might be just an axiom*

A good theory must elucidate the appropriate correctness conditions for perceptual experiences if it is adequately to distinguish these experiences from states that do not represent the world as being a certain way to the subject. But the importance of elucidating representational content goes far beyond the need to draw that distinction in the right place. By perceiving the world, we frequently learn whether a judgement with a given conceptual content is true or not. This is possible only because a perceptual experience has a correctness condition whose holding may itself exclude, or require, the truth of a conceptual content.¹

In Christopher Peacocke’s *A Study of Concepts* scenarios are visual or spatial fields centred on an individual (sensitive bodywork composition). The individual experience, individually associated with a ‘scene’ (a filling-in, ASoC 64), stiffens delivered representational contents so that in their physicalised aspect described by Peacocke contents can be available as objectively describable in a way that then contributes to Peacocke’s thesis that they are both an index of and derivational base for assignment of non-conceptual contents. As I will stress in Peacocke such a characterisation is primarily focused on associating experience with content particularly as described utilising concepts. In *A Study of Concepts* ’scenarios’—containers for scenes, for physical, spatial, egocentric awareness secured on bodily centres and made vivid basically—remain significantly local in the sense that they are allowedly but functionally and importantly (to his thesis) locally inchoate. I pass by the possibility that such inchoateness is a matter of gradience, that materials not rising to some degree are taken as support for some non-conceptual materiality, they expand only as they are a base for a conception of assigned non-conceptual contents where in that situation contents are a type of match. From that standpoint, scenarios describe local materials in terms of their development in the sort of way a certain gentrified kind of loaf of bread describes its origin in a starter.

Perhaps the characterisation of Peacocke’s sheerly invert objective groundings developed in representation dependencies is unfair. Then how are ‘spatial’ parts (ASoC 61 et seq.) ‘scenario’, ‘scene’ (ASoC 64) independently biased outside of some circular constraints holding for some described mutual interactions associated in term uses definitionally reflective of that? How more supported than, say, is either ‘bouquet’ or ‘floral’ as derived from their standing in ‘floral bouquet’ (or just ‘bouquet’) in an argument citing some contribution to a phrasing for some arrangement that is floral, like a bouquet? How is paired even regurgitative characterisation here in the light of paired definition (even labeling operating on grounds) effectively paratactic, dis-associative?²

My interest is not in the reality of divisions among content types. What does interest me is the division forged by Peacocke in having a medium, the ‘scenario’, become for primitive theoretical regulation of contents distanced from concepts which themselves feature essentially in the specification of descriptively matched content purely as a matter of theoretical imposition, and as Peacocke confirms, fundamental by way of giving the content of a scenario. This is a theory intent on stripping out its base as incoherent in a match qualitiedly dependent on some theory. Unless of course one believes that there is some base reality informing a paralleling structure ‘non-conceptual/conceptual’ realisable as parallels across type of realisation. The peculiarity being that contents in both senses—non-conceptual/conceptual —have one form of realisation essentially invoked in descriptions capable of describing incoherence giving the content of a scenario in describing it.
The interest—ploy—here might be in seeing individuals’ materials labeled or called in realities localised to recovery of what they are as that feature of calling in a structure built as accommodations with available individuations. It might be offensive to some psychologist’s sense of realities that we think of theory structuring in terms of combination that’s analytically so immediately decomposable, of test contact at a theoretical match, not as supporting direct analogy drawn tight to fundamentals. What I want to suggest might be interesting in the Peacocke scenario sketch I offer is just a registering of kind of non-trivial concoction in having some underpinnings appear as they do as priming in their basicness. I then also want to draw some analogies with theories—in syntax and of syntax’s relations with other related theoretical disciplines—that occasionally derive alternation with respect to adequacy/inadequacy of committed descriptive characterisations where characterisation was itself operationally fundamental in building characterisation otherwise seemingly unsupported. Picturesquely, I want to describe some dangling dependencies of a type—a-localising. The type has, I want to say, consistencies across projections to do with content involved in analogical matching in descriptions, enriched in a special sense of unknowingly in Peacocke in theoretical construal from which depends fixed objective constructions involving material underlying constitutive experience available in a scenario related to descriptions that are intimately actually insufficiently refined, ‘intimate’ a necessary proviso for entering into that contrast.

But the type also supports idiomatic imposition or collocation, in deriving its materials just so intimately and in inverted analogues for materials then descriptively chained. For a type of two way licensing example, getting slightly ahead of myself, it’s as if referencing expansion on what may be fundamentally indexical or locative as associatively quantitively bound by presentational idiom would, in giving the content of particularised expansion, involve one in a kind of indexical periphrasis. One might then, as Peacocke does, equate the centres of bodies with that material supporting construction, but limitedly; say, as if invoking an implied agent of a construction—either robustly or internally, some functional entity marked for agency in functional accord, even of a type—to use an example from Landau (following)—the etiolated (in respect of the goals of a theory of content) controlling ‘it’, say, of ‘it was decided to leave’ or generally something as necessary to expansions as essentially involving form of content and agreement.

A different reader might naturally want to hold that the priority for Peacocke was the displacement of theoretically compounded material by more readied materials active at some core of centring or mapping interest explicitly; archiving, let’s say, input from the sensorium. Interest in the explicit philosophical Peacocke scenarios’ cases relates only to the having of structural descriptions absent their specified thematics on some directed reconstruction, the scenario. What this does in terms of supporting a metaphysics of workable, descriptive, separable, content complexes is a matter again of kind of status one affords contributing items. Whatever, that is, one takes a construal as implying in a context taken as freed of supported commitment. In his intended locally centring support to context in Peacocke there is some specialising a-localising supra context at work designed as though as enriched in relation to theoretical construal; a studied positioning in respect of detected effects invoking selectional properties taken in explanatory combination with predicates or properties. Returning in that construal materials primed for later conceptual consequentiality (invoked in ‘correctness conditions’ underlying application). Conceding to Peacocke’s perceptual and spatial types of expanded correlate—those centred fields—this might be loosely an association to a ‘mapping’, a wrought from some centred cartographic input (again, associated by
Peacocke with contents, see for instance his being driven around wearing a blindfold analogy of his earlier *Sense and Content* that constrains representation ordered in some constructively available way as representative of sense dependents. With wrought-ness perhaps an achievement like some idiomatic imposition or collocation.

There is a less indirectly posed or artificial, clearly active median between mapping and syntactic (as even organisational) constraint as one might think of grammatical *representation* effects, as at least effects trimmed to representation. It, that median, doesn’t claim to elucidate anything; it will facilitate, if it does, a kind of representational, formal lucidity (not speciousness). Whether this amounts to more than a kind of organisational workspace clarity is something else. Clearly Peacocke is targeting something more, that interactional component bearing on a truth of a conceptual content on a basis of inference, explicitly. Absent completed detail in proposals about how that would go (detail in Peacocke is somehow to do with archiving stabs at the sensorium as a labeling-of constructed from the physical centre) that can be rather plain base construal, and one with no duplicative configurational base (studied effects a product of the theoretical imagining). So for instance as projected as worked on archived correlates’ sensorial dependents will not order relations of take-up in the un-configured base and there will be reliance on some organisational hierarchies that are said to effect or discipline uses in something like syntactic construction where active construction was a source of analogy.

It would be a commonplace to remark a syntax impetus as well as a cognitive science one invoking related matches assigned effectively among hierarchies supporting interconnections or chains or webs or type of augmented visualisation. What is not my target here is the way in which—endorsed, I think, by Peacocke—agents make inferential transitions involving materials supported by semantic matches within and among materials as a base of transitions (supported in the sense of mapped by structures for such transitions). Unsurprisingly, there is no necessarily objective visual or spatial component (excluding say, stringing) in metaphorical uses connected even in materials that appear sourced in that way which are *not* sourced in that way. A ‘scenario’ in Christopher Peacocke’s sense—a mode of transition for content—can be supported as visually coded in the same sort of way that some person’s choice of assignment from ‘rural’/‘cosmopolitan’ may be visually encoded too. Normal base arbitrariness in some reduction goes to typing encodings of oppositions as material (‘symphonies’/‘symphon’/‘knees’, symphonies/‘symphonies’)—I’m just adverting to mixing materials generable from analytic as opposed to quotational idiom/convention (where a theoretical use is an expansion on convention with a virtual component driven by analyses).

I take then from the kind of examples above (and others to follow)—in which an item given a grammaticalised content characterisation carries extra-grammatical information plugged backed into any target of its functional profiling—material into combination with criticism of various apparent systematic inadequacies of grammatical systems to fully characterise the content of structures they do characterise. An easier example of this comes from certain types of functional profiling accorded in linguistics targeting categories minimally imposed. So, for instance, discussing control structure^5^ with semantic consequence, Idan Landau in *Elements of Control*, in which in discussing speaker’s construal of control, gives examples necessitating construal of controllers involving agents—p22, the paradigms b/c contrasted with a (PRO marks the implicit controller)

a. {Before PRO entering the basement}, the rain washed the stairs.
b. {Before PRO entering the basement}, the stairs were washed.
c. {Before PRO entering the basement}, Mary was washed.
So of course this is a different matter than the agency implied in Peacocke’s fillings-in, his centrings. How explicit does that have to get? Running from one (in-explicit) extreme, an idealisation in respect of the supporting mechanics of non-conceptual content as a match between sub-personal configurations in construction in then dependent characterisation independently posed, to some explicit segmental continuities supporting structural, associated dependencies, as formally necessitated in the grammar in dependent but nominally empty constituents recognised by the grammar (with the possibility of nodal representations). The ‘do characterise’ point can then, I hope, be related to that sense of characterising that takes one to elements, formal, contrived; loosely aspectual, delexical, that are systematically stigmatic (in the sense that they mark); the failure I mentioned earlier being only the inability to characterise as properly systematic any types of relatable systematisation, so unconstrained (minimal). Homogeneity in formalisations in ascribing of a kind relief from ascription of base credulity (easier to achieve as limited in the syntax) would be the goal that I see missed. The non-modal relating of contents in that way seen as improperly exposed, naked.

Where precisely is the right place—Christopher Peacock’s ‘right place’? I take it that there’s always some lock onto some specifier covering for representations in terms of its support for content in relating perception to content in tractable forms where in any expansion on that in descriptive context that expansion remains in lock with that core content (shifting the analogy again, as is some reduplication to its base as being—in the theory centric cases that count—differentiated in connection with a content core replicated). The figural, epistemological, metaphysical basis of that I mean here, although the analogy that interests me comes straight from phonological theory; specifically, as originating in McCarthy and Prince (1993) as redescribed in their 1995 in terms of strictures on input output clauses considered under ordered competing constraints of that (phonological) theory.
Norvin Richards’ expression in ‘Deriving Contiguity’ (author’s pre print, 2017).


2 Of course I don’t mean to address the basis in human psychology of observations relating to perception and the parsing of material related to that in informed philosophy of perception. With adjustment to what is meant by ‘level’ there is really nice attention to problems associated with regulating materials associated with a definitive parsing in achieving principled descriptive correspondence or matches in Match Theory, see Elisabeth Selkirk, 2009, in The Handbook of Phonological Theory, 2nd edition, John Goldsmith, Jason Riggle and Alan Yu, eds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

3 (Elements of Control, 174.) Idan Landau is concerned with the specifics of control, he describes ‘it was decided to leave’ as an instance of control by ‘the implicit agent of an impersonal passive’ (174). For my purposes here, I want just to assimilate dummy, expletive or pleonastic instances, here ‘it’, to other positions as carriers of formally registering content, a kind of reversal of the philosophers’ pinning of contents to semantically superficially active items.

4 The phrase ‘mapping’ is problematic, so as supporting a reduction to content via some imposition of combination or inversion it’s problematic outside of usage carrying some kind of stipulated reductions anyway. For instance as linked with argument visualisation, instrumentation, boxing etc, in implementing associated generic senses for ‘argument’ as reproducing as ‘mapping’ is used that way in both (cognitive) linguistics, in combinatorics supporting syntax matches, and in philosophy as well in the sense of a recurrent or ‘object of’ in construals.

5 A control verb licences its arguments; subjects or objects. In Landau there are important distinctions relating to the nature of control and the character of that and a particular distinction between predicational and propositional characters of the control verbal relation to its objects.

6 Prominent across phonology/morphology/syntax (again, Richards 2017) where supported facts about an interface or interfaces derive continuities. More on this later.

7. We should not all be facing some form of synaesthesia or straight modal diffusion.

In Christopher Peacocke’s *A Study of Concepts* scenarios are visual or spatial fields centred on an individual contents of which should be available objectively in a way that contributes to Peacocke’s thesis that they are: a base for a conception or assignment of non-conceptual contents. In Peacocke such a characterisation is primarily focused on associating experience with content particularly described as *described* utilising concepts.
I go on to say something about other ways in which explicit characterising commitments arise even as a consequence of other kinds of formalised commitment in a kind of a continuing reverse of the Peacocke situation. A different reader might naturally want to hold that the priority for Peacocke was the displacement of theoretically compounded material by more readied materials active at some core of centring or mapping interest explicitly; archiving, let’s say, input from the sensorium. Interest in the explicit philosophical Peacocke scenarios’ cases relates only to the having of structural descriptions absent their specified thematics on some directed reconstruction, the scenario. What this does in terms of supporting a metaphysics of workable, descriptive, separable, content complexes is a matter again of kind of status one affords contributing items. Whatever, that is, one takes a construal as implying in a context taken as freed of supported commitment. In his intended locally centring support to context $^4$ in Peacocke there is some specialising $\alpha$-localising supra context at work designed as though as enriched in relation to theoretical construal; a studied positioning in respect of detected effects invoking selectional properties taken in explanatory combination with predicates or properties. Absent completed detail in proposals about how that would go (detail in Peacocke is somehow to do with archiving stabs at the sensorium as a labeling of) that can be rather plain base construal, and one with no duplicative configurational base (studied effects are hypostasised, a product of the theoretical imagining). So for instance as a projected semantics worked on archived correlates, sensorial dependents, will not order relations of take-up in the un-configured base there will be reliance on some organisational hierarchies that are said to effect or discipline uses in something like syntactic construction? Conceding to Peacocke’s perceptual and spatial types of correlate—those centered fields—this might be loosely an association to a ‘mapping’, a wrought from some centred cartographic input (associated by Peacocke with contents, see for instance his being driven around wearing a blindfold analogy of his earlier Sense and Content) that constrains representation ordered in some constructively available way as representative of sense dependents. With wrought-ness perhaps an achievement like some idiomatic imposition or collocation. There is a less indirectly posed or artificial and clearly active median between mapping and syntactic constraint as one might think of grammatical representation effects, at least effects trimmed to representation. In, say, ‘control’ effects in grammar (active over strictly empty representations as a functional complement to categories with inherent content) the analogy as it concerns me is between a relation of representation and construal with content, it’s almost incidental that a philosopher should invoke a cartographic input to that
base that supports generalisations described as contents. Part of my thesis is going to be that the kind of attention to functional categories (in distinctions imposed at the level of theory internal functionality) disposed of some of that awkwardness of modality associated with instantiations covering content instantiation. Driving, I hope, the issue of content-types back into matter of appropriate matches among categories.

Invoking control directly instancing syntax with semantic consequence, I quote from Idan Landau’s *Elements of Control* in which in discussing speaker’s construal of control, he gives examples necessitating construal of controllers involving agents—p22, the paradigm b/c contrasted with a (PRO marks the implicit controller)

a. {Before PRO entering the basement}, the rain washed the stairs.
b. {Before PRO entering the basement}, the stairs were washed.
c. {Before PRO entering the basement}, Mary was washed.

I want to take from the kind of example above (and others to follow)—here in which functioning item [control] carries extra-grammatical information plugged backed into any target of its functional profiling—material into combination with criticism of various apparent systematic inadequacies of grammatical systems to fully characterise the content of structures they do characterise. The do characterise point can then, I hope, be related to that sense of characterising that takes one to elements, formal, contrived; loosely, aspectual, that are systematically stigmatic (in the sense that they mark); the failure I mention being only the inability to characterise as properly systematic any types of relatable systematisation, so uncontrived (minimal). Homogeneity in formalisations in ascribing of a kind as relief from ascription of base credulity would be the goal that I see missed.

Norvin Richards at the start of his ‘Deriving Contiguity’ describes the following principle from previous work

(1) Generalized Contiguity
If α either Agrees with or selects β, α and β must be dominated by a single prosodic node, within which β is Contiguity-prominent. (Richards 2017, 1 unpaginated)

a development of ‘Match Theory’, an attempt at mapping syntactic structure explicitly onto prosodic structure. In Richards’ 2016, ‘Agree’ and ‘selection’ components as in (1) are developed as locally overriding some principles of Match Theory. The generalized statement is a few paragraphs later discussed as problematic, as being perhaps ‘just an axiom’ pending development, attempts at principled structured derivations—derivation involving ‘other principles’ (Richards 2017, 1-2 unpaginated). The aim is now rather to develop (1) as a theorem invoking independent conditions, showing as structured dependencies (e.g., ‘on the syntactic representation of Agree relations’, on ‘selection relations’)—to dissolve (1) in some greater dependencies.
The phrase ‘mapping’ is problematic, so as supporting a reduction to content via some imposition of combination it’s problematic outside of usage carrying some kind of stipulated reductions. For instance as linked with argument visualisation, instrumentation, boxing etc, in implementing associated generic senses for ‘argument’ as reproducing as ‘mapping’ is used that way in both (cognitive) linguistics, in combinatorics supporting syntax matches, and in philosophy as well in the sense of a recurrent or ‘object of’ in construals. To support primitive construction out of materials directly associated with as though objectification, visualisation again, spatial real located-ness, constructions we’re to take it can be from or in placements almost as if effected from use of materials supposedly to hand where labels are to hand too. In a sophisticated version of that, I’d argue, there is a primacy of the visual and spatial components as linked to content in explicatory and explanatory use (in metaphors involved in invoking such) mapped to cognitive considerations showing up discretely as equivalents of explanatory materials given at nodes, a process that actively links to a type of resolution of (visualisation) materials in theory supported according to theorised instantiations invoking originals. Part of my interest here is in that resolution.

Unsurprisingly, there is no necessarily objective visual or spatial component (excluding say, stringing) in metaphorical uses connected even in materials that appear sourced in that way which are not sourced in that way. A ‘scenario’ in Christopher Peacocke’s sense—a mode of transition for content—can be supported as visually coded in the same sort of way that some person’s choice of assignment from ‘rural’/‘cosmopolitan’ may be visually encoded too. Normal base arbitrariness goes to typing encodings of oppositions as material (‘symphonies’/{symphon}{knees}, symphonies/‘symphonies’)—I’m just adverting to mixing materials generable from analytic as opposed to quotational idiom/convention (where a theoretical use is an expansion on convention with a virtual component). What is not my target here is the way in which—endorsed, I think, by Peacocke—agents make inferential transitions involving materials supported by semantic matches within and among materials as a base of transitions (supported in the sense of mapped by structures for such transitions). It would be a commonplace to remark a syntax impetus as well as a cognitive science one invoking related matches assigned effectively among hierarchies supporting interconnections or webs or type of augmented visualisation. So setting aside the ordinariness of a bit of usage there remains the question what is the reality of a construal, the product of a matching, matching terms as available to a theorist? Why should Richards (for one) worry at and want to decompose a piece of explanatory reality as just that type of reality in its detail?
Norvin Richards’ expression in ‘Deriving Contiguity’ (author’s pre print, 2017). In it he refers to his 2016 book *Contiguity Theory*, Cambridge, MA.

1. I’m not referring to the taxonomic use of ‘construal’ in cognitive linguistics in particular.

2. How explicit does it have to get? Running from one (in-explicit) extreme, an idealisation in respect of the supporting mechanics of non-conceptual content as a match between sub-personal configurations and then dependent characterisations independently posed, to some explicitly segmental continuities supporting structural, nodal, associated prominence across phonology/morphology/syntax (again, Richards 2017) where supported facts about an interface or interfaces derive continuities.


4. *A Study of Concepts*’ scenarios are ‘local’ at least in the sense that they are allowedly but functionally locally inchoate. I pass by the possibility of the suggestion that such inchoateness is a matter of gradience; that materials not rising to some degree are taken as support for some non-conceptual materiality—are a base for a conception or assignment of non-conceptual contents. My interest is in no way about the reality of divisions among content types.

5. I’m not really suggesting materialisation effects other than in the sense of structural slots being necessarily barely as it were pregnant. For a sort of two way licensing example, getting ahead of myself, it’s as if referencing expansion on what may be fundamentally locatives would, in giving the content of such expansions, involve one in indexical periphrasis, or in constructions at least represented as such. One might then equate the centres of bodies with say that material supporting constructions either in the sense of the ‘that’ in ‘that’s what it takes’ or, less damagingly, as the implicit agent of a construction—to use an example from Landau (following)—the controlling ‘it’, say, of ‘it was decided to leave’. (*Elements of Control*, 174.)

6. A control verb licences its arguments; subjects or objects. In Landau there are important distinctions relating to the nature of control and the character of that and a particular distinction between predicational and propositional characters of the control verbal relation to its objects.

7. We should not all be facing some form of synaesthesia or straight modal diffusion.