntagmatic processes—rules like Palatalize velar before front vowel or Nasalize vocoid after nasal—which allow us to leave unspecified contextually determined properties like the palatality of velars or vocoid nasality. But syntagmatic processes—the P rules of Stanley (1967)—cannot be used to rid segments of constant, nonalternating yet predictable features such as the voicing of consonants or the continuancy of vowels.

Donca Steriade, 'Underspecification and Markedness', in John Goldsmith (ed.), *The handbook of phonological theory,* 1995, 114-5

6. Contents now would be a kind of product of anticipations as Bradley thinks in terms of the forms of and lineal interconnections existing among inferences taking one from one content to its dependent content. The analysis affects even his discussion of memory as conjoining content items under dependent characterisations where a complex exists even as fundamental distinction in mode of thought exists. See ETR, XII, 'Some Remarks on Memory and Inference', 366

7. Reservedly or unreservedly: this passage referring to Bradley's understanding of Russell's multiple-relation theory theory of judgment

Suppose that, as sometimes happens, a husband A is jealous of a man C who does not exist but is imaginary, On the above [Russell's] doctrine this complex unity C would, apparently, be made *ad hoc* by A's present judgment. But C has really been the result of a gradual morbid growth. And, in order for the new unity of the judgment to supervene, this result apparently must be *ad hoc* disintegrated. Again, to pass from this, there is a difficulty, the importance of which it would, I think, be hard to exaggerate. I understand that the world made for me by a new multiple relation may or may not answer to things as they are outside that relation. But what I cannot understand is why one of these two worlds should be more real than the other. Why is not the content affirmed in my judgment in any case absolutely real?
'Some Problems in Connexion with Mr Russell's Doctrine', 294, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, Clarendon Press, 1914

8. Loosely, as a variable in place of varying of content.

9. As I think does Stewart Candlish for instance. The succinctly aloof almost barbarous, direct Bradley of the following is worth holding in mind

You cannot ask how in any proper sense truth is related to the real. For such a relation to be possible, you would require reality on one side and truth on the other. And, since without truth reality would not be real, and truth apart from reality would not be true, the question asked is ridiculous. There cannot in the end be a relation between two inseparable aspects of one whole. On the other hand you can inquire how truth stands to reality, in this sense that you can ask in what way truth is different from and falls short of the Whole. What is it lacking to truth, on the addition of which truth itself would be reality? This is a question which to some extent can be discussed and answered.
ETR, 11, 'On Some Aspects of Truth', 343

The involved conceptions, whatever their ancient originals in ancient formal contrast, are dispensed with.

10. Productive material recuperations from some thought firmament.

11. As does James Allard in his *Logical Foundations of Bradley's Metaphysics*. Later, in connection with which, Allard is at pains to distinguish Bradley's connective interest in form in determinations approximating logical characters against a backdrop of categorically resolved singularities; he describes (40) a Hegel concerned with '… categories that are necessary for knowing and distinguishing between individual objects.' Where of course objects are determinations in some sense of specific character.

(Allard notes he follows Terry Pinkard in non-specialised use of 'individual'.)

12. We're close to the general form, which Bradley is famous for pointing out, of regress of relations. There are nice examples in fn.2, 329, ETR

It is impossible in the end by any judgment to qualify Reality as conditioned. R, taken with the condition, implies a higher R within which it falls and of which it is asserted. This general principle has of course many applications. Thus (as we have seen) you may attempt to make the qualification of the object in a judgment include also the personal satisfaction of the judger. But this inclusion forthwith makes a new object, and so on indefinitely. Hence the satisfaction of the judger, as and while he judges, is necessarily excluded from the judgment. From the other side, the satisfaction, or the psychical prevalence, which is asserted, cannot be the satisfaction or prevalence belonging to the act of such assertion. It may or may not be consistent with this, but to judge concerning such a point belongs to and involves a further reflection.

13. Here is one sense supportive of an or else like division, selection among contents

As soon as we judge, we are forced to analyze, and forced to distinguish. We must separate some elements of the given from others. We sunder and divide what appears to us as a sensible whole. It is never more than an arbitrary selection which goes into the judgment. We say "There is a wolf," or "This tree is green;" but such poor abstractions, such mere bare meanings, are much less than the wolf and the tree which we see; and they fall even more short of the full particulars, the mass of inward and outward setting, from which we separate the wolf and the tree. If the real as it appears is X= $a\,b\,c\,d\,e\,f\,g\,h$, then our judgment is nothing but X = a, or X = a-b. But a-b by itself has never been given, and is not what appears. It was in the fact and we have taken it out. It was of the fact and we have given it independence. We have separated, divided, abridged, dissected, we have mutilated the given. And we have done this arbitrarily: we have selected what we chose. But, if this is so, and if every analytic judgment must inevitably so alter the fact, how can it any longer lay claim to truth ?
PL, 94

14. Let's say, just *referred to* as that content, this in no way implies indexicalty or anything demonstrative-like. Bradley tends to subsume this under 'thisness'

But thisness on the other hand does belong to the content, and is the general character of every appearance in space or time. Thisness, if we like, we may call particularity. Everything that is given us is given, in the first place, surrounded and immersed in a

complex detail of innumerable relations to other phenomena in space or time. In its internal quality we find again a distinction of aspects, which we always can carry to a certain length, and can never be sure we have quite exhausted. And the internal relations of its component elements in space or time are again indefinite. We are neyer at the end of them. This detail appears to come to us on compulsion; we seem throughout to perceive it as it is, and in no sense to make or even to alter it. And this detail it is which constitutes thisness.*

PL 65

Footnote* is a long, remarkable, comment on (thisness involving) apprehensions of character in the compressive sequences of timings in the ordinary apprehension of changes, to oneself and in other things.

15. See fn 14 above on 'thisness'.

16. Or extraneous now only by way of directorial force; suppressing psychic and mindful proof as merely a (mourned for) dressing for required sooty presentations collapsed to contents repressive of such states. (The reader can have in mind a Dick Van Dyke appearing in cockney chimney sweep mode corrected by Mary Poppins.)

17. The entire extract is from Michael Broe's 1993 thesis, *Specification Theory, the treatment of redundancy in generative phonology*, 6-7. Internal quotations are from James McCawley, 'Concerning the base component of a transformational grammar.' *Foundations of Language.* 4:243-269. 1968. Gerald Gazdar, 1982, reprinted in *Papers in DTR*, 1990, University of Sussex; Gazdar, G., E. Klein, G. Pullum and I. Sag, Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar, 1985, Oxford, Blackwell.

Broe is referring to the Richard Stanley of 'Redudancy Rules in Phonology', 1967, *Language*, Vol. 3, No. 2.

18. I introduce 'explosion' not in the sense of 'logical explosion' (here and see following. note on Kit Fine). Imagine a graphic representation in slight elevation and at slight angle to the viewer of parts in some discrete mechanical object, a gearbox say. The exposed or cut-away view shows parts in assembly without diagramming their sequence as in functional array. It may be implicit in the ordering of parts that they have the function that they have if one had preceding knowledge of that function; but the representation in itself does nothing to determine that (outside of any generic conventions applying in how one reads as seen graphic representation). The representation is not, specific to the representation, representational.

19. Where I say modal here and elsewhere I mean any aspectual, tense involved or shifted presentation not just those invoked in explicit world shifted analyses. The point in invoking modality here is to suggest some part in content that my not be moveable alongside a regular paraphrase which paraphrase would fix as conditioned a recurrence.

20. I make a *very slight* observation on the arraying method adopted by Kit Fine, in which axioms and rules were set out to be co-refined across developments in representations taking materials in relation to the rules now as subject-matters separately treated as modally transfixed, going from structured back to structures (it's a very slight observation because of course *that is the* method). See Kit Fine 'Angellic Content' (download University of Birmingham 2024) for context (relation of part to whole and of conjunctive to disjunctive 'part' in partial content).

21. I've dropped a couple of footnotes, references are to Sigwart, *Logik*.