

## How Should We Understand the Balancing View of Ought?

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### Abstract

Thomas Schmidt argues that a widely held combination of views about reasons and ought—the Balancing View of Ought and the claim that reasons against  $\phi$  are reasons for not- $\phi$ —is extensionally adequate only if it is complemented by two principles of reasons transmission. In this paper I present three problems for Schmidt’s package of views and two problems for his transmission principles considered in isolation. I then defend a rival package of views—a version of the Balancing View and the claim that reasons against  $\phi$  are reasons that bear on  $\phi$  with negative weight—that avoids these problems *and* secures extensional adequacy without Schmidt’s principles. I conclude that friends of the Balancing View should prefer my package of views.

### I. Introduction

The Balancing View of Ought is a widely accepted account of how an agent’s reasons for action relate to facts about what they ought to do. According to the Balancing View (hereafter “BV”), what agents ought to do is determined solely by the balance of reasons with respect to the actions available to them. For example: if going to work today is more strongly supported by reasons than any of your other options, then you ought to go to work; if instead you ought to stay at home and rest, then this is because resting is more strongly supported by reasons than any of your other options, including going to work. The BV is both simple and intuitively plausible.

Despite its natural plausibility, Thomas Schmidt argues in this journal that two extant versions of the BV ( $BV_1$  and  $BV_2$ ) are extensionally inadequate when combined with a widely held analysis of reasons against (the “Standard View” that reasons against  $\phi$  are reasons for not- $\phi$ ). This inadequacy can be fixed, however, by supplementing  $BV_2$  with two principles of reasons transmission ( $R^+$  and  $R^-_O$ ); as these transmission principles repair the otherwise-plausible package of  $BV_2$  and Standard View, friends of the Balancing View should accept them.<sup>1</sup>

In this paper I defend a rival package of views that friends of the Balancing View should prefer. I show that this package of views is independently plausible; extensionally adequate *without* Schmidt’s principles; and avoids problems facing Schmidt’s package of views.

I start by briefly summarising Schmidt’s case for adding  $R^+$  and  $R^-_O$  to  $BV_2$  and Standard View (§II), before arguing that the combination of  $R^+$ ,  $R^-_O$ , and Standard View faces three deep problems (§III). §IV presents a novel and independently plausible analysis of reasons against—the Vector View, according to which reasons against  $\phi$  are reasons that bear on  $\phi$  with negative weight—that avoids these problems *and* those that motivate Schmidt to add  $R^+$  and  $R^-_O$  to the Standard View. §V then presents a version of the BV ( $BV_3$ ) that, in combination with Vector View, avoids the extensionality problems facing extant versions of the BV. §VI presents two counterintuitive implications of  $R^+$  and  $R^-_O$ , and concludes that friends of the Balancing View should prefer  $BV_3$  and Vector View to Schmidt’s package of views.

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<sup>1</sup> Schmidt, Thomas, “The Balancing View Of Ought”, *Ethics*, vol.134, no.2,(2024). All otherwise unattributed page references in this article are to this paper.

## II. Schmidt's Case for $R^+$ and $R^-_O$

The versions of BV that Schmidt claims to be extensionally inadequate are:

(BV<sub>1</sub>) For any agent  $A$ , and any action  $\phi$ -ing available to  $A$ ,  $A$  ought to  $\phi$  if, and only if,  $A$ 's reasons for  $\phi$ -ing are weightier than  $A$ 's reasons against  $\phi$ -ing (M. Schroeder 2007, 130).

And

(BV<sub>2</sub>) For any agent  $A$ , and any action  $\phi$ -ing available to  $A$ ,  $A$  ought to  $\phi$  if, and only if,  $A$ 's reasons for  $\phi$ -ing are weightier than  $A$ 's reasons for any alternative to  $\phi$ -ing (Parfit 2011, 32–33; M. Schroeder 2015).

Given

*Standard View*: Reasons against  $\phi$ -ing are nothing more than reasons for not- $\phi$ -ing.<sup>2</sup>

and the claim that  $\phi$ -ing is impermissible just in case one ought to refrain from  $\phi$ -ing, both BV<sub>1</sub> and BV<sub>2</sub> entail

(IMP) An action  $\phi$ -ing available to an agent  $A$  is impermissible if, and only if,  $A$ 's reasons against  $\phi$ -ing are weightier than  $A$ 's reasons for  $\phi$ -ing.

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<sup>2</sup> Schmidt endorses Standard View at, e.g., p.251 fn.9. See Tucker (2022) for a defence of this claim.

Schmidt argues that IMP yields counterintuitive results in the following case:

*Anne's Choice*: Anne could either stay at home, go for a walk, or go for a bike ride. As Anne has promised to stay at home, she has a final reason for staying at home; by stipulation, Anne has no other final reasons.<sup>3</sup>

Intuitively, Anne ought to stay at home; it is therefore impermissible for her to go on a walk or a bike ride instead. IMP, however, wrongly implies that walking or cycling are *not* impermissible, given that Anne has no reasons against (or for) either option.

To avoid this implication, Schmidt suggests that we supplement IMP with

(R<sup>+</sup>) If there is a final reason for  $\phi$ -ing, then this reason provides reasons against each alternative to  $\phi$ -ing.

R<sup>+</sup> implies that Anne's final reason to stay at home gives her reasons against going on a walk and going on a bike ride. As her (transmitted) reasons *against* walking or cycling are weightier than her (non-existent) reasons *for* walking or cycling, IMP and R<sup>+</sup> together correctly imply that both options are impermissible.

Even the addition of R<sup>+</sup> is not enough to save the combination of BV and Standard View from extensional inadequacy, however. Consider

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<sup>3</sup> By "final reason" Schmidt means a reason that is not grounded in some other reason (p.251).

*Dining Decision*: Belinda could order the soup, the salad, or the salami. Belinda has a final reason for ordering the soup (it is delicious) and an equally weighty final reason against ordering the soup (it is cold); by stipulation, Belinda has no other final reasons.

Intuitively, all three options are *optional*: for each option it is true that Belinda neither ought to choose it nor ought to refrain from choosing it. Yet IMP and  $R^+$  imply that both the salad and the salami are impermissible: on  $R^+$ , Belinda's final reason for ordering the soup transmits to reasons against ordering the salad and the salami; as each of these reasons against outweighs the reasons *for* either option, then IMP deems them both impermissible. This, Schmidt claims, is a "fatal blow" (p.255) for IMP and  $R^+$ .

To secure the correct result in *Dining Decision*, Schmidt proposes that we accept another transmission principle:

( $R^-_O$ ) If there is a final reason against  $\phi$ -ing, then this reason provides reasons for each alternative to  $\phi$ -ing that is optimal, where an alternative is optimal just in case there is no other alternative that is better supported by final reasons.<sup>4</sup>

That  $R^+$  and  $R^-_O$  repair the otherwise-plausible combination of BV and Standard View is not our only reason to accept them, however: Schmidt argues that both solve an important problem with the Standard View considered independently of the BV. To see this problem, consider

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<sup>4</sup> Schmidt defends  $R^-_O$  on pp.256-260.

*Crowded Restaurants*: You have a choice between restaurants A, B, and C. A is crowded; B is very crowded; and C is not crowded at all.<sup>5</sup>

Intuitively, the fact that A is crowded is a reason against going to A (hereafter “A-ing” or just “A”). On Standard View, however, this reason against A is *nothing more than* a reason for not-A. Given that A, B, and C are your only options, then the only way for you to not-A is for you to [B or C].<sup>6</sup> On the Standard View, then, your crowdedness-given reason against A is nothing more than a reason for [B or C].

The *problem* with this view is that while A’s crowdedness may plausibly be a reason to go to C, it is clearly *not* a reason to go to B: if A’s crowdedness counts against going to A, it cannot plausibly count in favour of going to somewhere *even more* crowded than A. Reasons for disjunctive actions like [B or C] are clearly not—or clearly do not give us—reasons for each of their disjuncts. More generally, the Standard View owes us an account of how reasons for not- $\phi$ -ing transmit to reasons for particular ways of not- $\phi$ -ing. Call this the Which Alternatives Problem.<sup>7</sup>

Schmidt argues that his transmission principles help the Standard View overcome the Which Alternatives Problem. In response to *Crowded Restaurants*, Schmidt claims that your reason against A is not a *final* reason against A; it is, rather, a *non-final* reason you have in virtue of having a final reason against some *type* of action (e.g. “going to crowded restaurants”) that A-ing is a more specific way of doing. According to the Standard View, this final reason against

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<sup>5</sup> This case is owed to Snedegar (2018, 730).

<sup>6</sup> Schmidt argues this at p.250 fn.6.

<sup>7</sup> (Snedegar 2018, 730)

going to crowded restaurants is just a final reason *for not* going to crowded restaurants; as C is the only way of not going to a crowded restaurant, then this reason is a final reason for C. If you have a final reason for C, then  $R^+$  tells us that this final reason transmits to non-final reasons against A and B. This, Schmidt claims, is a plausible account of the reasons we have in cases like *Crowded Restaurants*; as the Which Alternatives Problem is motivated by cases like *Crowded Restaurants*, then  $R^+$  can help the Standard View overcome the Which Alternatives Problem.<sup>8</sup>

After explaining why friends of the BV should prefer  $BV_2$  to  $BV_1$ ,<sup>9</sup> Schmidt concludes that  $BV_2$ , Standard View,  $R^+$ , and  $R^-_O$  form an attractive package that friends of the Balancing View should endorse.

The remainder of this article presents an alternative package of views that friends of the Balancing View should prefer. I first present three problems for the combination of the Standard View,  $R^+$ , and  $R^-_O$ , before offering an independently plausible account of reasons against—the Vector View—that avoids these problems *and* the Which Alternatives Problem. I will then show that the combination of the Vector View and a rival version of the BV ( $BV_3$ ) secures correct results in *Anne's Choice* and *Dining Decision* without  $R^+$  and  $R^-_O$ .

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<sup>8</sup> Schmidt also offers an argument of this form for  $R^-_O$  (pp.262-263). As the argument is essentially the same, I won't duplicate them here.

<sup>9</sup> pp.264-265. I omit rehearsing this argument as, regardless of whether we should prefer  $BV_2$  to  $BV_1$ , this paper shows that we should prefer  $BV_3$  to both of these alternatives.

### III. Three Problems For Standard View, $R^+$ , and $R^-_O$

The first problem with Schmidt's response to *Crowded Restaurants* is that it does not address the Which Alternatives Problem—it merely pushes it back. This is because, on the Standard View, your *transmitted* reason against A is just a transmitted reason for not-A (i.e. for [B or C]). As it is implausible that this transmitted reason against A is a reason *for* B, then the Standard View *still* owes us an explanation of why this transmitted reason against A is a reason for some ways of not-A-ing (C) and not others (B). The Which Alternatives Problem re-emerges at the level of transmitted reasons.

Second, *even if* the Standard View can explain why our transmitted reason against A is a reason for C and not a reason for B, the resulting picture is objectionable in a different way: if your final reason for C transmits to a reason against A, and this reason against A is just a reason *for* C, then the Standard View and  $R^+$  imply that your final reason for C transmits to a non-final reason for C. This, however, is plainly implausible: your final reason for C does not give you a non-final for C. Standard View and  $R^+$  overgenerate reasons.<sup>10</sup>

The third problem with the Standard View,  $R^+$ , and  $R^-_O$  can be brought out by considering

*Only Crowded Restaurants:* You have a choice between restaurants A, B, and C. A is crowded; B is very crowded; and C is somewhat crowded.

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<sup>10</sup> Note that all of the problems I raise for  $R^+$  (including overgeneration) can be re-stated as problems for  $R^-_O$ .

The only difference between this case and *Crowded Restaurants* is that C is now somewhat crowded. If C is now somewhat crowded, then it is no longer a way of not going to a crowded restaurant; therefore there cannot be a (final) reason to go to C in virtue of its being not-crowded. If there is no final reason to go to C, however, then there is no final reason to transmit—*via*  $R^+$ —to reasons against each of C’s alternatives, A and B. As Schmidt’s explanation for why you have reasons against A and B assumes the existence of a final reason for C, his account predicts that you have no crowdedness-given reasons against A or B in *Only Crowded Restaurants*.

Intuitively, however, you *do* have crowdedness-given reasons against A and B in *Only Crowded Restaurants*: both restaurants are just as crowded, and their crowdedness is just as undesirable, as in the original case. That Schmidt’s view cannot accommodate this intuitive verdict is a mark against it.

Problems 1)–3) suggest that Schmidt’s principles cannot help Standard View avoid the Which Alternatives Problem. The next section presents an independently plausible analysis of reasons against that avoids problems 1)–3) *and* the Which Alternatives Problem *without* Schmidt’s principles; this view will later form part of a package of view that friends of the BV should prefer to Schmidt’s package of views.

#### IV. The Vector View

Reasons are vector quantities. By this I mean that reasons have both magnitude and direction: the direction of a reason corresponds to whether it is a reason *for* or *against* some action, and the magnitude of a reason corresponds to how *strongly* or *weakly* it counts for or against an

action. To say that reasons are vector quantities—that they count for or against actions and that they do so more or less strongly—is, I hope, to point to an uncontroversial feature of reasons.

Another uncontroversial feature of reasons is that they have *weight*. Typically, the idea of weight is used as a measure of the *magnitude* of a reason: weight is treated as a scalar quantity that corresponds to how strongly or weakly a reason counts for or against some action.

This is not the only way we can use the idea of weight, however. If we treat weight, like the reasons it is a measure of, as a *vector* quantity, then we can use weight as a measure of both the *magnitude and direction* of a reason: while the magnitude of a reason's weight corresponds to how strong or weak that reason is, the *polarity* of a reason's weight—whether its weight is positive or negative—corresponds to whether that reason is a reason for or against the response it bears on. On this view, the distinction between reasons for and reasons against boils down to a distinction in the polarity of their weight: while reasons for  $\phi$  bear on  $\phi$  with positive weight, reasons against  $\phi$  bear on  $\phi$  with negative weight. The remainder of this section formalises the simple but overlooked idea that weight is a vector quantity into an analysis of the distinction between reasons for and reasons against; shows that this analysis is distinct from both the Standard View and extant rivals to the Standard View; and argues that it avoids the problems with the Standard View considered in §III.

To start, note that reasons are facts<sup>11</sup> ( $\pi$ ) that stand in the reason relation R to some agent A and some response  $\phi$ ; this relation has the property of weight ( $w$ ). More formally:

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<sup>11</sup> The Vector View is consistent with any ontology of reasons. I assume that reasons are facts.

$R(\pi, w, A, \phi)$ :  $\pi$  is a reason of weight  $w$  for  $A$  to  $\phi$ .<sup>12</sup>

If we allow that a reason's weight is not just a scalar property of the reason relation, but rather a vector property with both magnitude *and* polarity, then we make conceptual space for

*Vector View*:  $\pi$  is a reason for (against)  $A$ 's  $\phi$ -ing if and only if  $\pi$ ,  $A$ , and  $\phi$  stand in a reason relation, and this reason relation has a positive (negative) weight.

The Vector View, I submit, is a naturally plausible extension of the familiar idea that reasons are vector quantities: if we take seriously the idea that reasons are vector quantities, then the idea that weight has a polarity corresponding to the direction of a reason should be no less strange than the idea that weight has a magnitude corresponding to the magnitude of a reason.

The Vector View is distinct from both the Standard View and its extant rivals. The Standard View claims that reasons against  $\phi$  are reasons for not- $\phi$ . Extant rivals to the Standard View deny that reasons against  $\phi$  are reasons for not- $\phi$ , and claim instead that reasons for  $\phi$  and reasons against  $\phi$  are irreducibly distinct relations involving  $\phi$ .<sup>13</sup> The Vector View claims neither of these things: the Vector View claims that reasons for and reasons against are in every way alike except for one property—the polarity of their weight.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> The idea that reasons are facts standing in reason relations is taken from Skorupski (2010, 36–38).

<sup>13</sup> E.g. Greenspan (2005) and Snedegar (2018). See also Metz (2020).

<sup>14</sup> Like Standard View, the Vector View is ecumenical regarding *what it is* to be a reason: all it claims is that, regardless of whether we prefer, e.g., a value-first account of reasons, or reasons primitivism, we can use the idea of weight as a measure of both a reason's magnitude *and* direction.

That we *can* use the idea of weight to distinguish between reasons for and reasons against doesn't yet show that we *should*; this is, alas, a claim I cannot argue for fully here. What I will do, however, is show that the Vector View avoids both the Which Alternatives Problem *and* the problems facing Schmidt's attempt to solve it on behalf of Standard View. This, combined with its natural plausibility as an extension of the familiar idea that reasons are vector quantities, should suffice to show that the Vector View is a serious alternative to the Standard View.

The Standard View faces the Which Alternatives Problem because it claims that the existence of a reason against  $\phi$  entails the existence of a reason for not- $\phi$ . The Vector View, however, makes no such claim: that some fact  $c$  stands in a reason relation of negative weight to action  $\phi$  (i.e. that  $c$  is a reason against  $\phi$ ) entails nothing about whether  $c$  stands in a reason relation of positive weight to not- $\phi$  (i.e. that  $c$  is a reason for not- $\phi$ ). Since the Vector View denies that reasons against  $\phi$  entail reasons for not- $\phi$ , it avoids the Which Alternatives Problem.<sup>15</sup>

We might worry, however, that the Vector View goes too far by denying *any* kind of entailment between reasons against  $\phi$  and reasons for not- $\phi$ . In *Crowded Restaurants*, for example, it seems clear that the crowdedness of A contributes positively to the deontic status of C—that by pushing A away from (rational) permissibility, A's crowdedness pushes C towards permissibility. Plausibly, A's crowdedness does this *by being or providing* a reason for C; by denying that reasons against  $\phi$  entail reasons for any alternative to  $\phi$ , the Vector View cannot account for how A's crowdedness contributes positively to the deontic status of C.

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<sup>15</sup> As Vector View avoids the Which Alternatives Problem without Schmidt's transmission principles, it thereby avoids the overgeneration problem.

This conclusion is too hasty, however. For one can deny that reasons against  $\phi$  entail reasons for not- $\phi$  *without* denying that reasons against  $\phi$  play a role in determining the deontic status of not- $\phi$ . Just as non-reason factors like disabling conditions and modifiers can impact on the deontic status of an option without themselves providing reasons for that option, reasons against  $\phi$ 's alternatives can contribute to the deontic status of  $\phi$  without themselves providing reasons for  $\phi$ . How *exactly* they do so is not the job of Vector View to explain: this is something that only our account of deontic status can tell us. Indeed, in §V I will propose a view (BV<sub>3</sub>) that does just this. For now, however, we should be happy that the Vector View avoids the Which Alternatives Problem by denying that reasons against  $\phi$  entail reasons for not- $\phi$ , and wait for §V to show us how reasons against  $\phi$  can contribute to the deontic status of not- $\phi$  even though they do not provide reasons for  $\phi$ .

Moving on: the Vector View also avoids generating counterintuitive results in cases like *Only Crowded Restaurants*. The problem this case poses for the combination of Standard View and Schmidt's principles is that this combination of views fails to account for why there are reasons against F and G *even when* there is no final reason for H. As the Vector View does not make the existence of reasons against F and G depend on the existence of a reason for H, it can avoid this implication: F's crowdedness can stand in a negatively valenced reason relation with going to F regardless of whether or not H is crowded. This is another reason to prefer the Vector View over the combination of Standard View, R<sup>+</sup>, and R<sub>O</sub>.

The Vector View also avoids another problem that has been levelled against the Standard View. The problem can be seen by noting that, on the Standard View, reasons against  $\phi$  count against  $\phi$  *indirectly*, insofar as they count in favour of some *other* option (namely, not- $\phi$ -ing); some in

the literature have found this structure of explanation implausibly indirect, given that reasons against  $\phi$  seem to *target*  $\phi$  directly.<sup>16</sup> The Vector View, however, has no such issue: both reasons for and reasons against  $\phi$  target  $\phi$  *directly* because  $\phi$  *itself* is a relatum of both reason relations, unlike on the Standard View.

The Vector View, then, has a lot going for it. It is a serious rival to the Standard View that doesn't rely for its plausibility on Schmidt's transmission principles. The next section presents a version of the Balancing View (BV<sub>3</sub>) that, in combination with the Vector View, avoids the extensionality problems Schmidt levels against extant versions of the BV.

### V. BV<sub>3</sub>

Behold:

(BV<sub>3</sub>) For any agent  $A$ , and any action  $\phi$ -ing available to  $A$ ,  $A$  ought to  $\phi$  if, and only if, for every incompatible alternative  $\psi$  to  $\phi$ , the set of  $A$ 's reasons for and against  $\phi$ -ing is weightier than the set of  $A$ 's reasons for and against  $\psi$ -ing.<sup>17</sup>

Note that the weight of a *set* of reasons for and against  $\phi$  is determined by a competition between the reasons for and against  $\phi$ : reasons against  $\phi$  make the set of reasons for and against  $\phi$  *less* weighty than this set would be in their absence, while reasons for  $\phi$  make the set of reasons for and against  $\phi$  *more* weighty than it would be in their absence. For the sake of

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<sup>16</sup> Metz (2020, 3196).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Snedegar (2021, 14) and McHugh and Way (2022 Ch.6).

exposition, I will model the weights of reasons *for* with *positive* cardinal values; the weights of reasons *against* with *negative* cardinal values; the competition between them as a matter of summing these values; and the competition between sets of reasons as a matter of comparing *these* summed values. This, of course, is a simplification: Vector View and BV<sub>3</sub> are no more committed to the cardinality of weight, or any particular view of how reasons aggregate, than Standard View or other versions of the BV. These assumptions are merely useful simplifications that I will employ for the sake of exposition.

Before showing that BV<sub>3</sub> is extensionally adequate without Schmidt's transmission principles, I will first derive an account of impermissibility from BV<sub>3</sub> in the way that Schmidt derives IMP from extant versions of the BV. Following Schmidt, I assume that it is impermissible for one to  $\phi$  just in case one ought to not- $\phi$  (p.250). Moreover, I assume that the only incompatible alternative to *not- $\phi$ -ing* is  $\phi$ -ing (the only way to not- $\phi$  is to  $\phi$ ). The combination of these assumptions and BV<sub>3</sub> yields

(BV<sub>3</sub>-I\*) For any agent *A*, and any action  $\phi$ -ing available to *A*,  $\phi$ -ing is impermissible if, and only if, the set of *A*'s reasons for and against not- $\phi$ -ing is weightier than the set of *A*'s reasons for and against  $\phi$ -ing.

BV<sub>3</sub>-I\* can be made neater. For ease of exposition, call the set of *A*'s reasons for and against  $\phi$ -ing *A*'s *reason to  $\phi$* . On this way of speaking, BV<sub>3</sub> tells us that *A* ought to  $\phi$  just in case *A* has more reason to  $\phi$  than to perform any incompatible alternative to  $\phi$ . Of course, the reader need not endorse this way of converting between sets of reasons (count noun) and *reason* (mass noun); all I ask is that you accept it as a less cumbersome way of speaking.

With this way of speaking to hand, note that A's reason to not- $\phi$  is weightier than A's reason to  $\phi$  *only if* there is some way of not- $\phi$ -ing for which A has more reason. For example: in a choice between A and [B or C or D] (i.e. in a choice between A and not-A) Jane's reason to [B or C or D] is greater than her reason to A only if she has more reason to do at least one of [B or C or D] than she has reason to A.

Imagine now, however, that out of all the ways that Jane could not-A, there is only *one* way of not-A-ing (say, B-ing) for which she has more reason than A-ing. In this case, does Jane have more reason to not-A than to A? I suggest that she does: so long as there is *some* way for her to not-A (e.g. by B-ing) that is more strongly supported by reason than her A-ing, then Jane has more reason to not-A (*by* B-ing) than she does to A. This example shows that A's reason to not- $\phi$  is weightier than A's reason to  $\phi$  *if and only if* there is some way of not- $\phi$ -ing (i.e. some incompatible alternative to  $\phi$ -ing) for which A has more reason.

Combining this result with BV<sub>3</sub>-I\* we get

(BV<sub>3</sub>-I) An action  $\phi$ -ing available to an agent *A* is impermissible if, and only if, the set of *A*'s reasons for and against some incompatible alternative to  $\phi$ -ing is weightier than the set of *A*'s final reasons for and against  $\phi$ -ing.

To see how the combination of BV<sub>3</sub> and Vector View avoids the extensionality problems Schmidt levels against BV<sub>2</sub> and Standard View, consider again *Anne's Choice*. Anne has a reason for staying at home, and no reasons against staying at home. She has no reasons for or against going on a bike ride, and no reasons for or against going on a walk; by stipulation, she

has no other reasons. Let us, for the sake of illustration, say that Anne's reason for staying at home has weight +3.

BV<sub>3</sub> secures the correct verdict in *Anne's Choice*. BV<sub>3</sub> tells us that Anne ought to stay at home because the combined weight of her reasons for and against staying at home (+3) is greater than the combined weight of her reasons for and against any of her other options (0 and 0). BV<sub>3</sub> doesn't need Schmidt's transmission principles to accommodate our judgement in Anne's choice.

BV<sub>3</sub> also secures the correct result in *Dining Decision*. Recall that, in this case, Belinda's final reason *against* ordering the soup is exactly as weighty as her final reason *for* ordering the soup. As Belinda's reasons are equally weighty but oppositely valanced (on the Vector View), they cancel each other out; in other words, the combined weight of Belinda's reasons for and against ordering the soup comes to 0.

The same is true of the salad and the salami: as Belinda has no final reasons for or against either option, then the combined weight of her reasons for and against each option is 0. As the combined weight of her reasons for and against each of her options is neither greater *nor* less than the combined weight of her reasons for and against any other option, then it is true of each option that Belinda neither ought to do that option, nor that that option is impermissible—in other words, BV<sub>3</sub> tells us that each of Belinda's options are optional. Again, no transmission principles are needed for BV<sub>3</sub> to yield the correct result in this case.

Before concluding that BV<sub>3</sub> is a version of BV that both inherits BV's natural plausibility and avoids Schmidt's counterexamples, we should anticipate an objection from Schmidt. BV<sub>3</sub> as

presented above allows that an agent ought to do an action for which there are no reasons. For example, consider a modified version of *Dining Decision*:

*Dull Dining Decision*: Belinda could order the turnip, the trout, or the terrine. Belinda has no final reasons for ordering any option (they are all equally bland) but has final reasons against ordering either one of the trout or the terrine (they contain animal products); by stipulation, Belinda has no other final reasons.

Intuitively, Belinda ought to order the turnip (the turnip is, we might say, the least bad option available to her).  $BV_3$  and Vector View can accommodate this judgement: although Belinda has no reasons for ordering the turnip, her (empty) set of reasons for and against ordering the turnip is still *weightier than* her set of reasons for and against either alternative, given that each rival set of reasons consists solely in negatively-weighted reasons *against*.  $BV_3$  and Vector View imply that Belinda ought to order the turnip even though there are no particular reasons for her doing so.

The idea that one ought to  $\phi$  even though one has no particular reasons for  $\phi$ -ing is implausible, however. As everything that is a *good basis* on which to  $\phi$  is a normative reason to  $\phi$ ,<sup>18</sup> then the fact that Belinda has no normative reason to order the turnip entails that she has no good basis—no good motivating reason—for ordering the turnip. If  $BV_3$  tells us that Belinda ought to order the turnip even though she has no reasons for doing so, then it seems to allow that

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<sup>18</sup> For an analysis of normative reasons in terms of good bases, see Gregory (2016). For the view that normative reasons are essentially things that can be acted upon, see, e.g., Schroeder (2021).

Belinda could comply with what she ought to do even though there is no good basis for her doing so. This, however, is plainly implausible.

Proponents of  $BV_3$  can avoid this implication, however, by endorsing something like Scanlon's claim that an action's wrongness gives us a reason against performing it.<sup>19</sup> The claim would be that the fact that A ought to  $\phi$  gives A a reason to  $\phi$ ; this reason can serve as a good motivating reason for A to  $\phi$ . For example, the fact that Belinda *ought* to order the turnip gives her a reason—and therefore a good basis upon which—to order the turnip; this is true even though she has no reasons to do so independent of or prior to the fact that she ought to so. Although I have no space to defend this view further, the availability of this response should suffice to show that the above objection is not a fatal blow to  $BV_3$ .

Although a full defence of both the Vector View and  $BV_3$  are beyond the scope of this paper, I hope to have shown that they together constitute a plausible package of views that avoid Schmidt's counterexamples; importantly, they do so without appealing to anything like Schmidt's transmission principles. As such, I conclude that friends of the Balancing View have at their disposal a rival package of views that is at least as plausible as the package Schmidt defends. If we are to accept Schmidt's transmission principles, then some other reason for doing so must be found.

To finish, I will present two implausible implications of  $R^+$  and  $R^-_0$  as they stand independently of the BV or any account of reasons against; these implications give us good reason to prefer the combination of  $BV_3$  and Vector View to  $BV_2$ , the Standard View,  $R^+$ , and  $R^-_0$ .

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<sup>19</sup> Scanlon (2000, 11).

## VI. Which Package Should We Prefer?

Consider

*Murderously Hungry:* You are lazily sunning yourself in the park. There are many courses of action available to you. One option is to buy an ice cream from the nearby ice cream van; another option is to brutally murder a nearby stranger. Suppose that, out of all the options available to you, you have most reason to buy an ice cream. Do the reasons against murdering the nearby stranger give you reasons to buy an ice cream?

The answer here is: *surely not*. Your reasons against doing something *horrendous* don't transmit to reasons for doing something good.  $R^-_0$ , however, has exactly this implication: given that buying an ice cream is, in this situation, optimal, then  $R^-_0$  tells us that your (final) reasons against murdering a stranger transmit to reasons for buying an ice cream. This, I submit, is an implausible implication: you have no more reason to order an ice cream just because you could murder a stranger.

Similar implications can be drawn out for  $R^+$ . Consider

*Ravenously Murderous:* Everything is at it is in *Murderously Hungry*. Do your reasons for getting an ice cream transmit to reasons against murdering the nearby stranger?

$R^+$  implies that they do.

To see why this is implausible, consider the following counterfactual: imagine that, as you're deliberating, the ice cream van closes for the day. As it is no longer possible for you to buy an ice cream, buying an ice cream is no longer an option for which you have reasons.  $R^+$  implies that this turn of events weakens your case against murdering the stranger: the combined weight of your reasons for and against murdering the stranger is diminished by the closure of the ice cream van, as this event entails that you have fewer (transmitted) reasons against murdering them. This, I submit, is an implausible implication of  $R^+$ : your reasons for doing something nice don't transmit to reasons against doing something horrendous.

As §§III-V showed that friends of the Balancing View should find no benefit to accepting  $R^+$  and  $R^-_O$  that the combination of  $BV_3$  and Vector View cannot secure, I conclude that these implausible implications give us at least some good reason to prefer  $BV_3$  and Vector View over the package of views that Schmidt presents.

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