

EVIL IN THE FINE-TUNED WORLD

EBRAHIM AZADEGAN

*Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, IRAN
School of Analytic Philosophy, Institute for Fundamental Sciences (IPM), IRAN*

If the world has been fine-tuned for human life, why does that life encompass such calamity and suffering? It seems that in so far as we are impressed by the fine-tuning intuition that the world has been designed for human life, the problem of natural evil gains in urgency. I propose that observing the world from the anthropic point of view is the source of theists' challenge which arises from this tension. Dealing with this challenge I suggest perhaps the world is fine-tuned for God's *telos*, which may be His manifestation of love through sentient beings' pains and emotions.

I. INTRODUCTION

Discoveries in physics and astronomy provide remarkable support for the idea that the universe is 'fine-tuned'—where this means that basic physical constants, the initial conditions of the universe and the fundamental laws of physics, have to be within a certain minuscule range if intelligent life of our kind was to have developed.¹ It is clearly a fact that intelligent life in the form of *homo sapiens* has developed, and that we observe our own flourishing in this world. From this seemingly trivial fact, Carter infers the famous weak and strong anthropic principles:

Weak Anthropic Principle: '[W]e must be prepared to take account of the fact that our location in the universe is *necessarily* privileged to the extent of being compatible with our existence as observers.'²

Strong Anthropic Principle: '[T]he Universe (and hence the fundamental parameters on which it depends) must be such as to admit within it the creation of observers within it at some stage.'³

According to WAP, our location as observers *here and now* shows that our universe has life-permitting and life-containing cosmic parameters; and according to SAP, since our universe has such cosmic parameters it is definitely a life-permitting and possibly (perhaps at some stage) a life-containing universe. Both principles make the same important point that our universe must be compatible with our existence as observers, whether *here and now* (WAP), or *at some stage* (SAP).⁴ Some theist philosophers have interpreted these principles (mainly SAP) as the basis for an important premise in a new teleological argument famously known as the Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA).⁵ The proponents of FTA interpret SAP as saying that the goal of fine-tuning is the life of conscious observers such as human beings, and based on this premise they argue that our universe has been designed and fine-tuned (by God or another intelligent designer) with the *telos* of developing such observers.⁶

According to proponents of FTA, we need an explanation for the fact that our universe is fine-tuned for life whereas universes which permit life are uncommon among the range of possible universes with different laws, constants or initial conditions; and the best explanation thus far suggested is the God hypothesis. Presumably, on monotheistic accounts God would want

there to be human life, namely the lives of free rational beings with whom God can have communication, relationship and share love.⁷ However, from an atheist perspective, the fine-tuning in physical constants, physical laws and the universe's initial conditions has come about by chance. Since there is no good rationale to explain the existence of human beings in a godless world, so that the subjective probability that we exist given theism is greater than the subjective probability that we exist given atheism, proponents of FTA argue that the fact of fine-tuning supports the God hypothesis over naturalism.

There are several objections to FTA, two of which are particularly important: the Anthropic Objection and the Multiverse Objection. The Anthropic Objection starts with the acceptance of SAP: although it is true that if the universe were not fine-tuned we would not be here to observe this fact, this fact needs no explanation since it is impossible that we would observe this if it were not fine-tuned.⁸ In other words, FTA involves a form of Observation Selection Effect (OSE), according to which our necessary limitations as observers affect the conclusion we draw from the evidence. We observe that we are here and we conclude that the constants of physics must be designed for this. But if we are in fact here, then whether there were any design or not, the probability of fine-tuning is 1. So the fact that we are here cannot provide any support for the design hypothesis.

The Multiverse Objection supposes that there could be innumerable universes (whether spatiotemporally related or unrelated) each of which has different physical constants and conditions. Among this multiplicity of universes it is not surprising that in one or another the values of physical constants and conditions are such as to be life-permitting.⁹ The basic point of both types of objection is that SAP and WAP are trivial statements and require no further explanation. It is extremely likely that at least some universes are life-permitting within a very large ensemble of universes.

The response by proponents of FTA to both objections turns mainly on the 'this-universe' reply. What we observe is that we are *here*, living in a fine-tuned world. So our world, this world that we are living in, is fine-tuned to be life-permitting and life-containing. It seems that this very special fact does require explanation, and in focusing on this universe the design hypothesis is preferred to the chance hypothesis.¹⁰ Regarding the Multiverse Objection the same response is available. The multiverse hypothesis might explain why *some-universe-or-other* permits life, but it doesn't explain why our universe, *this* particular universe, permits life.¹¹

In this paper I shall try to show that the this-universe reply makes FTA vulnerable to a new objection arising from the well-known problem of natural evil. I shall show that in order to escape this objection, the relation between FTA and the anthropic principle must be revised.

II. FINE-TUNING AND NATURAL EVIL

FTA as a new design argument ought to empower theism to resist arguments based on its archenemy, namely the problem of evil. Ironically, however, FTA in fact supports the intuition behind the problem of evil: why are so much suffering and evil experienced by human beings in a natural world which God, the omniscient and omnipotent, has fine-tuned for *us* to live in? The problem arises when we focus on the FTA premise that the universe has been designed for *us*. In the traditional form of design arguments there was no focus on the anthropic principle or on human beings as the aim of creation. So, traditional teleological arguments were immune to this charge. However, since FTA fundamentally adopts the anthropic principle it seems reasonable to ask the proponent of FTA to explain seriously and rigorously why is there then so much natural evil. Derek Parfit subtly refers to this point:

It may not be surprising that God chose to make life possible. But the laws of nature could have been different, so there are many possible worlds that would have contained life. It is hard to understand why, out of all these possibilities, God chose to create our world. What is most baffling is the problem of evil. There appears to be suffering which any good person, knowing the truth, would have prevented if he could. If there is such suffering, there cannot be a God who is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good.¹²

Here Parfit refers to the problem of natural evil that arises when we take the fine-tuning intuition seriously. The prominent reply to the problem of natural evil is one that appeals to the constancy and predictability of the natural regularities (which were often thought of as laws of nature) as a requirement for providing a cosmos in which human beings can acquire (experimental) knowledge. These laws on the one hand necessitate natural evils, and on the other hand constitute a world in which we can acquire empirical and even moral knowledge. Swinburne argues that ‘natural evil is needed to give us the choice of whether to acquire knowledge of the good and bad effects of our actions, and indeed in order to allow us to have very well-justified knowledge at all.’¹³ Yet the prerequisite of knowledge here is the constancy and predictability of the world’s regularities, not the evils which might have happened in connection with this constancy and predictability. In order to see the effects of our actions upon other humans or on the natural world we don’t need to suffer natural evils.¹⁴ It seems that in a more fine-tuned world with less natural evil we can still have experimental and moral knowledge. Consider the *Eden World* scenario:¹⁵

Eden is a universe similar to our actual world, in which the causal laws governing the behavior of matter are so finely tuned that there are fewer naturally occurring disasters or calamities, and less horrendous pains. There are less fatal diseases, and no terrible earthquakes, horrifying tsunamis or floods etc., which happen independently of human or other free creatures’ direct or indirect actions or interventions. So it seems that possible worlds like Eden are more suitable and comfortable for human life than our actual world. Of course, Eden is not evil-free. There could be many evils produced directly or indirectly by human beings or other free creatures. Yet in Eden, the goods which outweigh the evils or necessitate the evils are still obtainable. There could be enough moral evil, if required, for the process of soul-making to happen, enough occurring pains to encourage scientific inquiries, and enough suffering to spur people to help each other and show mutual sympathy (the outweighing reasons normally considered or suggested in theodicies). The inhabitants of Eden could help each other to find food and water, and might even engage in wars for these needs. But it must be allowed that ‘the total amount of evil would most likely be less in Eden than in the actual world, not only because there is no natural evil in Eden but also because much moral evil is influenced or caused by natural evil.’¹⁶

The objection to FTA then goes as follows: if God with His unlimited power, knowledge and benevolence has so finely tuned the world’s parameters and conditions, certainly He could have created a world with somewhat different laws and conditions than the present ones which would have produced better situations with less calamity and pain than the actual world.¹⁷

Atheistic philosophers such as William Rowe have used such scenarios to show that there could be possible worlds that are better than the actual world which God has not actualized. By ‘better possible world’ one means a world encompassing more aggregation of *world-good-making* properties such as containing agents with freewill and a suitable degree of freedom of action, or having the capacity for intellectual and scientific striving; as compared to *world-bad-making* properties like natural evils, suffering and pains. There are three types of reply available for theists to this challenge, which can be leveled against our proposed (*Eden*) objection to FTA as well. In the following I shall deal with these three types of response and show that none of

them can weaken our objection to FTA. Theists either follow Leibniz in claiming that the actual world is the best possible world; or maintain that there are multiple unsurpassable worlds and the actual world is among them; or argue that the actual world is a good-enough one among other good possible worlds.¹⁸ The first claim, which regards the actual world as the best possible world is too controversial. A proponent of this type of reply has to show that the Eden world is not better than this world, even though in the monotheistic sacred texts the Eden-like world is introduced as a good world in which Adam and Eve lived before the Fall. The concept of the Fall connotes that Eden world is better than the world we live in after the Fall. How could it be a sort of fall if the Eden world was not better than this world? In addition to this textual irony for the-best-possible-world-advocate, many contemporary philosophers believe there could be no *best* possible world since logically it seems possible to double all instantiations of the world-good-making properties of the supposed best possible world and then construct a new better possible world as well.¹⁹ So we reject the best possible world supposition as many others do.

The second and third types of response to the better world challenge are available for everyone except, I think, for the advocates of the this-universe reply (hereafter TUR) in support of FTA. In response to the Multiverse objection the advocate of TUR appeals to a 'special feature'²⁰ of our world, which is its fine-tuning for life (life-permissibility). Among all the multiverse worlds whose constants and conditions are not life-permitting our world has this special feature that makes it reasonable to be actualized. But now the TUR advocate is faced with a new challenge, namely *why*, among other life-permitting worlds, this world has been actualized?²¹ Here again the TUR advocate cannot just appeal to the typical goodness of this world as its life-permitting feature. She must demonstrate the *special* goodness of our world among other life-permitting worlds in order to show the consistency of her philosophical approach. So it seems the second and third types of reply are not open for TUR advocates.²²

In so far as the proponent of FTA insists on her intuition about fine-tuning the advocate of the Eden scenario can press the question of why God did not actualize the more pleasantly and better world instead. FTA proponents might reply that God has just chosen a loosely fine-tuned world in which human beings could exist, and might not know or care about the natural evils that happen during their lives. Yet this still undermines God's goodness, benevolence and knowledge if, as we suggest, the moral evils are sufficient for the supposed outweighing goods that necessitate the existence of evils. So as long as there is any fine-tuning for the purpose of human life the problem of natural evil requires special explanation (above the general explanations already available in normal theodicies).

Recently some philosophers have proposed a maximalist suggestion that all good possible worlds exist as one multiverse, namely the Theistic Multiverse (TM hereafter).²³ According to their view, if God exists then the actual world is a multiverse that comprises only universes that are axiologically worth creating. So this world (TM) is 'the unique best of all divinely actualizable worlds.'²⁴ If a being fails to create any universe that is both worth creating and worth sustaining, and is also creatable and sustainable (by that being), then that being is surpassable.²⁵ If God is unsurpassable then 'all worthwhile universes are created and sustained by God.'²⁶ Therefore based on the TM hypothesis one can dissolve our objection to FTA by claiming that since God has actualized all good-enough or unsurpassable good possible worlds then there would trivially be no surprise if He has created our world among all of them, since our world is worth creating. So we need to find no special feature for our world in order to rationalize its actualization.

But is this tremendous world (TM), which contains all worlds which are creatable and worth creating, and sustainable and worth sustaining, also a *possible* world? Consider a possible world which is similar to our world except that Hitler died when he was two years old. That world (call it *w*1) seems to be worth creating and sustaining. Is *w*1 in TM? If yes, then since the actual

world which already has been created and sustained by God is in TM, both the following sentences would be true in TM: ‘Hitler died when he was two years old’, and ‘Hitler was responsible for many crimes in this world.’ That is contradictory. And if w_1 is not among the universes of TM, TM does not comprise a creatable and sustainable world, so TM is not TM. That is also contradictory. So it seems TM is an impossible world.

I can conclude that while Eden-like worlds are possible, no answer can be given for why God chose this world from between several fine-tuned possible worlds. It seems that unless we can identify a special feature of our world we cannot answer this question. Is there any special feature that our world has and the Eden-like world lacks, which could rationalize God’s fine-tuning? In the next section I shall try to demonstrate that God could have a special purpose for fine-tuning our world, and His purpose could not be satisfied in Eden-like worlds.

III. FROM GOD’S POINT OF VIEW

Let us reconsider the dialectic of our discussion about FTA. From the surprising fact that we are here observing the world, it is inferred that the physical parameters and conditions have been finely set for us to be here. It is then suggested that the fine-tuning observation can be better explained by the God hypothesis than by the naturalistic chance hypothesis. As mentioned above, the anthropic principle provides the groundwork for the basic premises of the FTA. However, as we saw, as long as we are impressed by the fine-tuning intuition that the world has been designed for human life, the problem of natural evil finds greater support. It seems there is no way out of this challenge for the proponent of FTA. Here, though, I want to propose a new version of FTA which adopts another perspective. Rather than formalizing the argument from the human point of view, I construe the argument from God’s point of view in order to see that the world is properly fine-tuned for God’s *telos*, which necessitates an outweighing good for the existence of natural evils that cannot be substituted for by moral evils.

Aristotle has taught us that in talking about God we are talking about an intellect who always engages in self-contemplation, and that it is through this process of self-contemplation that God manifests His thoughts through creation.

[T]he absolute thought is of the absolutely best, the highest thought of the highest object. The intellect thinks itself in grasping the intelligible, since in the act of touching and knowing its object it becomes intelligible. Therefore the intellect and the intelligible are the same. For that which can receive the intelligible and essence is the intellect, and its operation lies in possessing the intelligible. It follows that the object rather than the power of thought is that which is divine in the intellect, and that the contemplation thereof is supremely pleasurable and good.²⁷

Since God manifests His thought through thinking about Himself and ‘the intellect and the intelligible are the same’ so by the process of self-contemplation He manifests Himself. From God’s point of view then all the creation is His manifestation. God’s *telos* of creating everything is self-manifestation. There would be no exception for evils. Evils are also manifestation of His essence that is love, goodness and compassion. So if we are trying to explain our observation that we live here in this world, appealing to the God hypothesis requires paying attention to the divine teleology, according to which God is manifesting His love through the process of self-contemplation and creating. The anthropic principle draws attention merely to half of the greater picture in which God is the ultimate aim and human beings are in the midst of the process of divine manifestation.

I suggest therefore that we construe the basic FTA premise in the following manner: *We are observing* ourselves in a world which has been finely tuned so that we could be here. The mere observation that our world is fine-tuned is the basic premise of traditional design arguments. This observation may be infected by observation selection effects. The observation that our world is fine-tuned for our life is the premise of the version of FTA which as I argued vindicates the problem of natural evil. The observation that human beings are observing themselves in the midst of a designed world requires special explanation. I suggest that by adopting God's point of view we can explain this observation in a way that at the same time explains away the problem of natural evil. So my question becomes the following: if the divine manifestation is the *telos* of the process of creation, what is the functional role of natural evil in the middle of this immanent process?

The theory of divine manifestation through the process of self-contemplation has led over the course of centuries to mysticism and Sufism in both the West and the East. I do not propose to address such a great subject matter here. I do however acknowledge that if we focus on the God hypothesis in the context of FTA we have to identify which concept of God we are talking about. According to one view, God is outside space-time, unchanging and impassible to our pains, but through His love has bestowed upon us His mercy by creating us. Although it is not his own view, Richard Rice subtly spells out this concept of God:

God dwells in perfect bliss outside the sphere of time and space. From his lofty vantage point, he apprehends the whole of created reality in one timeless perception: past, present and future alike appear before him. But though he fully knows and cares for the created world, he remains essentially unaffected by creaturely events and experiences. He is untouched by the disappointment, sorrow or suffering of his creatures. Just as his sovereign will brooks no opposition, his serene tranquility knows no interruption.²⁸

According to this view God is too transcendent to suffer our sufferings.

The alternative view sees God as both transcendent of and immanent in the created world. According to this view, divine love requires God's having feelings of sympathy, empathy and solicitude toward us. To have sympathy with another is to have a common feeling, a sense of the other's sorrow and pain. And to have a sense of pain is nothing else than to have pain. So God, through our pain, pleasure, suffering and happiness, shows His empathy, sympathy and solicitude. God then is manifested as love through His feeling of our feelings. God sees His face from our eyes; God suffers when we suffer. Of course He is the fine-tuner and creator of the world, and nothing coerces Him to manifest as such. He is transcendent of the world He freely creates, and He is independent in His existence of any creature. Yet He finely tuned the world in which we and all other animals have ever lived, and it is through our sense of pleasure and pain that He shows His love and sympathy towards us. Pains are points at which God shows His special attention and solicitude toward us. Natural evil is dominant in the history of the world, and all sentient beings and animals suffer from it during their lives. Moral evil belongs merely to the recent period of the process of evolution in which conscious human beings have lived on the earth. Natural evils are required, however, in order for God to show His solicitude toward *all* His sentient creatures. So this world better than Eden world satisfies God's purpose.

Clark Pinnock claims that the concept of divine impassibility comes from Plato rather than the religious texts.

What we should say is that God sympathizes in his relationship with us. God risked suffering when he opened himself up to the world, when he made it possible for the creature to have an

impact on him. God risked suffering when he decided to love and be loved by the creature. A lover's existence is inescapably affected by the other, especially when the loved one acts in ways that grieve and disappoint.²⁹

So by viewing the world's fine-tuning from God's perspective, in which God manifests Himself through creation, we can find an explanation of our observation that we observe ourselves understanding that the world has been fine-tuned so to permit our life. If we insist instead on the anthropic point of view, the fact of fine-tuning will vindicate the problem of evil and so lose its power as the premise in a fine-tuning argument for God's existence.

From this point of view, then, the God hypothesis can support our observation that we observe ourselves here in the natural world. The world is fine-tuned for God's *telos*, which is His manifestation of love through sentient beings' sentiments, pains and pleasures. Through this point of view, then, the fine-tuning intuition can be reconciled with the observation of natural evil in the world.

It is noteworthy that the problem of evil, either natural or moral, still maintains its urgency. One can still ask why, in order to manifest His love and sympathy, God permits us to live in a world with suffering? Is God so cruel that to attain His own purpose He allows all sentient beings to suffer? While I do not propose to address the problem of evil and its theodicies in this paper it is noteworthy to clarify two points in this regard. First, as mentioned above, from God's point of view divine manifestation as Love requires a medium through which His love, sympathy, empathy and solicitude could be manifested and actualized. This medium is the sentient beings pains, suffering and implorations. However these pains and suffering are limited to this world time-plan and there is an everlasting afterlife other-world in which the sentient beings according to theological Scriptures will live in Heaven for ever. So this limited pain can be compromised by an eternal happiness. So the world in which we suffer for a small period of time and then gain an everlasting pleasure because of divine grace and love would be better than a world in which we suffer less and receive less eternal happiness.

The other point concerns theological notions of atonement and redemption. Sufferings as a kind of divine love function as atonement for our sins and can make us clean, pious and sanctified ready to arrive at a beatific vision of God. A world in which I can see God face by face in the afterlife (or perhaps in this life) seems to be better than a world with fewer evils without such a delighting and happy ending.

In this paper I tried to show how FTA's dependence on an anthropic point of view makes that argument vulnerable to the problem of natural evil, and then to suggest that from one interpretation of God's perspective we can reform the FTA so that this objection cannot be leveled against it.

IV. CONCLUSION

As long as we focus on the intuition that our world is designed and finely tuned specifically for human life, support grows for the rival intuition that the pains and suffering which come from nature are incompatible with the God hypothesis. I have suggested that the underlying problem here is due to our anthropic point of view, according to which the world has been fine-tuned to enable our life. If we switch to God's perspective and consider the God hypothesis as referring to a God who is both transcendent of and immanent in the world, then we may save our fine-tuning intuition without empowering the problem of natural evil. Although the problem of

natural evil remains as the arch enemy of theism, we may yet have freed the feet of the FTA to run from it.

Notes

1 See Luke Barnes, 'The fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life', *Publications of the Astronomical Society of Australia*, 29:4, (2012): pp. 529-564.

2 Brandon Carter, 'Large number coincidences and the anthropic principle in cosmology', in ed. M. S. Longair, *Confrontation of Cosmological Theory with Observational Data* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974), pp. 291–298, (here p.293).

3 *Ibid.*, 294.

4 John Leslie, *Universes*, (London: Routledge 1989), p. 129.

5 For recent statements and developments of the argument, see Robin Collins, 'The teleological argument: an exploration of the fine-tuning of the cosmos', in eds. W. L. Craig and J.P. Moreland, *The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), pp. 202–281; see also Geraint J. Lewis, and Luke A. Barnes, *A Fortunate Universe: Life in a Finely Tuned Cosmos* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

6 Some might think that they can formalize FTA free from presupposing anthropic principle. Following Richard Swinburne I think FTA is a sort of teleological argument since the concept of fine tuning connotes a sort of goal for fine-tuning. Richard Swinburne, *The Existence of God*, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Ch. 8.

7 Richard Swinburne, 'The argument to God from fine-tuning', in ed. Melville Y. Stewart, *Science and Religion in Dialogue* (Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010), pp. 223-233, (here p. 223); Alvin Plantinga, *Where the Conflict Really Lies? Science, Religion and Naturalism* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 199.

8 Elliott Sober, 'The design argument,' in ed. Neil A. Manson, *God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science* (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 27–54; Elliot Sober, 'Absence of evidence and evidence of absence: evidential transitivity in connection with fossils, fishing, fine-tuning and firing squads', *Philosophical Studies*, 143:1(2009), pp. 63–90.

9 See for example John Leslie, *Universes*; See also Darren J. Bradley, 'Multiple universes and observation selection effects', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 46 (2009), pp. 61–72.

10 Plantinga, *Where the Conflict Really Lies?* p. 204.

11 Roger White, 'Fine-Tuning and Multiple Universes,' *Nous* 34 (2000), pp. 260-76.

12 Derek Parfit, 'Why anything? Why this?', *London Review of Books*, (22 January 1998), pp. 24–27, (here p. 25).

13 Richard Swinburne, *Providence and the Problem of Evil*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 179. Note that the argument from the need for knowledge is one of the central defenses of natural evil, and I think the fine-tuning intuition weakens this defense. Other defenses of natural evil appeal to outweighing goods like providing for the possibility of a more sympathetic life, or the soul-making which can be achieved in a world containing moral evils but fewer natural evils.

14 For the same response see Eleonore Stump, 'Knowledge, Freedom and the Problem of Evil', *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 14 (1983), pp. 49-58, (here p. 53).

15 Nick Trakakis has proposed the *Eden* world example in 'Is Theism Capable of Accounting for Any Natural Evil at All?' *International Journal for Philosophy of religion*, 57 (2005), pp. 35-66; and prior to him a similar example was proposed by David O'Connor in 'Swinburne on Natural Evil from Natural Processes,' *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 30: 2, (1991). Both developments of the idea posit a world containing no earthquakes, sickness, illness, disease, etc., and I suspect that such worlds may be possible. Yet our bodily life depends on the existence of bacteria in our bodies and in our environment whose normal function may produce disease in us; while geological so-called disasters are also beneficial for renewing the earth and creating situations more suitable for our future lives. So it seems implausible to think that our bodily life can exist without any pain or sickness at all. In addition to that biological organisms are developing through the process of evolution in which many unfitted species have to be extinct painfully as the machinery of natural selection goes forward. Nevertheless, it does seem fair to allow Eden-like worlds in which plausibly less natural evil exists.

16 Trakakis 'Is Theism capable?', p. 39.

17 Within the Judo-Christian tradition it is widely accepted that God put Adam in the garden in Eden in which he freely rebelled against God and he and all of his descendants have lived ever since under the righteous

wrath of their Lord. Based on this tradition the evils which we encounter in this world are due to our (actual or inherited) sins. In a wider scope evils are the direct or indirect consequences of free creatures' sins. According to the Pauline-Augustinian tradition the first human being has been created in a perfect form and then mortality, death, and suffering came upon us as the result of the sin of Adam. However, according to Irenaeus and Eastern tradition humans selected by God and put into the Garden of Eden while they were already frail, imperfect and child-like. In contrast to the Augustinian type of theodicy with respect to the problem of evil according to which man was created in a perfect state and then by his sin destroyed his own perfection, Irenaeus thinks that man created in an imperfect state and through a path of worship and grace can finally be brought into his perfection. Ironically in the path towards perfection men engage in sinning and encounter with its evil consequences. So 'instead of the Augustinian view of life's trials as a divine punishment for Adam's sin, Irenaeus sees our world of mingled good and evil as a divinely appointed environment for man's development towards the perfection that represents the fulfillment of God's good purpose for him' (John Hick, *Evil and the God of Love*, (NY:Palgrave MacMillan, 2007) P. 215). In this paper I take Irenaeus' pathway and instead of interpreting evils as God's punishment for sins I shall try to interpret them as God's way of love through solicitude, sympathy and empathy with sentient beings in order to undergo their development and growth.

17 However, I do not accept the main idea underlain both traditions that evils are firmly connected to human sins. I think that natural and evolutionary evils typically are due to the laws of nature in physics and biology. For if one takes that relation between evils and sins seriously she has to accept that natural or evolutionary evils which had existed long before human era were due to disobedience or immoral actions of nonhuman animals during the history of evolution. Joshua Moritz defends this strange position (from both theological and scientific points of view) earnestly. He argues that 'Evil—as resistance to God's will that results in suffering precedes the arrival of human beings and already has a firm foothold in the nonhuman animal world long before humans are ever tempted to go astray' (J. Moritz, 'Animal suffering, evolution, and the origins of evil: towards a free creatures defense', *Zygon* Vol.49, no. 2 (2014), pp. 348-380, (here p. 374). According to Moritz all evils then are the consequences of free-creatures (including humans and non-human animals) moral evil and disobedience. He supports his idea by theological texts and also by scientific facts. Despite his efforts it seems to me that Moritz in order to save a theological claim that all evolutionary or natural evils are a sort of moral evils, already expands the realm of moral responsibility to all non-human animals. Perhaps once upon a time, there was no sharp distinction between our ancestors and other primates, but this fact does not exclude the reality that now there is a sharp distinction between human beings and other animals in ascription of moral responsibility. Human beings ability for rational thought and understanding moral norms, in addition to her capability of self-consciousness makes us too different with other sentient beings. To see these great differences as a matter of degree of one kind could force the proponent of Moritz's argument to accept panpsychism. In addition to that even if one could ascribe moral responsibility to some mammals (like wolves or apes) it would be too difficult to expand the realm of morality to reptiles, tetrapods, and even fishes. Anyway, I can still save my claim that there could be better world than our world (Eden scenario) with some changes in the laws of nature. Since, if for the sake of argument I accept Moritz's idea that natural (evolutionary) evils are due to the free-creatures sins, it is evident that the mechanism through which our sins affect on our lives should work through the laws of nature. (For example our sins result earthquakes or floods). So still perhaps there could be some Eden worlds in which the consequences of our sins (evils) were much lower and softer than this world. Thus we can still expect the designer of the world to tune the world's laws more finely that results less amount of natural evil. So my argument can go ahead.

18 Klaas Kraay, 'Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse', *Philosophical Studies* 147 (2010), pp. 355–68, (here p 357).

19 See for example Alvin Plantinga, *God, Freedom, and Evil* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), p. 61; Swinburne, *The Existence of God*, pp. 134-6.

20 As Parfit (in 'Why anything?') argues, among all cosmic possibilities our world should have a 'special feature' that makes its actualization reasonable.

21 Here it seems note worthy to see the dialectic of the debate. FTA proponents see the fact that the physical constants and conditions of our world have been designed and fine-tuned for evolution of life. And they think that best explanation for this observation is the existence of God. Multiverse scenario is a scientific theory about the cosmos which has been developed by some physicists. The theory says that there are some parallel worlds in addition to our worlds with different physical constants and conditions. The relation between these worlds and ours, the nature of them, and the rules govern them are the subject of various Multiverse theories among physicists. As an objection to the FTA some philosophers get the intuition behind Multiverse theories that if there are so many or even infinite worlds with different constants and conditions, then the fact that our world is fine-tuned for the life is not a surprising fact that requires explanation. This Universe Reply (TUR) in

this debate claims that even if the Multiverse hypothesis be true (and we know that Multiverse hypothesis is regarded big controversies between physicists) still the existence of our world is so strange and specific that requires explanation. So TUR does not try to show that there are other universes in which life is possible and then consider whether ours is special compared to the others. But, TUR tries to show that *if* there are other universes in which life is *not* possible then the fact that our universe is life-permitting is a specific feature of our world which requires rational explanation. Now I suggest that TUR, if one accepts the Eden scenario that there could be other life-permitting worlds better than ours, faces a new challenge that what would be now the special feature of our world among these life-permitting worlds.

22 Here I do not presuppose Molinism, according to which God knows all possible states of affairs of all unactualized worlds. I only take it for granted that the world's fine-tuner, whoever he was, should know how to fine-tune the world's parameters and conditions in order to reach his aim. Suppose that FTA accepts the view that the fine-tuner has fine-tuned the world for a purpose which involves providing a situation compatible with or permissible for human life. Then there would definitely be some sort of foreknowledge presupposed here.

23 See Klaas Kraay 'Theism, possible worlds'; Klaas Kraay 'One Philosopher's Bug Can Be Another's Feature: Reply to Almeida's 'Multiverse and Divine Creation',' *Religions*, 9:3. (2018); Donald Turner, 'The Many-Universes Solution to the Problem of Evil', in *The Existence of God* Eds. Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 1–17; Donald Turner, 'Revising the Many-Universes Solution to the Problem of Evil', in *God and the Multiverse: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Perspectives* ed. Klaas Kraay (New York: Routledge, 2015); Timothy O'Connor, *Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008). They argue that God creates all universes 'worth creating and sustaining' (Kraay), all universes that are 'on-balance good' (Turner) and all universes 'at or above some goodness threshold' (O'Connor). Here I focus on Kraay's argument.

24 Kraay, 'Theism, possible worlds', p. 358.

25 Ibid., p. 362.

26 *ibid.*

27 Aristotle, *Met.*, 1072b.

28 Richard Rice, 'Biblical Support for a New Perspective,' in *The openness of God: A biblical challenge to the traditional understanding of God*, eds. C. Pinnock, R. Rice, J. Sanders, & W. Hasker (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1994), pp. 13-14.

29 Clark Pinnock, 'Systematic Theology,' in *The Openness of God* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1994), p. 119.