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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

A Review of "The Making of Contemporary Indian Philosophy: Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya"

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Abstract

The reviewed book, titled "The Making of Contemporary Indian Philosophy Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya" (Raveh, D., & Coquereau-Saouma, E. (Eds.). 2023) (the/this book hereafter), edited by Daniel Raveh and Elise Coquereau-Saouma, is part of the Routledge Hindu Studies Series in collaboration with the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies. This series aims to foster dialogue between Hindu traditions and modern research trends. The editors deserve commendation for adding value to the series and contributing significantly to debates in Indian philosophy, particularly regarding Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's philosophy (KCB thereafter). This book brings together scholars who have carefully looked at KCB's big ideas, giving us clear and deep insights into his philosophy. This review carefully examines each chapter, simplifying the book's content and ensuring that no significant details are overlooked. Our aim is to motivate readers to delve into KCB's broader body of work and, more specifically, this book, which greatly enriches our understanding of his worldview. In harmony with the book's flow, we delve into the current trends in Indian philosophy, giving special attention to situating KCB's philosophy within this context, as discussed by the contributors. Additionally, we seek to clarify any misunderstandings surrounding this field, aiding aspiring researchers in tackling the intricate intellectual challenges within modern Indian philosophy—an endeavor certainly worth pursuing.

Keywords Krishnachandra Bhattacharya · Daniel Raveh · Elise Coquereau-Saouma · Review · Future

Preamble

The complexities and contradictions within contemporary Indian philosophy, driven by the multifaceted objectives of influential thinkers such as the pursuit of India's liberation from British colonialism; the delineation of its philosophical character as either

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argumentative, spiritualistic, or materialistic (posing a metaphilosophical challenge); the promotion of the Indian Renaissance; the preservation of cultural heritage; and the molding of the nation's destiny, pose a formidable challenge for any scholar (Mahadevan & Sarajo, 1983). These intricate intellectual and practical dimensions of Indian philosophy, interwoven with historical and sociopolitical contexts, demand a deep and nuanced understanding to navigate effectively (Radhakrishnan & Muirhead, 1936). Moreover, a challenge arises in determining which thinkers fall under the purview of "contemporary Indian philosophy," whether those from the pre-independence or post-independence era and how to precisely classify this philosophy (Chatterjee, 1998). Notwithstanding these challenges, the book's editors, Daniel Raveh and Elise Coquereau-Saouma, assert that specific contemporary Indian thinkers, among them Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, manage to transcend these constraints. He adeptly fuses classical Indian sources with Western methodological influences without losing the essence and cultural roots, transcending historical boundaries. His oeuvre offers unique insights into both Indian texts and Western philosophers like Kant and Hegel, solidifying his stature as a keystone of modern Indian philosophy. Thus, he emerges as a pioneer in shaping the trajectory of Indian philosophical thought. However, it also raises the question of whether we can effectively accomplish such a task when we employ foreign languages, methods, and attempt to understand one's own culture. This issue has been a subject of considerable debate among scholars, and as a result, the editors of the present composition expand the scope of assessment to determine the feasibility of cosmopolitan philosophy and thought practice. In line with the discussion, the reviewed book, appropriately titled "The Making of Contemporary Indian Philosophy: Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya," dedicates itself entirely to exploring the philosophical legacy of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya (K.C. Bhattacharyya, KCB, 1875–1949). This volume delves into KCB's significant philosophical works and addresses a critical question, one that we have also highlighted: the need for deeper examination within contemporary academic circles.

As per editors Daniel Raveh and Elise Coquereau-Saouma, this volume revitalizes contemporary Indian philosophy through an imaginative engagement with Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's worldview. This endeavor unveils the broader realm of contemporary Indian philosophy while intricately examining K.C. Bhattacharyya's specific contributions. The project delves into various dimensions of his work, with particular emphasis on the concept of freedom spanning metaphysical, political, and postcolonial spheres. Contributors of the book undertake the intriguing task of deciphering KCB's intricate terminology, addressing concerns shared by his readers. The volume also expands KCB's philosophical scope, challenging the prevailing notion of him solely as a Vedāntist (*Advaitin*) scholar. Noteworthy credit is attributed to contributors who explore KCB's engagement with diverse topics such as "Rasa aesthetics," "the subject as freedom" in phenomenology, his place between classics like Abhinavagupta and thinkers inspired by him like Daya Krishna, and his discourse on Sāṃkhya and Yoga (p.2). Furthermore, the book delves into the contemporary relevance of KCB's philosophy, encompassing metaphilosophical inquiries, challenges of other minds, freedom in social and political contexts, and explorations in soteriology and aesthetics. Divided into five pivotal sections — Entrée, Lexicography, Philosophical Junction, Sāmkhya and Yoga, and the debate on Freedom — the book meticulously situates KCB's ideas within each chapter.

Entrée

The book's entrée section includes Daniel Raveh's introduction to the project and a preliminary chapter on KCB philosophy by prominent modern Indian analyst, Daya Krishna (1924–2007).

Daniel Raveh and Introduction of the Book

In this introduction, the editor endeavors to delve into Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's philosophical legacy, with a special focus on his intricate engagement with classical Indian texts and his distinctive contributions to the works of Kant and Hegel. Daniel Raveh raises a valid concern regarding KCB's relatively modest recognition in contemporary philosophy circles. Despite being acknowledged as a trailblazer in his field, his writings remain largely undiscovered by many. Even his remarkable work "Swaraj in Ideas," which serves as a manifesto for the decolonization of knowledge, has not received widespread exploration beyond its original lecture format (p.2). The book's editor aims to revive KCB's philosophy in contemporary discourse, challenging the perception that it is difficult, vague, and overlooked. The contributors deserve praise for shedding light on the uniqueness of KCB's thoughts and engaging in a comprehensive exchange of ideas from various angles. As an introductory chapter, the editor counters the misconception that Indian philosophy is solely confined to classical figures like Upanishads, Śaṅkara, and Nāgārjuna.

The editor and contributors aim to demonstrate that Indian philosophy is not just a relic of the past but remains relevant today. "They emphasize that modern Indian thought extends beyond renowned figures like Swami Vivekananda and Gandhi to include academic philosophers such as Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya and onward philosophers" (p.3). Raveh references Daya Krishna, D. P. Chattopadhyaya, and Kalyan Kumar Bagchi as part of KCB's "onward philosophers," and this book reproduces their works, illuminating contemporary Indian philosophy, particularly KCB's philosophy. A metaphilosophical question arises: can these designated "onward philosophers" truly be considered philosophers, given skepticism regarding the inclusion of academicians in this category? This prompts contemplation on the placement of renowned thinkers like Shankara, Nagarjuna, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. Additionally, there is a noticeable distinction between KCB's philosophy and that of the mentioned "onward philosophers," raising questions about the extent of innovation within KCB's philosophical realm. The reviewer welcomes alternative perspectives while seeking to uncover novel dimensions beyond retrospection, criticism, and analysis in elucidating KCB's "onward philosophers."

Moving ahead, Daniel Raveh categorizes KCB's work into three distinct realms. His foremost concept, "Swaraj in ideas," passionately explored, seeks an analogy with Gandhi's idea of an "Indian slate," a canvas for novel inscriptions. Unravelling this notion, the author interconnects it with abstract concepts like self, identity, agency, and freedom. This exploration leads to an inevitable confrontation between philosophy and politics, a perennial conundrum. This inquiry stems from Gopinath

Bhattacharyya's decision to exclude "Swaraj in Ideas" from KCB's pivotal work "Studies in Philosophy." Notably, Gopinath Bhattacharyya, KCB's son, and editor, propounds a dichotomy between politics and the essence of "philosophy proper." Nonetheless, the current chapter's author contends that the very act of philosophizing, entailing critical reflection and inquiry, inherently embodies a political dimension. KCB's pursuit of Swaraj manifested in his quest for an "Indian slate" for contemplation, resounds throughout his body of work (p.4).

However, it is crucial to address the view that politicizing philosophy is essentially propagandistic. This perspective stems from the belief that politics often distorts truth through ideological frameworks. Such distortion transforms politics into a tool for propaganda, undermining the essence of philosophy, which seeks pure truth and comprehensive reality. While some may attempt to view works like Acharya Shankara's "Brahma Sūtra" or Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" through a political lens, this usually results from preconceived biases rather than genuine philosophy. Pure philosophy, exemplified by KCB's detached analysis, offers a remedy to this issue. Recognizing a link between philosophy and politics can introduce subjectivity, leading to narrow perspectives, a concern explored in this upcoming review, primarily in Raveh's introduction and extensively in the final section, especially the last chapter. Excessive politicization and idolization risk eroding reasoned discourse's universality and credibility. If questioning becomes a political act, it raises the question of which ideology should guide philosophy. History shows that no ideology is all-encompassing; each can be corrupted and requires philosophical scrutiny for resolution. Thus, the discourse itself becomes philosophical, and Raveh provides a platform to ponder and address issues.

Deciphering KCB's "Swaraj in Ideas," the author unveils a comprehensive freedom concept, cautioning against cultural subjection and excessive foreign idealization. The author adeptly reveals KCB's hidden motives, showcasing both research and philosophical acumen. For instance, while acknowledging India's historical challenges like poverty and casteism under British rule, KCB modernly addressed evolving casteism forms such as elitism, scientism, and English-centric obsessions. As Raveh Cites to KCB:

> We condemn the caste system of our country, but we ignore the fact that we, who have received a Western education, constitute a class more exclusive and intolerant than any of the traditional castes (p.5).

Continuing, the author introduces the remaining two rubrics of KCB's three phases. The second rubric entails a fusion of classical Indian sources with modern European philosophy, an innovative trend during his era. On the classical Indian spectrum, KCB delves into Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, Pātañjala-yoga, Jaina philosophy, and the Rasa theory of aesthetics. Concurrently, he analyzes Kant and Hegel from the realm of modern European philosophy. Transitioning to the third and final rubric, it encompasses his independent essays such as "Place of the Indefinite in Logic" (1916), "The Subject as Freedom" (1930), "The Concept of the Absolute and Its Alternative Forms" (1934), and "The Concept of Philosophy" (1936). Notably, this phase captivates scholars' attention due to the essays' novelty, often cloaked in distinct vocabulary that demands ongoing interpretation. Aligning with the essence of

this book, the third phase strives to decipher these unique terminologies for contemporary readers. Throughout diverse texts within KCB's extensive repertoire, authors shed light on various facets of his work, offering multidimensional insights.

The project of bridging the East–West philosophical and cultural gap involves scholars from both regions (Gupta & Mohanty, 1999). Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's second phase focused on this endeavor, blending classical Indian texts with modern European scholarship. Despite the dedicated focus on KCB, the author subjects him to philosophical critique. Drawing insights from Daya Krishna and George B. Burch, Raveh outlines KCB's limitations in Vedanta, Samkhya, Yoga, Kant, and Hegel. Yet, he notes that KCB's originality shines, highlighted by Arindam Chakrabarti's essay "New Stuff" (2011) and KCB's own essay "The Advaita and Its Spiritual Significance" (1936), linking spiritual awakening to moral repentance. KCB's philosophical creativity reveals a hidden facet: his perspective suggests spiritual awakening is akin to shared consciousness and moral change. Raveh decodes KCB's metaphysical concepts like "I," "Me," "Others," and the pivotal "Subject," showcasing Advaitin philosophy's influence. Further, Raveh navigates contentious territory, exploring language's role in Indian philosophy. He delves into Sanskrit's significance, English suitability, and the credibility of translated texts. This debate involves figures like Daya Krishna, Raguram Raju, and Rajendra Prashad. It is important to note that the intricacies of translating Sanskrit into English demand careful consideration, and this task should be approached with the utmost care and diligence (Bhushan & Garfield, 2011). It appears that this aspect may require revision or further justification within the present book. This issue seems to have been somewhat overlooked by both the editors and the authors of the chapter. Moreover, this tendency to treat the issue lightly extends beyond just this book and can be observed in speeches and writings as well (Raguramraju, 2006).

Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya (KCB) has left behind a prolific body of philosophical work that delves into a diverse array of theoretical subjects. Spanning his intellectual journey, these writings chronologically cited by the author include "Studies in Vedāntism" (1907), based on his 1901 Ph.D. dissertation, and "Some Aspects of Negation" (1914), which delve into intricate aspects of philosophical thought. "The Definition of 'Relation' as a Category of Existence" (1918) and "The Place of the Indefinite in Logic" (1916) reflect his exploration of fundamental concepts. In "Śaṅkara's Doctrine of Māyā" (1925), KCB delves into the complex teachings of Śaṅkara. He further delves into aesthetics and art with works like "Artistic Enjoyment" (1925) and "The Beautiful and the Ugly" (1925). KCB's profound analysis extends to other philosophical systems, such as "The Jaina Theory of Anekāntavāda" (1925). His writings encompass broad themes including truth, freedom, error correction, and the subjective nature of reality. Through works like "The Absolute and Its Alternative Forms" (1933–1934), he explores profound metaphysical concepts. Additionally, he delivers insights into the concepts of value, philosophy, and spiritual significance in works such as "The Concept of Value" (1934) and "The Advaita and Its Spiritual Significance" (1936). The depth of KCB's philosophical engagement is further exemplified through his "Lectures on Sāṃkhya" (1937) and "Lectures on Yoga" (1937), demonstrating a profound exploration of diverse philosophical realms. Furthermore, the author highlights the pivotal role of Gopinath

Bhattacharya, Kalidas Bhattacharya, and George Burch in deciphering KCB's philosophy. These scholars are recognized as key interpreters, with Raveh emphasizing the similarity between KCB's style and classical sūtra literature, necessitating continuous interpretation (p.19). Furthermore, this section also outlines Kalidas Bhattacharya, who simplified the KCB's philosophy methodologically or otherwise. The interesting part of this section also consists of the outline of the notion of alternation in KDB's thought that all KCB's works should understand. Raveh Cites Tara Chatterjee to simplify it:

> Alternation is a method through which one "transcend[s] all one-sided philosophies, and reach[es] a philosophical conclusion which is anekānta". "Without being committed to any particular view", she further explains, "the philosopher has the freedom to enjoy all the views positively. When KDB talks of it, he is almost poetic here, speaking of this position as dynamic seesaw motion, where one swings from philosophy to philosophy in cosmic oscillation". Thus, the question follows: Can we apply this idea of "alternation" between philosophies to KCB's attitude to Kant, Hegel, and Vedānta? Or to Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Jaina philosophy? (p.18)

The author emphasizes George Burch's crucial contribution in clarifying KCB's philosophy. Burch, known for his work on KCB, divides KCB's philosophy into three distinct phases within his notable book "Search for the Absolute in Neo-Vedanta." These phases involve the Indefinite Absolute, the Subject, and the mentioned Alternation. Raveh skillfully outlines these three pivotal phases based on Burch's insights, explaining their essence: Burch's categorization acts as a valuable guide to navigating KCB's work. KCB's exploration of Vedānta and Sāṃkhya falls under the "knowing" category; his analysis of Pātañjala-yoga and Kant falls under "willing," and his examination of Rasa aesthetics falls under "feeling." Additionally, Burch suggests that in the third phase, KCB interprets the term sacchidānanda as "sat or cit or ānanda" (p.20). Following that, the author outlines the key highlights from the Special Issues on KCB's "Swaraj in Ideas," published by the Indian Philosophical Quarterly (IPQ), and the Research on the Philosophy of K. C. Bhattacharyya by the Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research (JICPR). Acknowledging his limited exploration of these issues, the author suggests that those genuinely interested in further exploring KCB's evolving ideas should delve into these publications. In short, this introductory write up offer a concise overview and outlines of the whole book.

K.C. Bhattacharyya: A Philosophical Overview by Daya Krishna

This overview of KCB's philosophy is compiled by the book's editors, drawing from Daya Krishna's segments in his books "Indian Philosophy: A New Approach" (1997) and "Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards" (2002). While providing a lucid outline of Daya Krishna's perspective on KCB, those interested in a deeper analysis can refer to these works. Daya Krishna discusses KCB's three absolutes and their alternation, as well as

the subject-object relationship within KCB's framework. Mirroring the book's theme, Daya Krishna acknowledges KCB's radical ideas, noting that his contributions were often overlooked until his time. KCB stands apart in the realm of philosophy, encompassing classical Indian and modern Western thought, particularly Kant and Hegel. Daya Krishna emphasizes KCB's significant contribution to Advaitic thought, proposing alternative absolutes that challenge conventional metaphysical views. This perspective extends beyond spiritual figures like Vivekananda and Aurobindo (Chatterjee, 1998). Daya Krishna further delves into the Subject/Object phenomenon, the Second Round of three Absolutes, and the Sāṃkhyan Roots of KCB's Project. He explores the debate between KCB's project and the Upaniṣadic unity of Sat, Cit, and Ānanda, a foundation for KCB's three absolutes. Furthermore, as noted, KCB's position in this regard is quite creative and radical since—

> He argues that, unlike the Upaniṣadic unity of Sat, Cit and Ānanda, in KCB's worldview, these absolutes are essentially and inalienably alternative in character, in that if one is realised or actualised, the others cannot be actualised or realised in principle (p.39).

KCB's argument initiates a paradigm shift in Vedāntic philosophy, challenging both classical Vedāntic thinkers and modern stalwarts like Vivekananda, Ramana Maharshi, and Sri Aurobindo. The notion of an alternative form of the absolute, as proposed by KCB, is a debated topic, as it seemingly contradicts the very essence of the absolute, while Hegelian terminology offers a clue, KCB's departure from Hegel's "Dialectic" method cautions against complete parallelism between their notions of the absolute. As Daya Krishna writes about the KCB's peculiarity:

> Hegel's dialectic moves through negation towards a synthesis… K.C. Bhattacharyya's dialectic, on the other hand, moves through what may be called a process of identification and de-identification…the dialectic, of course, is that of Sāṃkhya (p.41).

It has also been discussed here that KCB introduced the notion that the postulation of an absolute was a necessity of thought to resolve a fundamental problematic question or paradox that is found in self-consciousness itself. Moreover, it is well-recognized, as philosophers generally agree, that the self-conscious reflection on any object gave rise to philosophy, and the philosophical enterprise consisted, first, in becoming aware of the paradox involved in self-consciousness and then, second, of the attempt to resolve it. As this resolution, according to him, could be attempted in different ways, "the idea of alternative absolutes was entailed by the possibility of alternative ways of resolving the problematic question posed by self-consciousness to the philosophical reflection on it." (p.40) Alternatively, Daya Krishna still finds a scope of Dialectic in the KCB's global philosophical program, but differently and creatively. Daya Krishna adds that KCB's dialectic is rooted in Sāṃkhya philosophy instead of Hegelian philosophy. K. C. Bhattacharyya, therefore, gives a new turn to it. Daya Krishna's creativity

shines here again, not only explaining the "new turn" but also critiquing KCB. Raveh highlights Daya Krishna's points in the book's synopsis: "Firstly, he reminds KCB that identification is equally free as de-identification, conveying a sense of freedom. Secondly, Daya Krishna advocates for re-identification after de-identification, asserting that freedom lies in the interplay of engagement and disengagement at one's will." (p.24) In short, here Daya Krishna elaborates on KCB's argument regarding the paradoxical nature of the subject-object relationship in self-consciousness, leading to a unique resolution with alternative possibilities. KCB's creative approach challenges absolutistic perspectives, setting his project apart from more rigid philosophies. Addressing the subject-object issue within KCB's philosophy, Daya Krishna highlights a dual dynamic. On the one hand, the object asserts its independent ontic reality, emphasizing objective understanding, while on the other hand, the subject seeks a self-awareness detached from objectivity. This concept of the subject arises through negation and disassociation from various object associations, starting with the human body (p.40).

Lexicography

This section has three chapters, each focusing on one central concept of KCB's philosophy. Elise Coquereau-Saouma focuses on "demand," Nir Feinberg, on "feeling," and Dor Miller on KCB's "Heart Universal.

1. The Concept of Demand: Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's Key to Spiritual Progress by Elise Coquereau-Saouma

George Burch highlights that in KCB's philosophy, "Demand" is a significant code word, second only to "alternation" (p.25). Following this insight, the lexicography section features Elise Coquereau-Saouma's composition on the pivotal concept of "Demand" in KCB's philosophy. She draws this concept from the first chapter of KCB's masterpiece "The Subject as Freedom," presenting Demand as the Key to Spiritual Progress. This addresses the question: What initiates spiritual growth and motivates a deeper understanding of subjectivity? KCB asserts that a "demand" arises at each level, indicating the need for sublation and guiding the path toward a desired state, imbuing a sense of necessity. This crucial demand fuels spiritual advancement, a facet rarely explored until now. This chapter explores Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's pedagogy and method, shaping the structure of his study. Through phenomenological analysis, it engages with Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Kalyan Kumar Bagchi, and J. N. Mohanty in a dialogue on the concept of demand. As Elise Coquereau-Saouma writes:

> KCB develops a philosophic-practical method and explains what we can hope to achieve if we exercise our consciousness accordingly. This, as traditionally expected, is meant to attain liberation, which cannot be realised without active work at the level of the subject, described as "spiritual progress" (p.47)

What KCB implied by spiritual progress is quite unique here since it is a realization of the subject as free. In other words, it is a form of consciousness of perfection, freedom. As per the Elise Coquereau-Saouma interpretation and citation:

> Salvation as the end is . . . a demand for some kind of activity of the subject toward itself . . . *The specific activity demanded is primarily in the inward-swing direction* and secondarily, if at all, in the direction of creating objective or social values (ibid).

Continuing, the author analyzes KCB's progression alongside Kalidas Bhattacharyya's alternation concept in the first section. This inquiry delves into the essence of the term "demand." Is it external or internal? Whose demand does it represent, and what prompts its emergence? Coquereau-Saouma scrutinizes KCB's Vedānta writings, focusing on "demand paragraphs" to unravel its meaning. She engages in discourse with Kalidas Bhattacharyya, George Burch, and Kalyan Kumar Bagchi to trace its development, notably through Kalidas Bhattacharyya's perspective. The subsequent section highlights gradual spiritual progression. This chapter uniquely decodes the mystical element of KCB's philosophy—the concept of "Demand." It bears direct significance for KCB's philosophical soteriology. Raveh thoughtfully emphasizes this notion's importance in the book's synopsis: "demanding to be known" (p.25). Numerous metaphysical terms like "realisation," "freedom," "subject," and "inwardising" populate KCB's philosophy. Yet, according to Elise Coquereau-Saouma's analysis, KCB does not fully elaborate on the demand for inwardisation or its role in salvation. The process of moving from object to absolute subjectivity demands a "spiritual discipline." Given the limited discussion of "Demand," the author suggests it functions as a "modal expression," guiding the path toward the intended state, rather than an object of study. While analysis of Demand is confined, it sparks the exploration of other facets. As the author further decodes it that demand isn't spiritual discipline; it does not define the method's progression, the final liberation, or even the intermediary stages. Rather "It signifies movement between stages, linked to knowledge as the "demand to be known," yet not an attribute, content, postulate, or cause of knowledge" (p.49).

The author then links classical Vedanta with KCB's philosophy by connecting "demand to be known" with the concept of "jijñāsa" (inquiry). This innovative interpretation highlights the complexity of "jijñāsa" in classical Indian thought, which involves contexts, goals, and normativity. Kalidas Bhattacharyya is brought into the context as he frequently employs the concept of Demand. Quoting from his work "Classical Philosophies of India and the West," Coquereau-Saouma defines Demand as "what ought to be, but not yet is" (p.51). She interprets his article to emphasize the normative nature of Demand and its tension with existing facts, describing it as a tension between "ought" and "is." This tension motivates action to dissolve it, reflecting the essence of philosophy. This idea aligns with Daya Krishna and KDB's views, emphasizing the role of tension in philosophy. As interpreted by the author:

> … Kalidas's own *philosophical* exploration does not aim at "solving" but at exploring how the plurality of philosophies, even when they contradict each

other, constitute different responses to the tension between ought and is (p.52, italics added).

Kalidas's analysis challenges conventional divisions of philosophies based on pragmatic and cultural values. Instead, he categorizes classical philosophies by their expressions and responses to the concept of demand, a unique perspective drawn from KDB's philosophy. The author further explores how Kalidas's interpretation of "demand" serves as a constructive commentary on KCB's use of the rope-snake analogy from classical Advaita Vedanta. Kalidas's insight on the rope-snake analogy is that these idealities or demands strive to be real but are not yet real (p.51). This parallels KCB's phenomenological description of subjectivity's inward movement through progressive objective stages, encapsulated by the concept of demand. Supporting this notion, Kalyan Kumar Bagchi's comments underscore the "existential" nature of this movement and the essential role of demand in KCB's ontological thinking.

> …Something appears to him, and he feels a demand that it must be realised: such realisation involves re-ordering ordinary experience, a recasting of the ordinary modes of thought that inhibit the grasp of what appears to the metaphysician (p.58).

In summary, this chapter exclusively explores the KCB's concept of Demand while also charting his journey towards the Absolute. This journey spans consecutive levels of subjectivity, progressing from the bodily to the psychic, culminating in absolute subjectivity as depicted in "The Subject as Freedom." Additionally, the chapter traces KCB's progression from the empirical to the pure objective, spiritual, and ultimately transcendental thought as presented in "The Concept of Philosophy."

2. Feeling and Factuality: K.C. Bhattacharyya's Reflections on Śaṅkara's Doctrine of Māyā by Nir Feinberg

In the nineteenth century, Western philosophers became intrigued by classical Indian philosophy, including Advaita Vedānta and its terms like saṃsāra, Māyā, nirvāṇa, karma, and dharma. Nir Feinberg's chapter explores feeling and KCB's effort to introduce Shankara's "Māyā" concept globally. The author draws from Nietzsche and Advaita Vedanta to elucidate Māyā's essence. As he writes:

> Māyā represents the phenomenal world that is governed by the principle of individuation… In Nietzsche's words, the concealed truth is the "mysterious primordial unity," which in the tradition of Advaita Vedānta is commonly evoked by the concept of Brahman (p.64).

Thereafter, Nir Feinberg outlines the typical Western understanding of this Maya and Brahman, where these two are usually considered radically different. And then shows how K. C. Bhattacharyya's essay titled "Śaṅkara's Doctrine of Māyā" (1925) discusses the structural similarities between māyā and Brahman. The author also highlights yet another KCB's radical position that claims that—

> Both māyā and Brahman cannot be established by reason or by conventional means of knowledge (pramāṇas). Moreover, both māyā and Brahman involve an absolute denial of givenness, as they reject the possibility that real entities simply present themselves to us (p.64).

The author explores KCB's innovative concept that establishes a connection between Maya and Brahman through the notion of "Feeling" at their core. This pivotal point of concern in the chapter is central to both Śaṅkara's māyā doctrine and KCB's philosophy, as demonstrated by KCB's words: "The knowledge of Brahman is no mediate affirmation but an intuition which is not a result that is reached but is felt when it comes to having been eternally there" (p.65). The author also highlights the philosophical link between KCB and Nietzsche in their shared focus on affectivity in lived experience. Additionally, the chapter delves into the theory of māyā's origin and development, addressing translation disputes from classical Advait Vedānta to modern neo-Vedānta, including KCB's philosophy. It tackles the core challenges that Advaita Vedanta faces, including creationism, multiplicity, continuity, suffering, and the neglect of individualism, among others (p.66). However, KCB is very much specific here since he does not engage with all of the above-mentioned traditional Advaita discourses on metaphysics; rather addresses the question concerning the source of Māyā itself which is at the heart of Advaitin's philosophy. In other words, KCB focuses on the question concerning the source of the theory of Māyā. As the author premises:

> KCB brackets the question, "How does the illusory world come into being?" and focuses on the question, "What drives a person to believe that the everyday world is an illusion?" Having chosen this question as his starting point, the first potential answer KCB explores suggests that the theory of māyā stems from the feeling of the vanity of life (p.66).

Subsequently, the author highlights an existential perspective, suggesting that our perception of the world as Māyā arises from a sense of dissatisfaction or even disillusionment with worldly pursuits. This existential dilemma drives the quest for ultimate truth. KCB, however, approaches this issue uniquely. The author, citing KCB, presents his distinct stance and offers an original formulation of the question regarding the connection between the feeling of disinterest in worldly matters and the belief in the unreality of the everyday world: "Is the theory of the world's illusoriness an essential expression of the sense of life's futility? This sentiment implies the transience of value from objects of interest. Does the loss of value equate to a loss of reality?" (p.66) KCB responds negatively to these questions, asserting that the lapse of value does not equate to a lapse in the "givenness" of reality (p.67). The author then examines KCB's perspective by introducing the concept of "givenness" into the philosophical debate. Before that, the author discusses how several philosophers of KCB's era had also contemplated this matter, citing Ras Bihari Das's essay "The Falsity of the World" (1940) and outlining its key points. Returning to KCB's philosophy on māyā, the author explores his distinct concept of the role "feeling" plays in Śaṅkara's māyā doctrine. Unlike traditional interpretations of vairāgya (dispassion), nirveda (disgust), and saṃvega (distress), KCB's notion of "feeling" presents

an alternative perspective. The author highlights a critical point from KCB's philosophy: even in dispassion, some form of reality continues to seemingly manifest, indicating a persistent form of givenness. As KCB phrases it:

> Thele KCB acknowledges the traditional Advaita notion that the illusoriness of the world is grounded in the feeling of the vanity of life, he insists on emphasizing that the reality of the everyday world does not simply disappear because of the feeling that the world is meaningless or worthless (p.67).

The author proceeds to discuss KCB's analysis of the snake-rope analogy, a key element for understanding the concept of māyā. Drawing from Gopinath Bhattacharyya's analysis of KCB's essay on Śaṅkara's māyā doctrine, the author highlights two points: KCB's detailed examination of the snake-rope example and his interpretation of māyā as neither real nor unreal. These innovations in KCB's analysis are of particular interest. The author contends that KCB's use of the term "feeling" is central to understanding these concepts (p.68). The chapter then focuses on the relationship between Feeling and factuality in KCB's philosophy. The author addresses a philosophical dilemma—the dichotomy between facts and feelings. KCB bridges this gap by asserting that the factuality of the phenomenal world is rooted in feeling. This leads to the idea that "māyā is a fact, yet Brahman is real" (p.73), drawing from Brian Massumi's work and interpreting KCB's perspective.

> The factuality of māyā is predicated on feeling, while the reality of Brahman is completely unaffected by one's emotive state. In the illusory experience, the empirical givenness of the object is fractured, and the reality of the phenomenal world is revealed to be an effective fact as opposed to an epistemic fact (p.73-74).

In summary, the author discusses essential aspects of Advaita philosophy from KCB's work "The Advaita and Its Spiritual Significance," emphasizing that illusion is not merely a logical error. The author's main point is that according to KCB, correcting an illusion transforms the world from empirical fact to affective reality (p.75), revealing the fusion of feeling and factuality in KCB's exploration of Śaṅkara's Doctrine of Māyā.

3. Vocabularies of the Heart Reflecting on Hṛdayasaṃvāda and Sahṛdaya in Light of K.C. Bhattacharyya's New Commentary on Rasa by Dor Miller

The author of the chapter, Dor Miller, starts with a problem that states that it is a commonly accepted belief in contemporary academia that "there has not been any creative contribution to the long-established tradition of the theories of rasa, literally "liquid," or "that which flows," and metaphorically – "taste" or "savour" (āsvāda), since the seventeenth century" (p.77). He cites the seminal work in Indian aesthetics—Rasagaṅgādhara (c. 1650) written by Jagannātha as marking the end of this commentarial tradition. The introduction in itself starts with the heading-cum-question that "The Demise of the Commentary Tradition?" (p.77) At the outset, this title and introduction seem to imply that a search for other

sources of rasa notion in Indian aesthetics must also demise. Nonetheless, Dor Miller challenges this declaration with the help of KCB and certain hermeneutic framework. As the author put it: "This confining conviction can perhaps be negotiated using Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's new commentary on rasa." In his essay, "The Concept of Rasa" (KCB 2011a, [1925]), KCB draws on classical theories of aesthetics to enrich our extant philosophical vocabulary. (p.77) This discussion explores Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's perspective on aesthetics, highlighting his paradigm shift towards valuing aesthetic feeling in human consciousness over intellect and will. This shift requires a new language of feelings, including an analysis of the Rasa concept, leading to an alternative vocabulary. The key points covered are:

The revival of classical Indian discourse and the emphasis on aesthetics breathe new life into India's intellectual tradition, establishing a unique link with historical thinkers such as Bhojarāja, Abhinavagupta, and Rūpa Gosvāmī. This resurgence serves as a distinct pathway to the Indian renaissance. After outlining these key points of KCB's philosophy of aesthetics, the author maintains that this renaissance of classical Indian discourse or an emphasis on the same has renewed India's distinguished tradition of aesthetics and legacy of the works of thinkers such as Bhojarāja, Abhinavagupta, and Rūpa Gosvāmī. The author also outlines the KCB's concluding argument in his analysis of the concept of rasa:

> KCB touches on the notion of the bībhatsa-rasa, or the rasa of disgust, which according to him, epitomises Indian aesthetics. Considering the bībhatsa-rasa as the mahā-rasa, or mūla-rasa in this manner, challenged some of the time-honoured "truths" established by the classicists who argued for the pre-eminence of either the śṛṅgāra-rasa, śānta-rasa, or bhakti-rasa, that is, the erotic, the dispassionate detachment, or the religious sentiment (p.78).

Afterward, the author explores the rasa theory from the eighteenth century onward, finding it still relevant today. This effort has generated cross-linguistic work that reconstructs and enhances the commentarial tradition. As intended, this chapter demonstrates that the commentarial tradition did not conclude with Jagannātha's Rasagaṅgādhara (c. 1650) but thrives in contemporary Indian thought. As the author points out:

> Its initial premise considers contemporary rasa thinkers as providing information about classical sources and as legitimate interlocutors working within the tradition of Indian aesthetics shoulder to shoulder with classicists such as Bharata, Abhinavagupta, and Jagannātha (p.79).

The author synthesizes KCB's thoughts with classical Indian resources on art philosophy, emphasizing that these interconnected sources enabled KCB to develop his unique interpretation of rasa (p.79). This concept of rasa, as the author summarizes, involves a worldly form of freedom within feeling-consciousness, distinct from mere pleasant bliss or absence of sensation that may arise from introspection (svātmānupraveśa) (p.79) Moving on, the author explores the locus of rasa in KCB's art philosophy and challenges logo-centric and bhakti-centric

interpretations of aesthetic feeling. This shift in Indian aesthetics presents a fresh perspective, prompting a reconsideration of the role of feeling (p.80). Categorizing feelings within KCB's worldview, the author identifies:

- Direct or Primary Feelings: Where an object triggers a particular feeling, like a toy bringing joy to a child.
- First-Order Direct Feelings: Representing sympathy, akin to modern empathy, towards another's initial feelings.

`The author also touches on "Expression of Freedom that Opens Up a Space for Self-Consciousness" (p.82), inviting readers to contemplate KCB's use of "freedom." KCB's analysis reveals a "threefold subjectivity" distinguishing the subject of aesthetic feeling from primary feelings (p.83). The concept of contemplative feeling follows, highlighting aesthetic experience as symbolic interaction with reality, contrasting previous first- and second-order feelings. Transitioning from the discussion of aesthetics, the book arrives at a significant philosophical juncture.

Philosophical Junctions

4. Three Absolutes and Four Types of Negation: Integrating Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's Insights? By Stephen Kaplan

When we think about the KCB's metaphysical speculation, what striking hits the mind is his notion of alternative forms of absolute and his emphasis on the method of negation. Following the same, Stephen Kaplan (the author after that), begins the chapter by exclaiming that title of the present chapter is a question mark because it denotes uncertainty taking three forms in KCB's project. He, therefore, asks:

> …did K.C. Bhattacharyya elucidate the relationship between his theories of the absolute in three alternations and his theory that all philosophical thinking is rooted in different types of negation, specifically four types of negation? Second, can one with sharp acumen uncover and explicate the relationship between these two theories even if Bhattacharyya did not explicitly develop these connections? (p.97)

Considering Gopinath Bhattacharya's acknowledgment of potential uncertainties in understanding Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's writing, the chapter commences by outlining Bhattacharyya's exposition of four types of negation. Each negation, aimed at dispelling illusion, leads to distinct philosophical perspectives. This nuanced comprehension of negation sheds light on profound disparities among philosophical and religious schools. In light of KCB's stance in "The Concept of Philosophy" (p.97), the author posits that the correlation between KCB's fourfold negation schema and his three absolutes might appear evident, given their fundamental role in philosophical and religious thought (p.97). Drawing on "B.K. Lal" (p.98), the author suggests a potential link between Bhattacharyya's fourfold negation theory and his

three absolutes, raising the pivotal query: "How do these central concepts interrelate? How does three correspond to four, and vice versa?" (p.98).

Subsequently, the author deciphers Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's four forms of negation, each revealing the absence of something while also enabling the affirmation of what exists (p.99). The first type exposes illusory positive relationships imposed on two facts, negating the existence of a particular in relation to another (p.100). The second type retains particularity, where relationships are not inherently false (ibid). In contrast, the third type denies inherent particularity, constructing it through a series of negations that distinguish it from countless possibilities (ibid). The fourth type aligns with modern pragmatism and Hegel, viewing truth as a construct of the will, embodying creative negation, and echoing the spirit of Hegelian dialectic (p.101). This type connects to the three absolutes, one of which embodies absolute will (p.101), converging contemporary thought with historical notions. After the careful framework of the four-type negation, the author attempts to outline the absolute and its alternative forms, which is one the central thesis in KCB's metaphysical worldview. The author begins this section on "The Alternative Forms of Absolute" with an outline of Bhattacharyya's formulation of "…three absolutes related to three modes, which is, or are, neither one nor many" (p.102) with the following KCB's quotes:

> Truth, freedom, and value then are the absolutes for knowing, willingness, and feeling. It is impossible to avoid this triple formulation of the absolute though the notion that there are three absolutes would be just as illegitimate as the notion of there being only one absolute (p.101).

Subsequently, the author engages with a contentious aspect of KCB's philosophy, asserting that the absolutes of truth, reality, and value, discerned through knowing, willing, and feeling, are distinct and non-reducible. This perspective identifies these absolutes diversely: truth aligns with Advaita Vedānta and Sāṁkhya, reality with "nihilistic Buddhism," Yoga, and pragmatism, and feeling with Vaiṣṇavism and Hegel. The central inquiry of this chapter revolves around the alignment of the fourfold theory of negation with the threefold absolutes. While prior discussions find support in KCB's writings, merging the negation concept with absolutes proves complex due to the absence of an explicit map. To navigate this, the author employs a hermeneutic circle, uncovering a logical sequence within KCB's three-phase works. This sequence encompasses diverse thinkers and philosophical traditions, encapsulated by the statement: "KCB's works link the absolute to different ideologies" (p.102). A concluding postscript provides further insight into this intricate endeavor within KCB's philosophy.

(1) The absolute truth, revealed through knowing, is identified with Advaita Vedānta and Sāṁkhya.
(2) The absolute reality, arrived at through willing consciousness, is identified with "nihilistic Buddhism" and Yoga.
(3) The absolute as value, through a consciousness of feeling, is identified with the Hegelian absolute.

(4) The fourth type of negation (this is the author's creative identification) with the absolute as willing, where consciousness constructs the content by sheer negation, consequently, transcends all being.

5. "Felt" Body and the "Interiority" of Space in the Thought of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya by Kalyan Kumar Bagchi

Kalyankumar Bagchi's preamble of this chapter aims to discuss the KCB's views on the body vis-à-vis subjective freedom that has been part of KCB's classic "The Subject as Freedom". In this regard, the author outlines two objections: The author outlines prerequisites for contextualizing Bhattacharyya's views on the body within his philosophical framework. One precondition is understanding these views as integral to his theory of subjective freedom. The author suggests that while the body is part of the perceived world, it holds a distinct position defying materialistic explanation. This distinct perspective emphasizes that we perceive our body differently from other objects. The crux of Bhattacharyya's argument lies in the impossibility of the body observing itself, raising a philosophical query: what significance does he seek to convey in highlighting this empirical limitation? The central point is that the body, especially through others' perspectives, cannot refer to "me" as a subject. This unique approach challenges materialism, which treats the body as a mere object. To counter materialism, the author presents three key arguments from KCB's philosophy that are worth nothing in this chapter (pp.112–113). To gain a deeper understanding of this chapter, we can draw upon Raveh's insights from the synopsis where he emphasizes KCB's thoughtful exploration of the body and embodiment, akin to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's approach, within his soteriological perspective. KCB presents a nuanced argument that suggests our perception of the body is constrained, capturing only a fraction of its complexity. Raveh further delves into the concept of full-body perception through the use of mirrors, x-rays, and selfies, contending that these tools provide indirect and superficial representations. Raveh explains:

> While I can 'complete' the unseen parts of other objects by changing my perspective or imagining their 'unseen half,' this isn't possible with my body. I can't step out of my body or change my viewpoint. It's both an object among objects and fundamentally distinct from them (p.26).

The revelation that my body holds more intersubjectivity than any other object has profound implications for "Self-Other," "Self-Nature," and "Self-World Relationship" in both theory and practice (p.27). This emphasis aligns with continental thought, where Nietzsche, Husserl, and Emanuel Levinas underscore the wisdom inherent in our bodies. Levinas' concept of "the face" reshapes our perception of others, reflecting KCB's philosophy. Moving alongside KCB, the author strives for a transition from intersubjectivity to total subjectivity. As explained, the felt body remains connected to the perceived body, avoiding mere psychic transformation (p.115). This subjectivity necessitates liberation not only from objects but also from perception and their attitudes. The author explores the "disunion of subject and object" (p.27). As Raveh encapsulates the chapter's essence beautifully:

> Bagchi discusses this distinction and the body as the most immediate "place" for this disunion. Bagchi's depiction of KCB's move is reminiscent of the Sāṃkhya narrative of the disunion of puruṣa and prakṛti, equivalent to subject and object in KCB's vocabulary. In the Sāṃkhyan framework, she (prakṛti) is distinct from him; he (puruṣa) is dissociated from her. Here prakṛti (the objective world, including body and mind) is depicted as a nartakī, a female dancer, that has shown herself to the spectator; namely, puruṣa ceases to dance (nṛtyāt nivartate). Her dance shows her distinctness, which in turn confirms his dissociation. And Īśvarakṛṣṇa moves on to say that "When dissociation from the body is achieved (prāpte śarīrabhede) . . . he [puruṣa] achieves freedom (or aloneness, or apropos KCB, sheer subjectivity) which is both absolute and final (aikāntikam ātyantikam ubhayaṃ kaivalyam āpnoti) (p. ibid).

6. Up Down Backward on the Stairs of the Self from Bodily to Spiritual Subjectivity by Arindam Chakrabarti

In this chapter, Arindam Chakrabarti, hereinafter referred to as "the author," delves into KCB's intricate work "The Subject as Freedom." This monograph, often acclaimed as the densest and most challenging to decipher, becomes the focal point of the author's extensive study. As the title implies, the author's objective is to unravel the significance and position of the subject within KCB's overarching perspective. As Raveh writes in the synopsis:

> KCB's main concept. "I am no one free being amidst many other free immaterial beings", Chakrabarti beautifully explains, "like a Sāṃkhya puruṣa, or a Leibnizian Monad, or a Kantian citizen of the kingdom of ends, or in a community of Sartrean pour-soi-s". And he drives his point home, drawing on chapter 13 of the Gītā: "I am freedom beyond being and nonbeing." (p.28)

The author commences by depicting the famous painting or picture by M.C. Escher, "Ascending and Descending" (1960), quoting from Bhagavadgītā 15.1, Bhagavadgītā 15.1, K.C. Bhattacharyya, "Studies in Kant" and translating a paragraph from the unfinished Bengali monograph Manovijñān simultaneously with an aim to centralize the whole debate in search of "subject" or "self". Here is a glimpse of his selected quotation and translation on the subject:

> What a self it is that allows itself to be discovered! …. Self-awareness (ātmabodh) is an unparalleled phenomenon. In other sorts of awareness, the object is distinct from the awareness, whereas in self-awareness,' it's object – the self – is known as the same as the awareness. In other kinds of awareness, the temporal location of the object is experienced: the object is felt as existing in the present, past, or future or always (p.118-119).

In the introductory section titled "What and How Does 'I' or 'You' or 'This' Mean?" of the chapter, the author addresses an enduring philosophical inquiry. The Analytic Western tradition has often dismissed the elusive nature of the subjective as beyond serious description, but Nagel and Chalmers have lent

importance to subjective consciousness. The exploration delves into the significance of the first-person perspective, posing questions about the viability of subjective experience as scientific data and the potential contradiction of a "science of the subjective." Drawing from a range of philosophers, East and West, ancient and modern, the aim is to unravel the complexities of "I," "You," or "This." The investigation traces a path to the core of elusive subjectivity, epitomized as uttamaḥ puruṣaḥ (Bhagavad-Gita 15.17). K. C. Bhattacharyya's philosophy provides a crucial framework, particularly his examination of "freedom," where the subject detaches from the object, described as pratyāhāra (p.122).

The author proceeds to an intriguing section discussing the "Two Grades of Bodily Subjectivity," drawing from KCB's work "The Subject as Freedom." Here, each chapter is recognized as unveiling "a new dimension of our ambivalent epistemic relation to our own body" (p. ibid). Considering its placement after Kalyankumar Bagchi's chapter, the two should be collectively examined for a deeper comprehension of bodily perception in KCB's worldview. The complexity of knowing our own body is emphasized, influenced by KCB's Vedantic perspective, which resonates with the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and offers distinctive insights.

> The windows of the senses are cut out to see outside and never see the inner self or even themselves: by what can one know the knower? But he develops a much more complex argumentation to prove that the proprioceptively felt body and the externally perceived body is not ordinary object of perception (p.123).

George Burch notes: "One's own body is only half-perceived; the rest being eked out by imagination" (p.123). This discussion concludes by addressing the goal of highlighting the two grades of subjectivity. It emphasizes that while "my body" is publicly observable, its unique feature lies in being absorbed into a non-reversible sameness with the self. This distinguishes it from others' bodies. After exploring the two grades of subjectivity, the author explores the intermediary bodily subjectivity and psychic fact using the "Knowing by Missing" approach (p.126). This involves considering the detachment of the perceived my-body from the perceived object and the felt body from the perceived body, as previously discussed (p. ibid). Quoting Gopinath Bhattacharyya's summary, "The direct knowledge of the present absence of an object is a detachment both from the perceived object and the perceived body but not from the felt body" (p. ibid), this section delves into addressing how this detachment occurs. Subsequently, we move to another central section of the chapter that addresses a point about "On Trying to Think" (p. ibid) which helps us overcome the confusion between thinking and imagining that persists not only in the contemporary Anglo-analytic but also in the continental-phenomenological discourse. As the author put it:

> While thinking is supposed to deal with meanings (of words and sentences), concepts and generalities, imagining seems to have a natural pull toward visualizing with simulacra of sense-given particulars, even if images are notoriously incomplete in detail (p.128).

As the author tackles these matters, they construct the proposed ladder to spiritual subjectivity. This process is central to the subsequent section titled "From Feeling of the Lack of a Feeling to Introspection, to Spiritual Subjectivity." Within this section, the recognition of lacking a feeling is explored, prompting the question: "Is such awareness of wanting a feeling… distinguishable in such a feeling?" (p. ibid). Drawing from KCB's "The Subject as Freedom," this section concludes that when one encounters a disclosed lack of feeling, "the relief may take the form of the feeling of a lack of feeling… reaching… spiritual subjectivity." (p.130). In this context, there is resonance with Nyaya's moksha concept, which envisions a consciousness-devoid Self. Addressing the charges of Nyaya, the question's validity depends on the author's authentication. Additionally, the author examines "Am I Free or Am I Freedom? KCB on 'Dissociation': Can We Identify This 'Functional' Subject with a Self?" (p.130), delving into subjective consciousness from idealist and realist perspectives. As the author put it:

The author further introduces a paradox by connecting the subject with freedom, highlighting how the term "subject" implies both a perceiver affected by experience and a seeker of freedom. This connection is further explored as the author notes, "KCB's subject 'realizes" its freedom from successive levels of imbrication by spiritual progress which turns out to be a regress of 'theoretic consciousness'" (p.131). This insight leads to the chapter's conclusion that the subject willingly undergoes delimitation but, through spiritual progress, regresses to return to its root: freedom (p.131). The subsequent section delves into the "Importance of 'Turning one's gaze Inward: How Going Deep Down is Climbing Up – The Three Deepening Movements of Theoretic Consciousness'," and the chapter ends with a "Meta-Methodological Conclusion: What is KCB Doing in Subject as Freedom? Freedom From Freedom." This conclusion draws from various sources including W. B Yeats, George Burch, Wittgenstein, and Kalidas Bhattacharya, culminating in a spiritual observation. Kalidas Bhattacharyya puts it even more succinctly as a suicide of the individual selfhood of the subject: "The pure individual subjectivity that we have at the stage of introspection must commit suicide" (Bhattacharyya, Kalidas, 2016, 135). The author references the enigmatic injunction from the Mahābhārata (XII.316.41): "yena tyajasi tat tyaja," advocating renouncing the means of renouncing dualities, suggesting a pragmatic approach (p.134). Additionally, inspired by Chakrabarti's eloquence, Raveh likens reflecting on philosophy to retracing a poet's mental journey from formless feeling to articulated expression (synopsis). This analogy implies philosophy, like poetry, emerges from an original formless feeling (p.). Raveh sees Chakrabarti's chapter as a dialogue with KCB, rooted in feeling and knowing, and highlights Chakrabarti's noteworthy concept of "freedom from freedom" in conclusion. These insights, along with Chakrabarti's comparisons to Abhinavagupta, segue into the upcoming chapter.

7. Between Abhinavagupta and Daya Krishna: Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya on the Problem of Other Minds by Nalini Bhushan and Jay L. Garfield (*Henceforth the authors)*

Philosophy, like other domains, experiences trends and fashions. Notably, the recent attention bestowed upon the philosophy of mind signifies such a trend. This chapter

delves into the problem of others' minds, a topic explored in both Western and Indian philosophy. The author intends that while traditionally considered epistemological rather than metaphysical, the question emerges: "Given that there are obviously other minds, how is it that I can know this?" (p.137). The focus is not merely on comprehending the contents of others' minds, but on understanding how I can ascertain the existence of other minds. This issue extends even to modern science, which grapples with the challenge of recognizing others' minds despite observing their behavior and speech. Wittgenstein and Russell's thoughts are cited by the authors to emphasize the complexity of this predicament (p.137).

The chapter's core objective is to investigate Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's response to the "problem of another mind." It achieves this by comparing his solution with those presented by Abhinavagupta and Daya Krishna. We also see the refutation of the physicalist as well as of metaphysical idealists' arguments with a detailed analysis of Abhinavagupta's position. The authors begin by exploring Abhinavagupta's viewpoint, drawing insights from Arindam Chakrabarti's expertise. They then delve into Daya Krishna's approach to the same problem before circling back to K. C. Bhattacharyya's stance. Notably, this chapter's comprehensive examination transcends cultural confines. It initiates by discussing Abhinavagupta's solution and its complexities, engaging with Arindam Chakrabarti's translation, which contends that:

> …no argument from analogy, and no single case induction can lead to knowledge of other minds since when I speak or act, my speech and action are guided by states of mind. Others speak and act as well. So, their speech and action must be guided by state of mind. What, Abhinavagupta asks, is the entailment (*vyāpti*) in this argument meant to be? (p.138)

The authors conclude this section with a claim that Abhinavagupta offers us an important clue toward the solution to the problem of other minds. The summary of two of his arguments is as follows:

1. The problem of other minds presupposes otherness. Given otherness, or the real distinction between minds, the problem, he acknowledges, is insoluble. The solution, therefore, involves eliding that otherness in favor of a specific kind of identity. That identity is realized in the act of address when the address or recognizes the addressee as a subject to whom speech is directed (p.139).
2. The second problem concerns third people. We do not only ascribe minds to those with whom we are in dialogue but also to the countless others with whom we interact or of whom we are aware in non-dialogical contexts, those who neither directly address us nor are addressed by us. Any solution to the problem of other minds must explain why we ascribe mental states and processes to those others and how we do so (p.141).

Regarding the first argument, the authors acknowledge Abhinavagupta's emphasis on second persons and address but question his assertion that the perceived identity of addressee and address gives rise to the concept of mind,

particularly its linkage to the divine mind (p.140). Addressing the second point, the authors contend that while Abhinavagupta offers insight into the problem of other minds by suggesting that attributing minds to others precedes doing so for ourselves, he falls short of presenting a comprehensive solution (p.140). Transitioning from Abhinavagupta's stance and its challenges, the authors shift focus to Daya Krishna's alternative approach, as outlined in his essay "Freeing Philosophy from the Prison-House of 'I-centricity'" (p.140) The authors conduct a comparative analysis, paralleling Abhinavagupta and Daya Krishna. They suggest that akin to Abhinavagupta, Daya Krishna highlights address as a context presupposing other minds for self-awareness. However, Daya Krishna differs by not asserting identity between self and addressees; instead, he underscores the distinct plurality of minds. This plurality embodies resistance and alterity, crucial to language and thought. Finally, the chapter's focal point is Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's resolution to the "other mind" predicament, positioned between Abhinavagupta and Daya Krishan's viewpoints. Daya Krishna's perspective on consciousness and the "I-centricity" issue is influenced significantly by Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya and Kalidas Bhattacharyya, albeit with some reservations (p.143, Italics paraphrased). The chapter concludes by highlighting one of KCB's well-known methodologies. These Indian approaches share the common insight that the "other minds" problem is only apparent, not an inherent issue.

> …if we take our epistemic task in coming to know the mind as that of working our way out from our own case. They each believe that reciprocal relations with others constitute the necessary conditions forgetting to know ourselves as subjects and thinkers (p.145).

In essence, Abhinavagupta posits a strict identity between addressee and addressor, while Daya Krishna emphasizes radical differences between them. Both approaches have limitations. K. C. Bhattacharyya strikes a nuanced balance here, recognizing that interaction requires both distinctness and sameness. Shared community identity enables language use while acknowledging diverse perspectives fosters meaningful discourse. "This hermeneutic understanding, guided by norms, unveils self and others' minds, asserting that other minds are crucial for our own existence" (p.145).

Sāṃkhya and Yoga

8. K.C. Bhattacharyya and Spontaneous Liberation in Sāṃkhya by Dimitry Shevchenko

K. C. Bhattacharyya is very well known for his creative and revolutionized thinking. This chapter is also based on a selection from one of his posthumously published works, "Studies in Sāṃkhya Philosophy," where he has argued for the view that there is no method of liberation in Sāṃkhya instead, it is a "religion of reflective spontaneity or spiritual naturalness," in which the liberation from suffering occurs in "absolute spontaneity, continuous with the flow of life" (p.151) Is not it quite

surprising that when both modern scholars, as well as ancient saints, consider liberation in Sāṃkhya to be a result of some method — either meditative practice, as in Yoga, or rational inquiry, KCB is arguing for something opposite that in fact create a paradigm-shift in Sāṃkhya philosophy? As Dimitry Shevchenko (He/the author hereafter) put it:

> liberation is a natural process started by a certain tension in the not-yet-conscious, "blind" nature – a tension which we call "bodily pain." The pain eventually leads to freedom of the self from pain and to the self's transcendence of the very physical nature, which was imagined to be an integral part (p.151).

The author's motivation in this chapter is that despite Bhattacharyya's unique and argumentative "spontaneous liberation" approach, it has received little attention. In fact, it is regarded as Bhattacharyya's philosophical innovation that does not represent the actual position of the classical Sāṃkhya. Considering the same, the author argues that the "spontaneity of liberation in Sāṃkhya is well supported by traditional sources, although Bhattacharyya interprets it uniquely, assisted by Hegelian dialectics" (p.151). In this regard, the author proposes a three-stage plan that follows:

1. He describes Bhattacharyya's account of liberation as a reflective dissociation from physical pain.
2. He demonstrates that KCB's approach agrees well with Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhyakārikā and its classical commentaries.
3. He analyzes the role that Hegelian thought played in KCB's interpretation of liberation in Sāṃkhya and how this interpretation relates to Bhattacharyya's other works.

Beginning with K. C. Bhattacharyya's spontaneous liberation approach, the author explores Sāṃkhya's philosophy of suffering and liberation. Pain's paradoxical essence is outlined: being felt yet desiring not to be felt. The wish to be free from pain holds contradictory elements, simultaneously enabling freedom and setting the stage for pain's existence, as its absence would negate its perception. This contradiction leads to a different kind of wish: "the wish to be free from pain." (p.152) It here consists of the spirit of KCB's spontaneous liberation approach, which he explains like this —

> The first instance of the wish to be free from pain is the "secular wish," and the second is the wish to be free from the secular wish – the "spiritual wish." The second wish is the necessary wish for absolute freedom from pain and the potentiality of future pain… The wish that pain would not be a part of the self makes the self-opposed to itself or the object of itself. The spiritual wish marks the beginning of the separation of the self from pain because the pain becomes an object separate from the self (p.152).

The author cites Gopinath Bhattacharyya, who identifies "spiritual naturalness" in Sāṃkhya as KCB's original contribution. The author laments that while

some scholars mention Bhattacharyya's "natural liberation" approach, they neither validate nor challenge it. From a reviewer's perspective, it is questioned whether KCB's approach encompasses karma's law and liberation from the birth–death cycle, given the distinction between a harmonious life and spiritual liberation in Indian philosophy. This critique draws parallels to the stoic school and Nietzsche's concept of "Amor Fati," embracing life's events while differing from Indian philosophy's liberation. Nevertheless, KCB's approach remains a rare and creative philosophical endeavor. As the author cites Gerald J. Larson, arguably the leading expert on Sāṃkhya,

> Although K.C. Bhattacharya's work contributes little to the problem of the historical interpretation of classical Sāṃkhya, his treatment of the meaning of Sāṃkhya as a philosophical position is one of the most creative and profound in modern scholarship. . .. For Bhattacharya, . . . the interpretation of Sāṃkhya is not really a historical task but, rather, a constructive philosophical problem (p.153).

The author contends that Bhattacharyya's approach discerns unique aspects of liberation in Sāṃkhya, overlooked by traditional historians. Focusing on "Natural Liberation in the Sāṃkhyakārikā (S, K) and Its Commentaries" (p.153), the analysis unveils how Bhattacharyya subtly references traditional sources, particularly in the case of "natural liberation." He draws from Īśvarakṛṣṇa's SK verses 59 and 60 and Māṭhara's commentary on SK verse 37 to examine the relationship between puruṣa (pure self) and prakṛti (nature) (Bhattacharyya 1983b, 141, 146). This exploration underscores that classical Sāṃkhya's primary focus lies in elucidating the generation of liberating knowledge by inherent, unconscious natural forces (p.153). Transitioning to Hegel's perspective on pain, the author connects KCB's ideas with Hegelian dialectics. Both philosophers share parallels in their views on pain's origin and freedom. The author interprets Hegel as akin to KCB, where the contradictory nature of the mind engenders pain's possibility. "The possibility of pain in its distinguished human sense, is found in the contradictory nature of the mind" (p.152 & p.155). This shared viewpoint posits that the mind's contradictory essence forms the basis for pain's existence and the potential for freedom through reflective transcendence. While differing slightly, Hegel and KCB align in recognizing the potential for pain and its subsequent liberation through the mind's assertion of mastery over contradiction. "The cause is also the solution" (p.155, italics added). Furthermore, based on the above discussion, the conclusion of the chapter embraces certain points about the KCB's approach:

1. K.C. Bhattacharyya's view of Sāṃkhya as a path of innate liberation draws from the Sāṃkhyakārikā and its commentaries. His innovative reading depicts liberation as a self-resolving contradiction inherent in bondage itself (p.161).
2. Bhattacharyya contends that interpreting Sāṃkhya is more a philosophical challenge than a historical endeavor, blurring the lines between historical and philosophical comprehension (Larson 1979, 66–67).

3. Bhattacharyya's unique reinterpretation of Sāṃkhya, depicting liberation as a detachment from bodily pain, breaks new ground. His method underscores that active philosophical engagement best elucidates ancient ideas (p.161).

9. Bhattacharyya-Vṛtti: K.C. Bhattacharyya's Commentary on the Yogasūtra by Daniel Raveh

The Indian yoga tradition, ancient and intricate, holds controversies regarding its origin, foundation, and history. Daniel Raveh delves into these complexities, commencing with a contentious translation of the renowned "Patañjal Yogasūtra." Raveh explores Pradeep Gokhale's assertion that Patañjali draws from Yogācāra Buddhism, not Sāṃkhya philosophy, charging Patañjali with plagiarism (p.167). Gokhale contends that Vyāsa, Patañjali's commentator, distances him from Buddhism. To add nuance, Raveh cites the "Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha," which presents Patañjala-yoga as "seśvara sāṃkhya," combining Sāṃkhya with Īśvara. This sets the stage for a philosophical journey. Next, Raveh introduces the central figure, KCB, who closely associates Yogasūtra with Sāṃkhya. KCB highlights differences in "Studies in Yoga Philosophy," emphasizing Sāṃkhya and Yoga's nuances across chapters (p.168). The author laments the lack of attention KCB's profound contributions to Samkhya-yoga philosophy have received.

The author's anguish stems from viewing KCB as an unparalleled commentator on Patañjali Yogasutra. This perception is grounded in KCB's acute insight into the text and its classical commentators, such as Vyāsa, Vācaspatimiśra, Bhojarāja, and Vijñānabhikṣu. Furthermore, KCB demonstrates comparative prowess across various systems of classical Indian philosophy, notably Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Vedānta, as well as European thinkers including Leibniz, Kant, and Nietzsche. This sentiment leads to the author's focus on exploring KCB's commentary titled "Bhattacharyya-Vṛtti" on the Yogasūtra. Additionally, the author aims to assess the significance of SYP within KCB's broader body of work. Notably, SYP introduces KCB's Gītā-Kantian threefold concept of the Absolute, comprising knowledge, feeling, and the notion of willing (p.168). The author extracts the basic difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga in KCB's philosophy because they perceive the concept of willingness contrarily.

> In Sāṃkhya, willing is a function of ahaṃkāra, not of the buddhi. It is an activity of a "finite agent", namely, the worldly "me", through which he maintains his "finitude". The Buddhi, on the other hand, is perceived here as infinite. Willing emanates from the "self-conscious certitude which is the function of the buddhi" but works at the limited level of ahaṃkāra. In Yoga, on the other hand, willing is asmitā. It is not only born of self-consciousness (as in Sāṃkhya), but it is, in fact, "self-conscious subjectivity (p.169).

The author highlights Nietzsche's influence on KCB's yogic ideas, dedicating a section of the chapter to "KCB on Patañjali and Nietzsche." A passage from SYP's chapter 9, paragraph #134, featuring Nietzsche's phrase "beyond good and evil," is cited. The author extracts KCB's definition of Yoga as "the will not too

will, the will to nivṛtti," aligning it with Nietzsche's concept in "On Three Metamorphoses." This allegory portrays a triple transformation of the human spirit—camel, lion, and child. The author provides further elaboration:

> The camel carries the burden of life in the world (with its social implications), what Patañjali and other moksha thinkers refer to as duḥkha, suffering. The lion symbolizes the transformation from "Thou shalt" to "I will". He fights against "the great dragon" of old values and finds the courage to utter a "sacred No" – No to the dragon, to decadent values, to "Thou shalt". This is negative freedom, freedom from. However, the lion cannot create new values. He, therefore, must metamorphose into a child (an embodiment of innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a wheel rolling out of itself, a first movement, a sacred yes-saying) (p.173).

After this discussion on Nietzschean positive freedom, the author also put forth an antithesis from Patañjali's Yoga point of view:

> There is no new world, no creation, but "sarva nirodha", total cessation of the world, or in fact of worldly, intentional, constructive consciousness, and retreat (I think of Patañjali's term pratiprasava – in YS 2.10 and 4.34 – involution, return to origin) into what KCB sees as sheer subjectivity (p.172).

The author diligently follows KCB's thematic exploration, interweaving relevant sūtras and commentaries across diverse traditions, both Indian and European. This dialogue spans from Sāṃkhya to Nietzsche, encompassing Patañjali's treatise. Editor Raveh, in the chapter synopsis, outlines the discussed themes: memory's role in meditation stages, the interplay of knowledge and willing, and the centrality of dispassion (vairāgya) as the foundation of yoga. KCB presents a distinctive interpretation of Īśvara-Praṇidhāna, categorizing it as a mode of intellectual love for God, aligned with knowledge rather than feeling—an alternative perspective to willing in yoga. Moving forward, the author examines KCB's stance on siddhis and Vikalpa from Īśvara-Praṇidhāna onward. Siddhis, depicted as super-normal knowledge or magical control, are explored as a pinnacle of willing's potential, distinct from fantastical powers. KCB's perspective on siddhis is portrayed as a test, the final temptation for yogins, which they should transcend devoid of desire and conceit. The author further delves into the siddhis' significance in the yoga procedure across three levels. Siddhis are not an end or goal in themselves, and again, the "magical powers" acquired "are not meant to be used for the gratification of desire" (p.184).

Furthermore, in the final segment, the author proceeds to discuss KCB's perspective on the concept of Vikalpa. This serves as a philosophical appetizer, setting the stage for a future exploration of the "presentation of a content that appears real even when known as unreal," namely, vikalpa. To conclude this section, George Burch's quote is invoked, emphasizing that the ancient traditions of Sāṃkhya and Yoga, as presented in SSP and SYP, are living philosophies requiring further deliberation. These traditions have faced challenges in retaining their path to spiritual liberation due to the specific cultural preferences of the modern or post-modern world.

Debating Freedom

The fifth and last section, "Debating Freedom," consists of three chapters: "Three Moods in Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya" by A. Raghuramaraju, "The Concept of Freedom and Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya" by D. P. Chattopadhyaya, and "The Problem of Freedom and the Phantasmagoria of Swaraj: Reflections on a Necessary Illusion" by Murzban Jal.

10. Three Moods in Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya by A. Raghuramaraju

In this chapter, Raghuramaraju (the author hereafter) explores three affective trajectories within KCB's compositions, encompassing his connection to the past, emotional response to colonialism, and demonstration of cognitive competence in scrutinizing Kant. Additionally, the author aims to address the biographical details attributed to Bhattacharyya by Editor Gopinath Bhattacharyya (editor henceforth). The author commences by comparing two introductions—Gopinath Bhattacharyya's introduction to KCB's collected writings and KCB's own introduction to "Studies in Vedāntism." However, the author acknowledges the open question of whether KCB's statements in the "Studies in Vedāntism" introduction apply universally across his works, a topic not pursued here. Notably, Raveh's introduction sheds light on the author's intentions.

> Raghuramaraju sees a gap between KCB as projected by Gopinath and as explained in his own words. "While Bhattacharyya [KCB] takes this extremely arduous task on his shoulders", Raghuramaraju suggests, namely, to set the intellectual foundation for independence from the British rule, both external and internal, "the Editor [Gopinath] is busy portraying him as an individual creative philosopher (p.31).

The author highlights KCB's alignment with both classical Samkhya-Yoga and Vedānta schools, positioning himself between historical Indian thought and contemporary philosophy. This distinctive approach avoids solely delving into the past and instead bridges to the present and future. A conflict between the Editor and Bhattacharyya arises over the nature of "constructive interpretation" in KCB's work (p.195). While the Editor emphasizes construction alongside interpretation, Bhattacharyya subordinates' construction to interpretation, prioritizing the revelation of classical Indian philosophies' relevance to modern systems. This task, which aims to juxtapose Indian and Western philosophies to enhance the credibility and superiority of Indian systems, carries a political and patriotic undertone absent in the Editor's work. The author asserts that Bhattacharyya takes on this challenging endeavor, in contrast to the Editor's portrayal of him as an individual creative philosopher (p.195–196). The author beautifully summarizes it:

1. Philosophizing Is Not an Exposition of Traditional Indian Philosophical Systems.
2. KCB Seeks Subordinate Construction to Interpretation.

3. KCB's intentions in philosophising are to bring the classical Indian philosophical systems on par with modern Western philosophical systems and consequently to present the former as superior to the latter.

The author evaluates the Editor's perspectives on three key issues, highlighting accuracy in the first, identifying a flaw in the second, and pointing out an omission regarding Bhattacharyya's philosophy. This reveals a clear distinction between the Editor's portrayal and Bhattacharyya's true stance. The author also examines the Editor's concept of a "risky method," which involves projecting personal ideas onto others' thoughts. In contrast, the author argues that this approach is instrumental in integrating Indian philosophical systems into mainstream discourse, making classical "esoteric doctrines" understandable—a critical aspect for any philosophical system or culture. This divergence between KCB and the editor carries significant implications. The text acknowledges potential risks in sound philosophy and associates it with broader practical goals, countering the view that pure philosophy solely stems from a love of wisdom. This metaphilosophical inquiry raises the question of whether philosophy should be pursued intrinsically or embrace external objectives. The author contends that infusing personal or cultural aspirations into philosophical pursuits risks compromising its integrity with influences from the social sciences. Throughout, the author underscores the Editor's neglect of KCB's ultimate purpose. As he pointed out at one point in the chapter:

> … the Editor overlooked Bhattacharyya's crucial distinction between historical and philosophical study, along with the recommended hierarchy. The second risk, focused on by Bhattacharyya, was also missed. Notably, the Editor failed to acknowledge the role of "Western expositions of Eastern philosophy and religion" as the source of this risk, a significant omission. By skipping these essential steps in Bhattacharyya's argument, the Editor hastily moves to ordinary consciousness (p.198-199*, summarized*).

Bhattacharyya emphasizes prioritizing philosophical study over historical context, in contrast to the Western approach to Indian philosophy. He criticizes the Western practice of reversing this order as an "aberration" that distorts understanding, leading to pessimistic and fatalistic interpretations influenced by external factors. This, according to him, is history passing judgment on philosophy. The author extends the discussion to KCB's project of creating a distinct Vedantic stance, recognizing the disparities between Eastern and Western thought. KCB's goal is to contemporize Indian philosophy by reinterpreting concepts like dream-state psychology and relating them to contemporary philosophical contexts. This bridges Vedānta with Kant and Hegel, acknowledging the self's self-manifesting process within self-consciousness. In the second section, the author investigates the editor's biographical claims regarding KCB's political allegiance, socio-religious matters, and ideological stance, particularly the portrayal of KCB as a "Right-wing Hindutvavadi" in modern terms—a point worth assessing in the broader context of KCB's intellectual landscape.

Thereafter, the author's exploration, centered on KCB's masterpiece "Swaraj in Ideas," reveals his preference for assimilation over slavery, marked by a clear distinction between the two (p.203). However, the absence of an explanation within "Swaraj in Ideas" regarding how the enslaved self aspires for swaraj prompts the need for clarification to furnish the details and program for "achieving swaraj" (p.204). Moving forward, the third section delves into KCB's concept of Swaraj at the level of ideas, touching on his critique of Kant in "The Concept of Philosophy" and his reinterpretation of Vedānta. Additionally, the text outlines KCB's adept diagnosis of Kant, its application in his projects, exploration of the "knowing without thinking" initiative, and the Vedāntic origin of the four grades of thought, as seen in the Gauḍapāda-Kārikā. Another facet of this chapter involves the use of modified Vedānta as a response to Kant, raising questions about recommending an Indian solution to a Western problem in line with Bhattacharyya's suggestions on swaraj for Indians (p.206). The assertion that conclusions in Bhattacharyya's "The Concept of Philosophy" do not align with his thesis in "Swaraj in Ideas" (p.206) might not find universal agreement due to the distinct nature of the writings. Nevertheless, the author's audacious brevity is notable, presenting a thoughtful critique of the subject of the book itself.

In pointing out the inconsistency between KCB's works, the author poses an intention for discussion.: "Either Bhattacharyya fell short in reflecting on this, or he did not properly test the purview of his concept of swaraj" (p.207). This line above showcases the author's critical perspective on KCB. However, amidst this critique, the author acknowledges KCB's remarkable contribution to both classical and modern Indian philosophy. This contribution is deemed vital not only professionally but practically, exerting influence on the political and spiritual pursuits of figures like Swami Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo, and Mahatma Gandhi. The author concludes with an intention to revisit KCB's work, "addressing any potential shortcomings and enhancing it. Such an endeavor aims to ensure that KCB's work remains relevant in contemporary philosophy, transcending being a mere assembly of hypotheses or an academic exercise. Instead, it has the potential to integrate into the dynamic tapestry of ongoing philosophical discussions, particularly within India. (p.207).

11. The Concept of Freedom and Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya by D.P. Chattopadhyaya

In this chapter by D. P. Chattopadhyaya (referred to as DPC/the author), the focus lies on exploring the concept and essence of freedom in KCB's philosophy, an endeavor marked by creative and unconventional approaches. The outset challenges conventional notions of freedom, establishing KCB's perspective as more ontological or metaphysical than social, ethical, or aesthetic (p.209). This exploration spans a spectrum from physical to spiritual dimensions, seeking the reality of freedom or freedom as reality. DPC observes a dialogue between three systems of freedom—Vedāntic, Kantian, and phenomenological — within KCB's works, and delves into their convergence. To comprehend KCB's conception of freedom, it's essential to recognize that it transcends mere social appearances and involves concepts like

subject/object, meaning/meant, and feeling/felt. As highlighted, the initial duality between these concepts gradually transforms into continuities and unities, affirming the primacy of subject, meaning, and more (p.210). Diving deeper, the author explores the notion of "I" from Vedāntic, Kantian, and phenomenological viewpoints. The chapter's third section introduces another intriguing facet — the idea of disengagement (as freedom) against the backdrop of the subject's intimate connection with its sub-psychic, perceptual, or bodily level and its environment. This intimacy parallels Heidegger's concept of "Being," where existence is intertwined with the world and environment. Additionally, the chapter accounts for KCB's stance on self-knowledge, which echoes Kantian principles while maintaining proximity to Vedāntic thought (p.216).

In addition to exploring the concept of freedom within thought, the author proposes a distinction from the freedom achievable through imagery. This distinction arises from the image's inherent connection to the object, while "both image and sense-percepts mediate thought's relation to the object" (p.219). This novel interpretation broadens artistic possibilities, countering the constraints of post-modern art. The author intertwines Kant, Vedanta, and phenomenology, integral to KCB's ideology. Summing up, the author encapsulates the notion of epistemic freedom as a sequential disengagement of consciousness from material objectivity — transitioning through somatic, introspective, essential, and transcendental consciousness. This progression, seemingly regressive, "actually signifies the advancement towards heightened freedom of consciousness at superior levels" (p.220).

In this extensive chapter, Raveh succinctly captures the essence by delineating DPC's depiction of KCB's process of inner transformation as freedom achieved for spiritual and soteriological pursuits. A significant facet is the role of the body as both foundation and means in this journey (sec- III, IV). Aligning with preceding discussions, the body's pivotal role in KCB's quest for truth becomes evident, evident in Kalyankumar Bagchi, Arindam Charkrobarti's, and now DPC's analysis. Raveh distills a crucial point: according to KCB, bodily sensations meld into psychic feelings, representing a regressive "withdrawal" of consciousness, engendering detachment from the body. This detachment offers an initial, ineffable taste of freedom: "Detachment at the level of the body provides… disengagement from objects and objectivity" (p.32) This discourse delves into the philosophies of Vairagya and celibacy with inventive interpretation. Another audacious assertion posited by the author is that KCB dismisses the notion of "roads to freedom" as figurative distractions, emphasizing that freedom achieved through knowledge extends seamlessly to feeling and willing (p.229). Notably, this implies no contradiction. A compelling dimension unveiled is KCB's view of freedom's realization as intrinsically spiritual and transcendent, harmonizing classical Indian philosophy with contemporary contexts, highlighting his continuity and relevance. There is also a unique synthesis that the author highlights:

> The main motive force behind KCB's philosophy has remained steady and almost uniform throughout his life. Thoroughly opposed to "the illusion of the identity between the mind and the body", he carefully defends "the true theory of being", or metaphysics based on self-knowledge in life. This early view

("Mind and Matter" 1906 is found to be reiterated in his later works like "The Concept of Philosophy" (1936). To him, "philosophy is . . . [a] self-evident elaboration of the self-evident" (231)

Finally, the chapter concludes with key insights underscoring that Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's concept of freedom doesn't seamlessly fit within unitarian, complementary, or dualistic scientific frameworks. As stated, "If reality is taken as a causal unity of physical, biological, and mental or cultural objects, freedom cannot be placed in it." (p.231) The following points are extracted. The chapter concludes with a preview that while these points are seemingly disheartening from a scientific perspective, this notion aligns with KCB's perspective. The author acknowledges that whether the discrepancies between certain "contemporary scientific theories and the concept of freedom outlined in this chapter" are substantial enough to abandon the latter is a complex question, exceeding the scope of this discussion (p.231).

12. The Problem of Freedom and the Phantasmagoria of Swaraj Reflections on a Necessary Illusion by Murzban Jal

After this comprehensive discussion, it becomes evident, at least to the contributors of this book and practitioners of Indian philosophy worldwide, that KCB occupies a substantial position in modern philosophy. Significantly, his lecture evolved into the timeless masterpiece "Swaraj in Ideas" (1928), which remains pivotal to this section and, specifically, to the chapter. This work has surpassed the realm of philosophy, captivating cultural theorists, educators, and socio-political scientists alike. Various perspectives have arisen in response to its inquiries. This chapter by Murzban Jal serves as a philosophical retort to KCB in general and "Swaraj in Ideas" in particular. Extracting questions like "What is Indian about Indian philosophy?" and "What is the nature of freedom?" from KCB's essay, the chapter delves into their controversies, akin to debates on abstract concepts like justice and morality. Addressing the first question, Raveh contextualizes the issue, invoking Daya Krishna's dissent from KCB's mokṣa-centered interpretation. Daya Krishna argued for other centers of Indian philosophy, including language, social, and political philosophy, while emphasizing dialogue and debate's centrality. An alternative perspective suggests that contemporary Indian philosophy's Indianness lies in its correspondence with classical Indian texts. These references encourage thoughtful engagement, propelling thinkers to engage deeply with the subject matter (p.48).

Acknowledging these considerations, the author initiates the chapter by probing the essence of Swaraj, pondering its potential alignment with philosophical reasoning. This introspection questions whether the "Indian mind" can truly attain genuine liberation and withstand the challenges that fate presents (p.236). At the core of this chapter lies the author's pursuit of a hypothetical discourse between KCB's Swaraj ideal and contemporary thinkers' interpretations of freedom. This exercise aims to redefine the interplay among philosophy, humanism, and freedom (p.34). The author commences by critiquing prevalent notions and definitions of philosophy, in both the abstract realms of the East and West, ancient, and modern. In an intellectually captivating show, the author tackles the essence of "Indian philosophy" by engaging with

the concept and practice of "Caste." In this light, the author asserts that to truly discuss "Indian philosophy," a discourse on caste is imperative (p.236). Raveh, in the synopsis, aptly summarizes the author's intent, asserting that for Murzban Jal, the true spirit of Indian philosophy transcends concepts like mokṣa, philosophical methodologies, adherence to classical texts, and language (p.33–34). Instead, it resides in the willingness and commitment to confront, theorize about, and contribute to the eradication of the caste system. Jal contends that everything else remains superficial, merely skimming the surface ("philosophy from the above") and avoiding the essence of Indianness. Furthermore, he suggests that remaining superficial is tantamount to either knowingly or unknowingly perpetuating the caste system (p.34).

Integrating the ongoing question and debate, the author sets an agenda by addressing the concept of Swaraj and the question of the self in Indian philosophies. The author explores this theme through a dialogue between KCB and D. P. Chattopadhyay, along with examining the Gandhian and Marxist perspectives on "Swaraj for What and whom?" Additionally, the author engages with the idea of Swaraj in relation to the Marxist interpretation of the Indian class "Bourgeoisie," drawing on Bhagavan Das' essay. However, the author's approach appears one-sided, primarily focusing on the Marxist perspective and overlooking the implications of capitalism. The author emphasizes the need for opposing viewpoints in philosophical discourse, akin to Karl Popper's falsification principle or classical Indian Vada practice, to enrich arguments. In essence, this chapter centers around identity politics and the crisis in the Indian context, urging Indian thinkers to address casteism, inequality, and discrimination. The author aims to make philosophy more humanistic by linking it to social issues. To achieve this, the author attempts to bridge tradition and modernity, highlighting Indian philosophy's perceived neglect of practical concerns. The synthesis of Lenin's and Ambedkar's views is presented as a potential remedy. The author's sentiment aligns with the notion that philosophers must not merely interpret the world, but actively change it. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the state of journalism and philosophy, "expressing a need to transcend traditional philosophy to truly comprehend the world" (p.249, Summarized).

Concluding Remarks

This comprehensive review delves deeply into a succinct book, reflecting the intricate layers within its text. This extensive analysis is prompted by the use of specialized terminology by the authors, necessitating thorough explanations to elucidate ideas and facilitate a comprehensive understanding of KCB's perspective. While the contributors are esteemed in KCB's philosophical realm, a notable limitation stems from the book's abundant technical jargon and cryptic elements, as evident in chapters such as Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. This aspect of the book may give the impression that it is mainly intended for professionals and professional settings, potentially distancing philosophy from the general population. Moreover, it also compounds the inherent challenge of comprehending KCB's complex work, suggesting a need for a discerning reader. One might argue that the editors should have guided contributors towards simplifying their ideas, promoting intellectual accessibility. Certain

chapters, organized into multiple sections, require readers to harmonize efforts in synthesizing concepts and tracing their alignment with KCB's overarching philosophy, as seen in Chapter 11. Further, the book diligently and methodically traverses KCB's comprehensive framework encompassing ontology, metaphysics, epistemology, logic, soteriology, aesthetics, and socio-political ruminations. Nonetheless, an omission surfaces, that of moral philosophy — a facet through which both Eastern and Western scholars have critiqued Indian philosophy (Ranganathan, 2007). While glimpses of morality emerge sporadically, these are intertwined with soteriological contemplations. In essence, morality is portrayed as a conduit to spiritual liberation, a perspective conjoined with the exploration of soteriology. The realm of ethics in its distinct humanistic manifestation remains comparatively uncharted in KCB's musings. Hence, there lies a compelling prospect to incorporate an axiological segment within the book, thereby enriching the narrative with a dedicated examination of KCB's ethical cogitations. Such an inclusion would undoubtedly contribute to a more holistic appreciation of KCB's philosophical fabric, infusing his intricate doctrinal tapestry with the hues of ethical contemplation (Bilimoria et al., 2007).

Moreover, an additional facet that merits consideration pertains to certain instances within the book wherein ideological inclinations have inadvertently found their way into the discourse. This occurrence, albeit sporadic, has the potential to slightly deviate from the pure philosophical essence and KCB's meticulous intellectual trajectory. To illustrate, while acknowledging the contributor's audacity, it becomes evident that the final chapter, an exploration of KCB's conception of freedom, lacks the finesse of courteous alignment with the broader thematic underpinning. This discrepancy arises due to the presentation of views either previously disproven within earlier chapters or, undesriably, marred by personal ideological overlay, thereby compromising the impartiality that resonates within KCB's professional thought. Moreover, if the discussion turns towards politics, it becomes crucial to acknowledge the politics inherent in interpreting Sanskrit philosophy within the English philosophical framework. Concretely, this aspect has been minimally explored within the book, save for a handful of directive statements and diplomatically worded responses by Raguramraju cited in its introductory section (p.8–10). This absence is significant due to its relevance as a contentious topic in contemporary Indian philosophy. Noteworthy figures such as Daya Krishna's dismissal of Indian philosophers writing in English (Bhushan & Garfield, 2017) and J. N.'Mohanty's call to re-engage with Sanskrit texts (Mohanty, 2002), a sentiment also apparent in KCB's "Swaraj in Ideas," warrants particular attention. In essence, addressing this aspect serves as a foundational step to ensure the seriousness of Indian discourse is recognized.

It is my sincere hope that these observations will be duly acknowledged and addressed in forthcoming editions of the book. Such considerations would undoubtedly enhance readers' engagement with KCB's writings, fostering a more enriching exploration that elevates the essence of his intellectual project. By mitigating prolonged ideological contestations and technicality, readers can immerse themselves in the profound depth of KCB's ruminations, thereby harnessing a more profound value from their reading attempts. Nonetheless, it remains certain that the book holds a distinguished status that indisputably adds value to contemporary Indian philosophy, embodying a classic essence that captivates professionals, compelling them to revisit and scrutinize its contents. A felicitation is in order for both the editor and the array

of contributors who have skillfully crafted a thought-provoking symphony of ideas. Their cogent compositions, impassioned discussions, and well-reasoned arguments, orchestrated in defense of their distinct interpretations of KCB's perspectives, contribute unequivocally to the book's philosophical eminence. This collective endeavor solidifies the book's stature as a beacon of philosophical inquiry, perpetually beckoning scholars to unravel the intricate tapestry woven by KCB's intellectual odyssey.

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