HAN D OVER FIST: THE FAILURE OF
STOIC RHET ORIC

Students of Stoic philosophy, especially of Stoic ethics, have a lot to swallow. Virtues and emotions are bodies; virtue is the only good, and constitutes happiness, while vice is the only evil; emotions are judgements (in Chrysippus' Stoa); all sins are equal; and everyone bar the sage is mad, bad and dangerous to know. Non-Stoics in antiquity seem for the most part to find these doctrines as bizarre as we do. Their own philosophical or ideological perspectives, and the criticisms of the Stoa to which these gave rise, are no less open to criticism than are the paradoxes and puzzles under attack – but they may be, often are, better documented, less provocatively attention-begging, or simply more familiar. Even disputes within the Stoa can be obscured or distorted by modern prejudices. Posidonius rejected Chrysippus’ theory of a unitary soul, one rational through and through, on the grounds that such a theory could not satisfactorily account for the genesis of bad – excessive and irrational – emotions, the πάθη (Galen, PHP 2.246.36ff., 314.15ff. De Lacy).¹ Posidonius’ own Platonising, tripartite soul feels more familiar to us because the Republic tends to be a set text rather more often than do the fragments of Chrysippus’ de anima; and the balance in Plato’s favour is unlikely to change. When Posidonius wrote, on the other hand, the Chrysippian soul was school orthodoxy, and Platonism the latest thing in radical chic.

There was one division of Stoic philosophical doctrine in which the best part of the educated Hellenistic and Roman world had the advantage of familiarity to lend support to its contempt, one which we rarely touch, and would hardly think of as part of philosophy at all: rhetoric. If ancient philosophers do turn in that direction, it is philosophy’s quarrel with rhetoric which is most likely to take their fancy. Yet rhetoric provided what might be called the standard higher education in the ancient world, for those who could afford it, from about the 4th century B.C.² Whole areas of ancient rhetorical teaching (what types of oration there are, what should go into each of the different parts of a forensic speech, theories of style³ and of types of

¹ The idea that emotions are judgements may at first glance seem less surprising to a modern than to an ancient philosopher: but crucial issues in Chrysippus’ moral psychology – his conception of reason, his grounds for justifying moral responsibility, his reasons for believing the extirpation of the passions to be a good thing – are inescapably Stoic.


³ Style has been by far the most long-lived of all these rhetorical topics, of course. What distinguishes the rhetorical handling of style, however, are its continuing associations with persuasion and with the formal, institutionalised contexts in which it was displayed, associations which remained part of the method of teaching composition even beyond the end of antiquity. On the later history of rhetoric, see G. A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (London, 1980).
The Failure of Stoic Rhetoric

The best way of handling evidence extracted under torture, what to do with one's hands when declaiming, and many other topics thrashed out or limply fondled by Aristotle, Hermagoras, Cicero, Quintilian, and their epigones) now seem as strange to us as Stoic stylics, which will be the central concern of this paper, seemed to the ancient rhetorical establishment. In a number of ways Stoic rhetorical teaching was, as we will see later, barely distinguishable from its professional counterparts. Style – an area in which the Stoa reputedly achieved almost unqualified failure – was not one of them. But it is very difficult to appreciate today how unorthodox Stoic pronouncements on style once seemed to professional orators and rhetoricians precisely because we have no personal experience of the traditional rhetorical precepts challenged by the Stoics, while there are mere references to a tiny handful of major orators, all Roman, who actually 'spoke Stoic'. This dearth of evidence – familiar enough to historians of the Stoa – happily turns out far less an obstacle to reconstructing at least the broad outlines of Stoic rhetorical style than might at first be feared.

A brief sketch of conventional teaching on style in the rhetorical schools may be helpful. Style (λέξις, φάσις, elocutio, dictio) traditionally constitutes one of the five areas of oratorical expertise. (The others are: εὐρέσεις, inventio, finding out what is to be said; τάξις, ordo, arranging such material; memory; and delivery.) Different qualities of style are determined by choice of vocabulary, by the structure and rhythm of sentences and of their parts and groupings, and by the use of the standard ornaments described in all later textbooks, figures and tropes. The theoretical framework employed for critical and didactic purposes alike (and the normative, paedagogic slant of much of ancient stylics can hardly be overlooked) had, roughly speaking, two main props, the 'virtues and vices' (δέσμευμα καὶ κακίας) of style, and the 'types' or 'characters' of style (the χαρακτήρια τοῦ λόγου or genera dicendi), though the two tended to merge with time. The origin and development of the genera dicendi are complex and problematic, but, revealingly, the fundamental assumption on which this mode of classification rests – that different audiences, different speakers, in short different circumstances, demand not only different objects but also different (because all equally appropriate) styles of discourse – appears to have no place in Stoic stylics.

Another approach, though one often complementary to the first, was for the critic to isolate what he saw as the excellences and defects of an author's style, and for the

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4 The stasis (or status) of a case, roughly speaking, is the 'issue' on which it turns, the point which if decided will determine the outcome of the whole case. Defining stasis and isolating its intricate subdivisions are major topics in the handbooks. Quintilian 3.6 is the clearest ancient treatment of this tricky subject. See also R. Volkmann (cited n. 2), pp. 38–92; S. F. Bonner, Education (cited n. 2), pp. 296ff.; D. A. Russell, Greek Declamation (Cambridge, 1983), ch. 3.

5 Useful introductions to the teaching of style in antiquity can be found in all the texts cited in n. 2.; see also D. A. Russell, Criticism in Antiquity (London, 1981), esp. chs. 8, 9.

6 See Russell, op. cit. n. 5, pp. 136ff., on this tendency.

7 The chief bones of contention have been: Theophrastus’ contribution to this area of stylistic theory, and the origins and ramifications of its commonest variant, the doctrine of the ‘three styles’ (viz. the grand, the plain, and the smooth or middle style), which was itself hotly debated; e.g. ad Her. 4.11ff.; Cicero, de or. 3.199, cf. 210ff., where different styles are discussed under the rubric of the virtue of appropriateness, and associated with different sorts of discourse; orator 20ff.; Quintilian 12.10.58ff.). Especially useful modern studies are: G. A. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion (cited n. 2), pp. 278ff.; Russell, Criticism (cited n. 5), ch. 9; D. Innes, ‘Theophrastus and the Theory of Style’, in Theophrastus of Eresus: On His Life and Works, ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, vol. 2, 1985), at 251ff., esp. 260ff.
teacher to attempt to inculcate in his pupils whatever 'virtues’ were considered appropriate to, say, different divisions of a speech, or to the different sorts of oration (forensic, deliberative, and epideictic/encomastic/panegyric), and to eliminate the associated 'vices’. For example, the narrative of a forensic speech, in which a speaker presents his version of the events surrounding the case, had conventionally to be clear, concise and plausible (so for example Quintilian, *inst. orat.* 4.2.31; Cicero, *orator* 122, *part. orat.* 32, where *suavitas* is added). The standard list of virtues comprises: purity (Hellenism or Latinity), clarity, appropriateness, and ornament (e.g. *ad Her.* 4.17ff.; Cicero, *de or.* 3.37ff.; Quintilian 8.1.1ff.), but others are invoked as required: so with brevity and plausibility in the case of narrative. The notion of an (or the) ἀπεταί of discourse makes it first known appearance in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (3.2.1404b1ff.). His unitary conception seems to have been analysed by Theophrastus into what became the four standard ἀπεται, which were appropriated, and often expanded or adapted, by just about all later writers on style, including, probably, the Stoics. But in the use it made of the ἀπεται τοῦ λόγου the early Stoa, as we will see, overlooked or rejected other, related Peripatetic stylistic precepts, as well as contemporary professional orthodoxy, and appears to have reverted in part to an even earlier model of rhetorical discourse.

In two of the three traditional branches of rhetoric, the forensic or judicial and the deliberative, the orator did not exercise his stylistic abilities purely for the delight of his audience: only the third, epideictic, was principally directed, as Quintilian remarks, 'ad popularem...delectationem' 2.10.11; cf. 8.3.11–14, and Cicero, *orator* 65, ‘nee tam persuadere quam delectare’).8 The aesthetic appeal of a speaker’s language served only to further his chief purpose: to persuade them to a particular end (an acquittal or a guilty verdict, or the adoption of whatever course of action or way of thinking was advocated by the speaker). ‘Those well-worn precepts, common to all’ which Crassus learned in his youth, declare ‘the orator’s first task to be to speak in a way that is suited to persuade’ (*de or.* 1.137–8). The traditional orator’s goal, persuasion, dominates a wide variety of definitions of the function (*ἐργον, officium*) or end (*τέλος, finis*) of oratory or the orator: from Plato’s ‘manufacturer of persuasion’ (*Gorgias* 453a), through Aristotle’s ‘the power of discovering in each case all possible material of persuasion’ (*Rh.* 1.2.1355b25–6), Hermagoras ‘treating the proposed political question as persuasively as possible’ (τὸ τεθνέον πολιτικόν γάρ τοις διαπειθεται κατὰ τὸ εὖδεχόμενον πειστικός) (*Sextus*, M. 2.62), and Cicero’s youthful ‘persuadere dictione’ (*de inv.* 1.6) to Capella’s (5.439, p. 152.10f. *Willis*) ‘persuadere id, quod est propositum, dictione.’

To achieve his goal a speaker would appeal to his audience’s prejudices, vested interests, emotional ties, loyalties, sense of humour, common sense, and aesthetic sensibilities, as well as to its powers of reason, to its moral beliefs, and, of course, to the law: hence the standard observation that the orator has to instruct, please, and move his audience (Cicero, *orator* 69; Quintilian 3.5.2, cf. 5.pr.1). Different parts of an oration could be assigned these different purposes (e.g. Cicero, *part. orat.* 4;
Quintilian, 8.pr.7), and Cicero at least associated them systematically with the stylistic trichotomy – grand, plain, and smooth or middle – which was perhaps the commonest variant of the doctrine of the genera dicendi (orator 69). The key is appropriateness: matter must find its proper expression, and consideration has also to be given to the (ostensible) character of the speaker, his client,9 and his audience, indeed to all the circumstances of the case (Cicero, orator 70, 100–101, 123, de or. 3.210–12; Quintilian 8.3.11–14). But conventional rhetorical wisdom stressed the often crucial rôle of appeals to the emotions. Quintilian puts it succinctly: 'And indeed this briefest of precepts can be given to both parties [sc., to a case] alike: that the orator should place before his eyes every strong point in his case, and when he has seen what in the facts of the matter is, or could seem, invidious, pleasing, hated, pitiful, he will say the things he would be most moved by were he the judge' (6.1.11; cf. de or. 2.185ff.).

The importance, and the difficulty, of using language in the way precisely calculated to have the desired effect on an audience, was not underestimated, at least by the best teachers. Quintilian reminds his readers that this is the 'partem operis, ut inter omnes oratores convenit, difficillimam' (8.pr.13). He also usefully sums up the advantages earned by an ornate style. It is not enough to speak clearly and correctly, for that is rather to lack faults than achieve excellence; to win popular approval, and not merely the approbation of the better sort, the speaker must be able to call on the other qualities of style: 'cultu vero atque ornatu se quoque commendat ipse qui dictit et in ceteris iudicium doctorum, in hoc vero etiam popularem laudem petit, nec fortibus modo, sed etiam fulgentibus armis proeliatur' (8.3.2.). Brilliant successes are won by brilliance of style, sweeping the audience literally off its feet (4; cf. Cicero, de or. 3.53). Further, rhetorical ornament helps one's cause: 'nam, qui libenter audiant et magis attendunt et facilius credunt, plerumque ipsa delectatione capiuntur, nonnumquam admiratione auferuntur' (5). Cicero's Crassus stresses the importance of rhetorical amplification ('amplificare rem ornando') for making what is being said seem trustworthy ('ad fidem orationis faciendam'), whether the speaker is explaining something or rousing the emotions – particularly the latter (de or. 3.104–5). It is one of Cicero's favourite themes (e.g. de or. 3.96ff.), echoed wholeheartedly by Quintilian (8.pr.18ff.), that too much time and effort were expended by contemporary teachers and students of rhetoric on empty tricks of style; and both Cicero (e.g. de or. 3.54–5, 74ff.) and Quintilian (1.pr.9, 12.1.ff.) regard as central to their task the description of an educational programme for a modern version of the model of Roman oratory which was both described and shaped by the elder Cato, the vir bonus dicendi peritus.10 But their disapproval only highlights how far style had come to occupy central stage in the teaching of oratory.

9 In Rome representation by a 'professional' orator was far more common than under classical Greek law; see for example K. J. Dover, Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1968), chs. 8, 9. (I put 'professional' in quotation marks because in law no fees could be received.) The Greek logographos has thus to be able to write himself into another's character. But writing 'in character' was no less important for the Roman orator, who needed to put across to his audience both the (moral) character he wished to project, and the character he wished his client to seem to possess; and there was also the task of introducing one's opponents, as well as fictitious or historical persons. The motive, of course, was to appear as plausible as possible. On Roman procedure, see Kennedy, Art of Rhetoric (cited n. 2), pp. 8ff.

10 This definition of the orator, attributed to Cato the Elder by Seneca the Elder (contr. 1.pr.9), may perhaps suggest Stoic influence: but its totemic rôle may be another, small illustration of the happy coincidence between (some of) the principal tenets of Stoic ethics, and Roman ideology as developed in the face of Greek culture.
The texts I have been calling on all date from the last century of the Republic and the first of the Empire; but it is clear that the standard ingredients of the rhetorical curriculum had already been established by Hellenistic professionals by the time Cicero and the author of the *ad Herennium* came to the study of the subject early in the 1st century B.C. Reliable information about precisely when and how that curriculum was established is in short supply: that is, information from the period between, on the one hand, Aristotle and the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, the oldest extant example of the rhetorical school text, and, on the other, Philodemus, and the earliest surviving contributions to the Roman rhetorical tradition: evidence from precisely the period that interests the scholar of early Stoicism most closely. Almost everything which was written during the formative period of Stoic rhetorical theory (as well as a good deal of what Epicureans and Peripatetics of the period may have had to say on the subject) has vanished without trace. Recourse must be had, in the first instance, to Diogenes Laertius’ invaluable, if flawed, account of Stoic philosophy, and then, for the most part, to Cicero’s peculiarly rhetorical-cum-philosophical treatises.

Diogenes reports that one of the subdivisions of the Stoic science (*ἐπιστήμη*) of rhetoric, is something called *φάρασ*, which looks to be no more than the Stoic counterpart to the now familiar rhetorical topic, ‘expression’ or ‘style’. The central Stoic teaching on style is not, however, to be found in this scrappy and unsatisfactory *précis* of Stoic rhetorical lore. It is found instead in the *φωνή* or *σημαίνοντα* part of dialectic, at Diogenes 7.59, that is, in the part of dialectic that deals with language as signifier rather than with the different kinds of *σημαίνωμενα* or *λέκτα*, which are what language signifies (cf.7.43, 55, 63). Dialectic and rhetoric are the two standard components of what the Stoas called *τὸ λογικόν*, the ‘logical’ part of philosophical exposition (41). Stoic stylistics, as reported by Diogenes, is a version of the doctrine of the virtues or excellences, the *ἀρέται*, of *λόγος*; here, correctness, clarity, conciseness, appropriateness, ornament. The basic framework is unsurprising, though the details contain some fascinating novelties. What is remarkable is that, according to Diogenes 7.56, *λόγος* is simply *φωνή* *σημαντική* ἀπὸ διανοιας ἐκπεμπομένη, ‘significant vocal sound emitted by the mind’ or (57) ‘significant *λέξις*’, where *λέξις* is articulate *φωνή*.11 What seem to be an offer are criteria for using language successfully, regardless of what one wants to say or what format it is given. Different criteria for poetry might reasonably be expected, and Posidonius seems to have consciously applied the term *λόγος*, at any rate in stylistic or literary-critical contexts, to prose as distinct from poetry.12 But it looks very much as though the *λόγος* in evidence at Diogenes 7.59 at least embraces any kind of prose.

11 The first definition of *λόγος* is presumably that of Diogenes of Babylion, for he is the authority cited for the definition of *λέξις* which immediately precedes it. Diogenes’ definition is slightly more sophisticated than the second (that at 7.57). His influence is perhaps confirmed by Galen: cf. *PHP* 2.130.13–15 De Lacy. That written language too comes under the scope of these definitions is shown, for example, by the fact that the Stoic ‘parts of *λόγος*’, the Stoic word-classes, are the constituents of all language, not just of significant talk.

12 According to Posidonius’ definition a poem is ‘metrical or rhythmical *λέξις* which deliberately avoids the form of *λόγος* (*τὸ λογοτέθης*)’. Language thus formally achieves poetic status by possessing rhythm or metre. Almost any rhetorician one could name stresses the vital importance of prose rhythm in oratory (e.g. Aristotle *rh.* 3.8.1408b21ff.; Cicero, *de or.* 3.173ff.; *orator* 168ff.; Quintilian 9.4.52ff.), and even Theophrastus thought polished prose at least should have rhythm (*de or.* 3.184). The main debate centred on how far oratory should reproduce the rhythms of poetry (an unorthodox view in Dionysius, *c.v.* 415–17). Lack of Stoic interest in rhythm is at least consistent with their disapproval of the figure Hyperbaton: see pp. 416. Chrysippus’ attitude to euphony fluctuates intriguingly: see p. 420.
The authorship of the classification is unknown. It may perhaps belong to Diogenes of Babylon (mid 2nd century B.C.), though Diogenes may simply have formalised earlier teaching, say, that of Chrysippus. There are two clues to authorship. First, there is the reference to η τεχνική συνήθεια, 'the technical usage', in the definition of Hellenism. This only makes sense, as Michael Frede has observed, if there is already a τεχνη of Hellenism, that is, a grammar of some sort, or a proto-grammar, laying down rules for linguistic purity, which is not yet a wholly distinct discipline: it is still located in the framework of the doctrine of the virtues and vices of style within which it originated. This piece of Stoic dialectic must accordingly have been formulated before the Stoic-influenced Pergamene school established a Stoic grammar as a separate discipline in the 2nd century B.C., but is unlikely to be a product of the very earliest years of the Stoa. Second, there is the use of the term λέξις in four of the five definitions of the virtues. (This might serve as a reminder that parts of speech – single terms – and their complexes, λόγοι, contribute alike to the quality of a piece of prose.) The definition of λέξις as any vocal articulation is attributed to Diogenes of Babylon (Diogenes 7.56); but it may be older. Taken together these clues suggest a date somewhere between the middle of the third and the middle of the second century, and the author(s) must also have a recognised interest in language. The obvious candidates are therefore Chrysippus, and Diogenes of Babylon; and in what follows I shall be primarily concerned with the stylistics of the early Stoa, which seems to have exercised an immense influence within the school.

The difficulty, then, for reconstructing Stoic teaching on rhetorical style is that there is no reliable evidence for early Stoic stylistics: it is rather that the doctrine of linguistic excellence is located, not in rhetoric proper, but in dialectic. There is a famous Stoic distinction between rhetoric and dialectic according to which the former is the science of speaking well in a continuous narrative or exposition, and the latter the science of correct discussion by means of question and answer (Diogenes 7.42). Further, the conventionality of at least some elements in Stoic rhetorical instruction

14 I would propose two further reasons why such articulate strings would be in question: (1) they are the bearers of ambiguity (Diogenes 7.62) and ambiguity will cause lack of clarity; and (2) they will also, presumably, be the primary bearers of what the Stoa would regard as undesirable euphonic and rhythmic properties: see further pp. 417–18. The use of the term φράσεις in the definition of Hellenism is puzzling; I can only suggest that it is intended to exclude mere articulate strings of sounds or letters, for there seem to be only two Stoic offences against linguistic purity, barbarism, which attaches to single terms, and solectism, a fault of syntax. Yet, puzzlingly, the same term denotes one of the subdivisions of rhetoric, as already noted (Diogenes 7.43). The answer may simply be that φράσεις is one of the commonest Greek terms for what the Roman rhetoricians called elocutio: Quintilian 8.1.1.
15 It is of course disputed how much of Diogenes Laertius' detailed report of Stoic dialectic at 7.49–83 is an excerpt from Diocles Magnes' Survey of Philosophers (7.48). The brief survey of dialectic at 7.43–4 is in fact very close, in both content and arrangement, to the longer account; the principal difference is that in the version of Stoic logical doctrine arguably known to Diocles epistemology is dealt with before dialectic proper begins, at 49–54. But, whether or not it is specifically Diocles whom Diogenes is excerpting, one must agree with Mejer that 'the Stoic doxography cannot have been composed by Diogenes himself – nor can it go back to one of his usual sources. It must have been taken in toto from some other source' (Diogenes Laertius and his Hellenistic Background [Hermes Einzelschriften, 40; Wiesbaden, 1978], p. 7). The information about Stoic stylistics must accordingly be granted special status. For a detailed discussion of the arguments for and against Dioclean authorship, see Mejer op. cit., pp. 6ff.; see also D. Holwerda, 'De Dioclis Magnesii alterius operis vestigio neglecto', Mnemosyne 15 (1962), 169–70.
is unmistakable: witness the traditional divisions of orations into forensic, deliberative, and encomiastic (cf. e.g. Quintilian 3.4.12ff.); of the areas of rhetorical expertise into discovery, expression, arrangement, and delivery – only memory, out of the standard list (e.g. Quintilian 3.3.1), is missing; and of the rhetorical speech itself – plainly the forensic only can be intended – into proemium, narrative, reply to opponents, and epilogue.16 That only the forensic speech is described may be an accident of transmission; or may be an indication that the Stoics, like most teachers of rhetoric, considered forensic pleading to be the most difficult of the three standard modes of public discourse, and accordingly devoted most time and effort to it.

Together these facts tend to support the reasonable expectation that there was a rhetorical subdivision of Stoic stylistics. The truth is much stranger: in both theory and practice there was, strictly, no difference in style whatsoever between the discourse of the Stoic dialectician, and that of the Stoic orator.

An important preliminary point is that both definitions refer to λόγος. Diogenes Laertius reports (7.47, 48) that without dialectic the sage will not ‘be infallible ἐν λόγως’, or ‘prove himself sharp-witted and acute and generally formidable ἐν λόγοις; for it belongs to the same man to discuss and to reason correctly, and to the same man both to discuss given topics and to answer the question posed.’ Reasoning, debating, discussing an issue, and answering questions are not conceived of as radically different activities; it is one and the same science, dialectic, that teaches them all; and they are all manifestations of the same διάδεσσις, which is the science of dialectic seen as a state of its possessor’s soul, the soul of the sage. What must still be at work here, even in this sophisticated and complex classification of the sage’s dialectic abilities, is the influence of the historical model for dialectic, the one almost certainly inherited from Zeno, and before him, from Socrates: dialectic which is rationally conducted, public argument by question-and-answer.17 But in other, certainly later, definitions – those of Chrysippus and Posidonius – this question-and-answer aspect of dialectic drops out of sight (Diogenes 7.62). Methodical questioning and answering is just one of the procedures taught by dialectic (47). So, when the wise man is said to be infallible and formidable ἐν λόγοις, what should be understood by that term is not, or not merely, argument in the form of public dialogue, but all argument and all rational discourse, including the soul’s silent reasoning to itself.

It is appropriate too to conceive of Stoic dialectic as a body of scientific knowledge, of which the sage alone, of course, is in full possession. This science is only in part the science of argument. It is also the science of all rational discourse: it embraces what moderns label epistemology (since rational speech is the expression in language of mental processes and states: Diogenes 7.49), linguistics, grammar and semantics, and the study of linguistic ambiguity, as well as stylistics. The position of this last in Diogenes’ account (59) might perhaps indicate a particular connection with poetics (60); but, on the other hand, it is surely relevant that before turning to style, Diogenes has been describing the parts of speech. For the first Stoic excellence is correctness:

16 I strongly suspect that the remaining part, the ‘proof’, has simply dropped out of the text; it is impossible to believe that the Stoics simply neglected what was commonly held to be the vital component of any suit, proving one’s case, especially in light of the Stoic reputation for sharpness and effectiveness in argument; see pp. 401. It is unclear why memory is absent, and why arrangement comes after and not before διάδεσσις, its more usual position in the rhetorical textbooks. διάδεσσις is itself a conventional rhetorical term: see n. 14.

17 For an informative discussion of the earliest Stoic dialectic, see A. A. Long, ‘Dialectic and the Stoic Sage’, in The Stoics (cit. n. 13), pp. 101ff., esp. 105ff. Long argues that it was Chrysippus who developed the whole of Stoic dialectic (not merely formal logic) beyond its question-and-answer origins into a science of all rational discourse.
and any account of Hellenism would necessarily involve reference to the nature and correct use of nouns, verbs, and the other word-classes.

This sort of broad interpretation of Stoic dialectic, taking its historical development into account, will be familiar, for interest has generally been focused, understandably, on dialectic to the near exclusion of rhetoric. But equally the definition of rhetoric should not be abandoned to unhistorical and over-literal interpretation. Rhetoric supervises λόγοι which are ἐν διεξόδῳ, that is 'in continuous prose' or 'in narrative form'. There is to my knowledge no suggestion in any ancient author that Stoic rhetoric produced experts in all continuous or expository prose; and there is some good evidence against that idea. The Stoic oration, as already noted, comes only in the three traditional flavours, deliberative, forensic, and encomiastic (Diogenes 7.42). This familiar, almost hackneyed, trichotomy could surely never have been contemplated, let alone commonplace (as it must have been to get into a potted guide such as this), if the standard definition of rhetoric was so different and so heterodox. Chrysippus, for example, is known to have produced many other definitions of rhetoric besides the familiar and influential 'scientia recte dicendi' (Quintilian 2.15.34–5): itself a timely warning not to treat what can be unpacked from it as Chrysippus' definitive pronouncement on rhetoric. According to Plutarch's report of Chrysippus' On rhetoric (St. rep. 1034B) the Stoic σαγε ῥητορέσεως καὶ πολιτεύσεως, and Chrysippus or the Stoics generally say that 'the wise alone are of the quality to be magistrates, judges, orators' (Diogenes 7.122; cf. SVF 1.216, 3.615, 618, 655).

It will be worth exploring in a little more detail what Zeno may have had to say about rhetoric, and in particular what may have been the point of his famous comparison of rhetoric to an open hand and dialectic to a clenched fist. Zeno's own explanation of this curious analogy is not preserved, supposing he ever gave one, and only the explanations of later authorities survive. (The evidence is collected as SVF 1.75.) It is generally agreed that what Zeno was illustrating was the terse, compact nature of dialectic and the expansiveness of rhetoric, which suggests that the two types of discourse differ only in their form: subject-matter is common. This surely calls for some explanation. The anecdote by itself, I think, supports the contention that the definitions of dialectic and rhetoric discussed earlier are Zeno's. The definition of dialectic, as already observed, seems to reflect and preserve Zeno's

20 There are other, less direct pieces of evidence that Stoic rhetoric has a narrower field of operations than all and any continuous discourse. Posidonius, who made at least one contribution to the technical side of rhetoric, in stasis theory (Quintilian 3.6.37), may have publicly defended the restriction of rhetoric to these narrow confines: this is implied by Plutarch's report (Life of Pompey 42.5) that he criticised the 2nd century B.C. rhetorician Hermagoras (usually credited with the 'invention' of stasis theory) on the topic of ἡ καθ' δῆλον ζήτησις, i.e. the rhetorical 'thesis'. Cicero reveals (de inv. 1.8, de or. 2.265ff.) that Hermagoras and his followers had come under New Academic fire for failing to restrict rhetoric's field of activities — for poaching on philosophical and scientific territory — and this could well have been the point of Posidonius' criticism too.
21 Striller saw the ghost of Aristotle stalking the Stoic ramparts at this point (de Stoicorum studiis rhetorici, Breslauer phil. Abhand. I 2, Breslau, 1886, p. 19): but ghosts, of course, are the products of a fevered imagination, and Aristotle could not have conceded that rhetoric and dialectic differ only in their style of discourse. It remains doubtful that in the area of rhetoric the Stoa owed anything specifically to Aristotle, and their debt to Theophrastus is certainly very limited: see pp. 419–20.
authority as founder – a common enough tendency in the early Stoa – even though dialectic soon (perhaps already in his lifetime) broke its historical bounds. But its implications go further. Of course, Zeno's famous syllogisms were themselves snappily memorable, whatever their demerits as modes of persuasion;22 and in his day there may very well have been dialectical rules limiting the sorts of answer an interlocutor was allowed to give (cf. Diogenes 2.135). But the key to Zeno's analogy is rather, I think, to take into consideration his well-attested inclination to épater le bourgeois. Zenonian dialectic seems to have been a mere dugout compared with Chrysippus' and other, later, Stoic logicians' sleek ocean-going craft. Plutarch reports that Zeno encouraged his pupils to study dialectic because it would make them able to solve fallacies (St. rep. 1034E), a policy which assigns dialectic a fairly limited rôle, but does at least suggest that for Zeno dialectic was tightly bound up with analysing arguments: to solve a fallacy is to identify what is wrong with it, and that demands some conception of what makes an argument 'right'.23

So if Zeno is saying, in effect, that dialectic and rhetoric differ only in their style of discourse, he is, I think, stressing that rhetoric's business, no less than dialectic's is (or should be) argument. Provided always the two definitions are intended as parallel, which is a plausible enough assumption, the λόγος in question would originally have been closest to 'arguments' in the sense of 'rational public exchanges'; and if the definitions are his, or have his approval, then Zeno may have wanted (characteristically enough) to annoy the rhetorical establishment by dismissing everything apart from sheer argument as irrelevant, for rhetoric and dialectic alike. Contemporary rhetoricians, for whom the debate about logical validity currently raging in the philosophical schools was only indirectly of interest, and who were certainly not bound by the austere morality of Stoicism, could not intelligently have accepted Zeno's comparison or simply ignored the challenge it represented: which is how Zeno's taste for controversy would have been satisfied (though, ironically, the rhetoricians who report his comparison think it useful and apposite). Like the definition of dialectic, 'Zeno's' definition of rhetoric would have been suitably interpreted and qualified by later Stoics to fit different, more complex, demands, above all by restricting it to conventional, institutionalised, contexts and formats. But this particular heterodoxy never lost its real force. What distinguishes Stoic orators and rhetoricians is their skill and shrewdness in argument and the importance they attached to proof. The partial compromise with the rhetorical establishment could never disguise Stoic oratory's origins as open-handed dialectic.

In fact the real problem, the one described earlier – that the doctrine of linguistic excellences and defects falls within dialectic, not rhetoric – seems only to have shifted its ground a little, not gone away at all. Even if dialectic in its mature form is the science of reasoning and rational discourse, it is now clearer than ever that rhetoric is none the less restricted to the traditional varieties of formal, public speechifying: which points to a far sharper distinction than the definitions I began with would suggest. In particular, it still seems reasonable to look for a more or less separate set of narrowly rhetorical virtues and vices. Should not dialectical discourse and rhetorical Kunstprosa conform to different stylistic rules?

The answer to that question can only be a resounding negative. What cannot fail to be felt is the stress the sources for Stoic rhetoric place on two features above all:

its literary poverty, and its argumentative richness. Here Cicero is the best available authority, though of course his evidence has to be handled with care, given his own ambitions to create a philosophical rhetoric.

Crassus, who by and large is Cicero’s spokesman in the *de oratore*, presents an assessment of each of the leading Hellenistic philosophical schools from the point of view of discovering ‘which most nearly approaches the orator’ (‘quae oratori coniuncta maxime’, 3.64); which, that is, is best suited to meet the orator’s educational and stylistic needs. The Stoics he dismisses on what will become familiar enough grounds. In the first place (65), many Stoic ethical tenets are hopelessly at odds with the realities and demands of public and political life. Second, ‘they have too a style of discourse that is perhaps subtle and doubtless sharp-witted, but, in an orator, feeble, unfamiliar, harsh to the public ear, obscure, hollow, spiritless, yet of the sort that cannot possibly be employed on the public; for different things seem to be good and bad to the Stoics and to other citizens – or rather other nations: “honour”, “disgrace”, “reward”, “punishment”, have a different force; whether rightly or not is of no importance for the present; but were we to adopt that usage, we would never be able to express anything in language’ (66).

This passage is initially puzzling because it seems to suggest there existed a distinct Stoic oratorical style of discourse (‘orationis genus’; *oratio* is one of Cicero’s favoured terms for rhetorical discourse), and that it is this – as opposed to Stoic philosophical discourse – which Crassus dismisses out of hand. So interpreted, however, the passage would introduce a radical asymmetry into Crassus’ evaluations of the main schools of philosophy. In his discussion of the Peripatetics and Academics (both the sceptical and the non-sceptical varieties) Crassus undoubtedly focuses on their use of language to expound and argue topics in philosophy, as, for example, in Arcesilas’ attack on dogmatic epistemologies (67). In all consistency his earlier assessment of the Stoic ‘orationis genus’ should be an assessment of the use of language by Stoics engaged in philosophy, not of the use of language by Stoic orators. The value of that earlier passage actually seems to lie in Crassus’ unspoken assumption – and we can only trust that he was well-informed on the matter – that the Stoic style he deprecates is the style a Stoic or Stoic-influenced orator would use: there is no alternative Stoic rhetorical style on offer.

Even were the existence of a theoretically distinct Stoic rhetorical style to be inferred from Crassus’ remarks, Crassus himself would warn us not to expect differences in practice. Elsewhere (de or. 2.159) he describes in similar, and similarly uncomplimentary, terms what the context shows must be Stoic philosophical language: ‘...and he [sc., the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon, cf. 157] brings with him a style of language that is not transparent, not relaxed and flowing, but feeble, dry, broken, and disjointed, which, if anyone approves of it, they will approve of only in such a way as to admit its unsuitability for an orator...’.

Passages in the *Brutus* and the *Paradoxa Stoicorum* confirm not only that Stoic discourse is unitary – that Stoic philosophers and Stoic orators speak the same dialect – but also that the Stoic discourse Crassus rejects as useless to the ideal orator is in fact that recommended by the Stoa: it is not the product of an unsuccessful attempt to meet some more conventionally ‘oratorical’ ideal, but the Stoic paradigm of linguistic expression. (Of course, we could not charitably expect it to be otherwise: to put only admitted failures into the dock would considerably weaken Crassus’ case.)

Brutus observes that only Cato, of all the Roman Stoic orators, achieved ‘summam eloquentiam’; the others he mentions – Fannius, Rutilius, Tubero – had little or no *eloquentia* to their name (*Brutus* 118). Cicero agrees, but explains Cato’s success by
outside coaching: 'Your uncle, though, as you know, gets from the Stoics what was to be sought from them, but learned to speak from the masters of speech, and trained himself after their fashion' (119). I will return to this assessment of Cato's education later. The point to note here is that according to Brutus (and again Cicero agrees) all the other Stoic orators, Greek and Roman, simply transferred the language they used for dialectic to the public domain: 'I see this same thing happening amongst our people as amongst the Greeks – that almost all the Stoics are extremely intelligent in debate, and they do it skilfully, and are almost so many verbal architects; but transferred from discussion to public speaking, they prove poverty-stricken' (118). In his reply, Cicero allows that the Peripatetics and New Academics fall as far short of the oratorical standard as do the Stoics, but for quite the opposite reasons: 'For just as the Stoics' discourse (oratio) is too concise and a little too compressed for the needs of an ordinary audience, so theirs is freer and more diffuse than the custom of the courts and of public life allows' (120). It is clear that Cicero is thinking of the schools' philosophical language (note the references to the glories of Plato's, Aristotle's, and Theophrastus's language at 121) – which makes his use of the term oratio (119, 120) for 'discourse' all the more telling (cf. p. 401 above). As for the Stoics, their rhetorical poverty is easily explained: '…all their care is lavished on dialectic; no use is made of that discursive and flowing and varied style of discourse (orationis genus)' (119). But we can go further: it not that Stoic orators and philosophers merely fail in practice to use language bearing the Ciceronian seal of approval. Brutus' observations, whatever value we attach to their assessment of the orators' merits, at least reveal that Stoic rhetorical language just is the language of dialectic. When Rutilius or any other Stoic turns to public speaking he does not even try to master some other, oratorical, Stoic discourse: none is available – except outside Stoicism altogether, in the conventional schools of rhetoric. Stoic skill and experience in dialectic and the language of debate are unrivalled, and Stoic orators fail because all that skill and experience count for less than nothing in the field of oratory; but no rival Stoic model of rhetorical language exists to which they could turn.

A similar picture can be pieced together from the preface to the Paradoxa Stoicorum (1–3). Cicero begins by praising Cato for his success in making even weighty and unfamiliar philosophical issues 'persuasive', probabilia, to the senate (in other words, deliberative oratory is in question). Which is all the more of an achievement, Cicero continues, because Cato, whom he describes as 'in my opinion, a perfect Stoic' ('perfectus mea sententia Stoicus'; cf. Brutus 118) 'both holds beliefs which are by no means accepted by ordinary people, and belongs to that school which does not pursue the flower of eloquence or treat its evidence expansively, but achieves its purpose by tiny little questions, like pinpricks'.24 Cato's success is all the more remarkable because the philosophy he popularises is generally unpopular, and because his style of discourse, the style he uses in the senate, is not calculated to please. The passage from the Brutus quoted earlier reveals that Cicero regarded Cato's eloquentia as the result of his orthodox rhetorical education, and not of his Stoicism. But Cicero's praise of Cato's success in the senate would lose all point if the language Cato adopts in public life were not the language of Stoicism – a fact confirmed by Cicero's own words: Cato belongs to a philosophical sect that 'does not pursue the flower of eloquence'. The Stoa as a school makes no effort to cultivate oratory's hothouse blooms.

There are other useful references in Cicero to Stoic rhetorical teaching, and in

24 Cf. de or. 2.158: the Stoic dialecticians 'ad extremum ipsi se compungunt suis acuminibus'.
particular teaching on style. Chrysippus’ lack of ‘hanc dicendi ex arte aliena [i.e. from the art of oratory] facultatem’ did not stand in the way of his services to philosophy (de or. 1.50). There is the famous remark that both Chrysippus and Cleanthes wrote rhetorical textbooks but that only someone who wanted never to open his mouth would benefit from them (de fin. 4.7). Stoic style is called ‘rather down at heel’, squalidius (de fin. 4.5), in comparison with the elegance of Academic and Peripatetic writings; and in general terms Stoic language comes off worse in any comparison of the styles of the main philosophical schools (see especially de or. 3.67ff.). Now Cicero, of course, has his own reasons for disliking Stoic style. He argues that as Stoic language is inappropriate to the seriousness and loftiness of its themes it cannot move anyone, cannot convince or improve. He warmly and repeatedly advocates what he sees as a more rhetorical – a more eloquent, more flowing, more copious – style of discourse for philosophy, and wishes to ‘re-unite’ oratory and philosophy as they were in the days before Socrates, who was directly responsible for the rift between eloquence and philosophy, and also, indirectly, for the fractionalism of the post-Socratic schools (de or. 3.60f.). The ideal is presented at Tusc. Disp. 1.7: ‘hanc etiam perfectam philosophiam semper iudicavi quae de maximis quaestionibus copiose posset ornateque dicere’; and Crassus envisages an ideal discourse that embraces the functions of rhetoric and philosophy alike (de or. 3.76). As a result, Cicero’s assessment of Stoic style must be hostile and accordingly to some unknown extent, perhaps, unreliable. Indeed the crabbedness and austerity he scorns are, as we will see, belied by his praise for what he explicitly calls Cato’s Stoic ornamented style, as well as by Stoic provision for approved emotional content in all discourse. At stake is something deeply serious: what people should and do find persuasive, especially where what is at stake for them is the state of their souls and the whole conduct of life. This issue will surface again later. The initial contention, though, is unchallenged. On Cicero’s evidence there is no radical distinction between the approved Stoic philosophical style, the style circumscribed by those five excellences reported by Diogenes, and the approved style of Stoic oratory, which takes it basic qualities, like its concern with argument, from dialectic.

Cicero has also usefully highlighted for us one of the most significant differences between Stoic and conventional rhetoric. The critical terms Crassus applies to Stoic style (cf. p. 401 above) all serve to place it in Cicero’s version of the ‘three styles’ theory mentioned earlier. It is tacitly classified as a very poor example of the first, plain, style, with the plain style’s characteristic faults, being insipid, dry, feeble, and not even lucid. (Crassus himself is later made to observe that this ‘fine’ or ‘subtle’, tenuis, style should not be ‘lacking in force and vigour’, should not be ‘sine nervis ac viribus’, 3.199.) The plain style, in Cicero’s eyes, is especially suitable for one of the orator’s three tasks or officia, informing his audience. Cicero, like most other rhetoricians, as we saw, allots the orator two further officia: moving the emotions and pleasing an audience. Quintilian in fact rejects a claim that the only natural eloquence is everyday speech, on the grounds that it is incumbent on the orator not only to teach but also to sway the feelings and to delight his audience.25 I am not suggesting that

25 According to the theorists Quintilian is criticising, the natural officium of words is ‘to be slaves to sense’, servire sensibus. Things have their own names, and there is no need for circuitus or translatio (apparently blanket terms for periphrasis, tropes, and all rhetorical ornament); the oldest orators used to speak ‘maxime secundum naturam’, but later adopted a more ‘poetic’ language (12.10.41–2). Quintilian replies (43) that the orator has not only to ‘state the facts’, but to please and move his audience, and to do so he uses the ‘adiutoria quae sunt ab eadem natura nobis concessa’. The position he rejects could well form part of a (Stoic-influenced) Atticising
the Stoics themselves described their own oratory as 'plain', or that they borrowed any non-Stoic critical terminology: only that Cicero classified in the conventional manner the distinctive quality he has detected in Stoic oratory, its emphasis, almost to the exclusion of everything else, on informing, and in the case of the Stoa, on instruction above all by shrewd and subtle argumentation, which conventionally is but one weapon in the orator's armoury (cf. e.g. ad Her. 2.27–30; Cicero, de inv. 1.34ff.; Quintilian 5.8–14). Quintilian provides confirmation: 'Minus indulgere eloquentiae Stoici veteres; sed cum honesta suaserunt tum in colligendo probandoque quae instituerant plurimum valuerunt, rebus tamen acutis magis quam, id quod sane, non affectaverunt, oratone magnifici' (10.1.84; cf. 12.2.25). If the sage is 'formidable ἐν λόγοις' in virtue of his dialectical training, his dialectical ability will none the less take as its field of operations all discourse wherever required, including some parts of rhetorical speeches. Here, more than anywhere, the dividing line between dialectic and rhetoric begins to blur.26

Other divisions of the rhetorical speech required, not argument, but rather exposition or summary. Available evidence strongly suggests that simplicity and straightforwardness of language would also have been prescribed at least in two of the non-argumentative parts of the speech, in the proemium and epilogue; and that appeals to the emotions were out of bounds.

Here two especially useful pieces of information are available. First, Chrysippus is reported to have wanted the epilogue of a speech to be 'unipartite', μονομερῆς (R.G. 2.454,1 Sp. = SVF 2.296). The context shows that this one part is to be a summary of the speaker's case. The professional rhetoricians, in contrast, typically dictate that the epilogue (of a forensic oration) can and on most occasions should have another part, an appeal to the feelings of the judges or the audience; and that sometimes one can do without the summary altogether, and sometimes without the appeal (ad Her. 2.47–50; Cicero, de inv. 1.98ff., part. orat. 52ff.; Quintilian 6.1.1ff.). Quintilian points out the dangers of bald repetition: 'aliaque nihil est odiosius recta illa repetitione velut memoriae iudicum diffidentis' (6.1.2). The point of Chrysippus' injunction is not hard to see. It is instructive to contrast these remarks of Quintilian's: 'Most of the Atticisers and almost all the philosophers who wrote something on rhetoric, approved only of this type of epilogue [i.e. the enumeratio, recapitulation]. I believe the Atticisers27 held this opinion because at Athens the orator was forbidden, through the medium of the herald, to move the emotions. I am less surprised at the philosophers, for whom it is practically a vice to be emotionally moved...Yet they will admit that emotions are necessary, if truth and justice and the

diatrise, rather than being authentically Stoic (or Epicurean). The Stoic contribution to Roman Atticism is disputed; Kennedy, Art of Rhetoric (cited n. 2), 241–2, 338–9, argues convincingly that Atticism is, unusually, an original Roman contribution to stylistics, without Greek precedents.

26 Philodemus, unfortunately in a very fragmentary context, refers to some people who 'have taken their technical matter (τὰ τέχνηκα) from other (τέχναι), e.g. certain eristic matters and the business of ambiguities from dialectic' (rh. 2. 67.7–68.12 Sudhaus). This text shows at the very least that the question of shared τέχναι – which presumably are or include θεωρήματα, the theorems of a science or expertise – was debated in Hellenistic times.

27 Quintilian must mean 'Atticisers' rather than 'Athenians'; his point is that the Atticists, with their concern for unadorned, emotionally restrained discourse, appealed to classical Athenian procedural law as providing a model for the structure of the oration which happily suited their antipathy to ornament and emotional strewdness. Their appeal seems to have little historical basis: see Butler's note ad loc. (Loeb tr., vol. 2, p. 386 n.1).
public interest cannot otherwise be secured’ (6.1.7).\textsuperscript{28} I have little doubt that the Stoics are the philosophers whom Quintilian represents as regarding emotional responses as vicious. The real Stoic position is more complicated, as we will see, but hardly less palatable.

The second piece of evidence concerns the introduction to the oration, προοίμιον (Diogenes 7.43). Professional rhetoricians commonly distinguished between two types of exordium, which in general is supposed to render the audience ‘benivolum, attentum, docilem’ (‘well-disposed, attentive, and looking for instruction’), as Quintilian puts it (4.1.5). One is a straightforward sketching of what one is going to say and argue, and is typically called the proemium or principium. It is appropriate in easier, for example straightforwardly honourable cases. Where, though, one has, for instance, to take a stand against a good or poor or sick man, or one’s own case is, say, difficult to prove, or dishonourable, the speaker has to be tricksier and then the introduction is called the ἔφοδος, whose Latin name insinuatio, is revealing: ‘the ingratiation (insinuatio) is discourse (oratio) that steals into the hearer’s mind by a kind of dissembling, and by obscure indirectness’ (‘quadam dissimulacione et circuitione obscure’ (Cicero, de inv. 1.20). If the Stoic rhetoricians knew of this distinction – and as it is familiar to the author of the ad Herennium (1.5, 9; cf. Quintilian 4.1.48) it must already have been commonplace in Greek rhetorical handbooks – then it seems likely their intention was to eliminate tricksiness and deliberate obscurity from their introductions; and it is reasonable to suppose that that injunction extended to language. This point should not be overstressed, for it was an old and well-established rule that the exordium must be simple in style (Quintilian 4.1.58–60) – though that very simplicity could itself be a form of insinuatio (60).

What one really wants to know now, is why: why there is a Stoic doctrine of style at all, and why it includes what it does. It is hardly unreasonable to expect reasoning behind that doctrine, and reasoning of a high level; for, however brief and distorted Diogenes’ and Cicero’s reports and comments may be, behind them lies what some Stoic or group of Stoics had to say about rhetoric, and the Stoics were of course philosophers, some of them brilliant and original, whose arguments could be weighty and impressive, and who prided themselves on the unity and coherence of their philosophy. The remainder of this paper will be an attempt to reconstruct one of those arguments. I believe it was an important argument, one taken seriously by the men who were regarded, and who regarded themselves, as specifically Stoic orators.

Perhaps the best place to begin is with a comparison between Stoic attitudes to rhetoric and those of the other most influential dogmatic school of the Hellenistic era, the Epicurean. Stoics and Epicureans famously disagreed over whether the wise man, the paradigm of human perfection, would or would not take part in politics (Epicurus: S.V. 58, Diogenes Laertius 10.119; Stoics: e.g. Cicero, de fin. 3.68, Diogenes 7.121). Epicurus’ disapproval of conventional ambition and power politicking extended to the ‘fancy speechifying’ (ῥητορεύσεις καλῖως, Diogenes 10.118) and panegyric (120) such a life would entail, though he conceded that the wise man would bring court cases (120a, δικάσεωςθαι). The notorious injunction to ‘flee all

\textsuperscript{28} Graeven ad loc. (Cornut. Artis Rhetoricae Epitome, edition and commentary by J. Graeven (Berlin, 1891, repr. Dublin/Zürich, 1973), §207, p. 41.10ff. = 1.454.1.1ff. Sp.) doubts whether Quintilian is referring to Stoic (and Platonic) views, but he gives no reason for this scepticism. (Graeven’s identification of Cornutus as the author of the original version of this handbook has not been accepted: see Kennedy, Art of Rhetoric [cited n. 2], 616 n. 5). For Stoic influence on the Atticisers, see n. 25.
learning’ (10.6) was taken by professional rhetoricians, at any rate, to apply to the art of oratory (cf. e.g. Quintilian 12.2.24).29

In contrast, the doctrine that the sage will play politician, where circumstances allow (Diogenes 7.121), is deeply embedded in Stoic social and political theory. Two important texts will point the contrast. First, according to Chrysippus,30 amongst others, the sage will take part in politics if nothing prevents him, ‘for he will both restrain vice and promote virtue’ (Diogenes loc. cit.). Presumably this at least means that the power, money, influence, family connections, and so on the wise man may gain in the course of his career will widen his scope for action, for virtuous choosing and rejecting.31 The passage will, however, bear another interpretation as well. The sage cannot hope to people the world with other sages, and sages alone are virtuous and perform virtuous acts. Yet he might by his own words and actions try to encourage ordinary people to perform acts which would be (perfectly) virtuous, if performed by the sage – the ‘intermediate’ acts which are still ‘duties’ (καθήκοντα) even if an ordinary person performs them, and which, if always or regularly performed, are somehow necessary for progress towards virtue.32 And we know that the Stoic rhetoric defined by Diogenes is a science (cf. Sextus, M. 2.6), and a virtue, and thus exclusive to the wise, who possess all virtues (so for example Panaitius’ pupil Mnæsarchus, ap. de or. 1.83). Why though, would the sage want to behave like this?

The answer must lie in the Stoic conception of society and the justice which binds it together. Cicero’s Cato is made to argue that ‘since we see that man is created to protect and preserve his fellow men, it is in agreement with this nature that the wise man should want to take part in politics and in governing the state... ’ (de fin. 3.68), and that ‘we are driven by nature to want to benefit as many people as possible, especially by giving instruction and transmitting the principles of wisdom (δοκεïν ῥητορικ&sigmafigur;νεϋ προετοιμασίαν και προετοιμασίαν ταιεδικην)’... Since, moreover, the nature of man is such that a kind of civil right (‘quasi civile ius’) mediates between himself and the human race, one who upholds this will be just, and whoever departs from it, unjust’ (65, 67). That is, wanting to benefit others is natural, and natural for every human being, not merely for the sage; and instruction, especially ethical instruction, is picked out as one of the primary methods of doing this. Material welfare should not be considered of sole or primary concern. Of course, any ordinary man or woman would prefer family or friends or fellow citizens not to go hungry, fall sick, be poor, or be defeated in war and killed or enslaved, because all such conditions ‘go against nature’: we all

29 Philodemus refused to admit two of the three conventional types of rhetoric, forensic and deliberative, as τέχνης, while claming special status for ‘sophistic’ rhetoric, which apparently extends to literary prose in general; but he continued to stress the importance of clarity (and solecism is classed as a cause of obscurity: rh. 1, pp. 157–8, col. 15.6–24 S.). He voices disapproval of the (panegyric) orators’ lack of concern for the truth, and of their obsession with ‘mere sound, and periods, and parallel constructions, and antithetical ones, and homoioteleuta’ by which people are ‘persuaded’ (φυλαγωγούμενοι) (1, p. 33 = 2, pp. 257–8, col. 4.14–col. 5.4). Philodemus is a useful but limited source for Diogenes of Babylon’s teaching on rhetoric (see p. 421); unfortunately the text is badly preserved and fragmentary, and it is not always possible to be sure who is being quoted and criticised.

30 Chrysippus defined rhetoric as a kind of τέχνης, and τέχνης are not confined to the wise (cf. SVF 2.393). What Chrysippus meant by this is far from clear. See further, pp. 420.

31 Nature and the things in accordance with nature are ‘the principle of duty and the material of virtue’ according to Chrysippus (Plutarch comm. not. 1069E). See B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford, 1985), pp. 201ff.

32 This idea of advancement to virtue through practice seems to be implied by e.g. SVF 3.500, 510, and esp. by Cato at de fin. 3.17ff.
naturally prefer to live healthy, comfortable, free, lives.\textsuperscript{33} But what matters above all is living virtuously, and if other people are genuinely to be benefited, and benefited by our agency, then we must encourage them to virtue: for it is a Stoic axiom that only virtue and virtuous action constitute benefit.\textsuperscript{34} The natural inclination to benefit others must be adapted to the moral imperatives that should govern our lives; and in accordance with that principle others must be encouraged to choose what ordinary usage calls ‘good’ and the Stoa ‘preferred’ things\textsuperscript{35} only when that choice does not conflict with the choosers’ moral welfare. Our own moral welfare would be safeguarded, since we would not be primarily responsible for whatever actions our fellows finally perform: assent to the propositions or policies advocated is in our audience’s power, not in ours.

Cato does not supply a detailed programme of ways of benefiting others, by instructing them or otherwise, and we have to go beyond the available evidence. The duty to benefit others only in the approved way will have broad implications for the content of rhetoric discourse and the general mode of presentation. In very general terms, it can be inferred that taking part in politics will entail public and formal advocacy of policies which best accord with virtue, and opposition to wicked ones; the praise of virtuous individuals, objects, institutions, or communities, and the censure of vicious ones. A Stoic panegyric, for instance, would mention with approval not a man’s wealth or good looks, but rather his not attaching too much importance to these things. A useful reminder of rhetorical orthodoxy is Cicero’s treatment of encomium in his \textit{Partitiones Oratoriae}, where virtue and vice do, admittedly, play the largest rôle, but goods of the body, general cultural attainments, and external goods are also brought into play, and practically the whole speech should be ‘directed to the hearer’s pleasure and delight’ (20ff., esp. 74–5, 72, 80; and see p. 394 above on the aesthetic function of panegyric).

The forensic ideal would, presumably, be to bring or defend only a morally good case, and to present arguments for it that are good morally as well as sound logically: one should not coldbloodedly try to deceive or mislead a jury or impede its progress toward virtue. There may have been a Stoic argument (it is attributed only to ‘certain philosophers’) that discourse of this sort, unorthodox as it might appear, is in fact perfectly natural. The argument assumes that we all have natural impulses to virtue – a commonplace in Stoicism\textsuperscript{36} – and that there is a kind of \textit{prudentia} (I take this to be \textit{φρονήσις}) which operates in the field of ‘what must and what must not be said’, ‘in dicendis et non dicendis’, just as there is \textit{prudentia} determining ‘what must and what must not be done’ (cf. \textit{SVF} 3.262). Accordingly we all have within us traces of that particular virtue, waiting to be trained and developed (Quintilian 2.20.5–6).

This linguistic \textit{prudentia} may perhaps be dialectic: for the Stoics are said to have defined dialectic as the ‘science of speaking well’, where ‘speaking well’, \textit{εὖ λέγειν}, means ‘saying what is true and what is fitting’, τά ἀληθή καὶ τά προσηκοντα λέγειν (Alexander, \textit{in top.} 1.10ff.). But Stoic rhetoric is not some rival discipline, with wholly distinct content, aims and methods: rather it is this same ‘natural’ linguistic \textit{prudentia},

\textsuperscript{33} E.g. \textit{SVF} 3.124, 128; Diogenes 7.104–5; Cicero, \textit{de fin.} 3.50. Without this difference between objects – not a difference in moral value, but in terms of preference – there would be nothing for wisdom to do, nothing on which it could act.

\textsuperscript{34} The sage and the friend are classified as ‘not other than benefit (\textit{ώφελεια})’: Sextus, \textit{M.} 11.22ff.; cf. Diogenes 7.103, \textit{SVF} 3.104. The virtues and virtuous actions are classed as ‘good’ because benefit happens to result from them: \textit{M.} 11.26.

\textsuperscript{35} For this distinction, see e.g. Plutarch, \textit{St. rep.} 1048A, a quotation from Chrysippus’ \textit{περὶ ἀγαθῶν}. Bk.1.

\textsuperscript{36} See especially \textit{SVF} 1.179, 552, 186, 357a, 566; 2.1170; 3.214, 216, 234.
as adapted to the peculiar demands of certain forms of public, institutionalised discourse.\footnote{37}

The political rôle and ambitions of the sage were, admittedly, transformed as the Stoa matured, above all as it was called on to meet the needs of Romans faced with the practical business of governing more and more of the known world. Zeno's early political radicalism could not survive intact.\footnote{38} As early as Chrysippus the sage's preference for conventional political activity was accepted,\footnote{39} though at this stage the emphasis was still rather on his place in the community of men and gods that is the Stoic rational cosmos (cf. Cicero, \textit{de fin.} 3.66; \textit{SVF} 2.528). Problems of loyalty to a particular state, given that the place one lives and calls one's homeland is so by a mere accident of birth (cf. Seneca, \textit{de otio} 4.1), do not seem to have been felt as particularly pressing, perhaps in part as a result of the instability and fragmentation of the political world in which the early Stoics themselves lived. The imposition of a more rigid and centralised political structure by Rome brought fresh and pressing ethical dilemmas for rulers and subjects alike, while Stoicism itself, under the influence of Panaetius, enjoyed a new flexibility, with the emphasis of moral philosophy shifting to the individual agent and to analysing and meeting particular ethical problems. Panaetius seems to have considered the sage, if still the human paradigm, of little use to ordinary moral agents,\footnote{40} but he seems not to have doubted the central tenet of Stoicism, that virtue alone is good.\footnote{41} It is disputed whether he considered political leadership the ideal,\footnote{42} but a natural inclination to truth and to independence – the

\footnote{37} The sage will not, admittedly, always and automatically take part in politics. This is implied by the principle 'the sage will enter politics, if nothing prevents him' which has already been quoted (Diogenes 7.121). He will prefer to do so (\textit{SVF} 3.611, 686, 690), just as he will prefer to marry and have children. 'For these things are in accordance with the nature of the animal which is rational, sociable, and reciprocates affection', \textit{SVF} 3.686, p. 172.19–20. Stobaeus mentions one ground above all for the wise man's abstaining from politics, 'if he is going to do no benefit to his homeland' (\textit{SVF} 3.690, p. 173.20–21). Indeed the question 'will the wise man enter politics?' became a favourite topic for declamation (Quintilian 3.5.6; Cicero, \textit{top.} 82. Under the later Republic and the Empire commitment to political service became a hotly-contested issue, as Cicero and Seneca both attest (see M. Griffin, \textit{Seneca, a Philosopher in Politics} (Oxford, 1976), ch. 10.; the Stoic position is analysed too, at pp. 340–4, and Cicero's at pp. 344–5). But my concern here is rather with how the sage will behave once he has made the decision not to abstain from the life of politics, and not with his reasons for abstaining or quitting.

\footnote{38} For Zeno, ordinary people are 'enemies and foes and slaves and foreigners, even parents to their children and brothers to brothers and kin to kin' (Diogenes 7.32), whereas the good alone are 'citizens and friends and kin and free' (33; cf. 124, and \textit{SVF} 1.262, 264). In Zeno's ideal republic there would be no lawcourts: Diogenes 7.33; forensic rhetoric would presumably wither away. (In Posidonius' Golden Age the wise rulers and apparently there were no laws: Seneca, \textit{ep.} 90.5.)

\footnote{39} Stobaeus (\textit{SVF} 3.686) reports that the sage will by choice take part in politics, and that being a king or supported by one, and being a sophist, are acceptable options too. This is strikingly similar to Chrysippus' account of the sage's three best methods of making a living: Plutarch, \textit{St. rep.} 1043E.

\footnote{40} This is suggested by the anecdote recounted by Seneca, \textit{ep.} 116.5; cf. also perhaps Cicero, \textit{de off.} 1.46.

\footnote{41} Panaetius does claim that the wise man needs health, money, and strength (Diogenes 7.128), but that this is almost certainly the familiar Stoic doctrine that he must have a sufficient store of 'preferred' things on which to exercise his virtue has been ably argued by J. M. Rist, \textit{Stoic Philosophy} (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 7ff.

\footnote{42} The focus of the debate is whether \textit{de off.} 1.71–2 is borrowed from Panaetius (as argued by M. Pohlenz, \textit{Antike Führer?um} (Teubner, 1934), pp. 46–7); on the other side J. M. Rist (op. cit. (n. 41), pp. 193, 200) argues that \textit{de off.} 1.152–60 is a veiled attack by Cicero on Panaetius' scholastic ideal.
reluctance to accept falsehoods or obey inferiors – is certainly central to his conception of human nature (Cicero, *de off.* 1.13–19). His Roman Republican follower, P. Rutilius Rufus, is credited with typically Stoic self-reliance (Cicero, *Brutus* 114–15), criticised Crassus’ oratorical style (*de or.* 1.227–8), and was renowned for his virtuous conduct at home and abroad (see further, pp. 426–7).

The Stoic view is well summed up by Stobaeus: ‘Justice exists, they say, by nature and not by convention: accordingly the sage takes part in politics, and especially in such states as display some progress toward perfect government; and he makes laws, and educates people; and it is appropriate for good men to compose books capable of benefiting those who come across them, and to condescend to marriage, and raise children, both for his own sake and his fatherland’s, and to endure on its behalf – if it is moderate – both hardship and death’ (*SVF* 3.611).

What still remains unclear is how the orator’s choice of language would be affected by these ethical constraints. Here a piece of information from Sextus will prove useful. Arcesilaus is reported to have criticised the Stoics for failing to observe that assent is not given to impressions, as they assumed, but to propositions (Sextus, *M.* 7.154). What the Stoa intended by making impressions the object of assent is unclear, but if, as Michael Frede has argued,43 the point of Arcesilaus’ criticism is that impressions do not merely have propositional content, but have other qualities besides, then this extra something may include or comprise both the whole psychological and physical condition of the person having the impression and the manner in which the impressions are presented. On this hypothesis, if an impression is presented by means of language, then a large part of its manner of presentation will be the speaker’s precise choice of vocabulary, the arrangement of the words, their sound, the arrangement of subordinate clauses, and so on. The purpose of the Stoic stylistic precepts will then be to provide a model for presenting impressions in language such that nothing extraneous or inappropriate impinges on the proposition (say) being presented for assent, such that nothing gets in the way between the potential assenter and rational assessment of the proposition. Speakers have to offer the right sort of proposition for acceptance, but they have also to present it in the right sort of language. What the list of the virtues determines, in broad outline, is what ‘right’ means in this context.

A significant qualification can now be made to our earlier outline account of Stoic approved style, which seemed unremittingly plain, almost harsh. Arcesilaus’ criticism points the way to understanding how Stoic oratory can also be acceptably emotive. An impression can embody not merely a λέκτον (a proposition, a command, a question, and so on), but also some sort of emotional assessment of and response to its message, its ‘signified content’ strictly speaking; and where the impression is linguistic, signifiers can or can fail to be selected which accurately connote this ‘emotional content’. Hitherto I have stressed – as Cicero and Quintilian do – the argumentative strength of Stoic oratory; but appropriate stylistic embellishment will have been possible – indeed, will surely have been necessary – for the Stoic orator whenever he wished his discourse to have approved emotive force: an audience must assent to the nexus of contents (and we must recall that for Chrysippus’ Stoa all emotions are judgements: cf. p. 392 above), while the ethical programme of benefiting-by-informing will be completed, not undermined, by instruction in, and induction into, morally healthy emotional responses. At the same time, the perceived

stylistic plainness of Stoic oratory is easily explained by the very limited array of approved emotions and objects to which the Stoic speaker has access. Diogenes' list is extremely brief, and some of its terminology obscure—and there are no illustrations to help—but its peculiar combination of conventionality and eccentricity does begin to emerge from a comparison with versions of the doctrine in the professional handbooks. At first blush the list is ordinary enough, except for the inclusion of conciseness or brevity, συντροφία, to which I will return shortly, and for the fact that Hellenism and clarity are in no way set apart from the other virtues. There is no sign of the distinction between essential and non-essential virtues which is fairly common in mainstream theory, a distinction associated with the conviction that training in linguistic correctness (and perhaps clarity too) should be the province, not of the rhetorician, but rather of the teacher of (elementary or 'first') grammar (so Cicero, de or. 3.38, cf. 52; and esp. Quintilian 1.4.6ff., 2.1.1–3). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for instance, ranks purity, clarity, and brevity as 'essential virtues', but makes persuasiveness an 'additional virtue' alongside such qualities as charm, sublimity, and grandeur, which characterise different authors and different pieces of writing to different degrees. 44 One version of the plain style of oratory described by Cicero possesses clarity, correctness, and conciseness, but little or nothing in the way of ornament (orator 20). All five Stoic excellences, in contrast, are to be found in all approved discourse.

It is generally agreed that one's message must be easily intelligible. Clarity is thus obviously important. 45 Since clarity is relative to content, speaker, and audience, rhetorical language will to that extent be audience-dependent: but philosophical discourse will of course be equally subject to this provision. The Stoic version of appropriateness (τὸ πρέπον) resembles its professional counterparts far less closely. Within the format of his distinction between ἐθνός and πάθος and the associated forms of (artificial) proof, Aristotle had laid down that the orator must express himself in a way appropriate not merely to his subject, but to his audience, the (moral) character he wishes to project, and the emotion he is projecting (rh. 1.2.1356a1ff., cf. 8.1365b21ff., 2.12.1388b31ff., the audience's character; 3.7.1408a25ff., the speaker's character; 2.11.377b20ff., arousing emotion); and this principle was adapted and closely followed by later rhetoricians, especially in their treatment of style. Such appropriateness produces plausibility: the audience will be convinced that the speaker is trustworthy and sincere (1356a4–7), and its judgement will be affected by the emotional state induced in it by the speaker (14ff.). Appropriateness was considered by Quintilian to be the most important quality, for without it purity, clarity, and embellishment are vain (11.1.2, and ff.), and he promises a lengthy treatment to aid the beginner (5); the rule is to judge what is suitable 'in conciliando, docendo, movendo iudici' (6), and in particular attention must be paid to the speaker's character, especially his moral quality (16ff.), the character of any fictitious personages introduced (31ff.), the character (especially rank and status) of the hearers (43ff.), the time and place (46ff.), and the emotion consonant with the pleaders' circumstances (48ff.). Fancy tricks of style are of no use to the man arraigned on a capital charge; they will simply alienate the audience's sympathy (49–50). Cicero's Crassus remarks


45 The pretty well universal ancient assumption in literary criticism (and teaching of composition) that any discourse has content independent of language, is clearly shared by the Stoa; and thus can win no place in an attempt to isolate and explain crucial differences between Stoic and professional rhetoric.
that ‘non omni causae nec auditori neque personae neque tempori congruere orationis unum genus’ (de or. 3.210), and Cicero himself argues that propriety is to be observed ‘non in sententis solum sed etiam in verbis; non enim omnis fortuna non omnis honos non omnis auctoritas non omnis aetas nec vero locus aut tempus aut auditor omnis eodem aut verborum genere tractandus est aut sententiarum, semperque in omni parte orationis ut vitae quid deceat considerandum; quod et in re de qua agitur positum est et in personis et eorum qui dicunt et eorum qui audiunt’ (orator 71ff.).

In contrast, Stoic appropriateness is appropriateness simply to the object in question, the πράγμα: no other factors are mentioned. The true nature and quality of the subject of discourse have to be straightforwardly communicated. An audience’s assent cannot be secured by winning its pity or admiration, or by arousing its anger, or by playing on its snobbery or stupidity or vulgarity. Accordingly, the orator’s language cannot be put to the service of any of these low purposes. Yet it can quite properly be deployed to create impressions whose content partly constitutes an accurate communication of an object’s true nature precisely by embodying, and (if assented to) arousing in the hearer, a good emotional response to that object. Base and irrational emotions are not to be felt by the speaker or aroused by him in his audience, but certain subjects of discourse would not be treated as they deserve if their moral qualities were not permitted to be appropriately emotive; and allowance will also, I suppose, be made for acceptable emotional responses to the natural objects of preference, such as health and homeland. At the same time, no attention will be paid to speaking as plausibly as one can by adapting one’s style, though presumably clarity is not to be sacrificed. (Regrettably, the terseness of the Diogenes account will allow nothing more than speculation as to the way the virtues are to be balanced one against the other to produce harmonious discourse.)

Conciseness, or brevity, is the outstanding peculiarity of the Stoic theory. It is the one new item the Stoics have added to Theophrastus’ list (Cicero, orator 79) of the linguistic virtues. Crassus mentions only purity, lucidity, ornament, and appropriateness as the features he believes good discourse must boast (de or. 3.37). The professional rhetoricians describe brevity as a desirable feature only in certain sections of a rhetorical speech, above all in the narrative (cf. p. 394 above), and in the parts of the epilogue devoted to a summary of the case (so for example Quintilian 6.1.2) and to the appeal to the audience’s pity (ad Her. 2.50, Cicero, de inv. 1.109). In fact it is permitted wherever it may be appropriate elsewhere: in a fairly straightforward case a lengthy introduction, for example, or a lengthy summary, would tell against the speaker’s interests, by boring the audience and implying it was too stupid to remember what has been said. The ad Herennium (2.47ff.) and Quintilian

46 Cf. orator 71–2: ‘Quod et in re de qua agitur positum est et in personis et eorum qui dicunt et eorum qui audient. Itaque hunc locum longe et late patentem philosophi solent in officiis tractare – non cum de recto ipso disputant, nam id quidem unum est…’. The philosopher most closely associated with the topic of duty is Panaetius, and it looks likely that Cicero has at least been inspired by Panaetius’ work in his own analysis of the oratorical qualities appropriate to each character and each station in life; Panaetius’ ethical scheme for adapting one’s behaviour to one’s rôle is outlined at de off. 1.107ff. Whether Panaetius adapted his notion of individual appropriateness to discourse is, as far as I know, not recorded, although he was a teacher of the famous Stoic Rutilius Rufus, whose oratory was so unsuccessful: see pp. 426–7. The unorthodoxy of the sort of appropriateness the Stoics may have had in mind is perhaps illustrated by Zeno’s claim that ‘nihil esse obscenum, nihil turpe dictu’ (SVF 1.77): since there is nothing naturally obscene, language used to denote it cannot be obscene either. Hence there will be no need for polite circumlocutions, whatever the audience or circumstances of utterance.
(6.1.2ff.) offer especially informative accounts of the value and place of brevity in the oration.

For the Stoa, conciseness is always and by definition a desirable characteristic of discourse. The descriptions of Stoic style in Cicero support this surprising fact; but he offers no explanation for it, and neither does Diogenes. Malcolm Schofield’s attempt to explain Zeno’s famous emphasis on brevity suggests the line to take: ‘If you want an argument to be as safe and strong as possible, then you must keep it as short as possible. Safeness and strength are at least characteristically the sorts of argumentative virtues looked for by philosophers keen to make their arguments probative.’47 The Stoic orator must ensure that the linguistic presentation of the arguments he relies on so heavily is as brief as the arguments themselves or as their constituent premises – those ‘tiny little questions, like pinpricks’ (cf. p. 402 above) – so that the arguments’ content and structure are accurately conveyed through the medium of words. More conventionally, narrative, summary, and other continuous discourse must be brief, comprising only ‘the essentials for signifying the matter’, as Diogenes reports, but the Stoic orator’s aim is not to be plausible or lively and entertaining: rather he seems morally bound to offer for assent a reliable record of facts, or a straightforward summary of them and of his argumentation, though couched, where appropriate (and the occasions will be few), in suitably emotive language. Quintilian offers a useful contrast; having stated that the narrative must employ only ‘just what is needed’, he corrects himself: ‘Quantum opus est autem non ita solum accipi volo, quantum ad indicandum sufficit, quia non inornata debet esse brevitas, aliqqui sit indocta; nam et fallit voluptas et minus longa quae delectant videntur’ (4.2.46; cf. 21, and his definition of narrative at 31, 33). There is certainly no evidence to suggest that the Stoa thought digressions and longwindedness were to be avoided because doing so would help a speaker hold his audience’s attention.

More puzzling is the first virtue in the list, Hellenism. It surely cannot be treated merely as a means to clarity, which is how Philodemus seems to approach it (rh. 1, p. 157, col. 15.6–p. 158, col. 16.4 Sudhaus) and how Cicero’s Crassus certainly does (de or. 3.38). (Hellenism as originally conceived by Aristotle embraces clarity: rh. 3.5.1407a19ff.) Perhaps it is a minor concession to the ordinary orator’s concern to ingratiate himself with his audience, since solecisms and barbarisms earn contempt and neglect (so for example Cicero, de or. 3.52), but I find this implausible. A more ambitious – and tentative – at least partial explanation of Hellenism’s stylistic importance would look instead to Stoic semantics. Grammar tries to provide rules for the formation of correct sentences in a given language. Stoic syntax, however, falls under the heading of the structure of complex λεκτά, as Frede has shown,48 not under the part of dialectic dealing with parts of speech. Someone who wants to speak correct Greek must therefore also study the syntax of λεκτά. The dialectician must know how to form correct complex λεκτά, as well as the arguments which are sequences of λεκτά of one sort, the statement of ἀξίωμα (thus yielding the Stoic equivalent of WFFs: cf. perhaps Sextus, P.H. 2.231, 235). He must also, of course, however, be able to express them in language. Accordingly he must master both syntax at the level of the λεκτόν, and the nature of and distinctions between the

47 Art. cit. (n. 22), 56.
various linguistic items, the parts of speech, which correspond to or signify different types of λεκτάν and which are strung together to form sentences. In brief, Hellenism is required to regulate the articulation of thought and argument in language. The orator shares this need and this knowledge.\footnote{A vaguer, but still powerful factor will I believe have been the Stoic assumption of the fundamental rationality of language, which reflects – albeit imperfectly, given its corruption over time – the rational ordering of the cosmos, down to the level of individuals. On the one hand, the structure of sentences, as noted above, is largely determined by the syntax of λεκτά, which in turn appropriately articulates externally obtaining relations between particular objects with reference to their actions, passivities, and states; Chrysippus’ interest in anomaly probably testifies to an acceptance of a ‘basic regularity’ in the relationship between language’s formal and semantic characteristics: see Frede (art. cit., n. 48), 68–9. Stoic Hellenism is the expertise which extracts rules and underlying principles from linguistic data on the assumption that how we speak is ultimately determined, in content and structure, by reason; and will even go so far as to modify usage where the primitive correspondence has been unacceptably blurred or distorted. On the other hand, Chrysippus’ reliance – on a vast scale – on everyday usage, in his de anima and On the passions (see n. 61) as support for Stoic (moral) psychology, rests on the assumption that language can be a reliable guide to the nature and quality of things in the world, such as the seat of the ruling part of the soul. Stoic etymology (reported e.g. by Augustine, de dialectica, ch. 6) attempts to provide rules for these correspondences at the level of the individual word.}

It is especially striking that the only Stoic concession to elegance or ornament is negative: the avoidance of ‘vulgarity’ or ‘colloquialism’, ἰδιωτισμός. Unfortunately it is unclear precisely what the orator is supposed to avoid, for ἰδιωτισμός and the associated verb ἰδιωτεύειν seem to have no agreed meanings fixed independently of what individual authors assign to them, not always self-consistently. A passage from On the Sublime (ch. 31) will serve as an illustration. ‘Longinus’ praises ἰδιωτισμός for its effectiveness, on the grounds that ‘colloquial language’ is familiar from everyday life, and can thus be ‘far more revealing than beauty (κόσμος)’: and ‘what is customary already carries more credence’ (τὸ δὲ σύνηθες ἡδὴ πιστότερον) (§1). Herodotus is quoted to show how difficult a trick of style it is to use correctly: his language ‘approaches very near to the common man, but does not vulgarise because it is (said) in a meaningful way’ (ἔγγος παραξύει τὸν ἰδιώτην, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἰδιωτεύει τῷ σημαντικῷ [e.g. λέγεθαι]).\footnote{See also D. A. Russell’s note ad loc., ‘Longinus’ On the Sublime (Oxford, 1964), p. 151.} Elsewhere ‘Longinus’ criticises a word in Herodotus for being ἰδιωτικός and ἄσεμος (43.1), but his admiration for ‘colloquialism’ is not unique: other professional rhetoricians provide rules for readmitting it because of its forcefulness and its potential for humour and inventive. The elder Seneca (contr. 7 pr. 5), in a critical analysis of the style of Albucius Silus, comments: ‘Among the oratorical excellences colloquialism is rarely advantageous. Great restraint is needed, and the right opportunity. [Albutius] employed it with varying success...Nor is it remarkable if a virtue so close to vice is so hard to come by’. Quintilian agrees that colloquialism has to be used sparingly, but allows that it can be extremely effective, and regrets the artificial refinement of contemporary oratory ‘which deprives itself of a large part of the language’ through its fastidiousness (8.3.21–3).

The Stoic position is accordingly difficult to reconstruct. By merely avoiding vulgarity the orator would escape ridicule, and at the very least gain a hearing. Alternatively, it should perhaps be borne in mind that one may be called on to speak in many contexts, from a noisy public assembly or courtroom to a dignified Privy Council; to avoid ἰδιωτισμός is to eschew language which one’s hearers would think beneath them. If so, if ἰδιωτισμός is not a fixed quantity, but determined by audience usage and expectation (just as ‘Longinus’, Seneca, and Quintilian all decide for...
themselves what counts as ‘colloquial’), it is a welcome sign of flexibility in the list of the Stoic virtues of style.

I doubt, however, that merely eschewing what other people judge to be ‘vulgar’ or ‘colloquial’ is the point of the Stoic directive. We have seen that because of his self-imposed moral code the Stoic orator will standardly defend his chosen – virtuous – policies, or plead his case in court, by stating or arguing for the truth. ‘From falsehoods there arises mental disturbance, from which grow many bad emotions and causes of instability’ (Diogenes 7.110). It seems he cannot appeal to what Stoicism regarded as the bad emotions, the παθη, grief, fear, pleasure, and desire, or to the intricate moral pathology of anger, pity, hatred, jealousy, Schadenfreude, and so on (cf. e.g. Diogenes 7.110ff.), which are his unphilosophical rival’s bread and butter, and which are wrong precisely in that they can give rise to a bad character and to evil actions (cf. e.g. SVF 3.389). The only good emotions (varieties of εὐπάθεια) are those which the sage feels (Diogenes 7.116), joy, watchfulness, and wishing, with an understandably limited appeal to the ordinary public: a far cry indeed from Quintilian’s remark that the defendant will make his hearers weep with pity, and the prosecutor make them shed tears of indignation (6.1.9).

Such restraints strictly regulate Cato’s habitual use, ‘in the Stoic manner’, of ‘rhetorical embellishments’ when he speaks of ‘greatness of soul, of self-control, of death, of the whole glory of virtue, of the immortal gods, of love for one’s country’ (para. stoic. 3). These must be the subjects a Stoic would think demand and deserve a more eloquent, less austere language, regardless of hearers’ expectations or prejudices, and must be described in such a way as to try to evoke the restrained and rational emotions appropriate to their moral quality or ‘preferred’ status (though Cicero goes on to imply, and I think with reason, that they are picked out for special treatment because they are far more likely to find favour with a lay, Roman audience than are the notorious paradoxa Cicero himself goes on to defend).51

Elsewhere, Cato is allowed to extend the stylistic concessions mentioned by Cicero to strictly philosophical discourse (de fin. 3.19) – ‘ita fit cum gravior, tum etiam splendorior oratio’, he remarks; as this accords so ill with the harsh things Cicero has to say about Stoic style elsewhere, one might suspect that the concessions are ad hominem. (Cicero, actually in propria persona, here grants that clarity alone is appropriate for certain topics, which may seem hard to square with his declared ideal of philosophical language at Tusc. Disp. 1.7; but there it is ‘perfectam philosophiam’ which speaks ‘copiose...ornateque’, and then only ‘de maximis quaestionibus’. The whole exchange between Cato and Cicero cannot, accordingly, be simply discounted as an experiment, or an eccentricity, on Cicero’s part.) But now we can see that language which is in some way distinguished from colloquial speech is indeed allowed by the Stoic doctrine of the linguistic virtues. The difficulty is rather Cicero’s claim that it is Cato’s conventional rhetorical training which has provided him with the orator’s conventional weapons, while his Stoicism merely determines when and where he may use them with propriety. The influences on the historical Cato’s rhetoric remain obscure; but Cicero’s bias against what he sees as the stylistic impoverishment of the Stoa could well have blinded him to the fact that Cato might have got what he needed, stylistically as well as ethically, from the Stoa: for Stoic discourse is single, with dialectic and rhetoric conforming to the same requirements. There was no specifically

51 Death may look like the ‘odd man out’ in this list of approved objects, but no doubt Cato’s rhetorical skills would be deployed to represent death as no evil, and even as a duty in certain circumstances, and to evoke the (unusual) emotional responses appropriate to this Stoic perspective.
rhetorical Stoic discourse, and accordingly no training course in stylistics especially designed for Stoic orators.

It is impossible to pretend that what is known of Stoic stylistics looks satisfactory, even by ancient standards. It appears rigid at best and unworkable at worst. Conciseness, for instance, is not a single quality: are all varieties of conciseness, from pregnant Aristotelian brevity to sententious Senecan brevity, equally acceptable? Is use of imagery permissible provided lucidity benefits, even if such imagery exceeds the strict limits of appropriate κατασκευή? No practical application of these principles – no Stoic oration – has survived, and mere speculation is worthless. It is purely by accident – or rather I would say through carelessness – that the rhetorician Theon of Alexandria seems to have preserved one small but important detail of theory. It seems that at least some Stoics regarded one of the traditional tropes or figures, Hyperbaton or transposition, which occurs when normal word-order is disturbed, not as an indispensable aid in creating prose rhythm (which is how the school rhetoricians regarded it: ad Her. 4.44; Quintilian 8.6.62, cf. 2.14–15), nor as producing tension and excitement (which is how the author of the treatise On the sublime analyses it: 22.3–4), but as producing inclarity – and thus as downright undesirable.

Theon of Alexandria is rather an obscure figure. He may have been a contemporary of Quintilian, or lived later, in the 2nd century A.D.52 Of the seven works ascribed to him by the Suda, only the progymnasmata survives, a teacher’s handbook of the preliminary exercises which formed the preparatory stage of instruction in rhetoric, including the writing of various kinds of narrative, the topic under which obscurity is discussed.53 Somewhere Theon found a Stoic classification of ambiguity types, and he records it, or part of it, within his own account of the causes of obscurity in the language of narrative (81.30–83.13). The list is said to be the work of ‘the dialecticians’, but its Stoic origin is proved by its close resemblance to a classification of ambiguities recorded by Galen in his little treatise On linguistic sophisms and there explicitly attributed to ‘the more sophisticated Stoics’.

Theon apparently has little philosophical or dialectical background, though he expresses a belief that the young orator needs to study philosophy (2.59.1ff. Sp.; cf. 65.26ff.), and it is unclear whether he came across the classification in some Stoic stylistic, perhaps rhetorical treatise, or secondhand, in some earlier, non-Stoic handbook itself employing Stoic material. One of the internal features supporting the

54 On linguistic sophisms, περὶ τῶν παρὰ τῆν λέξιν συφομάτων, vol. 14.582–98 Kühl; references by the page and line number of the edition of Gabler (Diss., Rostock, 1903) and the page number of S. Ebbesen’s edition (Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistic Elenchi (3 vols., Leiden, 1981), II. 1ff.). The Stoic classification is at ch. 4, 12.10ff. G. 21–5 E. The ‘more sophisticated Stoics’ are mentioned at 12.18 G 21E. Theon’s wording at 81.30–1 might lead one initially to believe that the only sort of ἐμφασία isolated by the dialecticians is that παρὰ τῆν κοινῆν, and that therefore the rest of the classification is Theon’s own, or is drawn from some other source; but the closeness of the resemblance between this list and the one reported by Galen rules out either possibility – Theon’s clumsiness of expression is simply misleading. For a full discussion of both classifications, see my The Stoics on Ambiguity (Cambridge, forthcoming).
first alternative is the presence of Hyperbaton and Interpolation (μεταξολογία, 82.19–25). Interpolation is something of an oddity, and I will come back to it in a moment. But Hyperbaton is familiar enough. It crops up in most rhetorical handbooks, usually as a figure, sometimes as a trope. Typically it has two forms, ἄναστροφή or reversio, which occurs when the normal order of two words is reversed, as in ‘meicum’ or ‘secum’ or ‘quibus de rebus’; and hyperbaton proper, when normal word-order is more disturbed. Both sorts are praised by Quintilian and by the author of the ad Herennium as attractive, especially as helping achieve good prose rhythm. Hyperbaton gets its chief listing in Quintilian’s classification of tropes, but he does mention ‘excessive and confused hyperbata’ as one of the sources of obscurity, when words are transposed too far from their natural position (Quintilian: 8.6.62ff., 2.14–15; ad Her. 4.44).

Yet this cannot have been the Stoic policy. What Theon is reporting is a list of types of ambiguity, and by no stretch of the imagination could Hyperbaton be classed tout court as a mode of equivocation. In fact Theon does at once come out and say that Hyperbaton is acceptable so long as it is not confused or overused. Instead he advises that ‘one must take care too not to use hyperbata, of which Thucydides uses a good many; for we do not disapprove of the genus of hyperbaton altogether, for as a result of it expression becomes varied and not colloquial’ (82.19–23). Theon is plainly correcting himself, belatedly qualifying an initial sweeping injunction. Compare his comment on digressions in narrative: ‘One must avoid too inserting lengthy digressions in the middle of a narrative’ (80.27–8). Here the fact that only a limited restriction is being advised is perfectly clear: the important adjective μακράς, ‘lengthy’, occupies a prominent position at the end of the sentence (an example of Hyperbaton, incidentally), and is not hived off into a separate clause, as Theon’s qualification is in the case of Hyperbaton. Theon has realised, too late, that what he is advising his readers to instruct their young charges is hardly rhetorical orthodoxy, and not to his taste at all: he would know Hyperbaton primarily as a trope or a figure, a valued weapon in the orator’s stylistic armoury. It is noteworthy that only here in the classification are first-person verbs employed, though Theon uses them quite freely elsewhere (e.g. 59.18ff. (in the introduction), 83.18ff. (in the treatment of conciseness in narrative)).

There are other peculiarities. The reference to Thucydides’ notorious penchant for hyperbata is of course too commonplace for its authorship to be settled on purely internal grounds (cf. e.g. ‘Longinus’, On the sublime 22.3; for examples used by rhetoricians, see e.g. R.G. 2.438.15ff.; 3.38.13–14, 17ff., 136.19–20 Sp.); but one looks in vain elsewhere in the Stoic classification for the sort of stylistic advice Theon appends to his description of Hyperbaton. His account of Interpolation is strikingly similar in form and theme. Theon states: ‘<One must be careful> not <to use> interpolations either, that is, lengthy ones (καὶ ταῦτα διὰ μακροῦ); for quick resumption of the account does no injury to one’s listeners’ (81.23–5). Once again, an initial blanket ban is partially lifted. The term μεταξολογία is extremely rare in rhetorical texts, which is perhaps significant in itself. It appears only in a pair of the numerous definitions of Hyperbaton, being applied either to the reversal of the order of a pair of words, or to the insertion of a word between the halves of a compound (R.G. 3.170.14–17; 188.5ff.; these two rhetoricians seem not to have distinguished ἄναστροφή from Hyperbaton proper). The rule in the rhetorical textbooks is to list all insertions, whether of a word or of groups of words, or of complete sentences, as one species of the genus Hyperbaton, and not as a distinct figure or trope (so for example R.G. 2.438.1ff. – indeed Hermogenes neglects all hyperbata save insertions;
There is also a broad distinction between Hyperbaton in a single word (division and interruption of a compound, transposition of a single term) and in a word-complex (λόγος), where any disturbance of the usual order seems to count as Hyperbaton (e.g. R.G. 3.48.5ff., 197.20ff. Sp.). I have mentioned both insertions and disturbances of structure as it is not clear where the Stoics' Hyperbaton ends and their Interpolation begins. What is undoubtedly unusual is listing them separately. In the rhetoricians the tendency is rather to list Hyperbaton proper and ἀναστροφή separately: so 3.48.5ff., 18–20, 197.20–28, 10–18 Sp. Theon's Stoics might be distinguishing between, on the one hand, changes in the word-order of a single linguistic group, and, on the other, the insertion of extraneous material into an otherwise unaltered sentence. This tends to confirm that μεταξυλογία in this context is an authentically Stoic term.

The treatment of the next item in Theon's list, Elleipsis, is very brief (82.25–6), and evidence from elsewhere in the proggymnasmata tends to suggest that Theon's dialecticians did not accept Elleipsis — omission of some word or words — as an ambiguity mode at all. Further, Theon does not say or imply that any of these three items causes ambiguity (Elleipsis is simply said to be πρός τὴν σαφῆνειαν, 82.25–6), as he does for all the other items in his list, and he does not illustrate them, though examples are offered of all the other kinds. After Elleipsis, Theon appears to return to the Stoic classification of ambiguity types, for the item which comes last in his classification is last in Galen's too, and it is very fully described (82.26–83.13).

What seems to have happened is that Theon has wrongly inserted into the list of ambiguity types at least two and perhaps three items which simply do not belong here. He realise his error, and tries to undo the damage. Other features of the list very strongly suggest Theon has been tampering with his source, and as Theon is no scholar or doxographer, accuracy and fidelity are not in any case going to be his prime concern. The obvious source for these extraneous items is the Stoic list of causes of obscurity from which the classification of ambiguity kinds was itself taken. No school rhetorician would list Hyperbaton and Interpolation under 'obscurity': but a Stoic rhetorician might. He could argue that any disturbance of normal word-order (and I take it that the Stoa, like all ancient theorists of style, assumed that there is such a thing, just as they assumed that there is such a thing as a normal vocabulary) would only interfere with ordinary language expectations regarding word-order and syntax, and thus serve to draw an audience's attention away from a speaker's meaning. He might also observe, as the author of the treatise On the sublime does in the case of Demosthenes, that Hyperbaton can create emotional tension in an audience by

55 'Obscurity in word-complexes' is said to occur 'when what is said can be understood in several ways, nothing being either added or taken away' (76.24–6). But what Theon is offering here is almost certainly a definition of ambiguity. His brief list here of cases of obscurity in single terms obviously anticipates the longer and more detailed classification at 81.6ff., immediately before the dialecticians' classification of ambiguity types. Theon is surely calling on the same sources for both his treatments of the topic of linguistic obscurity. If so, the 'obscurity in word-complexes' he describes will in fact be a condensed version of the dialecticians' ambiguity: Theon has simply failed to note that they are classifying equivocation in particular, not obscurity in general. And in that case the dialecticians' ambiguity will by definition have excluded Elleipsis.

56 Theon's clumsy introduction to the classification has already been observed (n. 54). Most revealing, perhaps, is Theon's account of the last equivocation type (82.26ff.), which is significantly dissimilar from the certainly genuine description of this kind in Galen, and may very well not merely reflect differences in the original (though admittedly that could well be the case with some other discrepancies between the two sources).
interrupting syntax until the resolution when meaning and structure finally become clear (22.3–4) – but, unlike ‘Longinus’, he would note this fact only with disapproval.

Such a position is surely pretty well untenable in practice. A varied word order can be genuinely in the interests of clarity, above all by allowing emphasis on important words or phrases, and by catching and holding a listener’s or a reader’s attention. Hermogenes goes so far as to call Hyperbaton an ‘instrument of clarity’, δρογανον τῆς σαφνείας, for it allows the speaker or writer to insert into a sentence the explanation he wants to offer for, say, an event or a sequence of events (R.G. 2.438.1ff. Sp., especially 7–8). Quintilian remarks of figures of one sort: ‘adeo sunt virtutes orationis ut sine iis nulla intellegi fere possit oratio’ (9.2.2). The usefulness of tropes and of figures of speech and of thought, when properly applied, seems undeniable. Cicero’s Crassus describes a wide variety of figures and warmly praises their effectiveness in speech (3.202ff.; cf. orator 134ff.). Personification, for example, is often lauded by the professionals for its attention-grabbing brevity. Perhaps the Stoics behind the stylistic theory which Diogenes records were more flexible in their approach. In particular, figured discourse might be justified precisely as a vehicle of clarity and as lifting one’s speech above the level of the vulgar or colloquial; or might be accepted as a concession to clarity, given ordinary human weakness and lack of imagination: Seneca (ep. 59.6) writes: ‘illi qui simpliciter et demonstrandae rei causa eloquebantur parabolis referit sunt, quas existimo necessarias, non ex eadem causa qua poetis, sed ut imbecillitatis nostrae adminicula sint, ut et dicentem et audientem in rem praesentem adducant.’

Chrysippus himself is said to have used rhetorical stylistic devices, and in particular a variety of figures of thought. Fronto complains to Marcus Aurelius that from the point of view of acquiring a good style he (Marcus) is reading all the wrong authors. He is preferring to learn to swim like a frog rather than like a dolphin: for he is reading Diodorus and Alexinus when he should be reading Plato, Xenophon, and Antisthenes. Fronto supports his admonition by describing Chrysippus’ own prose style. The exact meaning of some of Fronto’s jargon is unclear, and it does not appear to correspond perfectly with the Greek translations he appends to the list of Latin terms, but the gist is plain enough: ‘Sit up and pay attention to what Chrysippus himself wants. Is he happy to teach, to point out a thing, define, explain? He is not: instead he magnifies it as far as possible, exaggerates, anticipates objections, repeats, digresses, recurs, asks questions, describes, makes divisions, personifies, adapts his language to another character…Do you not see how he handles practically all the orator’s weapons?’

57 Olympiodorus uses the term ‘interpolation’ where, in one instance, the parenthesis contains an explanation of what Aristotle is saying, in another, an illustration of it: in meteor. 41.23ff., 204.18ff. and 24ff.
58 Elsewhere Seneca expresses a dislike of long and complex sentence-structures (ep. 114.16). But it would be rash to employ Seneca straightforwardly either as an authority for or as an example of approved Stoic style. On the one hand, he can be starkly critical of Stoic style; on the other, the question of the sources for Seneca’s style is a vexed and complicated one. It is rather a matter of saying that such-and-such a piece of Senecan writing or Senecan stylistics betrays signs of Stoic influence. His criticisms of the Stoas sometimes remind the reader forcefully of Cicero’s strictures on the same subject: references in Griffin op. cit. (n. 37), p. 15, n. 1, who also has an informative survey of possible models for Seneca’s own style (13ff.).
59 Fronto, ad M. Antoninum Imp. de eloquentiae liber II, ed. Hout (vol. 1, Brill, 1954), §§16–17, pp. 139–40 (= (part) SVF 2.27). The figures of thought in question seem to be: anticipation (prolepsis), question (interrogatio), personification (prosopopoeia), mimicry (ethopoeia), and perhaps vivid description (evidentia). Amplification is not so much a figure as a generic term for what figures enable the speaker to do: so e.g. Cicero, de or. 3.104ff. – Chrysippus was in fact notoriously prolix: Diogenes 7.180, SVF 2.27, 883.
So little remains of the Chrysippean corpus that it is impossible to check Fronto's assertion with any confidence. The extant book of Logical Questions (Λογικά Ζητήματα) may very well not be a typical work, though a detailed stylistic analysis of, say, the quite extensive remains of the central and far better known de anima would be useful. Fronto's application of standard rhetorical jargon could be inappropriate and distortive; what counts as a specifically rhetorical device is theoretically determined (one ancient theory of language actually labelled all figures of thought, and perhaps of speech too, as fictions). At all events Fronto has provided an invaluable reminder: the stylistic qualities in question are essentials, not essentials. Together they constitute a model, an ideal standard of discourse. How Chrysippus actually wrote (or is perceived to have written) is not to the point.

The main evidence for Stoic style in theory and practice has been assembled and examined; we can now return to the origins of Stoic stylistics, and draw up a final assessment of its eccentricity. The Stoics, as I observed much earlier, probably took over and adapted a doctrine of the virtues of language from the Peripatetic Theophrastus (cf. Cicero, orator 79–80): but there the debt ends. Simplicius reports that Theophrastus in his On the elements of speech 'set in motion' the disciplines, πραγματείας, that concern λέξεις qua λέξεις, rather than qua significant, which is Aristotle's subject-matter in the Categories (cat. 10.24ff. = fr. A.VI.1 (c), p. 15 Maier). These 'disciplines' cover, inter alia, the distinction between strict and metaphorical expression, and what its qualities (ιδέα) are, 'what is "clarity" in expressions (λέξεις), what "elevation", what "pleasing" and "persuasive"' (10.30–11.1). (Unfortunately it is unclear how much of what Simplicius reports is authentically Theophrastean.) This apparent interest in the entire realm of discourse might perhaps be thought characteristic of Hellenistic philosophy before (to put the matter crudely) the professional rhetoricians and grammarians had pretty well carved linguistic studies up between them, leaving only the semantic crumbs to the philosopher. Another important fragment puts paid to that idea: 'As the orientation (σχέσεως) of language (λόγος) is two-fold, both toward the hearers (to whom it also signifies something) and toward objects (πράγματα), poetics and rhetoric are concerned with its orientation toward the audience...but the philosopher will primarily be interested in language's orientation toward objects, refuting what is false and demonstrating what is true' (fr. A.VI.1(b), pp. 14–15 Maier (with omissions), fr. 65 Wimmer, fr. 24 Schmidt). As a comparison with Aristotle's Rhetoric will show, Theophrastus has here formalised and schematised the teaching of his master, just as he does the Aristotelian doctrine of the stylistic virtues.

Aristotle's attitude to rhetoric is a curious mixture of contempt and sophistication. He is firm that the whole business of rhetoric is πρὸς δόξαν ('directed toward appearance', or perhaps 'reputation': cf. Plato, Apology 35b9). It is δίκαιον to look for nothing in a speech ἢ ὡστε μῆτε λυπεῖν μῆτ' ἑυφραίνειν, and to fight one's case only αὐτοῖς...τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὡστε τάλα ἐξω τοῦ ἀποδείξει περιέργα ἑστίν. The fragments of a book of this work are preserved as PHerc 307. It seems to be a more or less random collection of problems in dialectic (so D. N. Sedley, 'The Negated Conjunction in Stoicism', Elenchus 5 (1984), 311ff., at 314: 'The Logical Questions appears to consist in a series of aporetic problems in logic without any attempt at definitive solutions'). Form, content, and style all suggest that it may have been little more than a private notebook. (See my unpublished Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, 'The Stoics on Ambiguity', pp. 203ff.).

60 Galen's de placitis Platonis et Hippocratis (ed. P. De Lacy, 2nd. ed. with tr. and commentary, Berlin, 1981) preserves considerable fragments of these works; those of the de anima were assembled by von Arnim in what he believed to be their original order at SVF 2.911; those of the On the passions are collected at 3.461ff. 62 Cf. R.G. 3.11.18ff. Sp.
minimum requirement is clarity, so that one’s δδασκαλία gets across; the rest is φαντασία...καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἄκροατήν: διό οὐδὲίς οὕτω γεωμετρεῖν διδάσκει (3.1, 1404a1ff.). In an oration language must be made exotic or unusual, ξένη: θαυμαστάι γὰρ τῶν ἀπότων εἰσὶν, ἕδυ δὲ τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἑστιν (3.2, 1404b10ff.). The key is to appear to be natural, while not being so (18–20). Success means that ἔσται τε ξενικὸν καὶ λανθάνειν ἐνδέξεται καὶ σαφῆνει: αὕτη δ’ ἦν ἣ τοῦ ῥητορικοῦ λόγου ἀρετὴ (35–7).

Aristotle identifies one complex excellence of (rhetorical and poetical) language: ὀρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετή σαφῆ εἶναι (σημειών γὰρ τι ὁ λόγος ἐστι, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοὶ οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἔργον), καὶ μὴ ταπεινῶ τοῦ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν (3.2.1404b1–4; 3.5 offers instead a complex ‘principle’ of language comprising elements of clarity and purity, but the differences between the two treatments are not important here). It is this which Theophrastus has analysed into the familiar four ἀρεταῖ, a small initial contribution to that peculiar rigidity – over-subtlety combined with insensitivity – which infects much of ancient stylistics. Like the Stoa, Theophrastus seems to have intended good discourse to have all four excellences, just as Aristotle’s unitary ἀρετή characterises all good language, even though poetic and rhetorical discourse meet its criteria in importantly different ways. But what Aristotle saw as the inherent deficiency of rhetorical discourse – its audience-dependency, its need to please and not merely inform, its low emotionalism – has apparently been accepted, and its irreconcilable incompatibility with the language of the philosopher and the scientist has been reduced to the anodyne status of a mere differentia.

Theophrastus has altered, not merely developed, Aristotle’s teaching, apparently an unusual step for him in this field. If early Stoics knew of Aristotle’s work in the field, though, they wanted no truck with it either. It is not merely that they prescribed more than clarity for philosophical (indeed any) discourse: rather they refused to acknowledge any important distinction at all between the discourse of the philosophy school and that of the lawcourt or assembly. It is not surprising that they also entirely failed to absorb the conventional distinctions described earlier between various types of oration and between styles of discourse within orations.

We have seen some of the large and perhaps insoluble difficulties posed by the details of Stoic stylistics. Two features of the broader picture also refuse to fall altogether happily into place.

So far I have been concentrating on Stoic rhetoric as the province of the wise man, as a science. It is a well-attested Stoic tenet that the sage is the one true orator, and that rhetoric is a science and a virtue (cf. p. 406 above). Yet we have Plutarch’s evidence that Chrysippus defined rhetoric as a τέχνη or ‘expertise’ of some sort (St. rep. 1047A). Now Plutarch’s sole interest is in convicting Chrysippus of inconsistency – despite his detailed treatment of delivery, Chrysippus affirms later in the very same work that such things as hiatus are to be ignored, and so too are ‘certain unclarities and omissions and solecisms’ (1047B) – and not in unbiased reportage of

63 For a survey of Theophrastus’ debt to Aristotle in matters of diction, delivery, and almost certainly style as well, see Innes, art. cit. (n. 7).

64 Unfortunately the text is problematic; the most plausible reconstruction has Chrysippus refer to rhetoric’s subject-matter as κόσμων εἰρομένου λόγου καὶ τάξιν, ‘order and arrangement of continuous discourse’. (In passing I would point to a possible connection with Ἑρώτας 504b.) The phrase ‘continuous discourse’ (if it is authentic) recalls both the λόγου ἐν διεξάγει of Diogenes 7.42 and the Stoic definition of rhetoric preserved by Sextus (M. 2.6). The description itself seems at once too vague and too restrictive: not sufficiently technical, yet excluding such matters as vocal modulation, gestures, and facial expressions, which Plutarch asserts Chrysippus did indeed discuss.
Chrysippus' views on rhetoric. But on this occasion at least Chrysippus does seem to have made rhetoric an expertise, and Diogenes of Babylon appears to have referred to it as one of a number of expertises (Philodemus rh. 2.211.9ff. S. = SVF 3.II.117). Chrysippus' own On rhetoric is listed in the bibliography partially extant in Diogenes under a subsection of ethical works which are concered with 'common reason [i.e. rationality common to men and gods], and the skills and virtues constructed from it' (7.201–2 = SVF 2.17, p. 9.20ff.). Quintilian (2.17.2) asserts that 'the Stoics and Peripatetics agree for the most part that rhetoric is an ars'. Further – and this is the second reason for puzzling over the Plutarch passage cited earlier – one of the distinguishing characteristics of an expertise appears to be that it has an end or τελος (finis), which sciences lack. But the extensive literature expounding and rebutting (mostly New Academic) criticisms of rhetoric's widely-contested pretensions to the status of an expertise – and one of the chief points made against rhetoric was that it has no definite 'end' – never adverts to what would surely be a remarkably unorthodox position: that the expertise which is Stoic rhetoric has no 'end'. If Stoic rhetoric really is an expertise, it should by definition have an 'end'. Why, then, is there no record of it, when so much material on the topic has survived?

The question is not a trivial one, for two reasons. First, although expertises and sciences are similar in that they are both bodies of organised knowledge, in the form of systematically-arranged 'theorems', sciences, unlike expertises, are the sole province of the wise. Rhetoric qua science is a virtue, and virtues, again unlike expertises, do not admit of degrees (SVF 2.393): everyone can be more or less proficient at an expertise, but every sage is as good and virtuous and knowledgeable as every other. Sextus (M. 2.6) reports explicitly that although the Stoa and the Academic Xenocrates appear to share a definition of rhetoric, 'the science of speaking well', Xenocrates simply meant 'the expertise of speaking well' but the Stoics conceived of science as 'the holding of firm apprehensions, and naturally present only in the sage' (on science being the province of the wise, see also M. 7.150ff.). If the Stoa conventionally defined rhetoric as such some sort of expertise, one would expect Sextus, with access to (inter alia) a whole array of New Academic arguments against rhetoric's technical pretensions, to know about it.

65 Zeno's definition of 'expertise', 'a system of apprehensions organised together to some useful end in life' (SVF 1.73), became standard in many later texts (e.g. Sextus, M. 2.10; SVF 2.93, 94, 95). Chrysippus' and Cleanthes' definitions (Olympiodorus in Gorg. 12, pp. 69.26–70.3 Westerink) are similar. Definitions of 'science' stress its stability and unchangeability, but never mention an 'end': Sextus, M. 7.151; Diogenes 7.47; SVF 2.117. Stoic sapientia is not like 'the other expertises' because its end lies in activity, as with dancing or acting (de fin. 3.24–5); but this only confirms that expertises all have some sort of end. The sage is said to have an 'expertise of life' (e.g. Sextus, M. 11.199), but this synoptic expertise will not be on all fours with ordinary-range expertises, which each comprise a narrow set of theorems directed to a particular goal within the context of life as a whole.

66 The most comprehensive survey of arguments against rhetoric's technical status (strictly, against its existence) is Sextus, M. 2; Quintilian presents and attempts to refute a fair selection at 2.15ff. and 12.1ff. For a favourable review of Sextus' criticisms, see J. Barnes, 'Is Rhetoric an Art?', DARG newsletter 2/2 (Fall 1986), 2ff.

67 Sextus, M. 2.48–59 sets out to prove that rhetoric has no subject-matter, διηλη. At 56–7 Sextus gives three grounds on which the orator might be said to frame 'fine language', all of which he goes on to reject; the second and third together almost cover the area of the Stoic stylistic virtues (appropriateness alone is missing). Sextus concludes that 'therefore rhetoric's job is not to produce fine language and speaking well (ῥός εἰτ λεγεῖν)’ (58). One might at first glance think this a poor sort of argument against Stoic rhetoric; but Sextus might well regard it as a good tactic to attack the Stoa for paying even the feeblest attention to matters of style, and for restricting their 'speaking well' by any stylistic criteria at all. If this is Sextus' main individual
This whole issue has fundamental consequences for how we conceive of Stoic rhetoric. In the hands of the wise expertises may become ‘quasi-virtues’ (SVF 3.111, cf. 294, 562), but the evidence describing rhetoric as a virtue is not in the least provisional. Given the differentia between expertise and science already described, it would be a plainly inadequate response that a science is actually a species of expertise: the same system of rhetorical theorems could not be both an expertise and a science. The usual Stoic definition of an expertise, attributed to Zeno, describes the end simply as ‘useful in life’, and says nothing about its moral nature; something similar seems to be implied by Cleanthes’ and Chrysippus’ definitions. Rhetoric strictly conceived cannot be an expertise because of the contradiction between the morally neutral conception of expertise and the morally loaded duty of participating correctly in politics; but the rhetoric which is an expertise can be made (more) morally acceptable by being made to share as many theorems as possible with oratory-as-science.68 The orator-sage will thus function as an ideal for conduct in the public arena, and his rhetorical knowledge as a paradigm for the expertise which all can exercise. I have chosen to concentrate on rhetoric as a science and a virtue, but the other, technical, rhetoric must not be ignored, especially as it may perhaps represent the Stoa’s attempt to provide practical guidelines to the would-be Stoic orator, who knows he is not a sage but none the less wishes to conduct his public and political life on Stoic lines. On the other hand, the difficulty is not to be glossed over. If rhetoric is a science and a virtue, it is in one important sense removed from the public realm, a strange fate for the science of formal public discourse: if it is a mere expertise, the orator seems to lose his infallibility and invincible authority.69

That Chrysippus at least believed that allowances could be made for unintentional failure to achieve correct rhetorical style is suggested by the passage in Plutarch already cited. Two stylistic features which professional rhetoricians thought the sine qua non of good style, and which, as we saw (p. 410) were sometimes dubbed the
criticism of Stoic rhetoric, it could confirm that it did not have an ‘end’, and in particular that the Stoa did not associate rhetoric with the goal of persuasion. It is unclear to me whether Chrysippus’ definition can be usefully linked with a passage from Sextus (M. 2.43), where ‘certain people’ are reported as holding that there are two sorts of rhetoric, one for the wise, one for ‘middling’ or ‘intermediate men’ (ἐν μέσοις ἄθροισοις). I do not see how μέσοι could be used by a Stoic as co-extensional with ‘ordinary, non-wise’: for it typically designates actions just insofar as they are performable by wise and non-wise alike, not such actions as performable or actually performed by just one of those jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive groups.68 Quintilian’s formulation of the ‘end’ of rhetoric adopts what was originally probably a Stoic scheme, but I doubt that his application is itself Stoic. Quintilian distinguishes between the ‘end’ of rhetoric, ‘speaking well’, and persuasion, which is only a desired consequence, the σκότος (2.17.23). This does not seem to conform to the authentic Stoic end/σκότος scheme: contrast esp. SVF 3.16, Plutarch, comm. not. 1070f, Cicero, de fin 3.22. On the whole issue, see R. Alpers-Gotz, Der Begriffe σκότος in der Stoa und seine Vorgeschichte (Hildesheim, 1976).

Of course the sage is not infallible in any straightforward sense. It is significant that Chrysippus’ formulation of the ‘end’ of life is ‘living in accordance with experience of what happens by nature’ (e.g. Diogenes 7.87). Even the wise cannot always predict what is fated to happen, and thus direct their choices accordingly (cf. Inwood, op. cit. (n. 31), 203ff.); hence they too will sometimes assent to its being merely ‘reasonable’, εὖδογμα, that such-and-such will be the case, and their infallibility actually lies in never failing, where circumstances require it, to preface the propositions to which they assent with this ‘operator’. Similar allowances may perhaps be built into expertises and sciences alike: some at least of their theorems will be guidelines, not substantive and invariable laws. Augustine (SVF 2.106) reports that the Stoics defined dialectic as the solertia disputandi which, like Diogenes 7.48, confirms that it necessarily has an experiential element. Rhetoric might be subject to the same sort of limitations: for example, the sage cannot be sure, only be sure it is reasonable to expect, that this speech will be clear to this audience. But this provision does not help fix the distinction between rhetoric as expertise and as science.
essential virtues of style, Hellenism and clarity – the first two entries in the Stoic list – were it seems not thought essential by Chrysippus. As we noted, he advised disregarding not only hiatus but also 'certain obscurities and omissions and by Heaven solecisms'. (Chrysippus himself was criticised by Galen for solecising: SVF 2.24. 894, p. 245.3ff., cf. inst. log. ch. 4.6.) Chrysippus obscurely advises the policy instead of 'holding fast to what is better'. His unorthodoxy might spring from the conviction that traditionally embarrassing signs of a poor education, such as intermittent lapses of attention to euphony and lucidity, are less serious errors than are the telling lapses of taste, into purple prose or Gorgianic figures, which betray incorrect moral standards. Chrysippus is asking indulgence for the inept or inexperienced but well-intentioned speaker: if his motives are good, some deficiencies are excusable and relatively unimportant.

Quintilian’s rhetorical education (like Cicero’s) is directed to the formation of an ideal orator, the ‘Romanum quemdam sapientem’ (12.2.6–7) who undoubtedly has some Stoic blood in his veins; but Quintilian seems to distance himself consciously from the Stoic model,70 while his appeals to support from the Stoa only on a few disputed points suggest independence elsewhere.

One of the chief areas where Quintilian feels the need for Stoic backing is in his defence of the concessions that the orator – who for Quintilian too must be a vir bonus – will where necessary tell falsehoods and arouse the emotions of his audience (2.17.18ff.; 12.1.36ff.). The permissible falsehood is undoubtedly a Stoic principle, the justification for which has come down, in a rather garbled form, both in Quintilian (12.1.38–9) and in Sextus (M. 7.42–5). Falsehood is acceptable given both that the speaker knows that what he is saying is false, and that he has a good διάθεσις, a condition which the sage alone can meet. Quintilian’s reply to the charges mentioned is worth quoting: ‘Neither of these things is disgraceful (turpe) when it has its origin in a good ratio, and for that reason not a vice either. For it is permitted even to the sage sometimes to say a falsehood, and the orator will of necessity move the judge’s feelings if he cannot otherwise be led to justice.’ When summarising the philosophers’ opposition to emotional appeals in perorations, Quintilian observes: ‘I am less surprised at the philosophers, for whom it is practically a vice to be emotionally moved; nor is it a sign of good character, if the judge is distracted from the truth in this way, nor is it appropriate for a good man to exploit vices. Yet they will admit that emotions are necessary, if truth and justice and the common interest cannot otherwise be secured’ (6.1.7) (cf. pp. 404–5).

Quintilian would of course be wrong to attribute to the Stoa the view that emotions simpliciter are close to vice: it is the πάθος which play that rôle, the excessive impulses uncontrolled by reason or warped and corrupt judgements which lead to wretchedness and vice; vice itself is inconsistency and disharmony in the whole conduct of life (cf. e.g. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 4.29; SVF 3.378, 462).71 The Quintilian passage is interesting because it confirms both that it is normally wrong to stir others’ passions (for the issue

70 Quintilian may perhaps be reacting to the quietist movement in Stoicism that received a hostile response from Cicero and Seneca, and perhaps Panaetius. See further nn. 37, 42.

71 In describing the passions as weak and corrupt judgements I am of course following the Chrysippean moral psychology. A Chrysippean orator would see part of his task as extirpating excessive impulses and irrational judgements (the passions), and his (justified) appeals to the passions as incitements to (bad and vicious) judgements, whereas a Posidonian would rather call for the passions to be controlled by the rational part of the soul, or, in the special case under consideration, urge them against the dictates of reason. But the appeals to reason and the strict demands of morality would remain substantively the same; and it is therefore I think doubtful that this theoretical difference would show itself in the style of rhetoric.
is not whether the speaker is moved, but whether he will move his audience) and that the sage’s perfectly virtuous disposition frees him from that prohibition. (It is illuminating to contrast Antony’s boast that he never feigned emotion in court, and his demand that the orator should always be sincere: de or. 2.189.) The wise man uses ‘crooked’ emotional appeals which are otherwise forbidden in order to bring the jury back to ‘the straight and narrow’ (for the image, see Quintilian 2.17.29: ‘recta via...alio flexu’); perhaps this explains a curious passage in Plutarch where Chrysippus is reported to have said that ‘the sage will speak in public and take part in politics as if wealth were really a good and reputation and health likewise’ (St. rep. 1034B). Presumably – though Quintilian does not say so – he will use appropriate emotional language, for it is no use merely mouthing the words ‘I appeal to your pity’ or ‘I wish to arouse your anger’.

It is one of the less palatable Stoic doctrines that the sage will gull and manipulate his audience as adults deceive little children (the analogy is from Quintilian, 12.1.38, but its context suggests it is Stoic), and that this particular concession to human weakness, to ordinary but morally unacceptable motivation, should have been made at all. Of course the wise do not actually deceive: common people consent out of weakness to the false impressions he presents (Plutarch, St. rep. 1055F ff., esp. 1055F–1056A, 1057B), and the sage does not lie or deceive (SYF 3. 567). Strictly, then, I assume, he cannot be said to persuade either, if persuasion is actually inducing assent, for the sage only presents his hearers with impressions: sometimes they are merely plausible, sometimes they are true and reliable: but assent to them is always in the audience’s power. And he steps uncomfortably outside the boundaries normally imposed on discourse by our duty to others not in using language calculated to move, but in presenting impressions whose emotional charge is that of a passion. I shall return shortly to the question of the wise man’s persuasiveness.

Earlier I tried to indicate some of the radical differences between Stoic and Aristotelian rhetoric and stylistics. Yet Aristotle and the Stoa were, I believe, reacting to a common challenge. Ideal Stoic oratory, I suggest, becomes more intelligible as the Stoa’s partial and one-sided response to the notorious Platonic onslaught on oratory. Whereas Aristotle accepted the practical need for rhetoric, and in particular developed the psychology of persuasion sketched in the Phaedrus (271a ff.), the Stoa conceived of an orator who not only ‘knows just things and is just’ (cf. Gorgias 459c–461c), and wants only to make his fellow-citizens as good as possible (as Socrates, the only politician, wants to do: 513e–514a), but at the same time has a style of discourse barely distinguishable from the Stoic model of philosophical discourse, dialectic – whose historical model is Socratic question-and-answer dialectic.

The Stoic debt is not exhausted by such particular connections as the fact that, for example, Socrates’ account in the Symposium (198d) of the correct procedure for praising anything – say what is true about it, pick out what is fairest and arrange it in the most becoming way – might almost be a programmatic statement for the Stoic encomiast, with suitable interpretations of ‘fairest’ and ‘becoming’. The real point is much broader. The Stoa put a stop to the long-running competition between rhetoric and dialectic – a competition Plato can be fairly said to have started – not by a few cosmetic improvements and not by eliminating rhetoric altogether, but by simply cancelling the fixture: rhetoric and dialectic become two aspects of the same hand, open palm and clenched fist. Rhetoric keeps its own formal distinguishing characteristics (those lengthy speeches derided by Socrates: Gorgias 448c–d, 461e–462a; Protagoras 335c, 336c–d, cf. 338b–c; the public nature of rhetorical discourse
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approved at *Phaedrus* 261b), but abandons its literary pretensions; keeps its necessary association with the wise and good man versed in philosophy (261a, 269d4 ff.; cf. 270a, Pericles) and with the public promotion of virtue and knowledge (*Gorgias* 513e–514a, *Phaedrus* 260d3ff., 277e–278a), but loses its hitherto inalienable association with persuasion (just as words spoken merely *πειθως ἐνεκα* are unacceptable, 277e). I am not supposing that this would be a scholarly and dispassionate reading of the relevant dialogues; and there is no evidence that early Stoics read and reacted to them. But I think it a real possibility that when they sought to rehabilitate oratory – a task imposed by the ethics of service to the community – it was Plato’s damning criticism of oratory which they saw as the challenge, which they tried to meet and neutralise; and they did so by refusing to admit into their own ideal the very aspects of it which had initiated the war between rhetoric and dialectic.

Plato’s *Apology* may have provided the Stoa with a model, though an imperfect one, of the criteria by which an orator is to select his material and his language. The opening sentences of the work explicitly oppose plausibility to truth (17a1–4), and the real orator always speaks the truth (b4–6). Socrates does not offer beautiful, cunningly crafted λόγος (17b8–c2), but asks the judges to ignore the ‘manner’ of what he says and concentrate on deciding whether it is just or not (18a2–6). His concern has always been with the moral welfare of his fellow citizens (29d7–e3, cf. 30a2–4, 36c5–d1); the weapons of conventional oratory are (ostensibly) rejected (38d2ff.) because ‘it seems just neither to ask a favour of a judge, nor to get off by asking it, rather than teaching and convincing him’ (35b9–c1), and Socrates disdains the usual courtroom histrionics (e.g. 34b7ff.). The *Apology* even shows one and the same individual delivering a continuous oration and cross-examining his accuser in a skilful display of dialectical tactics (24c4ff.). We should note too that Socrates’ acceptance of fate (39b7–8, 41d3–5), his affirmation of the providence of the gods (41d2), his confidence that no harm can befall the good man (30c9–d1, 41c9–d2), his wonderful encomium of death (40c4ff.), and his conviction that moral progress is paramount (28b5ff.) look as much part of Stoic orthodoxy as his denial that he is angry with his accusers, even though their behaviour is blameworthy (41d7–e1).

The rift between Plato’s Socrates and the Stoa lies not so much in the facts that Socrates does, of course, indulge in more or less open emotionalism (such as the famous mention of his children), and that his protestations of ignorance and inexperience (in any case, of course, conventional orator’s tricks) are belied by the beauty, rhetorical mastery, and emotional power of the speeches Plato gives him. Socrates is convinced that a good man will not long survive the enmity and hatred generated by political activity, and he has channelled his moral concern into one-to-one philosophical encounters (e.g. 31d6ff.). The Stoa has tried to provide a model of discourse which spans this public/private divide, for the Stoic orator does not have two languages, one public, the other private, one for philosophical inquiry and discussion, the other for the courtroom and assembly. (Socrates asks his judges to excuse his using in court the same sort of language as he employs in ordinary life: e.g. 17c7–d1.) What he refuses to accept is that the possibility of moral improvement for his fellows has to be restricted to Socratic conversations (31e1–32a3). His oratory will play in public the same rôle (*mutatis mutandis*, of course, allowing for the Stoic moral code) of benefitting others as Socrates’ elenctic sessions did in private – and will be just about as popular.

I started with a list of some of the notorious Stoic paradoxes, and I will end with one of my own: Stoic rhetoric is an enormously successful failure. If by ‘rhetoric’ is
meant what the ancients usually meant by ‘rhetoric’ – the theoretical study of the content and techniques of certain modes of formal discourse directed (at least nominally) to effecting persuasion – then not only does the Stoic orator fail, for the most part, in the conventional task of persuading, trying to persuade, or finding persuasive material, but there is no such thing as ‘Stoic rhetoric’; and discussing it is not possible, not (the usual excuse) because there is no evidence, but because there is nothing to talk about. Rather it is the science of speaking well, or correctly, and speaking in accordance with the stylistic virtues must surely enter into any account of what ‘well’ or ‘correctly’ mean in this context; and I have tried to argue that those virtues were chosen because they are supposed to ensure that what is said in court, or in the assembly or the senate, if it is approved and assented to, is assented to precisely because it is a good and sound argument, or a piece of true narrative or description, not because it sounds attractive or is presented in an amusing, novel, moving, or exciting way.

In fact the outstanding peculiarity of Stoic rhetorical stylistics is that it hardly so much as nods at the goal of orthodox oratory. Persuasion or trying to persuade are not what the wise man aims for: but at the same time what is persuasive in his speech is only what as rational, moral agents people should find persuasive – except when, in our ignorance and weakness, we assent to the falsehoods and appeals to emotion he deploys for our own good. The sage will on occasion, as we saw, present merely plausible impressions, but his oratory is not directed toward or informed by the conventional goal of mere plausibility. This is the irreducibly alien heart of that strangest of virtues, Stoic rhetoric. Public discourse is a necessary part of public duty; so far the Stoa conforms to the ordinary conception of oratory as a vital part of the performance of the citizen’s role, at once his burden and his privilege. But ‘speaking well’ is a matter of private success, because it is exercising a virtue, and to that extent is removed from the public realm and freed from public criteria of success and failure.\footnote{One might be tempted to add that the wise cannot even be said to attempt persuasion, since no virtue can be exercised with varying degrees of success. (Many conventional definitions of the goal of the orator or of oratory employ such a ‘failsafe’: what the orator does is, not persuade, but ‘find persuasive material’ or ‘treat a political question as persuasively as possible’ or the like: cf. e.g. Quintilian 2.15.12,13,23ff.). Failure to persuade in any given case would not be damning, since it may only be reasonable, εὐδοκοῦν, not fixed and predictable, that such-and-such a speech or certain components of it will or will not bring success in these particular circumstances (cf. n. 69). I think a more formidable objection to this formulation of the Stoic orator’s goal is that introducing the notion of the ‘plausible’, πιθανόν, would grossly distort our apprehension of his true purpose, benefiting others. The use of falsehood and of appeals to emotions – that is, of mere persuasiveness – has a limited role in his programme, which as a whole is ethically impeccable. Further, Chrysippus stresses that the sage is in no way responsible for our being deceived (Plutarch, \textit{St. rep.} 1055E–1056A), and he surely could not be described as having the intention to deceive, that is, of trying to lead us to assent to what he knows to be false: what the sage wants is not assent, but action and impulse (1057B).}

The remarkable thing is that there were men, Romans, who took this ideal seriously enough to stake their political careers on it: there can be no more striking testimony to the power of that ideal and no more poignant reminder of Stoic oratory’s almost universal uselessness in practice. Rutilius Rufus, a student of Panaetius, is described by Velleius as ‘virum non saeculi sui sed omnis aevi optimum’ (2.13.2), and by Cicero as ‘paene perfectus in Stoicis, quorum peracutam et artis plenum orationis genus scis tamen esse exile nec satis populari assensione accommodatum’; his style of speaking was ‘tristi et severo’ and his speeches ‘ieiunae’ (\textit{Brutus} 113, 114). What is not to be scorned, though, is his devotion to virtue. Rutilius saw his duties as applying equally
to the subjects of Roman rule. As *legatus* to Asia in 943 he earned the respect of the local population for defending them against the avarice of the *publicani* (cf. Cicero, *ad fam.* 1.9.26; *pro Plancio* 35), who accordingly, had him brought to trial on trumped-up charges of extortion (probably in 92 B.C.) and secured his condemnation by bribing the judges. Cicero's Antony blames Rutilius' failure to obtain an acquittal on his refusal to plead his case as Crassus would have done: 'non modo supplex iudicibus esse noluit, aut liberius quidem, aut ornatus quidem, aut simplex ratio veritatis ferebat' (*de or.* 1.229; cf. *Brutus* 114–15). He lived out an honourable exile in Smyrna, and died there in about 77. But none the less he was exiled, and there could be worse fates for the unsuccessful. It is no coincidence that Antony makes Rutilius' historical model no less a figure than Socrates himself, who also disdained rhetoric's aid.73 For students of philosophy, the Stoic orator's successful failure is equally poignant: for he shows us why he fails, shows us the limits of reason.74

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73 So Antony, *de or.* 1.231, cf. Xenophon *mem.* 4.4.4; elsewhere (*Tusc. Disp.* 1.71), Cicero asserts that Socrates had *magnitudo*, greatness of mind, not *superbia*, haughtiness. For other noble Romans in the Stoic mould, see Griffin, op cit. (n. 37), 248–9. Antony's account of the trial is fascinating. Rutilius and his fellow-pleaders have to toe the party-line (almost literally: no foot-stamping permitted), or else be denounced to the Stoic authorities (*de or.* 1.230). The tone is mocking – Antony's Stoa functions as an alternative state, the implacable and authoritarian guardian of morality to which offenders can be 'denounced' – but would lose its bite if Stoic orators did not have the ideal of calm and unemotive delivery and, I would suggest, language as well. On Rutilius, cf. G. L. Hendrickson, 'The Memoirs' of Rutilius Rufus', *Classical Philology* 28 (1933), 153–75.

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