Moral Archetypes

ethics in prehistory

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REMARKS

We will adopt the MHRA (Modern Humanities Research Association Referencing Guide) Style 3rd edition¹, concerning quotations and citations contained in this work. Exceptionally, in some citations, we may apply the APA (American Psychological Association) Style.

This paper's formatting features will follow the corresponding guidelines of the majority of the European and North American Universities, complemented, when necessary, by the ABNT-NBR rule #14724.

We will use both American and British English language vocabulary, spelling, grammar, and semantics without restrictions or preference in this work.

ABSTRACT

The philosophical tradition approaches to morals have their grounds predominantly on metaphysical and theological concepts and theories. Among the traditional ethics concepts, the most prominent is the Divine Command Theory (DCT). As per the DCT, God gives moral foundations to humankind by its creation and through Revelation.

Morality and Divinity are inseparable since the most remote civilization.

These concepts submerge in a theological framework and are primarily accepted by most followers of the three Abrahamic traditions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: the most considerable part of the human population. Holding faith and Revelation for its grounds, the Divine Command Theories are not strictly subject to the demonstration.

The opponents to the Divine Command conception of morals, grounded in the impossibility of demonstration of its metaphysical and religious assumptions, have tried for many centuries (albeit unsuccessfully) to devalue its importance. They held the argument that it does not show material evidence and logical coherence and, for this reason, cannot be taken into account for scientific nor philosophical purposes. It is just a belief and, as so, should be understood.

Besides these extreme oppositions, many other concepts contravene the Divine Command theories, in one way or another, in part or in full.

From the classic Greek philosophy up to the present date, many philosophers and social scientists sustain that
morality is only a construct and thus culturally relative and culturally determined. However, this brings many other discussions and imposes the challenge of determining the meaning of culture, which elements of culture are morally determinant, and finally, the boundaries of such relativity.

Moral determinists claim that everything related to human behaviour, including morality, is determined once free will does not exist.

More recently, modern thinkers argued that there is a rigorous science of morality. However, despite explaining several facts and evidence, the scientific method alone cannot enlighten the entire content and full meaning of ethics. Morals' understanding requires a broader perception and an agreement among philosophers, which they have never achieved.

These questions have many different configurations depending on each philosophical strand and start complex analysis and endless debates as long as many of them are reciprocally conflictive.

The universe and the atmosphere involving this research are the dominions of all these conceptual conflicts, observed from an objective and evolutionary standpoint.

Irrespective of this circumstance and its intrinsic importance; however, these questions are far from the methodological approach of an analytical discussion on objective morals, which is, indeed, the aim and scope of this work.

We should briefly revisit these prominent traditional theories because this work shelters a comparative study, and its assumptions at least differ profoundly from all traditional theories.
Therefore, it becomes necessary to offer direct and specific elements of comparison to the reader for valid criticism, dispensing interruptive research.

However, even revisiting the traditional theories, for this comparative and critical exposure purpose, they will be kept by the side of our primary concerns as “aliena materia.”

Irrespective of the validity of any or all of the elements of this discussion and their meaning as the philosophical universe of our research, the purpose of this work is to demonstrate and justify the existence and meaning of prehistoric moral archetypes arisen directly from the very fundamental social needs and efforts for survival. These archetypes are the definition of the essential foundation of ethics, its aggregation to the collective unconscious and corresponding logic organization and transmission to evolutionary stages of the human genome and different relations space-time, irrespective of any contemporary experience of the individuals. The system defined by these archetypes composes an evolutionary human social model.

Is this a metaethical position? Yes, it is. Moreover, as in any metaethical reasoning, we should look carefully for the best and most coherent routes, as Analytical Philosophy offers.

Thus, this work should reasonably demonstrate that morals are not a cultural product of civilized men or modern societies. Despite being subject to several cultural relative aggregations and subtractions, its essential foundations are archetypal and have never structurally changed. This reasoning induces that morality is a first attribute of the “homo sapiens”: it is not a property or an accident: it integrates the human essence and belongs to the ontological human identity.
The human phenomena are a continuing process, playing its role between random determination and free will, and we need to question how morality began and how it came to us in the present.

Key Words: archetype, culture, behaviour, deities, ethics, evil, evolution, God, good, humanity, method, moral, morality, Paleolithic, philosophy, prehistory, religion, society.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Evolution is a process that involves blind variation and selective retention.²

Demonstrating the archetypal structure of all the existing moral systems is a complicated assignment. However, is this demonstration important at all? For sure, it is. The philosophical praxis and the scientific investigation limited to the current time-space situation elements often are vulnerable to flawed conclusions. The same applies to observations of time-space situations different from the current one without the proper methodological severity. Two very clear examples are applicable. The first one comes from the classic Greek philosophy, stating that humanity was initially much better than it is in the present (400 BC) and adopts the theory of the three regressive ages (gold, bronze, and iron). The opposite happened with some radical contemporary historical materialists. Their claim is that present humankind is much better than the ancient societies deprived of science and technology, grounded on primitive infrastructures and living in the shadows of ignorance, violence, and mysticism.

Both assertions are the inconsistent result of modern biases and do not find reasonable coherence or any possibility of demonstration. Significant parts of the available studies

on ethics bring different and recurrent biases in their formulation.

The concepts, elements, and claims contained in this study in no way are new nor reveal unknown objects. No discoveries, revelations, unveiled realities, astonishing theories, complex reasoning, or airtight language proper for erudition will be found here. Philosophy is not an investigative science nor an exercise of complexity, but only a continued praxis whose intention is only thinking about things in the best way. Philosophers do not have the need nor the opportunity to be unique. They need to be coherent. This work suggests a proper way of thinking about morality without the contamination of metaphysical issues: a philosophic way to treat a philosophic subject from an objective position. This choice is the ground of the simplicity (and difficulty) of this work. In the program “Introduction to Philosophy” at the University of Edinburgh, Prof. David Ward and Prof. Duncan Pritchard suggest, through their pedagogical methodology, that academic works, as far as possible, should be written to everyone’s comprehension and not exclusively to the highly specialized academic dialect speakers.

In many strands of Analytical Philosophy, this simplicity is the vest of clarity, as exposed by Matthew McKeever:

In trying to understand the vagaries of language use or of morals, or of reality itself, analytic philosophers frequently produce these sorts of creative juxtapositions of ideas, the mere contemplation of which should appeal to anyone with a taste for bold visions of reality. So next time you have a yen for philosophy but are put off by turgid prose and numbered premises,
think about persevering in the hope that you might find, with Keats, both truth and beauty.\textsuperscript{3}

One of the most debated assignments of epistemology and ontology ever known is summarizable in only three words: “Cogito, ergo sum” - René Descartes (1596 - 1650). Descartes’s motto is a pursuit of philosophical truth, and this is beauty. For sure, the reasoning and demonstration we will adopt must consider an appropriate and integrative methodological framework not limited to philosophic thinking nor the fragmented available scientific elements resulting from the empirical observation of the material reality.

Along with human history, many different theories and concepts looked forward to understanding and explaining the moral phenomena and as long as all of them mean a valid and constructive contribution to the enlightenment of these extremely complex studies, none of them is to be ignored, wrongly understood, despised or referred to with stereotypes, personal bias or prejudice. They are the universe of this research. For these reasons, it is impossible to advance with this work without revisiting this rich heap of human culture, even though in a very simplified and concise way imposed by the very narrow boundaries of this study. We will try to summarize this visit, making it as short as possible. After arriving at the outcomes of this paper, it will be possible for anyone to analyze the degree of compatibility between them and the traditional philosophical theories, exercising his criticism and building up his autonomous opinion.


CHAPTER II

METHOD AND MATERIALS

1. Situation.

In this work, we understand “prehistory” as the Paleolithic period (3.3 million to 11,650 years ago), from the earliest known use of stone tools by hominins to the end of the Pleistocene.

We may eventually consider earlier periods when the subject recommends and our research finds material elements.

The reasons for electing the Paleolithic as the chronological universe of this study are various.

The most general one is that the adopted methodology looks for contexts the more remote as possible, totally isolated from any trace of the influence of elements of civilization whatsoever, and the near as possible to the very early advent of humankind.

We are talking about very remote archetypes.

The Paleolithic is the earliest period of the Homo sapiens development and the most prolonged phase of humankind's history. One of the most critical features of the period is the successive evolutionary episodes of the human species, causing many human genome changes, going from an apelike creature, or near human, to the definite Homo sapiens. Evolution is particularly vital to the neuroscientific studies on the development of the human brain and the corresponding mechanisms involved in the more remote archetypes' constitutions. During the
Paleolithic, the birth of humankind happened, and only in this time window can we contemplate its very original features.

The human population during this long period was very scarce. Modern scholars calculated this population in no more than one million individuals. Small nomad groups progressively spread over a very extensive geographical area. The Paleolithic societies practised an economy based on a hunt-gathering activity. Humans hunted wild animals for meat and gathered food, firewood, and materials for their tools, clothes, or shelters.

Factors of extreme importance to the existence of any moral principles began during the period, such as the capacity to abstraction, the ability to the semiotic interpretation of symbols, and the birth of oral communication using sound and visual codes – the first logical language traces.

The conjunction of all these features avoided the dispersal of the material elements useful to the context’s constitution to ground our analysis, despite the vast geographic area explored by our remote ancestors.

Our chronological universe ends with the advent of the Neolithic period, 11,650 years ago. The Neolithic period's advent brought a full stop to all these social features because of what scientists call “the Neolithic revolution,” represented by the emergence of agriculture, the seating of populations in defined territories, and the beginning of urbanization. All the Neolithic elements are entirely strange to the primitive contexts we are looking for and even as we consider them as part of the prehistory, for our work, the Neolithic is a “modern period.”

Therefore, just in this study, prehistory ended 11,650 years ago.
All these ingredients will help us with the definition of the several contexts demanded by the adopted methodology.

2. Method

We will predominantly adopt Analytic Philosophy concepts based on epistemological methods. In this case, it will mean emphasizing precision, cogency, and thoroughness about a specific topic and deemphasizing all imprecise or offhanded discussions of broad topics. The essential characteristics to be adopted are (i) an emphasis on clarity; (ii) the employ of rigorous argument; (iii) the disregard of metaphysics, irrespective of its relations with human behavioural matters; iv) contempt of obscurantism of the imaginary, bias or supposition whatsoever; v) sound arguments, besides the inclusion of additional contributions of many other non-philosophical sources.

The methodology admits the constant use of coherent reasoning and scientific elements, such as but not limited to archaeology, social and paleoanthropology, history, paleontology, social and cognitive psychology, behavioural sciences, and many others.

Referring to these scientific elements, we will prefer the most accessible and simple ones because their adoption in this philosophical study is complementary and aims only to ground the validity and cogency of arguments with known elements of the experimental empiric world. The most cogent methodological reasons for adopting the auxiliary elements are (i) the acceptance of induction, (ii) a few material elements, (iii) features of the object (antiquity, nomad populations, and absence of written and urban material elements).

3. Materials
Looking at the remote past, Philosophy does not walk alone anymore.

Presently, Archeology and Anthropology find their grounds on advanced theories and specific methods and occupy a relevant position in all social sciences issues in a very far more sophisticated manner than in the past.

The innovative methodologies of current multiscalar archaeological research offer much deeper perspectives on ancient changes in human social structures and bring material evidence of variation affecting human behaviour and interaction in very distant time-space contexts.

The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America published the complete article “Archaeology as a social science” by Michael E. Smith, Gary M. Feinman, Robert D. Drennan, Timothy Earle, and Ian Morris, in which the authors affirm that

For those interested in modelling long-term change in socioeconomic phenomena or understanding the deep background of modern practices, the days of fanciful speculation about the past on merely common-

4 Associate Professor, Department of Plant Pathology, University of Florida. https://www.pnas.org/content/109/20/7617
5 MacArthur Curator of Anthropology, The Field Museum
6 Distinguished Professor at the Department of Anthropology of the University of Pittsburgh
7 Chair of the Department of Anthropology, and President of the Archaeology Division of the American Anthropological Association
8 Department of Classics. Stanford University

sense grounds or of uncritical extrapolation from the present are over. The dirt-derived archaeology findings provide an empirically sound account of what people did and how they organized their affairs in the distant past.  

Our argument will take into account to have these demonstrated empirical elements as its ground. The most important contribution comes from all the nonlinguistic semiotic contents that these sciences can offer to become interpreted, such as human remains, ancient burials, human sacrifices, animal remains, ritual remains artefacts, locations inhabited in the period, and material elements with symbolic semiotic content (such as petroglyphs and others).


How can this fragmented evidence and scattered elements be relevant and determinant in this study, aggregating conclusions to philosophic reasoning?

The contextualization method takes place here. This method, in its several variations, has been successfully applied in philosophy and social sciences. The start point is the definition of various specific and independent contexts composed of evident elements of the same space-time situation brought from several sciences' contributions. In each of these contexts, the necessary relations of causation and correlation are logically deemed to be mandatorily present (employing

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preexistent evidence or knowledge), despite being still unknown. From this point on, deductive and inductive processes can cogently demonstrate the research object’s existence or coexistence.

In the case of this research, it will work like the epistemological example of a soccer match. The soccer match occurred two years ago, and it is the context of our research. This context will be our framework. The only material element that we have is a coloured photo. In the photo, we may see some of the players in an apparent movement, a part of the field, some spectators, a man with a black uniform very different from those used by the players, who supposedly could be the referee, nothing else. However, we are searching for a ball, and the picture does not show a ball. The existence of a ball is a “sine qua non” condition for the existence of a soccer play in progress (a particular material element without which the context could not exist). Therefore, very cogently, we may affirm: “a ball is being used in this match,” despite it not being visible.

The method adopts the epistemological idea that “the demonstration of the existence of the whole contains the demonstration of the existence of all its essential parts.” This inferential knowledge is considered by Bertrand Russel,10 once an investigation of the reality observed by this work cannot use any experience-based interaction and depends on many referential and descriptive elements.

In applying this method, we will build coherent contexts with fragmented evidence related to the same space-

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time situation so that none of these contexts could be possible without moral tenets – the ball that we will play.

We are looking for the ball, and in this case, the ball is any moral tenet essential to the context’s existence. After their identification, all the moral foundations we can bring to the evidence may be organized and arranged in a moral system: the supposed and possibly existing prehistory moral system.
CHAPTER III

RESULTS

In this paper, we will:

a) Argue that Ethics is a multidisciplinary and autonomous philosophical matter. Despite its interactions with other philosophical structures, such as metaphysics and ontology, we may better understand it when we see it as a social phenomenon subject to analytical observation from a specific methodological view.

b) Demonstrate that morality is an archetypal system and keeps unchanged its foundations since the most remote human experience. It is plausible to consider it a first attribute of the “homo sapiens,” albeit somehow culturally relative and adaptable to social and technological evolution.

c) Demonstrate that understanding morality imposes looking back at this archetype’s origins and its remote contents.

d) Demonstrate how this archetype evolved up to the present day through genetic and neural evolutionary mechanisms.

e) Recompose the prehistoric moral system and compare it with modern moral, social, economic, and political models and behaviours.
CHAPTER IV

TRADITIONAL THEORIES ON ORIGINS OF MORALITY

1– The Divine Command Theory.

Divine Command Theory (also known as “theological voluntarism,” “theistic subjectivism,” or simply DCT or DCM) is a meta-ethical theory that claims that morals are a consequence of God’s wish and that there is a universal moral obligation of obedience to God’s commands. Revelation gives God’s commands to humankind, and its content resides in the sacred books.

We may understand DCT as belonging to moral absolutism, which holds that humanity is subject to absolute standards that determine when acts are right or wrong. Moral absolutism, in turn, falls under the umbrella of deontological ethics, which teaches that actions are moral or not based on their adherence to given rules. That is the reason why DCT looks very close to the philosophy of law.

The divine command theory says that an act is moral if it follows the command of God. God’s commands dictate right and wrong—what He says to do is right, and what He says not to do is wrong. Human intent, human nature, nor human character are the basis of morality. The consequence of the action, as well, does not qualify its moral content, which finds its foundations solely on what God says.
Most three Abrahamic traditions have universally accepted this theocentric, metaphysic, and deontological-grounded theory: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The specific content of these divine commands varies according to the particular religion and the individual theorist's particular views, which gives specific relativity to the concepts of commands keeping its foundations uniform structure.

Many versions of the theory have emerged since its original formulations. The theory claims that moral truth does not exist independently of God and that his divine commands determine morality. Harder conceptions of the DCT state that God's command is the only tenet that a good action is morally valuable, and, last but not least, the more concessive variations indicate divine command as a vital component within more significant reasoning.

Being somehow relative, the DCT had the full acceptance of many prominent philosophers and theologians, mostly in the Christian world, during the last twenty centuries, including St Augustine, St Thomas Aquinas, Rene Descartes, William of Ockham, Blaise Pascal, Martin Luther, Philip Quinn, and Robert Adams.

The foundations of the DCT, as well, have permeated the Muslim tradition for centuries, albeit modern scholars refute the contemporary ideas that Islam is a defining case of ethical voluntarism. Considering that the Jewish culture's traditional moral concepts are theocentric, as


they are in Christianity and the Islamic culture, for sure, the theory found its place among Jewish philosophers and religious thinkers.

However, nowadays, as it happens with Islamic thinking, modern Jewish scholars refuse the idea of generalization and permanence of such influence. Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman\textsuperscript{13} state that we should expect that DCT theories were founded in Judaism, considering their presence in Christianity and Islam. However, the authors demonstrate that this presence is not confirmed in the Jewish texts, and, unlikely, this supposition, some texts are opposed to the DCT concepts. Attempting to demonstrate the absence of the theory, they claim that God's moral and rational character, according to Judaism, and the rational nature of "halakha" do not configure sufficient grounds for accepting DCT thesis. Irrespective of its many variations, the foundations of all Divine Command philosophical doctrines initially link to the central idea of the existence of a Natural Law, one of the most controversial matters of human culture and human thinking since its early beginning.

Formally, the natural law is understandable with simplicity, and we may reduce it to the announcement of its original foundations. Nevertheless, these concepts' importance to any philosophical exercise related to morals imposes widespread attention to their meaning. Moreover, the concept of morality under the natural law theory is not subjective. Therefore, the definition of 'right' and

'wrong' is the same for everyone, everywhere, as it persists in other deontological theories.14

This approach of DCT with natural law traditions accentuates its deontological structure and brings an inevitable immersion in practical ethics, as explained by Felix Ayemere Airoboman15:

Divine command theory seems to blur the difference between law and morality. It posits its claims as if God’s law stands for human morality. What God has given a man is law just as a nation gives its statutes to its citizens through its constitution. Failure to comply with the law, either of man or God, is backed by the threat. But morality springs from the free will or free action of the moral agent, independent of law or threat. However, divine command theory has the merit of addressing some problems of morality inherent in other ethical theories.

Divine command theory and natural law ideas are widely held to be refuted in many ways. In this paper, we will not discuss the validity of the opposition to the Divine Command concepts from any bias linked to conflicts between religion, philosophy, and science, usually taken into account in this discussion. From the eyes of the modern Analytic Philosophy strand adopted by the author, science and religion should not conflict. Science is a mental process from human rationality and never will


succeed in denying the existence of God. On the other hand, holding or denying science has never been the meaning or scope of Religion. The conflict between science and religion is mostly a very mistaken personal or ideological bias from philosophers, scientists, or religious thinkers.

Eduard Osborne Wilson\textsuperscript{16} once said that it is not productive opposing Science and Religion because they are the two most powerful forces in the World. Abdulla Galadari\textsuperscript{17} emphasizes that Scientists would not ever be Scientists if they were not Theologians at the same time and vice versa. They are complementary, attesting and justifying one for each other.

The most vigorous and most known opposition to the Divine Command Theory is a repetitive argument of implicit refutation known as “the Euthyphro Dilemma.”

The Dilemma rests on the following questions in a Socratic dialogue whose events occur in the weeks before his trial (399 BC), between Socrates and Euthyphro, who came to present charges of murder against his own father.

Socrates asks Euthyphro: “Are morally good acts willed by God because they are morally good, or are they morally good because God wills them?”

Each of these two possibilities leads to consequences that the divine command theorist cannot accept. Whichever way the divine command theorist answers this question, he would be refuting his theory. It is possible to formulate this argument as follows:

If divine command theory is true, then either (i) morally good acts are willed by God because they are morally good, or (ii) morally good acts are morally good because God wills them.

If (i) morally good acts are willed by God because they are morally good, then they are morally good independent of God’s will.

It is not the case that morally good acts are morally good independent of God’s will.

Therefore:

If (ii) morally good acts are morally good because God wills them, there is no reason to care about God’s moral goodness or worship him.

There are reasons both to care about God’s moral goodness and to worship him. Therefore:

It is not the case that (ii) morally good acts are morally good because God wills them.

Therefore:

Divine command theory is false.

This argument is the kind of “battle of syllogisms” widespread in some philosophical discussions. Some of them shelter important philosophic truths. Some others, however, are mistaken, just useless or sterile fallacies. An example is a popular argument called “a brain in a VAT,” offered by radical determinists and other sceptics. Anyhow, all “battle of syllogisms” have in common the essential feature of being strictly limited to formal logic in a linguistic format. Doing philosophy wearing this straightjacket is the same as conceiving human thinking as being like a simple digital calculator: something that understands all about syntax, none about semantics, and
that is useless in semiotics once being blind before the real world.

Many philosophers answered the Euthyphro Dilemma and the most highlighted responses are the arguments known as “Bite the bullet,” “Human Nature,” and “Alstons Advice.”

Despite being an essential reference to a more in-depth study on the DCT, there is no space left in this work to go over and over with this specific subject. Furthermore, this is an endless debate.

Anyhow, the Euthyphro Dilemma, irrespective of being the most “taken into account” argument opposed to the Divine Command Theory, is not the only one nor the most considerable. Several others oppose variable arguments.

**Objections to the Divine Command Theory.**

**Semantic objection.**

Michael Austin reports that the Philosopher William Wainwright considered a challenge to the theory on semantic grounds, arguing that "being commanded by God" and "being obligatory" do not mean the same thing, contrary to what the theory suggests. Wainwright believed it demonstrated that the theory should not be used to formulate assertions about the meaning of obligation.

Wainwright also noted that divine command theory might imply that one can only have moral knowledge if one knows God. Edward Wierenght argued that the theory seems to deny atheists and agnostics moral knowledge if this is the case. Hugh Storer Chandler has challenged the theory based on modal ideas of what might exist in different worlds. He suggested that, even if one accepts that being commanded by God and being morally right are the same, they might not be synonyms because they might be different in other possible worlds.

**The epistemological objection.**

According to the epistemological objection to divine command ethics, if morality is grounded in God’s commands, those who do not believe in God cannot have moral knowledge. Without moral knowledge, they do not hold any moral responsibility and have no obligation to God’s wishes. Moreover, In terms of this objection, DCT is deficient because certain groups of moral agents lack epistemic access to God’s commands, for many reasons, mostly because of the communication problem. How does God communicate to us his commandments?

These questions started a long and complex discussion between philosophers and theologians about the communication of God’s commands in such a way that we could understand if God has or has not communicated his will to us.

This objection has been raised– and answered before. However, the objection persists. It is reasonable to argue that it has not been substantially improved upon and does not deserve a second hearing. Whether or not God’s commands provide the basis of moral facts does not imply that unbelievers cannot have moral knowledge.
since the ability to know that something is true does not depend on our ability to know what makes it true.19

**The Omnipotence Objection**

The modified Divine Command Theory faces the problem of the inference that, somehow, God could command acts of cruelty and other abhorrent behaviours. The DCT defenders strongly deny this inference.

However, the opponents of DCT argue that this denial is not coherent because it would contravene the assertion that God is omnipotent. If God can create, extinguish, and modify everything, the supposition that he could not determine these abhorrent commands is a contradiction.

Thomas Aquinas (1225 –1274) responds to this understanding of omnipotence based on the argument of possibility. According to the philosopher, the meaning of “all” is not an absolute concept. Once this concept is a relative attribute, it should attempt the principles of possibility and adequacy. Thus, God is capable of doing everything possible and adequate for his Divine Plan. For this reason, God never acts in a contradictory, false, or anyhow abhorrent manner.

Pursuant to Aquinas, the nature of sin, such as giving abhorrent commands, is contrary to omnipotence. Hence, God being unable to do immoral actions is not a limit on his power, but rather, this comes from his omnipotence. In other terms, Aquinas claims that God

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cannot command cruelty precisely because he is omnipotent.20

The Omnibenevolence Objection.

To the nihilists, God's quality of Omnibenevolence makes logically evident a limit to his Omnipotence; thus, anyhow, it is a contradiction.

Nevertheless, the problem of Omnibenevolence is formulated because if all actions containing a positive moral value is a consequence of God’s commands, this is the same as God doing precisely what he commands himself to do, which is considered an incoherent conclusion.

Facing the argument, William Wainwright argued that although God does not act because of his commands, it is still logical to say that God has reasons for his actions. He proposes that God is motivated by what is morally good, and when he commands what is morally good, it becomes morally obligatory.21

In this meaning, God is in “virtue of himself,” and all his acts are cases of agent-causation.

The Autonomy Objection

Claiming that any concept of good is whatever God determines it to be, the DCT somehow denies the autonomous human structure and takes morality into

20 Austin, Michael W. in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - https://www.iep.utm.edu/divine-c/#H7
account only as something entirely dependent on God's will.

Many questions arise from this argument related to human moral liberty, identity, and responsibility, having reduced the possibility of independent thought and free will sharply.

Michael W. Austin, at Eastern Kentucky University, defends the DCT considering:

We are no longer self-legislating beings in the moral realm, but instead followers of a moral law imposed on us from the outside. In this sense, autonomy is incompatible with Divine Command Theory, insofar as on the theory, we do not impose the moral law upon ourselves. However, Adams (1999) argues that Divine Command Theory and moral responsibility are compatible because we are responsible for obeying or not obeying God's commands, correctly understanding and applying them, and adopting a self-critical stance concerning what God has commanded us to do. Given this, we are autonomous because we must rely on our independent judgments about God's goodness and what moral laws are inconsistent with God's commands. Additionally, it seems that a divine command theorist can still say that we impose the moral law on ourselves by our agreeing to subject ourselves to it once we come to understand it, even if it ultimately is grounded in God's commands.

22 Austin, Michael W. in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - https://www.iep.utm.edu/divine-c/#H7
The Pluralism Objection

Another objection is that God's notions are many and for sure relative to very different historical and cultural elements. Moreover, many understandings of God may be conflictive and follow various foundations.

A moral theory grounded in God’s will cannot be universal and is always limited to each existing concept of the Divine, declares the pluralist argument.

Martin Austin believes that the argument contains a flaw because the existence of many religions and different concepts of God and divinity does not mean that they should be in conflict or are reciprocally excluded in such a way that the moral foundations become incompatible. He points out that this subject involves personal analysis and proper choices and that anyone must decide by himself which understanding of the divine to adopt. In the same way, he should find which understanding of divine commands is the most compelling within her particular tradition.

He compares this situation with the deliberative process of a secular moralist facing a decision about which moral principles to elect to govern his life, among many moral traditions and several interpretations within those traditions.

Despite denying the theory’s axiological validity, the author considers that it is consistent with the belief that many religions contain moral truth and the same moral foundations. This fact makes it possible to know our moral obligations apart from revelation, tradition, and religious practice. “It is consistent with Divine Command

23 Austin, Michael W. in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - https://www.iep.utm.edu/divine-c/#H7

Theory that we can come to see our obligations in this and many other ways, and not merely through a religious text, religious experience, or religious tradition," says Austin (op. cit)

3 – Other Theories on the Origins of Morality.

3.1- The Kantian Theory

Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), one of the most influential philosophers, brought Western Metaphysics, one of its most structured conceptions.

It is impossible analyzing Kant’s Ethics theory without a first general understanding of his complex philosophic thinking.

The Prussian philosopher understood any philosophy as driven to the solution of three questions: “What is the world?” “What should I do?” “What may I hope?” 24

His Ethics theory is the philosopher’s epistemological answer to the second question: “What should I do?”

This understanding of Philosophy derives from his concept of three “ideas of reason,” which are the world, the self, and God.

As far as the “world” is concerned, In the Critique of Pure Reason, he considers that theoretical reason itself cannot prove its reality. According to this concept, “they are not constitutive, but are regulative, as they add systematic


unity and coherence to our experience. Since they are related to morals in significant ways, they have immense practical importance."\(^{25}\)

Referring to the “self,” he takes very complex reasoning that finally offers his conception of “humans as rational beings, worthy of dignity and respect. Anyone should treat Humanity as an end, not merely a means. To treat someone as a mere means to an end is to use that person to advance one’s interest.

Nevertheless, to treat a person as an end is to respect that person’s dignity by allowing each the freedom to choose for oneself.”\(^{26}\)

As an “ens realissimum or most real being,” Kant takes the notion of God into account. This most real being is also considered by reason to be a necessary being, that is, something that exists necessarily instead of merely contingently.\(^{27}\)

Kant brings his absolutist deontological concept of morals from this rational spectrum, stepping aside from any consequentialist or normative ideas. No moral codes are necessary because morality does not depend on specific rules defining good or bad, referring to human actions. What determines the moral value of an action is only the intention: an act only is morally good if its performance envisages the sake of duty.

\(^{25}\) Chapter 23, 
\(^{26}\) You Would Not Be Acting Autonomously As You Had No Control ... (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.coursehero.com/file/p2k8bd1/You-would-not-be-acting-autonomously-as-

Kant organized his ethical assumptions around the notion of a “categorical imperative,” a universal ethical principle. It consists of the determination that everyone should always respect others' humanity and only act by rules that could hold for everyone. Kant argued that moral law is a truth of reason and hence that the same moral law binds all rational creatures. Thus in answer to the question, “What should I do?” Kant replies that we should act rationally by the universal moral law.

Any person may find the moral law by himself once it is a part of the reason. Hence, moral law is a predicate of human reason in such a way that only one moral law binds all rational beings. This approach answers the question, “What should I do?”

The supreme principle of morality is named “categorical imperative,” meaning the foundation we must follow is rational and unconditional. Despite any natural desires or inclinations, we may have to the contrary. Humankind’s submission to the “categorical imperative” is entirely independent of anyone’s features or experience.

The “categorical imperative” is the scale to assign the moral validity for any action: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” The intention is the background of human activity defined by the “maxim” of our acts.

The duty derives from the maxim, the origin of all the reasons to act. The action in itself cannot be morally

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qualified. Therefore, when we ask, “What am I doing and why?” we are discussing the relationship between the intention and the maxim.

The second imperative is named the “hypothetical imperative,” “which is a command that also applies to us in virtue of our having a rational will, but not simply in virtue of this. It requires us to exercise our wills in a certain way, given we have antecedently willed an end. A hypothetical imperative is thus a command in a conditional form."

A feature of moral conduct is “goodwill,” understood in Kant’s terms as a will whose decisions are wholly determined by moral demands or, as he often refers to this, by the Moral Law. Human beings inevitably feel this Law as a constraint on their natural desires, which is why such Laws, as applied to human beings, are imperatives and duties. When the Moral Law is decisive to a human will, it is the thought of duty that grounds it.

Kant also argued that his ethical theory requires belief in free will, God, and the soul's immortality. Although we cannot know these things, reflection on the moral law leads to a justified belief in them, which amounts to rational faith. Thus in answer to the question, “What may I hope?” Kant replies that we may hope that our souls are immortal and believe that God designed the world through justice principles.

3.2 The Utilitarian Theory

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30 Ibidem
32 Kant, Immanuel | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://www.iep.utm.edu/kantview/

Utilitarianism is a Normative Ethics consequentialist theory, claiming that the happiness of the most considerable number of people in society is considered the human experience. Human actions are morally right if their consequences lead to happiness, the highest good. Pleasure and pain are the two sovereign masters governing the concepts of right and wrong. The action is right when it brings pleasure and wrong if it ends in unhappiness (pain). Since the inter-relation between actions and their happy or unhappy outcomes depends on the circumstances, no moral principle is absolute or necessary in itself.

The word “utility” is used to mean general well-being or happiness.33

Emerged with the Enlightenment, its creator, Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832), gives the best concise description of Utilitarianism:

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, is fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words, a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality, he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility

recognizes this subjection and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light".34

Considered a hedonistic theory, sustained actively “that the purpose of morality and laws was to promote the welfare of citizens and to maximize human happiness, not to enforce specific intuited unchangeable divine moral laws that label actions as wrong in themselves, without regard to their consequences. Bentham also believed that his utilitarian ethical theory was implicit in what we call moral ‘common sense’ or "intuitions" because utilitarian considerations are underlying all our moral intuitions."35

For many authors, as Ian Shapiro36, Utilitarianism, along with Marxism and Nozick's Libertarianism, is a radical theory in the measure that his author has sustained it up to their last arguments and under any circumstances.

Following the creator, John Stuart Mill (1806 – 1873), whose father had been Bentham’s disciple, adopted Utilitarianism but introduced many moderating and


adaptive features in his book “Utilitarianism” (1861), reaching a better approach with the libertarian ideas (“The Liberty” – 1859) that made him become one of the most influential philosophers in the Twentieth Century political thinking.

3.3 - Virtue Ethics.

Virtue ethics is a part of Traditional Ethics and currently represents one of the practical normative ethics approaches. In a very simplified way, its central concept could be considered an assertion taking into account the virtues, or moral character, as causation for human moral acts.

For sure, it is an individual-based theory, and unlikely the deontological or the objectivist approaches emphasizing duties, rules, and objective standards, or the consequentialist theories based on the consequences of actions, Virtue Ethics grounds itself on two essential ideas: the Virtue and the Practical Wisdom.

The Virtue:

According to Aristotle, a virtuous person is one who has ideal character traits. These traits derive from natural internal tendencies but need to be nurtured; however, they will become stable once established. Therefore, we may see Virtue as a character trait aggregated to an individual’s essence and determine how he should act in any circumstance. This individual behavioural feature does not relate to the act itself, but the reasons for the action will qualify it. To act with virtue means taking for the relevant reason for the moral behaviour, the assumption that “to do otherwise would be dishonest.”

This character-based approach to morality assumes that “we acquire virtue through practice. By practising being
honest, brave, just, generous, and so on, a person develops an honourable and moral character and learns how to make the right choice when faced with ethical challenges.”

The Practical Wisdom:

The second essential idea sustaining the Virtual Ethics Theory is Practical Wisdom. We may understand it as meaning the same as the “phronesis” considered by Greek Philosophy. It is a very complex concept, but Barry Schwartz and Kenneth Sharpe offer a simplified and very understandable description, comparing Practical Wisdom to the set of skills that an artisan needs to build a boat or a house jazz musician needs to improve. They are selective and intentional efforts to achieve a chosen result as near as possible to perfection. The difference is that practical wisdom is not a technical or artistic skill. It is a moral skill that enables us to discern how to treat people in everyday social activities.

As far as Western Philosophy is concerned, we may find Virtue Ethics’ origins in Plato and Aristotle’s Philosophy. In the East, this theory relates to Mencius and Confucius.

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38 The Dorwin Cartwright Professor of Social Theory and Social Action at Swarthmore College.
39 The William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College.
From classic Philosophy until the beginning of the Enlightenment, the theory played a crucial role in all axiological discussions. When Determinism and Utilitarianism started, they stepped aside the Virtue Ethics ideas. However, it was reborn in Anglo-American Philosophy after the Second World War, and any contemporary axiological analysis considers it.

3.4 – The rights-based Theory.

Some contemporary philosophers, as Ronald Myles Dworkin (1931—2013), claimed that morality originates from rights and, in the last instance, that moral rights are grounded on the idea of correspondence and causality between duty and natural rights.

Humans are supposed to act according to their moral rights as a natural consequence of their human conditions. These rights are individual and inalienable property of the human being. To any individual right corresponds a social duty of accepting and respecting such rule; in other terms, the individual natural right causes the social duty of respect and preservation.

The theory holds a patient-centred deontological structure, similar to some post-Kantian concepts, and claims that the foundations of morals originate from the social experience but instead in human nature itself.

The particular notion of what “right” could mean is relevant to distinguish the theory from other libertarian concepts.

John Leslie Mackie (1917–1981), an Australian philosopher, explains this peculiar meaning:

A right, in the most critical sense, is the conjunction of freedom and a claim-right. That is, if someone, A, has the moral right
to do X, not only is he entitled to do X if he chooses - he is not morally required not to do X, but he is also protected in his doing of X - others are morally required not to interfere or prevent him. This way of putting it suggests that duties are at least logically prior to rights. This sort of right is built up out of two facts about duties: that A does not have a duty not to do X and that others have a duty, not to interfere with A's doing of X. 41

These rights may be natural (also called moral rights) when pertaining to us by our humanity (as such, they apply to all persons), or conventional when they are created by humans, generally within the context of social and political organizations.

They could also be detrimental when they impose duties of noninterference on others or positive if they impose duties of assistance on others.

The rights-based theories on moral origins are roughly the opposite of the utilitarian theories and play a relevant role in developing Human Rights movements, institutions, and public agencies.

### 3.5 – Moral Relativism.

Moral relativism is the idea that several possible moralities or behavioural contexts of reference, and whether something is morally right or wrong, good or bad, just or
unjust, is always a relative matter. There is no universal or timeless moral structure. Any moral foundation is comparable to others, and they may disagree in full. Therefore, relativeness exists as a connection to one or another morality or moral frame of reference. Something can be morally right relative to one moral frame of reference and morally wrong relative to another. 42

We may understand Moral relativism in several ways.

Cultural relativism states the many different cultural structures, including various languages with multiple semantic coincidences and disagreements connected to nonlinguistic elements, cannot have the same moral frames. It is evident that each culture developed its own proper moral structure without any universal ingredient or any foundation brought from a different culture, albeit some few references seem nearly universal, but that are only linguistic elements.

The meta-ethical concept of moral relativism states that there is no possible determination of any overall concept from a culture on other cultures. Each society organizes its moral tenets using its intrinsic experiences and generalized beliefs.

Normative moral relativism claims that others must respect each moral structure, even though these differences could mean offence to the other cultures' moral or legal structure.

The development of Moral Relativism theory has suffered the influence of two cultural movements: the so-called

“new anthropology” and the several countercultural groups and activities of the second half of the XX Century.

The “new anthropology” was a post-war understanding of the meanings of “culture,” its structures, dimensions, and contents. Clyde Kluckhohn (1905–1960), in his book “Mirror for Man: The Relation of Anthropology to Modern Life” (1949), brought the aim to criticize all “ethnocentric ethical conceptions” and started new discussions on the meaning of “cultures.”

The new anthropologists stepped aside from the concepts of universality and focused on culture and society's fragments, proposing the study of small cultural elements rather than the traditional topics anthropologists have ever taken into account.

New anthropology may have contributed to unhelpful fragmentation in understanding culture and intercultural communication, inserting micro-cultures concepts in opposition to the broader traditional anthropological assertions. This split was part of a constant repositioning in anthropology on how to understand the concept of culture. Some anthropologists wished to see the concept abolished. Others, such as Kluckhohn (cited), wished to make Americans more “culture-conscious.”

This approach probably stimulated an essentialist reading of culture, and it continues to influence intercultural communication today.

The countercultural movements are the second factor responsible for the expansion of moral relativism ideas. The

American Sociologist John Milton Yinger created the term and gave it the following meaning:

Wherever the normative system of a group contains, as a primary element, a theme of conflict with the values of the total society, where personality variables are directly involved in the development and maintenance of the group’s values, and wherever its norms can be understood only by reference to the relationships of the group to a surrounding dominant culture.  

The term “subcultural” is also in use, keeping in mind that the counterculture needs to assume the existence of a dominant moral culture.

These movements have never happened. In sociological terms, Christianity, in its origins, has all the ingredients of a countercultural movement. Since the Enlightenment up to the present day, the prominent have been Romanticism (eighteenth and nineteenth Centuries), Bohemianism (nineteenth and twentieth Centuries), the Beatniks, the Hippies and Punk (second half of Twentieth Century), and more recently, the LGTB and the modern feminist countercultures.

However, as a philosophical proposal, moral relativism is needy of axiological foundations precisely because of its fragmentary concepts and opposition to moral structures’ universality. This theory focuses on minorities, which only are minorities because a different and dominant moral

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44 Former President of the American Sociological Association and Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Oberlin College

system exists. Therefore, in a very incoherent way, the theory denies the existence of one of its necessary causations.

If the approach of the theory denies the dominant culture to affirm the prevalence of the minorities, the theory is not related anymore to ethics but would be proposing the shattering of the social fabric or the social chaos in other terms.

3.6 – Moral Realism

Among many metaphysical approaches and theories related to the nature and structure of morality, Moral Realism plays a significant role in understanding many ethical issues.

Summarizing: the grounds of Moral Realism reside on the assumption that there are moral facts and propositions which are supposed to be correct and objective, precise, global, phenomenologically manifested, mind-independent, and subject to epistemological cognition.

These facts are the moral foundations and may be known, observed, and analyzed objectively “in ipsis,” independent of their evidence, of our perception of them or our beliefs, feelings, or other attitudes towards them.46

Realistic moral ideas find their ground the same way as scientific realism does: “the reality described by scientific theories is mostly independent of our theorizing. Scientific theories describe reality, and reality is “prior to thought.”47

46 https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_moral_realism.html - retrieved on July, 05 2019

There are many variations of this theory, and some of them may conflict as long as some concepts are involved. Internalist and externalist arguments may differ profoundly in the formulation of the moral realism grounds, and naturalism and non-naturalism face the same grounds with different arguments. The broad discussions about the realist foundations reside in cognitivism, moral truth, moral knowledge, descriptivism, and moral objectivity.48

However, David O. Brink, at MIT, argues that all these diversities orbit around the same foundations:

There may be a single formulation of realism in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions that are both global and precise or perhaps the various versions of realism form only a family or cluster of metaphysical theories, all of which assert some kind of mind-independence claim.49

In its essence, moral realism finds its grounds on the same concepts of scientific realism, following the approach that the reality described by scientific theories is mostly independent of our theorizing.

Scientific theories describe reality, and reality precedes knowledge and reason. Different moral realist approaches, independent of their specific claims, are

48 Hanuk University of Foreign Studies Korea Shin Kim in https://www.iep.utm.edu/moralrea/ (retrieved on July 05 2019)
plausible, compatible, and somehow mutually supporting.

The incompatible opposition comes from nihilism, once the cognitive epistemology in the realist ideas is denied in full by this theory.

David O. Brink makes this very clear:

The traditional opponent of moral realism is the nihilist or non-cognitivist, who denies that there are moral facts or true moral propositions or, as a result, any moral knowledge. Nihilists and noncognitivists must, therefore, be moral sceptics.50

Despite these various and recalcitrant oppositions do the realism foundations, and precisely because of their epistemological position, the trends of the Philosophy of Sciences keep this theory in evidence as Richard Boyd considers:

Some philosophical opportunities are too good to pass up. For many of the more abstract challenges to moral realism, recent realistic and naturalistic work in the philosophy of science is suggestive of possible responses in its defence. Thus, for example, it has occurred to many philosophers (see, e.g., Putnam 1975b) that naturalistic theories of reference and definitions might be extended to the analysis of moral language. If we could do this successfully, and if the results were favourable to a realist

50 Op.cit. pg 19
conception of morals, it would be possible to reply to several anti-realist arguments.\textsuperscript{51}

CHAPTER V

AN EVOLUTIONARY UNDERSTANDING OF THE ORIGINS OF MORALITY

Once Darwin said:

I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers who maintain that of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important. This sense, as Mackintosh remarks, "has a rightful supremacy over every other principle of human action." 52

1 – Preliminary assertions.

To introduce our reasoning, we should state that we adopt an approach to the Evolutionary Ethics Theories. For a whole century, the ideas of evolutionary ethics caused clamorous conflicts among philosophers, and up to the present day, induce many discrepant interpretations.

Rayner offers a balanced analysis of the philosophical position we adopt:

52 Darwin, Charles. The Descent of Man -1871b, Chap. IV par.97
Evolutionary ethics originated in the 1850s in the works of Herbert Spencer (1850). The theory gained some support and was debated throughout the nineteenth century until the criticisms of many philosophers, notably Thomas Huxley (1893) and G. E. Moore (1903), all but completely defeated the popularity of biological interpretations of morality. The field of evolutionary ethics, until relatively recently, remained plagued by bad interpretations of scientific research and unfounded speculation (such as the faulty idea that altruism originated via the process of group selection). The emergence of new theories of altruistic evolution, however, caused evolutionary ethics to experience a resurgence. This resurgence was brought about largely by E. O. Wilson’s seminal work: Sociobiology (1975), the development of Hamilton’s theory of kin selection and the concept of inclusive fitness (1964), Trivers’ hypothesis of the evolution of reciprocal altruism (1971), and the application of mathematical and game-theoretical models to evolutionary theory (e.g., Smith and Price, 1973). Today, evolutionary ethics is certainly a tenable position, with a breadth of empirical and theoretical evidence supporting it.\(^\text{53}\)

From the metaethical position, primarily adopted by analytical philosophers, we objectively understand morality as necessarily belonging to the realm of human social behaviour. The moral tenets are semiotic and

\(^{53}\) Rayner, Sam (2005) "Too Strong for Principle: An Examination of the Theory and Philosophical Implications of Evolutionary Ethics," Macalester Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 15 : Iss. 1 , Article 6. Available at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/philo/vol15/iss1/6-

hypothetic systems of commandments and propositions for the beacon and control of human behaviour, envisaging the viability, stability, and development of human social life. In other terms, morality is an essential and original social need of the “zoon politikon,” a material, social fact independently of its metaphysical grounds.

It is possible structuring these tenets in systems precisely like the juridical law, and irrespective of some extrinsic differences, moral and juridical systems embody commandments, propositions, or both. Only understanding these two different forms of content makes it possible to recognize the whole system.

Moral principles are not limited to linguistic structures nor encapsulated in texts, and their expression may happen by any means of semiotic content, such as gestures, visual elements, symbols, sounds, dressing, natural elements, and so on.

The modern written moral codes whatsoever are just a teleological attempt to certify to society systematically the existence of certain principles to be observed, generally summarized to the most important ones. Therefore, the written moral codes are a limited instrument of moral praxis and never express the existing morality’s content. For this reason, we may not declare expressively many moral elements, but we may naturally deduct them from other elements of the system. Hence, the hermeneutic of written moral codes are not sufficient to enlighten the entire human moral universe, and this broader entire understanding of such universe imposes the challenging task of submitting human behaviour to a rigorous analytical process.

The objective framework of this work is to follow the analytical process. We will consider everything else about
morality, which could not fit in this objective model, as belonging to the realm of abstraction.

We will consider morality exclusively as this human behavioural phenomenon that we will observe from its intrinsic and extrinsic elements. These elements are visible and cognizable within reach of the methods adopted by the Philosophy of Social Science. We will be attentive “to the differences and similarities between the social and the natural sciences, causal relationships between social phenomena, the possible existence of social laws, and the ontological significance of structure and agency.”

To understand morality, we should accept the proximity between philosophical thinking and the human sciences methods, recognizing the indivisible nature of human knowledge. Questioning morality sometimes involves analyzing dynamic social elements, neuroscientific observation, evolutionary genetics, and historical circumstances. Philosophy cannot walk alone in these fields.

The multidisciplinary approach is a trend of modern humanities, adopted by several analysts and scholars such as Paolo Mantovani, Margaret McFall-Ngai, Carlo

55 Columbia University
56 Pacific Biosciences Research Center, University of Hawaii at Manoa
The above examples are far from the only ones: in the life sciences, philosophical reflection has played an important role in issues as diverse as evolutionary altruism, the debate over units of selection, the construction of a 'tree of life,' the predominance of microbes in the biosphere, the definition of the gene, and the critical examination of the concept of innateness. Likewise, in physics, fundamental questions such as the definition of time have been enriched by the work of philosophers. For example, the analysis of temporal irreversibility by Huw Price and closed temporal curves by David Lewis have helped dispel conceptual confusion in physics.

Inspired by these examples and many others, we see philosophy and science as located on a continuum. Philosophy and science share the tools of logic, conceptual analysis, and rigorous argumentation.\textsuperscript{61}

If somehow one could question our reasoning, as far as a metaphysical consistency should be present, irrespective

\textsuperscript{57} Professor of Physics, Aix-Marseille University
\textsuperscript{58} Professor of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin
\textsuperscript{59} California Institute of Technology
\textsuperscript{60} Senior Researcher (permanent), ImmunoConcEpT, CNRS, University of Bordeaux; IHPST
\textsuperscript{61} National Academy of Sciences of The United States of America - PNAS March 5, 2019, 116 (10) 39483952; https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1900357116

of the limits stated by the methodology we adopted, we claim that in specific contexts, we approach the concepts of moral realism in its phenomenological, foundationalist, and cognitive versions.


2.2.1 – Introduction.

All the traditional models related to the origins of morality and its transition to modern human societies are presently under discussion as long as new evidence linked to their structure arises daily from new studies and research.

In his complex study “The Origins of Morality: An Evolutionary Account,” Dennis L. Krebs examines morality in terms of primitive, largely unconscious, competing instincts and motives. Grounded in evolution concepts, the author discusses all other perspectives: from the cognitive-developmental approach to social learning and the ethnographic views.

Krebs offers a reinterpretation of the Piaget-Kohlberg socio-moral model. He starts from his own research and follows cognitive-structural developmental psychology. Krebs claims that moral reasoning is rooted not in abstract

principles but rather on concrete thoughts about real-life situations.

Analyzing the psychological and neurological sources of primitive social behaviours and human prosocial behaviours, the author describes the evolution of this uniquely human process related to the origins of moral cognition.

Christopher Boehm (b. 1931) explored the possibility that morality could have affected natural selection and vice versa. Mechanisms of natural selection could be invoked to explain the individual human conscience. It is admissible that being moral may have enabled prehistoric people to participate in the very process of natural selection, albeit this participation more probably has been indirect and unconscious.

In this context, we claim that moral foundations emerged from the collective human experience as multiple behaviourally acquired information, being transmitted by the evolutionary process.

Jonathan Birch, in his review of Michael Tomasello’s “A Natural History of Human Morality," approached this idea very correctly:

66 Co-director of Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Co-director of the Wolfgang Kohler Primate Research Center, Honorary professor at University of Leipzig and at Manchester University’s Department of Psychology, and Professor of Psychology at Duke University.
This hypothesis implies a close relationship between the origin of morality and the origin of joint and collective intentionality, the focus of Tomasello’s research for over twenty years, and the topic of his previous book, *A Natural History of Human Thinking* ([2014]). Tomasello makes a powerful case that these phenomena are indeed related. If this is correct, then a great deal of previous work on the evolution of morality has been subtly misguided. The focus should never have been on acts of altruism but on acts of mutualistic cooperation. Moreover, the focus should never have been on explicitly linguistic expressions of moral judgment, hypothesized here to be an evolutionary latecomer, but rather on the way normative judgment, construed more broadly, enters into in the deeper, older cognitive structures implicit in feats of cooperation as apparently simple as two people carrying a log together."

Simplistically, evolution means a process related to biological changes, a consequence of the species' adaptive efforts, envisaging their survival. However, evolution is a much more complex fabric of causations and inter-related processes and effects involving neuron-based continuous functions and genetic elements. That is why evolution also plays a fundamental role in transmitting human behavioural experiences, mostly those related to collective life.

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The transmission of behaviourally acquired information by genetic structures and nervous system functions is one of this study’s essential premises. It is the ground for our conception of the origins of ethics and its aggregation to the collective unconscious in an archetypal structure. We argue that our reasoning is based on sound scientific assumptions, which we may aggregate to the philosophical method.

The neurosciences have already demonstrated that this assertion is no longer a hypothetical proposition taken into account by some scientific theories but that it is, in fact, a concrete and proven empirical reality. Don Marshall Gash\textsuperscript{68} and Andrew S. Dea\textsuperscript{69} offer a clear explanation of this assumption:

It is widely recognized that human evolution has been driven by two systems of heredity: one DNA-based and the other based on the transmission of behaviourally acquired information via nervous system functions. The genetic system is ancient, going back to the appearance of life on Earth. It is responsible for the evolutionary processes described by Darwin. By comparison, the nervous system is relatively newly minted and in its highest form, responsible for ideation and mind-to-mind transmission of information. Here the informational capabilities and functions of the two systems are compared. While employing

\textsuperscript{68} Director/Test Facility Manager, GLP Neuroscience Service Center, University of Kentucky College of Medicine, Anatomy and Neurobiology

\textsuperscript{69} Department of Anatomy and Cell Biology, Indiana University School of Medicine, Indianapolis IN
quite different mechanisms for encoding, storing, and transmitting information, both systems perform these generic hereditary functions. Three additional features of neuron-based heredity in humans are identified: the ability to transfer genetic information to other members of their population, not just progeny; a selection process for the information being transferred; and a profoundly shorter time span for creation and dissemination of survival-enhancing information in a population. The mechanisms underlying neuron-based heredity involve hippocampal neurogenesis and memory and learning processes modifying and creating new neural assemblages changing brain structure and functions.\footnote{Gash DM and Deane AS (2015) Neuron-based heredity and human evolution. Front. Neurosci. 9:209. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2015.00209.}

Canadian-American analytical and neurophilosopher Patricia S. Churchland\footnote{(a)UC President’s Professor of Philosophy Emerita at the University of California, San Diego;(b) op. ref. Churchland, Patricia S. “Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Selves” - W. W. Norton & Company – 2014 - ISBN-10: 0393349446 / ISBN-13: 978-0393349443} (b.1943) explained the roots of human moral behaviours with some genetic-specific elements. The author describes morality as arising from the interaction of genes, neural processes, and social experiences and states that survival and reproduction are genetic capacities. Among all species, mammals have specific “genes to produce the chemical oxytocin and vasopressin, which prompts them to care for their young. In some mammals such as humans, the same chemicals
encourage animals to form long-term relationships and care for each other”.72

This caring sustains the biological root of morality in Churchland’s opinion for each other primal social behaviour. Early humans lived in small groups of around 100 people, but the expansion of groups resulting from agriculture and intellectual ideals expanded compassion, sympathy, and empathy beyond people’s immediate group.73

Finally, the author states that moral norms arise from four interlocking brain processes: caring, recognizing others' psychological states, learning social practices, and problem-solving in a social context.74

Dennis L. Krebs75, as we considered before, explained these complex evolutionary processes highlighting the inquiries on the psychological and neurological sources of primitive prosocial behaviours, the evolution of uniquely human prosocial behaviours, and their contents and structures. Reviewing Krebs's works, Peter Gray concludes:

A psychodynamic perspective examines morality (and immorality) in terms of primitive,

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largely unconscious, competing instincts and motives; a social-learning perspective examines it in terms of the individual's social experiences; a cognitive-developmental perspective examines it in terms of the child's development from more concrete to more abstract ways of thinking, and an ethnographic perspective examines it in terms of cultural norms. However, here, under the umbrella of evolution, Krebs can integrate, refine, and expand upon the insights of all of these perspectives. All of them have to do with the interaction of environmental experiences with the evolved human brain, which has built into it, certain biases and predilections. Krebs provides us here with a biological foundation for thinking about all aspects of morality.76

Following his functionalist approach, Krebs introduced a reinterpretation of the stages of cognitive development considered by Kohlberg 77 and emphasized his conviction about the dependency of moral shifts to real living situations.

These pieces of evidence and assertions, recently brought by the social and natural sciences about the material origins of the moral foundations, constitute nowadays a generally accepted notion by the modern Western

Philosophy theories, being they or not grounded on any metaphysical concept.

Hence, the incontrovertible questions about when and how this could have begun, and by which means and processes it has been incorporated into the human evolutionary nature, pulls our study to the assumption of moral archetypes' existence structuring and their aggregation to the human genome and collective unconscious.

2.2 – Concept and Nature of Archetypes.

Approaches to the idea of archetypes are as old as the philosophy itself, and this idea is the central pillar of this research, as we repeated since the beginning.

Semantically, the Greek word “archetypos” is related to an idea of “first imprint,” a concept contained in the complex Plato's Theory of Forms, in which the philosopher discusses the material world, composed of mutable objects, as well as the transcendent world, which is unchanging and made of forms.

Under this theory, humans have an intrinsic ability to recognize the correct form of an abstract concept, as Adam Imitiaz explains in a simplified way:

Plato took this idea even further. While agreeing that there were ideal forms of abstract concepts (liberty, equality, justice), there were also ideal forms of ordinary objects such as tables or beds. The objects we encounter in our day-to-day lives are simply imperfect and changeable versions of their perfect forms.
These perfect forms are memories that we can recall from a previous time in our existence.\textsuperscript{78}

Since Plato was reasoning about cognitive processes, he referred to these perfect forms as the first imprint of abstract concepts: the archetypes, in other terms.

These first imprints of abstract realities, such as liberty and justice, are unchangeable and remain indefinitely independent of the individual experiences: they are transcendental to the material world and the ideal form of abstract concepts. The forms were the first understanding of archetypes in Philosophy.

During the Enlightenment, John Locke brought a significant contribution to the epistemological discussion in that period with his work An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. At that time, Locke's opponents criticized this essay in reason of its empiricist approach. However, precisely because of this empiricist grounding of Locke’s thinking, the essay introduced the concept of “adequate ideas” and offered a vital reinterpretation of Plato’s ideas on archetypes:

Adequate ideas are such as perfectly represent their archetypes. Of our real ideas, some are adequate, and some are inadequate. Those I call adequate, which perfectly represent those archetypes which the mind supposes them

taken from: which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. Inadequate ideas are such which are but a partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are relative. Upon which account it is plain.79

Locke’s proposal is not so clear as it could be, like several critics said, but it is evident his assumption that behind and before any idea, there is an archetype, a primary form (in Plato’s language) subordinating any idea’s content.

During the Enlightenment, philosophers discussed these concepts predominantly from the epistemological angle during the 19th. Century the conceptualization of archetypes progressively acquired a multidisciplinary subject’s contours, albeit the numerous studies about being isolated and product of different methodologies and purposes.

In the first half of the 20th Century, the extensive work of the psychiatrist Carl Gustav Jung (1975 – 1961), a former supporter of Sigmund Freud, offered an extraordinary advance to the understanding of the human mind and the diverse and complex cognitive and emotional processes related to their corresponding functions.

Jung’s theories start with the definition of the collective unconscious as an assumption submitted initially to all kinds of interpretations and questionings by philosophers and scientists of all tendencies. Jung, by himself,

understood that the concept should be explained appropriately and did so as follows:

Probably none of my empirical concepts has met with so much misunderstanding as the idea of the collective unconscious.

The collective unconscious is a part of the psyche that can be negatively distinguished from a personal unconscious by the fact that it does not, like the latter, owe its existence to personal experience and, consequently is not a personal acquisition. While the personal unconscious is made up essentially of contents which have at one time been conscious but which have disappeared from consciousness through having been forgotten or repressed, the contents of the collective unconscious have never been in consciousness and therefore have never been individually acquired, but owe their existence exclusively to heredity. Whereas the personal unconscious consists for the of most complexes, the content of the collective unconscious is made up essentially of archetypes.80

Therefore, in the Jungian theory, unlike the individual unconscious, the collective unconscious's content is limited to instincts and archetypes and is not relative to any individual experience. However, Jung's summarized explanation helps us understand the collective


unconscious’ content, but does not enlighten the reasons because he denominated this structure as “collective.” We should ask Jung about this:

I have chosen the term “collective” because this part of the unconscious is not individual but universal; in contrast to the personal psyche, it has contents and modes of behaviour that are more or less the same everywhere and in all individuals. It is, in other words, identical in all men and thus constitutes a common psychic substrate of a suprapersonal nature that is present in every one of us.

Thus, the archetypes' collective qualification is related to the tenets of universality and perpetuity: two essential pillars of any reasoning related to morality.

The Jungian Theory's fundamental claims referring to the archetypes disseminate in philosophy, psychology, and human sciences as a gender, and even in the popular culture, causing many different interpretations and starting several controversies. For this reason, in any research, we will find different meanings and uses of the archetypal concepts, which may be reduced, expanded, or even conflictive when compared with Jung’s ideas. In the face of this broad and deep horizon, we should define in this paper, which is the understanding of archetypes we adopt. We accept as coherent with the structure of this study the extended definition given by Adam Blatner:

81 (Ibidem)

They represent the inherited, intrinsic tendencies in cognition, imagery, and emotion in the human species. Archetypes are the extensions of the phenomenon of instinct, as complexified and expressed in human experience. In themselves formless and expressing the sociobiological dimension of neurophysiology, their manifestations may be found in themes in art, ritual, custom, imagery, dreams, philosophy, psychopathology, and every other human endeavour.\textsuperscript{82}

According to the Jungian Theory, these elements' content finds its ground in the belief that nature enabled the human individual with “many things which he has never acquired but has inherited from his ancestors. He is not born as a tabula rasa; he is merely born unconscious. Nevertheless, he brings with him systems that are organized and ready to function in a specifically human way, and these he owes to millions of years of human development.” (Carl Jung – op. cit. Volume 4).

The archetypes' ancient philosophical concepts predominantly considered their contents and meanings as something unchangeable (a “pure form” as Plato thought about). Jung’s works and his empirical concepts opened the horizon for a more in-depth study of the archetypes' stability and gave them certain flexibility, coherent with the evolutionary processes, as Charles D. Laughlin punctuates:

The archetypes themselves may well have changed during our evolutionary past -- there is

\textsuperscript{82} Blatner, Adam, M.D - The Relevance of the Concept of Archetype - https://www.blatner.com/adam/level2/archetype.htm - retrieved on May, 14 - 2019
no way to know for sure (1953 [1943/45]:368) -- but in their present form, they encode the recurrent experiences of human beings over countless millennia and across all cultural boundaries (1970 [1955/56]:390). In some instances, the archetypes encode recurrent experiential material from our pre-hominid animal past (1953 [1943/45]:96).83

For a good understanding of the theory, we should always have in mind that Jung clarifies that the term archetype does not refer to an inherited idea or abstract element but rather to an inherited behaviour pattern. This assertion plays an essential role in this work since we understand any moral concept or content as a human behavioural phenomenon. In the present, neuroscientific studies support this proposition of the behavioural nature of the archetypes as George B. Hogenson indicates: “The discovery of mirror neurons by researchers at the University of Parma promises to alter our understanding of fundamental cognitive and affective states radically. This paper explores the relationship of mirror neurons to Jung’s theory of archetypes and proposes that archetypes may be viewed as elementary action patterns.” (Hogenson, George B – Archetypes as Action Patterns – The Journal of Analytical Psychology - https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5922.2009.01783.x – retrieved Jul, 27 – 2019).

Jung focused on the subject as a very objective and observable element of the human mind and kept aside metaphysical reasoning in his arguments. “Whether this psychic structure and its elements, the archetypes, ever

83 Laughlin, Charles D. Archetypes, Neurognosis and the Quantum Sea – Art. Pg.3)
‘originated’ at all is a metaphysical question and, therefore, unanswerable. (Carl Jung – op. cit. Volume 4). Despite avoiding any assumption related to the definition of archetypal origins, Jung highlights that all the elements of a human individual’s nature are primarily present and existing from birth. The individual experiences and their particular environment do not create these elements but only bring them out.

This behavioural nature of the archetypes, as sustained by Jung, approached his theories to other scientific and philosophical concepts and, if on the one hand, played an influential contribution to other sciences, on the other hand, absorbed several contributions from them. The evidence of these approaches is why we assume that the study of archetypes only acquired the contours of a multidisciplinary subject because of Jung’s works.

The progressive enrichment of the Archetypes Theory following Jung’s works in part is due to its multidisciplinary structure, as we can infer from Pearson’s text:

C.G. Jung left a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the ontological status of the archetypes and the collective unconscious. He did so because of the inadequacy of the science of his day. Modern developments in the neurosciences and physics—especially the new physics of the vacuum—allow us to develop Jung’s understanding of the archetypes further. This paper analyzes the salient characteristics of Jung’s concept of the archetype and uses modern biogenetic structural theory to integrate archetypal psychology and neurosciences. The paper reviews some of the evidence in favor of direct neurophysiological-quantum coupling [the author’s term] and
suggests how neural processing and quantum events may interpenetrate.\textsuperscript{84}

Mark Vernon also indicates the value of this multidisciplinary approach of the Jungian Theory:

In fact, the possibility that Jungian archetypes might be commensurate with biology was implied by EO Wilson in his book Consilience. He raised the possibility that science might make them "more concrete and verifiable." Following Wilson's lead, the psychiatrist Anthony Stevens sees archetypes at work in ethology, the study of animal behaviour in natural habitats. Animals have sets of stock behaviours, ethologists note, apparently activated by environmental stimuli.\textsuperscript{85}

Considering this apparent universality of archetypes in Sciences and Philosophy in the present day, we should accept the contributions of all studies and interpretations of the concept, which are compatible with the central pillars of our study, irrespective of the fields of Science from where they arise.


Among the several research contributions, two fundamental approaches fortify our basic assumptions about morality as a human behavioural and observable subject, resulting from archetypal foundations and carried for millennia of evolutionary processes aggregate to the species genome.

The first one comes from the fundamental axioms of biogenetics structuralism, summarized in three radical notions that form its foundations:

1. The first is that consciousness is a property of the nervous system.

2. The second is that all of the neural structures that mediate consciousness develop during life from initial inherited structures (from archetypes, in other terms), and

3. The third is that all we can mean by "culture" refers either directly to neurophysiological processes or indirectly to the artefacts and behaviours produced by those processes.86

The other prominent approach comes from the concepts of neurognosis, also emerging from biogenetic structuralism. Neurognosis is a technical term used to refer to the initial organization of the experiencing and cognizing brain.

The definition of this concept comes from Laughlin:

All neurophysiological models comprising the cognized environment develop from nascent models, which exist as the initial, genetically determined neural structures already producing

the experience of the fetus and infant. We call these nascent models neurognostic structures, neurognostic models, or simply neurognosis (Laughlin 1991, Laughlin and d'Aquili 1974:83, Laughlin, McManus and d'Aquili 1990:44-75). When we wish to emphasize the neurognostic structures themselves, we tend to mention structures or models. The neurognostic structures correspond to Jung's archetypes. Remember that although much attention was given to relatively dramatic archetypal imagery in his writings, Jung actually believed that there were as many archetypes as there are species-wide, typical perceptions (1968c [1936/37]:48). Jung's reference to the essential unknowability of the archetypes-in-themselves also applies to neurognostic structures in our formulation.  

2.3 – Transmissibility of Archetypes.

When Jung formulated his Archetypes Theory in the first half of the 20th Century, the Science then existing could not help him sufficiently.

Nonetheless, we have sufficient and accredited scientific research to support the justification required to validate our claims in the present. We will not demonstrate or review this scientific research because it would overflow the purpose, structure, and methodology of this work. Moreover, the most critical scientific grounds related to


archetypal transmissibility come from the neurosciences, which methodology is not extensive to Philosophy.

However, we should indicate and make detailed scientific research grounding our argument and quote their essential assumptions without changing their wording and structure rather than merely mentioning them.

The mechanisms for encoding, storing, and transmission of genetic information (such as the archetypes) are described by Don M. Gash and Andrew S. Deane as a complex process primarily determining the genetic informational content at the time of the individual’s conception:

Nucleotide encodes genetic information sequences and the chromosomal structure of an individual’s genome. Transcription and translation of encoded information are dynamic molecular processes regulating cellular life: responding to stimuli, maintaining homeostasis, and regulating growth, development, and reproduction. There are various mechanisms for transmitting genetic information in single cells and multicellular organisms involving replication of the encoded information.

[...] Neuron-based informational content is accumulated and modified throughout life in the human nervous system. Information in the nervous system is encoded in the molecular and cellular properties of neurons, their neural networks, and their synaptic connections.

88 Department of Anatomy and Neurobiology, College of Medicine, University of Kentucky

[...] The mechanism for the transfer of neuron-based information from individual-to-individual in a population is via mind-to-mind. Mind-to-mind transfer engages the brain and body as well as the mind.89

Attempting to decipher a so complex neural structured system, entirely unknown until some decades ago, is an immeasurable challenge for Science and one of the fascinating mysteries related to human phenomenon. Despite the circumstance, this exhaustive road conquered several advances, and each one of them propels the others.

Very relevant features and mechanisms of the encoding, storing, and transmission of genetic information related to human behaviour have been recently discovered, like the Kin Selection processes.

Kin Selection is a significant study of evolutionary biology, initially proposed in 1963 by the British evolutionary biologist W.D. Hamilton and offers an entirely new analytical perspective on animal social behaviour (mostly mammals, as the Homo sapiens).

In the present day, the Kin Selection Theory is one of the foundations of the modern study of social behaviour, which comprises any moral tenet's roots.

The theory clarifies the complex genetic evolutive foundations of essential social behaviours like altruism and reveals the original choices based on the cost-benefit in

animal life in a group. Kin selection requires genetic relatedness between the donor and the recipient of the altruistic act, and for sure, selection is the dominant explanation for the evolution of aid-giving behaviour.\textsuperscript{90}

Therefore, we may say that the Kin Selection Theory lays on the baby crib of human behavioural morality and unveils the fascinating beauty of the archetypes and their evolutionary process.

Patten described the central ideas of the theory as follows:

\begin{quote}
It is most accurately described as a form of group selection. Although mathematically, it is possible – and even sometimes heuristically invaluable – to make all fitness variation under the kin selection property of genes or individuals, this obscures the true causal forces that bring about gene-frequency change under kin selection. Kin selection is a way of understanding allele frequency change as a consequence of the actions and interactions among individuals who share alleles by recent common descent – i.e., kin. As with group selection, it is a consequence of the properties of groups that cause allele frequency change. With kin selection, though, the groups have this special genetic structure. Kin selection has been used to explain the evolution of cooperation and altruism in animal societies. The evolution of altruistic traits, which is opposed to groups but
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{90} Michael D. Breed, Janice Moore, in Animal Behaviour, 2012
favoured between groups, is facilitated by close kinship within groups. The within-group fitness losses that altruists suffer are partially offset by the fitness gains of kin who share the same genetic information. In this way, the genes that control behaviour can recoup the fitness losses of the donors of altruistic actions. Hamilton specified a useful rule for altruistic acts such as these that determine whether such behaviours are evolutionarily favoured: \( rb > c \). That is, if the benefits (b) conferred on kin, weighted by the relatedness (r) of the donor to the recipient, is greater than the cost (c) conferred on the donor, then such an action is favoured by natural selection.\(^\text{91}\)

The kin selection central idea is known as the theory of ‘inclusive fitness’ and has been formulated in a mathematical model called Hamilton’s Equation:

\[
\frac{B}{C} > \frac{1}{r}
\]

this can be rearranged as

\[
rB > C
\]

The elements of cost (C) and benefit (B), and relatedness (r) in this equation have already been introduced. The cost (C) is the lost potential fitness of the donor. The benefit (B) is the added fitness for the recipient due to the donor’s acts. The underlying message of this equation is that aid-giving behaviour by the donor should be favoured in the course of evolution if the donor-recipient relatedness (r)

times the added benefit to the recipient is higher than the cost to the donor.\textsuperscript{92}

More recently, Alan Grafen exposed several new mathematical models diversifying Hamilton’s research results and expanding their analytical boundaries.\textsuperscript{93} The result of all these approaches focuses on the same assertion:

Cooperation and altruism—and indeed social behaviour in general—are defined in evolutionary biology according to concepts of cost and benefit, in particular, according to costs and benefits to the fitness of interacting organisms. The fitness effects of behaviours are apparent and measurable through interactions between actors and recipients. Altruistic behaviour, in particular, has been usefully defined as behaviour in which an actor pays a cost to its direct, lifetime net fitness, and a recipient gains a benefit to its direct, lifetime net fitness.\textsuperscript{94}

Peter Woodford summarizes many discussions involving the Kin Selection Theory, mostly those provoked by an article published in the journal Nature by two

\textsuperscript{92} Michael D. Breed, Janice Moore op. cit

\textsuperscript{93} Grafen, Alan - Detecting kin selection at work using inclusive fitness - Proc Biol Sci. 2007 Mar 7; 274(1610): 713–719. Published online 2006 Dec 12. doi:10.1098/rspb.2006.0140 ---- 00PMCID:PMC2197210/

mathematical biologists, Martin Nowak and Corina Tarnita. The article questioned the explanatory efficacy and value of William Hamilton's theory of ‘inclusive fitness,’ the reigning theoretical and mathematical basis of decades of empirical research into the evolution of social behaviour—mostly cooperative and altruistic behaviour—across the living world.95

The author highlights the reaction of the scientific community, referring to that article:

A number of highly critical responses followed one signed by 137 eminent theoreticians and empiricists in evolutionary biology [2]. The number of scientists rejecting the conclusions of Nowak, Tarnita, and Wilson was itself an indication of the nerve that it struck and also of the continuing centrality of Hamilton’s theory to the study of social evolution. (Woodford, op. cit)

As far as the philosophical perspective is concerned, a very relevant conclusion came up from these discussions: the multidisciplinary nature of any discussion on human behaviour, as we have stated along with this work:

We quickly found that the questions raised, by their nature, cut across a variety of disciplines and areas of specialization within the biological sciences but also in areas that draw on theoretical resources of the life sciences, such as the emerging evolutionary social sciences, anthropology, and philosophy. This interdisciplinary scope is thanks in large part to

95 Woodford, Peter - Evaluating inclusive fitness – Royal Society Open Science -Published:26 June 2019https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.190644

increasing advancement in applying theories of social evolution across the living world from cells to humans and to more pressing questions about the generality of evolutionary principles. For this reason, this collection features articles from researchers in mathematical biology, behavioural ecology, anthropology and medicine to the philosophy of science, and even ethical theory. (Woodford, op. cit)

Systematically, science is searching to demonstrate the critical pieces of the puzzle representing the transmissibility of archetypes.
CHAPTER VI
THE BASIC TENETS OF MORALS IN PREHISTORY

1. Introduction.

The only acceptable evidence to sustain our arguments, in the face of the methodology adopted in this study, are the material elements of human behaviour, which could be scientifically taken into account, even though limited to correlated consequences of other material evidence or sound hermeneutical assumptions.

We should build the contexts in which such behavioural elements existed during the Paleolithic to verify whether they express any moral content and what tenets they represent.

As behavioural moral content, we should understand any evidence that the agents are consciously prosecuting the ability to serve complex and changing societal needs.96

The reasons for electing the Paleolithic Period as the stage for these contexts are explained in Chapter II.

We will use three contexts: the human, the imaginary, and the divine, and they will be formatted from research, analysis, opinions, and evidence brought by several authors.

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2. The Human Context.

To build up the human context in the Paleolithic, we should start with a “scenario”: a general description or the period's human atmosphere.

The American researcher Norman Pedersen\textsuperscript{97} gives us this scenario:

In my research into Paleolithic societies, I have used a one-to-one correspondence of Ice Age humans with simple hunter-gatherer societies known to present anthropology. This is a very limited group. The criteria I used were that the societies have no agriculture, that they be nomadic/semi-nomadic, and that they had no contact with civilization. Perhaps only the Polar Eskimos described by Peter Freuchen fit the criteria best. The Kalahari Ju/wasi (Elizabeth Thomas Marshall) also known as the !Kung and San Bushmen had minimal contact with agricultural societies. The Mbuti Pygmies of the Ituri Rain Forest (Collin M. Turnbull) had contact with neighbouring agriculturists but remained separate. The only other group that I felt might meet the criteria were the Australian Aboriginals, but there is no sufficiently unbiased

literature to study. All anthropological research has a modern bias, which must be considered.

These four simple hunter-gatherer societies had social behaviours that were very different from all other human societies: no leaders, complete equality between individuals regardless of sex or age, no violent aggression, and no selfish behaviours. (In a private message from Pedersen to the author).

Many other researchers endorse the one-to-one correspondence and similar models, and we may find an equivalent argumentation in Christopher Bohem works:

We can project these specific patterns backwards in time by using a systematic “ethnographic analogy.” This is still a developing aspect of prehistoric research, but my conservative version of it holds that if a behaviour is found in all six of the regions where hunter-gatherers have been studied by anthropologists over the past several centuries, essentially, the behaviour can be projected back to include all behaviourally modern humans.98

We can find the most diverse and conflictive theories related to cultural models of human behaviour evolution and its traits from its early origins to the present day. Most of them consider the relations or similarities between these prehistorical traits and modern human behaviour. Such diversity makes the research somehow exhaustive and

inconsistent. Christopher S. Henshilwood and Curtis W. Marean\textsuperscript{99} consider that rather than focusing on the development of theory, many researchers have suggested behavioural traits that are thought to be modern and concentrated on the empirical record for antiquity distribution of those traits. The authors offer a descriptive table of references between some important behavioural traits and their corresponding representative studies, clarifying these correspondences' systematic research.

This first Picture, or cover of our context, focuses on the most untouched possible scenario with their primary requisites: a hunter-gatherer society, the absence of civilization, and the inexistence of an agricultural economy. We should contemplate this scenario with total immunity related to any modern bias or historical model.

The first framework this study should consider is the assertion that humans, since the early Paleolithic, demonstrated using behavioural elements and that their nature was enabled with the features of what anthropologists call the "CCC Triangle" model for social structure. The "CCC Triangle" is a unique combination of human traits: "Cognition," "Culture," and "Cooperation," and we will employ this model to analyze prehistoric contexts.

During the workshop "Origins of Human Uniqueness and Behavioural Modernity," staged by Arizona State

University's in 2010, scholars in anthropology, primatology, cognitive Science, psychology, palaeontology, archaeology, evolutionary biology, and genetics agreed on defining that human uniqueness is the "underlying capacity to produce complexity," understanding that behavioural modernity as "the expression" of those capacities.

Cognition, the first of these traits, means a fundamental element to any moral behaviour and finds its most important content in the capacity to deal with abstractions. The unquestionable evidence of the early Paleolithic humans' ability to use symbols to represent abstract contents comes from language.

Only humans have language, which allows us to think about the rightness or wrongness of our behaviour. Allen situates the beginning of human language in the Middle Paleolithic and comments on the stages of such development:

Human development in the Middle Paleolithic contributed to the emergence of speech and language, art, religion, and technical skill. Speech overtime went through the following development path: the first phase is characterized by general pantomime accompanied by additional stuttering; in the second stage, palaeolithic people started to

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communicate with precise gestures associated with corresponding voice symbols or words and at the end in the third phase pantomime and stuttering completely disappeared. People started to use systematic signs and words. At the beginning of the third stage appeared analytical thinking and concluding. Since that time, talking and thinking recorded a constant rise.102

The phonetic symbols and semantic sounds and gestures reached their visual codification progressively, starting the written language's construction. The earliest known evidence of abstract ideas' visual expression is 60,000 BC and engraved on eggshells.103

Therefore, the early Paleolithic humans held the necessary conditions to deal with complex abstractions and to express them with the appropriate semantic symbology, making possible the interaction among individuals overflowing the simple, instinctive patterns and embedding their will, desires, sensitiveness, ideas, interpretations, and feelings.

Besides language and other semiotic elements, technology is a relevant indicator of humans' cognitive stages. Technology during the long Paleolithic Period evolved (i) referentially to the relations of humans with the environment and their survival needs and (ii) as a parallel of biological evolution. The evolutionary process of this evidence of cognition, as significant and revealing as the


language, is classified according to its features and chronology by Joseph V. Ferraro.  

The author points out that our knowledge about Paleolithic technology is just beginning and that the available elements are very few. However, what we have for the moment is strongly indicative of the contexts we are studying and, for sure, as Ferraro comments, we should consider this apparent weakness of scientific material as a promising stage:

Rather than being utterly demoralizing, this actually makes for incredibly interesting and exciting times in Paleolithic studies. Important new discoveries are made every day; new analytical techniques provide windows to the past that were all but inconceivable even a few short years ago, and the widespread adoption of an increasingly rigorous scientific approach provides archaeologists with a sound methodological foundation upon which to fashion a cutting-edge 21st-century discipline. The ‘golden age’ of Paleolithic archaeology is just beginning.

Thus, by several means, Science demonstrates that the Paleolithic man’s behaviour, unlike any other animal, was not only a construction of actions determined by instincts but rather a complex and conscious original cognitive process in mind and brain structures. In all other animals’ behaviour, we can only identify instinctive reactions to determined stimuli. In early human evolution, we must accept the evidence of behavioural patterns based on

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104 Ferraro, op. cit.
choices among different possibilities affected by interaction among individuals, many times divergent from the ordinarily expected instinctive behavioural forms.

Pedro Blaz Gonzalez considers this assumption in his economics of beings concept:

Regarding man in prehistory, the economics of being represents a time of pressing vital need when the scope of values was narrower than it is today. This suggests that making choices that safeguarded the survival of individuals and their small clans was of crucial importance. It appears that the range of early man’s choice-making was efficiently guided toward survival. Given the physical, emotional, and psychical demands of their living conditions, choice-making for early men required conscious engagement with their limited field of possibilities.  

We called these behavioural patterns “archetypes,” and here, we state that they contained all the essential elements and qualities existing in any concept of morals at any time.

The second element of the “CCC Triangle” is “Culture,” meaning a product of thinking and social learning facilitated by language, technology, creativity, and innovation.  

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106 Despain, David – op.cit.
One can identify a cultural context by observing the external features of a social group or structure: language, art, beliefs, internal interaction, and organization.

Pedersen focused on these elements to delineate the cultural structure of humans in the Paleolithic:

We approach sociological and anthropological studies with the belief that human nature is an absolute, that people are always people, that we have always had the same motivations and emotions. Unfortunately, that has been proven to be a false assumption. 20,000 years ago, human nature was very different from what we think of as human nature today. Violence and aggression, competition and ambition, vanity and greed are all part of Modern human nature. We excuse antisocial behaviours because they are inherent in our human race. But none of these traits existed among simple hunter-gatherer societies (and therefore among our prehistoric ancestors.) For 150,000 years, human nature was kinder and gentler, non-aggressive, and considerate. Our ancestors were intelligent, extremely competent, egalitarian, and selfless. That is the human nature of our Homo sapiens species before the advent of Civilization became necessary.\textsuperscript{107}

Some specific structures are observable in the Paleolithic, starting with social organization.

Analyzing social organization in the Paleolithic is an arduous task for three main reasons: (i) the period is

exceptionally long and covers different stages of human development and evolution; (ii) the scientific evidence is scarce and frequently incongruent; (iii) many types of research contain several biases, and their results cannot be entirely validated.

A demonstration of this weakness of results in Paleolithic research is visible in some frequent incongruity. In archaeological studies, the Paleolithic social organization held a simple structure and a uniform social behaviour pattern. Unlike this assertive, research on fossil and paleoenvironmental elements indicates complex social structures and a visible variability in social behaviour.

Steven Mithen evaluates the incongruity of such findings as follows:

> I will argue that the resolution of this paradox, and indeed an understanding of early prehistory in general, can only be gained by addressing the evolution of the mind, an argument I have made at greater length elsewhere (Mithen 1996).

Pedersen warns us about the inappropriate content of many available studies about the Paleolithic society:

Scholars assume behaviours of Modern men to be universal throughout time, e.g., antagonistic, coercive, domineering, and belligerent.

Scholars use the motivations of Modern Man to explain hunter-gatherer societies, e.g., intimidation, peer pressure, ostracizing. These

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terms do not apply to nomadic hunter-gatherer societies. They are about Modern, Civilized men only. Scholars often fail to differentiate between nomadic / semi-nomadic hunter-gatherers and sedentary hunter-gatherers. There is a world of difference, which is why they have been categorized as simple and complex hunter-gatherers.109

The author goes further and recommends the banishment, in such studies, of the use of inappropriate concepts and language to define individual and societal behaviours, and indicates terms and concepts which have no meaning for hunter-gatherers: Division of Labor, Male dominance over female, Status, Territory, Ownership, Gift reciprocity rules, Kinship definitions, Kinship as a social factor, Marriage as a political factor, Marriage to cousins avoided as a cultural absolute, Peer pressure, Aggression, coercion as social factors, and Crime.

Therefore, as long as our concerns refer to moral contents aggregated to social behaviour, we will concentrate our attention on the evolution of mind evidence rather than on structural or organizational social features shown by traditional archaeology.

We will take it this way. Some of these features are widely known and are sufficient to ground our study on the behavioural elements arising from the Paleolithic social structure.

Three levels of social organization are recognized among human hunter-gatherers: the domestic unit, the

109 Pedersen. Norman – Predersen’s Prehistory in https://pedersensprehistory.com/biases-about-prehistory -

community, and the band.\(^{110}\). In these three levels, we should look specifically for social, and behavioural evidence.

Wolfgang Haak\(^{111}\) achieved the demonstration of the domestic unit. He claimed to have worked out with his staff some family relationships in a remarkable series of burials uncovered in central Germany in 2005 and declared in the National Academy of Sciences Proceedings. “We have established the presence of the classic nuclear family in a prehistoric context.” The researchers found that the children and the adult men grew up in the Eulau area, whereas the adult women came from at least 60 kilometres away, indicating that nuclear families in this region were organized around local men who mated with outside women.\(^{112}\)

The expression “classic nuclear family” for sure is a modern bias that we should not adopt. Anyhow, the demonstration of the existence of a defined and stable domestic core is relevant.

Presently there are no means to decipher the several specific features of these cores, but their existence, by itself, is enough to sustain the existence of indispensable


\(^{111}\) A geneticist at the Australian Centre for Ancient DNA in Adelaide.


and proper social behaviours among their members based on needs, motivations, and choices. The undoubted interaction of the cores constructs the primitive communities, which, in its turn, means the practice of more complex social behaviours based on the same elements.

For the simple fact that this happened among agents endowed with sufficient cognitive capacity, all these processes meant diversified practices of individual and collective choices. In other terms, they contained moral tenets and behaviours.

Besides this social organization, several other cultural elements are expressive regarding the individuals' psychological, emotional, and behavioural structures.

We may exemplify with the consciousness of life and death, the endless metaphysical human question, which appears with determinant cultural traces in the Paleolithic:

Since the Middle Palaeolithic ca.120,000 BP, burials of children, young women, and men found at caves in Europe (France) and Asia (Palestine), suggest bonds of relationship and social behaviour. These are the first indications of respect and faith to life after death and are mental expressions of Neanderthal man. The dead were also buried in caves, rock shelters, and ditches regardless of their sex. The burials are accompanied by burial offerings from the social group, such as tools, animal horns, and flowers. In many cases, the face or the body of the dead was adorned with ochre, "the gold" of the Paleolithic. Similar habits have come to light at numerous human burials of Homo sapiens
sapiens (modern man), which date to the Upper Paleolithic (35,000-11,000 BP).

Countless evidence of this social behaviour related to the dualism of life-death is expressed in practices and rituals in the period. Only cognitive and moral beings are able to formulate, interpret, symbolize, and express this metaphysical dilemma. Under any circumstance, life and death are moral questions.

Christopher Bohem enlightens the evidence of the consciousness of the value of life, one of the most significant moral tenets in the Paleolithic societies:

Prehistorically, killing group members was morally condemned, for the belief that “thou shalt not kill” long preceded the writing of the Bible. However, this ancient and universal condemnation was subject to important exceptions. Mercy killing was tolerated, as was infanticide as a form of birth control, while capital punishment was legitimate as a group strategy to cope with extreme, intolerable, and otherwise inescapable acts by social deviants. Such killings were the result of community intentions, and to work, they had to be strongly approved - or at least be morally countenanced - by the entire group. [...] This means that in our small and usually nomadic prehistoric hunting groups, for at least the past several thousand generations, we have been acting as judgmental, self-protective moral communities-groups that can form a consensus.


and moralistically agree to take extreme measures whenever a social problem becomes bad enough. [...] With both capital punishment and altruism, patterns of sophisticated choice have been working consistently over evolutionary time to create these parallel effects in our genome. 114

Beyond the social organization, arts play an essential role in any cultural context and outline human perception and cognition in a determined time-space situation. Despite the universality of the aesthetic sensation, as Kant sustained, its' material content is strongly cultural-relative.

The diversified Paleolithic art reveals many features of the individual and social life at those times and grounds the modern notions on aesthetic universality. The straight relations and reciprocal influence between arts and morals are widely known. 115

In the form of diagonal etchings made with a shark's tooth, Claims of artistic activity were made in 2014 relating to a 500,000-year-old fossil of a clam found in Java in the 1890s associated with Homo erectus. 116


We can estimate the oldest known drawing by human hands to be 73,000 years old.117

Findings from Paleolithic archaeology sites suggest that prehistoric people used carving and piercing tools to make instruments and create music for communication and amusement. Archaeologists have found Paleolithic flutes carved from bones in which lateral holes are pierced. The Divje Babe flute, carved from a cave bear, is thought to be at least 40,000 years old.118

The dance was an artistic manifestation, as well. Anthropologists refer to their practice as inspired by nature’s movements (animals, wind, waves, and other elements) and used in ceremonies, rituals, and day-by-day life, expressing feelings, prayers, emotions, and happenings.

Palaeolithic art remains very few, but its existence in those so remote times is a consistent demonstration of the ancient cognitive and human emotional skills.

Ambrose(118) says, “Paleolithic art, as well as the art of other hunter-gatherer cultures throughout history, seems to prove that art exists across all human societies.”

In modern societies, Paleolithic art exposed a complex semiotic content involving the empiric experience, the environmental references and interpretations, the human interaction, and the projective imaginary. Mithen’s researches arrived at this evidence:

118 Massey, Reginald, and Massey, Jamila. The Music of India - Google Books
This art was part of modern human ecological adaptation to their environment. The art functioned to extend human memory, to hold concepts that are difficult for minds to grasp, and to instigate creative thinking about the solution of environmental and social problems.\[119\]

Donald considers such universality from the standpoint of its causation:

There is no reason to think that visual art in the Upper Paleolithic came from a different creative source than it does today. The human brain is the biological constraint on, and the ultimate source of creativity. Culture provides the specific semantic fields that determine meaning. Thus, we cannot expect that the inspiration for Upper Paleolithic parietal art was somehow derived outside of the social-cognitive networks that have shaped its modern equivalents.\[120\]

The third and last element of the “CCC Triangle” is “Cooperation.”

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We have two ways to analyze this element: the affirmative and the contrary, or the “inclusion-exclusion” logic reasoning.

Affirmatively (inclusion), a general finding dismisses specific evidence and studies: the Paleolithic man survived and evolved continuously for one hundred and fifty millennia, based on small and organized interactive groups. They exchanged resources as artefacts, technology, knowledge, experience, and beliefs under the most aggressive and inhospitable environmental conditions of nomad life, needy of resources and full of threats. Unquestionably, this epic route would not be possible without cooperation.

Our study does not matter how cooperation happened and which detailed evidence we have about these specific forms or proceedings. Cooperation in the Paleolithic, from this affirmative angle, is just a clear logical inference supported by the historical argument.

From the negative side (exclusion), we should ask about the opposite of cooperation to confirm (or deny) the positive way's conclusions. The opposite of cooperation means competition, and here, once more, Pedersen can help us:

The Polar Eskimos and the Kalahari Ju/wasi did not have competition. They assiduously avoided it. Our simple hunter-gatherer ancestors lived the same with perfect social equanimity for 150,000 years.

We justify competition as building physical and mental skills, but our early ancestors simply
practised a skill until it was sufficiently acquired:- they did not need an opponent to beat.121

Pedersen’s argument gets more reliable in the extension that he considers war as the ultimate competition. Indeed, there is no research indicating the remains of armed conflicts or wars in the Paleolithic.

Conclusively, the exclusive logical way confirms the inclusive one, and we may coherently and soundly affirm that the presence of cooperation is evidence of the Paleolithic societies.

3. The Context of the Imaginary and the Divine

The imaginary is the realm of human free will. This assertion usually provokes a repugnance reaction or an angry grumble among radical determinists of any sect.

We will not discuss these preformatted theoretical ideas that do not enlighten any discussion and whose efforts to demonstrate that human knowledge and consciousness do not exist to the useless belief of sterility of intelligence.

We may learn from the neuroscientist Peter Ulrich Tse that what we said has scientific ground:

We will see that outcomes that arise from internal operations in working memory that afford imagination and deliberations about the future, can alter probabilities of future courses of action. I will argue that evolution has

instantiated these conditions necessary for Libertarian Free Will in our brains. Indeed, evolution has afforded us two kinds of Libertarian Free Will, one that we share with other animals, namely, the ability to weigh and select from among internally simulated options, and the other, unique to humans, namely, the capacity to imagine and then set about becoming of a new kind of chooser in the future.122

The presence and expression of the imaginary in a society is a cultural demonstration of cognitive ability, social consciousness, aesthetic sensibility, free will, and creativity among their individuals. The imaginary is a material ingredient in the construction of moral behaviour. The projection of current reality in an imaginary future and the perception of its consequences is a mechanism of intelligent choice and certainly is a moral mechanism. Without this projection, moral behaviour, a choosing exercise, would be a simple random occurrence.

The presence of the imaginary and their several expressions is one of the Paleolithic societies' relevant features. The semiotic structure of these expressions and the evolutionary ability to deal with symbols have been visible since the early Paleolithic.

Researches indicate that the evolution of arts during this period is visible in the visual arts and ritual dances, and other aesthetic expressions that surpassed the known world’s representation. Art became conceptual when it

122 Tse, Peter Ulrich in the course Libertarian Free will – Neuroscientific and Philosophical Evidence – at Dartmouth College.
reached the level of expression of abstractions, such as emotions and imaginary elements, and configured the practice of “art for the sake of art.”

Eduardo Palacio-Pérez and Aitor Ruiz Redondo focused on the content of such expressions of the imaginary:

In the course of research currently being carried out at Santimamine (Bizkaia, Spain) (González Sainz & Idarraga 2010) and Altxerri (Gipuzkoa, Spain) a series of zoomorphic figures have been identified (four in total between the two sites) that represent creatures that do not exist in nature (Figure 1). They are examples of the so-called ‘imaginary creatures,’ unreal or fantastic beings that appear in Paleolithic art ensembles. Despite their rarity—fewer than 50 are known in Paleolithic parietal art—they have been the subject of debate and controversy since the first of them were discovered.123

In the same course, the human experience in those times brought the perception of the Divine’s realm and, in the face of death’s comprehension, the collective and projective beliefs on a “post-mortem” life. Here religion starts.

Focusing on this context, we can understand that both rituals and religion are different human behaviour expressions of the same phenomenon: the assumption of

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123 Palacio-Pérez, Eduardo and Redondo, Aitor Ruiz - Imaginary creatures in Palaeolithic art: prehistoric dreams or prehistorians' dreams? DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003598X00050341 Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2015

the Divine's existence and the forms of relation and communication with the deity.

Credible and coherent evidence, brought by archaeology and anthropology, indicates this metaphysical human feeling and perception since the mid-Paleolithic Period. Religion aggregates the spiritual and psychological contents, systems, and semiotic elements defining the relation of human-divinity. Rituals are stereotypical corporal and psychological behaviours expressing elements of religion.

Hervey C. Peoples, Pavel Duda, and Frank W. Marlowe describe the characteristics of this process:

We reconstruct ancestral character states using a time-calibrated supertree based on published phylogenetic trees and linguistic classification and then test for correlated evolution between the characters and the direction of cultural change. Results indicate that the oldest trait of religion, present in the most recent common ancestor of present-day hunter-gatherers, was animism, in agreement with long-standing beliefs about the fundamental role of this trait. Belief in an afterlife emerged, followed by shamanism and ancestor worship. Ancestor spirits or high gods who were active in human affairs were absent in early humans, suggesting a deep history for the egalitarian nature of hunter-gatherer societies.124

The individual and collective imaginary, the ability to interpret nature as an expression of the divine, represent it with semiotic elements, and overpass the unknown by constructing myths, legends, and figurative abstractions were the ingredients of the imaginary/divine context.

From this sophisticated human experience came aesthetic sensibility, metaphysical assumptions, and religious beliefs. Continuously they evolved into specific moral and social behaviours incorporated into the collective unconscious.

In Jungian terms,

The primitive mentality does not invent myths; it experiences them. Myths are original revelations of the preconscious psyche, involuntary statements about unconscious psychic happenings, and anything but allegories of physical processes. Such allegories would be an idle amusement for an unscientific intellect. Myths, on the contrary, have a vital meaning. Not merely do they represent, they are the psychic life of the primitive tribe, which immediately falls to pieces and decays when it loses its mythological heritage, like a man who has lost his soul. A tribe’s mythology is its living religion, “whose loss is always and everywhere, even among the civilized, a moral catastrophe.

Nevertheless, religion is a vital link with psychic processes independent of and beyond consciousness in the dark hinterland of the psyche. Many of these unconscious processes may be indirectly occasioned by consciousness but never by conscious choice. Others appear to arise spontaneously, that is to say, from no
discernible or demonstrable conscious cause.125
CHAPTER VII
RECOMPOSING A PREHISTORIC SYSTEM OF MORALS

If we contemplate the three contexts of the Paleolithic societies we explored (the Human, the Imaginary, and the Divine), some question arises. The most important ones are: “What made these contexts possible?” “Which are the 'sine qua non' conditions of this process?”

Among diverse and equally correct explanations, one becomes the centre of our study: a moral behaviour system was ever-present in human social evolution. Analyzing the structure of our “CCC Triangle” model, we can immediately understand that nothing contained in the evidence we collected would exist in the absence of moral behaviour. Should we eliminate such a moral system in any human evolution phase, the results would change dramatically. It is relatively simple to build several experimental social and anthropological models based on the absence of morals since the Paleolithic. Indeed, none of them will conduct the same results demonstrated by Human History.

We have been looking for, since the beginning of this work, this ball. We could not see it because the coloured photo of the soccer match did not show it. However, we knew beforehand it was there because it is an indispensable element for a soccer match. Denying its presence would mean that what we saw in the photo could be a party, or a theatrical play, or anything else rather than a soccer match.
All this evidence brought by different sources is the foundation of our inferences, and going through the philosophical and scientific research, theories, and debates, we finally found the justification of our reasoning.

From our three contexts, we may easily extract several moral tenets existing in the Paleolithic, represented and expressed through social behaviours, being possible to summarize them as follows:

The notion of life and death.

The perception of the value of human life and the need to preserve it.

The necessity of the best relation between the individual and the social life to make survival possible.

The need for cooperative behaviours and congregational efforts to this end.

The definition of extreme situations is where social survival prevails over individual existence (capital punishment, euthanasia, etc.).

Altruism instead of egoism.

Equality and absence of discrimination.

Absence of any social domination.

The value of free will and the importance of choices.

Aggregation and exchange instead of competition and aggression.

The significance of the domestic core and its stability.

The responsibility for reproduction and care for the offspring,
The expression of feelings, ideas, and emotions by social means like arts.

The conscious dilemma about death and life after death.

The perception of the Divine, the efforts to understand it, and acceptance of its nature.

A non-destructive relation with the environment.

Flexibility for adaptation.

We mean for Paleolithic Moral System the social and behavioural model we can construct with all these tenets from the human experience's empirical observation. In no way do we adopt any deontological approach in these behaviours and understand them as internal propositional features of the societies involved, acquired by experience, and aggregated to the human genome as elements of the collective unconscious. They are the moral archetypes, the object of this paper.

For this reason, we step aside from any attempt to interpret these archetypes as a moral code. Moral codes are meaningless to philosophical thinking. They are modern formal deontological linguistic expressions attempting to convert into objective social commandments some specific moral tenets, intentionally chosen according to society's circumstances in a particular time-space context. They are formal teleological semantic expressions. Therefore, the emergence of a moral system from the study of a moral code is not possible. Moral systems shelter behaviours rather than textual declarations, and they may be compared with other systems. Moral codes cannot be compared to anything except to themselves.
CHAPTER VIII
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PALEOLITHIC MORAL SYSTEM AND MODERN SOCIETY

The tenets in the Paleolithic moral system traveled for uncountable millennia engraved in the human genome up to the present day. They have never changed, nor has our nature forgotten them. For multiple reasons, they have not been represented in social behaviour as a moral system in many times and places or have not been adopted by social groups for some elapses of time. However, they remain there in their integrity, ever and ever.

There is only one hypothetical possibility of eliminating the Paleolithic moral system from our collective unconscious: the construction of human society much more efficient as an evolutionary structure than the hunter-gatherer societies, based on entirely different moral behaviours, and able to be more successful than those, from all standpoints.

This hypothetical society should be submitted to the natural dialectic processes of survival, evolution, and stability of humankind for many millennia to substitute the content of our existing collective unconscious gradually. However, this would be a different world and a different species.
Indeed, any effective moral system is adaptable to cultural, technological, biological, and environmental changes. Adaptability is one of the crucial tenets we mentioned. For this reason, we have argued that our original moral foundations are somehow relative to time-space contexts.

When structural changes in the social fabric happened with the first agricultural settlements and urban organizations, at the end of the upper Paleolithic and beginning of the Mesolithic period, one of the most critical human behavioural adaptation processes took place. Even under the influence of these extreme changes in the social model, the Paleolithic moral tenets persisted with flexibility and adaptability. Indeed, researchers believe that the social models resulting from the transformation of the hunter-gatherer society into the territorial life arising from the first settlements did not necessarily contain any trace or mechanism of moral behaviour disruption.

The economic model of the early Mesolithic society was perfectly compatible with the evolutionary properties and moral foundations of our Paleolithic ancestors, as Vernon L. Smith explains:

> Prehistoric man developed institutions that conditioned his use of resources. Property rights evolved as an essential part of man's institutional environment as a result of the changing constraints of the natural and technological environment. These property rights could evolve in the absence of a centralized state because they depended on reciprocity, mutual dependence, and state-like forms of control achieved through broadened kinship ties, customs, and culture. While early property rights were not always private or
transferable, they did constrain individual and group behaviour by limiting access to scarce resources. In this sense, the successful evolution of humankind is closely related to the customs and culture that shaped prehistoric property rights.126

When we turn our attention to modern society, so distant from the hunter-gatherer life in terms of chronology, technology, culture, and behaviour, at first glance, we may believe that both are entirely different realities. This perception is as simplistic as false. On the one hand, the chronological difference of approximately 12,000 years is irrelevant in evolutionary and genetic terms when compared with the 150,000 years of behavioural stability of the Paleolithic. On the other hand, as far as moral behaviour is concerned, we can find in any period of modern human life the persistence of the same basic prehistoric moral tenets expressed as social behaviours or as “desiderata.”

We should ever consider social and cultural desiderata to analyze adaptive moral processes because they transport the same ethical content as the behaviour does. Behaviour is an active practice; social and cultural desiderata are the persistent essence of human cognition about behaving. Our cultural desiderata's semiotic content and structure are complex and aggregate to our collective unconscious the same way that the moral


behavioural tenets are. Both are archetypal universal elements, and we can find in both of them the traces and roots of our archaic morality. Consequently, we admit that human morality is universal, that its content is composed of archetypes and expressed through behaviours and desiderata.

The Attachment Theory considers the value of these semiotic contents in social adaptation, as Hinde exposes:

Attachment theory is based in part on biological considerations concerned with the selective forces that probably acted in our environment of evolutionary adaptedness. This functional approach poses questions seldom addressed by developmentalists – for instance, why are humans so constructed that particular childhood experiences have particular outcomes? Today much behaviour is directed towards goals other than the maximization of inclusive fitness. This fact poses a number of questions about the relations between biological and cultural desiderata and the methods for assessing attachment. Finally, the relations of biological and cultural desiderata to the individual desideratum of psychological well-being are considered.127

Thus, we argue that the day by day of moral behaviours in modern society, aggregating elements of many

different time-space situations, do not change its prehistoric foundations and is limited to necessary adaptations of the society experiencing new technologies, new scientific knowledge, many religious, economic, and political evolitional influences, cultural acquisitions and losses. These changes are superficial and generally related to limited and circumstantial features of moral behaviour.

We could not identify in our research any adaptive and stable moral behaviour introduced by modern humans which could be able to change or eliminate any of the tenets we listed above.

However, we should consider that modern society, with its continuous and progressive complexity, frequently deviates behaviourally to counter evolutionary situations by adopting practices and concepts contravening our original moral tenets. These contraventions are not adaptive changes nor the relative cultural evolution of the moral system. They are just contraventions, behaviours offending the foundations of human morality, a counter-evolutionary context of a pathological social state.

In many places, modern humans attempt to impose egoism, violence, competition, domination, discrimination, possession, war, cruelty, and despair. They even attempt to model an unfeasible and gammy society. All these attempts, meaning counter-evolutionary behaviours, prevail for a very short historical period, after which course the foundations of human morality outcrop from our collective unconscious, where they live for uncountable millennia.

Indeed, in a generalized context, we observed that these deflections do not have the capacitance to become aggregate by the collective unconscious just because they correspond to social behaviours in the benefit of
certain groups to the detriment of others, rather than an evolutionary element to be incorporated to the human genome.

In many cases, the social process defeats cultural instruments in some of these deflections. This reaction is the primary content of what we call “counter cultures,” meaning they are the social response against a dominant culture sheltering counter-evolutionary moral practices. In some other cases, the reaction could be more complicated than counter-cultural actions, but they are equally inevitable because the evolutionary process is determinant.

Very curiously, in popular culture, some changes made in the modern moral systems are taken into account as an evolutionary event, a developmental episode, or a substantial modernization of social behaviour when, in fact, they are just the restoration of a primitive moral tenet after the failure of systematic attempts to offend or denying it.

I offer two contemporary contexts: slavery and sexuality.

When the modern world abolished the last traces of slavery in North and South America, the fact was celebrated as a significant social advance, welcome modernity arriving from the last stages of human evolution. This interpretation is entirely wrong. Slavery was unknown by the Paleolithic societies and obviously contravened the Paleolithic moral system’s structure engraved in our genes, which was based on equality and collaboration.

Slavery was introduced by modern man and corresponded to the denial of several ancestral moral behaviours. This practice failed in its purposes and became the opposite of modernity and evolution, up to
the point where its banishment became a condition to the continuity of the human social experience. This banishment did not represent modern humans' advances but returned to our original moral system after many disasters caused by its infringement.

The same applies to the “sexual revolution” of the 60s’, the feminist movements since the beginning of the 20th Century, and the LGTBI movements and conquerers. The results of these movements considered the “evolution of the new moral” are, in fact, the “return to the ancient moral system” from 150,000 years ago because sexuality and gender options were not properly a problem in Paleolithic society. These themes became a modern moral problem because of modern discrimination and oppression, mostly arriving from contemporary religious, political, and economic actions.

These movements against sexual behavioural discrimination succeeded in a very short elapse of time just because discrimination and oppression are not a part of our genome as moral behaviours, being its abolishment acceptable by society as a whole.

All severe denial or offence to our original moral system introduced by modern humans resulted from violence, pain, misery, hate, inequality, ugliness, and death. These offences were the opposite of evolution, and for these reasons, they did not succeed as a behavioural model and never have been accepted as a cultural identity.

Therefore, we claim that modern civilization's behavioural and social-economic problems are a dialectic confrontation between counter-evolutionary models and the human genetic moral foundations. If the theorists of the “Game Theory” (as the brilliant John Maynard Smith) are right, and if the theory is somehow applicable to moral processes of decision, for sure, the modern players are
doing the wrong play. The immediate pay-off of some individuals and groups could be advantageous in a short time, but the table on which they play the game is under severe risk.

Philosophy should play a relevant role in understanding human social nature and behaviour in this context. Unfortunately, we cannot say that this is true.

From ancient Greece to the present day, all the Social and Political Philosophy is just a collection of conflictive, superficial, and useless essays on the severe problems arising from our genetic moral system's deviations. Philosophy thinking faces these severe problems passively, understanding them as a contextual circumstance of the modern human, which should be accepted as reality and somehow justified and organized.

Alongside its history, Political Philosophy and its theorists, in one or other ways: (i) justified or ignored slavery and misery, (ii) justified inequality, stimulated unlimited competition and possession, (iii) supposed imaginary social contracts supporting and regulating exclusion, domination, and injustice, (iv) justified or silently assisted the stupidity of war, violence and domination, genocide, torture and human submission for religious, political and economic reasons, (v) Accepted and stimulated colonialism in the benefit of dominant societies, (vii) proposed that the value of human existence could be calculated by an equation of the relations cost-benefit, (viii) proposed violent conflicts of classes and a totalitarian state, eliminating liberty and free will, under the discourse of elimination of inequality, (ix) disseminated the belief that magic and invisible hand would take care of sculpting social justice, (x) turned its attention away from the extreme misery and human suffering.
Western Social and Political Philosophy has always been passive and sterile spectators of the human tragedy and did not yet understand, clearly and simply, the essence of all universal thinking: the meaning of humanity and the intrinsic cosmologic value of life.

There is no Philosophy without Cosmology. Without cosmological foundations, “Philosophy is dead.” 128

In this confrontation between evolution, egoism, and blindness, for sure, evolution will prevail, even though this could mean the extinction of our species, once evolution is a cosmologic process rather than a human phenomenon, and will prosecute with or without humans. On the other hand, Homo sapiens will not survive without biological and social adaptation to the evolutionary process.

We want to close this work by repeating the same quotation used on the first page:

“Evolution is a process that involves blind variation and selective retention.” 129

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