Ästhetik heute
Zeitgenössische Zugänge zur Ästhetik der Natur und der Künste

Aesthetics Today
Contemporary Approaches to the Aesthetics of Nature and of Art

**Stefan Majetschak
Anja Weiberg
Hrsg.**

Beiträge
Contributions

39. Internationales Wittgenstein Symposium

39th International Wittgenstein Symposium

Kirchberg am Wechsel
7. – 13. August 2016

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Band XXIX

Herausgeber
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Contributions of the 39th International
Wittgenstein Symposium
August 7–13, 2016
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Volume XXIX

Editors
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Inhalt / Contents

Inhalt | Contents

Spontaneous Experiential Utterances in the Light of Perception-Action-Mechanisms
An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective on Wittgenstein's Remarks on Seeing

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Abstract

In the second part of his *Philosophical Investigations*, section xi, Wittgenstein observes how spontaneously and effortlessly humans share their experiences and make aesthetical utterances. The phenomenon of sharing experiences, including "gossiping", features in evolutionary psychology as one of the distinctive aspects of human cognition that separates it from animal cognition, and is considered as crucial for establishing and maintaining human cultural life. In this paper, I compare the role spontaneous experiential utterances play in the maintenance of culture both from Wittgenstein's, and from an evolutionary psychological perspective, and identify some striking similarities.

In their seminal paper "Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition", Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, and Moll (2005) identified the distinctiveness of human cognition (in contrast to other animal cognition) in its capacity for *shared intentionality*—i.e. the "ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions" (Tomasello et al. 2005, 675). Although many other primate species possess basic cognitive capacities that serve as necessary prerequisites for obtaining shared intentionality—such as understanding animate action, others' goals and intentions—Tomasello and colleagues claimed that these lack the particular *motivation* to regularly engage in these activities. This is apparent in ape mother-infant interactions, in which occasional maternal gazing and social smiling occur, but no proto-conversations (i.e. turn-taking sequences of looking, smiling, or verbalizing). These are characteristic only of human parent-infant interactions. Though apes are in principle capable of these activities, they show them only rarely. In contrast, the human species is "ultra-social" and highly motivated to share emotions, experiences, and activities. In fact, "gossiping"—as communication with the mere purpose of sharing interest and information—seems to be a distinctive human feature (Dunbar 1996).

The potential evolutionary adaptive value of this high motivation to share information might seem spurious, at first. Hare and Wrangham (2002) argued that sharing information synchronizes groups and facilitates cooperation, which might have served the "self-domestication" of humans—different from chimpanzees and other primates, which still show the traits of their overaggressive ancestors. However, humans are not aware of the putative evolutionary benefits of sharing experiences, and as "one cannot want what one does not know about" (de Waal and Ferrari 2010, 204), this cannot explain why humans would decide so frequently to engage in gossiping. Still, the human motivation to share experiences, talk about art, or gossip remains spurious from a first person perspective, given that these activities are often accused to be futile.

The human tendency to regularly and spontaneously share experiences is also of interest for Wittgenstein. He prominently assures that "Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing" (PI, § 25), which

also features in John McDowell's concept of the human *second nature* (McDowell 1996, 84ff). In the second part of his *Philosophical Investigations*, section xi, Wittgenstein jointly considers the concepts of seeing and aesthetical concepts. An important observation he presents several times is that humans tend to share the experiences *spontaneously*—that they straightforwardly report what they see. These activities seem effortless and "natural". In a thought experiment, a person suddenly notices a rabbit running past, and exclaims: "A rabbit!". Wittgenstein comments: "Both things, both the report and the exclamation, are expressions of perception and of visual experience. But the exclamation is so in a different sense from the report: it is forced from us.—It is related to the experience as a cry is to pain" (PI, 197). Here, the exclamation seems to occur like a reflex: instinctively, effortlessly, without consideration.

In this picture, people do not think of what they actually recognize in what they see. There is no cognitively demanding process in which an interpretation is imposed on perceptual "raw matter". Rather, seeing and thinking seem to merge: "Is it a case of both seeing and thinking? or an amalgam of the two, as I should almost like to say?" (PI, 197). Rather than first perceiving a visual stimulus, e.g. the duck-rabbit Wittgenstein presents, and then consecutively interpreting this figure as either a duck or a rabbit, the perceiver *instantly* views the stimulus either as a duck or a rabbit, without even considering the other option: "I think he would have given this description at once in answer to the question 'What are you seeing?', nor would he have treated it as one among several possibilities" (PI, 204). This observation also prominently features in John McDowell's *Mind and World*: Instead of imposing a conceptual interpretation on a previously un-interpreted, non-conceptual content acquired in perception, "the relevant conceptual capacities are drawn on *in* receptivity" (McDowell 1996, 9).

Wittgenstein's and McDowell's observations point out that humans are readily equipped to easily share their experiences—their very own perception already features a sort of interpretation. It comes easy and effortless for them to talk about those. On the contrary, secondary interpretations come at a cost, and can appear odd: "But how is it possible to *see* an object according to an *interpretation?*—The question represents it as a queer fact; as if something

were being forced into a form it did not really fit" (PI, 200). These cognitive costs imply that people should usually stick with their first, intuitive interpretation, and generally report what they actually see in the first place.

So far, it has been of little interest to philosophy how and why these perceptual mechanisms that allow for spontaneous interpretations and the articulation of these might have evolved. A promising approach might be provided by recent neuroscientific findings which point at similar, though rudimentary mechanisms in animals. The research or *mirror neurons* (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004) circles around so-called *perception-action-mechanisms*, in which viewing another conspecific performing a certain motor action activates the same areas in the motor cortex as performing the action oneself. These mechanisms have been suggested to be the neural basis of imitation, which is prompted already by merely observing an action. In this way, these become crucial for social learning. Similar to humans, monkeys show imitation spontaneously, even in absence of rewards, and already shortly after birth. De Waal and Ferrari (2010) claimed that it becomes even dubious whether perceptual and motor areas in animal brains can be strictly anatomically segregated, at all.

This fusion of perceptions and immediate (motor) reactions strikes as a similarity between animal perception and the spontaneous human utterances Wittgenstein observes. In the lectures on aesthetics that he delivered to selected students in 1937, he explicitly states that in his mind, aesthetical words, such as "beautiful" or "good", are mere elaborated gestures, with their verbal aspect being far less important than their expressive one: "A child generally applies a word like 'good' first to food. One thing that is immensely important in teaching is exaggerated gestures and facial expressions. The word is taught as a substitute for a facial expression or a gesture. The gestures, tones of voice, etc., in this case are expressions of approval. What *makes* the word an interjection of approval? It is the game it appears in, not the form of words" (Wittgenstein 1966, 2). This makes the continuity between motor and verbal behaviour explicit, and demonstrates that the *capacity* for aesthetic expression is not contingent on the acquisition of language, but innate, as already visible in child gestures. In this perspective, it becomes intelligible how aesthetic utterances are rooted in human biology.

Nonetheless, importantly, these mechanisms are not rigid. Throughout ontogeny, spontaneous expressions, e.g. about food, can become generalized towards other stimuli, such as art and music. In animals, perception-action-mechanisms serve social learning—including, for instance, tool-use and foraging decisions in monkeys. In humans, similarly, the concepts that people recognize in perception are not innate, but adopted in social learning: "You only 'see the duck and rabbit aspects' if you are already conversant with the shapes of those two animals" (PI, 207). In this regard, Wittgenstein points out that "[t]he substratum of this experience is the mastery of a technique" (PI, 208) acquired in learning. Given the high need for social learning in human societies, the regular report of experiences by various members of society provides an optimal learning environment—both for infants, but also for people of other ages, e.g. when becoming acquainted with a certain style of art or music. The innate capacity for social learning embodied in perception-action-mechanisms, together with a rich learning environment, is what makes cultural socialization possible.

Crucially, human perception is not only shaped in childhood, but can change later on. Wittgenstein highlights how the demand to change is particularly prevalent in talks about aesthetical objects: "Here it occurs to me that in conversation on aesthetic matters we use the words: 'You have to see it like *this*, this is how it is meant'; 'When you see it like *this*, you see where it goes wrong'; 'You have to hear this bar as an introduction'; 'You must hear it in this key'; 'You must phrase it like *this*'" (PI, 202). As said above, forcing a perception into a "form" (interpretation) which it does not seem to fit can feel odd. Luckily, the human perceptual apparatus is flexible and capable of adapting to its environment in the long term. This is why also Wittgenstein considers *aspect changes*, which occur from time to time, but in which we might have little introspection ("but I shall mostly have no recollection of the way my glance shifted in looking at it", PI, 199). Due to this difficulty in verbalizing aspect changes, it is difficult to guide others in aspect changes, and teach them how to see an object in a certain way. Rather, one describes the aspect as one sees it now, or simply classifies interpretations as fitting or not-fitting (*"This* word fits, *that* doesn't", PI, 209). Due to this complication, changes in aesthetical perception might require that people *frequently* talk about their aesthetical experiences, as long training might be necessary to acquire the appropriate skills for seeing objects in a certain aesthetic way. A high frequency of these utterances is prompted by the ease of the perception-action mechanisms previously described.

Aside from the frequency with which people talk about their experiences, another important aspect can be the number of people that share a certain perceptual/aesthetic opinion. Psychological experiments on conformity (Asch 1955) showed that human participants considerably adjusted their ratings of the lengths of different lines to the ratings of other (confederate) participants. Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux (1969) corroborated this by demonstrating that participants led to believe that a blue slide would be actually green (or vice versa) perceived the afterimage of that slide (on a white wall) to be complementary to the colour falsely induced. It is implausible that participants consciously reasoned the correct colour of the afterimage in order to please the confederate. Rather, they spontaneously *saw* that colour. This clearly demonstrates how humans can adapt their perception to that of groups.

In this paper, I have defended the following perspective: Perceptual and aesthetic socialization is facilitated—or even enabled in the first place—by humans talking so frequently about their perceptual experiences. This is facilitated by perception-action mechanisms inherited from animal ancestors, which allow for imitation and social learning. By means of those, talking about experiences becomes effortless, intuitive, "natural". Furthermore, talking about their experiences allows humans to synchronize those, which facilitates cooperation in groups, and, by this means, might have promoted human "self-domestication". In his remarks on seeing, Wittgenstein highlighted how spontaneous and effortless experiential utterances are, which points at their centrality for establishing and maintaining a shared perceptual/ aesthetic view on the world.

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Lebensform(en) im Widerstreit. Zur Rückkehr einer alten Debatte

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Abstract

Die Rückkehr einer alten Debatte zeichnet sich ab. Der Streit um die Bedeutung von Wittgensteins Begriff Lebensform(en) geht in eine neue Runde. Im Kern geht es um zwei Auslegungen von „Lebensform(en)", wobei die eine Auslegung als die ethnologische, die andere als die verhaltensbiologische bzw. ethologische bezeichnet werden kann. Beide sollen nun von einer Lesart zurückgewiesen werden, die ein vermeintlich diesen Ansätzen zugrunde liegendes hierarchisches Schichtenmodell mit einer Einteilung in eine höherstufig stehende menschliche gegenüber einer niederstufigen animalischen Lebensform ablehnt. Im Kontrast zu dieser meines Erachtens falschen Exegese Wittgensteins erachte ich beide Ansätze als gleichberechtigt und hierarchisch nicht geordnet.

Die Rückkehr einer alten Debatte scheint sich abzuzeichnen. Der Streit um die Bedeutung von Wittgensteins Begriff der Lebensform(en) geht in eine neue Runde. Hierfür gibt es handfeste Hinweise, denen ich in im Hinblick auf bald zu erwartende Veröffentlichungen nachgehen will.[1]

Im Kern geht es um zwei Auslegungen von „Lebensform(en)", die beide von einer neuen Lesart zurückgewiesen werden sollen. Die eine Auslegung kann als ethnologische, die andere als verhaltensbiologische bzw. ethologische bezeichnet werden. Beide Interpretationen sind nicht neu. Die verhaltensbiologische kann bereits seit der ersten Lebensform(en)-Debatte Newton Garver (1984) zugewiesen werden, während die ethnologische zweifelsohne mit dem Namen Rudolf Haller (1988) verbunden ist.[2]

Die ethnologische Lesweise zielt darauf ab, menschliches Verhalten und Kultur in ihrer Verschiedenartigkeit zu erklären. Gegenstand ist das vergleichende Studium des kulturellen und sozialen Lebens der Menschen. Ethnologie ist folglich die Wissenschaft vom kulturell Fremden, die Kulturen, ethnische Gruppen und indigene Völker zu erforschen und deren Verhaltensweisen zu erfassen versucht. Hingegen basiert die ethologische Lesart auf der klassischen Verhaltensforschung. Sie lehrt Gewohnheiten, Sitten und Bräuche zu erfassen, wobei Ethologie dem Wortsinne nach die Lehre von den Gewohnheiten ist und somit als Verhaltenslehre bezeichnet werden kann. Die Ethologie gilt als ein Teilgebiet der Zoologie.

Während also die Ethnologie die Besonderheiten verschiedener Kulturen und Völker studiert und die Devianzen zu unserer Lebensform sowie die Beziehungen zwischen den Lebensformen festhält, ist die Ethologie das zoologische Studium der Verhaltensweisen von Menschen und Tieren. Auf Wittgensteins Lebensform(en) bezogen bedeutet dies, dass der ethologische Ansatz versucht, die Differenzen aufzuzeigen, die eine Gruppe von Menschen von anderen unterscheidet. Die gemeinsame Lebensform konstituiert sich dabei aus einer bestimmten Art von menschlicher Übereinstimmung. Der ethologische Ansatz wiederum will aufzeigen, was unter dem Stichwort „Lebensform" als verhaltensbiologische Züge einer Spezies betrachtet werden kann.

Beide Ansätze zeichnen eine fundamentale Differenz aus: Im Gegensatz zum ethologischen Ansatz, bei dem tierisches und menschliches Verhalten als angeboren vermutet werden und nur recht begrenzt durch Evolution adaptiven Veränderungen unterliegen, wird beim ethnologischen Ansatz betont, dass die Verhaltensweisen der einzelnen Mitglieder einer Gemeinschaft erlernt und durch Anpassung an die anderen Mitglieder dieser Gemeinschaft erworben werden (*Enkulturation*). Dabei geht man in der Teildisziplin Soziobiologie der modernen Verhaltensforschung sogar davon aus, dass jegliches Verhalten eine genetische Basis besitzt, das sich durch Umwelteinflüsse anpasst (vgl. Kappeler [3]2012, 14).

Die neue Lesart will beide Ansätze nun in die Schranken weisen. Sie behauptet, dass diese Ansätze nicht auf das verweisen würden, was Wittgenstein zum Ausdruck bringen wolle. Hierbei wird angenommen, dass beide Ansätze nicht vollumfänglich unsere Lebensform erklären können. Der ethnologische Ansatz würde zu Recht vom ethologischen Ansatz dahingehend kritisiert, dass unsere Lebensform nicht etwas sei, was wir nur einfach erwerben würden, indem wir in diese Lebensform initiiert würden. Zugleich würde aber auch der ethologische Ansatz berechtigterweise vom ethnologischen kritisiert, da er davon ausginge, dass unsere Lebensform und damit unsere menschliche Verhaltensweise ausschließlich angeboren sei.

Hätte Wittgenstein sich einseitig auf einen der beiden Ansätze kapriziert, wäre die Kritik mehr als berechtigt, dass Wittgenstein etwas anderes zum Ausdruck bringen wolle. Die Antwort lautet aber: Dem ist nicht so.

Dies lässt sich leicht belegen, denn Wittgenstein spricht wohl kaum versehentlich von Lebensformen im Plural, und nicht nur von Lebensform im Singular. Damit ist ebenso eine einseitige Fokussierung auf entweder Kultur oder Natur nicht notwendig, selbst wenn die beiden Ausrichtungen in Form der sozialen Natur und der animalischen Natur in unterschiedliche Richtungen von Beschreibungs- und Erklärungsansätzen verweisen.

Wittgenstein hat nicht den einen Ansatz vor dem anderen präferiert, sondern vielmehr beide Ansätze in einen gemeinsamen Begriff – nämlich den der Lebensform(en) – einfließen lassen. Damit hat er zwei Dinge erreicht: Zwar ist dadurch der Terminus Lebensform vager und polymorph geworden, zugleich aber hat erst diese Vorge-

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1 Die Münchener Konferenz „The Form of Our Life With Language" hat hier deutliche Hinweise gegeben. Die Konferenz fand vom 23. bis 25. Mai 2016 in der Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung in Nymphenburg statt und wurde vom Lehrstuhl für Philosophie II der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München organisiert. Eine Veröffentlichung der Vorträge soll in Kürze erfolgen.

2 Letztere scheint mir die für Wittgenstein wesentlicher relevantere Sichtweise gewesen zu sein, auch wenn er sich durchaus explizit zu biologischen Lebensformen äußert, z.B. wenn er darauf verweist, dass wir einen Löwen auch dann nicht verstehen könnten, wenn dieser sprechen könnte (vgl. PU II xi 568).

hensweise Wittgenstein erlaubt, schwer beschreibbare bzw. erklärbare Vorgänge in einem Begriff so zu vereinen, dass er als Parameter weiterer Erkenntnis zur Verfügung steht.

Es stimmt, dass erst diese Vorgehensweise Wittgenstein die Perspektive ermöglicht, die mehrdeutigen Aspekte der Lebensform(en) in Form des ethnologischen als auch des ethologischen Ansatzes so zu subsumieren, dass er sie in den allgemeinen Erkenntnisprozess einbringen kann, ohne dass er dauerhaft die Frage nach der Substanz einer Lebensform eineindeutig auflösen muss.

Insoweit ist gleichfalls richtig, dass die Einführung des Begriffs der Lebensform(en) keine ausschließlich den Begriff inhaltlich umfassende Aussage ist. Sie ist vielmehr auch eine logische Aussage, da eine Möglichkeit zur Erkenntnis in der Operationsweise von Lebensform und Sprachspiel erst so philosophischer Reflexion zuteil wird, indem man das Ideal der Logik als Prüfung einer Aussage auf einen vagen, aber unstrittigen Begriff reduziert, der unseren intuitiven, bildhaften und menschlichen Einsichten hinreichend entspricht. Nicht von ungefähr heißt es in *Über Gewißheit*: „Was als ausreichende Prüfung einer Aussage gilt, – gehört zur Logik. Es gehört zur Beschreibung des Sprachspiels." (ÜG 82)

Es ist kein Zufall, dass Wittgenstein in diesem Kontext das Sprachspiel explizit als ausreichende Prüfung einer Aussage benennt. Denn es ist die Analyse von Sprachspielen, aus der Wittgenstein ableitet, wie die Sprache in menschlichen Gemeinschaften zu verwenden ist, damit diese den Merkmalen sowohl der menschlichen Lebensform als auch der jeweiligen Gemeinschaft gerecht wird. Genau hier liegt der Hauptunterschied zu den tierischen Lebensformen, die sich gerade nicht durch uns erschließbare Sprachspiele auszeichnen.

Sprachspiele operieren zudem spracherweiternd und -vertiefend. Etwas, was Wittgenstein beispielsweise in *Zettel* beschreibt: „Es ist Erfahrungstatsache, daß Menschen ihre Begriffe ändern, wechseln, wenn sie neue Tatsachen kennenlernen." (Z 352) Sprachspiele sind variabel und vorläufig, und können, wie man bei Haller lesen kann, gleichfalls mutieren (vgl. Haller 1988, 117f.; 524f.). Interessanterweise reklamiert Wittgenstein ähnliche Merkmale für die Logik, die so vielfältig wie die Sprache ist und sich ebenso als erweiternd und weiterentwickelbar herausstellt (vgl. ÜG 68, 82, 375, 501). Neben dem verbal geprägten Weltbild kann nur die Logik helfen, die Welt unermüdlich zu konkretisieren.

Dies alles scheint nun auf den ersten Blick dem ethologischen Ansatz zu widersprechen, der gerade wie die biologisch determinierte Verhaltensweise einer Lebensform abzielt. In den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* steht:

Man sagt manchmal: die Tiere sprechen nicht, weil ihnen die geistigen Fähigkeiten fehlen. Und das heißt: „sie denken nicht, darum sprechen sie nicht". Aber: sie sprechen eben nicht. Oder besser: sie verwenden die Sprache nicht – wenn wir von den primitivsten Sprachformen absehen. – Befehlen, fragen, erzählen, plauschen gehören zu unserer Naturgeschichte so wie gehen, essen, trinken, spielen. (PU I 25)

Demnach geht das Talent der kritischen Nutzung des „Sprachspielens" Tieren ab, so dass sie nicht auf der gleichen Stufe in „unserer Naturgeschichte" wie der Mensch stehen. Das Sprachspiel und seine Verwendung ist also ein Spezifikum der menschlichen, nicht aber der tierischen Lebensform. Wenn man aber unter Sprache nur eine Form von Kommunikation versteht, dann muss man vielen Tie-

ren die Möglichkeit tierischer Sprache einräumen. Daher ist eine Warnung angebracht: Die Tatsache, dass tierische Lebensformen keine „Sprachspiele" im menschlichen Sinne zu kennen scheinen, heißt nicht, dass sie keine Sprache besitzen. Im Gegenteil, ein Zweig der kognitiven Ethologie, der *animal language research* genannt wird, hat Ergebnisse produziert, die nahe legen, „dass Menschenaffen, Delfine, Papageien und Hunde elementare sprachliche Fähigkeiten erwerben können, vor allem, aber nicht ausschließlich, was passives Sprachvermögen anbelangt (vgl. Hurley/Nudds 2006, Part VI; Andrews 2011)." (Glock 2016, 75)

Bezogen auf die menschliche Lebensform(en) ist jedoch auch klar, dass es nicht reicht, Kommunikation nur an konstitutive Normen (z.B. in Form von sprachlichen Konventionen) zu binden, die nur dann gelten, wenn man nach den Regeln spielt. Wäre dem so, würde dies auch für die Sprache der Tiere gelten und wäre daher kein Unikum der menschlichen Lebensform. Auch das Kriterium, dass nur die Gemeinschaft der Sprachnutzer als Ganze die Kriterien für den Gebrauch der Sprache bestimmt, ist nicht hinreichend. Erneut würde sich nicht zwingend eine Differenz zur tierischen Sprache auftun, da die Festlegung durch die Gemeinschaft vermutlich sowohl für Mensch wie Tier gilt.

Es muss also mehr geben, was die menschliche Sprache von der tierischen unterscheidet. Dies ist zusätzlich zu sprachlichen Konventionen oder kulturellen Regeln, Riten und Gebräuchen der Sprachgemeinschaft, vor allem die geteilte soziale Praxis und die Übereinstimmung in Urteilen, die die menschliche Sprache erst in besonderer Verwendung von Sprache und Regeln als zwischenmenschliche Dimension bedeutsam macht. Dies ist zugleich der Grund, dass eine Lebensform als eine bestimmte Art menschlicher Übereinstimmung verstanden werden kann.

Die Übereinstimmung gibt wieder, was Menschen als Grundlage ihrer Handlungen für gegeben halten, insoweit die Menschen überhaupt über ihre Handlungen reflektieren. Deshalb basiert Gewissheit nicht auf einer Überzeugung, sondern vielmehr auf einer Art von Handlung in Übereinstimmung mit anderen (vgl. Gebauer 2009, 163). In diesem Zusammenhang spiegelt der Charakter von Sprachspielen den Charakter von Lebensformen insoweit wider, dass sie nur als Arten gemeinsamen Handelns verstanden werden können, denn „[s]tatt des Unzerlegbaren, Spezifischen, Undefinierbaren" könnte man sagen, dass „[d]as Hinzunehmende, Gegebene (...) *Lebensformen* [seien]." (BPP II 630)

In der Tat sind Sprachspiele und menschliche Lebensformen Parallelkonzepte, denn eine Art und Weise den hier vorliegenden Unterschied zu erfassen, heißt sich auf das zu fokussieren, was im Verstehen sowohl von einer Lebensform als auch eines Sprachspiels involviert ist. An dieser Stelle setzt die neue Lesart mit Kritik ein: Sie behauptet, dass es ein logisches Paradox sei, Lebensformen verstehen zu können, da jedes Individuum immer schon in einer Lebensform eingebettet wäre, in die man zuvor initiiert wurde. Daher könne man keine Lebensform von außen verstehen, sondern nur von innen. Als Beleg wird vor allem folgende Bemerkung Wittgensteins angeführt:

Wir sagen auch von einem Menschen, er sei uns durchsichtig. Aber es ist für diese Betrachtung wichtig, daß ein Mensch für einen anderen ein völliges Rätsel sein kann. Das erfährt man, wenn man in ein fremdes Land mit gänzlich fremden Traditionen kommt, und zwar auch dann, wenn man die Sprache des Landes beherrscht. Man *versteht* die Menschen nicht. (PU II xi 568)

13

Hier scheint mir ein schwerwiegender Gedankenfehler vorzuliegen: Die Tatsache, dass wir uns bewusst sind, dass andere Menschen oder Tiere andere Lebensformen als die unsrige haben, bedeutet sogleich erst, dass wir uns diese bewusst machen und über selbige reflektieren. Wäre uns keine Differenz bekannt, könnten wir dies nicht, und nur dadurch, dass wir es können, macht der Begriff der Lebensform(en) für uns erst Sinn. Der Plural Lebensformen ist hier folgerichtig, denn wir können nie nur Kenntnis über eine Lebensform haben, sondern vielmehr haben wir, wenn wir von einer Lebensform Kenntnis haben, immer schon Kenntnis über mehr als eine Lebensform.

Das Nichtverstehen einer anderen Lebensform ermöglicht uns Menschen erst, die Lebensform der anderen überhaupt als solche zu realisieren. Beides umfasst verbale und nicht-verbale Komponenten. Während eine menschliche Lebensform zu verstehen entwickelt und ausgedrückt werden kann (und es muss möglich sein, an einem mit dieser verbundenen Sprachverständnis anzukommen), verlangt das Erreichen eines Verständnisses des Spiels, dass wir lernen, wie man es regelgemäß spielt. Es ist, so könnte man sagen, der nicht-verbale Teil, der hier im Vordergrund steht – viel mehr eine Art zu lernen, wie man das Spiel spielt, als eine Art die Sprache selbst zu lernen.

Und dies ist genau der Sachverhalt, auf den meines Erachtens uns Wittgenstein aufmerksam macht. Die menschliche Lebensform einer anderen Gemeinschaft „in einem fremden Land mit fremden Traditionen" können wir uns daher mittels des Sprachspiels in Form von Sprache und Handlung schrittweise erschließen. Beide Seiten können in den Diskurs aus ihrer respektiven Sichtweise und auf der Basis ihrer respektiven Sprachspiele eintreten. Hingegen schließt nach meinem Verständnis Wittgenstein das Erschließen für eine ethologisch andere Lebensform kategorisch aus, wenn er schreibt: „Wenn ein Löwe sprechen könnte, wir könnten ihn nicht verstehen." (PU II xi 568)

Das heißt, selbst wenn wir die Sprache des Löwen, der sprechen kann, wiedergeben könnten, wir würden sie dennoch nicht verstehen können, da sich uns die Sprache und Handlung des Löwen nicht in ihrer animalischen Form eröffnen würde. Wittgenstein stellt für einen solchen Fall fest: „Wir beschreiben hier ein Sprachspiel, welches wir *nicht lernen können*." (Z 339) Aus der Inkommensurabilität der menschlichen und der tierischen Sprache und Handlung, die aus der Tatsache folgt, dass etwas anderes in einem Löwen vorgeht als in einem Mensch (vgl. Z 340), folgt aber nicht, dass der Mensch vernünftig oder rational ist und das Tier nicht. Hierzu wird keine Aussage gemacht, da wir uns nicht in die Bewusstseinsvorgänge des Löwen eindenken können.

Auch hier kommt neuerdings Widerrede, die sich in diesem Punkt auf die *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* beruft, wo Wittgenstein sagt, dass sich eine Sprache vorzustellen nichts anderes bedeutet, als sich eine Lebensform vorzustellen (vgl. PU I 19). Dies ist allerdings kein logischer Widerspruch, denn man kann sich eine tierische Lebensform durchaus als eine andere Lebensform vorstellen, ohne dass man zugleich der Meinung sein muss, dass diese sich uns deshalb auch erschließen muss. Der Grund hierfür ist profan: Wenn die Sprache kein Sprachspiel, also kein Wechselspiel von Sprache und Handlung umfasst, mit dessen Hilfe wir uns in die Vorgänge des Tiers eindenken könnten, fehlt uns der sprachliche Ansatzpunkt die Lebensform zu entschlüsseln und möglichst umfassend zu verstehen.

Wissen und Sprache basieren für alle Menschen auf dem gleichen Hintergrund, sozusagen auf dem „harten Felsen" (PU I 217), aus dem unsere Fähigkeit Sprachspiele zu spielen erwächst. Das Wechselspiel von Sprechen und Handeln leitet sich aus komplexen sozialen Verknüpfungen ab, die sich in ihrer Zielgerichtetheit auf die kommunikativen Resultate im Handlungsprozess übertragen lassen und deren Vielschichtigkeit belegen: „Das Wesentliche des Sprachspiels", lesen wir in *Ursache und Wirkung*, „ist eine praktische Methode (eine Art des Handelns) – keine Spekulation, kein Geschwätz." (UW 116)

Hingegen ist die oftmals als menschenspezifisch angenommene Kapazität, neue Kapazitäten zu erwerben, kein Alleinstellungskriterium der menschlichen Lebensform. Solche Fähigkeiten finden sich ebenso in tierischen Lebensformen, so dass dem keine besondere Signifikanz zukommen kann. Dagegen ist es uns Menschen unmöglich, uns in die praktische Methode in Form der Art des Handelns eines Tieres einzulassen. Daher kann es epistemisch keine höher- oder niederstufigeren Lebensformen zwischen kommunikationsbefähigten Tieren und Menschen geben, denn beide Lebensformen bleiben immer schon grundlegend inkommensurabel.

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Aesthetic Experience and Certainty

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's mature philosophy offers a therapeutic way out of some conundrums stemming from taxonomic expectations regarding philosophical description of experience in general. The paper asks if this is also true of the facts of *aesthetic* experience. This possibility is hinted at by examining an application of the notion of certainty to aesthetic experience. Some traits of possible uses of central concepts of the mature Wittgenstein to a philosophical aesthetics inspired by the "new method" are also canvassed.

Is there a place for certainty in aesthetic experience? This question begs qualification. It would seem more natural, or philosophically interesting, to ask for the place of certainty not in aesthetic *experience* so much as in aesthetic *judgment*.

Philosophical discussion of aesthetic experience typically revolves around what kinds of objects elicit what kinds of responses – or what forms, isolated by the observer (or listener, etc.) in her apprehension, invite the focus of spirit to dwell on the peculiar mode of reaction we call aesthetic experience. Clive Bell's *Art* (1914) is a classic example of this approach. I'd like to suggest that, to the extent that Wittgenstein's mature philosophy offers a therapeutic way out of some conundrums stemming from taxonomic expectations regarding philosophical description of experience in general, this is also true of the facts of *aesthetic* experience. This might be hinted at by examining the possible application of 'certainty' to aesthetic experience.

In §353 of *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein describes a forester that asks his men to cut down a certain number of trees. He indicates by ostensive gestures which ones should be cut down. And he adds: "And I know that this is a tree". In a way, the figure of the *vernünftige Mensch*, of the rational man, thus asserts a basic proposition of the forester's belief system, one that is supposed to be true for all his men – but that, strangely enough, *should not* be asserted in that context. To pass that proposition over in silence, as an ellipsis, is part and parcel of the language game in place. Otherwise, it would suggest the need for verification in ignorance of what would count as verification. We could say: the tree itself! But the game does not provide for this possibility, except in a couple of special circumstances (hallucinations, thought experiments à la Gettier, fictional scenarios, etc.). Forbidden in normal situations, the occurrence of the assertion suggests a legitimate question as to the verification that would resolve the ignorance hinted at by the certainty expressed in the assertion. One of the forester's men reasonably asks himself: "But the forester simply *knows* that this is a tree, without examining it, or asking us to do so?".

His good faith made him thus fall into a trap. For, at this moment, crucially, practice is interrupted. The forester could be said to want to do justice to facts ("the most difficult" philosophical task, as Wittgenstein says in his comments on Frazer) but in a dogmatic, not a descriptive manner, one that violates the criteria of the use in question. And in so doing, somehow those very facts are drained of meaning. The experience of meaning (*Bedeutungserlebnis*) is thus emptied. By uttering a proposition stemming from the most basic layers of the systems of belief or verification in which the experience is anchored, and by doing

so with an attitude of certainty, the forester undermined the possibility of cooperation between vast regions of systems of propositions and concepts. For how to keep believing the forester who suggests, if obliquely, such doubt? Except in special situations, or jokes, beliefs in most of the things we know without making this knowledge explicit operate in silence. They form webs of connections of meaning, through intermediary links (*Zwischenglieder*), with different degrees of proximity – that is, they form systems (as the systems of propositions of the early 30s), even if open systems (unlike the systems of propositions of the early 30s).

We could say that it is precisely because I do not deduce certain fundamental certainties (a deduction whose process could be analyzed) that they are fundamental and form webs of systems (OC §417). And by being made explicit in the *vernünftige Mensch*'s fashion, they cast a fog of doubt, not over calculation mistakes, measurement imprecisions, memory flaws, etc., but over the kind of participation of the speaker in the very form of life in question. But I'm suggesting a further step: there are *non-dits* which should remain *non-dits* and must only be shown – if we want to do justice to facts. If this interdiction of assertion is violated, this must be done exclusively – in normal contexts – for therapeutic purposes.

Let us return to the aesthetic experience. When we say of an object that it is beautiful (or some other such quality), do we thus assign a quality to it? Or do we want in essence to say that it pleases us, or causes some such aesthetic effect in us? In this last case, we don't describe the object proper, the "lines and colors" of its volumes (bi- or tridimensional, etc.), but we give it a characterization that depends on our relation with it, one that is no longer reducible to, or even expressible by means of a sensory description – in contrast to the core of modern aesthetics. As Wittgenstein notes in 30.03.1947 on the effect of certain opera: "You gesture with your hand, would like to say: 'of course!'" (MS 134 78) – and here we seem to find the same kind of emphatic acquiescence presiding, for example, the massive acceptance of Darwin's theory of evolution: "The certainty ('of course') was created by the enormous charm of [the theory's] unity" (LA III. 32). Wittgenstein calls this an *attitude* – and places this attitudinal dimension on a level that is more fundamental than any considerations of verification might express.

A skeptic could doubt the possibility of the establishment of a standard of taste, occurring through a mode of presentation bearing the mark of certainty. But suppose the intervention of the skeptic is in terms of doubting the certainty that I am having an aesthetic experience as such, irrespective of the specific aesthetic quality of the object of such experience from the viewpoint of a regional aesthet-

ics – assuming the Grammar provides for these aesthetic games. All that this intervention could then accomplish is to undermine the experience of meaning as such. The situation is analogous to the case of the forester who asserts his belief that he is pointing *to trees* when pointing to trees. By wanting to do justice to the facts with inadequate instruments of description, the philosopher analyst tears the fabric of the very facts under philosophical description, undoing their characteristic lived experience. This is a typical case of throwing the baby out along with the bath water.

Who is this unfortunate child thrown out with the water of the analytic bath? Its name is said in many ways – and it would be interesting to survey these, from 29 to 51. One of the first would certainly be the notion of 'familiar experience', occurring in the manuscripts of the *Philosophical Grammar*. One of the last ones, in the latter manuscripts, would be the notion of *Geist*, Spirit – together with the notions of 'subtle shades of behavior', 'the soul of words', and activating philosophical operators adjunct to the concept of Aspect (aspect-blindness, dawning of an aspect, picture-object [*Bildgegenstand*], etc.). The survey of the names of our dropped-out child, and correlate concepts, would make up a conceptual constellation of an Aesthetics inspired by Wittgenstein. But before we say some final words on what such Aesthetics could look like, let us give voice once more to the skeptic. Around §200 of the PI Wittgenstein stages dialogues on the activity of following a rule, and on teaching and learning. In §213 two voices intervene:

"But this initial segment of a series could obviously be variously interpreted (for example, by means of algebraic expressions), so you must first have chosen one such interpretation." – Not at all! A doubt was possible in certain circumstances. But that is not to say that I did doubt, or even could doubt. (What is to be said about the psychological 'atmosphere' of a process is connected with that.)
Only intuition could have removed this doubt? – If intuition is an inner voice – how do I know how I am to follow it? And how do I know that it doesn't mislead me? For if it can guide me right, it can also guide me wrong. ((Intuition an unnecessary evasion.)) (PI 213)

Note that the second character, clearly a therapeutic one, seems to be in a paradoxical position. On the one hand, she recognizes the logical, modal possibility of doubt – but adds: this does not mean that I could doubt. The second 'can' is also an instance of the mighty logical 'kann'. However, the difference between both uses of the modal 'can' is that, in the second use, the philosopher takes into account the spirit of the game, its characteristic atmosphere, the wider institutional context of the lived experience of that meaning. The conclusion, certainly exasperating to lovers of crystals, is the paradox of saying that I could doubt but I could not doubt. The interdiction of the second character amplifies the logical space to include the anthropological or cultural dimension of the experience of meaning – without however twisting the philosophical nature of the commentary of experience into sociology or cultural studies. Why? Amongst other reasons, because its examples also have the nature of thought experiments, and not of empirical conjectures. They are thought experiments regulated by the Grammar of the spirit of the rituals, in the realm of phenomenological problems. We think here even of the rituals of mathematics, of logic, of science – to which underlie, as well as in the case of the rituals of ordinary life, an attitudinal aesthetic dimension. It is no wonder that the paragraph ends in a characteristic manoeuver of the dogmatic voice towards introspection, with the therapeutic

voice then replying by calling attention to the logical dimension of criteria.

Let us finally turn to the notions of aesthetics and aesthetic experience in the *Lectures on Aesthetics* (LA).

Wittgenstein begins his course on aesthetics by noting that the subject matter cannot be mixed up with traditional aesthetics, an investigation of aesthetic qualities and judgments. Running against the grain of the traditional syllabus, he remarks that, in most situations where we find an aesthetic experience, this kind of expression (of quality attribution, of judgment) does not occur. On the contrary: we usually find a language much closely associated with the language of right and wrong, typical of games of precise gradations. Now, this seems once again paradoxical, since aesthetic distinctions are seldom precise in the sense of measurement games.

If I say of a piece of Schubert's that it is melancholy, that is like giving it a face (I don't express approval or disapproval). I could instead use gestures or [Rhees] dancing. In fact, if we want to be exact, we do use a gesture or a facial expression. (LA I. 10)

What the language of aesthetic experience shows us is that what is at stake are not operations of the kind that would be regulated by standards of taste. Recall that in modern times this was the grain of the discipline, spread by institutions like the 17th Century Italian *Academy of the Good Taste.* Much more than standards of aesthetic judgment expressed by aesthetic adjectives, what is at stake is a characteristic lived experience, an attitude regarding objects and situations, or, as the philosopher says in his comments on Frazer, an attitude regarding – or expressed by – a ritual of a form of life. This mode of description accommodates much better a phenomenon that philosophers of aesthetics in the 20th-Century were keen to account for: the fact that certain families of art works seem to operate within identity criteria less and less linked to their facticity (lines and colors of their volumes), and more linked to the context in which they were presented (the "artworld") and to certain non-observable properties, especially the "theories" that intrinsically accompany the objects (the "institutional theory" of art).

The word we ought to talk about is 'appreciated'. What does appreciation consist in?
If a man goes through an endless number of patterns in a tailor's, [and] says: "No. This is slightly too dark. This is slightly too loud", etc., he is what we call an appreciator of material. That he is an appreciator is not shown by the interjections he uses, but by the way he chooses, selects, etc. Similarly in music: "Does this harmonize? No. The bass is not quite loud enough. Here I just want something different…." This is what we call an appreciation.
It is not only difficult to describe what appreciation consists in, but impossible. To describe what it consists in we would have to describe the whole environment. (LA I. 18-20)

Between aesthetics and anthropology, it seems that aesthetic experience can be seen, by the philosophical commentary on meaningful experience, as an interesting key to read the philosopher's latter philosophical step: that of expanding the field of criteria of concepts, propositions and beliefs to the lived experience of the form of life. In the final analysis, the soul of words could be seen as an aesthetic experience. And perhaps beyond that we could not venture ourselves. We can only immerse ourselves in its framework: the bedrock of our life.

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Consequences of the New First Page That Was Discovered at the Beginning of the Manuscript of the *Tractatus*

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Abstract

Martin Pilch has recently demonstrated that Wittgenstein begun the manuscript of his *Abhandlung* with a page that was cut away successively but that we are able to rebuild by means of its imprint on the opposite leaf of the notebook. That very first page contained the first six cardinal propositions (without the formula of proposition 6). This proves that, actually, the *Tractatus* was conceived as a recursive cascade of comments on comments on comments on its main propositions. Furthermore, it confirms that the remarks of the book were thought, and therefore are to be read, into distinct and fully significant sub-sequences, level by level; viz. 1-7, 3.1-3.5, 4.1-4.5, 4.21-4.28 etc. That manner of editing and reading the *Tractatus* is always meaningful and dissolves a lot of pseudo-inconsistencies which troubled traditional readers. Besides, it permits to detect other allusions and references, since a different disposition of its sentences makes the book a different one, probably nearer to author's purpose. Some scholars, like Peter Hacker and Martin Pilch himself, have the merit of having adhered to that exegetical perspective even *before* Pilch's philological discovery. As a fact, in this case like frequently in scientific research, an exegetical hypothesis precedes crucial data disclosure and not vice-versa.

In the summer 2014 Martin Pilch went to the Bodleian Library of Oxford to explore if the so-called *Prototractatus* (*alias* MS104, the manuscript of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*) could show some hints of its composition timing and methodology. Surprising and luckily, he finds a decisive evidence that nobody had noted before: between page 2 and page 3 of the notebook there is a strip of paper, the remaining portion of a missing page. What is more, the lost page had left traces of its content on the previous leaf. Analysing that mirroring image, Pilch demonstrated that the very first page of the notebook contained exactly and only the text of the cardinal propositions 1-6, without numbering and without the formula of proposition 6:

- The world is everything that is the case.

- What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.

- The logical picture of the facts is the thought.

- The thought is the significant proposition.

- Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions.

- The general form of truth-function is:

Since Martin Pilch's and my working hypothesis, supported by a multitude of independent clues (see Bazzocchi 2008a, 2010a, 2015), is that Ms104 constitutes the first draft of the *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung*, this discovery shows that Wittgenstein begun his thinking process from the cardinal propositions themselves. As it is obvious in our hierarchical reading of the *Tractatus* (Bazzocchi 2008b, Bazzocchi 2010b, Pilch 2015 pp. 72-75), these six cardinal propositions form a coherent and concatenated line of thought which anticipates in a suggestive way all the development of the book[1].

The numbering system was not conceived yet. Pilch supposes that in the second page (retro) of the missing leaf Wittgenstein started to develop the main remarks on these cardinal propositions.[2] After that, Wittgenstein copied into page 3 all the propositions of pages 1 and 2, in their hierarchical order, as we see them now (note that he didn't use any numbering system yet; visibly, until p. 5 numbers were added later from text). Afterwards, he iterated the procedure, commenting systematically on each propositions of page 3 (see pp. 4-5 of Ms104). Every block of statements is delimited by a free line, so that one can distinguish, even without numbers, the remarks on, respectively, statements 1.1, 2, 2.1, 2.2, 3, 3.1, 3.2 (see the sub-sequences which will receive the codes 1.11-1.12, 2.01-2.02, 2.11-2.14, 2.21-2.23, 3.01, 3.11-3.13 and 3.21). At this point, the situation was becoming more and more complicated. Copying every time all the materials in some hierarchical manner, commenting on each resulting propositions into the following pages, and so on, would be an heavy task, that would become heavier and heavier in a geometrical progression. The resulting text would be too confusing. So as it was, "without the numbering, it would be an incomprehensible jumble".[3] Thus Wittgenstein added the numerical references, adapting to his hierarchical exigence the numbering system adopted by Russell in the *Principia Mathematica*. Thence, it was not necessary to separate the groups with a free line (free lines were no longer used in the manuscript). Besides, Wittgenstein could insert a new remark *between* the remarks of a previous block by using the right number and modifying the subsequent ones: this was what he did at page 5 just after proposition 3.21, when he wrote proposition 1.12 and modified into "1.13" the previous 1.12 of page 4.

Understanding the method of composition of these first pages is crucial to understand the method of composition of the whole notebook, and *therefore* the method of conceiving the *Tractatus* itself. Scholars were struck by the numeric chaos of MS104 notebook and renounced to interpret it but by reordering the entire book in a sequential

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1 I am not tired to repeat (Bazzocchi 2014a, 1-3) that the *definiens* of each statement becomes the *definiendum* of the successive one, forming an explicit chain of related concepts: world - 'what is the case'; 'what is the case' - fact; fact - thought; thought - proposition; proposition - truth function; truth function - [formula of the general form]. Wittgenstein was searching to define the essence of the essence of the essence of the world; that intimate nut of our world was to be formulated by "the general form of proposition", which at that time Wittgenstein had not found yet.

2 Some final characters on the strip of paper demonstrate that the second page was occupied by some writing. The remaining characters are compatible with Pilch's convincing supposition.
3 I am quoting from Wittgenstein's irritated answer to a possible editor who in 1919 had proposed him to print the book *without* numbering.

manner; on the contrary, it is just the specific succession of the remarks of the notebook that reveals the actual succession of Wittgenstein's creative acts. It is evident that he had very clear in mind the coherent sequence of each separate block of commentary. Hence, the sense and even the syntax of any new proposition depend only from its place in the sub-sequence to which it belongs. In near all the phases of composition, Wittgenstein wrote down a coherent and complete line of thought, possibly in more than one block of remarks, and only later he started to comment on each single proposition of that line. Therefore, to understand his mind it is fundamental reading every line of thought (i.e. each decimal sub-sequence) by itself, without the intervening sub-remarks which only later he conceived and added[4]. Martin Pilch's discovery confirms that also the main sequence 1-6 (and, for extension, also the definitive sequence 1-7) was conceived by itself and have to be interpreted, in first instance, as an independent and complete line of reflection. In other words, it is not an index, nor a summary extracted by scholars, but an actual development of thought which we must read in narrow succession.

Now, each proposition of this primordial *home page* has the form of an essential definition: A is (essentially) B, or also: (the essence of) A is B. Since every proposition takes the conclusion of the preceding one to develop a successive step of analysis, the entire page sounds: (the essence of) A is B; (the essence of) B is C; …; (the essence of) F is G[5]. That is, the main path starts from "the world" to arrive, essence by essence, at the ultimate essence, i.e. the formula of "the general form of truth-function". That was the development of the purpose announced in 22.1.15 diary record: "My *whole* task consists in explaining the essence [*das Wesen*] of the proposition. That is to say, in giving the essence of all facts, whose picture the proposition is. In giving the essence of all being". The idea is fully explained at page 44 of Ms104: "The general form of proposition is the essence of proposition. To give the essence of proposition means to give the essence of all description, therefore the essence of the world" (see TLP 5.471-5.4711).

It is very remarkable that, when Wittgenstein begun to write his book, its explicit goal, i.e. the formula of general form, was not achieved yet. He was certain that a"general form" of proposition ought to exist[6], but at the moment he was able only to describe some of its characteristics and to express it as an open formula: "The general form of proposition is: [blank space]". Thus, the *Abhandlung* was actually an obsessive investigation on the essence of the world, namely the research of the formula of "the general form of truth-function". To this investigation on essence Wittgenstein alluded ironically in 1936: "You have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and hence of language, is […]. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you yourself most headache, the part about the general form of propositions and of language" (see PI §65).

The discovery of a missing folio where proposition 6 still appeared without its formula is very significant also for a correct dating of the *Abhandlung* composition. For the fact that the formula was not achieved before the end of 1916,

some scholars exclude that page 3 of Ms104 could be compiled in 1915. Kang (2005) suggests that the "*Abhandlung*" referred to in 1915 letters to Russell and Frege ought to contain only the materials of pages 28-60, concluding that Wittgenstein had written down the core-*Tractatus*, viz. the highest level propositions which we see at pages 3-28, only *after* the remarks on them: a complete overthrow of a reasonable procedure. On the contrary, I claimed that Ms104 was begun in spring-summer 1915 (Bazzocchi 2008a, 2010a), but I was forced to sustain without any definitive philological evidence that proposition 6, *or at least its formula* (Bazzocchi 2010c and 2015), was a later insertion. Now that that clear evidence is provided by Pilch's discovery, I cannot avoid the impression that my dating was significantly reinforced, while Kang's objections, recently renewed by Michael Potter (Sullivan and Potter 2013), were strongly weakened.

By itself, the fact that Ms104 was begun in 1915, in 1916 or (as von Wright supposed) in 1918 is not important. But, if we put it in relationship with the other notebooks, letters and testimonies, the panorama becomes quite different. Ms104 can be considered the main manuscript of the *Tractatus*, the notebook in which Wittgenstein's masterpiece assumed progressively its definitive form along more than three years of continuous addings, refinements and restructuring. For every proposition we are interested to, we can observe the form and the content of the precise hierarchical tree to which it was intended to belong at the moment.

Nevertheless, it would be ingenuous supposing that the notebook could *suggest* new exegetical hypotheses. Actually, the tree-wise reading of the *Tractatus* (Wittgenstein 2014) was suggested by its final structure, by giving the right importance to the numbering system. The substantial value of this interpretation depends on the new perspectives it implies about a multitude of passages of the text, when a level-by-level reading offers different meanings and a more plausible and linear concatenation of thoughts (Bazzocchi 2014a, 1-69; Bazzocchi 2014b; Hacker 2015; Oskari 2015). It was the question about the way in which Wittgenstein was able to create a similar architecture that led to read Ms104 notebook with new eyes, finding point-to-point illuminating relationships between the *Tractatus* and its genetic manuscript[7]. Only from this exegetical perspective it was possible to understand that Ms104 notebook, far from being a chaotic sequence of single remarks, was the faithful record of a hierarchical process of composition that presupposed, from its very first step, a tree-shaped vision of the book. More: Ms104 notebook was just the log-file of the creation of a primordial *hypertext*. In this sense, Martin Pilch's crucial discovery can be viewed as a consequence of exegetical investigations, before of being a source of new other considerations. Just as in Popper's foresight, some explanatory hypothesis must precede any empirical or philological datum, which finds its meaning only in the light of a hermeneutic inquiry.

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4 To understand what this implies, I warmly suggest to read Wittgenstein 2014.

5 We can add that the final element too, the formula G, is at its turn a definition. See 17.4.16: "But can there be such a rule? The definition is only possible if it is itself not a proposition. In that case a proposition cannot treat of all propositions, while a definition can".

6 See Notebooks, 5.5.15: "Does the general form of proposition exist? Yes, if by this one means the only "logical constant". And still in November 24th 1916: "When the general form of operation is found we have also found the general form of the occurrence of the concept 'and so on'".

7 See the specular structure of the First and the Second Part of Bazzocchi 2014a.

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Languages of Love, and Literature

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Abstract

The paper discusses the Wittgensteinian concept of love and the problem of specifying the "our" in "our language of love" and of tackling strange, unfamiliar languages of love.

1.

In the tradition of the Wittgenstein-inspired ethics, founded by Rush Rhees, we read about the importance of the language of love (Rhees 1969b, Dilman 1998, Gaita 2006). The "language of love" is a framework of linguistic practices expressing what love is and what love means. Rhees and his successors are not explicit about what particular things people say belong to the language of love. (Confessions like "I love you" may or may not be its part.) It is rather the way people who are in love use language to address each other; and this use of language significantly shapes what love means for people: beings that have the kind of language animals, for instance, don't have. This is one reason why we think of love between human beings as different from a dog's love for its master. Dogs are capable of love, but love between people means something different. Dilman (1998) suggests that our human language of love has developed in connection with literature. Love between people is love between beings whose language has the capacity to create literature.

Cockburn (2010) points out that Rhees doesn't talk about arbitrary linguistic acts, which found a convention of love. Language is not a condition of love; that there is the language of love goes along with love, as we know it. To learn to use language means to become accustomed to a way of living; words of language play a role within life and mean something that matters to us (Rhees 1997, 187: "we learn to live... in learning to speak"). Familiarity with the language of love also allows for different kinds of orientation in the contexts of love (recognising love in others, pretending to love).

Within the medium of the language of love, various attitudes of love are made explicit. Gaita reminds us that language of love is not only celebratory or laudatory, but it also opens a room for criticism, disappointment, etc. If someone we love disappoints us, we thereby express particular kind of care and concern for them we don't have for people we don't love. (They disappoint us differently.)

Language of love provides also a referential point of orientation: when it is debatable that an example is an example of love (though it is claimed to be), it is within the language of love that the controversy plays out. It is shown that linguistic expressions inherent to the discussed example can hardly be understood as expressions of the language of love. Rhees uses this implicit approach to discuss Simone Weil's remarks about love (Rhees 2000). Weil's ideas about love that Rhees considers most problematic centre around two points: 1) absolute detachment from the other and from making any prospects of common life or future etc.; 2) non-preferential character of love in its utmost purity (which is, ultimately, love for every other human being).

Rhees (loosely) paraphrases Weil's remarks about detachment as "If you love anyone, then always think of him as though he were dead" (2000, 105). He points out that an important part of what it means to say we love someone is that it matters to us whether they are alive, whether they flourish or not. An unconditional concern in the beloved's well-being is constitutive of love. Weil's remark is hard to understand as an expression of love, a part of the language of love.

Similarly, he criticises her emphasis on the impartiality of love as derogatory of the relationships of love that are relationships between two particular individuals. Their value consists in this unique bond between the two people. To see a third someone as equally as precious as one's counterpart can be legitimately understood as disloyalty towards him or her.

A relationship towards one's life-partner or one's children is pervasive; the loss of the other would go deep with one's life and the grief and bereavement is profound. If, from Weil's point of view, grief is an expression of unjustifiable, selfish attachment (a person loving in a saintly manner the whole humanity would not grieve in this way for the death of any other human being), that overlooks something important and constitutive of our notion of love. "When she died, it was as if my life ended as well" is not an expression of selfishness, but of something important about love.

Selfish attachment and love are two different things. In language, the words "selfish attachment" and "love" have different meanings, or to put it in Wittgensteinian terms, their use is different. But philosophy interested in this difference is not a dictionary where meanings of different words are written down; it tries to do justice to the differences that are, at the same time, differences of the lives people lead. If Wittgenstein's emphasis on "meaning is use" meant only the focus on the contents of dictionaries, Rhees (1969a) argues, there would be no work for philosophy: philosophy must account for what it means for people to be creatures that have language. Therefore, philosophy must elucidate whether there is a difference in what it means for people to be selfishly attached to someone and to love them, and whether and to what extent this difference matters.

2.

Language allows us to make sense of situations and to shed light on their important aspects. Whether something is an example of love is highlighted by the language used to comment on it or the language engaged in the discussed context by its participants. When Simone Weil speaks about what she calls "love", what it highlights isn't love as we know it from our lives.

But this argument made by Rhees betrays certain problematic points. When addressing Weil, the way he phrases his criticism often takes some such shape as "this is not a question we would ask", "it would not make sense to us to say that love..." He often refers to further unspecified "us"; but who is this "us"? Does the term "the language of love" (or: our language of love) mean there is only one language of love? Or are there more? If so, which is the one Rhees speaks of? It seems that there are multiple ones: there are serious differences between the ways Rhees and Weil speak of love, not to mention many other people.

This multiplicity does not correspond to the multiplicity of empirical languages (Chinese, English, Latin), although there can be connections. There are rather different underlying concepts of love, some of which are closer to others: "family resemblance". Does the family have boundaries? How can one tell love from what isn't love anymore?

To encounter another systematic way of speaking about "love" (for instance) means to face an unfamiliar way of treating something the meaning of which is, if not taken for granted, then implicitly considered different: "If you love anyone, always think of him as though he were dead"; "The omnipotent and perfectly good God allowed your grandparents to die in the Holocaust to give me an opportunity to elevate myself morally, when I reflect on that." Different languages represent such different grounds of familiarity. I may be surprised someone can think of love or of God in the above terms, but it can make sense to them, given the place love (or God) has in their lives.

However, differences differ in kind. The surprise or unfamiliarity can concern something one considers as central for their view of love, or its peripheral aspects only. I cannot enlist what is central and what peripheral for "my" or "our" notion of love – that would be a task for an empirical (psychological, sociological) inquiry. What is of interest for a philosopher is the difference between responses to the unfamiliar with respect to the central and with respect to the peripheral.

One of the common expressions of a man's erotic love for a woman is its manifestation through flower gifts. Flowers play a role in situations properly understood as examples of love. Or, in simpler terms, flowers are understood as an expression of love – a way a man can tell a woman he loves her (however ridiculously conventional it is and difficult to apply beyond the man-towards-woman context).

At the same time, I needn't see it as a central feature of what love means. My answer to questions "Can it be love if he never gave her flowers?" or "Do these people know true love if they don't have the tradition of giving flowers to their beloved?" would be quick: "Well, yes, why not, I can imagine that perfectly well". An answer to an analogous question based on Weil's assumption – "Is it love when he is indifferent to whether she is dead?" – would not prompt this kind of answer. I at least would be rather baffled.

This latter variety in the language of love introduces a difference in a central aspect and there seems to be a need for justification. The case cannot be solved by a hypothetical, abstract question. What we need is an example to show that this is possible. Examples serve as "objects of comparison" (Wittgenstein 2009, §130). When Wittgenstein introduces his invented examples of language games, he does that in order to highlight important aspects of true language working, as he understands it and wants to show it. Examples arrange and emphasise visible and convincing aspects of an issue one wants to decide or a thing one wants to characterise. What is jealousy and what to think about it (is it a vice, or a tragedy?) can be shown by introducing Othello. Othello's example helps us to orient ourselves in the issue.

In this connection, Peter Winch (1997) argues that cases of understanding are never principally based on introspection or a primitive acquaintance with the familiar. I don't understand that I am jealous or my culture's sense of humour through a different mechanism than I understand another's jealousy or a foreign sense of humour, where I would be forced to extrapolate the initial introspection, perhaps with the help of an example. I learn to understand my own psychological states and the foundational aspects of "our" culture, for what they are, by growing familiar with canonical examples as well. Literature and art play a central role in providing the clearest and most pregnant examples (consider the role of fairy tales).

Neither is love primitive, intelligible on introspection. We learn to understand its meaning (the meaning of events in our lives as events of love) using these objects of comparison. In the case of flower-less love this "internalised" reservoir of examples needn't be explicitly invoked. The way I am accustomed to "look at matters" faces no substantial trouble with inclusion of the flower-less love cases.

Weil's remarks about "love" may need an active search and arrangement of known examples to justify their status. In general, a stranger concept of love (a "centrally strange" one) can be vindicated as love, if we can make available examples powerful enough to make us see the concept's kinship. The examples serve us a bit like stones bulking out of water to jump across a river with dry feet. If they are too far from each other and the steps between them are too difficult, we can never make it to the other side. I think the Wittgensteinian reference to the "our" reflects the relative lack of the need to work actively with examples and the relative easiness of making the connection to the "other side", without having to concentrate on it.

3.

Distinguishing between love and what is not love is not taught by introspection, but it is cultivated by the study of the reservoir of canonical examples, often from literature. Literature can also offer a good example of what uncertainty resulting from an encounter with something disturbingly unfamiliar, yet claimed to be love looks like

I borrow an example from E.M. Forster's novel *Where Angels Fear to Tread* (1995). The principal interpretation of the book is as a powerful critique of the shallow and prejudiced British middle class (which it undoubtedly is). But there is more to it. The narrative tells a story of Lilia Herriton, a young English widow who falls in love, on her holiday in Italy, with a young man named Gino Carella and marries him despite her family's objections. On the one hand, Forster depicts Gino as a more authentic and cordial person than the Englishmen, especially in the second half of the story after Lilia's death, when they meet him and try to take Lilia's child to England. On the other hand, the previous glimpses into the marital life of Gino and Lilia are deeply disturbing, the more so when the word "love" is frequented in Gino's speech.

Forster doesn't have much sympathy for Lilia, whom he describes as selfish, cowardly, superficial and idle. She doesn't really love Gino. But, on the other hand, what Gino seems to appreciate most in their marriage is Lilia's money (he is on the brink of physically assaulting her when she threatens to cut him the money supply), he is unfaithful, but possessive towards her and behaves callously to her. When she dies in giving him a son, he seems content with

the result (unlike his wife's death, his son's eventual death strikes him cruelly).

One of Forster's aims was the critique of the cold "culture" of the English middle class of the early 20th century. He seems to argue: if you want to see what love truly looks like, you have to look elsewhere. His narrative is ambiguous, but he seems to suggest that this elsewhere can be Italy, exemplified in Gino. I don't know if that was Forster's intention, but his depiction of Gino serves as an example of an unfamiliar concept of love. The short synopsis I provided above, if it was a hypothetical proposal, would be probably denied the status "love". Does Forster's book succeed in providing an example powerful enough to show that something important about love is involved here contrary to initial appearances? I feel exciting uncertainty here about whether we can make it to the other side with dry feet.

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23

Vom „pun" zum Sprachspiel – Wittgenstein, Russell, Bradley, Hegel und der Streit um das *concrete universal*

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Abstract

Als Ludwig Wittgenstein 1911 in Cambridge zu studieren beginnt, verfügt er kaum über philosophische Vorkenntnisse. Alles, was er in der vergleichsweise kurzen Zeit bis zur Abfassung seines ersten eigenen philosophischen Hauptwerkes – des *Tractatus* – lernt, lernt er im Wesentlichen von Bertrand Russell in dessen Vorlesungen und den anschließenden persönlichen abendfüllenden philosophischen Diskussionen. Wie war es möglich, dass Wittgenstein trotzdem – schon im *Tractatus* und noch mehr im Spätwerk – ein derart eigenständiges, von Russells Philosophie emanzipiertes Denken entwickeln konnte?
Die Antwort auf diese Frage wird anhand des Streits um das *concrete universal* – einer in der Zeit um Wittgensteins Ankunft in Cambridge heiß diskutierten Auseinandersetzung – rekonstruiert und bis auf Hegel zurückverfolgt.

Zur primär mündlichen Wissensaufnahme Wittgensteins bei Russell kommt – im Verhältnis zum üblichen Grundstudium – erstaunlich wenig philosophische Literatur. Im Wesentlichen beschränkt sich Wittgensteins Lektüre in dieser Zeit auf Russells *Principia Mathematica* und Gottlob Freges *Begriffsschrift*, mit der sich wiederum Russells Arbeiten dieser Zeit intensiv auseinandersetzen. Folglich sind Russell und Frege auch die einzigen Autoren, die explizit als Quelle und philosophische Inspiration für den *Tractatus* in dessen Vorwort genannt werden. Dabei schätzt Wittgenstein diese beiden Werke weit über ihren rein philosophischen Gehalt. An Russell schreibt er begeistert von der „Musikalität" der *Principia* und Freges Stil beschreibt er noch viele Jahre später als „besonders tief".

Das eigentümlich Mündliche und Diskursive von Wittgensteins philosophischer Ausbildung wird noch verstärkt, wenn man sich vor Augen hält, dass er auch zur Lektüre von Freges *Begriffsschrift* den Autor persönlich aufsuchte und die Lektüre intensiv diskutierte. In Anbetracht dieser besonderen mündlichen, auf Russell fokussierten und andere philosophische Autoren ausschließenden Bildungssituation sowie in Anbetracht dessen, dass Freges Überlegungen in Russells Arbeiten weiterentwickelt wurden, kann man bei Wittgenstein mit viel höherem Recht, als dies sonst für Autoren gilt, von einem Schüler Russells bzw. von einem waschechten Russellianer sprechen.

Der Leser Wittgensteins, auch wenn er nur einigermaßen vertraut ist mit Russell, wird sich fragen, wie sich Wittgenstein trotz der beschriebenen auf Russell fokussierten philosophischen Bildungssituation schon kurze Zeit darauf mit dem *Tractatus* und erst recht mit seinem Spätwerk eine derart eigenständige und in vielen Punkten weit umfassendere philosophische Position erarbeiten konnte – eine Position, die Russell selbst 1959 noch ratlos mit den Worten zurückließ: „I have not found in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* anything that seemed to me interesting and I do not understand why a whole school finds important wisdom in its pages" (Russell 1959, 216). Dank seines langen Lebens durfte Russell mit ansehen, wie das Interesse der Nachwelt an Wittgensteins Philosophie dasjenige an seinen eigenen Arbeiten weit überragt.

Wie also konnte es dazu kommen, dass sich Wittgenstein, obwohl er sich auf so außerordentliche Weise im philosophischen Kosmos Russells ausgebildet hat, schon unmittelbar anschließend mit dem *Tractatus* eine so weit entfernte und so deutlich eigenständige Position erarbeiten

konnte, was noch einmal in höherem Maße für das Spätwerk gilt? Eine Antwort auf diese Frage soll im Folgenden anhand einer zeitgenössischen Diskussion skizziert werden, die Russell und andere Mitbegründer der frühen *analytischen Philosophie* gegen die *britischen Neoidealisten* um Francis Herbert Bradley führten.

Den Stein des Anstoßes gaben die Idealisten mit einem ihrer zentralen Konzepte, dem sogenannten *concrete universal*. 1883 hatte Bradley die *Principles of Logic* veröffentlicht und darin unter anderem anhand des *concrete universal* sein Programm eines monistisch-holistischen Idealismus vorgestellt. Russell, in den 1890er Jahren auf Vermittlung McTaggerts selbst noch Bradleyianer (vgl. Griffin 1991), ist inzwischen zur analytischen Philosophie konvertiert und polemisiert jetzt gegen Bradley. In einem Text von 1914, den er schon mit einer Dankesadresse an Wittgenstein für die persönlichen Diskussionen bedenkt (Russell 1914, 4) kritisiert er Bradleys Logik als „a product of logical confusion" mit *Kategorien*, die für „qualities of Reality as a whole" stünden und letztlich von Hegel stammen, der auch der Ursprung solch „essentially Hegelian conceptions as the ‚concrete universal'" sei (ebd., 43 f.). Bemerkenswert ist hier, dass Russell das *concrete universal* und mit ihm gleich die ganze Hegel'sche Philosophie, wenn auch pejorativ, so doch als basierend auf Sprachspielen („puns") charakterisiert: Hegel's philosophy is „built upon stupid and trivial confusions, […] one would be tempted to characterise as *puns*" (ebd., 45).

Diese Formulierung führte Russell 1912 im Rahmen einer Rezension zu Henry Stewart Macrans Übersetzung von Hegels *subjektiver Logik* ein (Russell 1912a, 739 f.) und verwendete sie bis zu seinem Lebensende (Russell 1972, 20). Unbedingt wird diese Charakterisierung der Hegel'schen Logik damals auch Gegenstand der Diskussionen mit Wittgenstein gewesen sein und wir werden noch fragen, inwieweit dies den Anstoß für dessen spätere Sprachspielkonzeption gegeben haben könnte.

Es lohnt sich also, etwas Licht in die heute fast vergessene, seinerzeit aber heftig diskutierte Kontroverse (Stern 2007, 116) um das *concrete universal* zu bringen. Beginnen wir – wegen unseres Interesses am „Russellianer" Wittgenstein – mit Russells Position im Streit mit Bradley und fragen dann, wie Hegel hier ins Spiel kommt.

In gewisser Weise stellt die Kontroverse eine moderne Form des klassischen Universalienstreites dar, in dem Russell eindeutig Stellung für die Realität der Universalien bezieht. Nach Russell wissen wir von Universalien durch

Bekanntschaft: „In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things, we also have acquaintance with what we shall call universals, that is to say, general ideas, such as, whiteness, diversity, brotherhood, and so on" (Russell 1912b, 28). Weil nun jede Proposition mindestens eine Universalie enthält, gilt: „all truths involve universals, and all knowledge of truths involves acquaintance with universals" (ebd., 53). Und diese Bekanntschaft mit Universalien ist real, nicht mental, denn „whatever being belongs to them is independent of their being thought of or in any way apprehended by minds" (ebd., 55).

Russells Universalienrealismus wendet sich damit gegen Bradleys Nominalismus, der mit seiner Charakterisierung der Universalien als *konkret* gerade sagen will, dass das Universale nicht real ist. Realität im vollen Sinne kommt in Bradleys monistischer Konzeption nur dem Absoluten zu. Einzelne Entitäten sind hier nur insofern real, als sie Teil des Absoluten, der „reality as a whole", sind. Das *Konkrete* im *concrete universal* richtet sich so vor allem gegen das *Abstrakte* oder die rein formale Bestimmung des Allgemeinen in der Russell'schen Konzeption, wo es *abstrakt*, d. i. losgelöst vom großen Ganzen, seine atomistische Realität beansprucht. Bradley schreibt dazu in den *Principles of Logic*:

> The more deeply you analyze a given whole, the wider and larger you make its unity; and the more elements you join in a synthetic construction, so much greater is the detail and more full the differentiation of that totality. We have here the antipodes of that false relation of extension to intent which we criticized before (Book L Chap. VI.). That preposterous article of orthodox logic turned the course of our reason into senseless miracle. The less a thing became the further it went, and the more it contained the narrower it became. Such a total reversement of our rational instinct could spring from nothing but a fundamental error. And it arose from our use of the abstract universal. That can not be real, and in consequence our thoughts were all built on unreality and ended in falsehood, but in the *concrete universal*, which has guided our steps, and which has appeared as the identity of analysis and synthesis, we have returned to truth and made our peace with reality. (Bradley 1883, § 25, S. 446 f.)

Im Spiegel des an Exaktheit orientierten Wissenschaftsideals im logischen Atomismus Russells und seiner formalen Logik erscheint aber gerade dieses *concrete universal* als ein *pun*, ein unzulässiges *Sprachspiel*, in dem offensichtlich der Unterschied der Kategorien aufgehoben werden soll, da doch ein Begriff wie *universal* nicht zugleich seinen Gegenpart *particular* bedeuten kann und somit hier „simply an abuse of language" vorliegen muss, „to call the individual ‚universal' at all" (vgl. Foster 1931, 7).

Werfen wir nun einen Blick darauf, wie sich Hegel *avant la lettre* zu diesem Streit stellt, und fragen dann, welche Spuren die Auseinandersetzung in Wittgensteins Philosophie hinterlassen hat. Einerseits könnte Bradley Hegel durchaus auf seiner Seite sehen, da Hegel selbst vom Begriff als dem „Konkrete[n] und Reichste[n]" (WdL II, 295) spricht. Sowohl in den Analysen zum *Qualitativen Urteil* als auch zum *Qualitativen Schluss* ist das *konkret Allgemeine* ausgezeichnet vor dem *abstrakt Allgemeinen*. Abstrakt ist ein Allgemeines hier, wenn es in einem Urteil einem *Einzelnen* zugeschrieben wird, bspw. dem Sokrates das *allgemeine* Prädikat Weisheit. Das *konkrete* Gegenteil dieser abstrakt äußerlichen Zuschreibung kann durch einen Satz wie „Sokrates ist ein Mensch" dargestellt werden. Das *Mensch-Sein* ist der Substanz *Sokrates* inhärent und ohne

diese Eigenschaft ist es schlechterdings unklar, was „Sokrates" überhaupt bedeuten könnte.

Auch schon am Anfang der *Subjektiven Logik*, im Kapitel *A. Der Allgemeine Begriff*, verweist Hegel ausdrücklich darauf, dass „das Allgemeine" selbst schon ein „Konkretes" sei in dem Sinne, dass es nicht leer ist, sondern „vielmehr durch seinen Begriff Inhalt" (WdL II, 277) hat.

Im Gegensatz zu Bradley spricht Hegel in diesem Zusammenhang aber nicht von einer Irrealität des Abstrakten bzw. von einer graduellen Steigerung der Realität hin zum Absoluten, sondern charakterisiert mit der Unterscheidung konkret/abstrakt, inwieweit das jeweilige Allgemeine inhaltlich oder (nur) formal bestimmt ist. Und dies ist unabhängig von der Nähe zum Absoluten. Für Hegel ist auf jeder Stufe der *Logik des Begriffs*, d. h. im *Begriff*, im *Urteil* und im *Schluss*, sowohl die *konkrete* inhaltliche als auch die *abstrakte* formale Bestimmung des Allgemeinen zu geben. Der Titel des von Russell im August 1912 rezensierten Macran-Übersetzung: *Hegel's Doctrine of Formal Logic* ist sogar irreführend, da es sich bei Hegels *subjektiver Logik* eben nicht um eine *formale Logik* handelt, die vom Inhalt der Begriffe abstrahiert.

Sehen wir nun darauf, wie der Russellianer Wittgenstein die Positionen dieses Streites in sein eigenes Denken aufnimmt. Auffallend stellt er sich eben nicht einfach auf Russells Seite, sondern versucht, seinem Gegenstand gerecht zu werden, indem er dasjenige, was er in den Diskussionen mit Russell als Negatives über Bradley und Hegel aufnehmen konnte, in seine Überlegungen integriert. Man könnte auch sagen: Die durch Russells vereinseitigte Konzentration auf die formale Seite der Logik unterdrückten Elemente fordern ihr Recht, sobald diese Logik wieder zurück auf den Bezug zur Welt bzw. auf die Grenzen der Sprache bezogen wird.

Dies wird bspw. thematisch, wenn Wittgenstein im *Tractatus* fordert: „Aber die Logik muss sich mit ihrer Anwendung berühren" (5.557). Der *Tractatus* verbindet beide Seiten des Streites um das *concrete universal* auf besondere Weise: Auf der einen Seite erinnern die Elementarsätze mit ihrer „allgemeinen Satzform" (4.5) an Russells Insistieren auf der formalen Unabhängigkeit der Universalien. Auf der anderen Seite wird – wie von Bradley – deren Weltbezug gefordert. Als ob Wittgenstein beiden Seiten des Streites gerecht werden wollte, stellt die Grundkonzeption des *Tractatus* in ihrer Isomorphie von Logik und Welt, Elementarsätzen und Sachverhalten das Moment des abstrakten Allgemeinen dem Konkreten der Welt zuerst als unabhängig gegenüber. Die Relation zwischen beiden Seiten besteht in der Abbildung der Welt durch die Sprache, ist also Korrelation von Elementarsatz und Sachverhalt.

Wenn Wittgenstein allerdings bemerkt, dass „unsere Probleme nicht abstrakt [sind,] sondern vielleicht die konkretesten die es gibt" (5.5563) und im gleichen Satz die Sprache selbst mit der Wahrheit identifiziert („Alle Sätze unserer Umgangssprache sind tatsächlich, so wie sie sind, logisch vollkommen geordnet. – Jenes Einfachste, was wir hier angeben sollen, ist nicht ein Gleichnis der Wahrheit, sondern die volle Wahrheit selbst"), ist das etwas, was weder ganz aus Russells noch aus Bradleys Konzeption folgt. Es erinnert eher an Hegel, der darauf dringt, dass schon die Allgemeinheit des Begriffs selbst etwas Konkretes ist (s. o.). Die Bildtheorie mit ihrer Korrelation von Sprache und Welt steht hier in der Klammer der paradoxalen Selbstaufhebung von Satz 7. des *Tractatus* und wird im Spätwerk bekanntlich ganz aufgegeben. Erhalten bleibt aber dieses Element der Konkretheit des Allgemeinen, wenn Wittgenstein bspw. im *Big Typescript* schreibt, „daß

die Verallgemeinerung selbst etwas bestimmtes ist" (BTS § 15) oder in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*: „Die Logik […] aber erscheint nicht als eine Abstraktion; sondern als etwas Konkretes, ja als das Konkreteste, gleichsam Härteste" (PU § 97). Was aber tritt im Spätwerk an die Stelle der Bildtheorie, die hier als Gegenüberstellung der Forderungen Russells (nach der formalen Unabhängigkeit der Universalien) und Bradleys (nach dem konkreten Weltbezug) eingeführt wurde?

An die Stelle des Dualismus von Sprache und Welt tritt eine ausdifferenzierte performative Struktur, die Wittgenstein nun affirmativ als „Sprachspiel" beschreibt: eine Struktur ähnlich derjenigen, die Russell mit denselben Worten, aber vor dem Hintergrund seines formallogischen Wissenschaftsideals noch als „pun", als unernstes Sprachspiel, charakterisiert hatte und über die er inzwischen urteilt: „The later Wittgenstein […] seems to have grown tired of serious thinking and to have invented a doctrine which would make such an activity unnecessary." (Russell 1959, 217)

Im Streit um das *concrete universal* bezieht Wittgenstein mit seiner Sprachspielkonzeption Position gegen den Universalienrealismus Russells. Er diagnostiziert dieser Position ein „craving for generality" (Wittgenstein 1958, 17 f.), die fälschlicherweise annimmt, es müsse etwas geben, das allen Vorstellungen, die unter einen Begriff fallen, gemeinsam ist. Als philosophische Therapie dagegen wäre zu fragen, was z. B. alle Spiele gemeinsam haben. „Sag nicht: ‚Es *muß* ihnen etwas gemeinsam sein, sonst hießen sie nicht ‹Spiele›' – sondern *schau*, ob ihnen etwas gemeinsam ist. – Denn wenn du sie anschaust, wirst du zwar nicht etwas sehen, was *allen* gemeinsam wäre, aber du wirst Ähnlichkeiten, Verwandtschaften, sehen, und zwar eine ganze Reihe" (PU § 66).

Damit stellt sich Wittgenstein aber zugleich gegen die systembedingten Vereinseitigungen eines Bradley'schen monistischen Nominalismus. Mit der Sprachspielkonzeption gibt es keinen einheitlichen Gradualismus der Realität hin zum Absoluten. Alle Spiele sind in ihrem Zusammenhang gleich real. Am Beispiel des Zahlenbegriffs erläutert Wittgenstein das folgendermaßen: „wir dehnen unseren Begriff der Zahl aus, wie wir beim Spinnen eines Fadens Faser an Faser drehen. Und die Stärke des Fadens liegt nicht darin, daß irgend eine Faser durch seine ganze Länge läuft, sondern darin, daß viele Fasern einander übergreifen." (PU § 67)

In Bezug auf das *concrete universal* teilt Wittgenstein mit Hegel die philosophische Grundhaltung, die Anstrengung der Überwindung von Vereinseitigungen, den performativen Anspruch, feste Begriffe zu verflüssigen und auch den, die Philosophie als ein „ernstes Sprachspiel" zu verstehen, als eine nie abschließbare kritische Praxis.

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Wittgenstein, Escher and Mach

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Abstract

This paper explores the link between the works on physiological optics by Ernst Mach, Wittgenstein's concept of nonsense and the art of Escher. Theoretical contributions such as Mach bands and the physicist's treatment of optical phenomena and visual perception of space in general lead to an improved understanding of the perception of perspective and movement. They also had an influence in arts that goes beyond the already known relation between literature and Machian phenomenalism. Our conjecture is that the work of Escher can be better understood as being intuitively related to Machian physiological optics, and not only to mathematics. Escher's work reflects nonsense and perplexity and the expression of "what can be shown but not said". Artistic representations are depictions of non-actual and impossible objects or circumstances as actual, rendering the spectator perplex, what is compatible with Wittgenstein's account of art as nonsense.

I. Wittgenstein: nonsense and aesthetic perplexities

It exceeds the limits of this contribution to give an account of the subtleties involved in Wittgenstein's conception of nonsense, the ineffable and perplexity [for reasonable accounts of the first two concepts see Glock (1996) or Kállay (2012)]. We rather will start from an idea that is commonly accepted regarding his conception of aesthetics, namely, that arts pertain to the realm of nonsense. We argue that aesthetic perplexity derives from the realization of nonsense via visual artistic representation, and the works of Escher are a suitable candidate to exemplify this issue. In LC (IV.1), Yorick Smithies claims that "Aesthetic puzzles-[are] puzzles about the effects the arts have on us. The puzzles which arise in aesthetics, which are puzzles arising from the effects the arts have, are not puzzles about how these things are caused".

Wittgenstein has been undoubtedly one of the most interested philosophers in the problems of representation, correspondence between the world and language and what we say about things. The task of contrasting the world with our perception of them has forced us to assign meaning to words by relating them to objects, actions, facts and to particular ineffable things. The aim of the *Tractatus* was "to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought)" (preface).

If we remit ourselves to language games and family resemblance then, we also find another aid to comprehend what nonsense is and its relation with art. "The study of language games is the study of primitive forms of language or primitive languages." (BB, p.17). By means of language games we can establish truth or falsity, sense and nonsense regarding propositions. These ideas are useful if we want to identify nonsense in arts. His ideas on aesthetics are also related to language oriented problems. Non-figurative art (and new artistic expressions in general) arise from the limits imposed in the world; new ways of expression are necessary to comprehend and communicate that what we cannot speak of.

Although in TLP §6.421 Wittgenstein refers to ethics and aesthetics as being the same, following Reguera (1981, p.294), the work of art is the object *sub specie aeternis* and the good life would be the world *sub specie aeternitatis*. Ethics and aesthetics would be transcendental. Being both nonsense, they do not refer to the world, but they allow everything in the world. That is why they both are dangerous. This reflections upon the relation between ethics, aesthetics and the world go beyond what is logical, so Wittgenstein was right when he asserted that his "work has extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world." (NB, 79e).

If we already know that nonsense is what has no reference in the world, there is still the task of how we can represent it: starting from imitation of nature, human beings have taken this imitative art to a separate plane lead by imagination and the concept that is expressed in the work of art, thus relying upon images to show what can't be said, i.e., emotions and ideas. As Rilke (2011, 21) puts it, "most events are unsayable, occur in a space that no word has ever penetrated, and most unsayable of all are works of art, mysterious existences whose life endures alongside ours, which passes away".

The concept of language games and family resemblance are inherent to all artistic activities. The artist plays a game where he uses his imagination in order to express nonsense in a world that apparently is full of sense. By playing this game, he helps to construct the rules of what we call art. The artistic creator uses whatever pretext he can in order to show nonsense via artistic depiction. The work of art forces us to fixate on it in terms of the game it proposes, not just as an object, but also insofar as it can do unto us. It wakes our imagination and helps us to experience nonsense.

Wittgenstein arrives to the conclusion that "What can be shown, cannot be said" (TLP, §4.1212) because if propositions are about the world, there cannot be any propositions about the things that are not within it, following the idea that starts in §4.121: "What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it". Art would be a mean to comprehend the world within the world without forcing ourselves to get out of it. §7 invites us to remain silent of those things that cannot be properly named. We simply pass this over and end up appealing to arts to express them. The artist has the will to surpass the limits, changes them, thus establishing a direct connection between sense and nonsense.

II. Mach bands, concave & convex forms, optical illusions and impossible objects

The presence of Mach in this paper arouse from a stunning coincidence regarding Jones (1856). The British architect gave a great importance to two architectural jewels of Muslim Spain: La Alhambra and the Mosque of Córdoba. The fascination for Muslim ornaments caught Jones in XIX century as it would do with Escher in the next one. Both of them visited Granada twice. Escher asserted in Schattschneider and Emmer (2003) that "the Moors were masters in the filling of surface with congruent figures and left no gaps over. In the Alhambra, in Spain, especially, they decorated the walls by placing congruent multicolored pieces of majolica together without interstices" (p. 100).

The artist also went on to affirm in Locher (1982) that "the regular division of the plane into congruent figures evoking an association in the observer with a familiar natural object is one of these hobbies or problems. [...] I have embarked on this geometric problem again and again over the years, trying to throw light on different aspects each time. I cannot imagine what my life would be like if this problem had never occurred to me; one might say that I am head over heels in love with it, and I still don't know why." (p. 67)

In our search of explanations for the works of Escher we have found an association that seems untold: Despite the many claims by art critics on the link between Escher's graphic art with mathematics, we see that it is on the field of physiological optics that we can better contextualize the unconventional works of this artist. It hit us by surprise as we found in Mach (1886) two significant references to Jones (1856). More surprising is an illustration (Figure 1) from the latter in chapter 10 (The Relations of the Sight-Sensations to One Another and the other Physical Elements), §7 of *The Analysis of Sensations*, to which Mach refers as follows:

Figure 1. Left, Illustration from Jones (1856). Center, reproduction of it in Mach (1886). Right, one of the many bird tessellations made by M. C. Escher.

The habit of observing bodies as such, that is, of giving attention to a large and spatially cohering mass of light sensations, is the cause of peculiar and often surprising phenomena. A two-colored painting or drawing, for instance, appears in general quite different according as we take the one or the other color as the background. The puzzle pictures, in which, for example, an apparition makes its appearance between tree trunks as soon as the dark trees are taken as the background, and the bright sky as the object, are well known. In exceptional instances only do background and object possess the same form —a configuration frequently employed in ornamental designs. (pp. 211-212)

Observation of the decorative motifs of La Alhambra made by Owen and Escher are known to have an impact on both of them, but its impact on the reflection upon arts and aesthetics in late XIX and early XX century is yet to be explored.

It is also worthwhile to mention the experiment with a folded visiting card that is described in §6 (Figure 3). It explains how light, shadows and folds affect our stereo vision and the perception of space, an issue which Escher managed to master in his favor to construct impossible objects.

Mach's fine artistic sensitivity, combined with a top level scientific education in his times allowed him –after having read Jones and long before Escher was even born– to explain the phenomena of perspective, two-dimensional representation of tridimensional space, impossible objects, to develop the *Mach effect*, among other significant contributions. Mach bands are responsible for our perception of illusory movements in some pictures (Figure 2); Mach bands are of aid to produce impossible objects.

Figure 2. Left, Mach bands. Right, Figure 1 of The Analysis of Sensations, a drawing in "Escher fashion before Escher".

Figure 3. Left, Figure 24 of The Analysis that illustrated Mach's explanation of an experiment with a folded visiting card (light, shadows and the fold affect our perception of depth). Right, Concave and Convex, Escher (1956). Impossible figures by 3D space representation on a 2D plane.

III. Escher: art that expresses "what can be shown but can't be said" and perplexity generated by nonsensical depictions

The graphic work of Escher undoubtedly illustrates principally nonsense and ineffability. Though he made a great effort, Escher had the impression that he could not come close to his visual ideas he saw in his mind, as stated in Ernst (2007): "If only you knew the things I have seen in the darkness of night, at times I have nearly been driven mad at being unable to express these things in visual terms. In comparison with my visions, every single print is a failure and reflects not even a fraction of what might have been" (p. 20).

The artist implicitly accepts here that there were limits related to the extent of what he could visually express with respect to all what he could conceive or think regarding visual ideas. It is also a way of recognizing the ineffability of his own pictorial ideas.

It is well known that Escher is an artist that is hard to classify. Ernst (1978, 2007) has asserted that for those who consider that art is an expression of feelings cannot do anything but to reject the works of Escher after 1937.

His works were constructed from understanding; His art is somehow intellectual. Many are prone to relate him to mathematics, but the artist himself mocked of it in Ernst (2007):

> I never got a pass mark in math. The funny thing is I seem to latch on to mathematical theories without realizing what is happening. No indeed, I was a pretty poor pupil at school. And just imagine-mathematicians now use my prints to illustrate their books. Fancy me consorting with all these learned folk, unaware of the fact that I'm ignorant about the whole thing. (p. 28)

We think that the roots of the artistic work of Escher is not in math, as it is a commonly asserted by critics following Ernst (2007). He was rather amazed and wondered by the phenomena that correspond to physiological optics as those studied by Mach in *The Analysis of Sensations*. His artistic practice is conceived upon tridimensional projection on planes, the problems of the representation of what's tridimensional in a two-dimensional surface. More than a graphical depiction of mathematical concepts, his work can be better explained as a practical inquiry of dynamic projections of objects in two-dimensional space (how to put tridimensional space to the plane) and the way in which irreducible contrasts are presented. Of course, we do not deny the documented exploration of Escher on mathematics, but rather intended to point out the need to reassess the sources of his artistic motifs even if Schattschneider (2010) considers what Escher did from 1937 to 1941 "a methodical investigation that can only be termed mathematical research" (p. 708).

Escher also made use of optical effects of illusory movements in fixed objects like in *Concave and convex* (1955), *Bond of Union* and *Print gallery* (1956) or *Waterfall* (1961), where figures shift in our perception from concave and convex via the Mach effect among other optical-physiological effects (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Left, *Print Gallery*, Escher (1956). Right, *Waterfall*, Escher (1961). Sample of illusory movement and use of the Mach bands and the Droste effect.

IV. Conclusions and final remarks

As a conclusion, we must affirm that Escher made an intuitive and very original exploration of the problems that were studied by physiological optics of late XIX and early XX centuries. The nature of those problems is such that it is still difficult for conventional scientific discourse to express them without the aid of illustrations. Escher turns into art a whole tradition of research in physiological optics, where names like Jacques Loeb, Ewald Hering, Hermann von Helmholtz and Mach himself matter. From this point of view, the work of Escher makes more sense. We differ from interpretations that tend to assume the work of Escher as being derived from pure mathematics. As we have seen, even in Escher's own words, his mood was not precisely that of a mathematician. Further historical research is expected to throw more light on the propinquity between Escher and the direct works on physiological optics.

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Wittgenstein and Altieri on Literary Experience

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Abstract

In his recent book, *Reckoning with the Imagination*, Charles Altieri relies on Wittgenstein for "restoring" aesthetic Idealism. Altieri's restoration consists in describing aesthetic experience as sensual, imaginative and attending to the writer's purposiveness. Altieri's literary experience boils down, I believe, to the reader's awareness that he recognizes the author's purposiveness. I will argue that Wittgenstein's aesthetic remarks do not agree with this description of literary experience. In particular, I will claim that for Wittgenstein literary experience is not conscious in the way Altieri's description requires. Defending Altieri's description by downplaying the role of consciousness and focusing on its directness will be claimed to be incompatible with Wittgenstein's belief that literary experience is indirect.

1. Altieri on Literary Experience

In his recent book, *Reckoning with the Imagination,* Charles Altieri laments that New Historicism views literary aesthetics as a social field which examines the political and economic interests behind literary texts. He believes that responding by simply emphasizing artistic craft and textual singularity (like H. Dubrow did) tempts only those already dissatisfied with New Historicism. He develops, therefore, an alternative response. He proposes "restoring" the German Idealists (e.g., Kant, Hegel and Schiller) who emphasized artistic craft while simultaneously underlining its social force. Altieri's restoration upholds four core idealistic principles of aesthetic experience: (a) it is sensual, not conceptual, (b) it is imaginative, not epistemic, (c) it requires attending to the creator's purposiveness, and finally, (d) it reveals individual powers for having values (Altieri 2005, pp. 5-15).

Later Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect seeing, subjectivity and art enable Altieri to bring these idealistic principles down to earth. Approaching imagination phenomenologically, he recognizes four essential features (following Edward Casey). Imagination defies practical and logical restrictions, imposes numerous subtle tonalities upon a situation, and it is self-justifying. Altieri adds an additional feature crucial to the arts: imagination deliberately draws attention to the way it deplores to display all these features.

Altieri shows this display at work in Ashbery's "The instruction manual" and Yeat's "Leda and the Swan." For Altieri, both poems draw attention to their imaginative character by employing appropriate syntactic elements, tones, and styles. These syntactic details follow a distinctive logic that provides each poem with a self-referring coherence.

Such aesthetic displays of imagination provide more than mere illusions because they agree with other everyday practices. Altieri draws here heavily upon the later Wittgenstein. His *On Certainty* shows that display is an attunement to non-epistemic language games. Epistemic language games use descriptions and propositions in order to resolve doubts; non-epistemic language games aim at attuning to certain situations.

Expressing one's self is an important class of such games. One everyday example is the verbal expression of feelings, as pain. "Ow!" neither resolves doubts about whether I am in pain nor reports my feeling it. "Ow!" is a public gesture which both displays and calls attention to my suffering. Another everyday example is the expression of sensations, such as colour sensations. Like "Ow!", "Red!" neither resolves doubt about an object's colour nor reports sensing it. "Red!" is also a public gesture which displays and calls attention to the agents suddenly recognising one of the objects' aspects, namely its being red. Following Altieri, this everyday form of display also underlies the imaginative expressions that we find in literary texts.

The character of these expressions is most faithfully captured by idealists and, in particular, Hegel (pp. 106-9). However, although Hegel recognised correctly that expressions are not simply emotional responses to sensations, he denied their worldliness. He saw them as the way a transcendental self-consciousness transforms its substantial aspects into recognisable natural and social determinants. Thus, Hegel places imaginative expression into an intangible realm of spirits and substances. Altieri calls upon Wittgenstein's account of display in order to refine Hegel's idea of a marginal subject attuning to what surrounds it from such transwordly commitments. For Wittgenstein believed that these surroundings are embedded within social language-games. Consequently, imaginative expressions create imaginary worlds which expand the world in which the subject is embedded.

Literary artworks portray such imaginary worlds. They establish a literary subject that strives for a non-epistemic truthful presentation of this world. The words and sentences this subject brings forth do not depict objects and facts of his imaginary world. They are gestures calling attention to what the subject becomes by inhabiting it. This truthfulness resembles a confession. It acknowledges the creator's responsibility for taking the time and care to employ language games appropriate for revealing how aspects of a situation dawned him.

In this way, the artwork becomes a distinctive, singular example, not one of the many examples of a general rule or concept (pp. 134-7). Artworks reveal themselves to be "exemplar as" something (i.e., Hamlet's example as melancholy) and great artworks, like *Hamlet*, really exemplify themselves; they are examples of their fitting their formulation. This exemplification is objective. Using works as examples for something not distinctive in them—for instance, D. Bellamy in *Cunt Norton*—will stumble upon their singularity.

Altieri believes that imaginative expressions exemplify by employing a speech act characteristic of art and fiction, "the demonstrative" (pp.150-5). The demonstrative invites us to see the maker's textual choices as gestures towards his audience. It calls the reader to enliven the text by rec-

ognizing how the author's purposiveness unfolds in his textual choices. The demonstrative invites the reader to see how these choices gradually guide her to find a meaning into the text and recognize herself in it. For Altieri, it is the pleasure of being so guided into partaking to the creator's freedom and imaginative power that makes us appreciate and admire the singularity of texts like *Hamlet*.

2. Wittgenstein on Literary Experience

I will argue that Wittgenstein's aesthetic remarks do not concede with Altieri's description of literary experience and, in particular, his second idealistic principle. According to this principle, literary experience is not cognitive; it is rather "sensuous" or (as illustrated later in the book) "self-conscious". In order to see this disagreement with Wittgenstein, we need first to distinguish the individual elements of Altieri's self-conscious literary experience.

Firstly, literary experience is, for Altieri, a form of awareness. Reading a text consists in noticing the creator's choices, recognizing the text's syntactical patterns, grasping its purposiveness and, consequently, realizing how the text transforms us. We can have none of these processes (noticing, recognising, etc.) without being aware of it. Secondly, literary experience is the awareness of certain mental states of the reader. Literary experience consists in the reader's awareness that he recognises the author's purposiveness. As Altieri puts it, "the purposiveness in these texts then resides […] in the awareness of [the] constant interaction" between reader and text (p. 225).

Finally, literary experience is immediate. Recognising the author's purposiveness is not similar to drawing a conclusion. Reading Claudius's speech, for example, does not give us statements about its syntax, grammar and style that we can use in concluding Shakespeare's purposiveness. On the contrary, the author's purposiveness dawns upon the reader as she concentrates upon its syntax, grammar and style. In an enjambment, to use Altieri's example, as we reach the end of a line without also reaching a complete sentence we immediately feel the intended "drive for further completion" (p. 83). If this reading of Altieri is correct, his second principle states the following: literary experience is the reader's awareness of directly recognising the author's purposiveness in the text.

Now the question is whether Wittgenstein's aesthetic remarks allow for this kind of literary experience. Does Wittgenstein too take literary experience to be the reader's awareness of his mental states? On first sight, the answer seems positive. For Wittgenstein, in reading a text the reader finds herself under certain mental states. "I read a story and have all sorts of images while I read, i.e. while I am looking attentively, and hence seeing clearly" (Z § 623). Similarly, if someone reads attentively, we expect that "this and that should strike him, and he be able to give an account of it" (Z § 91). Although at times Wittgenstein assimilates literary experience with overt public behaviour such as facial expressions, gestures and movements (CV pp. 79-80), he does not deny that literary experience is something of which the agent is aware.

But does, for Wittgenstein, reading attentively allow us to recognise the author's purposiveness directly? Does he for example believe that what strikes us when we concentrate upon the syntax, grammar and style of Claudius's speech makes its purposiveness dawn upon us? The answer is, I believe, negative. This is clear in the difference between how Wittgenstein and Altieri view experiencing deliberate syntactic deviations. Instead of Altieri's enjambment, Witt-

genstein considers the choice of modern German poets to write nouns in lower-case letters (e.g., die zeit, rather than die Zeit).

Apparently, this way of writing is meant to strike us as alien and novel. For Wittgenstein, however, we experience it only as puzzling; our first impression cannot "be described more exactly than by means of words like 'queer', 'unaccustomed'. Recognizing that these deviations are meant to strike us as alien and new is not part of the literary experience but of its analysis. Wittgenstein believes that we need to analyse our way into the author's purposiveness and not simply to discern it. This marks an essential difference to Altieri's description of literary experience.

One could ascribe the above difference to my reading Altieri falsely. Such an objection could run as follows. This reading overplays the points of Altieri's description that present literary experience as an awareness. It ignores the points Altieri seems to exhaust literary experience in its public expression (pp. 125-7). In them, he does not take the author to be aware of his insights before he puts them onto the paper; they are fully constituted by being written down (p. 34). At points Altieri seems to view the reader as equally latent; the latter recognises the authorial purposiveness without necessarily being aware of it. This recognition simply consists in associating the written text with others or its imagined scenario with ordinary ones. Thus, the awareness Altieri associates with literary experience is the minimal awareness required for leading and following in dancing a tango (p. 34). Read in this way, concludes the objection, Altieri agrees with Wittgenstein.

I believe though that such a reading disagrees with Altieri's commitment to idealism. It depletes consciousness; so it would probably not sit well with Altieri's commitment to Hegel's idea of self-consciousness. More importantly though, even the non-conscious strains of Altieri's position retain the final feature of literary experience; they accept that recognising the author's purposiveness is immediate. However, for Wittgenstein, recognising the author's purposiveness requires "analyses" of a text's first impression (RPP I, § 1087). The required aesthetic analysis differs, for Wittgenstein, crucially from an immediate process. It is a case of one of the most sticking inferential processes: namely, solving a mathematical problem.

Wittgenstein's assimilation of aesthetic analysis and solutions of mathematical problems is enduring. He holds as early as LC that aesthetics is "like a piece of Mathematics" and that answering aesthetical questions is like "solving a mathematical problem" (Moore 1954, p. 18). The simile between aesthetics and mathematics is retained later on in *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. Constructing and recognising the style of Brahms' variations of Haydn's St. Antony Chorale is considered there to be a kind of mathematical problem (RFM, VII § 11).

What do though mathematical and aesthetical analyses have in common? For Wittgenstein, solving mathematical problems provides us with reasons for substituting a mathematical expression for another. The same holds, I believe, for the mathematics-like problem solving of literary analysis. It provides reasons for substituting the expression "die zeit feels queer" with the expression "die zeit feels novel" or the expression "Claudius' speech is admirable" with "Claudius' speech resembles Ismene's speech in Antigone". These expressions manage to transform our impression of the text; they turn what first stroke us as puzzling into something normal. They are successful because they manage to "sooth" us (Z § 438).

Altieri could respond that he is not aiming at a complete account of Wittgenstein's aesthetical remarks. He can say that he is simply exploring what implications Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect seeing have for aesthetics. This makes the above objections to his description irrelevant. Wittgenstein does not explicitly deny that literary experience is a form of aspect seeing. In case Altieri's reading of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect seeing are correct, then the implication for aesthetics drawn by Altieri is correct, even though Wittgenstein himself is not drawing it.

However, I believe that Altieri's reading is not undoubtedly correct. For Wittgenstein, dawning of aspects needs not be conscious. Some of his remarks suggest that we can say that an aspect dawned to an agent without referring to his awareness (LPP I. § 570). In addition, Wittgenstein takes aspect seeing to be partly inferred, not fully perceived (LPP I, § 554, 564). Concluding, all the above reasons demonstrate my conviction that Wittgenstein thought literary experience to be neither conscious nor direct in the way which Altieri's second principle requires.

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Why Do We Need a Theory of Art?

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Abstract

This paper argues that within the class of aesthetic judgments, interesting variations occur depending on whether the judgment refers to an artwork or not. Additionally, it is suggested that in order to understand and satisfactorily explain these variations, one needs a convincing specification of the notion of "art". Thus, the main thesis of this paper is that a general theory of aesthetic judgments needs to be supplemented by a convincing and theoretically fruitful theory of art.

1. Introduction

What is art? This question can be answered by defining "art/artwork", i.e., by citing individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for attributing the term "art/artwork" to an object. Even though such a definitional project has been the center of attention in the philosophy of art for a long time, today this project seems to have gone out of fashion. There are at least three reasons for that.

First, in light of the many failed definitional attempts, it is questionable whether the definitional project can ever be brought to a successful conclusion. Second, there are many interesting questions with respect to art that might be answered independently of a satisfying definition of "art." Third, the philosophy of art is a subdiscipline of a more general aesthetic science. This more general theory is concerned with questions, which do not refer to art in particular, for example: Are our aesthetic responses to the world accompanied by a special sort of experience? What differentiates aesthetic from nonaesthetic judgments and how can we explain certain semantic and pragmatic features of aesthetic judgments? Interest in these general aesthetic questions has increased because developments in other fields beyond philosophy (for example, psychological aesthetics or linguistics) have raised the hope that real progress with respect to these general aesthetic questions could be achieved through interdisciplinary effort. However, because a definition of "art" does neither seem necessary nor particularly helpful in order to address these *general* aesthetic questions, the interest in such a definitional project declined.

The aim of this paper is to bring the project of defining "art" back on the agenda of aesthetic theorizing. In particular, I will question the last point just made. I am convinced that, despite first appearances, answering some general aesthetic questions would in fact profit a great deal from a convincing definition of "art." This thought seems especially true with respect to the general topic of aesthetic judgments. I will argue that within the class of aesthetic judgments, interesting variations occur depending on whether the judgment refers to an artwork or not. To understand and explain these variations, a convincing theory of art—that is, a convincing definition of our concept of "art," would in fact be very useful.

Thus, the main thesis of this paper is that a general theory of aesthetic judgments needs to be supplemented by a convincing and theoretically fruitful theory of art. In section 2, I will start with some preliminary remarks. In sections 3–5, I will then discuss three variations within the class of aesthetic judgments that call for a theory of art.

2. Aesthetic Judgments

I will concentrate on aesthetic judgments that can be expressed by uttering sentences of the following form "X is φ," where "X" stands for a singular term and "φ" for an aesthetic predicate. Of course, differentiating aesthetic from nonaesthetic predicates is no easy task, but one can at least give a list of paradigmatic examples:

> φ: beautiful, graceful, dynamic, vibrant, moving, somber, and so on.

This short list already illustrates how diverse and varied aesthetic predicates and judgments are: some are metaphorical (e.g., "X is moving") and some nonmetaphorical (e.g., "X is graceful"); some are evaluative (e.g., "X is beautiful") and some are nonevaluative (e.g., "X is dynamic"); and so on.

Let me briefly explain what I mean by "evaluative" here. The utterance of "X is beautiful" is evaluative in the sense that by uttering this sentence, the speaker conveys that she appreciates the perceptual experience of X. This conveyed information might be part of the semantic content of the sentence "X is beautiful," as contextualists or speaker subjectivists with respect to judgments of beauty would claim, or it might be conveyed pragmatically via some kind of Gricean implicature or via some other process, as some objectivists or hybrid-expressivists could claim. Fortunately, in the context of this paper it is not important to decide which of these theories is correct.

That "X is beautiful" is evaluative can be illustrated with the following sentence:

> (1) This flower is beautiful, but I don't appreciate how it looks.

Uttering (1) is highly inappropriate for the following reason: Uttering (1) is infelicitous because by uttering the second conjunct of the sentence, the speaker denies something that she conveys by uttering the first conjunct of the sentence. In this respect, judgments of beauty are comparable to judgments of gustatory taste:

> (2) This apple is delicious, but I do not appreciate how it tastes.

However, not all aesthetic judgments are evaluative in this sense. Uttering a sentence of the form "X is dynamic," for example, is not evaluative because uttering (3) is not necessarily infelicitous:

> (3) X is dynamic, but I don't appreciate how it looks/sounds.

That aesthetic judgments of the form "X is φ" vary along theoretically important parameters—evaluative versus nonevaluative or metaphorical versus nonmetaphorical—, depending on which aesthetic predicate one inserts for "φ", is a well known fact. However, what is less well known is that there are also interesting variations depending on the kind of object to which one attributes the aesthetic predicate. In the context of this paper, variations depending on whether "X" refers to an artwork are especially important because explaining these variations would benefit from a satisfying definition of "art/artwork." In the following sections, I will discuss three variations of this sort.

3. Evaluative Character

As specified above, the aesthetic judgment expressed by "X is beautiful" is evaluative. However, this is only true as long as "X" in the statement refers to a non-artwork. As soon as one substitutes "X" with a singular term referring to an artwork, the aesthetic judgment seems to lose its evaluative character. This result can be illustrated with the following quote by Thomas Mann: "Schönberg's *Verklärte Nacht* is [...] beautiful, but [...] insubstantial" (quoted in Schmidt-Schütz 2003, 196 [my translation]). There is nothing linguistically wrong or infelicitous with the above quote. Changing the quote along the lines indicated in sentence (5) would not make it infelicitous either:

(5) Schönberg's string-sextet *Verklärte Nacht* is beautiful, but I do not appreciate how it sounds—it is insubstantial.

This observation can be interpreted in at least two ways:

(a) The difference between (1) and (5) illustrates that judgments of beauty with respect to artworks are not evaluative at all. In contrast to "Natural object N is beautiful," the speaker of "Artwork A is beautiful" is not conveying the information that she values the sounds/looks of A. This is why an utterance of (1) is infelicitous, whereas an utterance of (5) is not.

(b) The difference between (1) and (5) illustrates that one has to differentiate aesthetic from artistic evaluations. If someone utters the sentence "Artwork A is beautiful," she is still conveying the information that she values the sounds/looks of the artwork in an *aesthetic* respect; however, she is not conveying the information that she values the sounds/looks of the artwork in another respect—namely, *artistic*. This is why, in contrast to an utterance of (1), an utterance of (5) is not infelicitous.

Depending on the preferred interpretation, the topic to be explained varies, but both explanatory attempts would benefit from a theory of art: By following option (a), one has to explain why an evaluative aesthetic judgment turns into a nonevaluative one as soon as it refers to an artwork. Because this variation depends on whether the judgment refers to an artwork, the features responsible for this effect are probably the features (or are closely related to the features) responsible for something's being an artwork. Thus, explaining the variation would benefit from a theory of art specifying which features are necessary and sufficient for an object to be classified as an artwork.

By following option (b), one has to explain how aesthetic and artistic values are related so that an artwork can have one without the other. Artistic values are values that an artwork has *as* an artwork. Thus, our understanding of artistic values and their relation to aesthetic values would surely profit from a theory of art.

4. Sensitivity to Reference Classes

Some aesthetic judgments are sensitive to reference classes in the sense that whether an utterance of the sentence "X is φ" is correct depends on the reference class relative to which the utterance is made. Take a look at the following sentence, where "S" refers to a specific natural object such as, say, a sunflower:

(6) S is graceful.

The utterance of (6) might be correct if the sentence is uttered in a conversational context in which the salient reference class is the set of sunflowers. Compared to other sunflowers S might in fact be graceful. However, in another context in which the salient reference class is the set of *all* flowers—including lilies, roses, and so on—uttering (6) would be incorrect. After all, compared to roses and lilies, S would not be graceful. In this respect, at least some aesthetic judgments are comparable to judgments of the form "X is small/tall" (see also Walton 1970, 355).

Presumably, not all aesthetic judgments are sensitive to reference classes in this way. Let us call the judgments that are sensitive to reference classes "aesthetic judgments$_{RC}$." Are there any variations with respect to the feature of sensitivity to reference classes, depending on which kind of object—artwork or natural object—judgments$_{RC}$ refer to?

Consider the following sentence:

(7) Piet Mondrian's *Boogie Woogie in New York* is vibrant/energetic.

Prima facie, it seems as if (7) exhibits the same kind of sensitivity. Uttered in a context in which the reference class is the set of De Stijl paintings, uttering (7) is correct. However, in a context in which the reference class is the set of *all* paintings (including works of abstract expressionism), uttering (7) seems incorrect. After all, compared to works of abstract expressionism *Boogie Woogie in New York* is rather static.

However, the difference between (6) and (7) is that, in contrast to judgments$_{RC}$ about natural objects, we tend to think that in judgments$_{RC}$ about art, certain reference classes are privileged over others. We regard a conversational context in which the question is whether Mondrian's *Boogie Woogie in New York* is vibrant as defective if the salient reference class is not the class of De Stijl paintings, but a class that includes paintings of abstract expressionism (for a similar point, see Walton 1970, 356 ff.).

That we indeed regard some reference classes as privileged can be illustrated by our behavior. Why do we read books on art, attend courses in art history, or take guided tours in museums? We do these things (i.e., we turn to experts with respect to art) at least partially in the hope that their expertise (e.g., their knowledge of artists' intentions, developments in art history, etc.) will help us to pick the privileged reference class in relation to our judgments$_{RC}$ about art.

Why do these variations occur (i.e. why do we treat some reference classes as privileged) if our judgments$_{RC}$ refer to art? How should we explain the way in which some reference classes are privileged? What features fix the privileged classes and how? All of these questions are concerned with an effect that depends on whether an aesthetic judgment$_{RC}$ refers to an artwork or not. If we knew which features were necessary and sufficient for an object to be classified as an artwork, we could investigate which features or combination of these features are responsible

for the characterized effect. This in turn would allow us to characterize the effect in more detail, thereby gaining a more robust understanding of it. Thus, our understanding and explanation of the described variation in aesthetic judgments$_{RC}$ would profit from a convincing theory of art.

5. Psychological Data

It is unclear whether experimental aesthetics is concerned with aesthetic judgments as I have introduced them (see section 2). Research participants in these studies are rarely asked to judge whether a certain object is beautiful/graceful/vibrant and so on. Instead, in most studies in visual aesthetics, the participants are asked to rate certain visual stimuli with regard to liking, interest, and affect on a seven-point scale ranging from one (*not at all*) to seven (*very much*); or they are asked to list the stimuli in order of preference. To differentiate the judgments that are expressed by these ratings and preference orderings from aesthetic judgments in a more strict and traditional sense, I will call them "aesthetic judgments$_{psy}$."

In visual aesthetics, interesting effects with respect to aesthetic judgments$_{psy}$ have been established (for an overview, see Palmer *et al.* 2013). One explanation of these effects is based on the fluency theory, which claims that the more fluently perceivers can process a visual stimulus, the more positive their aesthetic judgment$_{psy}$ will be. The fluency of processing depends on perceptual aspects—in this case, fluency "reflects the ease of low-level, data-driven operations that deal primarily with surface features of the stimulus, or its perceptual form"—as well as conceptual aspects—"referring to the ease of high-level operations concerned primarily with categorization" (Winkielmann *et al.* 2003, 199-200).

The fluency theory can explain and predict a whole set of interesting effects: (i) preference for larger, more symmetrical, more contrastive displays (see Silvera *et al.* 2002; Reber *et al.* 1998); (ii) preference for displays of categorical prototypes (see Halberstadt 2006; Farkas 2002); (iii) preference for displays seen more often (see Cutting 2003); and (iv) preference for certain spatial compositions (see Palmer *et al.* 2013).

Even though some of these effects also show up with respect to aesthetic judgments$_{psy}$ concerning artworks (especially (ii) and (iii)), the main thesis of the fluency theory is highly problematic if we apply it to those judgments$_{psy}$. First, the recent history of art can be viewed as a continual process of violating conventions of prior art practices. If the fluency theory were correct, then this process has to be understood as a process of continually producing aesthetically unappealing works of art.

Second, in opposition to the fluency theory, experimental studies have shown that, at least with respect to *artworks*, participants actually tend to *prefer* stimuli that are *not* easily processed. Even though participants rated certain artworks harder to process and more ambiguous, they nonetheless preferred them to easier-to-process, unambiguous artworks (see Jakesch and Leder 2009; Muth *el al.* 2015).

Note that the rated ambiguities are very different in kind. Sometimes participants describe them as switches between multiple inconsistent interpretations, as a complete lack of a consistent interpretation, or as a case of visual indeterminacy (for an interesting classification of these ambiguities, see Muth and Carbon 2016). Despite these differences, a visual display that is experienced as ambiguous in any of these senses is harder to process than one that is not. Nonetheless, with respect to displays that were known to be artworks, high ratings of ambiguity correlated with positive aesthetic judgments$_{psy}$. This is an interesting variation within aesthetic judgments$_{psy}$ and it depends on whether they refer to artworks or not.

Why do people tend to aesthetically prefer artworks that are hard to process, whereas with respect to non-artworks, it seems to be the opposite? Again, attempts to answer this question about aesthetic judgments$_{psy}$ would surely profit from a convincing theory of art. On the basis of what else should we try to explain the abovementioned variation? If we knew which features are necessary and sufficient for something's being an artwork, we could investigate which features or combination of these features are responsible for the characterized effect, thereby gaining a better understanding of it.

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The Fly, the Bottle and Postmodernism
Danto's Concept of the Art World versus Wittgenstein's Notion of Use

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Abstract

This paper articulates the necessity to rescue the concept of representation understood in a Wittgensteinian sense and reflects on whether one can bridge the gap that some scholars and art critics have identified between modern and postmodern art. For Danto, Warhol's Brillo boxes were produced in the art world, and it was in that theoretical context where they acquired meaning. It was not form that transformed matter into art, but sense. Wittgenstein's notion of use offers an alternative perspective from where to understand Warhol's Brillo boxes. It could be understood that it is the use that Warhol made of the Brillo box what conferred artistic meaning to it, and this has much to do with form, representation. I will apply Wittgenstein's notion of representation to works that are apparently beyond such a concept. Besides, I will build a comparison between the theoretical and the pragmatic contexts implied respectively by Danto and Wittgenstein.

Arthur Danto, in order to differentiate between Andy Warhol's Brillo Boxes and those apparently equal accumulated in supermarkets, developed the term of the art world. Let us go back to Warhol's Brillo Boxes to think about the implications of Danto's concept of the art world. What did it mean? That Warhol's Brillo Boxes were produced in a theoretical context, that of the art world, and without it, they could not be either perceived or interpreted as art. According to Danto, it is thanks to that theoretical context that Warhol's Boxes acquire meaning and require an interpretation. Danto attributed to Warhol the answer to the question about the ultimate difference between art and reality. The fact that there was a difference between an ordinary object of the world, such as a Brillo Box, and that same object put in an artistic context, such as Warhol's Brillo Boxes, showed that art, after all, was not mainly about aesthetic appearance, but about meaning. Thus, in *The transfiguration of the Commonplace*, Danto (1981) asserted that it is not form that transforms matter into art, but sense.

It has been argued (among others, by Danto himself) that this kind of discourse provides the key for the understanding of the art that did not fit into Clement Greenberg's conception of (modern) art. For instance, it is well known that Greenberg had serious difficulties accepting Marcel Duchamp's ready-mades. One could say that Duchamp was on the limit of Greenberg's conception of art. The problem was that Greenberg could not appreciate Duchamp's ready-mades aesthetically and therefore could not accept them as forms of art. However, they could be easily understood as art by means of Danto's concept of the art world and its implications.

In relation to Danto's assertion that art was mainly about meaning and not about aesthetic appearance, I will pose a very simple question: is the meaning of Warhol's Brillo Boxes (really) independent of their aesthetic appearance? Let me refine my question. I want it to be an indirect response to another question, and this second question is: what made Warhol's Brillo Boxes revolutionary? Was it not their aesthetic appearance, the fact that they seem to be indiscernible from ordinary Brillo Boxes accumulated in supermarkets? We could pose the same question in relation to Duchamp's ready-mades. Is not the aesthetic appearance of Duchamp's bottle rack, the fact that there is nothing special to it, after all, essential to the art work? An affirmative answer to this question involves a realization that Greenberg lacked about the role that form played in Duchamp's ready-mades.

Let us look closer at Greenberg's way of looking at things. Why did Greenberg have difficulties with Duchamp's ready-mades? He did not find anything special about their form and, on the contrary to Danto's position, for Greenberg art was all about form. In fact, Greenberg believed that the meaning of an artwork could not be differentiated from its form. Greenberg understood form and meaning as two sides of the same coin, but his analysis focused on form because he felt that speaking about the meaning of a work of art was not possible. Greenberg's aesthetic position was very close to that of Wittgenstein. In fact, one could say that their understanding was similarly determined by a non-dualistic approach. For both of them, the meaning of the work of art could not be something that somehow accompanied the work of art, something that was added to the object, to be more precise, to representation, to form.

Wittgenstein's philosophy can help us throw light on certain works that Greenberg judged very negatively. For instance, Wittgenstein's notion of use can save Duchamp from much of Greenberg's criticism. In fact, it offers an alternative perspective from which to understand both Warhol's Brillo Boxes and Duchamp's ready mades.

If "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (Wittgenstein 2009, §43), we could also look for the meaning of an object that is a work of art in the use that the artist makes of it. On how the object functions artistically, let us say. It is the use that Warhol made of the Brillo Box what confers artistic meaning on an object that we find in piles in the supermarket. Likewise, it is the use that Duchamp made of the bottle rack, the urinal or the bicycle wheel what makes those objects different from similar bottle racks, urinals or bicycle wheels.

How did Warhol use the Brillo Box? In a variety of ways, but all of them share the fact that they were used as art. He piled them with more or less harmony in museums and galleries and he even exhibited one individual piece with a pedestal coming out from the wall, transforming it into a little sculpture and yet building a bridge with the traditional art of painting. Moreover, it is not irrelevant that Warhol fabricated the boxes in wood. Why did he not just play with

real Brillo Boxes? He got them made and made sure that the logos and lettering were screenprinted to mimic the models. In fact, the first group of boxes was screenprinted in The Factory by Warhol himself and his principal assistant of the 60's. There was a lot of caring about form going on in that production. In other words, Warhol cared much for representation. If the screenprinting had not been accurate enough, his artistic project would have failed and the Brillo Box would not have caught up with its meaning.

For Danto it was the theoretical context that conferred meaning on art pieces like Warhol's Brillo Boxes. Wittgenstein's notion of use also points towards a context, but it is a context of a different nature from that of Danto's concept of the art world. In Danto's philosophy, the context is produced by theory. However, for Wittgenstein, who only had contempt for theory, the context conferred by use was pragmatic, a result of a framework of practices.

Interestingly, when Danto defended his historicist point of view in *After the End of Art* –the idea that understanding a work of art involves the comprehension of the art world in which it was created–, he made use of Wittgenstein's notions of form of life and practice. Danto explained that modernism had failed to realize that its characteristic search for aesthetic qualities was a demand of the form of life, of the framework of practices, in which modernism itself had developed. Danto continued saying that beauty is relevant for an art work only if it is relevant for the form of life in which that art work is produced.

All this fits very well with Wittgenstein's position in his 1938 *Lectures on Aesthetics*. However, from this perspective, the context supporting an art work would not be theoretical, but pragmatic. What Danto called the art world would only be a very small portion of that complicated framework of practices, and Wittgenstein would not have given more importance to it than to the art of cooking.

Danto asserted that aesthetic virtue could not serve as a qualitative criterion after the end of art. According to him, aesthetic virtue was not a defining principle of art but a particular case in the history of aesthetic appreciation (Danto 2002, p. 117). In general, when Danto refers to aesthetic qualities he seems to be referring to beauty and in particular to what beauty meant in Greenberg's discourse, namely formal adjustment, formal perfection, where harmony and clarity played fundamental roles. However, one can also talk of aesthetic qualities in works of art that do not have harmony and order among its fundamentals. But let me go deeper into the implications I see in Wittgenstein's notion of use.

While Greenberg was particularly explicit when talking about modern art, he did not show the same clarity when criticizing what has been termed postmodern (or posthistorical) art and was not always able to articulate adequately his aesthetic experience in those cases. One of the things that Greenberg was not able to appreciate is that Duchamp did not only take the urinal in order to create his piece *Fountain*, but also used it in a specific way. Warhol did the same thing with the first of his Campbell's soup cans. These kinds of actions, those particular uses of the objects, make room for modern notions such as representation or medium. Wittgenstein's concept of use is familiar in the contemporary discussions about art, but his notion of representation has to be rescued from oblivion.

Wittgenstein's notion of representation does not have anything to do with the representation discussed and rejected by postmodern art critics and it could play a very important role in the discussions about "postmodern" art. Postmodern artists and art critics share a critique of West-

ern representation(s) moved by an imperative to think art and reality in terms of difference (Foster 1991). According to them, representation –standing for the interests of power– is always a deformation, and only a radical critique could help us to understand and counter its negative effects (Wallis 1984, xv). Take the case of feminist art, which tries to condemn and criticize the masculine myths ruling society and the cultural images around them, extending this critique to art. However, the notion of representation underlying this analysis is not that of Wittgenstein. In fact, in Wittgenstein's terms, it confuses picture and representation. For Wittgenstein, it is the picture that holds us captive what has to be overcome and this can be done through a rigorous representation. I propose that one ought to differentiate between the cultural production of images and works of art. The balance between representation and content (and the subsequent aesthetic distance) that a true work of art ought to have in opinion of both Greenberg and Wittgenstein is able to transcend those pictures which do not allow us to look at the world afresh.

Rescuing the notion of representation involves moving away from the motto *everything goes*, which really disturbed Greenberg and is opposite to the spirit of Wittgenstein's thinking. Even Danto acknowledged the importance of having qualitative criteria (Danto 2002, p. 117). For instance, he said that the art criticism of objects like Robert Morris' *Box with the Sound of its Own Making* could help us to understand better what is good and what is bad in modern paintings like those of Mondrian or Pollock. So understanding what is good and what is bad in what he called posthistorical art could help us to grasp what is good and what is bad in modern art.

I think that it is important to emphasize that Danto had in mind a variety of criteria. He did not give priority to form. I think it is correct to say that Greenberg and Wittgenstein also had a plurality of criteria in mind even though both of them gave priority to form because they felt that form already involved, somehow, the rest of the criteria.

Form might not be the only criterion to evaluate art, but it is important to rescue it from its depreciation. There are Almodovar's films that are better than other Almodovar's films. There are jazz appropriations of pop and classical music that are better than other jazz appropriations of pop and classical music. Some of those uses are better than others. There are very good Hamiltons and very bad Hamiltons. There are wonderful Oldenburgs and just interesting Oldenburgs. All of us can differentiate, and do actually differentiate, according to our judgment of forms, but that does not have to imply that form is the only factor to take into consideration.

I believe that one does not have to know anything about Danto nor about the current art theories to feel something before Tracey Emin's *My bed* when one visits the Tate Modern, and I believe that this has something to do with form. The ugly also has its rules. Even in works such as *My bed* the concept of representation applies, since that piece is also an organization of the material, even if much of it was dirt and garbage. Do you think that Tracey Emin had not thought about making an art work out of her own bed till the very moment she saw it in the state she exhibited it? It is clear to me that Tracey Emin articulated her chaos in order to make it more appealing. Notice that apart from the untidy sheets, there is only a pair of stockings and a towel on the top of the bed. Notice also how clear it is the fact that lately she had been sleeping alone by how the sheets are distributed. In contrast to the empty bed, there are many objects on the rug next to the structure of her bed. Observe that the objects are either touching the limits

of the bed or as close as possible to them. Among them one can find a pair of panties with stains of blood, an empty bottle of vodka, used condoms, slippers, fag butts, old newspapers or used paper with bodily remains. It seems that Emin wanted to have them handy. Moreover, the fact that *My bed* was exhibited in different places, Charles Saatchy's living-room included, means that the apparent chaos of the piece had to be reorganized each time.

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Wilfrid Sellars and Pragmatist Aspects of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

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Abstract

In my paper, I trace out affinities between Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and some forms of pragmatism. I start by asking why the *Tractatus* is appreciated by Wilfrid Sellars, who is himself a source of inspiration for contemporary pragmatism. After sketching the aspects of Sellars's pragmatism salient to the paper, I argue that in many respects the *Tractatus* is congenial to them. Sellars most appreciates (besides the picture theory) Wittgenstein's refusal to assimilate every discourse to descriptive or depicting discourse. Furthermore, in the *Tractatus* we can find first glimpses of a theory of different statement functions based on what can be done (rather than said) using these statements.

Introduction – the Rorty narrative

There is no doubt that the later Wittgenstein has been a source of great inspiration to contemporary pragmatists. However, the earlier phase of his work, in particular the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (TLP), has generally not been placed into the vicinity of pragmatism.

In my paper, I would like to establish a link between a form of contemporary pragmatism and TLP. I do not want to defend a strong historical thesis, i.e., I do not want to portray the early Wittgenstein as a direct forerunner of contemporary pragmatism. Nevertheless, the point I want to make is not merely thematic, either, for there are cases where TLP is at least partly endorsed by authors who arguably belong to a broader pragmatist tradition. As I will show, Wilfrid Sellars, himself a source of inspiration for contemporary pragmatism, appreciates TLP in a way which is closely connected to the pragmatist aspects of his own work.

For an author with pragmatist affinities, explicit appreciation of the *Tractatus* is a rare thing. One clear-cut case of a reserved neopragmatist attitude towards the early Wittgenstein is Richard Rorty. Rorty writes that

> the pragmatic Wittgensteinians think that their hero's importance consists in having replaced a bad theory about the relation between language and non-language, such as that offered in the *Tractatus*, with a better theory, the one offered in the *Philosophical Investigations*. (Rorty 2007, 162)

The bad theory in question is the idea that language is meaningful only if it systematically hooks up with the world at certain places, or - in Rorty's terminology – representationalism. In an earlier essay on Wittgenstein, Rorty claims that the position Wittgenstein was moving to after TLP was pragmatism (Rorty 1991, 52). This is a simple picture, which I shall call the Rorty narrative. According to this narrative, the early Wittgenstein started out being committed to some austere form of representationalism and then steadily moved towards a pragmatist position, culminating in his *Philosophical Investigations*. This is, of course, a simplified picture even of Rorty's view but it will serve us as a useful reference point.

Many writers have challenged what the Rorty narrative implies, namely that there is a stark contrast between the early and the late Wittgenstein. I would like to challenge the narrative from a different angle. My claim is that if we accept some such picture at all, we can see TLP as already departed a good way towards some form of pragmatism.

The *Tractatus* in Sellars

In the picture of Rorty's narrative, Wilfrid Sellars takes up a middle position between representationalism and pragmatism. Instances of a qualified endorsement of TLP are present right from his early essays. For illustration, here are two examples:

> The realization that philosophical truths could not be factual truths, combined with too narrow a conception of the formal has led to the Wittgensteinian contention that there are no philosophical propositions. I hope to make clear that this is a mistake, while granting that in a sense the Wittgensteinians have the last word. (Sellars 1947, 186)

> What is the basic job of empirical statements? The answer is, in essence, that of the *Tractatus*, i.e., to compete for places in a picture of how things are, in accordance with a complex manner of projection. (Sellars 1964, 664)

There are many other passages showing appreciation which I do not have space to list, among others repeated endorsement of a remark in TLP 4.0312 (that logical constants do not represent, see e.g. Sellars 1962b, 39). In addition, there are two important essays (Sellars 1962a and Sellars 1962b) dedicated to an adaption of the picture theory.

One can distinguish two dimensions in which Sellars's endorsement of the *Tractatus* is explicit. The first is the idea that the function of empirical statements is to generate a linguistic picture of the world. The other dimension comes out, for example, in the first of the passages quoted above. Sellars appreciates the sharp distinction Wittgenstein draws between empirical, i.e. depicting statements, and other statement types. In the case of the passage above, these are philosophical statements, but it also includes, e.g., logical, mathematical or ethical statements. Wittgenstein's key insight from Sellars's perspective is that we must not assimilate all discourse to empirical or fact-stating discourse, i.e., that there may be discourses with a different function. For Wittgenstein, this is in the first instance a distinction between discourse which is meaningful and discourse which is not. Seen from Sellars's viewpoint, however, Wittgenstein actually gropes for a functional distinction.

Still, it is not initially clear what links these two dimensions to the pragmatist aspects of Sellars's work. In order to show this, I must say something about Sellars's pragmatism.

Pragmatism in Sellars

There are several aspects of Sellars's work which can be highlighted as pragmatist. I will focus on those which are of interest for the topic of this paper. First, Sellars emphasizes the diversity of roles which statements of different type can fulfill. Stating empirical facts or "representing" is just one of these functions. There are statements (e.g. semantic, ethical, mathematical, alethic modal) which do not describe the world in this sense and have a different role. However, they are not meaningless or without content simply because of the fact that their role is not to describe.

According to Sellars, it is a mistake to assimilate the role of all discourse to that of empirically descriptive discourse. His analysis rather focuses on what we do when we employ certain statements. Thus, for semantic statements, to say that a sentence is true is not to ascribe a property to the sentence but to issue an assertion license. To say what a word means (e.g. "'Rot' means red.") is not to put it into relation to anything but to remind the interlocutor of the use of a word he already knows and to say that the new word is used in the same way. For modal discourse, to say that A causes B is not to describe a relation between As and Bs but to endorse the inference from "x is A." to "x is B.". That is, in Robert Brandom's words, Sellars understands these statements as pragmatic metalinguistic statements (Brandom 2015).

According to Sellars, the intrinsic function of "empirical" statements is to provide us with an embodied linguistic map or picture of our world. With reference to TLP, he claims that the function of empirical discourse is to create a structure of physical objects and events (sound-events, complex ink marks etc.) isomorphic to our environment. The point of having such a linguistic map-like "representation" is again practical: it is the underpinning of successful interaction with our environment, from simple navigation in our surroundings to highly sophisticated ways of acting.

Concerning the depicting function of empirical discourse the link to Wittgenstein is obvious, even though Sellars adapts the picture theory decisively to his nominalist and naturalist background. Still, this theory has something pragmatist about it only if we understand depicting as a certain function fulfilled by one type of discourse among other discourses with other functions. Therefore, I will focus on Sellars's pluralism of discourse functions as the main point which illustrates pragmatist aspects of TLP.

Tracing Sellars's pragmatism in the *Tractatus*

In TLP, Wittgenstein obviously draws a sharp line between depicting statements and other types of statements. This sharp distinction is accompanied by a certain difference in valuation, as Wittgenstein calls these other statements meaningless or nonsense. However, this need not amount to a contention by Wittgenstein that they are functionless. If we view things in this light, we can see how Wittgenstein's approach in TLP is playing into the hands of Sellars's pragmatism.

There are several types of statements which Wittgenstein is eager to distinguish clearly from depicting statements. Among these are logical statements:

> But in fact all the propositions of logic say the same thing, to wit nothing. (TLP 5.43)

mathematical statements:

> A proposition of mathematics does not express a thought. (TLP 6.21)

ethical statements:

> And so it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. (TLP 6.42)

and statements about causal laws:

> If there were a law of causality, it might be put in the following way: There are laws of nature. But of course that cannot be said: it makes itself manifest. (TLP 6.36)

The two facts that Wittgenstein draws a sharp line between empirical and other discourses and that a second, pragmatist philosopher takes up this idea still do not constitute enough ground to position the early Wittgenstein closer to the pragmatist corner. But I think that there is more in TLP to justify such a move. Wittgenstein insinuates that those statements which he does not class with depicting statements have some role of their own.

Although there obviously is no worked out theory of this kind in TLP, we can see at least a beginning of it in the saying-showing distinction. In the framework of TLP, non-depicting statements are meaningless or nonsense. Meaningfulness is tied to the function of "saying something about the world" (in contrast to „showing"). However, Wittgenstein does not straightforwardly claim that non-meaningful statements are necessarily without use. Quite to the contrary, he makes several attempts to characterize their functions. Let us look at some examples of how Wittgenstein tries to express what functions non-depicting statements have:

> [...] we make use of mathematical propositions only in inferences from propositions that do not belong to mathematics to others that likewise do not belong to mathematics. (TLP 6.211)

> The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it. (TLP 6.124)

> Laws like the principle of sufficient reason, etc. are about the net and not about what the net describes. (TLP 6.35)

> Mechanics is an attempt to construct according to a single plan all the true propositions that we need for the description of the world. (TLP 6.343)

> If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world [...]. (TLP 6.43)

None of these passages of TLP amounts to a detailed and precise account of what the respective non-depicting statements do. Rather they are an accumulation of metaphors ("scaffolding", "net", "plan", etc.) and an assemblage of hints at what non-depicting statements may be used for: "altering the limits of the world", "constructing", "inferring". Further formulations by Wittgenstein include "showing", "demonstrating" or "mirroring" something. Wittgenstein seems to grope for some account of the function of non-depicting statements as non-descriptive, but nevertheless not without purpose.

Even if these sentences from TLP are still only gestures into the direction of a more detailed account of the functions of different statements, some things can be claimed with justification. It is clear that none of the discourses mentioned above say anything about the world in Wittgenstein's sense. Nevertheless, when we ask what things they enable us to do according to the passages from TLP cited

above, we see that many of these things or activities are directed towards language itself, or more precisely, towards the depicting language. Mathematical propositions help us draw inferences, statements of lawfulness give us a construction plan for descriptive statements, logical statements demonstrate the logical features of depicting statements. Thus, they show us what we can do with these depicting sentences. They are in a sense "about" the depicting language, but not in a descriptive sense – note for example Wittgenstein's pondering of the words "describe" and "represent" [*darstellen*] in TLP 6.124 above. They do not describe depicting discourse nor the relations of this discourse to the world, but rather, they *show* what can or must be done with this discourse. For example, logical statements concern relations between depicting statements, but they do not describe these relations. Rather, they give us a demonstration of what one must do in order to be using a depicting statement at all, i.e. to operate within the "limits of language". When we compare this to the account Sellars gives of such discourses, we see that he tries to capture it in a similar vein (and thus, that TLP hints at treating semantic, logical, law-like statements, etc., as pragmatic metalinguistic statements).

From this point of view, the main obstacle which kept the early Wittgenstein from moving even more decisively towards his later account was his making a problem out of simple distinction, i.e. drawing a line between what is meaningful and what is not on the basis of distinguishing different functions. But once we recognize that there are many types of statements having important functions but lacking meaning in the sense of TLP, Wittgenstein's way of making a distinction between what is meaningful and what is not ceases to be useful or clarifying. This is the point where a Sellarsian pragmatism would take over.

Conclusion

What I have tried to show is the following: first, one of the sources of inspiration for contemporary pragmatism, Wilfrid Sellars, endorses Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* in a number of ways. Rather than being hostile to Sellars's pragmatist outlook, his endorsement of the *Tractatus* is actually conge-

nial to his pragmatist concerns. Therefore, in so far as we see Sellars as a pragmatist in the sense I have put forward in the text, we can see TLP as offering at least first gestures into such a pragmatist direction. Thus, there are reasons for rejecting the Rorty narrative which sees the *Tractatus* on the representationalist extreme set over against pragmatism. Or, if we decide to adopt the picture after all, we should place the early Wittgenstein at a position already in between the representationalism and the pragmatism pole.

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Wittgenstein on the Use of "I"

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Abstract

Wittgenstein maintains that there are mistakes in the use of the first person pronoun "I" in the traditional philosophy. In order to remove those mistakes, Wittgenstein distinguishes two uses of the "I": it used as subject; and it used as object. The "I" as subject is neither used to refer to a mental entity, nor to describe a behavior. The use of the word "I" is significant. The meaning of "I" is related to its grammar, the language game in which it occurs and the form of life.

1. The Two Different Uses of the "I"

Wittgenstein notices that the word "I" has two different uses with regard to distinct language games. He says: "There are two different uses of the word 'I' (or 'my') which I might call 'the use as object' and 'the use as subject'" (BB, 66). The two uses of the word "I" are based on the question whether or not we recognize a particular person. In the first case in which the word "I" is used as object, there is a possibility of misidentifying a particular person, while in the second case in which the word "I" is used as subject, an error of recognizing a person is impossible. It is worth noticing that the distinction between these two uses of the word "I" is whether or not there is an action of recognizing a person, rather than whether or not there is a mistaken recognition of a particular person. In the first case, the action of recognizing a particular person is an action of thinking of a particular person. When a woman is in pain, she sees a broken arm at her side and thinks that it is hers when it is really her neighbour's. In this case, the misidentification is possible because the particular person sees her physical body part outside of her mental state, and recognizes something on the basis of which she states that "my arm is broken". The possibility of error does not adhere in what she sees, namely, a broken arm, but in what she recognizes/thinks, namely that the broken arm is hers.

It seems that there is an unclear formulation regarding "*I* see so-and-so". For example, "I see my arm is broken" should belong to the second use of the word "I". Is this immune from error? It should be possible for a person to say that "I see my arm is broken", when the arm is in fact her neighbour's. In this case the statement is erroneous. There is a possible solution to reconcile this challenge. One could say that this statement consists of two parts: one experiencing part "I see such and such", and one thinking part "my arm is broken". There is no direct answer to the question whether the statement "I see my arm is broken" is correct or not. It should be answered by considering which part of the statement is being questioned. If the question regards the experiencing part, the answer is that the statement is right, as a result there is no possibility of error. Nevertheless if the question concerns the thinking part, the answer is that the statement might be wrong, and hence there is possibility of error. When Wittgenstein says that "*I* think it will rain" is impossible to be erroneous, it does not mean that the thinking part is impossible to be erroneous. In the thinking part, the error could occur with regard to the content of the thinking: the weather. If this solution is what Wittgenstein had in mind, the distinction between "as subject" and "as object" aligns with the distinction between mental self ascriptions and physical self ascriptions (Evans 1982; Sluga 1996).

Nevertheless William Child argues that it is wrong to align the distinction between "as subject" and "as object" with the distinction between mental self ascriptions and physical self ascriptions. He gives an example of a judgment that my legs are crossed. Child says: "That judgment self-ascribes a physical property. But whether or not I could be wrong that it is *my* legs that are crossed depends on the basis upon which I make the judgment" (Child 2012, 377). In normal circumstances, I know whether or not my legs are crossed on the basis of how I feel "from the inside", therefore there is no opportunity for misidentification. While in an abnormal circumstance, say, I have been anaesthetized, I know whether or not my legs are crossed on the basis of what I have seen, therefore it will be possible to be right that someone's legs are crossed but wrong that *my* legs are crossed. Child is right to say that the normal circumstance is immune to error through misidentification while the abnormal circumstance is not, but wrong to argue that the distinction between "as subject" and "as object" does not align with the distinction between the mental self ascriptions and the physical self ascriptions. In the normal case, when I judge that my legs are crossed based on my inner sensations, the question whether or not my legs are crossed is about the subject who makes this judgment. In this case, the entire expression of the question is "whether or not *I* feel that my legs are crossed". That is to say, this question is about the experiencing aspect of the whole judgment rather than its content. The word "*I*" in this question is used as subject with respect to the subject's mental state. In the abnormal case, when I judge that my legs are crossed through my vision, the question "whether or not my legs are crossed" is about the content of the sight. In this case, the entire expression of the question is "whether or not what I see is that *my* legs are crossed", that is to say, this question is about the content of the whole judgment rather than its experiencing aspect. The word "*my*" in this expression is used as an object that refers to the physical feature. We ask whether or not what I see is that my legs are crossed, rather than whether or not it is I who look. In this expression, as I see it, there is no action of identification, while in other expressions such as "my legs are crossed", there is an action of identification.

2. The Word "I" and the Reference

Wittgenstein notices that there is a traditional view according to which the first person "I" refers to a mental entity. He criticizes that it is misleading. Wittgenstein insists that the word "I" does not function by referring to a particular person. Nevertheless the relation between "I" and reference has been widely discussed. While it may seem difficult to resolutely rule out the possibility that "I" has close relations with its bearer (Evans 1982; Sluga 1996), there is one

possible solution to this conundrum. It seems that the use of "I" should be divided into two functions on the basis of two perspectives: a speaker perspective and a hearer perspective. Wittgenstein says: "My attitude to my own words is wholly different from that of others" (PI, p. 201). Wittgenstein distinguishes two uses of "I". He says:

> "I have a pain" is a sign of a completely different kind when I am using the proposition, from what it is to me on the lips of another; the reason being that it is senseless, as far as I'm concerned, on the lips of another until I know through which mouth it was expressed. The propositional sign in this case doesn't consist in the sound alone, but in the fact that the sound came out of this mouth. Whereas in the case in which I say or think it, the sign is the sound itself (PR, 93).

From the speaker's perspective, when one utters that "I have pain", the "I" does not refer to the speaker herself. Its function is to express one's immediate experience. Wittgenstein says: "The experience of feeling pain is not that a person 'I' has something. I distinguish an intensity, a location, etc. in the pain, but not an owner" (PR, 94). When a person reports an immediate experience, she cannot mention the owner of the experience, because experience "*cannot* have an owner" (PI, §398). When the expression that "I have pain" comes out from a speaker, she does not announce an owner of the immediate experience by introspecting her mental state inwardly. There are two reasons for this. Epistemically, a subject could not experience herself as she experiences what happens on her at the same time. The subject has its own cognitive activity, such as seeing something. This cognitive activity contains two parts of which one is the subject as the precondition and another is the object as the content. Once the subject is active, it always contains the content which is separated from the precondition. In this case, the report of the content of experiences does not express a subject, but rather the subject's epistemic fact. Grammatically, a relation of ownership is used to connect a physical material and a person. One could own a material room in which she can walk, but she cannot do this action in a "visual room". To say that a person owns her "visual room" is a grammatical illusion. For the speaker, "I" does not get its meaning from picking herself out. Rather, the meaning of "I" is obtained from the language game in which it is governed by its grammar and its purpose, which is to get the others to take care of the speaker.

From the hearer's perspective, when one hears that someone else utters that "I have pain", the "I" refers to the speaker. Recognition of the speaker is significant for the hearer to understand the utterance. Wittgenstein says:

> If I say "Now I'm going there", then some things occur in the symbol that aren't contained in the sign alone. If, say, I find the sentence somewhere, written by an unknown hand, then it doesn't mean anything at all; by themselves, in the absence of a speaker, a present situation and an indication of spatial direction, the word "I", the word "now", and "there" are meaningless (BT, 367).

A bearer for the word "I" is necessary for the others to understand the utterance because it helps the hearer to find from which mouth the proposition came out. Even for the speaker herself, if she is able to listen to herself as she utters a sentence, she would recognize a speaker who is different from herself as the utterer. Wittgenstein says: "If I listened to the words issuing from my mouth, then I could say that someone else was speaking out of it" (PI, p. 201).

3. The Word "I" and Its Meaning

In the sentence "I am in pain", the word "I" is not used to refer to a mental entity. When we consider the meaning of "I", it is important to notice in which sentence it occurs. Its use has special role in a specific language game. Wittgenstein reminds people by saying:

> Consider how the following questions can be applied, and how decided:
>
> (1) "Are these books *my* books?"
> (2) "Is this foot *my* foot?"
> (3) "Is this body *my* body?"
> (4) "Is this sensation *my* sensation?"
> Each of these questions has practical (non-philosophical) applications.
> (PI, §411)

In those statements, the "I" occurs in different sentences which indicate different language games. For human beings, the form of life is essential for language games. With this thought in mind, Wittgenstein introduces the practical dimension of language games. At the end of the passage cited above, he implies that practical applications serve as essential illuminations to understand the meaning of "I". It is philosophically misleading to ask what the meaning of "I" is, when it is isolated from concrete propositions, as its meanings are related to its uses.

When we consider the use of propositions in which the word "I" is involved, it is worthwhile to notice that such propositions have a close relation to behavior. Wittgenstein mentions that the proposition "I have pain" replaces a primitive pain behavior. At first glance, Wittgenstein seems to be a behaviorist, but he is not. One reason is that a proposition with the word "I" is not a description of a pain behavior, but instead replaces it. Another reason is that in both pretending and imitating cases, pain does not correspond to pain behavior. In such cases, pain behavior is not the criterion for verbal expressions of pain. However, we could say that pain behavior is not the only criterion for verbal expression. Besides pain behavior, there are other behaviors, which are responses seen/viewed from third person perspective. Both of them are interwoven with the human form of life.

As far as forms of life are concerned, propositions involving "I" get their meanings in wide dimensions. Consider the following passages:

> (1) "How does the belief engage with this conjecture? Let us look and see what are the *consequences* of this belief, where it takes us." (PI, §578)
> (2) "A feeling of confidence. How is it manifested in *behaviour*?" (PI, §579)
> (3) "An 'inner process' stands in need of *outward criteria*." (PI, §580)
> (4) "An expectation is embedded in a *situation*, from which it arises." (PI, §581)
> (5) "What is happening now has significance a in these *surroundings*. The *surroundings* give it its importance." (PI, §583) (All my italics)

Statements involving "I", like "I believe such and such", get their meaning from their special surroundings. The situation in consideration provides the background for such statements. What preceded and what followed must be involved in those statements to establish their meanings. In this sense, the "I" could be used to serve some specific purpose, such as expressing the subject's immediate experience and intention, attracting someone's attentions, etc. When Wittgenstein eliminates the paradox of pain, he

43

says that we need to "make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please" (PI, §304). This insight is also effective for the various uses of "I".

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Do We Believe in Other Minds?

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Abstract

The problem of other minds challenges us to justify our belief in other minds. I argue that we do not believe in other minds, and so that challenge is confused. Our understanding of others as human beings, not automata, is a matter of what Wittgenstein calls an "attitude towards a soul", not a belief about them.

§1. Do we believe in other minds?

Do we believe in other minds? My aim is to convince you that the answer to that question is, or at least could be, "no". That claim, however, is likely to give rise to the following objection: how can I try to convince you of *anything* if the answer really is "no"? I will try to make clear why my aim is not simply self-defeating below.

§2. Other minds

We seem to believe that other people have minds, or that they are not automata. But the evidence for that belief seems to fall short of justifying it, since it seems consistent with the possibility that others do not have minds at all. Our evidence comes from behavior. But what that behavior is supposed to be evidence for is not a matter of behavior, and the evidence from behavior alone seems not really to touch it. So we are in trouble. How can we get out of it?

One way out of it is to try to secure a valid inference from the evidence available to the kind of conclusions about the mind that we want to justify (e.g. Russell 1948, pp. 482-486). But that approach runs into two problems: first, it seems to mistake the phenomenology of the beliefs we are trying to justify, since our beliefs about the mental lives of other human beings often seem to involve no inference at all; second, the attempt to justify belief in other minds by appeal to inferences, such as inferences from our own case, involve what seem to be bad inferences, incapable of justifying anything.

A second approach is to try to alter our understanding of the evidence available so as to see it as already being evidence of the mental lives of others by arguing that we can perceive others' mental states in some cases (e.g. Cassam 2007, pp. 155ff.). That approach, however, faces problems of its own, such as in explaining in what sense of the word "see" we can see that someone is in pain, for instance.

I want to propose an alternative solution: that we reject the idea that we believe in other minds at all. Such a solution might seem too radical to be worth taking seriously: we take it for granted that we believe in other minds, and it comes naturally to us to say that we do. So how could it be true that we do not believe in other minds? What could justify this denial of such an obvious truth?

I think there are a number of reasons for being suspicious of the idea that we believe in other minds in spite of (or perhaps *because* of) how naturally it comes to us to say we do. What I want to do is lay out some of those reasons, and explore one alternative way of thinking about our understanding of others as human beings not automata.

§3. Knowledge without evidence

In "A Defence of Common Sense", Moore writes that with respect to many things we know, we are in the "strange position" that we know we must have had evidence for them (since we know them to be true), and yet we do not now know what that evidence was (Moore 1925, 206). Among those things that we know, but no longer know how we know, according to Moore, is that other people have minds (though Moore, being Moore, doesn't put it quite like that).

Moore's claim is not that we cannot know something without knowing how, since he knows that other people have minds without knowing how he knows that. (So if Moore is an internalist here, he is a funny kind of internalist.) But his claim is also not that we can know things without *ever* knowing how, since he claims that if he now knows that others have minds, he must once have known what his evidence was. (So if Moore is an externalist here, he is a funny kind of externalist.) Moore's problem is that although he *must at some point* have known what his evidence was, he does not know it *now*. And though Moore is in the first instance speaking about himself, he does not think he is alone in this. (The solution to his problem is not simply to ask someone with a better memory.) Rather, Moore's claim is that we have all, *en masse*, suffered a colossal collective amnesia with respect to the evidence for many of our most cherished beliefs.

It is easy to feel some sympathy for Moore in this, and no little admiration. Having found himself in an awkward position that is both forced upon him by his conception of common sense and yet also flies in the face of it, Moore simply lays that awkwardness bare for everyone to see. He may be frowning as he writes his unhappy conclusion down, but he writes it down nonetheless, as openly as he can. One might conclude, from Moore's position, that the solution to our predicament would be to ask some children, since if we must at one time have had the evidence only to forget it later, we might with luck stumble upon a child who, having only just come by the knowledge, has not forgotten what the evidence for it is.

Alternatively, if random questioning of children in pursuit of philosophical enlightenment seems unappealing, we might take this peculiarity, as Wittgenstein does (1972), as a sign that, whatever we are dealing with here, it is not a straightforward case of belief in an empirical proposition. Perhaps what we need to rethink is not the evidence for our belief, but the idea that we are dealing with belief at all.

§4. Belief in other minds

We can find further reasons for questioning whether what is involved in our understanding of others as having minds is appropriately characterized as belief by comparing it with other things we call "belief", such as the belief that so-and-so is suffering, as Wittgenstein suggests (2009, PPF §§19-22).

In that case, we find a series of features that are not present in the case of (what we have been calling) "belief in other minds". For instance, my belief that so-and-so is suffering, if I believe that, is typically formed at some point during my encounter with them, and it is formed in response to certain evidence I come by during that encounter. I do not typically start out with the belief that they are suffering, but at some point, in response to certain evidence, I may come to believe they are. Moreover, I could tell someone of my belief and potentially inform them of something thereby. So my belief that so-and-so is suffering, on the face of it, has three (related) features: it is formed during my encounter with so-and-so; it is formed in response to certain evidence; and it is potentially informative.

The belief that so-and-so has a mind seems to differ in each of these respects. I don't typically believe of someone that they have a mind in this sense, because there is no point at which I explicitly form such a belief during my interactions with them, however well I come to know them. As a result, it is not a belief that I arrive at in response to certain evidence (good or bad) that I come by during those interactions. I don't start out open to the possibility that the people I meet might not have minds and then, at a certain point, in response to certain evidence, conclude that they do. Rather, it seems already to be part of what it is to think of them as a person at all, and that seems to be connected to the fact that my understanding of them as having a mind is not something that could be true or false of *them*. Whereas we can think of one and the same person as suffering or not suffering, we cannot in the same way think of them as having a mind or not having a mind: whatever has a mind is of a totally different kind to whatever does not.[1] Hence, in the case of belief in other minds, there is not something that is even potentially informative to others: a person just is a thing with a mind, so there is no informing someone of the fact that this particular person has a mind.

Belief is no doubt a broad church, covering a variety of cases that do not all share all the same features. But nevertheless, there is reason enough here to begin to question whether we are right to suppose that "belief" is an appropriate term for whatever it is that is involved in our understanding of others as human beings, not automata.

So how else could we characterize that understanding if not as a matter of belief? What else could explain our readiness to say that we believe that others have minds?

§5. An attitude towards a soul

One alternative way of thinking of our understanding of others as having minds is suggested by Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations*.[2] There, Wittgenstein contrasts, first, believing of someone that they are suffering with believing they are not an automaton, and, second,

believing of someone that they are not an automaton, or having the "opinion" they have a soul, with having "an attitude towards a soul" (2009, PPF §§19-22) or "towards a human being" (1992, p. 39):

> "I believe that he is suffering" —— Do I also *believe* that he isn't an automaton?
>
> Only reluctantly could I use the word in both contexts.
>
> …
>
> "I believe that he isn't an automaton", just like that, so far makes no sense.
>
> My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul.

Understanding another as not an automaton, is not, Wittgenstein suggests, a matter of having a belief about them, at least not in the sense in which I have a belief about them when I believe that they are suffering. Rather, it is a matter of an attitude, an attitude towards a soul or human being.

An attitude in this sense is a matter of our actions and reactions, of our basic modes of behavior in relation to something, and our having an attitude towards a soul or human being, accordingly, is a matter of our basic modes of behavior in relation to other human beings.

What that involves is not simply a matter of what we do on any specific occasion however: our attitudes are, rather, a matter of the ways in which we *can* behave in relation to something. To have an attitude towards a soul is not simply to respond to another's pain with pity or sympathy rather than with indifference, for instance. To withhold one's sympathy from another when they are in pain involves recognizing that they are the kind of thing with which one *can* sympathize no less than actually sympathizing with them would. Our attitudes are a matter of the kinds of behavior that are intelligible to us in relation to something, not of behaving in one rather than another of those ways.

But our attitudes are also about more than just behavior. They are also a matter of the kinds of thing it makes sense to say about something, the range of concepts that get a grip or foothold in connection with it, as Wittgenstein puts it (2009, §284). The ways in which we can behave in relation to others are themselves in part a matter of the ways in which we can make sense of someone's behavior, given the concepts that get a grip there, and those ways of making sense themselves originate in our more primitive forms of behavior in relation to others.[3]

Our attitudes, then, are a matter of the kinds of behavior and talk that make sense in relation to something, and it is here, in our basic modes of behaving in relation to other people and the concepts that find a grip in their behavior, rather than in any specific belief or opinion about them, that Wittgenstein locates our understanding of others as having minds, as human beings, not automata. Our understanding of others as having minds lies in our basic modes of behavior in relation to other human beings, and the kinds of things that we can say about them. It is not a matter of a belief at all.

To think of our understanding of others as human beings, not mindless automata, in this way is to reject the conception of belief in other minds that lies behind the traditional problem of other minds. Moore, for instance, takes

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1 This is reflected in the transformation our experience undergoes (like an aspect dawning) when we realize that we have mistaken an object for a person, or vice versa: for instance, mistaking a tree stump for a person in the dark.

2 Part II, renamed *Philosophy of Psychology-A Fragment* ("PPF") in Wittgenstein 2009.

3 I develop this account further in my 2016a and 2016b.

it for granted that the demand for evidence that goes along with that conception is justified, and his problem is that none of the evidence available is worthy of the name. Taking our understanding of others as a matter of an attitude rather than a belief can help to see that the problem is not with the evidence, but with the demand for evidence that goes with talk of belief in this context. That demand has no place in relation to the basic modes of interacting with others. Our problem is that in misconstruing the nature of our understanding of others we place upon ourselves a demand for evidence that cannot be met.

§6. Can we really be wrong?

I have claimed that we do not believe in other minds; our understanding of others as human beings not automata is a matter of our attitude towards them. But can we really be wrong about this? Isn't the conclusion that we don't believe in other minds too incredible to countenance?

Whether or not it will seem plausible that we could be mistaken will depend, in part, on the extent to which our attitudes, understood this way, could explain how naturally it comes to us, in response to the problem of other minds, to say that we believe in other minds, and so to accept the challenge that problem presents. In accepting that challenge, we in effect mistake a feature of the conceptual and behavioral framework within which we interact with others for a specific belief about them. In this way, our willingness to say we believe in other minds can be explained as originating in our underlying attitudes.

I hope I have convinced you that we might not believe in other minds. But whether or not I have, I hope at least to

have convinced you that my aim here is not simply self-refuting. Treating you as capable of being convinced is not a matter of holding a belief about you in the way we are inclined to think, and so does not imply that I do, after all, believe you have a mind, as paradoxical as that might sound.

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Seeing Colour, Seeing Emotion, Seeing Moral Value

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Abstract

Defenders of moral perception have famously argued that seeing value is relevantly similar to seeing colour. Some critics think, however, that the analogy between colour-seeing and value-seeing breaks down in several crucial respects. Defenders of moral perception, these critics say, have not succeeded in providing examples of non-moral perception that are relevantly analogous to cases of moral perception. Therefore, it can be doubted whether there is such a thing as moral perception at all. I argue that, although the analogy between colour perception and moral perception does indeed break down in several crucial respects, that conclusion does not weaken the case of defenders of moral perception, because better analogies are available. Inspired by some of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect-seeing, I defend the view that, if defenders of moral perception seek to draw support from an analogy, then seeing emotion will protect them better against criticisms than will seeing colour.

1. Introduction

It is often thought that we can perceive moral value at least in some cases that we can see, for example, the needfulness of someone's situation and the goodness in a person. Although we may *say* that we perceive these things, some philosophers have argued that moral perception is not really a form of perception, because there are too many significant differences between moral perception (say, seeing wrongness) and other, uncontroversial kinds of perception (say, seeing a certain shape). Defenders of moral perception are asked to provide examples of non-moral perception that are relevantly analogous to cases of moral perception in order to justify talk of perception in the moral case.

Wiggins (1998a and 1998b) and McDowell (1998a and 1998b) have famously argued that seeing value is relevantly similar to seeing colour. The analogy between colour-seeing and moral value-seeing is frequently invoked by those who seek to defend the possibility of moral perception. Some critics think, however, that the analogy between colour-seeing and value-seeing breaks down in several crucial respects (Blackburn 1985; Wright 1988). Defenders of moral perception, these critics say, have still not succeeded in providing examples of non-moral perception that are relevantly analogous to cases of moral perception. In short, the very idea of moral perception has been criticized by criticizing the analogy between colour perception and moral perception. If that analogy breaks down, then moral perception is thought to be in danger.

I will argue that, although the analogy between colour perception and moral perception may indeed break down in several crucial respects, that conclusion does not weaken the case of defenders of moral perception, because *better analogies are available*. Good candidates for an analogue of moral perception can be found in Wittgenstein's discussions of aspect perception (see 1980a; 1980b; 2009). These discussions are multifaceted and complex, and Wittgenstein offers many (sometimes greatly varied) examples of aspect perception. I will focus on one group of examples: seeing emotion. We can see joy, grief, fear, or sadness (1980b, §170; 1981, §225; 2009, §227). Cases of seeing emotion, I will argue, provide better analogues of cases of seeing moral value than do cases of seeing colour. A better analogy, in this context, is similar to the object of comparison (in this case, seeing moral value) in important respects where the original analogue (seeing colour) is dissimilar. Although a full defense of the rich analogy between seeing emotion and seeing moral value cannot be offered here (see, for a worked-out account, De Mesel 2015), I will point at two respects in which seeing emotion is closer to seeing moral value than seeing colour is.

2. The Active Element

A frequent complaint about the colour analogy is that it provides a very passive model of moral perception. Fisher and Kirchin formulate the problem as follows:

> No matter what I think, I cannot help but see a red patch (in certain lighting conditions) as having a certain colour. I cannot decide to change what I think and, in the future, consciously try to respond differently. Value responses are different. Even if we initially respond to an action as being cruel, we can reflect on that response afterwards and try to justify it to ourselves and others as cruel. (Fisher and Kirchin 2006, 220)

In short, the difference between colours and values is that colours determine or fix our responses in a way that values do not.

Suppose that an object is placed before me and I am asked what colour it is. I cannot try (or decide to try) to change my perception of white into a perception of black, and there are no good reasons for trying to do so. The imperative 'Now try to see it as black' makes no sense. I cannot fail or succeed in seeing something white as black. Compare this with the perception of moral value. I can try (or decide to try) to change my perception of moral value. Someone may urge me to try to see something as good which I had previously seen as bad, and I may succeed or fail.

The elements of control, conscious development and change can be grouped under what I call 'the active element' of value perception. While colour perception is dissimilar to value perception in this respect, aspect perception is not. Wittgenstein stresses that aspect perception is subject to the will (2009, §256). To say that it is subject to the will is not to say that we decide, in each and every case, to see an aspect or not to see it (as if we could not be struck by an aspect), but that it *makes sense* to order someone to try to see an aspect. Wittgenstein compares seeing an aspect to imagining: it makes sense to ask someone to try to imagine a tree, so imagining is subject to the will, but still the image of a tree can occur automatically. We can try to form an image of a tree and fail to do

so, we can have images of trees and fail to get rid of them (see Hausen and ter Hark 2013).

If indeed, as Wittgenstein claims, aspect perception is subject to the will, it seems well-placed to mirror the active element of moral perception. Let us do the test with our leading example, seeing emotion. I can try (or decide to try) to change my perception of emotions. Someone may urge me to try to see the happy face covered with tears as a happy face, while I had previously seen it as a sad one, and in doing so I may succeed or fail.

I conclude that aspect perception is active enough to capture the active elements of moral perception. At the same time, it is not too active. The passive element of colour perception and moral perception, shared by aspect perception, lies in the fact that I cannot choose or decide what I perceive. I cannot choose or decide to see a white table where there is a black one, to see a good act where there is a bad one or to see a happy face where there is a sad one. If the face is happy and I say that I see a sad face, I have made a mistake.

3. Education and Concept-Mastery

The active element in moral perception is closely linked to another aspect of it which is often emphasized by defenders of moral perception: adequate moral perception requires moral education, training and upbringing (McDowell 1998a and 1998b).

There are important differences between colour education on the one hand and emotional and moral education on the other. In contrast to colour sensibilities, we *expect everyone* to develop their moral and emotional sensibilities and we accept that this development takes time and is never finished. It is true that we expect most people to be able to discriminate colours, but this process goes much faster, and there is no need or expectation that people will keep working on their colour sensibilities throughout their lives. People who have developed their moral and emotional sensibilities to an exceptionally high degree are said not only to see more, but also to understand more, to be wiser and more mature than others. These terms are not used for persons with well-developed colour sensibilities.

Wittgenstein emphasizes the role of education and upbringing in aspect-seeing (2009, §168 and §216). He further characterizes aspect perception as "half visual experience, half thought", "both seeing and thinking", or "a fusion of the two" and "the echo of a thought in sight" (2009, §140, §144, §235). In order to be able to see certain aspects, such as emotions in a face, one needs to have mastered certain concepts, to have reached a certain level of intellectual sophistication.[1] According to Schroeder, aspect-seeing is "particularly concept-laden, typically more so than seeing shapes and colours" (2010, 360). Similar points are often made in discussions of moral perception, both by defenders and critics. Audi notes that "moral perception is possible for virtually every normal person with an elementary mastery of moral concepts" (2013, 121). Starkey calls moral perception "cognitively 'thick' perception" and contrasts it to "the 'thin' characterization of perception as uncategorized seeing, hearing, smelling and so on" (2006, 76). Watkins and Jolley describe moral perception as "an intellectualized perceptual ability". They add:

> We can say that these acquired skills [of moral perception], when they rely heavily on perception or are purely

perceptual, are perceptual skills augmented by intellect. But to say this is not to say that the intellect adds something to what is seen, or somehow reshapes what is seen. Instead, it is to say that exercising the skill reveals something that is not revealed by unskilled, unfit, perceptions. Someone who exercises one of the skills correctly sees what a person without the skill does not see – but what is, nonetheless, there to be seen. Acquired perceptual skills provide information that unskilled perception cannot provide; but not because the skill adds something to what is seen. Correct exercises of the skill are revelatory, not creative. The mechanic who can tell what is wrong with a car by listening to it as it runs can hear something the non-mechanic does not hear. However, the mechanic's acquired perceptual skill does not create the mechanical trouble. (Watkins and Jolley 2002, 77)

Two things are remarkable here. First, what Watkins and Jolley say about moral perception, namely that the acquired skills of moral perception are perceptual skills augmented by intellect, but that this is not to say that the intellect *adds* something to what is seen, is almost exactly echoed by what Wittgenstein says about aspect perception: "Is being struck [by an aspect] looking + thinking? No. Many of our concepts *cross* here." (2009, §245) Thinking is not just *added* to seeing, but in aspect perception seeing and thinking are *inextricably interwoven*. Second, the fact that moral perception requires thought and concept-mastery does not make the term 'perception' any less appropriate. We see what is there to be seen, and we do not create the object of sight in thinking or imagination. Moral perception is 'revelatory, not creative'.

I conclude that, with respect to the need for education and concept-mastery, seeing colour and seeing value are in many respects different. In these respects, seeing emotion is closer to seeing value than is seeing colour.

4. Conclusion

I conclude that seeing emotion is, at least in certain respects, a better analogue of seeing moral value than is seeing colour, although the latter has been a philosophers' favourite for decades. At this point, one could remark that, however similar or dissimilar seeing emotion might be to seeing moral value, it does not show what the latter is like, because we hardly know what seeing emotion is like. The *explanans* does not explain. That could be true. But even if it does not explain, it helps, first, to remind us of certain features of moral perception that are not captured by the colour analogy, so that we are less prone to be misled by that analogy. Second, it does something else that I find worth doing in philosophy. I agree with Wittgenstein when he says that "Philosophy often solves a problem merely by saying: '*Here* is no more difficulty than *there*.'" (1980a, §1000) According to Schroeder, the case "then loses its disquieting uniqueness, its appearance of anomaly, and begins to look once more as common as it is." (2010, 364) Moral perception will all too easily appear unique and anomalous if one compares it to colour perception. Comparing it to emotion perception, by contrast, may make it look less disquieting and anomalous. And that, I presume, is something that defenders of moral perception will welcome.

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1 As I said, Wittgenstein provides many different examples of aspect perception. Not *all* aspect perception requires concepts or sophistication.

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Oiticica: Kunst und Philosophie

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Abstract

Oiticica war ein bedeutender brasilianischer Avantgarde-Künstler und innovativer Filmemacher, der Wert auf Erlebnis, Herausforderung und Experimentieren in seiner Kunst legte. Er schuf Kunst im öffentlichen Raum, Performances, Filme, Fotografien, Videotapes und neue Kunsttheorien. Oiticica begann in den sechziger Jahren damit den Zuschauer als wichtiges Element in seine Kunst einzubeziehen: Der Zuschauer wird zum Teilnehmer des Werks, das er handhaben kann, in das er hinein gehen kann und mit dem er visuelle und taktile Erfahrungen machen kann. Inspiriert von der phänomenologischen Philosophie des Berührens des französischen Philosophen Merleau-Ponty, räumt der Künstler Oiticica Berührung und Körperlichkeit sowie der Teilnahme der Zuschauer eine zentrale Rolle in seinem Werk ein. Eine besondere Inspiration waren für Oiticica auch die Theorien von Herbert Marcuse und Frantz Fanon, was besonders in Oiticicas Solo-Ausstellung *Éden* in der Whitechapel Gallery im Februar 1969 zu sehen war. Die neuen Werke, die er für die Ausstellung schuf, waren durch urbane Räume inspiriert.

Oiticica sagte über die Installation *Éden*, dass es eine *Whitechapel Experience* sei, die Lüste in Kreisen anbietet. Die Zuschauer durchlaufen verschiedene Erfahrungen mit unterschiedlichen Werken. Zuerst müssen sie Schuhe und Socken ausziehen, dann betreten sie den Sand, den Oiticica vorbereitet hat. In Oiticicas Worten ist *Éden*

> ein experimenteller Ort, […] wo alle menschlichen Erfahrungen als Möglichkeit der menschlichen Spezies erlaubt sind. Es ist eine Art von mythischem Platz für Empfindungen, für Handlungen, zur Erledigung von Sachen und für den Aufbau eines inneren Kosmos eines jeden. Deswegen werden „offene Vorschläge" und selbst rohe Materialien gegeben, um „Sachen zu machen", die der Teilnehmer realisieren kann. (Oiticica 1986, S. 17; eigene Übers.)

Für die Ausstellung Éden in der Whitechapel Gallery ließ sich Oiticica von den Theorien von Herbert Marcuse und Frantz Fanon inspirieren, wie man aus Oiticicas Brief an Lygia Clark vom 8. November 1968 entnehmen kann. In diesem Brief schrieb Oiticica an Clark über das Buch *Eros and Civilization* (Eros und Kultur) von Herbert Marcuse. Daraufhin entwickelte Oiticica sein Freizeitkonzept für die Ausstellung *Éden*, die er *Crelazer* nannte (Braga 2007, S. 123).

Im Buch *Eros und Kultur* schreibt Marcuse, dass Repression und fehlende Freiheit einige Reflexe der Zivilisation sind, die Suche nach sofortiger Satisfaktion wird durch die geplante zukünftige Satisfaktion ersetzt, die Lust wird dadurch eingeschränkt und die Aktivitäten, die Spaß bereiten, werden durch die Arbeit ersetzt. In seinem Text behauptet er, dass es möglich ist, ein Leben mit dem Prinzip der Freiheit zu führen.

Im Projekt *Éden* kann man den Einfluss von Marcuse im Bezug auf die Konzeption von Zeit sehen, dadurch dass in dieser Installation der Teilnehmer den Unterschied zwischen der Arbeitszeit und der Freizeit verlieren solle (Oiticica 2009, S. 59). In diesem Kontext schuf Oiticica den Begriff *Crelazer*. Dies ist für ihn ein Zustand, in dem die Zeit keine Stunden hat und kein Ende, die Freizeit der Teilnehmer zum Beispiel in der Ausstellung *Éden*, in der sie mit dem Werk interagieren und Lust dabei empfinden. Oiticica erzählt, dass der Künstler Edward Pope seine Ausstellung *Éden* in der Whitechapel Gallery in London besuchte und in das *Bett-Bólide* hineinging und dort lange Zeit blieb. Die Zeit dort habe laut Oiticica keine Dauer, es sei eine offene Zeit, in der man in der Lustaktivität Empfin-

dungen wiederfindet. Der *Crelazer* sei eine erschaffende Freizeit und nicht eine repressive Freizeit (Oiticica 1986, S. 120).

Auch Marcuses Theorie von produktiver und kreativer Arbeit, eine Kritik an der Arbeit in einer kapitalistischen Gesellschaft, die meistens entfremdete Arbeit ist, inspirierte Oiticica in seiner Ausstellung *Éden* in der Whitechapel Gallery. Oiticica ist der Meinung, dass die Arbeit des Künstlers produktiv ist, nicht in dem Sinne der realen Produktion, aber in dem Sinn, dass es kreativ ist und nicht alienierend, im Gegensatz zur Produktion in einer kapitalistischen Gesellschaft. In dieser Hinsicht sei der Künstler am Rand der Gesellschaft und hierbei verwendet Oiticica die Theorie von Marcuse, dass der Künstler zu keiner sozialen Klasse gehört, beziehungsweise nicht dem Drängen der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft nach Produktion folgt. Oiticica möchte die soziale Stellung des Künstlers als Schöpfer verdeutlichen: Es handle sich für ihn nicht einfach darum, am Rande der Gesellschaft zu stehen, sondern darum, eine kritische Stellung zur alienierten Gesellschaft zu beziehen, Mythen der dominierenden Klasse zu zerstören, die Repression zu kritisieren, kreativ zu sein (Figueredo 1998, S. 74-75).

Oiticica ließ sich in derselben Zeit auch von Frantz Fanon inspirieren. Laut Oiticica sei Fanon ein schwarzer gewaltsamer Revolutionär, sodass Marcuse im Vergleich dazu ein Metaphysiker sei (ebenda, S. 75).

Fanon plädiert für die Verwendung der Gewalt, die für ihn politische Befreiung und die Therapie selbst des Inferioritätsgefühls des Kolonialisierten in Bezug auf den Kolonialherren bedeutet (s. Heitmeyer und Hagan 2003, S. 984). Er schreibt, dass man Europa nicht nachahmen solle. Hier kann man eine Parallele ziehen mit Oiticicas Theorie der Neuen Objektivität und mit seinem Text *Brasil Diarréia* (Brasilien Durchfall), in dem Oiticica gegen die Nachahmung der europäischen und amerikanischen Kunst ist und für die Schaffung einer eigenen brasilianischen Kunst eintritt.

Fanon arbeitet in seinem Buch *Die Verdammten dieser Erde* mit den Fragen der Dekolonialisierung, der Gewalt, der kulturellen Assimilierung, der Repression in den Kolonien und dem Post-Kolonialismus in Afrika. Im Buch rief er auf zur Befreiung vom Kolonialismus und zur Bildung von nationalen Befreiungsbewegungen. Das Buch erzählt von Fanons Erfahrungen im Algerien-Krieg. Die Revolution solle durch eine revolutionäre Kultur unterstützt

werden, die authentisch national sei. Er unterscheidet zwischen einer revolutionären Kultur und einer pseudonationalen Kultur, die in den meisten afrikanischen Ländern vertreten sei, die sich mit der Folklore begnügten (Burke 1976, S. 134). Oiticica lässt sich von der antikolonialistischen Theorie und von der Idee einer revolutionären Kultur in diesem Buch inspirieren.

Oiticica, Fanon und Marcuse glauben an ein neues Menschenbild, das durch Befreiung und Revolution kommen wird. Oiticica lässt sich von Fanons Theorie der Dekolonialisierung inspirieren und sieht die Kunst als einen Weg zur totalen Freiheit, was er in seiner Ausstellung *Éden* zu realisieren versucht. Er ist auf der Suche nach einer nationalen Kunst, die nicht nationalistisch ist und die befreit ist vom Kolonialismus.

Oiticica schuf das Projekt der Ausstellung *Éden* 1968, als er noch in Brasilien war, vor seiner Reise nach London mit den Ideen der kollektiven Kunst, der Teilnahme der Zuschauer, der Guerilla in der Kunst gegen die konservativen Standards von Kunstinstitutionen und inspiriert durch Marcuses, Fanons und Marighellas Ideen. Er befand sich im Kontext der Repression der brasilianischen Diktatur, was seine künstlerische Arbeit stark beeinflusste. Er kritisierte nicht nur die Inhalte der Ideologie der Diktatur, sondern verwendete die Teilnahme des Körpers an dem Kunstwerk, die kollektive Teilnahme, billige Materialien als eine künstlerische Strategie, die mit der Verbreitung von künstlerischen Aktivitäten außerhalb von traditionellen Kunstinstitutionen in einer brasilianischen künstlerischen Guerilla kulminierte.

1969 nahm Oiticica an dem Symposium *First International Tactile Sculpture Symposium* über die Kunst des Tastens teil, organisiert von August Coppola. Das Symposium fand in der Gallery C des Instituts of Fine Arts des State College in Long Beach vom 7. bis 12. Juli 1969 statt. An diesem Symposium nahmen 15 Personen teil, unter diesen waren Professoren, Psychologen, Studenten, Musiker, Choreografen, Tänzer, Designer und Künstler wie Hélio Oiticica, Lygia Clark und August Coppola. Auf diesem Symposium diskutierten Psychologen und Professoren über die Wichtigkeit des Berührens, der Emotion, der künstlerischen Werke und der Gesellschaft. August F. Coppola sagte: „Das Symposium sollte seine Überzeugung verdeutlichen, dass ‚unsere Gesellschaft eine berührungs-verhungerte ist'" (Oiticica 1969a, eigene Übers.). Er fällte dieses Urteil nach zehn Tagen der Erfahrung, mit verbundenen Augen alles berühren zu dürfen, was er sonst nicht sehen könne (Oiticica 1969a).

Clark und Oiticica waren die einzigen Brasilianer, die zum *First International Tactile Sculpture Symposium* eingeladen wurden. Oiticica und Lygia Clark thematisierten seit den *Neokonkretismus*-Phasen (1959) die Teilnahme der Zuschauer, die Wichtigkeit des Körpers in der Kunst, des Berührens und des Fühlens der Kunstwerke durch das Publikum. Sie ließen sich hierbei von der phänomenologischen Philosophie des Berührens des französischen Philosophen Merleau-Ponty inspirieren, die in Brasilien durch Mario Pedrosa und Ferreira Gullar verbreitet wurde.

Sowohl die Werke von Oiticica als auch von Lygia Clark erhalten ihr „Leben" durch die Interaktion des Teilnehmers mit den Kunstwerken, beim Anziehen, bei der Bewegung, durch die eigenen Erschaffungen, durch Berührung. Oiticica schreibt in einer Tagebuchnotiz vom 28.12.1961, dass er sich von Merleau-Pontys Begriff des Körperdaseins in der Welt inspirieren ließ (Hélio Oiticica, *CD Projeto Hélio Oiticica*, 0182.59-p72.jpg). Nach Oiticica wurde das Problem der Mobilität des Zuschauers von ihm schon in seiner

Werkserie *Penetráveis* („Durchdringbare") thematisiert, und zwar mit Teilen, die bewegt werden konnten (Hélio Oiticica, *CD Projeto Hélio Oiticica*, 2090.63-p1.jpg).

1. Das First International Tactile Sculpture Symposium

Oiticica schrieb für die Teilnehmer des Symposiums eine Einführung zu seinen und Clarks künstlerischen Arbeiten. In diesem Text schreibt er über Clarks Werkserie *Nostalgia do Corpo* Folgendes: Es gehe in diesem Werk um die Entdeckung des Körpers, ein sehr wichtiges Element in Clarks Arbeiten. Es handle sich nicht um die Beziehung der Teilnehmer zu einem gegebenen Gegenstand, diese Beziehung sei schon übertroffen. Der Text sei keine Beschreibung oder ein Katalog von Erfahrungen, sondern er zeige die Idee der Gesamtheit ihrer Kunst.

Oiticica brachte das Werk *Parangolé Estou possuído* („Ich bin besessen") mit. In diesem *Parangolé* bezieht sich Oiticica auf das Geistwesen *Moleque* der Mangueira Samba-Schule – es ist ein Geistwesen des Kultes der afrobrasilianischen Religion Ubanda, eine Mischung aus Christentum, Spiritualismus, Katholizismus, Orixá-Kult und *Catimbó* aus dem Nordwesten Brasiliens. Das Element *malandrinho* hat als Haupteigenschaften die Gaunerei, die Liebe zur Nacht, zum Spiel und zu Frauen. Wenn das Geistwesen sich in einer Person manifestiert, wird diese besessen und beginnt, die Eigenschaften des Geistwesens wie oben beschrieben zu haben. Das Element ist bekannt unter dem Spitznamen *Seu Malandrinho*. Darüber hinaus werden in diesem Werk die sozialen Probleme in den Favelas thematisiert.

2. Der Text "The Senses Pointing Towards a New Transformation"

Dieser Text, der sich mit Merleau-Pontys Philosophie befasst, handelt vom menschlichen Verhalten und den Sinnen. Oiticica war der Meinung, dass man ein Kunstwerk nicht nur unter dem ästhetischen Gesichtspunkt betrachten sollte, sondern auch als einen Appell an die Sinne. Man könne die Betrachtung und die Handlung nicht voneinander isolieren (Oiticica 1969b). Lygia Clarks und seine eigenen Werke folgten demselben Prinzip. Lygia Clark schlägt in ihrer Werkserie *Nostalgia do Corpo* einfache sensorische Erfahrungen vor, um das Bewusstsein daran zu erinnern, dass der Körper etwas Lebendiges ist. Außerdem geht es um die Beziehung zwischen der Selbstkenntnis und der Kenntnis der anderen (ebenda, S. 2). Oiticica zufolge seien Galerien und Museen unpassende Orte für das Ausstellen bestimmter Kunstgegenstände; er selbst brauche alternative Orte, um seine Kunst zu zeigen. Nach Hélio Oiticica erfordert der Übergang des Kunstfokus vom Visuellen zu den anderen Sinnen (Tastsinn, Gehörsinn, Geruchssinn, Geschmackssinn) ein Bewusstsein der Gesamtheit. Seine Behauptung stützt sich auf die Rolle, die der Körper (die Wichtigkeit des Verhaltens) für Maurice Merleau-Ponty spielt. In dessen Philosophie erfolgen alle Sinnesbeziehungen im menschlichen Kontext als ein 'Körper' von Bedeutungen und nicht als Summe von Bedeutungen, die von speziellen Kanälen empfangen werden (Oiticica 1969b).

Im Text „The Senses Pointing Towards a New Transformation" stellt sich Oiticica endgültig gegen ein Kunstsystem als Darstellung beziehungsweise gegen die Erschaffung von Darstellungsgegenständen, die Ausstellungsplätze erfordern, damit sie betrachtet werden können (s. Hélio

Oiticica, Tagebuch, 22. Dezember 1961, Rio de Janeiro, in *CD Projeto Hélio Oiticica*, 018259-p50.jpg).

Das Thema selbst und die Diskussionen des Symposiums enthalten einen Bezug zur Philosophie der Berührung und zu Merleau-Pontys Denken: Die Teilnehmer berühren einander mit verbundenen Augen. Nach Merleau-Ponty könne der Blinde somit durch das Tasten und die Bewegung des Körpers die zentrale Rolle der Leere empfinden. Man brauche die Berührung im Alltag (Duarte 2004, S. 78). Für die Zuschauer dieses Symposiums war der Tastsinn (die Berührung) der einzige Wegweiser.

Bei diesem Symposium waren auch junge amerikanische Künstler anwesend, wie beispielsweise der kalifornische Künstler Richard Register, der die Performance PREFOTEMMS aufführte, in der man Gegenstände berühren sollte. Ein anderes Beispiel ist D. C. Prior Hall, ein Designer aus San Francisco, dessen Werk *Pleasure Pit* aus Wassermatratzen bestand. Er verteilte Pamphlete mit folgendem Inhalt: „Es ist ein Freund, der in dich verliebt ist. Der dich verlockt, in eine verzückte sinnliche Pracht zu kriechen." (Oiticica 1969a, eigene Übers.). Darunter stand: „Das Pleasure Pit ist, als würde man mit seinem Bett ins Bett gehen" (Oiticica 1969a, eigene Übers.). Der Direktor der Gallery C, Carl Day, der mit Studenten das Labyrinth aufbaute, in dem die Kunstwerke ausgestellt wurden, meinte zum Symposium und zur angebotenen Berührrungserfahrung: „Die Menschen machen sicher Dinge kaputt […] Diese Erfahrung hat mich gelehrt, was für ein Stier der Mensch wirklich ist." (Oiticica 1969a, eigene Übers.). Für ihn war diese Erfahrung motivierend; die Menschen sollten mehr Berührungen und ähnliche Dinge ausprobieren. Für viele Zuschauer war diese Erfahrung ganz neu.

Die Theorien von Ponty, Fanon und Marcuse waren sehr wichtig für die Entwicklung von Oiticica's künstlerischem Schaffen. Zusammenfassend kann man behaupten, dass Oiticica die Grenzen der Kunst auslotete; er arbeitete mit verschiedenen Medien, und verfasste darüber hinaus zahlreiche Texte, die man im Zusammenhang mit seinen Werken analysieren, beziehungsweise nicht voneinander trennen sollte.

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Reading the *Tractatus* and Seeing the World Rightly

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Abstract

If the cardinal problem of philosophy is to be found in the distinction between what can be said (= thought), and what cannot be said but can only be shown in what is said, the task of making the logic of language perspicuous can be understood as a perceptive exercise – and the TLP as an aesthetic endeavour that, in what it says and in the form in which it says what it says, allows its readers to see the world rightly. In the end, this is both an ethical and an aesthetic achievement, for, what is then seen should make one understand that what is more valuable is indescribable in language – and the way to do it justice, is to keep silent about it.

1.

When, in 1919, Wittgenstein sends his book to Russell, he tells him that all the affair of logical propositions is a corollary and that the real, the cardinal problem of philosophy, is related to the distinction between what can be said (*gesagt*) – or, what is the same, what can be thought) – and what cannot be said but can only be shown (*gezeigt*) in what is said (cf. GBW, letter from Wittgenstein to Russell dated 19.08.1919). In Wittgenstein's eyes, this was the main business of his book. Moreover, the fundamental thought (TLP 4.0312) he is putting forward, is described by Wittgenstein as the impossibility of delegating logic by mandate, that is, of there being something that can represent the logic of facts in language, in propositions: there are no proxies or replacements for this, but we can see it if nothing stands in our field of vision, hence the necessity of making the logic of our language perspicuous to us. Hence, also, the significance of vision, of images, models, figures, configuration, pictures, picturing, form, and all the plethora of terms related to *Bild*, understood as image or model, such as: *logisches Bild, lebendes Bild, Bildhaftigkeit, abbildende interne Beziehung*, *Urbild*, etc.

Making the nature of propositions clear, is a supporting and grounding task for the solution of the chief problem of the book: since it must distinguish between what can be expressed in propositions and what can not be thus expressed but is nonetheless shown in what is uttered with sense, the book, via the clarification of the nature of propositions, should make logic perceptible (and illustrate that logical form or the form of reality, its essential and structural features, the internal relations between language / thought and world, are made visible in propositions with sense).

In the TLP, ethics, aesthetics, the sense of life and the world and the mystical, join logic as that which is not possible to express in language – this does not mean, however, that they are equivalent or of the same kind. In reality, although ethics (one with aesthetics) is transcendental, like logic, it is also supernatural, as Wittgenstein puts it in the *Lecture on Ethics*.

Regarding logic, we have, on one hand, logical propositions, *Scheinsätze*, that are without sense, *sinnlos*. Tautologies and contradictions constitute examples of such propositions: the limits of language are grounded on the logic of language and the bipolarity of propositions that secure the possibility of representing a state of affairs in a proposition and of it being compared to reality in order to determine its truth or falsity. Tautologies and contradictions are limiting-cases of language and thought – the first permits all states of affairs, the second, none – and for this reason they are not images of any fact of the world, because they do not portray a possible situation (cf. TLP 4.461 and 4.463). On the other hand, we have to consider propositions *about* logic and their *unsinnigen* character, for they belong to a different kind of propositions without sense, i.e., they are different from *sinnlosen* propositions. We are not, here, dealing with propositions that are limiting-cases, but with propositions that go beyond the limit of what is sayable with sense. This has to do with logic being transcendental, prior to any experience that we can describe with sense and compare with reality in order to investigate its truth or falsity. It is due to its transcendental nature that one cannot establish a logical theory with sense, and thus, the attempt to talk about logic, which permeates the world, is *unsinnig*.

On its turn, ethics, that is one with aesthetics, does not permeate the world – it is not only transcendental but also supernatural. Its sphere is beyond the world and so beyond language, truly outside the limits of sense, that is to say, beyond the limits of facts that we can portray in a proposition. It has to do with value, with what stands past the description allowed for in propositions. Propositions that try to talk about this sphere are also *unsinnig*, and although they might seem, at first blush, to say something meaningful, logical analysis shall make clear that they do nothing of the sort, and the reason for this is that they are about what is higher than facts and cannot therefore be pictured through words.

2.

Since the possibility of a proposition being an image of the situation that it presents, is critical for it to represent a fact, the notion of *Bild*, as we already saw, is crucial for understanding the book. In fact, vision pervades the *Tractatus*: everywhere we have to exercise it, so much so that one could say that the book is like a series of exercises of perception that aim at extracting the logic of language from everyday language: "Everyday language is part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it. It is humanly impossible to gather immediately the logic of language." (TLP 4.002)

In addition to the difficulty that this remark points to, another difficulty, related to the comprehension of the aim of the book, has to do with the need of surpassing or overcoming its propositions. This requires, on its turn, that we understand the author, for only then can we see that what he has said throughout, is *Unsinn*, nonsense: the compensation for this is, though, that we are then capable of see-

ing the "world rightly" (TLP 6.54). Wittgenstein refers to his propositions as the ladder one has to climb up and then throw away. The movement of going up corresponds to the exercise of reading the *Tractatus*: its propositions are degrees of understanding – and vision. We are, in the end (*am Ende*), capable of seeing what was concealed before the nature of the proposition was made perspicuous: the logic of language. Along with this capacity and knowledge, another thing becomes clear – something that has to do with overcoming the tendency and the inclination to speak of what does not let itself be put into words, that is to say, it becomes clear that we must try to be silent concerning all the cases in which anything that we might say, will not do and will not be enough to represent an excess, a surplus in relation to the world of facts. This feeling is not suitable of being communicated in a language with sense because it is *unnaussprechlich* (TLP 6.522). Alfred Nordmann highlights the fact that with this word Wittgenstein means that which cannot be put into words:

> In ordinary contexts, the German "*aussprechen*" concerns our ability to clearly speak, pronounce, or articulate words. As such, the German word is a hybrid of sorts between "*ausdrücken* (to express, quite literally in the sense of squeezing out)" and "*sprechen* (to speak)." Wittgenstein's use of "*aussprechen*" and the translation "express in speech" therefore reflects that the word refers to a particular mode of expression. […] "*Aussprechen*" is a special case of "*ausdrücken*" or expression: it concerns what we put into words or language, thus suggesting yet another translation of *TLP* 6.522: "There is indeed what cannot be put into words." (Nordmann 2005, pp. 50-51)

3.

In order to understand the essence of propositions, Wittgenstein advises us to think of hieroglyphics and of how they represent the facts that they describe in pictures (TLP 4.016). This advice has its roots in the *Einfall*, in the discovery about language and about propositions being images of the realities for which they stand, to which Ray Monk says that Wittgenstein gave enormous importance (cf. Monk 1991, pp. 117-118). However, before we go on to see what was this discovery, a small remark about the word *Einfall* that we just used is due: we again turn to Alfred Nordmann, who speaks of Wittgenstein as having a receptive spirit to discoveries while he works, as someone able to be struck by an image as if by a new way of looking to the world, or, better yet, as someone capable of turning his own moments of seeing into and being invaded by a new image of how things stand, into a decisive moment of genuine, untainted clarity concerning the way in which thought and language mirror the world in pictures. The *Einfall* we mean is a famous example: the well known way in which Wittgenstein saw very plainly before his eyes, how logic could take care of itself, forgoing a doctrine, a system of explanations with the objective of displaying the workings of language to us. It consists of how a report of a case in a court of law in Paris that portrayed a car accident using dolls, made him think of how in language (like in the model presented as a 3d depiction of the cars, people and houses that were part of the scene of the incident), we portray the situations, the facts of the world, with words that stand for things, arranged and related to one another in a certain manner, in a given correlation and connexion. In the *Notebooks*, in an entry listed on the 29th of September of 1914, we can read that this was indeed the much sought after answer to the problem he was facing and that had to do with the ability of language to account for reality

while keeping silent about how it is able to do so, in other words, by keeping silent about the logic of facts. For Wittgenstein, the example really shows the way forward, unless one is blind to see it: it is decisive because it shows the internal relation between the dolls representing the cars, the people and the houses, and the real cars, real people, and real houses. Just two days after noting it down, Wittgenstein says, "logic has to take care of itself". Someone who is not blind can, in principle, see the logic of language – it suffices that it is first made clear – so that afterwards there is nothing else left to say about it. The Paris model is especially significant for constituting an example of how logic shines through propositions with sense that are images of the facts they describe: a model, like a proposition, projects the form of its internal connection to the state of affairs, without more elucidations, it depicts the reciprocal position of its elements and represents what is essential. It is for this reason that one can say that the model was for Wittgenstein a touchstone to his philosophical undertaking in the TLP: showing how language and thought mirror the world in propositions with sense, without falling into pseudo propositions about the logic of facts – well, at least as much as possible. Wittgenstein has to use words to see his task through, which means to not completely follow the strictly correct method in philosophy (and going beyond only saying propositions of science, that have nothing to do with philosophy), to show that, when someone wants "to say something metaphysical" (TLP 6.53), in what is said, some signals have not been given precise meaning (*Bedeutung*).

4.

Even if Wittgenstein had not added the final propositions to his book, in which he speaks of ethics and aesthetics – of the sense of the world, the world of the happy man and the solution to the riddle of life – we could still say that he was pointing towards them and thus fulfilling the purpose that he envisioned for his book, which we know, thanks to a letter he wrote to von Ficker in 1919, was an ethical one. The *Tractatus* would still draw the frontier line and delimit the ethical from the inside, by keeping silent about it and opening up the possibility, to his readers, of apprehending or seeing that what is more valuable is ineffable in language, untouchable in *sinvollen* propositions. Because it delineates the limit of the sayable and simultaneously shows the sphere of the inexpressible in language, the *Tractatus* is an "ethical deed" (cf. Janik and Toulmin 1996, pp. 167-201) and an aesthetic one also. It is through what it says and in the form of saying it that Wittgenstein leads the reader to the position from where he can see the world correctly, and from where he can do justice to the feeling – that cannot be put into words – of seeing the world as a whole, and that is, for Wittgenstein, the mystical.

In TLP 6.54, Wittgenstein speaks of whomever reads the book and understands its author, as someone that thus acknowledges that its propositions are *unsinnig*. Understanding this rests on the comprehension brought about by the distinction between propositions with sense and propositions without sense, and within this last group, of the particular case of the *unsinnigen* propositions that try to state something that is not possible to make accessible to others through discourse, but only understood silently, through vision. In the end, the book opens up a new space, made visible by a limiting task that nonetheless reveals the possibility of really attaining a just vision of the world – one that can be pierced with value.

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Modeling Axis by Rotation

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Abstract

In this paper, the authors discuss OC 152 as an example of the idea of modeling as it is used in the contemporary philosophy of science. In the first part, an analysis of OC 152 is supplied and three possible interpretations of the section. In the second part, Schulte's analysis of OC 152 is presented. In the third part, the "axis remarks" are interpreted in terms of blurring the distinction between grammatical and experiential remarks in terms of their dynamism and connectedness to practice and activity. In the fourth part, the "axis remarks" are interpreted in terms of "modeling" in contemporary philosophy of science.

1. OC 152

OC 152 runs as follows:

> I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility. (OC 152)

OC 151 suggests that what is claimed is absolutely certain and a part of a method of doubt and inquiry, and OC 153 says that it gets its sense from the rest of our procedure of judging. The first sentence of 152 is connected with 151 because if such remarks are learned at all, they are learned implicitly, and to OC 153 which supplies an example of it: "My hands don't disappear when I am not paying attention to them." The second says that such remarks are discovered like "the axis around which a body rotates". This is an example of rotating bodies such as hinges, planets, or gyroscopes. The third is important because it differs between "hinges" (OC 341-3) and "axes" (OC 152). Hinges of the door or elbow connect the immovable door-frame and movable door, while the rotating body (a gyroscope or a planet) doesn't have an immovable part. The last part of the last sentence seems crucial, since the rotation of a body determines the immovability of an axis. Hinges are the condition of a partial rotation of a door on a doorframe. In OC, PI, and other works, Wittgenstein formulates an opposite metaphor. When talking about foundations, the metaphor would be of foundations that are carrying the whole house. However Wittgenstein writes it is like the roof that carries the whole house and its foundations altogether. Similarly, here he isn't claiming that an axis of rotation is a condition of the rotation of a body, rather, that the rotation of a rotating body determines the immovability of its axis. As if an immovable axis is an effect, or a result of a rotation.

Given that there is a consensus among scholars that Wittgenstein distinguishes between experiential and grammatical remarks (PG, PI), there is the possibility of a third kind of remarks based on analysis supplied by J. Schulte (see Schulte 2005, 59-75, Krkač 2012, 201-32, Krkač, Lukin, Mladić 2013, 222-4, Điri, Krkač 2014, 355-68). Some questions can be raised.
(1) Is an axis metaphor (OC 152) different from a hinge metaphor?
(2) Are there in Wittgenstein's writings, besides grammatical and experiential remarks, examples of axes remarks (OC 152)?
(3) If (1) and (2), then which of these possibilities is more plausible? (a) There are only two kinds of remarks (propositions), i.e. experiential and grammatical, while the "axis of a rotating body" is just a metaphor, or at best a special case of grammatical remarks which corresponds to the series of similar philosophical distinctions between experiential and rational, and analytic and synthetic (from Aristotle to 20th century logical positivists and Quine). (b) There are three kinds of remarks, namely grammatical, experiential, and axis remarks (on the basis of Schulte's analysis). (c) There is only one kind of remarks, i.e. axis with grammatical and experiential being their radical cases (if one connects OC 152 with say OC 94-99, 213, 308-9, 319-21, in which Wittgenstein suggests that there is no sharp difference between experiential and grammatical remarks, and consequently there is only one kind, while these are only radical cases of this one kind).

2. Schulte on OC 152

The answer to (1) lies in the question: are axes and hinges different? They both include the rotation of a body; however, they are different. Hinges include a fixed part of a joint, axes don't. Hinges allow partial rotation, axes allow full. There are differences in geometrical, physical, and engineering senses. Wittgenstein was aware of these differences, which give sufficient grounds for differences between metaphors.

The answer to question (2) starts with a suggestion by Schulte. He differentiates between the hinge and axis metaphors, and comments on OC 152 (as "another image") in contrast to OC 341–3 in (Schulte 2005, 71).

> Such an axis of rotation is a very different sort of thing from the kind of hinge on which the previous image is centered. Such an axis of rotation may be said to stand fast, but it does not do any real work; nor does it hold fast anything which in order to be able to move would need its support. One may say that a certain object would not move the way it does unless it, or one of its parts, could be described as rotating around such and such an axis. But that is a completely different kind of statement from the claim, for instance, that a given door turns on certain hinges. And because of this difference I want to conclude that the image of the axis of rotation applies to a different sort of proposition from that to which the hinge image applies. It is propositions conveying basic rules or information that can be compared with hinges while sentences expressing commonplaces of the type discussed by Moore and Wittgenstein are more like axis of rotation. (Schulte 2005, 71; see also Schulte 2005, 70–3)

Schulte recognizes two metaphors. Axis-propositions are, as Schulte suggests, like gestures or exclamations, and

therefore quasi-propositions. Schulte does not explicate if the hinge metaphor is a *metaphor* of grammatical remark. If this is the case, and if the expression "basic rules" that he uses suggests it, then what we have besides empirical and grammatical are fact axis remarks. Hinges are a metaphor for grammatical, while the axis is a metaphor of a separate kind of remarks, what was previously referred to as "hinge-propositions" by some scholars. Schulte's interpretation (or discovery?) claims that propositions like "Cats do not grow on trees", "Cars do not grow from the ground," or "We humans know that we have ten toes without looking at them" are not hinge-remarks since hinges are metaphors for grammatical remarks (Schulte 2005, 71).

3. Axis remarks

Let's turn to issue (3) and assume that there are experiential remarks, such as "Acorns grows on trees", or "Squirrels collect acorns", and grammatical ones, such as "An acorn is a part of a plant, not of an animal" or "A squirrel is an animal, not a plant.". Now let us imagine a boy Willard in Akron, Ohio, watching oak trees in his backyard from his room. He sees trees, acorns, and squirrels on trees. So, he thinks: "Do squirrels grow on trees?" and he asks his father. His father is surprised, but soon he commences to explain. They conclude that squirrels don't grow on trees (axis) because they are animals and not plants (grammatical). What kind of a remark is "Squirrels don't grow on oak trees"? It is not an experiential since there is no experience "This squirrel didn't grow on a tree" and this is so because there is nothing that can be experienced. It is neither a grammatical remark since by analysis of "squirrel" one cannot get "one that doesn't grow on a tree" without an additional premise.

Which are some features of axis remarks? (a) They are implied and at the same time essentially manifested in and by common actions. (b) If uttered outside of practical context, they sound odd. (c) A lot of them are negative existential statements. (d) They are neither universal like grammatical, nor particular and empirical like experiential, yet they seem to be connected to them, as if they can turn into them if needed.

In view of (d) axis remarks are like sand in the river image (OC 95-9). If hard rocks creating the bank are a metaphor of grammatical remarks, waters of a river of experiential remarks, then perhaps sand is the metaphor of axis remarks. However, if this is so, then it suggests a bit more; that sand has a dual nature. It can create a sandbar and even a river bank by sedimentation, but it can also be eroded and change the whole river. If sand is a metaphor for axis remarks, then perhaps they are rudimentary, while grammatical and experiential are derived, or they are a kind of "middle remarks", while grammatical and experiential are radical forms. As if axis remarks are modeled by rotation of experiential and grammatical around them. However, based on mentioned sections it is hard to decide whether the "axis of rotation" is a metaphor of grammatical remarks (3a), so one would get the classical analytic-synthetic distinction with a bit of *pragmatic aftertaste*, as in Quine's "Two Dogmas". Is it a third kind of remarks, different from experiential and grammatical (3b); or is it the only kind of remarks with experiential and grammatical as their radical cases (3c)? We are suggesting that (3c) is interesting grounded on the connection between OC 152 and other mentioned sections that suggest that there is no strict difference between experiential and grammatical remarks.

4. Modeling in OC

A section in Notebooks (NB, p. 20) runs as follows: "The proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it". This mention of a *model* is evidence that Wittgenstein uses the term *model* in a similar sense as we do, which means that if we consider his axis remarks as propositions, then we can speak of those propositions as models of reality. In PI 141, the term *model* can be interpreted as the difference between the *model* and *modeling* ("picture" and "application"). Mentioning of the term *paradigm* can be interpreted as model and as grammar (PI 50, 57); this analysis could also include concepts like "picture" (as a model) especially as used in TLP and PI, and similar concepts.

In terms of the model/modeling distinction, the metaphor of hinges can be interpreted as a remnant of Wittgenstein's former interest in models and not, like axes, his (implicit) focusing on modeling. There is development in Wittgenstein from the awareness of the importance of philosophical investigation of models to the more activity oriented, which focuses on modeling. In his PI period, Wittgenstein was familiar with the idea of a model via Hertz and Boltzmann, and it seems that he moves from "model" as an entity (as in TLP) to "modeling" as an activity (practice).

The dynamics that Wittgenstein tries to grasp with metaphors in OC resembles dynamics of modeling as described by philosophers of science (dynamical metaphors of rotation and flow). There are a lot of interesting similarities between some parts of OC and some parts of recent philosophy of scientific modeling. On the other hand, there is some continuity in Wittgenstein's dealing with models and modeling. It is possible to show parallel development in Wittgenstein and in the philosophy of science: from focusing on models proper to focusing on the activity of modeling. Can some ideas about scientific modeling provide a perspicuous presentation of some concepts in OC? There is no doubt that Wittgenstein's referential and deliberative use of terms raises interpretive difficulties. Metaphors in OC speak about elements, mechanisms and methods of modeling, and modeling is something the philosophy of science knows about.

In TLP the proposition is a picture and a model. Modeling is not *per se* interesting there as it is plain inference. In PI, the problem is "application of the picture" (PI 140, 374, 422-27), and OC seems to supply a solution. Here are some examples. "[M]y understanding [is] only blindness to my own lack of understanding." (OC 418) If we have understanding of the model, we still may lack understanding of the process of modeling. "Really 'The proposition is either true or false' only means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. But this does not say what the ground for such a decision is like." (OC 200) Modeling is so pervasive in our life, and hidden because we lack conceptual instruments to see it. We know that we are modeling when we manipulate the elements of modeling (with a tool-box of modeling). These elements are: models, metaphors, analogies, abstractions, idealizations, templates, skills, tacit knowledge, assumptions, „pictures", and pictures we have in OC (although there is no mentioning of model or modeling in OC).

We "have" picture(s) (TLP) vs. we are "doing" something with pictures (PI and OC). "There is a picture in the foreground, but the sense lies in the background, that is, the application of the picture is not easy to survey." (PI 422) "We form the picture [...] and this picture now helps us in the judgment of various situations [...] but somewhere I must begin with an assumption or a decision." (OC 146)

"[W]e work with [the picture]." (OC 147) World-picture "is the substratum of all my enquiring [...]." (OC 162) It "is the matter-of-course foundation for [...] research." (OC 167) We don't just see the picture, we do something with the picture, we manipulate with it.

"[I]t is not [...] *seeing* [...]; it is our *acting* [...]." (OC 204) "[P]art of the whole *picture* which forms the starting point [...]" (OC 209) "[T]he idea of 'agreement with reality' does not have any clear application." (OC 215) Representation is not a relation; rather it is an activity of representing. Hinges give us "our way of looking at things, and our re-searches, their form" (OC 211), that is, a form of modeling. "...there is no "sharp boundary between methodological propositions and propositions within a method." These sec-tions are about dynamics and transformations in modeling. The model (or picture) is not stable (OC 318). "I show that I know [hinge proposition] by always drawing its conse-quences" (OC 397). Drawing consequences from hinges which are "tacit knowledge" is part of modeling. "But doesn't my drawing the consequences only show that I accept this hypothesis?" (OC 399) No, hinges "do not serve as foundations in the same way as hypotheses which, if they turn out to be false, are replaced by others. [...] 'In the beginning was the deed.'" (OC 402)

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The Problem of Non-Ecofriendly Aesthetics

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Abstract

Environmental aesthetics is a new area in the contemporary philosophy, in which some aesthetic judgments are criticized to be non-ecofriendly such as is the case with swamps, prairies, snakes or bats. This creates a problem for the ethics-aesthetics relation since, unlike Wittgenstein assumes, aesthetics and ethics are not "one and the same". My aim in this paper is to find a way to save the so-called *ugly* creatures from aesthetic prejudices and justify how they can still be aesthetically appreciated. I claim there are two main reasons behind their condemnation: (1) *biophilia* thesis of Wilson and (2) the picturesque tradition left from the 18th century. In contrast to these influences, I claim that (1) Carlson's cognitive aesthetic approach along with guarantee of self-existence, and (2) a holistic and multi-sensuous aesthetic appreciation of nature can save these creatures within our aesthetic agenda and prove that aesthetics and ethics are in harmony.

1. Introduction

Aesthetics and environmental ethics contradict each other in some cases. For example, preserving landscapes with spectacular scenic visions such as waterfalls, geological formations, and smoky mountains are preferable to wetlands or prairies which seem to be just filthy and ugly. In the same vein, dolphins or cute polar bears always win the contest in comparison to fleas, flies, bats, snakes or spiders. Dandelions and crabgrass are just "weeds" that has to be torn away. The case of saving the threatened population of timber rattlesnakes in North Carolina was not as successful as of baby seals or bottlenose dolphins because "snakes" unfortunately "don't have big brown warm mammal eyes to blink" at us (Lintott, 2007, 381).

Then the question is: Is all nature really aesthetically appreciable? What would happen if we sacrifice the cods and be concerned rather with rhinos or lions or drain wetlands or bogs? Actually, this means that the whole ecosystem is at stake. This conflict leads us to question our aesthetic appreciation once more and find a way to bring aesthetics and ethics in harmony. We have to answer the following two questions: (1) What is the reason for our negative responses towards these creatures? and (2) Can we transform this non-ecofriendly aesthetics towards a more ecofriendly one, so that aesthetics and ethics become one and the same with each other as Wittgenstein (1998) assumes (77)? My response to the first question is: (1) Wilson's *Biophilia* thesis and (2) the picturesque tradition lead us to appreciate nature non-ecofriendly. Against these negative influences, I claim (1) knowledge can make us acknowledge their aesthetic value and a guarantee of self-existence can render Wilson's thesis invalid, (2) in contrast to the picturesque, a holistic and multi-sensuous aesthetic appreciation of nature will strip our prejudices away.

2. Justification of Negative Responses: *Biophilia* Thesis and Picturesque Tradition

Biophilia is Edward Wilson's thesis (2000) that aims to justify the negative aesthetic responses towards the so-called "ugly creatures" that have the potential to kill or harm humans. Wilson claims that due to our evolutionary heritage, we tend to avoid snakes, bats, spiders, etc. and wetlands (1-3). Some hidden evolutionary codes function in our genes such as "[b]ats may carry rabies, flies and mosquitoes various diseases, and some snakes and spiders are poisonous" (Saito 2007, 246). For example, the disease

malaria terminologically depends on the Greek word *miasma* which denotes the poisonous air rising from the rotting bogs. *Malaria* literally means "bad air" and those who lived close to wetlands were inflicted with it due to breathing (Rolston 2000, 585). A protist mosquito is the responsible agent for malaria who spawned in stagnant or slow moving waters, which justifies the condemnation of stagnant water in contrast to the flowing water. In short, according to Wilson's thesis, *biophilia* is the "innate tendency to focus on life and lifelike processes" and abstain from the reverse (Wilson 2000, 1).

The "picturesque" tradition left from the 18th century functions as a cultural code within our aesthetic appreciation. Picturesque asserts that nature shall be viewed as a landscape painting where visual qualities are emphasized (Hussey 1967, 4). The term *pittoresco* literally means "the painter's view" referring "after the manner of painters" (Hussey 1967, 9). In picturesque, since nature is experienced as if an 'ideal landscape painting', the approach is necessarily dominated by the sense of sight. Vision, colors, the play of light, "textures, relative size and arrangement or 'composition' of topographical masses like mountains, valleys, lakes, woods, meadows, fields, streams and so on" are the main parameters for determining aesthetic response (Callicott 2007, 108).

I think our aesthetic responses towards nature are still under this tradition's influence. Jonas (1966) states that how we interrelate with the world depends on our means of perception which determines the way we make sense of the world. It is obvious that "the world we accept is largely a consequence of our reliance on sight or at least on a particular kind of sight" (136). Following picturesque tradition "all the arts, painting, poetry, novel, architecture, even music coalesced around the picturesque aesthetic". The result is indifference towards the non-scenic nature as the case in "swamps, bogs, dunes, scrub, prairie, bottoms, flats, deserts, and so on" (109).

3. Creating an Eco-friendly Aesthetics: Knowledge, Guarantee of Self-Existence and Multi-Sensuous, Holistic Approach

Against the *biophilia* thesis of Wilson, I will propose two distinct arguments to save the so-called ugly living and non-living beings. The first argument is the guarantee of self existence. Wilson's *biophilia* thesis is a strong argument to justify our negative aesthetic tendencies towards

swamps, snakes and spiders; however, the story does not end here. There are some contradictions with this exposition: what about the insect zoos or reptile zoos that we visit in various national parks? What kind of pleasure do we take in watching them? If they are purely against the *biophilia* thesis, then we should not be inclined to see them at all. The phenomenon seems to be that when we guarantee our concern for safety, the aesthetic appreciation dominates the way we experience them: we feel pleasure or amazement upon their composition of colors, smallness, or colonization. Then, we can state that as long as we can guarantee our survival, these natural beings can be appreciated aesthetically. As Saito (2007) defends, distancing ourselves via "a glass, window, moat or metal bars" the problem of non-ecofriendly aesthetics can be solved. As long as we have the sufficient convenience to explore and appreciate the aesthetic value of these dangerous creatures, we can acknowledge their aesthetic value (246).

This argument of the guarantee of self-existence resembles the necessary condition of the aesthetic experience of the sublime. Both Burke and Kant upon explaining the sublime experience emphasize there should be proper distance between the subject and phenomenon (Burke 1998, 53; Kant KU, 5:260). This is the primary condition for sublime aesthetic experience because then, the subject's faculties and mode of the judgment will not be impaired by being afraid and feeling terror. In other words, for a proper aesthetic appreciation of the sublime to take place the subject shall have a safe distance between the natural phenomena and herself so that the phenomenon does not present a threat to her self-existence. Similarly, in the experience of bats, snakes, spiders or swamps, as long as we preserve the safe distance to guarantee our self-existence, we can gain aesthetic appreciation.

The second argument is the transformative role of knowledge. Carlson (1995) declares that the act of appreciation "has an essential cognitive component" (396). In other words, science can be a means to base our aesthetic appreciation of nature upon objective grounds. Carlson makes an analogy with art; he presents examples of courses that teach music appreciation. In these courses information is provided so that the appreciator can gain a particular "cognitive stance" (396). Carlson's cognitivism is based mainly upon Kendall Walton's thesis (1970) that in order to appreciate a Rembrandt in distinction from Duchamp, one shall have acquaintance with the context, the means of painting, etc. All these count as necessary knowledge relevant to each work (336f).

In the same vein, knowledge shows us swamps are not "biological wastelands" but rather rich "in biodiversity and biomass productivity" as being "among the most fertile and productive ecosystems in the world" (Rolston 2000, 586). They are not mere wastelands that have to be drained but rather "there are lives flourishing there". Just because humans cannot dwell around them does not mean that they are not home to any other creatures such as insects, mammals and exotic plants: "mink, foxes, bobcats, lynx" (Rolston 2000, 592).

However, Brady (1998) objects that although we can lack info about the object, imagination encourages us to have various perceptual experiences and "enriches appreciation" (142). Caroll (2007) argues sometimes we appreciate nature "less intellectively" but only by being "emotionally moved" (170). In contrast to these, many scholars defend Carlson's cognitive model. Eaton (1998) underlines the problem of relativity and sets a standard in aesthetic appreciation of nature and introduces the concept of "informed imagination" (151). She accepts Brady's criticism

but adds that no plain imagination can function as a discriminatory factor for aesthetic judgments without knowledge. In the epistemology of aesthetics some standard has to be presented which can enable us "to imagine well" (150).

To exemplify, *Bambi* is a good case to reveal how commonly held aesthetic judgments might harm nature due to lack of knowledge. Salten's novel *Bambi* caused people to have the idea that deer shall be protected in every case due to their innocent and cute characteristics; however, in the case of United States' conservation policy, the end result was damage of the forests with their overpopulation. They became "vermin" where several "songbirds and tree species' population decreased" (Eaton 1998, 152). In the same vein, not only Callicott (1983) defends that "a land aesthetic […] appreciation can be developed through knowledge of ecological relationships and the natural history of an environment" (350) but also Lintott (2007) is in support of scientific cognitivism asserting that "the bias of science is a useful tool in the aesthetic appreciation of nature, especially when forging the way to an ecofriendly aesthetic" (392). So, I also assert that the objection insisting upon a scientific basis for appreciation of nature does not "take all the fun out of it" but rather creates a standard for justified aesthetic appreciation which saves the socalled *ugly* creatures.

As a protest against the parochial vision of picturesque, a new aesthetic approach arose beginning with the second half of the 19th century. Leopold (1949) defended that nature shall be appreciated as a three-dimensional surrounding with all the senses; not reduced to sight alone and visualized as a two-dimensional painting (96). As a multisensuous experience, appreciation of nature should include hearing, wherein the sounds of rain, waterfalls, insects or birds integrate; the sense of touch where the crudeness of a rock, humidity of mud, warmth of sun or chill of a breeze shall interfere. In short, not only the eyes but also ears, surface of the skin, the nose and tongue shall play role.

Then, we cognize the interrelated nature of each being, that we are "interlocked in one humming community of cooperation and competitions, one biota" (ibid.). The cranes and marshes come to form a whole; the crane cannot be isolated from its wetland and "one cannot love crane and hate marshes". "The marsh itself is transformed by the presence of cranes from a 'waste,' 'Godforsaken' mosquito swamp, into a thing of precious beauty" (Callicott 2007, 111). I take this as a very important attempt of defense to save the so-called ugly creatures and form the groundwork of an eco-friendly aesthetics. If we can free ourselves from the "prevailing visual bias" and let all our sensory perception get involved, the aesthetic approach and experience of nature will totally differ. A rocky mountainous area takes its aesthetic value as long as the ants and cods crawl upon and the interesting smell and humidity of a swamp transforms the experience we have. In short, all sensory modalities "equally and indiscriminately" (Callicott 2007, 115) should affect our aesthetic appreciation of nature unlike the picturesque.

Saito's "incompatible environments" argument also supports multi-sensuous and holistic appreciation of nature. She asserts that when we experience the ugly creatures in their own environments, the attitude becomes more disinterested and worries of self-preservation does not interfere with aesthetic judgments. For example, "we condemn dandelions and other 'weeds' when they appear on our meticulously maintained lawn or golf course". In contrast, on a wild meadow we do not react with such repulsion (Saito

2007, 245). Evaluating each being as a part of its proper environment will make us regain the proper eco-friendly aesthetics we have lost. For example, a snake may raise detestation when it "slithers" across the basement floor, but if we experience it on a "forest floor" with a safe distance, we acknowledge its shiny skin, elaborate and smooth movement and the tender noise as an integral part of its own environment. In short, nature can be appreciated *as nature* as long as we preserve our position within it as a part, perceiving it in its totality with our all senses. This will not only enrich our aesthetic agenda but also bring it in harmony with environmental ethics.

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The Breath of Life: "Essentially Complex Totalities"*

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Abstract

I will suggest that the composition of MS 142 when viewed as a writing *process* helps us to unpackage subtle shifts in important concepts. I illustrate this idea by making observations on the interplay between MS 152 and MS 142 and MS 157a&b, principally. I discuss the concept of *Übersichtlichkeit*, and propose a migration of this concept from the early 1930s to the writing of MS 142, with possible co-changes in the concepts of aspect perception and mathematical drawings of divisibility of groups. Thus, rather than finding passages of the early 1930s in which a desire for a surveyability of our grammar can be read as proof of Wittgenstein's later views, I argue that this conception is best viewed as left behind as Wittgenstein moves further away from philosophical dogmatism and a morphology of cultures.

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* The term "essentially complex totalities" is used by Hans Sluga (2010). Waismann's distinction between totalities and systems is not appropriate here; indeed Sluga uses totalities as if they were open systems, which would fit Wittgenstein's conception very well.

1. Writing as Process

In MS 152, traditionally dated 1936 by von Wright, Rhees added the pencilled remark:

> In this notebook page 5 to 37 and the first four lines of 38 are drafts of MS. "Philosophische Untersuchungen Versuch eine Umarbeitung" Ende "36" in Band XI. The reference to "47" on page 5 is to "(47)" in that MS. – 39 to the end are rather drafts to the (published) <u>Philosophische Untersuchungen</u>. And the reference to "(47)" on pp. 56 and 68 is to 47 of the <u>Untersuchungen – not as on p.5 to MS. of Bd.</u> XI. (MS 152, 1)

Rhees reiterates this point in his letter to von Wright, May 13, 1977, and as a means of establishing the parameters of dating the undated MS 152, he attempts an argument: in conjunction with the argument that 157a has the date 9.2.37 and that this notebook seems to be a continuation of the latter part of 152, it can be reasonably conjectured that MS 152 was written before 9.2.37 (Rhees treats the latter part of 157a and 157b as a unity). This is of importance for Rhees because he is trying to respond, in this letter, to von Wright's larger question about the dating and content of the 1938 *Philosophische Untersuchungen* to which the 1938 *Vorwort* alludes.

For there to be a reference to '47' of MS 115, which was begun at the end of August 1936, in the first page of prose in MS 152 – there is a series of computations on the first pages of this notebook – it is clear that at least as far as remark 47 in the attempted revision at the end of MS 115 had been completed by the time that MS 152 was started. Furthermore, at MS 152, 8 Wittgenstein refers to '69' (MS 115, 190-191), and at MS 152,38 there is the reference "(siehe S. 253)" which is obviously to MS 115, 253 – two facts that Rhees fails to record in his note at the opening page of MS 152 or relay to von Wright in this particular letter. However, Rhees does suggest that Wittgenstein continued to work back and forth between these manuscripts, a conjecture which the further references to MS 115 could be taken to corroborate. While Rhees' argument successfully places the entire MS 152 between the end of August 1936 and before 9.2.37, considering the other numbers referenced in MS 152 from MS 115, the first part, MS 153, 5-38 could presumably be between end of August 1936 and at or near the close of 1936 when the *Umarbeitung* is completed in the final section of MS 115. Given that the *Umarbeitung* runs from pages 128-292 in MS 115, and the final reference is to page 253, this is a strong indication that the first section of MS 152 was completed by November 1936.

That the remainder of the text of MS 152 certainly treats of what is begun in MS 142 at the end of 1936 when Wittgenstein makes his breakthrough as to the appropriate method to use for his book, and has the references to remark numbers 3, 4 and 47 – which appear to be to MS 142: 3, 4 and 47 – I think it safe to conclude that MS 152 functions as a sounding board for what he has already written, and what he was in the process of writing. For example, looking at MS 152, 68, we find reference to "47" of MS 142; in MS 142: Remark 56(58), which has as its source in the Schulte edition MS 152, 63 and 70-71, it is obvious that at this particular point in the process Wittgenstein is both copying and transforming ideas into MS 142 from the passages he has written and emended at MS 152, 63 and 70-71. In other words, at times he is referring to already composed pages of MS 142, and at other times he has used MS 152 to edge forward to and to develop and clarify topics. We see this same process of composition in the 1938 summer section of MS 117: 127-148 when Wittgenstein interwove his current writing with topics in TS 213, this evidence physically present in both MS 117 and added remarks in TS 213. Even in the first passages which follow what appears to be a conclusion of sorts at MS 152, 38, the opening of MS 142 with the Augustinian passages is rehearsed in a very rough form (MS 152, pp. 38-40) while nonetheless referring at MS 152, 42 to Remarks 3 and 4 in what is obviously an already written MS 142.

2. Change of Gear: names, existence, genus

After the reference to '47' at MS 152,68 there are no other references to numbers in MS 142. However, presumably Wittgenstein uses MS 152 as a rough draft of sorts for MS 142 as many passages survived through all revisions into the published version of PU are present here. There is a horizontal line drawn across page 69 at midpoint, which acts as a form of signalling of change of gear in his investigation of the topic of names and existence, which comprises MS 152, 69-73. While this topic has been broached

earlier, he continues it with a new freshness and originality at MS 142: 53 (55), TS 220: 53(55); PU: 55.

The use of the horizontal at this point divides the material which relates to the remarks from the beginning of MS 142 up to Remark 52(54) from the source pages 69-71 which act as a revisiting of the very difficult topic of naming and existence as he prises apart the name from the bearer and considers questions of universals and generality, of relations of part to whole, of what, if anything, constitutes an element of reality. Generally, from remarks 53(55)-68(70) – except for 67(69) whose source is MS 115, 42 – MS 142 [PU 56-71] is created while weaving back to the pages in the 60s of MS 152 and forward to 69-77. It is within these contexts that the exploration of language games and the constellation of topics brought in to consider 'fuzzy borders' must be understood.

MS 142: 69(71)- 85(87) is created from an interesting combination of unsourced remarks, plus some remarks sourced from the 40s of MS 115, and remarks sourced from MS 152, spanning early pages going up to page 85 of MS 152, which is very near the end at page 96. This pattern of composition would strongly indicate that MS 152 has been concluded up to the last sourced remark of MS 152, 85 at least, and we know that MS 115: Remarks 40s was written earlier, with the unsourced remarks acting as integrating forces to move the argument along. The remarks at MS 142: 69(71), 70(72), 71(73) and 74(76), which are unsourced in the Schulte critical edition, are just those remarks which ask the philosophical question about genus, blurred edges, and applicability. Relatedly, in the passages on action-at- a-distance in TS 221,196 (BGM: 65) Wittgenstein brings in the application of a rule, not 'spooky' action at a distance when explaining the divisibility of groups: "'What does the action at a distance of the picture consist in?' – In the fact that I apply it". Application is something that one does, and recognises that one does it.

Interestingly, the last section of what concluded the first tranche of typing of TS 220, pages 1-65, concluded at just this point, MS 142:85. Furthermore, looking at the MS 142 facsimile we can readily see that this is the point, Remark 85, at which the smooth writing ends, and a much more turbulent process for many pages is mapped out in MS 142 itself when Wittgenstein began his exploration and exposition of the Sublime. MS 152 ends as source at this point and MSS 157a&b take over as conversational partners with MS 142.

3. Change of Aspect

It could also be argued that Wittgenstein's conception of aspect perception has also migrated as mathematical aspect perception in aligned with constructive proofs in what appears to be a new sense in MS 157b. For example, in the earlier notebooks the drawings of a series of strokes being divided up in some way were not proofs in precisely the same sense as those in the developed MS 117 of 1937/38. For example, in the 1929-39 MS 108,124 we have an example of 11 strokes divided into three groups with 2 remaining. This is, however, as Wittgenstein states, an arithmetical construction, and, possibly, a geometrical construction. There is a sense that the last or next group needs to be filled, so to speak, the third side of the triangle drawn. It has more in common with aspect perception which is conceived as discovering and inventing connections, and concomitantly with *Übersichtlichkeit* (a particular Goethean interpretation of the colour polyhedron is often cited for this interpretation). Also in MS 108,31 we find: "*Unser Grammatik fehlt es vor allem an Übersichtlichkeit*".

However, at MS 157b, 36r&v drawings very similar to those of MS 108 nonetheless show how groups overlap or can be divided in more than one way in what appears a paradox. In addition, the drawings of MS 117 are particularly apt to allow for mathematical surprise, as pieces of a puzzle fall into place.

However, it is true that we are told that proof involves perspicuity. At BGM I: 153: "Perspicuity is part of proof. If the process by means of which I get a result were not surveyable, I might indeed make a note that this number is what comes out – but what fact is this supposed to confirm for me? I don't know 'what is *supposed* to come out' (1956, 45e). I suggest that it is possible that as the nature of the drawings changed so did the use of the concept of *Übersichtlichkeit*, that in a sense it becomes linked to construction and things fitting rather than an overview pre-construction. Indeed, there is much more of a sense of recognizing that the action is following a rule and not just performing a bit of behaviour which could be made to accord with a rule.

Yet when we consider a grander, more inclusive form of *Übersichtlichkeit*, the paradigm starts to break down and positive aspects of unsurveyablity that are emerging are, as Hans Sluga points out, because "language contains countless kinds of sentence and use, a 'maze' of little streets and squares, and a 'multitude' of boroughs" (2010, p. 194). He continues: "We thus end up with three characteristics of unsurveyable totalities. (1) They typically contain large numbers of items. (2) These are typically of many different kinds that are related to each other in many different ways. And (3) they are not closed but constantly in transition" (2010, p. 195). Sluga suggests the fact that one and the same picture can represent two different things, as in aspect perception, defeats the Tractarian argument that representation is based on the representation and that which is represented having similar structures. If there is no guarantee that a representation is just of a certain thing (only), then representation itself can never offer surveyability. As Sluga puts it: "our capacity for using words, the command we have of our grammar, and our ability to participate in the human form of life cannot be due to our possession of a surveyable representation of the use of our words, or our grammar, or of our form of life. There are no such representations to be had" (2010, pp. 198-199). He argues, firstly, even if we might have surveyable models of parts of the complex totality, we cannot get a representation of it all. To believe so is a part-to whole fallacy; secondly, we could think that we could get an approximate representation of some parts and a precise representation of others and the precise bits, like a calculus, would be a guide for the others.

But this is an illusion. Complexity is the breath of life.

4. Concluding remarks

What I have attempted to show is that the composition of MS 142 when looked at carefully in terms of its composition sections as a writing process points to the junctures of rupture or emphasis which continue through into the later revisions. Thus the frisson at 55 when he considers the separation of the name and the bearer takes on not the easy and historically traceable resolution along Brentano lines of intentionality. Rather, it is a rougher passage into waters of what constitutes compositionality, which slides into questions of divisibility and borders, and into the even trickier waters of 'how much can we take away and it is still a broom; how blue need blue be to still be blue when it approaches the fuzzy border'. The answers edge into us-

ing applicability and application as criteria. Thus: when does a broom become something which we would not fetch when asked to fetch the broom in the corner, or when asked to paint the wall blue we would not know what colour to use?

It is also interesting to note that it is just at the end of the section on the Sublime, MS 142: 86(88)-110(112), pages 91-103/TS 220: 86-96, pages 66-77, that later operates as another point of rupture or frisson when Wittgenstein decided on the more radical revision in Swansea in 1943, one which involved the cuttings and pastings involving TSS 237, 238 and 239. For when the ideal was no longer "a preconception to which reality must correspond" (2009, PI 131) or as Sluga translates it "to which everything must conform" (2010, p.200), we have learned to accept both limited visibility and unclear borders. We also have moved away from any form of cultural morphology, and, in the final analysis, away from those particular aspects of Spengler and Goethe.

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Aspect-Blindness and Experience:
Can there be Aesthetic-Blindness?

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Abstract

This paper considers the three types of perception-specific blindness that occur within Wittgenstein's work and argues that it is possible to propose the idea of an aesthetic-blindness. From a reflection on Wittgenstein's usage of colour-, aspect-, and meaning-blindness it is suggested that what is lacking in all three types of blindness is not only the ability to perceive or experience a particular aspect of something but more importantly the facility for participating in all associated language-games. For the aesthetically-blind it is impossible to produce an emotional reaction to a particular work despite understanding notions of form and structure. The paper ends with a consideration on whether any form of aesthetic-blindness might be genuine.

There are three main types of perception-specific blindness that appear throughout Wittgenstein's work: colour-, meaning-, and aspect-blindness. Of these, it is only the first which references a phenomenon that already holds a place in our language-games. However, for the remaining types, the general principle is the same. That is, there is a particular feature or property that the 'blind' person cannot distinguish. Despite the fact that colour-blindness is a genuine condition, Wittgenstein's applications are not intended to represent the actual state. All the types of blindness are interrogative tools used to challenge assumptions about the world and our practices. They are a form of question, a method of asking, 'what if things were not this way?' It is the aim of this paper to apply this idea of blindness to the field of aesthetics by reflecting upon whether it is possible to be, and what it would mean to be, aesthetically-blind.

The interpretations and applications of Wittgenstein's use of the concept of blindness vary as much as with any other area of his work. For example, meaning-blindness has been taken as a demonstration that language is part of life (Minar, 2010, p. 197) or an attempt to consider whether the meaning-blind person is using language or words with any meaning at all (Fox, 2010, p. 36). In contrast, aspect-blindness has been applied to the inability of religious fundamentalists to see the world in more than one way (Robinson, 2009, p. 124). In contrast, it is not usual to see the various kinds examined closely in conjunction, or in relationship to aesthetics. In part this is because they are actually different dimensions of one concept, thus by considering 'aspect-blindness' the investigation might be seen as all-inclusive. The aim here is to draw out the similarities more systematically by considering their individual usage in Wittgenstein's work.

1. Wittgenstein's Three Types of Blindness

Colour-blindness appears the most frequently, occurring at least once in many of the texts. However, it is most present in *Remarks on Colour*, usually as a method for examining our concepts: "Imagine a *tribe* of colour-blind people […] they would not have the same colour concepts that we do" (ROC, I, §13); "The colour-blind not merely cannot learn to use our colour words, they can't learn to use the word "colour-blind" as a normal person does." (ROC, I, §77) The use of this idea indicates that what interests Wittgenstein is not colour-blindness itself, but how it affects participation in language-games. In contrast, given that 'meaning-blindness' is not a genuine phenomenon, at least a portion of Wittgenstein's reflections are centred on what such an experience would entail.

In *Zettel* he states that the meaning-blind man will understand the sentence, "Tell him he is to go to the bank – I mean the river bank" but not "Say the word bank and mean the bank of the river." (§ 183) The purpose of developing these thoughts is to extend the notion of 'meaning as use' inwardly: "When I supposed the case of a 'meaning-blind' man, this was because the experience of meaning seems to have no importance in the use of language." (*Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, I, § 202) The meaning-blind person then is one who is unable to attach meaning to a word. In contrast with colour-blindness it might appear that if the meaning-blind person can 'go to the bank', their participation in language-games is absolute. However, to interpret the argument in this way is to neglect the important comments Wittgenstein makes about experiencing the meaning of a word.

"Say some ambiguous word to yourself ('till'); if you now experience it as a verb, try to hang on to this experience, so that it lasts." (RPP, I, § 194) To the non-meaning-blind, this command might produce a strange feeling, but it would not be impossible to imagine. However, to the meaning-blind, the sentence itself would be senseless, as would any questions about the experience. In this respect, it is unnecessary to consider what relationship inner experience has to the seemingly externalised concept of meaning as use, it is only important to acknowledge that full participation in our language-games requires the ability to consider something that is termed 'experience.' As Victor J. Krebs argues, there is no "separability or independence of articulated experience from language." (2010, p. 127) The lack of the facility for experience in the meaning-blind renders the same diminished participation in particular language-games as colour-blindness.

Aspect-blindness is introduced by Wittgenstein as a reaction to visual stimuli: "could there be human beings who could not see something as something?" (*Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*, XI, § 257) If shown the same picture twice, the aspect-blind person might name it as different objects without recognising that it was the same. Each time, the person would be perceiving the complete object, not simply an aspect of it: "The aspect-blind man is supposed not to see the aspects A change." (PPF, XI, § 257) In parallel with the meaning-blind, there is an absent experiential element entailing that the aspect-blind person

cannot participate in all the language games associated with an object. It is this parallel that Wittgenstein argued made the concept of aspect-blindness important: "The importance of the concept 'aspect-blindness' lies in the kinship of seeing an aspect and experiencing the meaning of a word." (PPF, XI, § 234)

In addition to his recognition of the similarity between aspect- and meaning-blindness, Wittgenstein did query their connection to colour-blindness, asking of aspect-blindness, "Would this defect be comparable, say, to colour-blindness or to not having absolute pitch?" (PPF, XI, § 257) The aim of the preceding discussion has therefore not been an effort to express something unacknowledged about Wittgenstein's work, but to demonstrate shared elements that may be applied to aesthetics. To summarise these then, the 'blind' person lacks the ability to perceive a particular aspect or dimension; because they cannot perceive it, they are unable to understand it or converse about experiencing it; and because they cannot converse about it, they are unable to participate in a certain type of language-game.

2. The Subjective Element of Experience

In considering how issues of aspect-blindness might relate to aesthetics, Christian Helmut Wenzel suggests that rather than interpret Wittgenstein as a behaviourist only concerned with outer criteria, a better reading of aspect-blindness is as a disjunction between subjective and objective perceptions (2010, p. 210). The issue then becomes not that an aspect-blind person cannot see both the rabbit and the duck, but that they do not experience a subjective shift between the two perceptions. They do not recognise their "experiential togetherness," an experience that Wenzel argues is predicated on the ability to recognise that two experiences are occurring simultaneously (p. 204). In part this argument aligns well with what has been proposed about the experiential dimension of aspect-blindness, however, although Wittgenstein does refer to seemingly subjective elements and it is these references upon which Wenzel justifies his stance, the current argument does not require that a subjective element be demonstrated. It only requires that all language-games cannot be completely participated in by the aspect-blind.

Bypassing the distinction between the subjective experience of an aspect and the objective judgement of an object avoids one of the fundamental questions of aesthetics. That is, the debate as to whether value is contained within or projected onto an object. This debate is avoided as language-games remain unchanged regardless of where the value is 'located.' This can be shown through a reflection on the idea of colour. If the world is actually various shades of grey but through biological structures is interpreted as the bright variety of colours that appear to us, would our language-games change at all? The only reason to say yes is a feeling of discomfort caused by the consequence of the provided outsider-knowledge that we will never possess. The debate is not dismissed, its relevance simply collapses. There may be an objection that this is a poor analogy with aesthetics as whilst it is generally impossible to force the mind to perceive a red object as green, it *is* possible to change an aesthetic appreciation. However, the analogy holds because the object itself does not change. The new aspect will be perceived regardless of whether it is a projection or not, in the same manner that a person looking at the duck-rabbit will say "now it's a duck!"

3. The Possibility of Aesthetic Blindness

Given the criteria for aspect-blindness, the most obvious question relates to which aesthetic aspect or dimension a person might be blind to. That is, what experience would be missing and what language-games could not be participated in? This answer may be provided by Wittgenstein when he states, "The most important thing in connection with aesthetics is what may be called aesthetic reactions, e.g. discontent, disgust, discomfort." (*Lectures on Aesthetics*, II, § 10) Both discontent and discomfort appear to be related to a feeling of an object being 'incorrect' in some way; a picture which is hung crookedly or a discordant musical note in a tuneful sequence. The aesthetically-blind person would look at a crooked painting and not experience any sense of discomfort.

Although Wittgenstein's focus on what is proper or correct implies a particular type of aesthetic judgment, it is relatively simple to make a more general argument without recourse to form. The aesthetically-blind person in this case would be one who experienced no reaction to any form of stimuli typically associated with aesthetics. They would still be able to participate in *some* related language-games, but not all. For example, an aesthetically-blind person participating in an introductory art course might learn what makes particular paintings valuable and could achieve full marks when assessed, however, when shown an unfamiliar work and asked what they *felt*, they would not fully understand this language-game.

To revert to 'feelings' here might seem to move beyond the stated interpretation of Wittgenstein's work, that is, the important feature is not a subjective assessment but rather how aesthetic-blindness affects language-games. However, this is to neglect that Wittgenstein's purview is not *only* language. This is not to imply a desire to move to a consideration of the subjective, but rather to examine behaviour in all its complexities: "To describe what [appreciation] consists in we would have to describe the whole environment." (LA, I, § 20) It is not merely that a person describes a picture as beautiful, but how they react to it and what they do with it. A person who actually thinks a picture is lovely, "dusts it carefully, looks at it often." (LA, I, § 36) The aesthetically-blind student might learn what objects it is appropriate to call beautiful, but they will not linger over these objects in an art gallery, nor perhaps go there at all.

4. Why Aesthetic-Blindness?

The discussion thus far has demonstrated that it is possible to conceive of such a phenomenon as aesthetic-blindness. In keeping with the criteria, there is an aspect unable to be perceived, aesthetic value; this aspect is unable to be understood, it cannot be expressed what it is like to experience either beauty or aesthetic disgust; and consequently, not all aesthetic language-games can be participated in. The remaining factor to contemplate is why this is important given that the stated conditions could potentially cover every element of perception. That is, if the conditions for aesthetic-blindness are not unique, they may add nothing to philosophical contemplations. The answer to this is one that moves outside the scope of Wittgenstein's concerns.

One of the characteristics of Wittgenstein's reflections on blindness is that he was mostly unconcerned with whether such a thing actually occurs. It is this which is the most intriguing possibility with aesthetic-blindness. There are some who do not feel anything when they read poetry. They understand the words and the meaning, they under-

stand the metaphor and the allusion, but they have no re-action to the words that another might find full of feeling. Likewise, a person might understand why people like paintings to be hung straight, but not experience any sense of discomfort when they notice that one is crooked. Are these people afflicted with aesthetic-blindness? Whilst a person may come to appreciate a particular piece, if another is blind to the experience of it, they can no more force themselves to feel something than the person who could not see the red object as green.

This leads to the final question of this paper, which, like those just offered, is unable to be answered here, or perhaps at all. Judgments of aesthetic value are seen as reflections of cultural development, of education, of finesse or understanding. In comparison, judgements of colour are seen as biological or actual. The colour-blind person is not criticised for their inability to see colour, this seems an absurd proposition. The remaining question then, is this: Do we treat those with aesthetic-blindness more harshly than we treat the colour-blind and instead should acknowledge that it is possible that some people are not 'uncultured,' but are merely incapable of seeing something as something else?

Perception-specific blindness is used in Wittgenstein's work as a means of reflecting upon the way in which our inner experiences are reflected in our language-games. There is no requirement that we refer to or examine these experiences internally provided that an utter participation in external language-games can be demonstrated. When related to the field of aesthetics where there are many references to experience and feeling, aspect-blindness takes on a new dimension because it forces us to consider the idea that aesthetic feeling, of some types or all, may be difficult or impossible for some to experience.

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Some Notes on Writing a History of Editing Wittgenstein

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Abstract

This paper presents conceptual links between a 4-year project to write a history of editing Wittgenstein and a freshly established Collaborative Research Center at the University of Siegen (Germany). In contrast to exclusively tracing editorial-philological operations in transforming manuscripts into published books, the here-presented project utilizes key concepts from the sociological and media-ethnographic Collaborative Research Center „Media of Cooperation" (MC), with the main objective to make present again social processes and scholarly practices involved in the making of the posthumous editions from Wittgenstein's writings. Three key concepts from MC are discussed to suggest how such a history of editing Wittgenstein may be written: Susan Star's *boundary object*s, Bruno Latour's *actor*s and Clifford Geertz' *thick description*. Using these concepts, a history of editing Wittgenstein ought to provide a thick description of how acting editors have translated Wittgenstein's writings into boundary objects for scholarly communities.

I.

I first came into contact with scholars working on editions of Wittgenstein's writings on the Norwegian peninsula Os in early July 2007. As a freshly appointed PhD-fellow, I attended a conference devoted to the attempt of establishing an internet-platform for philosophical texts and computer-supported work on these. The most controversial issue during this conference was the proposal to create a so-called web-ontology for Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*. The idea behind this web-ontology was that scholars should firstly extract what Wittgenstein's remarks are about and secondly determine how these topics relate to each other. Resulting from this, a conceptual grid was imagined that – once linked to Wittgenstein's manuscripts and typescripts - would allow very efficient navigation through the corpus as well as automatic responses to complex search queries. I remember vividly the sunny afternoon when we discussed this question in the conference room of our hotel. What I was most struck by, however, were not so much the arguments for and against the possibility to let machines perform logical operations on the very texts philosophers want to understand. What I was most struck by was the fact that about 20 philosophers from different countries and with diverse backgrounds in ancient, pre-modern and modern philosophy gathered in the middle of the most beautiful Norwegian Fjord-landscape at the best time of the year – in order to black out the room and to stare, like pupils at a blackboard in their classroom, at the slides of a presentation about machine-readable relations and promises that ontologies may enable computers to „understand" and „reason". Occupied with the impression of this situation, I approached an Italian scholar during a coffee break. He was a retired schoolteacher who had transcribed into his computer the pre-socratic fragments that ought to become part of the envisaged internet-platform. During the break, he stood at a cliff, smoking a pipe that stuck out of his white beard and watching the picturesque scenery of the dark-blue water surrounded by archaic rocks. This man seemed sympathetic to me and hence I expressed my puzzlement. I told him that so far my idea of philosophizing has been quite different from sitting in a darkened room on an exceptionally bright and warm day and try to make machines „reason" (which I regarded as neither possible nor desirable). Instead, I said, I have always thought that philosophers should use splendid occasions like this for coming together, talking to each other and reason together in a dialogue, from human to human, without machines between them, perhaps allowing the conversation to be in-spired by the miraculous surrounding in which we happened to be in that very moment. In his reply, the Italian scholar agreed that what I had in mind was rather what philosophizing is, but to my surprise he added that our work in the blacked-out classroom was all about providing opportunities for doing exactly this.

II.

In 2007, I didn't understand this response and remained skeptical; however, I felt that there was some truth in the Italian scholar's reply. Now, about ten years later, I shall try to grasp better what it was that puzzled and interested me then – and ever since: namely the very practices of scholars who have devoted large parts of their lives and work to editing the writings of philosophers, and in particular those of Wittgenstein. As of today, we can look back to 65 years of editing Wittgenstein's writings. A description of this editorial history promises to me most interesting insights into the culture of the humanities in the 2nd half of the 20th century. To gain some theoretical help for seeing more clearly what we are looking at and for in this history and to receive suggestions for how to write it, I will try to utilize three key concepts from MC.

Talking about "the practices of scholars", it is clear that I am not only interested in the minute philological operations on manuscripts in the history of editing Wittgenstein, but rather in winning an understanding of the work of the scholars who perform these operations. In this view, the edited philosophical texts are not the sole focus of attention, but rather the starting point for describing which role they and the editing of them have played in the scholarly world. This is where I want to bring in the concept of *boundary objects* by Susan L. Star. Derived from a historical case study in the sciences, boundary objects were a proposal to analyze scientific work in complex institutional settings (Star 1989, 387). According to Star, boundary objects enable scientists with diverse backgrounds, interests and problems to cooperate. In order to fulfill this binding function, boundary objects must be "both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites." (Star 1989, 393) Using this definition, we may regard Wittgenstein's remarks as boundary objects, allowing for cooperation in diverse and complex scholarly communities. I think it is fair to say that Wittgenstein-scholarship has proven the capacity of Wittgenstein's remarks to be both "plastic enough" to adapt to the prob-

lems and needs of diverse interpreters and "yet robust enough to maintain a common identity". More specifically, we may identify Wittgenstein's remarks with a subtype of boundary objects called "repositories" which are, according to Star, "ordered 'piles' of objects which are indexed in a standardized fashion" (Star 1989, 410). The literary form and the very materiality of Wittgenstein's remarks which are ordered by numbering-systems may be seen as features of such an "ordered pile of objects". The practice of interpreters seem to support what Star has identified as the advantage of such a boundary object, namely that "people from different worlds can use or borrow from the 'pile' for their own purposes without having to directly negotiate differences in purpose" (Star 1989, 410).

III.

If we conceive of Wittgenstein's remarks as a repository of objects that mediate cooperation between scholars with diverse interests and problems in changing constellations, a description may follow in which ways they have fulfilled this function for manifold groups during decades of Wittgenstein-reception. Yet, this may become an infinite descriptive endeavor and is not the focus of the here-presented project. Quite in accordance with Star, we may not only investigate how scholars *use* boundary objects, but rather how they *produce* them in order to make cooperation possible. This shifts the focus of our interest towards the processes, interactions and scholarly practices involved in the making of Wittgenstein's remarks, from the first notes to publication. This interest in the making of scholarly results we share with the author who provides the second concept which I want to render fruitful for writing a history of editing Wittgenstein: Bruno Latour. With Latour (e.g. 2007) we may say that the history of editing Wittgenstein ought to allow us to take a look into the "laboratories of philosophers". Further, this description of the daily work of philosophers ought to bring to life again the social processes that have entered the preparation of Wittgenstein's writings. Of course, the first dimension that comes to mind with such a focus is to describe what entered Wittgenstein's own creation, selection and composition of his remarks, including his biography, encounters with discussions partners, lectures and last but not least his working and writing practices. Wittgenstein-scholarship has already shed a lot of light on this dimension. What remains to be recognized more fully is the fact that the making of Wittgenstein's published works is not exhausted with his own working acts: Wittgenstein did not publish anything of his later philosophy; instead, he transferred to three of his former students the task to publish what they thought fit from about 18.000 pages that he had created between 1929-1951. Thus, the making available of Wittgenstein's remarks extends to a second generation, and in fact goes on until today. It is this trans-generational structure of working on Wittgenstein's writings that provides a most interesting set-up for investigating rarely studied social processes in the humanities. As Latour's considerations on Actor-Network-Theory are supposed to help making social processes present again, the next concept from MC that I would like to utilize for writing a history of editing Wittgenstein are his *actors*.

Latour's concept of actor is intimately connected with the insight that social processes ought not to be presented as a "social explanation", in our case e.g. an explanation for how the editions of Wittgenstein's writings look like today. This would, according to Latour, turn the social into a variable that remains empty – whereas we are interested in seeing what we actually mean by these social processes.

Hence, we ought to describe as neatly as possible the editors' actions and interactions. For this description it is most important that, again, the actors are not merely variables, but intentional humans with a biography, thoughts, fears and hopes, virtues and shortcomings, all of which enter their dedicated work in philosophy. Only when full-blooded actors do act in our account, the social processes we are interested in will show up; if this is achieved (which is a most difficult literary task), no additional explicit explanation is necessary. In turn, without full-blooded actors there won't emerge any social processes that may be perceived. For writing the history of editing Wittgenstein this implies that the editors have to enter the stage as humans that make, in their individuality, a difference to the story. For the era of the first three editors this means we will understand their work only when we take into our account their discussions and relationships with Wittgenstein and what these acquaintanceships meant to them and for their editorial decisions. Thus our account of editing Wittgenstein has, in the first instance, a pyramidal set-up of relationships:

Wittgenstein

Rush Rhees ——————— Georg Henrik von Wright

Elizabeth Anscombe

When describing this set-up as an action-network, it is important to remember that, characteristically, not only humans can be actors, but everything that initiates relevant action. In this sense, the document of Wittgenstein's last will, for example, is an important actor that has set the whole structure in motion.

IV.

When we regard the editors as actors who made a difference we will be able to appreciate their distinct imprints on Wittgenstein's published works – but not as philological deficits, rather as their translations (to use another of Latour's terms) of the philosophy of their teacher and friend. This brings me to the third and last concept from MC which I would like to make fruitful for writing a history editing Wittgenstein: Clifford Geertz' *thick description*. Developed as a writing method in ethnography, thick descriptions shall bring us closer to understanding of what practitioners of other cultures do. That is, the ethnographer is supposed not only to record observed behavior but to present in his writings his observations as meaningful acts. This is achieved when the ethnographer recognizes what he perceives within the meaningful frame of the culture in which the observed behaviors have their function, i.e. are acts. Now, the same holds for a description of acts and practices within scholarly cultures, as Geertz himself has pointed out: "if you want to understand what a science is, you should look in the first instance not at its theories or its findings, and certainly not at what its apologists say about it; you should look at what the practitioners of it do." (Geertz, 1983, 9-10) Like Latour's descriptions of action-networks, thick descriptions are essentially actor-oriented. Hence, if we want to understand what has entered the editing of Wittgenstein's writings, we have to reconstruct the editors' reasons and motives for, say, selecting and reconstructing Wittgenstein's remarks when producing unified books from diverse sources. This is very different from judging their editions from the point of view of today's editorial sciences. The latter would be comparable to measur-

ing the practices in another culture against the standards of our western, science-orientied culture. By contrast, in a thick description of the history of editing Wittgenstein, the acts of the editors must be rendered intelligible as meaningful acts within their frame of thought, including the whole range of considerations, experiences and significances which *they* attached to it.

V.

From the point we reached in this presentation, the history of editing Wittgenstein becomes a case study of how texts are passed on in the culture of the humanities. Two threads may be further elaborated from here: a history of editing Wittgenstein as presented here is, firstly, a most interesting chapter in the history of philosophy, relating to newer forms in the historiography of philosophy and illuminating how traditions in philosophy actually develop and change. Secondly, the latest changes in this tradition that have come along with new standards in editorial sciences and new technologies as well as new research policies may illuminate the situation of the humanities today, as "science and technology studies" (STS) have illuminated the situation of the sciences in our current society. – These two threads cannot be developed in detail here. So let me conclude with another word on Geertz' thick description: it is essentially inspired by Wittgenstein's remarks on under-

standing other cultures. Hence the description of the history of editing Wittgenstein's writings in the vein sketched in this paper is a reflection of the consequences of Wittgenstein's thought applied to the history of his own writings.

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The Attendant *Artworld* — A Contemporary Western Perspective for the *Reading* of Chinese Traditional Arts

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Abstract

In response to the contemporary arts that appeared in the 20th century, Arthur Danto proposed a new strategy: identify and explain an artwork by a certain *artworld* instead of more traditional definitions of art. Danto's article, "Shapes of Artistic Pasts, East and West", attempts to uncover the philosophical and historical models of Chinese scholar-paintings by using the example of *Wan Shang-Lin*. Through an analytical study of Danto, this paper finds that Chinese traditional art history is also a product of the inheritance of a distinct Chinese *artworld* attendant in the paintings and rich in historical and theoretical atmosphere centered around the painters' aesthetic personalities and lives.

To seek to answer questions of art definition raised by contemporary art, Arthur Coleman Danto (1924-2013), an outstanding American art critic and philosopher, put forward a distinctly new theory of art that is founded in analytic philosophy. Danto coined the term "*artworld*" in the essay "The Artworld", which was published in the *Journal of Philosophy* in 1964. In the term *artworld*, Danto transferred the focus of art criticism away from "What is art?" towards "Why is art?" Compared with terms that developed from the classic art studies and that focus on the artwork itself, *artworld* brings out an opportunity to interpret Chinese ancient art closer to its true nature and within its own cultural context.

1. *Artworld* in the "Lung-men Monk"

Visual imitation as the basic principle of the western classic arts was challenged when Marcel Duchamp submitted his most influential artwork, "Fountain", to the Society of Independent Artists exhibition in 1917 under the pseudonym *R. Mutt*. Especially after the 1960s, ready-mades, such as Andy Warhol's "Brillo boxes" (1964), made art challenging to define with a sufficiently open scope. However, with the establishment of *artworld*, a new direction of art theory could be applied to contemporary art, different from the classic system that was developed from Socrates and Plato's view of art as a mirror (the "IT": Imitation Theory). In the case of ready-mades, "to see something as art requires something the eye cannot decry, an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld" (Danto 1964, 580). In other words, art is not art without the identification from a certain *artworld* of theory and history, since "What in the end makes the difference between a Brillo box and a work of art consisting of a Brillo Box is a certain theory of art" (Danto 1964, 581).

Here we can find some similar cases in Chinese art history: When *Wang Xizhi* (about c.303-c.361) wrote short leisurely letters to his friends and relatives about healthiness, diet, weather, etc., he did not purposefully make art. So, how did *Wang Xizhi*'s brush handwriting became calligraphic art, while most of the other comparable writings disappeared in history as simply notes of daily life? There must be a certain historical *artworld* to distinguish calligraphy from common writing. However, formal principles must be applied to the writing itself as they are still needed for quick judgments at first glance.

To better understand the ancient Chinese arts, Danto inadvertently reinvented the Chinese historical *artworld to*

some extent. In 1992, Danto published his collected papers *Beyond the Brillo Box: The Visual Arts in Post-Historical Perspective*, within which the article "Shapes of Artistic Pasts, East and West" compared the different art histories of East and West. Written in 1989, the article was inspired by the Chinese painting, "Lung-men monk", exhibited at the Metropolitan Museum in New York. Painted by *Wan Shang-Lin* (1739-1813), it displays significant influence from *Ni Tsan* (1301-1374). Though he did not purposely rebuild a Chinese *artworld*, as an art philosopher from the west, Danto's comparative research approach to *Wan*'s work offered a reference point to help understand how Chinese ancient art is appreciated from a western perspective. Thus, a Chinese *artworld* could be unearthed.

2. Art History in the Chinese *Artworld*: Inheritance by Imitating

Wan's painting is a typical example of scholar-paintings with a large-scale inscription; an oddity from a western perspective. These inscriptions were mostly written by the artists themselves and less often by friends and different owners along the course of the painting's history. However, the combination of traditional painting and inscription in the scholar-paintings conserved information from the past and brought a certain historical *artworld* to the present to be appreciated.

What the essential historical information is we can extract from *Wan*'s inscription of "Lung-men monk"? *Wan* writes: "I have seen two paintings of Lung-men monk by *Ni Kao-shi* (*Ni Tsan*). […] Both have some brushwork of excellent quality […]. So, from memory, I have done this copy. If it has some similarities, it is as *Tso-Chan* (*Su Tung-p'o*) says, 'similarity in surface only'. I feel embarrassed (for the quality of my work)." (Danto 1992, 116)

In the inscription, *Wan* expressed his esteem for two earlier artists in humbling himself as if he was a pupil. One is *Su Shi* (*Su Tung-p'o* 1037-1101) who wrote a poem for a painting created by an official. From this poem, Chinese scholar-artists were widely influenced by the sentence: "If you evaluate paintings by the criteria of similarity, you can find them from the neighborhood children" (Su 1982, 1525). Another artist respected by *Wan* is *Ni Tsan* who innovated the scholar-paintings style; in particular ink-wash landscape paintings with an emphasis on "expression of the indwelling leisureliness" (Ni 1778, 17).

From *Wan*'s inscription, we can sketch out a very important historical thread of deliberate imitation of the powerful model and theory from *Su Shi* and *Ni Tsan*. For the imitation of the original artwork, Chinese criteria differed from those of the West.

Wan's painting was preserved, not, I think, in the way we preserve copies of Poussin made by Degas, i.e., because Degas himself achieved an independent stature, and anything from his hand has meaning and certainly value in even the crassest sense of that term. I suspect, by contrast, that *Wan*'s painting would have what value it has even if he did little else beyond imitations of *Ni Tsan*, who himself did imitations of earlier artists. (Danto 1992, 117)

In western art history, students learned from previous masters by way of imitation. In Chinese art history, artists wanted to spiritually become the masters by imitating their works. By purposefully maintaining a certain sequence of imitation, their artwork can be further imitated by future artists.

Danto also takes the example of Michael Baxandall: "Try to imagine how Cezanne would look to us if Cubism had never been invented" (Danto 1992, 118). Similarly, we can also imagine if there was not the mainstream of scholar-paintings in Chinese traditional art history, how would we look upon *Su Shi* and *Ni Tsan*? As with the meaning of Cezanne to Cubism, the tradition of the West's art history is founded on creation, even creation in the technique of "IT." The difference in Chinese art history is that though there must be something new continually put into every practice of imitation of the predecessor, the imitation purposely means to repeat and reinforce the precursor.

Through endless imitation, Chinese artists created a historical sequence and a collection comparable, in terms of endless worship, to the God of the Christian Bible, or as

Danto mentioned: "To say simply that one was 'influenced by *Ni Tsan*' thus would be like reading, in a life of Saint Paul, that he was 'influenced by Jesus Christ" (Danto 1992, 120). As a result, the practice of imitating predecessors in art history has an intentional directionality to a better future in the West, and a better past in the East. The utopia of the art, in the West and in the East, exists on these two polar ends of history.

3. About the Theory of Chinese *Artworld*: Imitate What?

Consider, what is the highlight of utopia in Chinese art? And how is it expressed in imitation of previous generations by future generations? What do the scholar-artists want to learn and show from their predecessors?

Aesthetic emptiness is a widely accepted concept in the appreciation of Chinese traditional paintings. Just as Danto pointed out: "The paintings of *Ni Tsan*, however, are marked by their abstract openness, their 'boundless feeling'. The empty paper becomes a kind of empty, dreamful space from which the possibility of horizons has been subtracted" (Danto 1992, 118). We do not know in what ways or to what extent *Wan*'s "Lung-men Monk" is visually similar to *Ni Tsan*'s original work, according to *Wan*'s memory, but the "emptiness" is there, composed of the monk, trees, rocks and the water, which are the typical items in *Ni Tsan*'s paintings. When considering *Wan Shang-Lin's* imitation painting, it is not important, if *Ni Tsan*'s original painting was attendant or not, or even if the image was or was not visually similar to the original one.

Danto recognized that the emptiness does not mean ignorance within the lines and brushstrokes. *Wan*'s inscription exposed the importance of the brushwork. In fact, such "emptiness" can only be achieved with free brushstrokes. Just like *Ni Tsan* wrote: "When every boulder or rock shows free and untrammelled ink strokes, then the painting will have a scholar's air. If it is too laborious, the painting will resemble the work of a draftsman." (Danto 1992, 119)

So, neither the visual similarity that *Su Shi* laughed at, nor the draftsman's air that *Ni Tsan* looked down upon made the "*avisual*"[1] (*Chou* 2015) emptiness so different from the western *artworld*. It is a kind of "scholar's air", in other words, a kind of aesthetic personality trait of the scholar. Only if the scholar's personality can be recognized in the emptiness and recalls resonance from the imitator's own structure, imitation in free brushstrokes is possible. Danto has discovered this secret and he writes: "The imitation cannot be outward indiscernibility: rather, the work must flow forth from the same internal resources, and painting in the style of *Ni Tsan* in consequence becomes a form of spiritual exercise" (Danto 1992, 119).

Danto noticed that *Ni Tsan* was a noble recluse: "a man for whom vulgarity was the evil to avoid" (Danto 1992, 120). He retained a spiritual realm in his paintings for the artists imitating his paintings to experience. Such a kind of spiritual exercise, on the one hand, can help the imitators come closer to their model by building up their own personalities; on the other hand, "the same internal resource" of the imitator is something of popular spiritual value to the scholars' class that can be vaunted. From this perspective, we can understand the "embarrassment" *Wan Shang-Lin* expressed in the inscription with such remarkable scale.

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1 "Avisual" was created and frequently used in *Chou*'s book. Something *avisual* is neither visual nor anti-visual.

Even more, we can understand another famous master *Xu Wei*（1521-1593）of whom *Zhen Banqiao*（1693-1765）and *Qi Baishi* (1864-1957) displayed the same aspiration: if only to be a dog in *Xu Wei's* house. The former expressed it in a signet (*Yuan* 1790, 6:30) and the latter wrote it in a poem (*Wang* 1996, 10:61).

This admiration from the imitator is already beyond reasonable understanding in the western tradition. It is not just artistic imitation and inheritance. It is akin to humble homage.

4. The Inheritance of the Attendant Chinese *Artworld*

Danto contributed to a Chinese *artworld* as belonging to the past from a western perspective: The history of imitation and the aesthetic emptiness of the scholar-paintings combined as a reasonable background offers us a theory and history-laden atmosphere to appreciate the Chinese traditional paintings, more precisely, the scholar-paintings.

Moreover, there are still many more elements of Chinese *artworld* which need to be detailed and expounded, such as the differences and interplay between "write" and "draw", the relationship between the "scholar's air" and technique, the using of signets, the history and the record of history and so on. These, together with the deeper study of brushwork, can recall a Chinese *artworld* as a kind of life atmosphere around the artists' aesthetic personalities, which is leading us close to the classical ages.

Over a long historical period in China, people, especially the scholars' class, took their social roles seriously and morally with respect to Confucian responsibility. Under such outside pressure, they found an indwelling world where they could rest. Taoist thought offered them a possibility to maintain the natural integrity internally. The motivation of keeping a balance between the outside societal pressures, the inner nature, and the corresponding behaviors that precipitated in the different personalities were both hidden and expressed in all kinds of arts in the psyche of illustration. Because of the overwhelming Confucian influence, educated citizens preferred to be scholars and officials to extend their personal ethical virtues to the social structure. From a traditional viewpoint, artists would be ashamed to be famous because of their art, but they would be proud, if their art was famous and appreciated by the on-coming generations because of their personal spiritual virtues. So-called *scholar-artists* did not really mean they preferred to be artists rather than scholars. Their artwork, with the typical abstract schema, the emptiness, the calligraphy and the signets and so on, carried elite information as much as possible to the present. This attendant *artworld* makes it possible for us to trace back to the spiritual and aesthetic life that they intended to bring to us, even if the artworks are shown in modern museums now.

What a Chinese *artworld* is composed of is not only the knowledge of art theory and history, but also different aesthetic personalities based on a certain spiritual vitality that links the predecessors, imitators, and the subjects of the arts. A Chinese *artworld* is more abstract especially in the case of calligraphy. Only when the artist matches his vitality to the vitality of the subject, or imitates the vitality of his model, and expresses it by the vital brushwork in a leisurely situation, can the natural integrity be recalled. And it is believed that the natural integrity is there, as something like a paradise that we lost when civilization began.

In Danto's *artworld* theory a certain *artworld* serves as some authority to identify art. However, in contrast, we can understand, in the Chinese case, that the inheritance of arts by imitation through history is a kind of inheritance of its *artworld*, *avisual* but ever attendant.

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Can Philosophy of Language Be a Kind of Philosophy of Science?

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Abstract

In this paper I present a recent research - FoP experiment - performed by a group of neuroscientists and researchers in robotics and I try to raise conceptual questions about the conceptual scheme used by them. The aim is to drive the attention to the possibility of an enlightening philosophical activity that interacts with science - considering uses of words - and clarifies conceptual relations. This proposal has its base on the philosophical method emerged from Wittgenstein's texts, on Peter Hacker's view on the philosophical method as conceptual analysis, and conceptual analysis of the sciences, and also on my own interpretation that highlights the evaluation of the role of our expressions in their context of use.

Introduction

In my recent work, I suggested that the Wittgensteinian method of conceptual analysis, as it is considered by Peter Hacker, can be seen as a conceptual evaluation. I highlighted that one of the most important techniques of analysis is asking for the role that a given word or expression plays in a given context (the notion of evaluation is directly related to the notion of role). My approach of the analysis also emphasizes the need of attention on the connexions of the web of words of a given context, once the role of a word or expression can only be identified in a context.

In a nutshell, according to Hacker, philosophy doesn't look for new information, it helps one to organize ideas and information and also to investigate the use of central concepts. Philosophy, therefore, is a perennial activity that approaches conceptual points, as opposed to factual ones: "The point is not a factual one. It is not a matter of fact that only human beings and what behaves like human beings can be said to be the subject of […] psychological predicates." (Hacker et al. 2007, 20)

I agree with Hacker on this, but I defend that stating that it makes no sense to assign psychological attributes to the brain cannot be a regulation of the use of language to impose what can be said. Stating the lack of sense, in this case, can only help to guide thinking and scientific research in order to indicate that there is confusion in understanding. As we see in Wittgenstein: "We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order for a particular purpose, one out of many possible orders, not *the* order. " (Wittgenstein, 2009, §132).

In my view, the analysis is a type of evaluation that must take place in contexts of use. Therefore, what I propose now is to put the evaluative method of analysis into practice focusing on the question of what's the role of a word or expression in the scope taken by the neuroscientists that performed the FoP research, described below. In this paper, I present a first approach to their experiment and my aim is to raise the questions that can drive us to a better understanding of the role of the concepts involved in the research. Therefore, further investigation should be directed to the main concepts involved in the neuroscientific research, namely, perception, sensation, illusion, feeling of presence, and closely related ones, and, comparatively, to their different uses in different contexts.

The experiment

The recent study performed by a acknowledged group of cognitive neuroscientist researchers, neurologists and researchers in robotic systems, mechatronics and precision engineering, aims to show that the *feeling of presence* (FoP), reported by psychiatric patients, is caused by the mistaken perception of source and identity of sensorimotor (tactile, proprioceptive, and motor) signals of one's own body.

> The strange sensation that somebody is nearby when no one is actually present and cannot be seen (feeling of a presence, FoP) is a fascinating feat of the human mind [**…**]. Although it is described by neurological and psychiatric patients [1, 2][1] and healthy individuals in different situations [1, 3, 4], it is not yet understood how the phenomenon is triggered by the brain. (Blanke et al. 2014, 1)

According to the paper, the initial goal of the researchers is to understand how the FoP phenomenon is triggered by the brain. For this, they associate neural mechanisms with FoP and point to the subtle balance of brain mechanisms that generate the experiences of 'self' and 'other' advancing on the understanding of the brain mechanisms responsible for hallucinations and schizophrenia.

Although mainly reported by psychiatric patients, FoP can also occur in healthy individuals. The scientists mention the case of a couple of climbers. One of them relates having felt the presence of a third climber keeping a regular distance from them, on his right side, immediately outside of his field of vision, but, in fact, there was no one. Scientists identify this sensation, reported by climbers, also like *feeling of presence* (FoP) and claim that it is reported in cases of physical exhaustion. They also indicate that although studied by psychiatry, the neural origin is unknown, but there was a case in which an electric stimulus in the temporoparietal cerebral cortex induced FoP, suggesting the importance of sensory-motor disorders in evaluating cases FoP.

Based on that, the researchers performed their experiment as follows: first, they made an analysis of brain lesions in patients who reported FoP based on a neurological deficit analysis associated with the FoP. The results of this analysis show a clear association between brain damage and FoP. They claim that their data show that FoP is an illusory own body perception associated with sensorimotor loss and it is caused by lesions in three regions of

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1 Figures of the experiment. Available on the appendix of the paper: Blanke et al. 2014.

the brain: temporoparietal, insular and frontoparietal cortex. Further analysis, however, comparing different damaged regions show, also according to the scientists, that FoP is specifically associated with the frontoparietal region.

The researchers then developed an experiment in a control group - who do not report FoP - for inducing FoP. The method of inducing *Feeling of Presence* involves generating sensorimotor conflicts. For this experiment, it was developed a robotic system, called master-slave, by means of which, according to scientists, it would be possible to investigate sensorimotor signals and their roles in the induction of FoP. For this "We investigated whether the FoP is associated with illusory touch sensations [...] and mislocalization of the body" (Blanke et al. 2014, 2), they say. This procedure made it possible to create a robotically induced FoP once it produces conflicting sensorimotor signals, according to the researchers.

This part of the experiment can be described as follows: The participant of the experiment, standing, moves his arms holding a primary mobile device in front of him. The robot designed for the experiment is able to reproduce the movements of the main device in the auxiliary device, which is built into the wall behind the participant. What happens is that the auxiliary device plays exactly the movements of the participant's arm touching the participant's back synchronously. Then the participant feels like he is touching himself. That is, according to the researchers "sensorimotor signals from the fingertip (forward-extended arm) while a tactile cue is applied to the subject's back induce the illusory feeling of touching one's own back with one's own finger (self-touch) and bias self-location toward the fingertip." (Blanke et al. 2014, 2)

Similarly, a second time, the auxiliary device reproduces the movements asynchronously, so that the patient feels the touch, but not at the same time that he is moving his arms. In this case, there were reports of location deviations of one's own body that would be touching itself, reports of feeling to be touched by other and FoP reports, the researchers say.

More interesting effects were observed during stronger sensorimotor conflicts; during asynchronous stimulation, participants showed a drift in self-location in the opposite, backward direction (p < 0.01) and reported higher other touch than self-touch. Moreover, during postcondition debriefing, five subjects reported to have experienced a FoP (Supplemental Experimental Procedures). In study 3 (Supplemental Experimental Procedures), we investigated whether we could induce the FoP experimentally, predicting that under asynchronous stimulation without somatosensory force feedback (fingertip), subjects would feel the presence of a person that is touching them, associated with a backward drift in self-location (toward the presence). (Blanke et al. 2014, 2)

The image below is presented on the paper to illustrate the experiment. (Blanke et al. 2014, 4)

How can philosophy of language interact with the scientific research? Conceptual questions on the FoP experiment

After a first reading of the FoP paper, it seems that the conceptual problems of this research are an easy catch. It's easy to identify the main ones, but dissolving them is a very challenging task that, I believe, requires an approach similar to the one developed by Peter Hacker in one of his recent works: *The Intellectual Powers*.

On the one hand, the neuroscientists are considering the neural conditions (which are not taken as brain lesion) as an intermediate between the actual perception of something and the illusion – not only as a (physical) condition – so, having an illusion, in this case (robot induced FoP), is having a mistaken perception of something that is actually perceived. My question in this case is: Wouldn't it be close to a judgment? On the other hand, (regarding hallucinations) they are considering that the neural conditions (in this case, brain lesion) are the cause for perceiving something that is not actually perceived.

It is important to point out the difference between the situation A, where we can point at an object (the robot) that 'incites' the perception, and the situation B, where we can't point at an object that 'incites' the perception (the hallucinations). Therefore, the easy to catch problem is that they are neglecting an important distinction between illusion and hallucination. But, can they do that based on their view that the neural conditions are the very center of the issue? Would it be the case that, although they can consider the neural conditions as a physical condition (and perhaps the same) for perception, misperception, illusion and hallucination, the experiment doesn't show what they think it shows, namely, that FoP is an own body perception? May they have induced sensorimotor conflicts, but not induced neither illusions nor hallucinations in the control group? Would this imply that they can't say that FoP is caused by misperceiving the source and identity of sensorimotor signals based on their experiment? Do they have to show that there is an inner source of sensorimotor signals in order to say that FoP is caused by misperceiving the source and identity of sensory motor signal? What is the role of the concept of perception? Is it used to refer to both: external stimulus and brain activity? Are both the same thing? Can this concept be used in both ways and make sense in both cases?

What they did in this experiment was to relate illusions (induced FoP) with areas of the brain. I believe that we could also say that hallucinations can be triggered by some kind of conflict in the brain, but can we understand the conflict in the brain as *misperceiving the source and identity of sensorimotor-signals* if we take 'misperceiving the source and identity of sensorimotor signals' as having the impression that one is being touched by a person when one is really being touched by a robot? Is it possible to understand that as a conflict in perceiving? Could the conflict of sensorimotor signals be the cause of FoP (induced) and also be a hallucinatory own body perception (hallucinatory FoP)? In the case of the induced FoP, could the conflict of sensorimotor signals be the cause of FoP and also be an illusory perception? Is this only a matter of definitions?

According to Hacker, there are several sources of confusion involved in the concept of perception and "The conceptual concern is the distinction between illusion, hallucination and dreaming, on the one hand, and sense-perception, on the other." (Hacker, 2014, 260)

Our main question is: how can a factual stimulus, capable of generating illusions, be compared to hallucinations that are not associated with any physical object?

Would the concept of *sensorimotor-signal in the brain* be sufficient to identify illusions and hallucinations in relation to the cerebral apparatus eliminating the need for the factual sources of perception? If so, can the neural condition for a feeling be considered a source of perception? To what extent? Is it possible that the role of 'source of perception' of the concept of sensory-motor signals can be maintained in the context in which we speak of an illusory FoP generated by a robot; if so, in what sense?

My interlocutor could say that the conflicts in the sensory-motor signals provoke both the illusion and hallucination, no matter the source of the conflict, if by a lesion or by an actual perception of factual objects. If we conceive the experiment under this view, most of the problems that my questions suggest would be dissolved, but if we consider the contrast between the role of the concept of *sensorimotor-signals in the brain* in the experiment hypothesis, when the sensorimotor conflict is caused by brain damage, not generated by external stimuli, and its conceptual role in the connection between external stimuli and FoP in the case of the control group when the sensorimotor signals would not be the cause of FoP, but only the intermediary between the external event and the FoP, we have a lot to deal with.

According to Hacker's perspective although brain injury may be responsible for hallucinations and illusions, to the extent that they are a neural condition for hallucinations or illusions, that doesn't mean that there is an internal perception in any of the cases, either illusions or hallucinations.

Considering that, I would say, on a first approach to the scientific research, that the FoP experiment, despite its undeniable contribution to the neuroscientific research indicating that FoP is associated with an abnormal integration of sensorimotor signals caused by focal injury in the frontoparietal cortex, does not show that FoP is an illusory perception of the body itself (internal). This assumption is based on the questions presented above, it is mainly focused on Hacker's critique of a causal relationship between brain activity and the private perceptual event (the feeling) and the very concept of perception considered by the research. I believe that a possible alternative that could avoid the problems in question would be conceiving brain activity as a neural condition associated to the FoP. But this is, for now, still speculation.

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Wittgenstein at Cultural Criticism: Clement Greenberg as Wittgensteinian Critic

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Abstract

In this talk we draw a comparison between some ideas of two superficially different thinkers who are nonetheless thinking about the state of things in the late 1930s. We use notions of "correctness" and "deterioration" from Wittgenstein's *Lectures on Aesthetics* to frame Clement Greenberg's discussion of "avant-garde" and "kitsch." We thus begin to suggest the potential for using Wittgenstein's thoughts about aesthetics to underwrite a kind of aesthetic, artistic, and cultural criticism.

One purpose of this paper is to draw a comparison between an aspect of Wittgenstein's thoughts about aesthetics in his *Lectures on Aesthetics* (1938),[1] and the approach that Clement Greenberg takes in his "Avant-garde and Kitsch" (1939). A second purpose of this paper then will be to begin to establish that Wittgenstein can be read as providing resources to underwrite a kind of aesthetic, artistic, or cultural criticism.

In what follows we first address relevant ideas from the LA, in particular what Wittgenstein says about "correctness" and "cultural deterioration." Second we will discuss how Greenberg characterizes "kitsch" and "avant-garde," and why it's plausible to fit these together conceptually with Wittgenstein's remarks. What is important is how they go about making the aesthetic judgments they do—what they appeal to and why. In the last part of our paper we will briefly examine a recent example of art criticism. The example, while contrasting with Greenberg, also can usefully be seen as underwritten by a Wittgensteinian approach to criticism. Thus there is a third purpose our paper will serve, namely, that of beginning to establish the practical usefulness of Wittgenstein's thoughts about aesthetics.

1.

In (LA I, 8), after having spent some time addressing the word 'beautiful', Wittgenstein observes that "in real life, when aesthetic judgments are made, aesthetic adjectives such as 'beautiful', 'fine', etc., play hardly any role at all. [...] The words you use are more akin to 'right' and 'correct' (as those words are used in ordinary speech) [...]." Wittgenstein begins by suggesting a focus (e.g., words, and 'beautiful' in particular) and then proceeds to refine that focus (e.g., from words to applications and concomitant actions). This process repeats, and the refinement is often spurred on by a sensitivity to the "real life" uses(s) of the words(s)/actions(s) under discussion. It is this way of talking about things that is important, along with the motivating and guiding sensitivity, rather than his particular "conclusions" about aesthetic matters.[2]

(LA I, 8) offers another tentative assertion. If we pay attention to the contexts in which we would think words like "beautiful" might arise (say, in criticism), one thing we see is that at least some of the time[3], we employ other kinds of words that are more like "correct." Words like this are not exclusively "aesthetic adjectives" in the sense of being seemingly directly about the form of the thing being considered, seemingly justified in virtue of its having an "aesthetic property." Whether Wittgenstein is right in making this claim about words used in making aesthetic judgments is of course up to us to assess. This requires our reflecting on our own linguistic experiences.

In (LA I, 12) Wittgenstein asks "How should poetry be read? What is the correct way of reading it?" Initially this might strike one as a strange question: how could there be right and wrong ways of reading? What could it mean to read a poem incorrectly, as long as one is reading the poem's actual words? Wittgenstein answers by suggesting an experience that strikes us as relatively common. "A man says it ought to be read *this* way and reads it out to you. You say: 'Oh yes. Now it makes sense.'" The suggestion is thus that it is *understanding* that provides the standard for correctness. The way in which it's read to you leads you to understand something about the poem, and this understanding is something you might not get from a different form of reading.

If we relate these observations about "correct" back to (LA I, 8), we're led to a suggestion about aesthetic judgments. Aesthetic judgments reflect understanding, or lack thereof, of the thing being judged. One thing the judger (critic) is doing then is expressing her understanding (or lack thereof).

Wittgenstein suggests that we can call something "correct" in different ways. In (LA I, 15) he distinguishes two senses of "correct" (again, these should be generalizations based on our "real life" uses). And if there are different senses of correct, it is implicit from the preceding discussion that these would correspond to different ways in which we might come to understand an aesthetic object (or, and this is not necessarily the same thing, to different understandings of an aesthetic object).

The first sense of "correct" is when something is produced in accord with the established rules for the practice of making that thing. So in music "one is drilled in harmony and counterpoint" and for tailoring one learns "how long a coat is to be, how wide the sleeve must be, etc." (LA I, 15) We might call this learning the technical details of the practice, as one does in an apprenticeship. The second sense of correct is when "I develop a feeling for the rules." (LA I, 15) One then actually makes "an aesthetic judgment about the thing which is according to the rules" in the first sense (LA I, 15). This must mean that one makes a judgment about the thing based on understanding the thing—one sees why the rules are as they are, and this supplies a dif-

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ferent standard for judging something to be "correct." In particular, something could be "correct" even if it doesn't meet the normal "technical" expectations of the practice. The thing could look different, be made differently, etc.

In (LA I, 22-3) Wittgenstein is at least expressing a kind of cultural pessimism. In these sections he is talking about judgments made from the perspective of the spectator. He begins by making a distinction between the person who knows nothing about suits and one who knows a lot—notice the kind of example he uses here—and proceeds to make glib dismissive remarks about "arts and crafts" and portraiture in photography.

And then he generalizes: "You can get a picture of what you may call a very high culture […] and what happens when this deteriorates." (LA I, 22) He elaborates somewhat by saying that deterioration involves "imitations," "interest in the minutest details," and not knowing "where [things] come from." (LA I, 22) The implication here is that we are, to some degree (in the late 1930s) in a state of deterioration. Notice that the characterization of deterioration he gives might apply equally to the would-be appreciator, or to the artist/craftsman producing the things to be appreciated. Having a certain kind of knowledge—or lacking it—is what is important, and this is seen in "what he says, how he acts, etc." (where "he" is, again, potentially the artist or the spectator).

A footnote to (LA I, 23) gives one of the students' different versions of this part of the first lecture: "A period in which everything is fixed and extraordinary care is lavished on certain details; and a period in which everything is copied and nothing is thought about." If we apply the discussion of "correctness" to these comments about deterioration, we might characterize the deteriorating culture as one focusing on the less thoughtful first sense of "correct" (again, from either the production or the appreciation side).

2.

As a critic writing at the same time that Wittgenstein is lecturing on aesthetics, Greenberg seeks to explain the contemporary coexistence of two different kinds of cultural expression, which he identifies as "kitsch" and "avant-garde." It's significant that Wittgenstein and Greenberg are working in the late 1930s; the Anschluss occurred in Austria in March 1938 and the Nazis publicly condemned Modern Art and embraced an academic figurative style in their infamous exhibitions of 1937.[4] As a Marxist, Greenberg additionally understood his social-historical moment as being in the final phase of capitalism and thus in crisis. In (Greenberg 1939), Greenberg describes the last phase of "our own culture" (Greenberg 1939, 35) as characterized by decay, which resonates with Wittgenstein's consideration of deterioration in LA.

Again, Greenberg identifies the two kinds of cultural expression in this historic moment as "avant-garde" and "kitsch." For Greenberg, kitsch is a manifestation of a culture in decay. It is characterized "by an academicism in which the really important issues are left untouched because they involve controversy, and in which creative activity dwindles to virtuosity in the small details of form, all larger questions being decided by the precedent of the old masters"(Greenberg 1939, 35). Greenberg, like Wittgenstein, sees an increasing focus on the minutest details to be characteristic of a period of deterioration.

Not only does Greenberg's kitsch emerge out of the condition of decay, but it also resonates with Wittgenstein's characterization of the first kind of correctness, which depends on learning and following the rules. Greenberg states that "Kitsch is mechanical and operates by formulas" (Greenberg 1939, 40). The rules to which kitsch adheres are those of genuine culture and in so doing Greenberg argues that kitsch deceives those who do not have a sensitivity to the values of genuine culture. Wittgenstein's second sense of correctness requires such a sensitivity. Greenberg states that "ersatz culture, kitsch, destined for those who, insensible to the values of genuine culture, are hungry nevertheless for the diversion that only culture of some sort can provide" (Greenberg 1939, 39). Kitsch thus requires the rules and constraints developed by or derived from genuine culture, but ignores "the rest", which is arguably that which Wittgenstein would find important according to his second kind of correctness. Thus kitsch differs fundamentally from genuine culture, to which the avant-garde belongs.

For Greenberg, the industrial revolution has lead to this particular social-historical condition in which both kitsch and avant-garde culture are a part. Kitsch is a new commodity that not only emerges for those who are "insensitive" to the values of genuine culture, but it also works to instill a continued insensitivity in those who consume it. Kitsch depends upon this genuine culture with its pre-existing set of rules. Greenberg sees kitsch as a product of industrial society and the development of a literate proletariat who are incapable due to lack of time and education of developing such a sensitivity to, and understanding of, genuine culture.

Greenberg provides *The New Yorker* as an example of kitsch that masquerades as high culture calling it "high class kitsch" (AGK 41). In this way, kitsch can even dupe those who believe themselves to be consumers of high culture. If they lack a certain sensitivity, they will be unable to distinguish genuine high culture from kitsch. Greenberg attributes kitsch's ability to extend its reach even into the realm of high culture to the fact that it is mechanically reproduced. In this regard, one might argue that it is necessary to have a sense of Wittgenstein's second sense of correctness in order to make a proper judgment. It is not enough that the object simply follows the rules associated with objects of high culture; according to Greenberg, "It is not enough today, in a country like ours, to have an inclination towards [genuine culture]; one must have a true passion for it that will give him the power to resist the faked article [...]." (Greenberg 1939, 40)

Alternatively, the avant-garde on which kitsch relies is about "the expression of an absolute" (Greenberg 1939, 36) and is "valid solely on its own terms" (Greenberg 1939, 36). In discussing the appreciation of modern artist Pablo Picasso, Greenberg points out how it requires time and energy to "train" and for "conditioning" (Greenberg 1939, 46). For Greenberg, the correct reading of Picasso requires someone (a critic?) to train and condition the individual to enjoy Picasso in what Wittgenstein might call a correct way in his second sense. And, in particular, one would need to develop a sensitivity. In this way, Wittgenstein's second sense of correct corresponds with Greenberg's notion of the avant-garde.

3.

In a recent *New York Times* article on the Belgian design firm Studio Job, "kitsch" figures prominently as a term of criticism. The article's author, Blake Gopnik, quotes the

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4 Ausstellung „Entartete Kunst" and the „Große Deutsche Kunstausstellung".

head of the firm as saying, "We all live surrounded by kitsch […] and with things that we assume are good taste but are bad taste—and the other way around. The world we are living in is absolutely not clear" (Gopnik, 2016). Gopnik explains that the firm's work is fighting back against "elegant modernism," which is "the worst kitsch you can get." So they do not avoid "bad taste and excess" with their work. They are of the view that "it's better to make really nice, cool, unique pieces, and really do what we want, instead of being a slave to the machinery of some Italian producer." A motivating principle behind their designs is that "almost every object they make fits some 'normal' design category," but with a work they are "trying to get to the root of archetypes." So Gopnik says, "Don't expect to sit in a Job chair with any easel think of it as a seat-shaped sculpture that sparks thoughts about what a chair means, and about all the chairs that have come before it."

We'd like to observe a few points about this discussion. Studio Job preferences exactly the kind of work that Greenberg is opposed to, and dismisses exactly the kind of work Greenberg is known for championing. However, the reasoning behind these aesthetic evaluations is the same: pervasiveness, mass production, formulas. Studio Job can be characterized as operating from a position of understanding or sensitivity to things being made today. Their work can be seen as a reminder not to be "taken in" by the mere appearance of a design, but rather to reflect on the point of that appearance. And so they have the kind of sensitivity that Wittgenstein discusses. What's interesting is that this can lead in two, almost opposite, directions when it comes to making actual aesthetic evaluations. Surely this reflects something valuable about what Wittgenstein has to say.

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Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard on Ethics, Religious Justification and Meaning

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Abstract

In a 1942 conversation with Rhees, Wittgenstein allegedly dismissed as nonsensical Kierkegaard's question, "Does a Human Being have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the Truth?" This paper will examine in detail Kierkegaard's essay, and will argue that Wittgenstein failed to see the importance of Kierkegaard's fundamental insights on moral language and religious justification. Rather than a mere meaningless question, Kierkegaard's aesthetic examination of this particular moral problem offers a means of getting past the relativism of different world-views, and establishing universal moral norms independent of systems of belief.

In "Some Developments in Wittgenstein's View of Ethics," Rush Rhees notes that in a 1942 conversation with Ludwig Wittgenstein, the latter remarked that it was "strange that you could find books on ethics in which there was no mention of a genuine ethical or moral problem" (1965, 21). To illustrate this, Wittgenstein then allegedly made reference to Søren Kierkegaard's 1847 ethico-religious essay: "Does a Human Being have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the Truth?" Rhees reports that Wittgenstein's reaction was the following: "For me this is not even a problem. I don't know [w]hat it would be *like* to let oneself be put to death for the truth. I don't know how such a man would have to feel, what state of mind he would be in, and so forth" (Rhees 1965, 22). Wittgenstein's critique of Kierkegaard's essay attests to the view that ethics, and more generally aesthetics and religion, lie beyond the limits of language, and that questions such as that asked by Kierkegaard are in themselves meaningless, since language can only express *facts*, and no description of facts can ever imply an absolute moral judgement (Wittgenstein 2007, 143-55).

Wittgenstein's remarks here suggest that despite his admiration, Wittgenstein in many ways misinterpreted Kierkegaard's thought, which was much closer to his own than he seemed to have imagined. For Kierkegaard's ethico-religious essays lead to the conclusion that, as Wittgenstein himself suggests, these questions are themselves, if not meaningless, then at the very least non-problems. Moreover, Kierkegaard goes a step further than Wittgenstein in his analysis, and demonstrates that this can be seen through a logical examination of the questions themselves. Through a careful grammatical analysis of what may be seen, in Wittgensteinian terms, as a "meaningless" question, Kierkegaard shows that one can derive meaningful, universally binding normative principles. In what follows, we will analyse Kierkegaard's arguments and then demonstrate that they are compatible with Wittgenstein's views on ethics and religious belief, while offering perhaps more solid grounding for our contemporary understanding of the question.

"Does a Human Being have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the Truth?" asks Kierkegaard. In other words, can an individual ever determine that he legitimately possesses a "truth" which, unbeknownst to the majority, is of such great importance that he can be considered justified in sacrificing his own life for it, despite the fact that he has no objective grounding upon which to found this decision? Can an individual legitimately become a martyr for a cause which others do not see as valid?

Kierkegaard's moral enquiry on the legitimacy and meaningfulness of martyrdom is all the more pertinent to our modern age, faced with the development of jihadism: is it possible to understand violence (against oneself, and against others) as "religiously justified"? Are there any strong arguments that we can give which can demonstrate that, whatever the context, whatever the motivations, such justification is *never* possible?

For Wittgenstein, the response to this question was decidedly: *no.* All moral judgements are value judgements, and nothing about our world or our language enables us to arrive at *absolute* value judgements (Wittgenstein 2007, 143-45). All ethical and religious language relies on some form of allegorical expression which is a "misuse of language" (Wittgenstein 2007, 159), insofar as the use of expression such as "correct" or "right" cannot correspond to any facts about the world. And while we have the intuition that some absolute value must exist, Wittgenstein notes that we can give no real justification for this.

In many respects, Kierkegaard's view of ethics is similar to Wittgenstein's own. Like Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard insists on the fact that ethical questions are questions about which we must keep silent, since "silence is the measure of the capacity to act", as opposed to the chatter of uncertainty (1997, 56). Like Wittgenstein as well, Kierkegaard insists on the absolute value of ethics, which cannot be reduced down to relative value judgments. However, despite this apparent parallel, Kierkegaard assumes that some absolute, normative judgments *can* be articulated, and thus that there are normative principles which can serve to guide our actions, independent of our particular life-views.

In his essay, Kierkegaard chooses to explore the question of religious justification through a thought-experiment presented as a "fiction" or a "poetical venture" (1997, 88). Through this fiction, Kierkegaard invites us to examine a very extreme case of what might be considered to be moral solitude, and to question whether this extreme case can lead to any absolute, definitive conclusions at all. The case is that of a man brought up with a particular image of Christ as "the Crucified One," which is "the one and only impression he had" (1997, 55). Living entirely within this particular world-view, the man becomes so obsessed with the image that it possesses his whole life, and he becomes thoroughly convinced that the highest goal to which a human being can aspire is to imitate Christ—*i.e.*: to sacrifice his life for the truth. His life question thus becomes: ought he do it? Does he have the right to become a "voluntary

collaborator in his death," and simultaneously make others guilty of committing a murder (1997, 71)?

Through a series of grammatical examinations, Kierkegaard tries to understand what the real meaning of letting oneself be put to death for the truth would be. The individual who aspires to imitate Christ and become a martyr supposes that by suffering death for the truth, he will help to awaken others to this truth. Yet this presupposition brings up two major problems: 1) how can one be sure that one is really in absolute possession of the truth, and 2) if by suffering death for the truth one makes others guilty of a crime of murder, has one not oneself committed a worse crime than had one left them in untruth?

For the purposes of the thought-experiment, we must assume that this particular individual is indeed in possession of some absolute truth, and that it is *for this reason* that he is to become a martyr, since if these two propositions are not true, then no religious justification is possible. Even accepting these two propositions as true, however, one must further consider that "those who put him to death get a murder on their consciences" (1997, 84). Kierkegaard asks whether it is justifiable to knowingly commit such an act which, from a moral perspective is certainly an "offense" and "a cruelty to the others" (1997, 72). Can a religious duty supersede a moral duty? Or, as Kierkegaard asks: "*Is my duty to the truth* of such a nature [that it is absolute], or *does not my duty to my fellow beings* rather bid me to yield a little? How far does my duty to the truth reach, and how far my duty toward others?" (1997, 68). Of course, the martyr, from a religious perspective, believes that he is acting in the interests of others. Yet Kierkegaard points out that in reflecting in this way, "[o]ne never comes to the real question" (1997, 67). How, indeed, can one assume that one is awakening others to the truth, when simultaneously making them guilty of murder? The religious thinker who claims that he is doing nothing other than imitating Christ's example misses the point, since he fails to see that Christ's self-sacrifice brought redemption, and thus erased the guilt by the same act, whereas the death of a "truth-witness" does not have that power, since the truth-witness is and remains, despite his faith, a *human being* (1997, 73).

But precisely as a human being, how can one know that one is in absolute possession of the truth? To believe that one is in possession of a truth that others do not recognise, requires that one consider oneself to be *essentially* different from other human beings. But, Kierkegaard asks: "do I have the right to assume […] that with regard to the truth I stand so far removed from other people, so high above them, so far ahead of them, that there is almost no kinship between us?" (1997, 77). In order for an individual to be justified in believing that he is in possession of a truth which others ignore or refuse to accept, he would have to assume that there is so great a "heterogeneity" between himself and others that he might have access to a higher truth than they do (1997, 83). And as Kierkegaard remarks, every "human being, simply as a human being, [is] so relative in relation to other human beings" that he can in no way be justified in appealing to some higher truth, and has no grounds upon which to legitimate his claim to possessing an absolute truth (1997, 83).

Kierkegaard thus comes to the conclusion: "a *human being* does not have the right to let himself be put to death for the truth" (1997, 84). And what is particularly interesting about this conclusion is that Kierkegaard arrives at a *categorical universal norm* from the presentation of a *particular individual* dilemma. In presenting this extreme case, Kierkegaard presupposes a situation in which it is possible

for an individual to be in possession of a religious truth, that this really be a truth, and that the individual in question is entirely convinced that his highest duty is to act in virtue of this truth. Yet, as the demonstration shows, even from within this extreme and isolated position, rational argumentation can demonstrate to the individual that these convictions are misguided. The categorical conclusion that one is never justified in letting oneself be put to death for the truth is thus independent of any form of religious justification or psychological dispositions.

Wittgenstein's reaction to the essay was to dismiss the question itself, and in response to Rhee's suggestion that they discuss a more ordinary moral dilemma (a man's decision to sacrifice his research on cancer for his wife, or sacrifice his duties to his wife for the benefit of humanity), he remarks that the way in which the dilemma is to be answered depends on the particular ethical framework and form of life in which one finds himself (Rhees 1965, 23). In the end, there is just no way of saying that any particular ethics is superior to another; ethics "cannot be put into words" (TLP §6.421). Of course, Wittgenstein's general view is that ethics is the path through which the individual comes to lead a happy life; in this sense, there is no way of establishing normative rules which one *must* follow, or universal guidelines in the quest for meaningful existence.

However, Wittgenstein seems to have missed Kierkegaard's point entirely, and his remarks seem to indicate that he very probably never read this particular essay at all. Kierkegaard would certainly have agreed with Wittgenstein about the fact that with regard to common moral dilemmas, we are often in a position where the answers we offer depend on the social norms of the world we live in, our belief systems and particular motivations. However, this is precisely why Kierkegaard finds it necessary to write about *extreme, particular* cases, and not general everyday moral dilemmas. And it is through the analysis of these extreme cases, portrayed through literary representation and not abstractly written about in treaties on ethics, that we may derive universally binding moral principles. In his essay, Kierkegaard insists upon the fact that *whatever* a person's belief system or form of life, there are some *universal moral principles* which everyone, through reason and logic, must admit. Even in the most extreme cases where a religious belief system posits other values, and *even admitting that this belief system were true* (*i.e.*, corresponding to an actual fact about reality), this *does not* offer grounds for "suspending" the ethical. Kierkegaard comes to the same conclusion in other texts, notably the *Book on Adler* where he shows that no one can claim with authority that he has had a revelation of the truth, and *Fear and Trembling*, where he demonstrates that there is no "teleological suspension of the ethical" possible for contemporary human beings. Moreover, Kierkegaard's essay suggests that Wittgenstein is wrong in saying that ethics is that about which we must remain silent. For as long as an individual remains silent, he closes himself off in his own world-view, and considers himself fully justified in his beliefs. It is only through speech that he can come to question these beliefs, and only through language that he is able to recognise that his conviction was erroneous and to come to understand himself.

Rather than a meaningless question, Kierkegaard's literary/grammatical reflection on dying for the truth offers the grounds for establishing some important conclusions. Firstly, Kierkegaard suggests that martyrdom, and by extension the use of violence, can never be religiously justified. The argument presented here, which makes reference to the solitary individual, can moreover be extended to the solitary community: any community which cuts itself

off from dialogue with other forms of life might come to similar conclusions, but Kierkegaard suggests that this is never logically justifiable. Wittgenstein's remarks in *On Certainty* go in this direction; Wittgenstein notes that certainty is established by our "belonging to a community linked by science and education" (OC 298) and that our judgments have to be in accordance with those of humanity in general in order to be considered either correct or erroneous (OC 156). Second, Kierkegaard suggests that while our forms of life and even our selfhood may differ according to our religious or metaphysical beliefs, this is no grounds for assuming that there is an ethical difference between human beings. We have responsibilities toward others *because we are human beings* and our responsibilities extend to them *as human beings*: there is no teleological suspension of the ethical.

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Mental States and Attitudes

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Abstract

When philosophers talk about the psychology of human beings they usually refer to their mental states, e.g. to what they believe, desire, fear, hope, etc. In this paper I am interested in what it means that someone *believes* something. Human beings believe many things, and what they believe, i.e. their beliefs, develop in different ways. They acquire beliefs, they justify their beliefs, they change their beliefs, and sometimes they give up their beliefs. In considering the question of what it means for someone to have a belief, I take into account the development of someone's beliefs. I also use some of Wittgenstein's remarks from *On Certainty* that consider how and under which circumstances we use our language in order to express that someone believes something.

Human beings believe many things. They express what they believe, for example, by saying "I believe that today is Monday" or "I believe that someone knocked on the door". When a speaker expresses such beliefs, we can readily view her as in a certain mental state of possessing a belief. We seem to have a quite good idea of what a speaker believes in terms of the propositions that those beliefs express. For instance, we perfectly know what would make the speaker's belief that today is Monday to be *true*. That is, we understand what that proposition means in terms of its truth conditions. Thus, the propositional content of beliefs may explain how beliefs can be systematically organized. This picture is therefore quite attractive.

In this paper, however, I take a step back from it and simply consider beliefs as something that we find ourselves in. I argue that viewing beliefs as mental states under certain truth conditions misses a crucial feature. In particular, this view misses the fact that someone who believes something has a *certain attitude* towards what he or she believes. This becomes clear when we consider how we use language in order to express our beliefs. Some of our attitudes are determined by the *logical status* of those sentences by which they are expressed. If this is correct, the psychology of our beliefs might be improved by focusing on attitudes rather than on the propositional content of mental states.

1

Jenny believes that today is Monday. Accordingly, she finds herself in a mental state. So far though, we have not said anything about how she has come to possess this belief. Wittgenstein remarks in this context that "the assumption […] forms the basis of action, and therefore, naturally, of thought" (cf. Wittgenstein 1969 [hereafter: OC], 411). It seems that Jenny's assumption that today is Monday leads her to find herself in a particular mental state. What might be the reason for Jenny to express what she believes to be true? One common purpose might be that she wants herself to make sure that something is the case. For example, she wants to make sure that today is Monday because she has an important meeting that she cannot miss.

The first step in order for her to make sure is to utter - one might say *hypothetically* - her belief. She expresses with her utterance that she intends to sustain her mental state and that she does not intend to change it. Otherwise she might rather express that she is quite undecided or even indifferent towards what she believes. Yet in those cases we would not say that the speaker *believes* something whatsoever. The second step is to make sure that she can keep on possessing her belief, i.e. that she can sustain her mental state. One condition for taking this step seems that Jenny must have admitted herself the possibility to make sure what she believes by means of evidence (cf. OC 23). This condition is usually called *fallibility*. Fallibility implies that, although Jenny has the belief, she takes into account the possibility that she might give up the belief and that she eventually has to change her mental state. To face the possibility that today might be Tuesday instead of Monday is an example of what Wittgenstein calls a "practical doubt" (cf. OC 19). Notice that being in practical doubt does not mean that the speaker is undecided or indifferent regarding what she believes.

2

Jenny can rule out practical doubt, for example by taking a look at the newspapers. Good evidence seems to decide if she has to give up her current belief and if she has to change her mental state. After she had a look at the newspapers, her belief might be seen as justified. Furthermore, the possibility for Jenny to make sure what she believes allows her to change what she believes into something that she knows. Instead of uttering what she believes, she might therefore claim that she *knows* that today is Monday.

One might wonder how this change can be explained if we view beliefs as mental states. Before Jenny had any empirical evidence for her belief, it was unclear if she could reasonably persist in having that belief. With this evidence at hand though, she can refer to it as justifying her belief that, for instance, today is Monday and not Tuesday. In that case, she may express the fact that she can sustain her belief by uttering that she knows what she has believed so far. One condition for the possibility of denying the change of her belief, as we said earlier, is that the speaker takes into account the possibility that she might change her mental state. One might be reminded on the importance of this condition by the expression "I thought I knew" (cf. OC 12). Knowledge or, as Wittgenstein puts it, "subjective certainty" (cf. OC 194) requires the absence of practical doubt. Only if there is no practical doubt the person sustains her mental state and may claim that she knows something.

3

In addition to beliefs that imply fallibility, we usually have also beliefs that seem infallible or certain. For example, I believe that I am a human being, and I also believe that I have two hands. In the case of these beliefs, it seems that there can be no practical doubt, nor can these beliefs be known. If I express the belief "I know that I am a human being", it is unclear how I could reasonably doubt this belief. It is also unclear how I could have ruled out the practical doubt, respectively. Nevertheless, philosophers have argued that those claims express knowledge, and that knowledge can rule out *philosophical doubt[1]*.

I shall emphasize here again that one condition for a speaker to say that she knows that she is a human being is that she takes into account the possibility that she might give up what she believes. In the case that someone believes that she is a human being it is, however, hardly conceivable how the speaker might be able to eventually give up her belief. One might thus argue that, in order to conclude that the speaker knows something, she does not even need to take the possibility in account that she eventually has to give up what she believes and change her mental state. The fact that she cannot even doubt what she believes seems to show already that she knows something.

Yet this conclusion is mistaken for the following two reasons. First, since we use the expression "I know" in circumstances in which a speaker can make sure what she believes, the expression is misused in cases where this possibility is excluded. Second, if the expression "I know" was used in cases in which the speaker does not need to make sure what she believes (because the possibility is excluded), it would seem that her belief was, as Wittgenstein puts it, "a queer and extremely important mental state" (cf. OC 6; see also OC 21, 367, 486 and PPF 19). In those cases one must assume that that she knows something is not a result of making sure what the speaker believes, but that she knows something seems already to be *implied* in what she believes, i.e. in her mental state.

4

The question of whether a speaker knows something or not cannot be answered only by reference to a particular mental state, i.e. only by reference to what someone believes. Rather, if a speaker knows something depends on the possibility to make sure what she believes and to sustain her mental state. Furthermore, not every belief implies the possibility that a speaker knows what she believes. Some beliefs cannot be expressed by saying that the speaker knows what she believes without misusing the expression "I know". Nevertheless we may also say in those cases that the speaker believes something and that she finds herself in a mental state. Thus, the view that beliefs can be described as mental states looks to be in tension[2]. On the one hand, a speaker who believes something can find herself in a mental state in which the possibility of practical doubt is required in order to know something. On the other hand, while the speaker believes something, she also can find herself in a mental state in which the possibility of practical doubt is excluded. Since in both cases the

belief is considered as mental state, one might wonder how this crucial difference can be captured if beliefs are viewed as mental states.

The answer to the preceding question leads back to how someone begins to believe something. As we have seen, in some cases we just assume what we intend to believe and seek to justify our belief with good evidence. In other cases, however, we possess our beliefs because we have learnt certain facts. As Wittgenstein points out, "[a]s children we learn facts [...] and we take them on trust" (cf. OC 159; see also OC 144, 160, 170f, 240, 286). Among other things, children learn that they are human beings and that they have two hands. Usually though, children do not take into account the possibility that they may have to give up what they learn, i.e. by abandoning or revising some beliefs they have adopted in their training. When a child learns to believe that this is a hand while someone is saying "*perhaps* this is a hand", the practical doubt that is expressed in that sentence does not have any consequences (cf. OC 450) because children lack the possibility to doubt what they learn to believe. For a start, they sustain the mental state in which, due to learning, they find themselves in.

5

Someone who believes something might deny changing her mental state. In his remarks Wittgenstein refers to a speaker who claims "with passion" that "[n]othing in the world will convince me of the opposite!" (cf. OC 376, 380) One might raise the question of how to make sense of this utterance. I would argue that the speaker is expressing her *attitude* towards what she believes. She is doing this by letting others know that she is not ready to let anything count as a disproof. Accordingly, she considers her mental state as an "irreversible belief" (cf. OC 245). Wittgenstein's interpretation of the utterance seems to confirm this view: "This "Nothing in the world" is obviously *an attitude* which one hasn't got towards everything one believes or is certain of" (OC 381; my emphasis).

Concepts like "believe", "surmise", "doubt", "be convinced", "know", etc. are often used in order to describe mental states. This kind of use is either confusing or even wrong. Rather, we may say that they express a speaker's attitude regarding the mental state she finds herself in[3]. Apart from that, speaking of mental states is quite decent, though, in order to clarify the attitudes' point of reference. One may therefore notice that our speech about attitudes towards persons or things is only a shortening in order to express our attitudes towards *what we believe* of persons and things, i.e. towards our mental states.

6

Some of our attitudes towards what we believe are determined by the use of language. We may say of Jenny, for example, that she believes that her friend is in pain. Given some evidence, we might even say that she knows that her friend is in pain. But can we say that a speaker believes or knows that a corpse is in pain? Of course, it does not make sense to say something like that. Wittgenstein explains why: "[A] corpse seems to us quite inaccessible to pain. - Our attitude to what is alive and to what is dead is

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1 In contrast to practical doubt, philosophical doubt is specifically aimed to cast doubt on our more fundamental beliefs, e.g. the belief that "I have two hands" or that "I am a human being." A philosophical skeptic may question whether there are any human beings in the first place and consequently, he may cast doubt on my belief that I am a human being.

2 Wittgenstein's following remark indicates the tension: "'I believe that he is suffering.' —— Do I also *believe* that he isn't an automaton? Only reluctantly could I use the word in both contexts." (PPF 19)

3 Lars Hertzberg makes a similar point regarding desires in Hertzberg 1988. He argues that when someone utters a desire (e. g. in order to give reasons for action) one does not simply have a desire but rather expresses an attitude towards this desire. A person forms an attitude while she learns when and under which circumstances it is right to utter what she desires.

not the same" (PI 284). As well as we have learnt to believe that human beings have two hands we have learnt that human beings can be in pain. It is hardly conceivable how one might be able to give up these two beliefs in light of new evidence. If Jenny is in pain she is *objectively certain* that she is in pain. *This* is what we call "being in pain". Regarding the corpse, however, we do not know what this expression is supposed to mean. The concept, as Wittgenstein remarks, is not able "to get a *foothold*" (ibid.) in this context. The reason for this is not that we do not have enough evidence to say that a corpse is in pain or not, but that corpses are not the kind of thing that can be in pain. It is not that we need to change our belief regarding this. Rather, we cannot even form this belief because it lacks the possibility to take an attitude towards it. The reason why we cannot find an attitude is that the word "pain" has no application whatsoever in relation to a corpse[4]. We believe different things of what is alive and what is dead, and accordingly we have different attitudes towards these beliefs in each of both contexts.

It is our attitudes that strengthen, weaken or modify our mental states. Yet we cannot adopt or abandon our attitudes at will. As we have seen, the way we have learnt to use certain concepts and the circumstances under which we have learnt them determine the possibility of taking an attitude towards a mental state[5]. The reason for this is that we can only express our attitudes in a way that makes sense to us. We may say that we are in pain and one might even try not to believe that one is in pain, but we can hardly imagine circumstances in which we may say that we doubt, are convinced of, or know that we are in pain. We may thus conclude that at least some of our attitudes towards mental states are determined by the "logical status" (cf. OC 53) of their expression. The investigation of attitudes and their logical status might establish a new approach in the philosophy of psychology.

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4 I am indebted to Edmund Dain's excellent interpretation of Wittgenstein's remark here although in this paper I am developing a slightly different understanding of what attitudes are than he does in Dain 2016.
5 For this point see also Winch 1980.

Wittgenstein Reimagines Musical Depth

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Abstract

I explore and outline Wittgenstein's original response to the Romantic discourse concerning musical depth, from his middle-period on. Schopenhauer and Spengler served as immediate sources for Wittgenstein's reliance on Romantic metaphors of depth concerning music. The onset for his philosophic intervention in the discourse was his critique of Schenker's view of music and his general shift toward the 'anthropological view', which occurred at the same time. In his post-PI period Wittgenstein was able to reimagine musical depth in terms of vertically interrelated language-games which facilitate *Menschenkenntnis*.

One of the most prominent features of German Romantic thinking about music is the evocation of metaphors of depth. Depth is one of two ideal types of the "German" in music, which have reached full maturity and distinctiveness in the writings of philosophers, critics, music analysts and composers around mid-nineteenth-century, and persevered almost without change well into the mid-twentieth-century (Sponheuer 2002). This ideal type gives rise to a chain of binary opposites, all revolving around sensuality versus intellect. For example: melody/harmony, prosaic/poetic, physical/metaphysical, mechanical/organic, civilization/culture, entertainment/ideas etc. The other ideal type, which both contrasts and complements the first, is the conception of the "German" in music as something "universal" that brings the "purely human" to its fullest expression (ibid.).

Metaphors of depth were initially used to articulate an anti-French, anti-rationalist aesthetics of music, but also to expand the listener's sense of inner space beyond the limits prescribed by rationalism or by language, to convey the sense in which music differs from linguistic and visual modes of expression, and ultimately to create and transmit a distinctly Germanic cluster of idealized values pertaining to music, among them spirituality, inwardness, and seriousness (Watkins 2011).

The Romantic writers began to imagine an interiority to music similar in its uncanniness to the interiority of the listening subject. E. T. A. Hoffmann, in his epoch-making Beethoven essays, was the first to attempt to penetrate the 'inner structure' of Beethoven's music by means of analytical language, suggesting the presence of a 'vertical' dimension to music complementing its axis of 'horizontal' or temporal unfolding. Ultimately, Romanticism exhibits what Charles Taylor called 'the expressivist turn', conceiving musical depth in terms of an inexhaustible inner domain whose contents are not reducible, not collectible, not calculable, hence could never be fully articulated (Taylor 1996, 390).

I would like now to explore and outline the philosophical onset in Wittgenstein's original intervention in the Romantic discourse concerning musical depth. The manifestation of this discourse in Wittgenstein's middle-period is quite straightforward. Consider the following passage from 1931:

> Some people think music a primitive art because it has only a few notes and rhythms. But it is only simple on the surface; its substance [Körper] on the other hand, which makes it possible to interpret this manifest content, has all the infinite complexity that's suggested in the external forms of other arts and that music con-

ceals. In a certain sense it is the most sophisticated art of all. (Wittgenstein 1998, 11)

This passage elegantly traverses the entire range of opposites pertaining to musical depth, ultimately pointing at the ulterior sophistication of the art of music. Two immediate sources stand out for Wittgenstein's reliance on metaphors of depth. First, Arthur Schopenhauer, for whom "the unutterable depth of all music [...] by which also it is so fully understood and yet so inexplicable, rests on the fact that it restores to us all the emotions of our inmost nature [...]." (Schopenhauer 1964, 341) Wittgenstein's interest in Schopenhauer, which was kindled at an early stage, spanned in one form or other his entire career.

The second immediate source is Oswald Spengler. Wittgenstein read Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West* with great enthusiasm in the spring of 1930. It deeply resonated with Wittgenstein's own feeling of alienation from modern life, and it had a significant impact on the emergence and formulation of some of the most distinctive methodological aspects of Wittgenstein's later philosophy.

While Schopenhauer framed for Wittgenstein the physical/metaphysical dialectic pertaining to musical depth, Spengler framed the corresponding civilization/culture dialectic. Spengler powerfully pursued the Romantic conception of artistic depth as a cultural characteristic of what he idiosyncratically dubbed 'Impressionism', the mark of the late hours of the 'phase of accomplishment' in Western culture. For Spengler, music is a reflection of the Western soul, its prime symbol, the ideal medium for expressing the Faustian ideal of a striving toward infinite space. In a passage anticipating Wittgenstein's 1931 remark, which I quoted above, Spengler writes: "Be the artist painter or musician, his art consists in creating with a few strokes or spots or tones an image of inexhaustible content, a microcosm meet for the eyes or ears of the Faustian man; that is, in laying the actuality of something objective which, so to say, forces that actuality to become phenomenal." (Spengler 1939, 286)

Grafted on the impact of Spengler, we find also Wittgenstein's critical engagement with the music theory of Heinrich Schenker, which was facilitated by conversations with Felix Salzer, in particular between the years 1930-1933 (Guter 2004, 2011 and 2015). Schenker, who was by and large aligned with Spengler's cultural pessimism (Almén 1996), framed for Wittgenstein also the melody/harmony dialectic pertaining to musical depth. According to Schenker all great masterworks possess a deep structure, or background, which lends them not only their coherence but also their cultural identity and value. As Watkins points out, "for all its apparent formalization,

Schenker's notion of the background is emphatically not just a musical concept. Instead, the background delineates an imaginary space with abundant figurative overtones, including those of nature, God, origin, genius, the soul and Germanness – all by this point conventional associations of depth." (Watkins 2011, 25)

I would like to argue that at this particular nexus of the impact of Spengler and Schenker, at that particular phase in Wittgenstein's middle-period, as he was putting together the *Big Typescript*, we begin to see the contour of his unique, subtle intervention in the Romantic discourse concerning musical depth.

I have shown elsewhere (Guter 2015) that Wittgenstein's explicit dissatisfaction with Schenker's view of music was grafted on his critique in the *Big Typescript* of Spengler's philosophical dogmatism concerning the notion of proto-type (*Urbild*). For Wittgenstein, the Schenkerian *Ursatz*, the representation of the primal musical phenomenon which has been conceived to encapsulate the essence of tonality, is yet another example of an ill-conceived, dogmatic use of the idea of *Urbild*. Schenker's mistake was to extend the scope of statements true of tonality (in its pre-articulated form) to particular instances of tonal music. In this sense, the Schenkerian *Ursatz* becomes a useful heuristic device that can be laid alongside the musical instances under consideration as a measure, "not as a pre-conception to which everything must conform" (Wittgenstein 1998, 30). It has a mere regulative use as a focal point of our observation of the musical field. I maintain that this is the reason why Wittgenstein told Salzer that Schenker's theory needs to be "boiled down."

Yet "boiling down" Schenker's theory in this way created, for Wittgenstein, a specific difficulty in rendering musical depth: in what sense could he say that music "is the most sophisticated art of all"? Hence it comes as no surprise that his middle-period texts in particular include quite a few tentative passages concerning the theory of harmony (*Harmonielehre*). Strikingly, Wittgenstein worked out his solution to this problem concerning musical depth in the context of the major philosophic shift, which characterizes his middle-period: his gradual moving away from the conception of language as a system of fixed rules (a calculus), which is prominent in the *Big Typescript*, and toward the "anthropological view," which characterizes his later work, from the *Philosophical Investigations* on. The shift toward the *Philosophical Investigations* is attributed to the stimulus of Piero Sraffa's criticism on Wittgenstein's ideas during this middle-period (Engelmann 2013).

Sraffa's criticism prompted Wittgenstein to reconsider the philosophical import of gestures, that is, signs, which (when taken in isolation) we could not give a grammar for them. Wittgenstein realized that the use of words meshes with life. As Mauro Engelmann put it, "we have to look at the environment, the surroundings, where the language functions (the form of life). The understanding of a gesture in our language may come before the capacity to explain according to a calculus with fixed rules of 'grammar'" (Engelmann 2013, 166). Wittgenstein's new idea was to consider the purpose and the point of languages and language-games as part of a form of life.

Wittgenstein's reworking of his notion of *Harmonielehre* followed suit. While most of his references in the middle-period to *Harmonielehre* render it as a standard example for 'grammar' in the constitutive sense, that is, as a kind of structure of language that determines the conditions of sense and understanding, a necessary condition for language, Wittgenstein came to realize, upon criticizing the

music theory of Heinrich Schenker, that this was not a good example. By 1936 his thinking about *Harmonielehre* has already been fully entrenched in his newly developed anthropological view:

> Could *one* reason be given at all, why *Harmonielehre* is the way it is? And, first and foremost, *must* such a reason be given? *It is here and it is part of our entire life*. (MS157a, 24-26; my translation, my emphasis)

The notion of *Harmonielehre* has now become circumscribed within the grand idea of language as a universal medium (see Hintikka 1986). It has been "boiled down" to a merely technical notion, hence drops out of consideration for Wittgenstein. Indeed, the term disappears from his writings hereafter. Wittgenstein now needs to reimagine musical depth while realizing that tonality—the way we experience and express certain relationships between musical tones—is affected by the way we recognize and describe things and ultimately by the kind of beings we are, the purposes we have, our shared discriminatory capacities, and certain general features of the world we inhabit.

Wittgenstein's sustained response to this challenge shows once again how closely related his thinking about music was to the cutting edge of his philosophical advancement. In much of Wittgenstein's later writing on music, the bulk of which belonging to his final, post-*Philosophical-Investigations* period, he grappled with the need to explicate the 'infinite complexity' of musical gesture—what and how it speaks to us; why and how it is so meaningful—while probing (in his various writings on philosophical psychology) into the constitutive indefiniteness of our concepts of the 'inner'. In effect, his response to the quintessentially Romantic characterization of musical depth in terms of the listener's inner space (exemplified vividly in the writings of Schopenhauer) was framed by means of his overarching philosophical thrust to move beyond the pervasive inner/outer divide.

Two major late-vintage ideas shape the way Wittgenstein finally reimagines musical depth. First, the idea of vertical interrelations between language-games. Not all language-games function on the same logical level: some language-games logically presuppose other language-games, and so they tend to lend themselves to enormous complexity as each move in such vertically-complex language-game may presuppose sometimes countless other corresponding moves in myriad other logically prior games. This idea comes across most clearly when Wittgenstein writes:

> Doesn't the theme point to anything beyond itself? Oh yes! But this means: the impression it makes on me is connected with things in its environment – for example, with the existence of the German language and its intonation, but that means with the whole range of our language games. If I say for instance: here it's as though a conclusion were being drawn, here as though someone were expressing agreement, or as though *this* were a reply to what came before, – my understanding of it presupposes my familiarity with conclusions, expressions of agreement, replies. (Wittgenstein 1998, 59)

Wittgenstein is retaining here the essential metaphor of verticality pertaining to musical depth, yet his point is that when we have a sense of musical depth it is not because understanding sends us further inwards into a determinate mental state. Rather, musical depth is folded across the unexpected topography of our actual language and patterns of life, the similarities that give unity to the ways of life of a culture.

Second, the notion of *Menschenkenntnis*—our acquaintance with, and knowledge of human nature. For Wittgenstein, *Menschenkenntnis* is not a body of theoretical knowledge like psychology. Rather, it is more like a skill, or a highly diverse cluster of skills, which some people have a more intuitive grasp of than others, and it can be improved by experience on the basis of 'imponderable evidence', that is, "evidence which can make us certain about someone's psychological state, without our being able to specify what it is in their behavior that makes us so sure" (Ter Hark 2004, 140).

Wittgenstein's account of *Menschenkenntnis* is fundamental to his discussion of musical expression and musical understanding. It lends a rich conceptual framework, also cohesion, to many of Wittgenstein's late-vintage passages in which he tracks and explores how musical meaning (which he takes in an intransitive sense) is grounded in an indefinite edifice of interrelated language-games which admit imponderable evidence—evidence that cannot be recognized or fully explained by mere reference to rules, yet is accepted by those who are acquainted with the infinite variation of human physiognomy. This idea captures the essential dialectic of mechanical versus organic (irreducible; not calculable) pertaining to musical depth. This comes across clearly when Wittgenstein writes:

> This musical phrase is a gesture for me. It creeps into my life. I make it my own. Life's infinite variations are an essential part of our life. And so precisely of the habitual character of life. Expression consists for us <in> incalculability. (Wittgenstein 1998, 72)

Wittgenstein's final answer to the question concerning the ulterior sophistication of music is this: "Appreciating music is a manifestation of human life." (ibid., 80) Read in context, it encapsulates his comprehensive, forward thinking about the philosophic entanglements of language and the mind. It also renders music as a facilitator of *Menschenkenntnis*, thereby complementing the ideal type of depth with the second ideal type of universality, as having a sense of musical depth opens up possibilities for the "purely human" to attain its fullest expression.

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New (Re)Search Possibilities for Wittgenstein's Nachlass II: Advanced Search, Navigation and Feedback with the FinderApp WiTTFind

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Abstract

We present a new web-based approach to searching and researching Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical Nachlass as made available by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB), on Wittgenstein Source (http://www.wittgenstein source.org/). The approach uses highly sophisticated web-technology together with methods and tools from the field of computational linguistics that are developed at the Centrum für Informations- und Sprachverarbeitung (CIS) at the LMU Munich. Tools include the full-form lexicon WiTTLex, the "FinderApp" WiTTFind, the symmetric autosuggestion tool SIS, a Facsimile Reader with hit-highlighting and an Investigation Mode with an integrated FeedbackApp. The search-methods of the FinderApp include a query language which allows the user to specify exact, lemmatized and grammatical search-queries and a semantic search which permits content driven navigation for colour language and other selected areas. In 2014 our FinderApp WiTTFind won the Open Humanity Award within the EU-Project Digitized Manuscripts to Europeana (DM2E).

„…wer im Stande ist uns einen Sack voll Rosinen zu geben kann damit noch keinen Kuchen backen…" (http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-136,92a_f)

1. "Since last time …" (Kirchberg 2012)

In this paper we present the second generation of WiTTFind, a search engine application that allows users to navigate through the text editions of the Bergen Nachlass Edition (BNE) available on the Wittgenstein Archives' (WAB) Open Access site Wittgenstein Source (http://www.wittgen steinsource.org/). This edition gives access in both facsimile and text editions to the Wittgenstein Nachlass, as it was catalogued by G. H. von Wright (von Wright 1986). As of August 2016 the facsimile edition is almost complete, while the text edition so far offers around 5,000 pages in normalized and diplomatic versions. These pages were originally made available in 2009 through the EU financed Discovery project (http://wab.uib.no/wab_discovery.page) and include the following Nachlass parts: two items in English from the Bertrand Russell Archives in Ontario, Canada: the "Notes on Logic" manuscripts Ts-201a1 and Ts-201a2 (1913-14), and eighteen items from the Wren Library at Trinity College, Cambridge: the "Lecture on Ethics" manuscript Ms-139a and the "Lecture on Ethics" fair copy typescript Ts-207 (1929), both in English; the volumes ("Bände") Ms-114 (1932-33) and Ms-115 (1933 and 1936), the notebooks Ms-148, Ms-149, Ms-150, Ms-152, Ms-153a, Ms-153b, Ms-154, Ms-155, Ms-156a (1931-36), the loose sheets Ms-140 (page 39v, 1936) and Ms-141 (ca. 1935) and the typescripts / typescript cuttings Ts-212 (1932), Ts-213 (the "Big Typescript", 1933), Ts-310 (the "Brown Book", 1935) – all except for the "Brown Book" mostly in German. It is for these Nachlass items, and with them as pilots, that WAB and the Centrum für Informations- und Sprachverarbeitung (CIS) have since 2011 cooperated on developing the advanced FinderApp WiTTFind. In the course of 2016-17, the BNE text editions will be extended to match the facsimile edition, and WiTTFind will be developed further to be applicable also to the additional Nachlass texts. As of today, WiTTFind offers advanced search functions for the 5,000 "Discovery" pages. The search results are displayed in the normalized text edition with parallel highlighting of the result's locus in the corresponding facsimile. Thanks to the Investigation Mode and FeedbackApp features, WiTTFind additionally offers the capability of studying WAB's source transcriptions and facsimiles in parallel and, moreover, also to send feedback to the editors on the quality of the transcriptions and facsimiles.

Fig. 1: FinderApp WiTTFind
http://wittfind.cis.uni-muenchen.de

2. Symmetric Autosuggestion, Rule-based Search and Lemmatized Search

Unlike standard (i.e. approximate) search capabilities as e.g. found in Google Books (https://books.google.com/) or the Open Library project (https://openlibrary.org/), the FinderApp WiTTFind uses specifically tailored rule-based, i.e. "focused", search-technologies in conjunction with electronic lexica and part-of-speech tagging. Moreover, it provides lemmatized and inverse lemmatized searches. User input is additionally supported by symmetric autosuggestion (Bruder 2012) that is coupled with frequency information on occurrences in the source. When entering

more than four characters into the search box the symmetric autosuggestion technology starts: The entered character sequence is expanded to both the left and right to include all the words stored in the index that feature the same sequence regardless of position (prefix, suffix, and, as a novelty, in infix position). Base lemmas belonging to the word, as well as morphological variants, are suggested and their respective frequencies in the text are subsequently displayed.

Fig. 2: "rates" expands to "Sok-rates", "concent-rates", "Appa-rates" and lemmatizes

We show two examples of lemmatized autosuggestion search for the characters "rates" (Figure 2) and "fiel" (Figure 1): We are offered (frequency numbers in parentheses) the verb lemma "fallen" (139) as well as its morphological variants "fällt" (69), "fallen" (38), "fiel" (13), "falle" (8), "fall" (7), "fiele" (3) and "fielen" (1) – but also "einfallen" (43), "wegfallen" (99) and "mißfällt" (2). Selecting one specific suggestion reveals all occurrences of the specified word in its sentence contexts that are subsequently displayed in the browser with the corresponding "Satzsiglum"[1] with the corresponding facsimile extract highlighted. WiTTFind allows queries which include word form and syntactic as well as semantic and sentence structure specifications (Hadersbeck et al. 2012).

3. Facsimile Reader with Investigation Mode and Feedback-App

Clicking on the facsimile extract that is displayed concurrently with the highlighted search hit lets one enter the WiTTFind Facsimile Reader (Lindinger 2015) where the user not only can view the facsimile in question, but thumb and navigate along the found hits through the entire *Nachlass* item. To enable hit highlighting, a semi-automatic tool was developed to extract the geometrical information of remarks with the help of OCR, edition texts and methods of approximate searching (Capsamun 2014). The reader offers a double page view of the source as well as single page views and zoom options for close inspection. Additional hits can be directly accessed within the reader, thus allowing a quick overview of the occurrences in their different contexts. Clicking the zones of specific remarks ("Bemerkungen") in the reader takes one to Investigation Mode that gives a detailed view of WiTTFind's XML transcription alongside the facsimile. In Investigation Mode, scholars can not only study or compare either the transcription[2] or

the facsimile of the source in detail, but also report mistakes, deficiencies and desiderata via the integrated FeedbackApp to the editors at WAB. This feedback functionality is of great use to the editors and can be regarded as a kind of crowdsourcing. At the same time, it also offers benefits to users wanting to learn about transcription techniques and markup. By comparing the facsimile with the XML transcription the user sees which codes ("tags") were used for recording which writing acts, e.g. <del> for deletions, <add> for insertions, <emph> for emphasis etc. By displaying the use of attributes and attribute values such as <emph rend="us1"> (for the encoding of passages with one straight underlining) and <emph rend="uw1"> (for the encoding of passages with a wavy underlining) along with the corresponding facsimile that contains the passages underlined, the tool also offers a small transcription school for aspiring digital philologists, and introduces them to the use of XML elements, attributes and attribute values in the tradition of TEI guided encoding (TEI 2007). The XML transcriptions shown in Investigation Mode can be displayed in different variants: From the open access XML variant at WAB to a reduced XML transcription which is used from the FinderApp. The user fascinated with markup will nevertheless find enough markup and codes accessible in this mode to have his thirst for text encoding matters satisfied, as well as the editors for having their need for correction of the most visible errors.[3]

Fig. 3: Investigation Mode and Feedback App

Fig. 4 Full XM-transcription for Satzsiglum Ms-115,118[3]_1

4. Computational Linguistic Tools and Software Development

Our FinderApp WiTTFind is based upon the electronic lexicon *WiTTLex* which stores the vocabulary in 58,000 entries with full-form, lemma, morphological, word-form and semantic information. The texts of the 5000 pages were provided by WAB in *XML* format that along with an *XSLT* style sheet permits their conversion to readable normalized *HTML* output. In order to allow for syntactic disambiguation in WiTTLex, this output is preprocessed using a state of the art part-of-speech tagger, namely the treetagger (Schmid 1995). With the additional help of local grammar techniques, even separated particle-verb constructions like "fällt … heraus" (from "herausfallen) (http://wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-213,1r[1]_n) can be disambiguated and thus, unlike classic search engines, ultimately also found (see Fig. 5).

Fig. 5: Particle Verb separation and disambiguation

The symmetric autosuggestion feature, another tool within our FinderApp, implements the novel index structure *SIS – Symmetric Index Structures* (cf. for a reference implementation and proof of concept http://sis.cis.lmu.de), a highly efficient implementation of *Symmetric Directed Acyclic Word Graphs* (Gerdjikov 2012). All our software development around WiTTFind is carried out using professional open-source software development best practices including git revision control together with test driven development (TDD), continuous integration (CI) and integrated build system (gitlabci).

5. Guided Navigation and Semantic Search

To enable users to access the *Nachlass* through content rather than string, word or phrase search only (Falch et al. 2013), WiTTFind has commenced to provide facilities for semantic category based searches. This includes searching for adjectives, numerals, proper nouns and temporalia. Special attention was paid to the handling of adjectives. To this end, eleven groups out of around 7000 adjectives were annotated semantically and together with stylistic information stored in WiTTLex (see Fig. 6). As a result, the user can browse through semantical classes of adjectives and follow channels of stylistic "flavour". Among the adjectives, special attention was again given to the word field of colours (Krey 2014). Here, the subcategories *Grundfarbe*, *Zwischenfarbe*, *Transparenz*, *Glanz*, and *Farbigkeit* were applied. That Wittgenstein himself deals in his "Big Typescript" (http://wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-213_f) subchapter "Phänomenologie" (http://wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-213,436r[1]_n) with issues of colour and colour mixture was taken into account in our classifications (see Fig. 7). One lesson from this work was that the application of a standard linguistic classification schemes does not suffice to provide the classifications and tools the Wittgenstein researcher will find useful.[4]

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4 Complementary work on semantically guided navigation includes the conceptual ontology for Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics and psychology

Figure 6: Semantic Classification Adjectives

Figure 7: Semantic Classification of Colours

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Moore-Sätze – Normen auf totem Gleis?

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Abstract

G.E.Moore hat bestimmte Erfahrungssätze, bspw. „Hier ist eine Hand", als trivial oder gewiss wahr behandelt. Sätze diese Art werden in ÜG ausgiebig behandelt. Ihre gängige Bezeichnung ist dementsprechend „Moore-Sätze". Ein Satz dieser Art, – z. B. *p* –, ist nur allzu klar, so dass wir im Alltag in Bezug auf ihn *Knowledge-Claims* wie „Ich weiß, dass *p*" normalerweise nicht erheben. Die Trivialität der Moore-Sätze beschreibt Ludwig Wittgenstein so, dass sie „auf ein totes Geleise verschoben" worden seien (ÜG §210). Welche Rolle spielen dann aber diese „auf ein totes Geleise verschobenen" Sätze in unserer Sprache? Fungieren Moore-Sätze als Normen, deren Regeln wir ständig folgen, weil sie die Grundlagen unserer Lebensform ausmachen? Oder gehören die Moore-Sätze zwar zu unserer Sprache, werden aber nie gebraucht, weil sie gleichsam kaum einen Nutzen haben? In diesem Paper werde ich zeigen, dass entgegen der Erwartung die zweite Deutung plausibler ist.

I. Moore-Sätze und ihre Trivialität

Die sogenannten Moore-Sätze sind trivial oder gewiss wahr. Von diesem Sondercharakter sagt Wittgenstein bspw. so: Ein vernünftiger Mensch zweifelt nie daran; kein Irrtum ist darin möglich; oder man kann sich darin nicht irren. Als Moore-Sätze kann man aus ÜG z. B. folgende von einem Sprecher formulierte Ich-Sätze entnehmen: „Ich habe zwei Hände", „Die Erde hat schon lange vor meiner Geburt existiert", „Niemand war auf dem Mond", „Ich war nie in Kleinasien" (in dem Fall, etwa bezogen auf Wittgenstein selbst, bei dem dies völlig klar war). Die Moore-Sätze sind uns so gewiss, dass wir ihre Sicherheit durch andere Sätze nicht bekräftigen müssen. Weil Moore-Sätze für uns feststehen und allzu trivial sind, tauchen sie im Alltag nicht auf, und wir äußern sie normalerweise nicht. Diesen Charakter beschreibt Wittgenstein metaphorisch so:

> Bekräftigt mein Telephongespräch mit N.Y. meine Überzeugung, daß die Erde existiert?
> Manches scheint uns festzustehen, und es scheidet aus dem Verkehr aus. Es wird sozusagen auf ein totes Geleise verschoben. (ÜG §210)

Moore-Sätze wie „Die Erde existiert" erscheinen in unserer Sprache wie Züge, die ohne weitere Verwendung auf ein nicht befahrenes Gleis abgestellt wurden. Welche Rolle spielen dann aber im Sprachspiel diese Sätze?

II. MN-Deutung

Eine Antwort auf die Frage, welche Rolle Moore-Sätze spielen, wäre die Folgende: Sie seien zwar trivial, würden jedoch als Normen die Fundamente des Sprachspiels ausmachen. Die Deutung von „Moore-Sätzen als Normen" wird bspw. von Michael Kober (vgl. Kober 1993, 208) dargelegt und im Folgenden als MN-Deutung bezeichnet.

Es gibt tatsächlich in ÜG Paragraphen, die von „Normen" handeln und somit die obige Lesart heranziehen könnten. Wie §§96-99 in ÜG zeigen, könnte man sich vorstellen, dass gewisse Erfahrungssätze sozusagen „erstarrt" wären. Solche Erfahrungssätze haben nicht den gleichen Status wie andere und lassen sich festlegen (ÜG §167). Der folgende Teil in §167 zeigt genau diesen Punkt: „man [kann] ihn [=einen Satz] vom Erfahrungssatz zu einer Norm [oder alternativ zu einer Regel] der Beschreibung machen". Wenn man sich *Wittgenstein's Nachlass* ansieht, sieht man das Wort „Norm" über dem Wort „Regel" kleingeschrieben (MS174 35v). Mit dem Hinweis auf diese Stelle

schreibt Kober, „daß es in bezug auf Gewißheit angemessener ist, von ,Norm' statt von ,Regel' zu sprechen" (Kober 1993, 206). Denn er erkennt im Wort „Norm" die Mehrdeutigkeit, die sowohl „normal" als auch „normativ" umfasst. Beide Wörter seien jeweils deskriptiv und präskriptiv. Diese Beschreibung könnte z. B. zu dem Satz in ÜG §567, „Wasser siedet bei 100°C", gut passen. Durch empirische Untersuchungen wurde festgestellt, bei wie viel Grad Wasser siedet. Der Siedepunkt wurde später als „100°C" definiert. In der Vergangenheit, als man diese Tatsache entdeckt hatte, konnte man „Ich weiß, dass Wasser bei dieser bestimmten Gradzahl siedet" als einen *Knowledge-Claim* mit Recht erheben; mit der Zeit ist diese Tatsache jedoch zur „Norm" erstarrt. Die vollkommene Sicherheit dieses Satzes wurde, so Robert Greenleaf Brice, gleichsam *erreicht* („*arrived at*") (Brice 2014, 24).

Gewisse Erfahrungssätze werden in unserem Sprachspiel als sozusagen „erstarrt" behandelt und werden wegen ihrer vollkommenen Sicherheit seinem Fundament zugeordnet. Der MN-Deutung nach ist dieser Übergang nun nichts anderes als das „auf ein totes Geleise vorschoben worden" sein. Zwar würden die „erstarrten" Sätze im alltäglichen Gespräch nicht mehr geäußert, aber sie herrschten im Fundament des Sprachspiels und gälten als unausgesprochene Regeln. Gilt aber diese Sichtweise ebenso beim Beispielsatz in ÜG §210, „Die Erde existiert", in dem von „einem toten Geleise" die Rede ist?

III. Unterschiede zwischen Normen und Moore-Sätzen

Brice unterscheidet zwischen den sogenannten Angelsätzen („*Hinge-Propositions*"), deren man sich völlig gewiss ist, zwischen den überaus fundamentalen Sätzen („Die Erde existiert") und den anderen Angelsätzen („Wasser siedet bei 100°C") (Brice 2014, 22-4). Ich halte diese Unterscheidung für plausibel und betrachte es als irreführend, dass Sätze beider Arten unter derselben Terminologie zusammengefasst werden. Ich bestreite zwar nicht, dass gewisse Erfahrungssätze als Normen behandelt werden, denke aber, dass dies den Sätzen der ersten Art, die eigentlich ausschließlich „Moore-Sätze" genannt werden sollen, nicht ganz entspricht. Der wesentliche Charakter äußert sich vielmehr in den folgenden Paragraphen:

> »Ich kann mich darin nicht irren; und schlimmstenfalls mache ich aus meinem Satze eine Norm.«

»Ich kann mich darin nicht irren: ich bin heute bei ihm gewesen.«

»Ich kann mich darin nicht irren; sollte aber doch etwas gegen meinen Satz zu sprechen scheinen, so werde ich, gegen den Schein, an ihm festhalten.« (ÜG §§634-636)

Nur „schlimmstenfalls", z. B. gegen den Schein, hält man bspw. am Moore-Satz „Ich bin heute bei ihm gewesen" fest. Ich finde den „schlimmsten" Fall allzu außergewöhnlich und ggf. dem Fall gleichend, den Skeptiker ins Spiel bringen. Abgesehen von solchen „schlimmsten" Fällen hat der Moore-Satz keinen normativen Charakter, sondern ist meines Erachtens einfach trivial klar. Unter dem Ausdruck „auf ein totes Geleise" verstehe ich also einfach eine Analogie zu der Vorortung in unserem Sprachspiel, an dem Sätze weder ausgesprochen noch an sich verwendet werden. Die Sätze, die auf diesen Platz „verschoben" wurden, nämlich Moore-Sätze, haben im Sprachspiel kaum einen Nutzen.

Angenommen, dass Moore-Sätze irgendwelche Normen wären, dann müssten wir von ihnen beim Handeln, Denken, etc. geleitet werden. Dies würde zeigen, dass sich Moore-Sätze in weiterer Hinsicht äußerten, als dass sie bloß trivial wahr seien. Was sie inhaltlich liefern, müsste somit viel sinnvoller für unser Alltagsleben sein. Die Sätze „Ich war nie in Kleinasien", „Ich habe zwei Hände" etc. scheinen aber, auch intuitiv betrachtet, nicht so beschaffen zu sein, als ob wir uns im Alltag nach ihnen als Normen richten würden. Wenn es der Fall wäre, dann hätten Moore-Sätze selbst nach Kobers Auffassung einen präskriptiven Charakter, der wie der Charakter von Regeln beschaffen wäre. In seinem *Big Typescript* beschreibt Wittgenstein bezüglich der Regeln den präskriptiven Charakter so, dass „erst *alle* Regeln das Spiel, die Sprache, charakterisieren, und daß diese Regeln nicht einer Wirklichkeit verantwortlich sind". Weiterhin schreibt er: „eigentlich können ja Regeln nicht kollidieren, außer sie widersprechen einander" (BT, 184f.). Dies wirft die Frage auf, *wie* deskriptive Erfahrungssätze und präskriptive Normen ineinander übergehen. Angenommen ich würde tatsächlich nach Kleinasien fliegen, wie sähe dann der normative Satz aus? Solche Fälle, in denen das Gegenteil eines Moore-Satzes wahr wird, halte ich nicht unbedingt für außergewöhnlich, sondern eventuell realistisch. Würde mich die Norm nicht dennoch dazu zwingen, zu denken, ich sei noch nie in Kleinasien gewesen, falls ich es praktisch fände, nach wie vor an den Satz festzuhalten? Der normative Charakter kann in Wirklichkeit nicht durch Tatsachen beeinflusst werden.

Außerdem bin ich der Ansicht, dass Moore-Sätze sogar keinen regelartigen Charakter haben. Denn es fehlt ihnen ein Hauptcharakteristikum des Regelfolgens. Wie nämlich könnten wir ihnen entgegenhandeln?

In Wittgensteins Schriften sind einige Verwandtschaften zwischen grammatischen Sätzen und Moore-Sätzen ersichtlich. So weist PU §251 darauf hin, dass grammatische Sätze ebenso die Form von Erfahrungssätzen besitzen können, und auch, dass ihr Gegenteil für uns nicht vorstellbar ist. Dazu gehört bspw. „Jeder Stab hat eine Länge", „Ein Meter ist so und so lang". Solche grammatischen Sätze zeigen aber im Wesentlichen, wie Wörter wie „Stab" und „Meter" gebraucht werden. Im Gegensatz zu ihnen dienen Moore-Sätze nicht als „Hinweise" auf die Gebrauchsweise von Wörtern. Die *Wahrheit* eines Moore-Satzes – z. B. „Ich habe zwei Hände" – liegt nicht darin, dass ich verstehe, wie die im Satz liegenden Wörter verwendet werden sollen.

Wenn es um grammatische Sätze geht, könnten wir einen Schüler testen und prüfen, ob er sie verstanden hat, oder ob er richtig darauf vorbereitet worden ist, wie bestimmte Wörter gebraucht werden sollten. Zur Überprüfung ob er das Wort „gelb" verstanden hat, könnten wir ihn auffordern: "Bring mir eine gelbe Blume!" Hierbei ist klar, was eine richtige Reaktion oder was ein Fehler ist. Zum Beherrschen einer Regel muss man wissen, welche Reaktion richtig oder falsch ist. Denn "[d]as Üben im Gebrauch der Regel zeigt auch, was ein Fehler in ihrer Verwendung ist" (ÜG §29).

Bei Moore-Sätzen handelt es sich hingegen nicht um die Beherrschung der Gebrauchsweise von Wörtern. Der Unterschied zeigt sich z. B. in ÜG §§70-5. In §71 wird ein Freund ins Spiel gebracht, der sich plötzlich einbilden würde, er hätte seit langem bei einer anderen Adresse als bei seiner tatsächlichen Adresse A gewohnt. Hier wird angenommen, dass der Freund bereits die Gebrauchsweise einschlägiger Wörter wie „Straßenname", „Hausnummer" kenne und unzählige Male den Hausnamen, die Hausnummer, Briefe, etc., die auf seine Anschrift hinweisen, wahrgenommen hätte. Bei dem Freund hätte der Satz „Ich wohne an der Adresse A" ein Moore-Satz sein sollen, aber wie wäre es, wenn er auf einmal anfinge, nicht so zu denken? Wittgenstein behandelt vielmehr den fälschlichen Glauben dieses Freundes nicht als einen „Irrtum", sondern eher als eine „Geistesstörung". Der fälschliche Glaube dieser Art lässt sich im Gegensatz zum „Irrtum" nicht in das richtige Wissen einordnen (ÜG §74). Mit anderen Worten: Er lässt sich nicht korrigieren, während ein Irrtum korrigierbar ist.

Bei „vernünftigen" Menschen ist ein Irrtum bei Moore-Sätzen ausgeschlossen. In ihnen können sie sich nicht irren. Dies macht den Irrtum und somit das Testen des Irrtums unmöglich. Nehmen wir nun an, dass ich einen Schüler prüfen würde, ob er versteht, dass er zwei Hände hat. Was wäre dann ein Kriterium für sein Verständnis? Wenn er antworten würde, dass er drei Hände habe, dann würde ich nicht sagen, dass er einer Norm falsch gefolgt wäre, sondern hielte ihn Wittgenstein folgend eher für „geistesgestört". In diesem Fall könnte ich seinen fälschlichen Glauben nicht korrigieren, sodass ich ihn nicht zum richtigen Wissen bringen könnte. Moore-Sätze haben also nichts mit dem Training, dem Beherrschen von Techniken, etc. zu tun.

In Anbetracht dieser Argumentation stehe ich der MN-Deutung misstrauisch gegenüber. Daher würde ich sagen, dass eine solche Normativität keine wesentliche Rolle bei den Moore-Sätzen spielt und dass sie in unserem Sprachspiel keine Normen oder Regeln mehr sind. Meiner Meinung nach sind sie einfach trivial wahr, diese Trivialität spielt aber doch eine entscheidende Rolle in unserem Sprachspiel.

IV. Die Funktion von Moore-Sätzen

Bei Moore-Sätzen müssen eigentlich die Begründung bzw. die Rechtfertigung nicht zu einem Ende kommen, denn diese Sätze können sich ebenfalls auf Evidenz stützen. Bspw. schreibt Wittgenstein über die Evidenz für den Moore-Satz „Die Erde hat schon lange vor meiner Geburt existiert" folgendes:

Was wir historische Evidenz nennen, deutet darauf hin, die Erde habe schon lange vor meiner Geburt existiert; - die entgegengesetzte Hypothese hat *nichts* für sich.

95

Wenn nun alles für eine Hypothese, nichts gegen sie spricht – ist sie dann gewiß wahr? Man kann sie so bezeichnen. [...]. (ÜG §§ 190f.)

Dementsprechend dient die historische Evidenz dem Untermauern des Moore-Satzes. Zur Evidenz dieser Art zählt Wittgenstein auch „die Evidenz der Sinne", „die unseres Gedächtnisses" etc.. Sie weisen auf andere Moore-Sätze hin. Allerdings äußert sich ein großer Unterschied zwischen Moore-Sätzen und Erfahrungssätzen im folgenden Punkt: Durch die Rechtfertigung zeigen wir auf, dass Erfahrungssätze wahr sind; hingegen bedarf die *Wahrheit* von Moore-Sätzen weder Rechtfertigung noch Begründung. Denn wir wissen bereits als „*Common-Sense*" in unserem Sprachspiel, dass Moore-Sätze wahr sind. Im Nachhinein könnten wir sagen, dass verschiedene Sorten der Evidenz auf die *Wahrheit* verschiedener Moore-Sätze hinweisen. Die Rechtfertigung von Erfahrungssätzen ist sozusagen ein *top-down* Verfahren: Wir haben die Sätze zu rechtfertigen, um zu zeigen, dass sie wahr sind. Hingegen ist die Rechtfertigung von Moore-Sätzen ein *bottom-up* Verfahren: Wir wissen bereits, dass Moore-Sätze wahr sind, und erkennen an der *Wahrheit* der Moore-Sätze, dass eine bestimmte Evidenz ihrer Rechtfertigung dient.

Dieses *bottom-up* Verfahren bei Moore-Sätzen bringt eine andere Tatsache mit sich. Diesen Punkt beleuchten Wittgensteins nähere Betrachtungen der Moore-Sätze. Hier zitiere ich von seinen Manuskripten die Passagen, die den §§201-2 in ÜG entsprechen:

Denk, jemand fragte: »Ist es wirklich richtig daß wir uns auf die Evidenz unsres Gedächtnisses (oder unsrer Sinne) verlassen wie wir es tun?« // »Haben wir recht, uns auf unsre Sinne & unser Gedächtnis zu verlassen, wie wir's tun?« //

Moores gewisse Sätze sagen beinahe aus, wir hätten ein Recht, uns auf diese Evidenz zu verlassen. (MS 175 2r-3v)

Bei der zweiten Variante, die Wittgenstein im ersten Zitat aufführt, ist es deutlich klarer, dass die zweite Passage (ÜG §202) als Antwort auf die Frage der ersten Passage (ÜG §201) dient. Dementsprechend zeigt „diese Evidenz" in der zweiten Passage offensichtlich „unsre Sinne & unser Gedächtnis". Fernerhin zeigen Moore-Sätze, obwohl nicht auf explizite Weise, dass wir darin Recht haben, uns auf unsere Sinne, unser Gedächtnis etc. als Evidenz zu verlassen. Moore-Sätze werden in unserem Sprachspiel nicht verwendet, haben aber die Funktion uns dazu zu bringen, dass wir uns auf eine bestimmte Evidenz verlassen.

Nun möchte ich einzelne Fälle dieser wesentlichen Funktion der Moore-Sätze betrachten. Prima facie scheint z. B. der Moore-Satz „Ich war nie in Kleinasien" gar nicht verwendbar zu sein, geschweige denn als Norm oder Regel zu fungieren, aber seine Trivialität macht unser Gedächtnis als Evidenz zuverlässig. Ebenso können wir uns bei den Sätzen „Ich habe zwei Hände" und „Die Erde hat schon lange vor meiner Geburt existiert" jeweils auf unsere Sinne und die historische Evidenz verlassen. Was als Evidenz gilt, legt u. a. ein Denksystem nahe. Wie ÜG §108 zeigt, fungierte der Satz „Niemand war auf dem Mond" in den 1950er-Jahren, als Wittgenstein ÜG niederschrieb, als ein Moore-Satz im damaligen System der Physik. Der Satz war für die damaligen Menschen trivial wahr, weil sie sich auf die Erfahrung des damaligen physikalischen Systems gestützt haben. Solche verschiedenen Arten zuverlässiger Evidenz gehören zum Fundament des Sprachspiels. Sie befinden sich am Ende der Rechtfertigung in unserem Sprachspiel und gehören zu unserem *Handeln*, das dem Sprachspiel zugrunde liegt (ÜG §204).

Die Evidenz ist unter gewöhnlichen Umständen ebenso sicher wie Moore-Sätze (ÜG §250). Weil sie in unserem Sprachspiel gewiss sind, ist auch die Evidenz für sie gewiss. Moore-Sätze machen also die betreffende Evidenz so zuverlässig, dass wir ohne Zweifel unsere Sinne, unser Gedächtnis etc. als Evidenz weiterhin anwenden können. Die „auf ein totes Geleise verschobenen" Sätze werden zwar nicht mehr verwendet, dienen aber dennoch dazu, bestimmte Evidenzen zu sichern.

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Wittgenstein in Tagore's *Dark Chamber:*
An Examination of the Influence on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Tagore's *The King of the Dark Chamber*

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Abstract

It is a widely accepted fact that the influences on Wittgenstein by the traditional philosophy are very limited. Among this 'limited' group of philosophers, Rabindranath Tagore was the notable 'one & only' thinker from the outside of the Western world. In a letter to Paul Engelmann, Wittgenstein discusses Tagore's play, *The King of the Dark Chamber*, and indicates that he disagrees with the 'object of inquiry' of the drama. However, few months later, in another letter to Ludwig Hänsel, Wittgenstein claimed that his earlier opinion on the drama should be revised and drama has something grand. I would like to locate this study in the theoretical space between Wittgenstein's two positions on *The Dark Chambers*. In particular, this study explores Wittgenstein's discussion of Tagore's play within the context and the process of his philosophical development and examines whether Tagore's creative works influence Wittgenstein's later philosophy (the *Philosophical Investigations*).

Introduction

It is a widely discussed fact that Ludwig Wittgenstein's reading of other philosophers was very 'limited' and very 'selective'. Even among those 'limited' thinkers whom Wittgenstein mentioned in his writings, Rabindranath Tagore is a notably less documented person by Wittgensteinians. Tagore was an Indian poet and Wittgenstein's contemporary. Tagore seems to have been one of the 'most known' Indian thinkers at that time, since he was the first Indian who was awarded the prestigious Nobel Prize for his contributions to literature in 1913. Wittgenstein mentioned Tagore's drama *The Kings of the Dark Chamber* in his letters to (a) Paul Engelmann on the 23rd October 1921 and (b) Ludwig Hänsel in November 1921.

These were the only two occasions that we see these Tagore-Wittgenstein interventions (if we might call it an intervention). Beside these two instances it was documented that Wittgenstein read Tagore's poems when he had a meeting with group of philosophers from the Vienna Circle in 1927. This 'poetry reading' has been given different interpretations by scholars on the subject. Janik and Toulmin (1973, 215) claim that this should be read as an indication for Wittgenstein's counter-attitude towards his position in *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*. They further state that "If, on their first meeting, Wittgenstein insisted on reading the Vienna Circle philosophers the poetry of Tagore" that shows that "Wittgenstein openly dissociated himself from the 'technical' and 'professional' conception of philosophy" (1973, 257) which was advocated by the *Tractatus*.

My objective in this paper is to engage with Wittgenstein's direct readings of Tagore's *The King of the Dark Chamber* and to examine an indirect conceptual relationship of Wittgenstein teachings and Tagore's thinking. And I contend that there are philosophical notions behind Tagore's *The Dark Chamber* and argue that there was a significant theoretical influence on Wittgenstein's later thinking from this Tagore's creative work. In particular, I examine (a) a possible 'conceptual relationship' between the later Wittgenstein's considerations of a private language and Tagore's concept of inner sensation; and (b) Wittgenstein's thought-experiment of the 'beetle in the box' and Tagore's motive of 'Queen in the dark chamber'. By examining this, this paper argues that there is a correlation between Tagore's idea of individual internal awakening and outer manifestation in his dramatic expression and Wittgenstein's notions of inner and outer in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Wittgenstein's communications on Tagore

In a letter to Paul Engelmann from the 23rd October 1921, Wittgenstein mentioned that he read Tagore's drama *The King of the Dark Chamber* and was rather critical of the content of it. He rather indicated his disagreement with Tagore's works. Wittgenstein wrote that it seems to him that this drama made him feeling that the "wisdom has come out of the ice-box". He further wrote,

> I should not be surprised to learn that he got it all second-hand by reading and listening (exactly as so many among us acquire their knowledge of Christian wisdom) rather than from his own genuine *feeling*. Perhaps I don't understand his tone; to me it does not ring like a tone of a man possessed by the truth. (*Like for instance Ibsen's tone.*). It is possible, however, that here the translation leaves a chasm which I cannot bridge. I read *with interest* throughout, but without being gripped. That does not seem to be a good sign. (Engelmann 1967, 25)

However, Wittgenstein, in a later letter to Ludwig Hänsel, mentioned that he is rereading Tagore's *Dark Chamber* and this time with more pleasure. He says, "I now believe that there is *indeed* something grand here" in *The King of the Dark Chamber* (Hänsel 1951, 276).

Wittgenstein's readings of Tagore's play can be categorized by two main positions: (a) The disagreement with what Tagore presented through the drama and (b) changing the position of it though without outlining the area or points which he disagreed earlier and agrees now.

I locate my interest in this study in the space between Wittgenstein's contrasting positions concerning Tagore's *The King of the Dark Chamber* and engage in mapping the indirect conceptual relationship that these two prominent thinkers shared in between.

Content of Tagore's *The King of The Dark Chamber*

The play is about a King who is not visible throughout the play. It is also about the King's 'relationship' with his Queen Sudarshana and other characters. The Queen has been kept in a dark chamber where she cannot see the King. It seems the relationship between Sudarshana, the Queen, and the King is symbolic and not real. Since the Dark Chamber doesn't allow the Queen to see who the King is, she has to 'construct' an imaginative structure in order to fulfill her desire to think that the King should be a handsome person. This relationship between the King as imagined by the Queen and the Queen as a real person could be read as a relationship between man and the Divine on the one hand, and for some, a romantic relationship between two equally powerful individuals in the other.

The King is unseen by his subjects; some of them question his very existence. There are other important characters in the play, including the maidservant Surangama and others who are so loyal and worshipful to him that they do not even request to see him. The subjects have need to seek proof of the King's existence; they believe him to be real and great. Only those who have disarmed their own pride in subjection to their King know him. They have a sense of when the King is nearing and when he is present. But the Queen who keeps equal 'existence' to the King in her imaginary world cannot reach him. However later part of the drama presents the each character of the play as having its own 'imaginary existence' of the King, which might not meet his real existence. Moreover, the King as a person might not exist at all.

The play also deals with the "inner" aspects of an individual's spiritual and personal awakening, in relation to beauty and truth. The following discussion between the Queen and the Servant shows the relationship between "sense" and "without seen".

> SUDARSHANA. How can you perceive when he comes?
> SURANGAMA. I cannot say: I seem to hear his footsteps in my own heart.
> Being his servant of this dark chamber, I have developed a sense-I can know and feel without seeing. (Tagore 1914, 53)

Tagore *in* the later Wittgenstein's works

The passages of Wittgenstein's texts that are relevant to this study are primarily Sections 243 to 307 of the *Philosophical Investigation*. There are two main areas of inquiry that Wittgenstein engages in these sections: the private language argument and the notions of inner and outer.

The discussion of the private language argument goes to show that the meaningfulness of psychological related concepts such as "pain", "sensation" etc. depends upon the possibilities of producing public criteria for the application of those concepts (McGinn 1997, 115). This position was established by Wittgenstein's argument in the PI, §258, which claims that the private sensation "has no meaning because there is no way of fixing that a future use of 'S' is correct" (McGinn 1997, 129). The idea of 'private' experience as "self ascription of an 'inner process' [is] criterionless"; the nature of such inner processes without outward criteria is meaningless (Budd 1989, 61). This study compares Wittgenstein's position with the conceptual picture that Tagore's *Dark Chamber* brought with regard to the concept of internal imaginative function of the 'other'

(*the King*) in the Queen's mind. The existence of the King functions as the 'entity of non-existence' on the one hand and the 'disciplined social order' itself represents the existence of the King on the other.

The second issue of importance is found in §§281-307 where Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of a word is not fixed throughout the practice. Here, the central issue is the idea that the inner understanding of the idea of a private object and its outer manifestation is possible only within the public linguistic use. The problematics of having a private ostensive definition, which Wittgenstein discusses in §§243-281, is very important here. Tagore's concept of outer manifestation of the inner feeling (the influence of the King on the servant/ order of the king without his real representation) shows interesting parallels to this idea. The grammar of traditional ordinary language-game as Wittgenstein presented through Augustinian words does not fit in defining the meaning in inward picture of the concept.

Wittgenstein's argument of the "beetle in the box" is central to this analysis. According to this argument we all have our own box (pain as a private object in the body) that has a beetle is inside which only a person having that box can see. All agents have, so to speak, their own feelings which are analogous to beetles in their boxes/bodies. But the beetles drop out. What remains are the boxes/bodies with their public manifestations.

Wittgenstein raises several issues: first, (a) whether these two (private object and its public grammar) do not connect at all, or (b) whether we could have some common understanding of the using beetle as something in different boxes and one set of problems; Second, whether (c) the inside of the boxes are always changing, or rather (d) there might not be anything at all in the boxes. It seems that this analysis is shown in the idea of the dark chamber in Tagore's play. The dark chamber as the Queen's box and "beetle" as the King, which has different manifestation for each of the participants to the discussion (the Queen, the Servant, other kings) show very interesting parallels to each other.

Conclusion

The dark chamber in the play is analogous to the box in Wittgenstein's terms. The queen has contact with the king only in the chamber. What is left for her is only her imagination. Other people experience the King's existence/ presence through the order of the kingdom (although there are some who doubt). The queen has, so to speak, only a private experience with the king. He is her beetle in the box. What she needs is a public experience of him. That is why she goes out to seek after him. The king lets her go, but says that he will be everywhere: "I shall show myself again and again, from every side of the crowd." (Tagore 1914, 61) The king is, as matter of fact, visible only in the order.

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Zwei Schiffbrüche und ein Liegeplatz

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Abstract

Lukrez zeichnet zu Beginn des 2. Buches von *De rerum natura* das Bild eines Schiffes in Seenot – gesehen vom sicheren Ufer aus. Hans Blumenberg hat das Motiv als „Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer" aufgegriffen. Es exemplifiziert ein Verhältnis zwischen Naturgewalt und reflexiver Reserve; übertragen auf künstlerische Darstellungen zwischen Ästhetik und Natur. Der Beitrag analysiert diese Bezüge schematisch und wendet die Analyse auf Blumenbergs Motiv an. Das Photo der Folgen eines Schiffbruchs hat, zweitens, 2015 international Betroffenheit ausgelöst. Sie folgt ästhetisch-moralischen Beweggründen und muss, so wird argumentiert, durch die Anerkennung des Faktors Natur ergänzt werden. Natur gehört mitbestimmend zu einem Kunstwerk, das diesen Schiffbruch im Gedächtnis hält.

„Ästhetik der Natur" ist ein zwiespältiger Titel. Er operiert mit der impliziten Opposition zwischen Kultur und Natur, nimmt sie aber gleichzeitig zurück, sofern beide als Gegenstand ästhetischer Betrachtung erscheinen. Traditionell ist unter dieser Überschrift in vielfältigen Abschattierungen das Verhältnis zwischen kognitiven und affektiven Bestimmungsgründen des Sinneswesens Mensch behandelt worden (vgl. etwa Post 2010). Doch das Thema wird auch in einer naturalistischen Variante verhandelt. Ihr zufolge untersucht die Ästhetik der Natur phylogenetische Determinationen (ehemals das Werk des Schöpfergottes), die menschliches Wohlgefallen bestimmen und als Grundlage sublimierter „Kunst"-Formen anzunehmen sind (vgl. Koch 2008).

Die folgenden Überlegungen halten sich aus diesem Konflikt heraus. Eingangs wird eine Sprachregelung vorgeschlagen, die „natürliche" und „künstliche" Momente schematisch unterscheidet. Davon ausgehend wird, als Beispiel für die Anwendung der Skizze, das Naturelement Meer in den Blick genommen. Dabei wird die Systematik deutlich, in welcher Meereskräfte und Kunstwerke miteinander verkoppelt sein können. Diese Überlegungen orientieren sich nicht an subjektiven Konstitutionsleistungen. Sie schließen mit Bemerkungen über eine Kunstaktion, welche der Natur den Vorrang lässt.

1. Ein Schema

Künstlerische Gestaltung wird seit der griechischen Antike als formendes Hervorbringen beschrieben. Diesem form*gebenden* Aspekt entspricht die *Prägung* durch Formen, traditionell ein Kennzeichen der Materie. Fragen der Naturästhetik verlangen eine Analyse dieses form*nehmenden* Moments und können es nicht bei seiner Passivität bewenden lassen. Architektonische Entwürfe können, zum Beispiel, Landschaftsformationen aufnehmen, und sich an ihnen orientieren. Im Extremfall *besteht* bei „ready mades" oder „found footage" die Gestaltung geradezu in der Übernahme externer Formen. Im *Übernommenen* liegt, in diesen Beispielen, das formgebende Prinzip. Eine Überprüfung des simplen Form-Materie-Musters ist angezeigt. Zur Kunstpraxis gehört, erstens, ein Anteil Passivität und die entgegen*genommene* Form ist, zweitens, ein Bestimmungsfaktor für Werke.

Dass Künstlerinnen sich von ihrer Umgebung inspirieren lassen, wird weithin anerkannt. Oft liegt in dieser Betrachtung der Akzent nichtsdestoweniger auf ihrer Form*gebung*. Der Platz auf der Sitzfläche eines Stuhls und nicht die eigene Materialität macht die Fettecke Joseph Beuys' zu Bestandteilen einer „Kunstinstallation" (Clewing 2005). Beuys' (ästhetische) Formgebung beruht jedoch auf einer (sit venia verbo) Form*nehmung*. Er nimmt Fett gerade wegen seiner „Formschwäche" . Es *ist* (in vergleichbar geringem Maß) geformt und wird *über*formt. Der Punkt berührt eine Schlüsselfrage der Naturästhetik. Wie ist das Verhältnis der beiden Formen zu verstehen? Erhebt die künstlerische Intervention vorliegende Materialien (formgebend) erst zu ihrem besonderen Status? Oder enthalten sie von sich aus bereits Charakteristika, welche in einer späteren Intervention (formnehmend) quasi freigelegt werden?

Der Zusammenhang wird in den nächsten Abschnitten an zwei Beispielen verdeutlicht. Schematisch lässt sich die Verschränkung durch eine Indizierung des Terminus „Form" anzeigen. Materie tritt in aller Regel nicht in ungestalteten Agglomeraten auf. Sie ist durch natürliche Prozesse zu einer bestimmten Konsistenz stabilisiert und/oder handwerklich bearbeitet. In „Kunstwerken" werden diese Ergebnisse zum Gegenstand weiterer Gestaltung. Gebilde, die der Formnahme durch künstlerische Tätigkeit *vorliegen*, können als Komposita aus „$Form_1/Materie_1$" notiert werden; sie werden im Kunst-Griff (der $Formgebung_2$) als $Materie_2$ behandelt. Die Nomenklatur ist banal. Sie erweist sich dennoch als nützlich, wenn es darum geht, die komplexen Wechselabhängigkeiten, die sich für Naturanteile in der Kunst ergeben, diskursiv auseinanderzulegen.

2. Ein Schiffbruch

Farbenprächtige Himmelsformationen oder imposante Felsen sind beliebte „Natursujets" wie – am anderen Ende der Skala – entwurzelte Bäume und reißende Wasserfälle. Eine Stufe anspruchsvoller erscheinen eine Ruine oder ein gekentertes Schiff. Im ersten Fall ist das formnehmende$_2$ Verfahren eine *imitatio*. Ihr Ausgangspunkt liegt in einem anonymen Prozess, der durch die darstellende Behandlung in die Sphäre des Beachtlichen, Eindrucksvollen, Schönen „gehoben" wird. Der symbolische Gehalt des Ergebnisses liegt zur Gänze auf der Seite der Betrachtung. Ein nächster Schritt sind $Formen_1/Materie_1$, die Spuren der Menschenwelt bereits in sich enthalten. Die ästhetische $Formung_2$ eines gekenterten Schiffes setzt sich zur $Form_1$ eines Beförderungsmittels in Beziehung. Ein Thema, in dem sich diese Interferenz verdichtet, ist der „Schiffbruch mit Zuschauern", dem Hans Blumenberg eine Studie gewidmet hat (Blumenberg 1997).

Die „Ästhetik und Moral des Zuschauers" entwickelt Blumenberg rund um eine Lagebeschreibung bei Lukrez. Es sei angenehm („suave") vom sicheren Ufer aus ein

Schiff in Seenot zu betrachten (Lukrez 1986, 2. Buch, 1-4). Lukrez beschreibt die Selbstbestätigung der philosophischen Reserve gegenüber dem Andrang der Welt. Das sprachliche Bild, dessen er sich bedient, eignet sich gut für Gemälde, wie sie etwa Claude Vernet oder William Turner ausgeführt haben. Sie sind formnehmend$_2$, dramatische Wiedergaben eines Sturmes, in dem Seefahrer der Macht des Meeres unterliegen. Form$_1$/Materie$_1$ dieses Sujets ist ein Überlebenskampf. Weil darin Menschen involviert sind, ist die Formgebung$_2$ nicht bloß Imitation. Sie bewirkt zusätzlich eine Identifikation. Der Effekt des Bildes kommt vom Wissen, dass das abgebildete Ereignis, so wie seine piktorale Wiedergabe, von einer zweifachen Verfassung des menschlichen Lebens handelt. Im einen Fall um seine Gefährdung, im anderen um die gesicherte Distanz, aus welcher alleine sie sich darstellen lässt.

Bilder vom Schiffbruch führen Menschen unter dem Diktat der Physik und als Beobachterinnen physikalischer Ereignisse vor Augen. (Entsprechend gibt es die Physik als wissenschaftliche Disziplin nur, weil Forscherinnen ihr unterworfen *und* von ihr distanziert sind.) Die Pointe lässt sich als ein Formenspiel fassen: die Formnahme$_2$ ist auf eine Form$_1$/Materie$_1$ gerichtet, die, parallel zur Formgabe$_2$, einen menschliche Anteil enthält. Nicht verklausuliert: das Werk des Malers zeigt Mensch-in-Natur; es dreht sich darum, dass Menschen zum Spielball des Meeres werden, auch und besonders angesichts der Tatsache, dass es sich um dieselben Wesen handelt, die aus diesen Verhältnissen (innerhalb des Bildes) ein Wohlgefühl und (im Kunstgenuss) Schönheit gewinnen. Die Rolle „natürlicher" Phänomene erschöpft sich in diesem Beispiel nicht darin, als Input in eine Formgebung zu fungieren. Der Homo sapiens (ein Naturphänomen) begegnet in einer Doppelrolle: sowohl in seinen (Kunst-)Werken, als auch in den Gestalten, die ihnen zugrunde liegen.

3. Noch ein Schiffbruch

Die Moral, welche in Blumenbergs Kapitelüberschrift angesprochen ist, hängt daran, dass sich die Auslieferung an Naturereignisse, anders als diese selbst, zwischen zwei Beteiligungsformen aufbaut: der Existenz der Opfer und der Emphase der Zeuginnen. Zwischen Akteuren in Gefahr und jenen in Beobachtungsposition bestehen, ausgesprochen oder nicht, Bindungen der Solidarität. Die Formnahme$_2$ des Form-Materie-Ensembles$_1$ bezieht (im Beispiel) hilflose Individuen auf solche mit Sitz in einem Hafen. Wie sollen sie sich verhalten? Die Frage stellt sich im faktischen Notfall der Seerettung und ebenso für Produkte mit ästhetischem Anspruch. Menschen-in-Natur, als gefährdet dargestellt, sind keine l'art-pour-l'art Objekte.

Ein realer Schiffbruch ereignete sich vergangenes Jahr. Am 2.9.2015 kenterte ein Schlauchboot mit 16 Passagieren beim Versuch, aus der Türkei zur griechischen Insel Kos überzusetzen. Der 3-jährige Alan Kurdi gehörte zu den Toten. Das Photo seiner angeschwemmten Leiche verbreitete sich schnell im Social Web und fand weltweite Resonanz (Death 2016). Affektive und gedankliche Faktoren machten es zu einer Ikone der Erschütterung über das Flüchtlingsschicksal. Seine Wirksamkeit bezieht es aus der Formnahme$_2$ eines Naturgeschehens, in dem ein kleines Kind zu Tod gekommen ist. Die letale Kollision zwischen dem Meer und dem Wagnis einer Überfahrt wird in eine Abbildung gebracht. Der Sandstrand als flaches Grab des Kindes ergibt ein eindringliches Memento Mori. In der Rezeption des Bildes ist vorwiegend vom Versagen politischer Systeme und einer Krise der Humanität gesprochen worden. Doch das ist nur der eine Teil der Konstellation eines Schiffbruchs.

Zugespitzt formuliert: das Photo handelt ebenso sehr vom Sieg des Meeres, wie vom Scheitern von Menschen, welche die Naturgewalten herausfordern. Es unterscheidet sich von Photos, die z.B. nach dem Amoklauf in einer Volksschule zu machen sind. Dort ist die Sterblichkeit ein Hintergrund, vor welchem die Unfassbarkeit wahnhafter Zustände aufblitzt. Die Szene an der Küste von Bodrum ist konstitutiv von der Unfassbarkeit der Natur geprägt, mit der Menschen sich anlegen. Die Aufnahme ist eine Dokumentation, die in eine moralische Umgebung einbezogen werden kann. Die politische und humanitäre Misere, in deren Rahmen sich die photographierte Episode zugetragen hat, bestimmte die Rezeption. Die Identifikation mit dem Totenbild aus einem Bootsunglück setzte eine Kette von Klagen, Vorwürfen und Aufrufen in Gang. Das ist jedoch nicht die ganze Geschichte. Die Erschütterung, welche das Bild des toten Alan Kurdi hervorruft, beruht auch auf der Demonstration, dass niemand etwas gegen den Tod ausrichtet. Der Materie-Anteil des Form-Materie-Kompositums$_1$ schlägt in seiner Ästhetisierung durch.

4. Schiffbruch mit Kurzschluss

Ein Grund dafür, dass die Rolle der Naturgesetze im Bild des toten Alan Kurdi kaum mitgedacht wird, ist der Modus seiner Verbreitung. Es ist nicht bloß schlagartig in den maßgeblichen Nachrichtenkanälen der Mediengesellschaft verteilt worden. In der Echokammer dieser Transportmittel ist auch die Nachricht über die globale Verbreitung einer Nachricht ein Wirkungsfaktor. Zum Wirbel der Mitteilungen und der Spuren, die beide im Social Web ziehen, hat das factum brutum der Lebensgefahr auf hoher See nichts beizutragen. Wenn man es entsprechend würdigt, legt sich die Frage nahe, aus welchen Gründen Migrantinnen (m/w) eher den Tod riskieren, als die Alternativen des Überlebens. Das ist kein Thema der Moral, sondern ein Auslöser zur Kritik der politischen Gesamtverfassung der Region. Sie muss auch eine Problematisierung der Menschenopfer einschließen, zu denen sich die Betroffenen selbst entschließen. Das Bild, das innerhalb eines dichten Gewirrs von Vermittlungsoperationen auf die Betrachterinnen trifft, ist auch ein Epitaph, ein Gedenkstein eines Naturereignisses.

Christian Geyer hat es als Reaktion auf den Albtraum des Syrienkrieges ausgesprochen: „Unser Albtraum ist, dass wir solche Albträume nur in abgeleiteten, von der Deutungsmaschinerie erhitzten Kategorien wie Fluchtursachen, Einzelfallprüfung und Kriminalitätsstatistik wahrzunehmen gewöhnt sind." (Geyer 2016, S.9) Nachrichten über tragische Todesfälle werden medial umstandslos in den Tagesablauf von Informationskonsumentinnen eingespeist und dort, wenn überhaupt, nur oberflächlich bearbeitet. Das quasi-ökologische Gleichgewicht, das jede Person zwischen ihrem Hoffnungspotenzial und ihrer Endlichkeit herstellen muss, ist überfordert. Im Anschluss an den Schiffbruch September 2015 ist an mehreren Stellen auf einen aktionistischen Notbehelf zurückgegriffen worden.

Die Spruchtafel „Je suis Charlie" wurde nach den Pariser Anschlägen vom 7. Jänner 2015 in unterschiedlichen Kontexten als Geste der Solidarität mit dem Satiremagazin eingesetzt. Nach diesem Muster tauchten schnell Plakate, Sticker und Webgraphiken mit der Aufschrift „Je suis Aylan" auf (z.B. Visual Transaction 2016). Das ist ein Gegenzug zum Albtraum, den Christian Geyer heraufbeschwört, nämlich die verbale Identifikation mit der Figur, die tot am Strand liegt. Diese rhetorische Intervention ignoriert alle Nuancen, die in der Darstellung eines externen, medial durchformten, Sachverhaltes liegen. Als Demonstration ist

sie verständlich, aber es muss auch erlaubt sein, darauf hinzuweisen, dass es sich um eine sehr bescheidene politisch-proklamative Kundgebung handelt. Sowohl der menschliche, als auch der schicksalshafte Anteil der Tragödie sind ausgeblendet. Der Spruch beschwört die *condition humaine* unter einem besonderen Blickwinkel, nämlich der Betroffenheit einzelner Manifestantinnen, die sich in die Trauergemeinde hineinreklamieren.

5. Übersichtliche Darstellung

Althergebrachte Zeichen der Anteilnahme an einem Todesfall sind schwarze Armschleifen in der Verwandtschaft, der Trauerflor auf einer Fahne oder eine Schweigeminute. Die beschriebenen Spruchtafeln bieten demgegenüber einen Slogan. Zwischen traditionellen Gebräuchen und aktuellen Solidaritätskundgebungen ist Platz für künstlerische Darstellung. Eine Verarbeitung des diskutierten Photos schließt den vorliegenden Beitrag ab. Es soll gezeigt werden, dass die Unverfügbarkeit von Naturabläufen darin ein Gegengewicht zur ästhetisch-moralischen Achse der Betroffenheit darstellt. Formal gesprochen wird in der Brücke der Empathie eine Komponente des Form-Materie-Komplexes$_1$ (das *menschliche* Schicksal) formnehmend$_2$ aufgegriffen und mit der korrespondierenden Komponente der Formgebung$_2$ (Betroffenheit der Betrachterin) verschaltet. Weniger umständlich formuliert handelt es sich um die schaudernde Anteilnahme am Geschick fremder Akteure, welche Blumenbergs „Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer" in eine einprägsame Formel bringt.

Zuseherinnen identifizieren sich demonstrativ mit der Not von Mitmenschen, die sie nicht sind. Sie bezeichnen sich sogar mit deren Namen. Offensichtlich ist das ein übertragener Gebrauch des Satzteils „Je suis ...". Jeder weiß, dass er – wörtlich genommen – nicht zutrifft. Die Diagnose erinnert an einen berühmten ästhetischen Effekt. R. Magrittes Schriftzug „Ceci n'est pas une pipe" unter dem Abbild einer Pfeife zeigt, was zu diesem Thema zu sagen ist. Identifikationen, die wir mit Hilfe von Darstellungen vornehmen, enthalten ein Element von Willkür; Semiotik verbindet die Bruchstelle zwischen Zeichen und Bezeichnetem. Die Botschaft ist auch im vorliegenden Fall zu beachten.

Der chinesische Künstler Ai Weiwei hat sich an jener Stelle, an der Alan Kurdi an den Strand geschwemmt wurde, in Positur gelegt. Ein Kritiker findet: „To pose as Kurdi is a crude piece of identification with the dead boy." (Ratman 2016). Er mokiert sich darüber mit der Bemerkung, Ai Weiwei sehe „a good deal heavier" aus, als das Kleinkind. Das ist eine kurzsichtige Lesart der Szene, die Ai Weiwei konstruiert. Gerade die abfällige Bemerkung über dessen

Körperfülle gibt jedoch Anlass für einen Blickwechsel. Dickleibigkeit ist in dieser Inszenierung ein Beitrag der Natur.

Der abgebildete Körper Alan Kurdis wird durch den Körper einer weltbekannten Figur ersetzt. Selbstverständlich ist es nicht Alan Kurdis Körper. Der Titel des Bildes könnte „Ich bin nicht Alan Kurdi" lauten. Seinen Effekt bezieht es allerdings nicht aus der Reflexion eines Darstellungsverhältnisses, sondern aus einer Naturgegebenheit. In der Terminologie des eingangs entwickelten Schemas ausgedrückt: ein Betrachter auf der Ebene der Formgebung$_2$ (ein Zuseher am Strand) legt seinen Körper an die Stelle, auf welche er formnehmend$_2$ hinweisen will. Er *ist* auf der Ebene des Form-Materie-Komplexes$_1$ das Wesen aus Fleisch und Blut, das er formgebend$_2$ zum Denkmal des Todes Alan Kurdis erhebt. Ihm vorzuhalten, seine körperlichen Eigenschaften seien nicht jene Alan Kurdis, ist so verfehlt, wie gegen eine Nachbildung des Kindes aus Stein oder Metall aufzutreten.

Niru Ratman hält Ai Weiwei vor, er wäre nicht in derselben Position wie Alan Kurdi, denn dieser könnte nach der Photosession nicht aufstehen und den Ort verlassen. Er moralisiert. Die Strandszene hält Schiffbrüchige und teilnehmende Beobachtung zusammen und auseinander. Sie tut das, indem sie dem Abbild einer Leiche, d.h. eines Menschen auf der Rückkehr zur bloßen Natur, das Abbild eines Menschen unterschiebt, der diesem Vorgang vorläufig widersteht. Eine Gegenstimme zur mentalen Identifikation ist die Bewegung, durch die sich Ai Weiwei mit einem leblosen Körper in eine Reihe stellt. So entsteht Kunst aus Natur.

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Recollecting Rush Rhees

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Abstract

This brief recollection is primarily an acknowledgement of a personal debt of gratitude to Rush Rhees. It may serve as a reminder that apart from his contribution to making Wittgenstein's works accessible, he developed his own distinctive philosophical voice. By casting a particular light on the man and his work I hope to encourage a re-reading. In the early part of this paper, I focus on his seminars and the impression they made on those who attended, while in the remainder, I comment briefly on wider issues; editing Wittgenstein, making his works more understandable through teaching and writing, as well as his own unique contribution to philosophy.

When I arrived in Swansea in 1981 to do post-graduate research, what I knew about Rush Rhees was perhaps similar to anyone with a nodding acquaintance of philosophy – namely, that he was one of Wittgenstein's literary executors, and that he was both an editor of and a commentator on his work. I did not know about his close friendship with Wittgenstein or his discussions with him regarding parts of the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) and its ordering (Rhees 2006, p. 257). Understandably, I was unaware of the reverence with which he was held as a teacher. Around this time Rush Rhees returned to Swansea from London and began giving lectures attended mainly by teaching staff from various disciplines. He was introducing Wittgenstein's "Lectures, on 'Private Experience' and 'Sense Data'". These were instigated by Professor Phillips, then Head of the Philosophy Department and former student of Rhees', who wanted him involved. After a small number of sessions, Rhees told Phillips that he no longer wished to continue. Without knowing the precise reasons, I suspect that he felt he was lecturing; merely increasing the audience's knowledge of a famous philosopher, when he wanted simply to teach those interested *in philosophy.* So he switched to giving weekly seminars to a small group of post-graduate students, of which I was part.

1. Rhees' Seminars

These took place once a week on Wednesdays, lasting about two hours though they often continued until we were evicted by the cleaners. There was a nucleus of about five or six of us with periodic visits from overseas students or staff. Rhees helped us greatly to understand Wittgenstein's works but more importantly he showed us by example an approach to philosophy and thereby gave us a sense of what it was or could be. Though in the twilight of his life, already in his late-70's, Rhees never missed a session over a six-year period. He lectured without referring to notes, though he would sometimes consult a volume of Wittgenstein's work usually the German Suhrkamp Taschenbuch edition, which was well-thumbed with notes and cross-references in the margins.

Rhees did not conform to the common notion of a great lecturer – there was nothing smooth or slick about his presentation, he was not interested in pleasing his audience and he did not make the topics he was dealing with simpler or more digestible. However, he left no one in any doubt about the importance of what he was discussing even if one did not always fully understand it. His delivery was slow and measured punctuated with occasional silences – he worked through philosophical problems anew – so there was a sense of vulnerability and drama. The slowness was not due to lack of preparation or an inadequate grasp of his material but reflected the care he took in selecting just the right word, the appropriate expression to which he paid great attention. If one was thinking along with him one was not conscious of the passage of time because of the uncertainty of the direction of his train of thought and the possibility of surprise. It carried a certain tension, which underlined the difficulty of the subject.

What one learns can only be gauged sometime after the event, but the common experience of those attending the seminars, was that of difficulty. While we were encouraged to contribute to discussion, sometimes our fear of talking nonsense or our inability to express ourselves with the required rigour could render us virtually speechless. Becoming full participants in the seminars was a slow, sometimes painful process. As a result students certainties began to waver and some questioned the viability of their research topics.

One could feel the strong link with Wittgenstein in Rhees' determination to share his understanding and his evident desire to be true to his teacher at all times. The approach was sometimes text-based – the *Tractatus*, *Philosophical Investigations*, *The Blue and Brown Books*, *On Certainty*; at other times he would take a problem such as 'the nature of causality' or 'time', or 'what it means to follow a rule' and examine it mainly through Wittgensteinian lenses but he would also provide some historical context. He ranged widely over topics much beyond the Wittgensteinian corpus. Whichever approach was adopted, Rhees wanted us to understand that Wittgenstein had taught a method, which he was passing on. The natural question to ask is what that method consisted of. There is no simple answer, though a number of things can be said. In fact, there is not just *one* method. Firstly, philosophy is an *activity* rather than a body of knowledge – it is something one must engage with oneself, which is one source of its difficulty (Wittgenstein 1974, T 4.112). Rhees suggested it was a good idea to have the *Tractatus* to hand when reading PI as the two works were often in dialogue with one another. He disliked talk of early and late Wittgenstein, because he wanted to emphasise the continuity of Wittgenstein's interest in *logic* in PI, although now he was likely to talk more about *grammar* or *conceptual analysis*. The difficult process of conceptual analysis is a key part of the method and everywhere to be found in Wittgenstein's PI, dealing with scepticism, privacy, mastery of a concept, following a rule and so on. A fundamental feature is the use of examples – for which Wittgenstein had a particular genius. These could be used to ground a discussion, to show other possibilities and to dislodge one's mind from its habitual ruts. It helped us see what this method was against – namely,

seeking a definition, craving generality and thereby despising the particular case. Related to this was what was called the '*anthropological method*', the use of imaginary cases as a liberating force – showing other possibilities were conceivable and moreover there was no necessity to our own practices. In contrast to science, philosophy is contemplative, and so it can consider cases that do not exist in actuality; seeing how things might be done differently in mathematics, science, or ethics from how they *in fact* are. Thus we see better what our own practices are like, but do not have to be (Citron 2015, p. 39). Rhees stressed the unity of philosophy suggesting that whatever problem you started with you would quickly stumble on others which you would have to deal with. He alluded to Wittgenstein's use of the analogy between philosophy and a map or a city – how with time one sees major routes and smaller ones and how parts are linked, the familiar and unfamiliar, how one might get lost and so on.

The most important element of Wittgenstein's teaching however, could not be set out in sentences – rather it had to be seen unfold in practice, in his struggles in lectures, writings or conversations. Attending Rhees' seminars, one felt his fidelity to that aspect of Wittgenstein's practice – providing a model of how to do this kind of philosophy*, in his own way* but with the same spirit of seriousness. You were *shown* rather than *told*. He emphasised that doing philosophy required patience and that with time one developed '*a nose*' for where the crux of a problem lay. One had to '*stick around*', stay with the problems, to make advances in understanding. Like Wittgenstein, the man and the philosopher were of a piece, so knowing the person perhaps helps with understanding the work.

2. Rhees as Philosopher

As the seminars progressed we became interested in Rhees' philosophical writings, his life and his work with Wittgenstein. Rhees took considerable pains editing Wittgenstein's corpus and when he was criticised for his editorial decisions, not printing the *Big Typescript as it stood*; he responded with characteristic honesty, "In any editing I have done I have asked again and again what Wittgenstein would have wanted. This has guided me in what I have decided to leave out and what I have decided to include." (Rhees 1996, p. 56) Wittgenstein had entrusted him and his two other executors with the task and he was carrying it out with judgement based on his detailed knowledge of Wittgenstein's working methods and standards. The seriousness with which he undertook the task can be seen in correspondence between the executors (Erbacher and Krebs 2015, p. 4).

The more we got to know Rhees, the more our respect for him grew, both as a person and philosopher. He showed great humility in his dealings with us, frequently dismissive of his own undoubted philosophical abilities and achievements. This of course was no affectation adopted in his later years – one has only to look at his job applications when much younger, to see his humility and extraordinary candour. (Rhees 2006, p. 270-1) Further, when the opportunity to attain academic promotion arose, he was quick to turn it down. It manifested itself too in his reluctance to have his work published no doubt feeling it failed to meet his exacting standards.

Attending his seminars it often crossed my mind that Rhees' career had been eclipsed by Wittgenstein, and that he suffered by being in his shadow. I began to change my mind however, when I read his excellent critical essay on "Wittgenstein's Builders", expressing his reservations

about the notion of "language games", along with the development of his ideas on the notion of a private language. (Rhees 1970, p. 71-84) With the appearance of several books published posthumously, edited by Phillips, the view of his independence as a thinker has been greatly strengthened. Rhees' intellectual honesty is shown in the critical position he adopts to those he admires, such as Simone Weil, or his contemporaries like Norman Malcolm. I suppose one might trace that thread of fearless critical engagement back to his troubled days in Rochester University from which he was expelled.

While Rhees' *method* of doing philosophy is greatly influenced by Wittgenstein, his *conception* of it is arguably different. For instance, he is much more interested in the history of philosophy and appreciates what we can learn by tracing arguments over time. He wanted to place Wittgenstein's discussions in line with those of the early Greek philosophers notably, Plato. Though Rhees himself goes to considerable lengths to minimise the difference between his views and Wittgenstein's it is useful to just compare what each has said, to highlight the areas of tension. From the start there is a strong tendency in Wittgenstein to want to get problems solved in philosophy – this business- like approach continued I think over time. In the Preface to the *Tractatus*, "the *truth* of the thoughts that are here communicated seem to me unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe myself to have found on all essential points, the final solution of the problems" (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 4); "The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to." (PI 133) Writing in 1933, in "Philosophy", he argues that philosophical problems arise from confusions in our language. The role of the philosopher is to make plain what is unclear or confusing with the aim of providing a "perspicuous representation" of the grammar of concepts. "The problems are dissolved in the actual sense of the word – like a lump of sugar in water." or "If I am correct, then philosophical problems must be completely solvable." (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 181-183).In the same article, he speaks of problems in philosophy being like an illness that requires treatment. Though Rhees accepts the analogy between *treating* a disorder using psycho-analysis with treating *a philosophical problem;* he takes issue with the notion of philosophical perplexity being analogous to an illness because it's not as if the person who is never troubled by such questions is somehow 'healthy'. If the philosopher gets clear about her puzzlement, she is not restored to the *where she was before being puzzled.* Rhees claims that to be a philosopher one must see the problems in a certain way. "Not wanting to dismiss the questions, nor to 'get rid of them' through any sort of answer, or to show that they are a needless worry to be put out of mind. (Wittgenstein sometimes spoke about this in a way that was misleading and contrary to his own practice.)" (Rhees 2006, p. xiii) In later discussions with Rhees, Wittgenstein rejected his idea of PI 133, that what he wanted was something that would enable him to stop philosophy whenever he wished – saying that "is a lie: for I cannot stop it" (Rhees 2006, p. 261).

Rhees does not speak of *solutions* to philosophical problems – philosophy is not about removing certain kinds of unease, or disease, the difficulties are not ultimately solved by conceptual analysis or the removal of conceptual confusion, though that will be part of it. The problems are not problems *with* language, "The man who is puzzled about the nature of thought is not puzzled about language; he is puzzled about thought." (Fann 1967, p. 74-78) He would agree with Wittgenstein that there is an aspect to philosophical practice that is not purely intellectual but involves character – a matter of the will and thereby has a

moral dimension. (Rhees 1969, p. 169-172) Philosophy for Rhees is discussion involving the growth and development of the understanding – there are no ultimate solutions.

While Rush Rhees will be remembered as one of the literary executors of Wittgenstein's will, intimately involved in the publication and dissemination of his works; for me he was the embodiment of the ideal philosopher – a person of integrity, with a vocation to developing understanding through attentive and honest discussion.

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The Viewpoint-View Scheme – Against the Philosophical Doctrine of the Privacy of Mental Phenomena

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Abstract

An essential part of the inner/outer picture of the mind which has dominated modern philosophy is the idea that mental phenomena are private. In this paper, I discuss the privacy of mental phenomena, not from the standpoint of subject-object framework but from that of viewpoint-view scheme, taking up the three different types of mental phenomena – perception, sensation and aspect-seeing – and suggest, inspired by and thinking with Ludwig Wittgenstein, that while the first two – a view and a pain – are not private, the last – an aspect - is private. I will then dispel the inner/outer picture out of the consideration on mental phenomena. Finally, I would say we might come up with communicative discrepancy due to the private characters of our seeing-an-aspect in that language game.

As to 'privacy', Glock once wrote:

> An essential part of the INNER/OUTER picture of the mind which has dominated modern philosophy is the idea that mental phenomena – ideas, sense-data, representations, experiences, etc. – are private in two respects:
> *privately owned* or *inalienable*: no one else can have *my* pain; other people can at most have a pain that is similar to mine;
> *epistemically private*: only I can know that I am in pain, since only I feel it, others can only surmise that I am, on the basis of my behaviour.
> (Glock 1996, p. 304)

In this paper, I discuss the privacy of mental phenomena, not from the standpoint of subject-object framework but from that of viewpoint-view scheme, taking up the three different types of mental phenomena – perception, sensation and aspect-seeing – and suggest, inspired by and thinking with Ludwig Wittgenstein, that while the first two – a view and a pain – are not private[1], the last – an aspect - is private. I will then dispel the inner/outer picture out of the consideration on mental phenomena.

First, I define the three terms as follows;

'A viewpoint' is a place from which something can be perceived or felt.

'A view' is what is perceived or felt from a particular viewpoint.'

'An object' is something in a view which is perceived or felt from many viewpoints.

My idea, developed below, is represented in the following figure 1.

	An object	A viewpoint	A view
Perception	○	many	many
Sensation	×	one	one
Aspect-seeing	×	×	×

Figure 1

Let me start with Wittgenstein's solipsist's claim that personal experiences are epistemically private. S/he says like this; "There is a temptation for me to say that only my own experience is real: 'I know that *I* see, hear, feel pains, etc.,

but not that anyone else does. I can't know this, because I am I and they are they.'" (BB, p. 46) S/he also says: "Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it." (PI 246) Wittgenstein's reply to her/him is: "In what sense are my sensations private? -- In one way this (what the solipsist says) is false, and in another nonsense." (PI 246)

So long as a person can engage in perception-, sensation-, and aspect-seeing language games, s/he will not necessarily hold the solipsistic doctrine, which I as well as Wittgenstein would like to refute. I will explain my idea below.

Perception

What is perceived is an object. In a perception language game, an object usually affords an infinite number of viewpoints with its views. I perceive an object not only from an actual particular viewpoint with its view but from an infinite number of possible viewpoints with their views in mind as well.[2]

When a solipsist says "I see a desk", s/he will dogmatically think no one else can see the desk as s/he does, and that no one else can have this sight. Against him or her, I would like to suggest that we should change our idea: it is not the subject 'I' but a viewpoint that correlates with the view. In my idea, anyone else can in principle see the view if s/he sees it from the same particular viewpoint as I see it from. So, instead of saying "I see a desk", I say "A desk is seen in the view from here (this viewpoint)". One viewpoint opens a corresponding view, and the important thing is I can point to the place (the viewpoint) independently of the view, which is a physical place anyone can occupy. Thus, even if I say of 'this' or 'my' viewpoint, it is no private; anyone can get to the place and open its view, in principle. The same is true of view: even if I speak of 'this' or 'my' view, it is the view which anyone can see from the corresponding viewpoint. In this sense, a viewpoint with its view is impersonal, not private.

Whereas Wittgenstein's solipsist says this way: "When anything is seen, it is always I who see" (BB, p. 63), Wittgenstein replies to her/him: "When I think about it a little longer I see that what I wished to say was: 'Always when anything was seen, something is seen.' I.e., that of which I said it continued during all the experiences of seeing was

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1 My idea is that we should not ascribe the ownership to what is perceived and what is felt. Perception overlaps with sensation, but in principle I distinguish them into two different phenomena in this paper.

2 I agree to the dynamic flow theory of perception, not the snapshot theory.

not any particular entity 'I', but the experiences of seeing itself." (BB, p. 63) This is very close to what I said.

I suggest that in a perception language game 'I' is redundant; anyone can see THIS view from THIS viewpoint.

Sensation

What is felt, such as a pain, is not an object, because whereas an object can be seen from many viewpoints by definition, a pain can be felt from only one. A pain affords just one viewpoint, so we can neither approach pain nor grab it to see from many angles. In a sensation language game, there is just one viewpoint from which I can see a view. A pain is not an object for another reason. A pain exists only while someone feels it. Whereas an object lasts regardless of whether someone perceives it or not, a pain would not last while someone does not feel it; if so, it is no more than nonsense.

There are two big differences between a perception- and a sensation language game. One is that a viewpoint is not a place for sensation. So, it is not easy for someone else to occupy the viewpoint to open its view (pain).[3] The other is that we cannot epistemically distinguish a view (pain) from the viewpoint. When I feel a pain, I cannot make clear where the viewpoint is: it infuses with the view (pain) for sensation.

When a solipsist says "I have a pain", s/he will dogmatically think no one else can have the pain as s/he does, and that no one else can have this pain. Against him or her, I would AGAIN like to replace the subject 'I' with a viewpoint. Instead of saying "I have a pain", I can say "A pain is felt from here (this viewpoint)", even though the pain and the viewpoint are epistemically indistinguishable.

However, the solipsist might still think that the viewpoint cannot be occupied by anyone else, so s/he is tempted to say it is 'this' or 'my' viewpoint (and pain) and that it is private.

Why does s/he think "I have my pain" or "It is only I who can have my pain; no one else can have this pain"? My answer is that it is just because I and anyone else cannot be in the same place simultaneously, just as "The colours green and blue can't be in the same place simultaneously." (BB, p. 56) It is not a metaphysical truth but just a linguistic rule, i.e., a grammatical proposition. "This is a grammatical rule and states a logical impossibility."(BB, p. 56)

In this sense, a viewpoint with its view is also impersonal, not private in a sensation language game. Anyone can have THIS pain from THIS viewpoint, in principle; it is just logically (grammatically) prohibited to say I can feel her/his pain. "Only I can have my pain" is also a grammatical proposition.

As to the private experience of perception and sensation, Wittgenstein once thought in 1930's that the pronoun 'I' has two different usages based on the essence of things in reality. One is 'relative' use: 'I' is a demonstrative pronoun among others, with 'you' or 'he' as adjacent pronouns. The other is 'absolute' use: 'I' is not a demonstrative pronoun and no longer opposed to anything. As well, he thought it is senseless in the latter use to ascribe 'my' to the personal things, because 'my' does not function at all. However, he changed his idea: it is not because of the

asymmetry between other personal pronouns and 'I' in the absolute use (with different verifications) but grammatical differences in linguistic practice. Thus, Wittgenstein began to contrast two different uses, 'subjective' and 'objective', of the first-person pronoun. In the 'subjective' use, I cannot mischaracterize the sufferer in saying of pain, so "In 'I have pain', 'I' is not a demonstrative pronoun" (BB, p. 68) and it is senseless to ascribe the pain to me in saying 'I have my pain'. In and after 1930's, he is a proponent of the doctrine that 'I' is something special, and follows out to make 'I' bloated, so that his idea nearly coincides with a no-ownership theory. Thus, he says "We can say the visual field has certain internal properties, but its being mine is not essential to its description. That is, it is not an intrinsic property of a visual sensation, or pain, to belong to some-one." (WL, 19)

Aspect-seeing

Seeing as (aspect-seeing) is quite different from a genuine seeing of an object (ordinary perception). When I see the duck-rabbit figure, a duck or a rabbit is an aspect, but when we draw the aspect, we draw nothing but the figure itself. An aspect is not an object, because an aspect cannot be seen from many angles by definition. And it's not a view, either. Even if anyone else can occupy the same viewpoint as I, s/he might not see the same aspect as I. In an aspect-seeing language game, what matters is not from where but how we see the figure. Aspect-seeing is related to the way we see. If I say "I see this as duck",[4] I am not saying that I see it from a particular viewpoint, but that I see it in a particular way.[5]

Another reason that an aspect is not an object is that while, if I see the same entity, such two propositions of perception language game as "I see a desk" and "I see a chair" conflicts with each other, these two propositions in an aspect-seeing language game are compatible, even though I see the same figure; "I see a rabbit" and "I see a duck".

Since an aspect is not a view, not something which I can see from a particular viewpoint, I cannot say anyone can see THIS aspect from THIS viewpoint, nor that anyone can see THIS aspect if s/he sees it THIS way.[6] That is to say, I cannot omit 'I' from a sentence like "I see it as a rabbit". Seeing an aspect is a private mental phenomenon. Seeing-an-aspect is a private phenomenon.

Finally, I would like to claim that the privacy of my mental phenomenon in aspect-seeing language game entails a communication problem. Some of the objects afford a single aspect, whereas others afford many. As Wittgenstein says, a knife and fork has just a single aspect, so it would be odd to say 'Now I see this as a knife and fork', 'Now it is a fork for me', or 'It can be a fork too'. (PPF, 122) These are the expressions peculiar to an aspect-seeing language game. We use them when we know there is more than one aspect of the object. However, if we have only ever seen it in its single aspect, we will simply treat it as a picture of, say, a fork. We won't say 'I see it as a fork'. Instead we will simply report the perception in the normal way, as in a perception language game: 'I see a fork.' Although something or some event affords many aspects, we are often only familiar with just one of them. Then, we would talk as if we are engaged in a perception language game. When we see different aspects from each other, seeing the same

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3 I do not say it is impossible, because Wittgenstein often says that "it is conceivable that I feel pain in a tooth in another man's mouth." (BB, p. 49) In possible worlds, someone other than the sufferer can occupy the viewpoint to open its view (pain).

4 'Seeing A as B' is a typical expression when I see an aspect.
5 The same is true for a rhetorical metaphor. When I say 'You are a shining star' (= 'I see you as a shining star'), that means I see you in a particular way.
6 Sometimes I can teach someone how to see an aspect, but not always.

entity, it matters much. What we see would conflict with each other, and we would be exposed to the risk of communicative failure. In an aspect-seeing language game, we would be unable to decide which is right or wrong, and if I don't notice our interlocutor's aspect, I would be at a loss to know what s/he is talking about. That would cause a big problem in mutual understanding.

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The how is key for *the what*
The family chronicle: Ludwig Wittgenstein from a relational perspective

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Abstract

The family chronicle (*Familienerinnerungen*) by Ludwig Wittgenstein's eldest sister Hermine is one of the main biographical sources about the 'private Ludwig' and has crucially shaped the images of Wittgenstein family members. This chronicle, published as a whole for the first time at the end of 2015, is an important step towards an informed reading of this source. However, a reading based upon autobiographical and literary theory can help to deconstruct some of the seductive interpretations of such an (auto)biographical text. In *Das Familiengedächtnis der Wittgensteins* (2011) I analysed this source, arguing that a relational approach – reading autobiographical sources from Hermine alongside autobiographical notes from Ludwig Wittgenstein and examining their attitudes towards the (auto)biographical genre – grants more insights into the way that the formatting of autobiographical texts shapes its content and its perception. This will help to review the images we have from both, built around alleged intended silences.

The family chronicle (*Familienerinnerungen*) by Ludwig Wittgenstein's eldest sister Hermine is one of the main biographical sources about the 'private Ludwig' and has crucially shaped the images that exist of him and the Wittgenstein family. The chronicle – covering the family story from the mid 19th century until 1948, written during and after World War II 1944-48 – had a crucial role also in establishing the family memory, as those stories were, and are, recycled in the family and in the biographies again and again. This chronicle was published at the end of last year (by Somavilla, 2015), and is a reason for me to reassess my dissertation, published as *Das Familiengedächtnis der Wittgensteins* (2011), which analysed this particular source from an interdisciplinary perspective. While back then the family chronicle was accessible only to Wittgenstein scholars close to the family (apart from published excerpts such as the chapter on Ludwig; by Rhees, 1987), now it is available to the broader public. This edition is an important step towards an informed reading of this source, however, a reading based upon autobiographical, literary and cultural theory can help to deconstruct some of its major narratives that have heavily influenced the way that the family and the 'private' Wittgenstein were seen. After all, it has also influenced our perception of him as philosopher. As Marjorie Perloff recently said at a symposium in Vienna: „Because of Wittgenstein being different he looked at difference. This perspective has something to do with your life. Ideas don't come out of a vacuum." Then she referred to his neglected homosexuality, the suicides of his brothers, the burden of Jewishness, and the isolation in places such as Norway; highlighting 'exile features' that can be found already in the early account by Hermine in her chronicle, when describing him as an isolated person from early childhood onwards, feeling permanently misunderstood and socially estranged.

In this article I would like to challenge some of *the seductive interpretations of (auto)biographical texts* in the Wittgenstein field. *Das Familiengedächtnis* is a relational biography, written from two perspectives, Ludwig and Hermine Wittgenstein, which analyses autobiographical sources from both sides, arguing that this helps to review both Hermine and Ludwig Wittgenstein as persons, by scrutinizing their attitude towards the (auto)biographical genre. The term *Familiengedächtnis* hints at the multiple voices that establish a Family memory, showing the impact this has on conceptions of biographical subjects.

Images of the Wittgenstein Family

Hermine Wittgenstein died in 1949, one year after she finished the chronicle. Then her brother Ludwig noted in his manuscript 138: "Mining dying. Great loss to me and all….Around me the roots are cut off, which my own life depends on." He died himself two years later in Cambridge. She had typed many of his manuscripts, which made her familiar with his thoughts. Of all six siblings, they had the most intense relationship, but also a tense one. Powerfully portrayed by the novelist Thomas Bernhard in his play *Ritter, Dene, Voss*. The scene: Ludwig Wittgenstein is sitting together with his sisters, Hermine and Margarete, at the dining table in the family's salon, surrounded by the ancestral portrait gallery. The atmosphere is oppressive. Ludwig speaks:

> Das Speisezimmer
> von dem alles Unheil ausgegangen ist
> Vater Mutter Kinder
> nichts als Höllendarsteller
> in Suppen und Saucen ist immer alles
> das etwas wert gewesen ist
> ertränkt worden
> hatte ich einen tatsächlichen
> hatte ich einen wertvollen Gedanken
> ertränkte ihn die Mutter in ihrer Suppe
> [...] von dem Vaterplatz aus
> sind nur Todesurteile gefällt worden
> [...] um mich erretten zu können
> zuerst der englische
> dann der norwegische Umweg
> [...] Daß wir zusammen Musik gemacht haben
> als ob es Jahrtausende zurück läge.
> (Bernhard 1988, 183f.)

Then he stuffs himself with Hermine's hand-made dumplings until almost suffocated. There is hardly air to breathe, until Hermine leaves the room and he gets up to flip the portraits of the ancestors. These images – Hermine as mother-substitute for 'little Ludwig', almost strangling her brother with care and affection, Ludwig Wittgenstein as a

tormented thinker, and the Wittgenstein family as a destructive community – are hegemonic narratives in the Wittgenstein literature, clearly to be found in numerous memoirs, but already in the chronicle of the sister.

Hermine herself described the Wittgenstein family as a kind of pathological community, by interpreting the suicides of her brothers as caused by father-son tensions instead of showing the different motivations and contexts. Book-titles such as *The House of Wittgenstein–A family at war* by Alexander Waugh (2010) put conflicts and secrets at the centre of a narrative, supporting a psychological reading that gives little space for alternative descriptions of 'normal' (family) life.

For example, Hermine shows the changes in her brother's life (from an engineer to a philosopher, to a teacher, to an architect) as motivated by inner needs and necessities, describing them as conversions, while giving little attention to contextual reasons, such as experiences in World War I or II. But World War I pushed not just Ludwig into a practical profession; also Hermine herself, after having served as nurse, opened a day care for poor children. While beforehand shifting roles between „Malerin, Gutsbesitzerin, Vereinsdame", so Hermine in a letter to Ludwig (28.12.1914), she became in 1921 the director of such an institute. Being unmarried and childless she started her own quasi family, until in 1938 it was dissolved by the Nazis, at the same time when the Wittgenstein family became threatened. This part of her personality remains almost unnoticed, it's the chronicler and Ludwig's eldest sister whom biographers describe.

Here one has to ask, to what extent did the biographers thereby follow not too "slavish in the footsteps of their hero" as Virgina Woolf has called it (in her essay *The New Biography* (1927, 475), characterizing it as 19th-century biography style), when portraying Hermine by following her unselfconfident self presentation? Similarly some critics (such as David Stern) have argued that the biographers had followed primarily the ideal image Wittgenstein had of himself. In the following I will claim that a relational approach grants more insights into what autobiographical texts do for their respective authors.

A relational biography

Das Familiengedächtnis (Immler 2011) is a relational (meta)-biography putting different (auto-)biographical writings vis-a-vis. On the one side, the largely conventional account of a chronicle, describing how the Wittgensteins became an important part of Vienna's economic and cultural life and how they suffered the fate of their Jewishness during the Nazi regime. While Ludwig Wittgenstein's reflections on his life are very fragmented, spread throughout his philosophical oeuvre. We have two pages of autobiographical notes, several remarks that he intended to write an autobiography, numerous observations on the genres of autobiography and diary, his practice of keeping a diary (though mostly not as separate notebook) and of making confessions towards family members and friends, and his use of a code (to separate more private notes in the manuscripts, private in the sense of being remarks on ethics, religion, and culture directed to a specific reader); all this shows that he valued the autobiographical project. Systematically compiling the different autobiographical sources of both authors, categorized and analyzed by genre, shows how the genres crucially shaped the self-presentations of the authors, but also (mis)guided the biographers.

Hitherto the chronicle has been read foremost in regard to the information given about Ludwig and the family, but not in regard to Hermine having her own intentions as author. Thus, freeing the chronicle and its author from Ludwig's shadow by editing the whole text, allows one to see the genre-character of this source, and also the function it has in a very important moment of Hermine's life: namely holding a family together at a moment it has fallen apart. This rupture however one hardly realizes as she focuses on family history, cultural traditions, daily rituals, and continuities. The rupture of the war is manifest in the texture, when Hermine shifted her language into a documentary style when describing the events of 1938. In chronological detail she describes the deal the family made with Hitler-Germany, when buying for a huge amount the Aryanization status to be able to stay in Austria. Hermine's decision to stay and to pay, while nearly all other family members (had) left the country, split the family for decades (Immler 2011, 244f.). Writing the chronicle, rooting the family deeply in Austrian culture, legitimizes her choice; while at the same time keeping up family ties and a lost world in an imaginative way.

Therefore it is not surprising that when talking about the chronicle in the Wittgenstein family, descendants focus not on what is told in there, but rather on what is absent, the lacks, and the misinterpretations ('legends'). And the biographers follow this route. This selective reading of the chronicle is caused also by interpreting the gaps as *intentional* silence, while textual analysis offers alternative readings by distinguishing between different forms of silence (Immler 2013):

There is *family-memory-specific silence*: as Maurice Halbwachs (1985) pointed out, family memory is focused on rituals and continuity, not on rupture; on creating symbols not testimony. We see *genre-specific silence*: a family chronicle is a genre that communicates family, it is a 'mental model' (Feldman 1994) shaping the production of the text as its reception: the author's personal intentions are overlooked, the focus on family overshadows the individual. The *context-specific silence*: the World War Two context supports narratives of healing, not of reflexivity (Holdenried 2000). And the *silence due to narrative patterns*: portrayal of everyday rituals and social networks creates narratives of stability in times of rupture. Therefore it is not surprising that the chronicle is ended with a rhetorical note signalling continuity, while in reality everything had changed. The split-up of the family is thus absent from the story line, but the rupture's grievance is visible in the text-structure.

The style of writing is a "style of thinking" (Denkstil)

The change in Hermine's writing style is particularly telling. She wrote that she describes her father in a "Telegrammstil" as it fits his character (Immler 2011, 289f.). To do duty to the events of 1938 she saw the need for a documentary style. That each content requires an appropriate form is an attitude crucial in the thinking of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who was always aware that certain things might be expressed in contexts of one sort, but not in contexts of another. As he wrote in a letter to his friend Ludwig Hänsel: „Wenn Du etwas weißt, so sag´s ihm; wenn Du einen Gedanken gehabt hast, so teil ihn ihm als Gedanken mit; wenn Du Zweifel hast, so teil sie als Zweifel mit, etc." (10.3.1937; Somavilla et al 1994, 143) This coincidence of saying and showing is characteristic for Wittgenstein's so-called "Denkstil". In this way, questions of style are always phi-

losophical questions as well: „Das *Wie* der Darstellung ist dem *Was* wesentlich. Der sich im Stil manifestierende diskursive Gehalt des Gedachten verweist nicht auf eine außerkursive Struktur der verhandelten Sachen, sondern auf das Darstellungsbedürfnis des Autors." (Abel, Kroß and Nedo 2007, 12) To understand these relationships between the *how* (the form) and the *what* (the content), offers a new interpretation of the alleged silences in the Wittgensteinian family memory.

From this perspective one could say that Hermine Wittgenstein, by performing a rupture in the text, indicates towards what *cannot be talked about*; the inner shock of the dispute between the siblings. The rupture is dealt with in a way that Angela Keppler has described in regard to family taboos, that in family conversation often taboos are indeed mentioned, but not discussed; told as fact, but a fact without relevance. In this way the family taboo is not denied, but one tries "to make it a non-issue", as no moral judgment is allowed (1994, 181f.). It is precisely in this area of ethics, morals, aesthetics and values that language has its limits: "Whereof one can not speak, thereof one must be silent", Wittgenstein wrote in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (7), saying that there are issues one cannot talk about, only show. Hermine Wittgenstein, one might say, has internalized those ideas and put them into practice. Silencing those experiences means then less the repression of unpleasant facts, but rather addressing them in a familiar way; a way that stresses the ethical dimension. And indeed, it is an issue that bewildered family members for decades.

Examining the relationship between the *form* and the *content* offers also new insights into Ludwig Wittgenstein's autobiographical notes. While Wittgenstein's image as an *analytical philosopher* was rather disturbed by personal remarks, those became key when seeing Wittgenstein as an *ethical thinker*. A reading however that hindered examining their performativity, even though Wittgenstein's scepticism towards the autobiographical supports this approach.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's autobiographical notes

Wittgenstein's remarks on the vain nature of autobiography, his scepticism towards the artificial linearity of autobiographical (and philosophical) writing, his deconstruction of authenticity when stressing the rhetoric of autobiographical notions and the illusions of striving towards an ideal of a better self, all demand – I would argue – a different treatment of his autobiographical remarks. It is true that Wittgenstein expressed in his writing the desire for a Socratic unit of work and life, but he himself had reflected this desire already as being an illusion and part of self-deception.

Whereas in the literature his confessions towards family members and friends are associated with a problematic perception of Jewish origin, extreme feelings of guilt, self-blame, a compulsive search for self-improvement, and masochism towards himself (McGuinness 1988, 98f.), from a cultural studies perspective the confession can also be read as a specific form of communication: addressing the opposite with a particular rhetoric. This, Wittgenstein was well aware of, when he wrote in his autobiographical notes: „Halbe Beichten gegen Mining in denen ich doch immer als ausgezeichneter Mensch zu scheinen weiß" (McGuinness 1988, 92f.). Here Wittgenstein distances himself from his own behaviour demonstrating its farce. Somewhere else he speaks of the confession as "langua-

ge game", pinpointing a formalized form of communication: "Wenn sich auf mein Geständnis meines Motivs nicht die Konsequenzen bauen ließen, die man im allgemeinen drauf bauen kann, dann gäbe es das ganze Sprachspiel nicht." (1.1.1949, Briefwechsel, Electronic-Edition 2004) While autobiographies are about confirming oneself, do confessions confirm the existing order (Voisine 1998, 399). This suggests that Wittgenstein's confessions can be read not just as an expression of guilt and a search for catharsis, but as a medium for stabilizing relationships. Moreover, Wittgenstein's scepticism towards his own autobiographical practices often remains unnoticed. To include his critical and playful reflections about the autobiographical, showing distance, would nuance the popular image of Wittgenstein as a rigorous ethicist.

Summing up: The concept *Familiengedächtnis* gave me the opportunity to compare different autobiographical text types next to each other, which provided new insights about how self-representations and biographical representations interact. The relational set-up, looking at the family chronicle and Ludwig Wittgenstein's autobiographical remarks as a particular "style of thinking", allows it to be seen that the chronicle includes also the rhetoric of Ludwig's own distinctive dicta; and illustrates that *the how* is key for *the what*.

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Wittgenstein and Dostoevsky on Aesthetics and the 'Inner' Life

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Abstract

The Private Language Argument (*Philosophical Investigations,* §§243-315) is often accused of seeking to abolish 'inner life'. However, reading it together with Wittgenstein's remarks on perception and aesthetics in Part II, iv and xi, reveals potential for a nuanced account of discernment of other people's intentions and 'inner' states. And his scattered references to Dostoevsky's novels—which reflect the role of art in the refinement of perception—point towards an aesthetic-ethical account of emphatic perception.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument (PLA) in the *Philosophical Investigations* §§243-315, where he strives to show with numerous intertwining examples that there cannot be a private linguistic reference to purely 'interior' states in one's body, even pain, has often been accused of abolishing 'inner life' (´cf. Murdoch 1997). The overall focus on social practices of the *Philosophical Investigations* seems to imply a reductionist behaviorism that only takes into account externally visible public conventions of behavior to explain intentions and sensations. However, this common misunderstanding of the *Investigations* does not stand up to a close reading of the actual text. Furthermore, Wittgenstein's scattered references to aesthetics and literature, such as to his life-long fascination with Dostoevsky, point towards potential for a nuanced, aesthetic-ethical[1] account of the 'inner life' from within Wittgenstein's philosophy.

Even though most of the core examples in the PLA deal with the impossibility of privately designating one's own sensation without recourse to public language, other examples seamlessly address the perception of others' 'inner' states. For instance, in §293 Wittgenstein compares the notion that interior states are comparable to 'things' that we can label with names with the notion that each one of us possesses a box with something inside we agree to call "a beetle." Nobody can look into the other's box and everybody assumes they can only know what a beetle is by looking in their own box. There is no way of proving that all do not have completely different objects in their boxes, just like there is no way of proving that "pain" feels the same to everyone. §293 concludes in the following manner: "Das heisst: Wenn man die Grammatik des Ausdrucks der Empfindung nach dem Muster von 'Gegenstand und Bezeichnung' konstruiert, dann fällt der Gegenstand als irrelevant aus der Betrachtung heraus." Wittgenstein then claims that the object inside the box is irrelevant for the language games it is embedded in—we can refer to the other's "beetle" without having seen it, just like we can inquire of, empathize with, and speak of the other's pain without having felt it.

This means that Wittgenstein does not mean to abolish inner life per se—he is only saying that *if* we reified 'interior' sensations and took them to be "things" we refer to, then these postulated interior objects would be irrelevant for our language. For we can, in fact, know that somebody is in pain without having unmediated access to their actual bodily sensations. Inquiring about their wellbeing, helping

them etc. that is—all the practices surrounding the concept of "pain" in our life form are possible without having immediate access to this purported "object". This shows that the "object" is irrelevant to the grammar of pain and that the facile representationalist notion of pain attribution is a good example what Wittgenstein calls a "picture" that "held us captive" in §115.

Wittgenstein consistently rallied against the Cartesian notion that mindedness is somehow 'inside' the body (like *res cogitans* is supposedly "inside" *res extensa*). By contrast, he asserts "The human body is the best picture of the human soul" (Part II, iv, p. 178.). To apply this to the Private Language Argument: when we say "I believe he is suffering", we are not making hypotheses about an object hidden inside the suffering person's body, "pain", rather, we are quite capable of non-inferentially perceiving it. However, this does not mean that 'inner life' is reducible to public conventions. By dissolving the Cartesian notion that 'interior' states are a special class of 'things', which are somehow 'inside' us, richer conceptual resources are made available to address it. For, abolishing a facile representationalist view of 'inner' states also relativizes the assumption that they are akin to already well-defined, solid objects and that the only conceptual work left to do in engagement with 'inner life' is to label them with a name.

Beside his dissolution of the 'inner'/ 'outer' dichotomy, making room for the empirical fact that others' feelings and motives can be transparent to us, Wittgenstein also points towards a notion that seeing others' 'inner life' is a *capacity* that is not just straight-forwardly there but that can be exercised well and improved upon. For instance, towards the closing of the *Investigations,* he asks, whether there is "expert judgment about the genuineness of expressions of feeling":

> Gibt es über die Echtheit des Gefühlsausdrucks ein 'fachmännisches' Urteil? – Es gibt auch da Menschen mit 'besserem' und Menschen mit 'schlechterem' Urteil. […] Kann man Menschenkenntnis lernen? Ja; Mancher kann sie lernen. Aber nicht durch einen Lehrkurs, sondern durch 'Erfahrung'. – Kann ein Anderer dabei sein Lehrer sein? Gewiss. Er gibt ihm von Zeit zu Zeit den richtigen *Wink*. – So schaut hier das 'Lernen' und das 'Lehren' aus. – Was man lernt, ist keine Technik; man lernt richtige Urteile. Es gibt auch Regeln, aber sie bilden kein System, und nur der Erfahrene kann sie richtig anwenden. Unähnlich den Rechenregeln. (Part II, xi, p. 574f.)

By contrasting correct judgments of others' feelings with calculating rules, Wittgenstein reminds readers yet again of the sheer diversity of language games and that he does

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1 It is well known that Wittgenstein frequently addressed both ethics and aesthetics simultaneously. Cf. *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* 6.421*;* „Lecture on Ethics", where he speaks of ethics in „wider terms", which generally "includes aesthetics") p. 38, PI §77.

not mean to assimilate everything to his paradigmatic example of a social practice, namely learning arithmetic rules.

In continuing the discussion on "expert judgment of the genuineness of expressions of feeling", he considers "a genuine look of love". Here he introduces an aesthetic consideration: "wäre ich ein höchst talentierter Maler, so wäre es denkbar, dass ich in Bildern den echten Blick und den geheuchelten darstellte", and "frag dich: Wie lernt der Mensch einen 'Blick' für etwas kriegen?" It is suggested that a talented artist, a painter, would have developed "an eye" for subtle signs of hypocrisy, and would furthermore be able to express them in his art in a way communicable to others. Wittgenstein implicitly suggests a correlation between a talent in art and a capacity to perceive "imponderable [*unwägbare*] evidence", "subtleties of glance, of gesture, of tone." (PI, Part II, xi, 576)

In recurring remarks in private notebooks, Wittgenstein explicitly turns to literary art to answer the question how to represent 'inner life', such as an intention. He evokes Dostoevsky in this context:

> Wie ist das: die Absicht haben, etwas zu tun? Was kann ich drauf antworten? Eine Art der Antwort wäre: das zu sagen, was /das zu sagen/das sagen, was ein Romanschriftsteller sagt, Dostoevsky etwa, // wäre: einen Romanschriftsteller … reden zu lassen/zu zitieren /aufzuschlagen //wenn /wo/ er die Seelenzustände einer Person / eines Menschen /beschreibt/die/der/ eine bestimmte Absicht hat. (Nachlass, [180b, 17r; 129, 135f; 228 § 284; 230 § 486])[2]

Studying the manner in which artists like painters or novelists express 'inner life' provides one avenue of a sophisticated representation of intentions and other mental states (*Seelenzustände*), which goes beyond the kind of representationalism out to simply label 'interior' objects.

Needless to say, Dostoevsky's novels are especially celebrated for their masterful insight into the workings of the human psyche. As Mikhail Bakhtin noted about the innovativeness of Dostoevsky's poetics:

> At a time when the self-consciousness of a character was usually seen merely as an element of his reality, as merely one of the features of his integrated image, here, on the contrary, all of reality becomes an element of the character's self-consciousness. (48)[3]

He draws attention to the relativity of the dichotomy between 'inner' life/ 'outer' world in Dostoevsky's art and the kind of depiction of the world from a personally experienced perspective that is usually associated with modern art.

One of the early novels, the semi-autobiographical *Notes from the House of the Dead*, which Wittgenstein considered Dostoevsky's greatest work (Malcolm and von Wright 2001, 45), depicts life at a Siberian hard labor penal colony. Its main theme is the narrator's shift in perception of his fellow inmates. With time, he is able to see 'beneath' "the revolting crust that covered them outside", to see them as "good people, capable of thinking and feeling" (228). However, the novel never psychologizes: it never bluntly

refers to the changes taking place 'in' the narrator's head, nor does he locate the convicts' worthiness by naming isolable thoughts and feelings the latter may have had. Rather, the changes become apparent by the narrating structure employed, by the manner subjectively felt temporality is extended in the beginning, and condensed later on, and by the way in which he refers to his fellow convicts.

Dostoevsky's last novel, *The Brothers Karamazov*—which Wittgenstein was "certifiably obsessed with" (Klagge 2011, 136)[4]—deals not only with perception and just representation of others' 'interiority', but it self-reflectively considers the role of art in perception. Similarly to the closing of the later *Philosophical Investigations*, the novel furthermore depicts perception not as a brute physiological fact, but as a capacity subject to the will and the imagination, and capable of refinement. Wittgenstein was primarily impressed with one of the novel's main protagonists, Father Zosima.[5] Drury recalls Wittgenstein telling him,

> When I was a village schoolmaster in Austria after the war I read *The Brothers Karamazov* over and over again. I read it out loud to the village priest. *There really were people like Staretz Zosima, people who could look into others' hearts* […]." (Qtd. in Rhees 1984, 79; added emphasis)

He seems to have been particularly impressed by the monk's extraordinary capacity to 'read' people.

Father Zosima's "fine discernment" is emphasized within the novel, as well:

> […] having taken into his soul so many confessions, sorrows, confidences, [Staretz Zosima] acquired in the end such fine discernment that he could tell, from the first glance at a visiting stranger's face, what was in his mind, what he needed, and even what kind of suffering tormented his conscience; and he sometimes astonished, perplexed and almost frightened the visitor by this knowledge of his secret even before he had spoken a word. (29)

However, the novel does not reveal Staretz Zosima's own 'inner' life. In the middle of the novel, in Book VI, "The Russian Monk", we find a hagiographic narrative of the late Zosima's life, written by his faithful disciple Alyosha Karamazov. Zosima appears in a highly stylized manner: his '*Vita*' expresses primarily external circumstances of his life, never wading too deep into psychological motives, as is characteristic of hagiographic conventions; his teachings are expressed in a childlike, naïve language.

While the character of Zosima is depicted with a two-dimensionality reminiscent of orthodox icons, his disciple Alyosha is shown in more psychological realism. For, whereas Zosima is introduced as somebody who has already mastered the art of 'people reading' over many years, the manner in which Alyosha speaks reveals his budding capacity for emphatic perception. Furthermore, his judgment of people and emphatic analysis of their circumstances is described in aesthetic terms. For instance, when he visits Lise, a childhood friend with whom he "day-dreamed together and made up long stories between them", he tells her about his encounter with Captain Snegirov, a poor and proud man whom he tried to help by offering money:

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[2] The series of references and the variation in formulation show that Wittgenstein re-typed this remark after jotting it down in his notebook and referred to it in several manuscripts (Biesenbach 2011, 87).

[3] Wittgenstein was closely befriended with Nikolai Bakhtin, Mikhail's brother. Dostoevsky's novels were a common topic of their conversations. Nikolai was known to have read Mikhail Bakhtin's book on Dostoevsky in 1931 and it is likely that he discussed it with Wittgenstein (McGuinness 2013, 237ff. and Fedayeva 2000).

[4] Furthermore, Dmitry Karamazov's mysterious purse around the neck had allegedly inspired Wittgenstein's beetle in the box example (Richter 2004, 34).
[5] Wittgenstein had reportedly read *The Brothers Karamazov* so often, that he knew large passages by heart, especially the speeches of Father Zosima (Monk 1990, 136).

Alyosha sat down at the table and began telling his story, but from the first words he lost all his embarrassment and, in turn, carried Lise away. He spoke under the influence of strong emotion and the recent extraordinary impression, and succeeded in telling it well and thoroughly. (214)

The manner his everyday account of what had just happened to him is introduced recalls aesthetic categories. His story "carried Lise away", evoking the effect of absorption in the artwork;[6] it is mentioned that he "succeeded in telling it well", a criterion not ordinarily applied to everyday conversations. It goes on that "Lise was greatly moved by his story. Alyosha managed to paint the image of "Ilyushechka" [Captain Snegirov's son] for her with ardent feeling." Alyosha's talent of describing people and circumstances is described with the *topos* of a painter and his image.

They discuss why the poor Captain did not accept the two hundred roubles Alyosha wanted to give him and discussed what words he should use to convince the proud man to take it without losing his face. Lise asks, in a manner revealing her utter absorption in Alyosha's story,

Listen, Alexei Fyodorovich, isn't there something in all this reasoning of ours, I mean, of yours…no, better, of ours…isn't there some contempt for him, for this wretched man…that we are examining his soul like this, as if we were looking down on him? That we have decided so certainly, now, that he will accept the money? (217)

Alyosha, very seriously, denies that there is any contempt in him for Snegirov, that he in fact considers himself pettier than the Captain. Because he does not consider himself better than Captain Snegirov, he is not expressing contempt of him by speaking about him. Alyosha quotes Father Zosima that "most people need to be looked after like children, and some like the sick in hospitals", and he and Lise rapturously vow to "look after people this way!" Alyosha, however, adds that he does not feel quite ready, "sometimes I am very impatient, and sometimes I don't see things" (217), suggesting that the very way one "sees things" is part of an attitude that expresses either contempt or active love, the readiness to "look after people." His manner of expression reveals that he considers his own perception of others a capacity he could improve on, because he attributes his momentary inability to "see things" to his impatience. It reveals that he considers the aesthetics of his narrative to have ethical implications—it might turn out to be contemptful of the object of his narration.

In conclusion, by denying that there can be a private language about 'interior' states, Wittgenstein does not therefore abolish 'inner life'. Rather, he seeks to subvert a simplified picture of the mind, according to which 'interior' states are reified into well-defined entities that exist independently of our engagement with them. He

recommends turning to artists and novelist for a finer discernment and dynamic expression of 'inner life', especially to Dostoevsky. The refinement of discernment in the perception of others is a prominent motif in the latter's work, which often serves as a structuring principle of narrative. Furthermore, Dostoevsky's novels themselves reflect the role of art in the refinement of perception and the ethical implications of aesthetic objectification.

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6 Denis Diderot—whose name recurrs repeatedly throughout the novel, mostly in parodic contexts—stresses absorption in his aesthetic philosophy. For a discussion of Diderot's notions of absorption and theatricality in relation to Wittgenstein's aesthetics see Fried 2007.

114

Seeing the Same Differently – A Case of *Family Deformations*

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Abstract

The aim of my paper is to propose a new term: *family deformation*. In the first part I discuss Wittgenstein's use of the term *family resemblance* to show that: 1) contrary to what Hans Sluga has suggested, it is only a resemblance, not a kinship term; 2) it should be understood as an object of comparison. In the second part I discuss a fragment of Ernesto Sabato's novel *The Tunnel* to interpret occurrences of the term *family deformation*. In the final section I compare *family resemblance* with *family deformation* and present *family deformation* as a special case of seeing an aspect.

As it has been repeatedly noticed, the term *family resemblance* (*Familienähnlichkeit*) occurred in *Philosophical Investigations*, in remark 67, when Wittgenstein answered to interlocutor's objection that, although in the previous remarks he had discussed the language games, he had not specified what was the essence of language games, language and general form of the proposition. Wittgenstein's answer was that there was not any common feature of what we call propositions, language games, or language, which would legitimize using these words in particular circumstances. Instead, Wittgenstein says, there are various affinities between them, affinities that can be characterised as "family resemblances", for they remind the resemblances between different members of a family. There are two issues to discuss with reference to these remarks. Firstly: does Wittgenstein propose any theory of language? And secondly: are all terms family resemblance terms? In my opinion, the answer to both these questions is negative, however here I will not discuss them in detail. My only objective is to point out these issues, as they appear frequently in Wittgenstein's reception.

For the first time Wittgenstein used the term family resemblance in *The Big Typescript*, in a subsection 58 of a section entitled *Grammar: The Strict Grammatical Rules of a Game and the Fluctuating Use of Language. Logic as Normative. To what Extent do we Talk about Ideal Cases, an Ideal Language? ("The Logic of a Vacuum.")*, with reference to Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West*. Wittgenstein suggests there that Spengler could have been better understood, if he had compared cultural periods to the lives of families and differentiate the family resemblances from the resemblances between different families, with indication to the object of comparison. Wittgenstein criticized there two things: 1) confusion of an archetype (an ideal object) with a concrete object, and putting on the same level of an archetype with the objects; 2) ascribing of the properties, which should be ascribed only to an archetype, to an object. However, according to this view, an archetype would be nothing more but a general picture consisting of all features common to all particular objects. Although our investigations would become more general, it would be possible to find objects with respect to which some claims about the archetype would not be true. What Wittgenstein wanted to point out, was, in my opinion, the following thing: in our investigations we often use the archetype as an ideal picture similar to Galton's photography (as the philosopher formulated it in *The Blue Book*), which allows us to gain generality, but the abovementioned problems are the price we pay for it – we confuse an archetype with an object, and ascribe the properties to the object, while they should be ascribed only to the archetype, which are the philosophical tendencies of craving for generality.

Meanwhile, the archetype should be nothing more but an object of comparison characterising our investigations and determining their form. According to Wittgenstein, the family resemblances function precisely as object of comparison. His argument against Spengler is that the latter talks about resemblances between different cultural periods, without proposing any object of comparison, on the basis of which a form of these resemblances could be defined.

What I would like to suggest is that also *in Philosophical Investigations* the term *family resemblance* is used in a sense of an object of comparison. Although the deliberations from *The Big Typescript* are not explicitly repeated there, we can trace their echo, when Wittgenstein talks about '*employing* examples in a particular way' (71) and 'seeing something in a particular way and using it in such-and-such a way' (Wittgenstein 1999, 71 74).

The term family resemblance – or rather *family likeness*, because this is how Wittgenstein himself translated the German *Familienähnlichkeiten* – is present also in *The Blue Book*. Hans Sluga in his essay "Family Resemblance" focuses his attention on these remarks. Sluga claims that the notion "family resemblance" is in fact more problematic that it seems at first sight, because by shifting the accent it can be understood either as kinship, or resemblance. Therefore, in his discussion, he differentiates between concepts of kinship, "of some sort of real and causal connection and of the links established by them", and resemblance, "affinity and correspondence" (Sluga 2006, 14). As Sluga argues, this interpretation is evident if we relate Wittgenstein's remarks from *The Blue Book* to Friedrich Nietzsche's essay "On Truth and Lie in a Nonmoral Sense", which allegedly was supposed to influence Wittgenstein (Sluga claims this on the basis of occurrence of a leaf example in both philosophers' works; it can be added that Nietzsche had taken this example from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz). Moreover, Sluga states that the very notion of family resemblance proves Nietzsche's impact on Wittgenstein, which, this time, is supposed to be borrowed from *Beyond the Good and Evil*. Insisting on Nietzsche's influence on Wittgenstein in this particular aspect is odd, as Sluga is well acquainted with Ray Monk's and Brian McGuinness' biographies of Wittgenstein, where both authors claim that in 1914 in Cracow Wittgenstein bought volume 8 of Nietzsche's works. It was "presumably from Naumann's Leipzig edition, where volume 8 contains [...] 'Der Antichrist' [...], 'Der Fall Wagner', 'Götzen-Dämmerung', 'Nietzsche contra Wagner', and Nietzsche's poems" (McGuinness 2005, 225). There is no further evidence of Wittgenstein having read any other Nietzsche's book. Paradoxically, Sluga's mistake coincides with his double understanding of family resemblance – as resemblance or kinship. By noticing unquestionable similarities

between the fragment from *The Blue Book* and Nietzsche's essay, he infers a kinship relation of impact. When it comes to historical-philosophical roots of the term "family resemblance", it is hard to provide any conclusive argument. As Baker and Hacker noted, the term occurred in many authors before Wittgenstein (see Baker, Hacker 2005, 209), including Arthur Schopenhauer. I would rather suggest that Wittgenstein possibly borrowed the term from Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Representation*, where it was used in a quite similar context – with reference to representations (precisely: intuitive representations). Nonetheless, what is actually interesting is a noticeable "shape of thought", and, if we look at it from this perspective, Schopenhauer's, Goethe's or Spengler's inspirations are all valid as all these authors in greater or lesser extent were interested in the morphological method. The fact of applying one of the methods typical for the natural sciences in philosophy, and the way how it was applied, are both interesting, albeit separate, issues. On the other hand, it would be helpful to contrast the morphological method with a Kantian idea of transcendentalism to better problematise the alleged Wittgensteinian transcendentalism. Going back to Sluga's interpretation, his mistake was, I think, to conflate the morphological method, which deals with description of forms, with the aetiological one, explaining the alterations in causal terms. One may suppose that he would not have committed this error, if instead of referring his reading of Wittgenstein to Nietzsche, he had referred it to Schopenhauer, even mentioned by him as an inspiration for both philosophers. The critique of being captivated by scientific method in philosophy is present also in Wittgenstein's *Blue Book*, in the fragment following the part in which Wittgenstein mentions the family likeness. Wittgenstein discusses there four tendencies of craving for generality in philosophy, and as the fourth one he mentions specifically the preoccupation with the method of science. Yet, Sluga intentionally omits this part as not relevant. The critique of the evolutionary hypothesis is also present in Wittgenstein's *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough*, not to mention the so-called meta-philosophical remarks in *Philosophical Investigations*.

Summarizing this part of my essay, what I would like to emphasise is that the term family resemblance is used by Wittgenstein as an object of comparison which shapes the whole investigation, the way of looking at different objects. From this perspective, it is not at all a theory but rather a change in the way of looking at things. Furthermore, it should not be understood as a kinship, but merely as a resemblance term.

In the second part of my essay I would like to introduce a new term closely related to *family resemblance*: *family deformation*. I encountered it in Ernesto Sabato's novel entitled *The Tunnel*, so it would be instructive to show in what sense the author uses it in his book.

The main character – Juan Pablo Castel – is a painter who wants to find a woman whom he has seen during one of his exhibitions. Because of his shyness and general lack of practice in relationships with women, he fantasizes about different situations when he meets her again. In one of his fantasies, they meet in a gallery of art. However, after a quick consideration, he realizes that it would be impossible, because he never enters the galleries, for he dislikes groups of people gathered only on the basis of their common taste, as they all share 'a whole bunch of grotesque attributes', which can be characterized as 'a repetition of some type'. To explain the term 'repetition of some type', he describes two situations. The first situation is the distress one feels while meeting someone who is constantly blinking their eyes or twisting their mouth. It is a

more or less regular repetition of particular behavior with respect to one person. However, if we met a whole group of such persons gathered in one room, we would deal with a repetition of the type. Here, then, we are faced with a feature which is not easy to bear in a single individual, but multiplied becomes intolerable. To go further, in the second case, Juan Pablo Castel shares his observation of many families in which 'certain characteristics, certain gestures, certain intonation of voice are repeated'. To leave this description this way would mean nothing more but to describe a family resemblance. However, the term "family deformation" includes a kind of "surplus". The main character of Sabato's novel narrates a short story which serves as an exemplification of what this special kind of family resemblances – i.e. the family deformations – are. Once, as he recalls, he had been impressed by one woman's features, but his delight soon passed and turned into shame when he met a sister of hers. The same qualities, so appealing in the woman he had met before, "in her sister turned out to be emphasized, deformed, slightly caricaturized, but not exaggerated: if they were too much changed, it would result in something else, but they were caricaturized enough to produce a comic effect". And he continues: "This type of distortion of the first woman's picture in her sister provoked a feeling of shame inside me, as if it was my guilt that her sister was shedding a ridiculing light on the woman whom I adored" (Sabato 1963, 19-20). This is exactly the situation wherein the term family deformation can be used. It should also be noted that Juan Pablo Castel recalls two other examples of family deformation: the example of painters who imitate the great masters, and of those who use a certain jargon (as, for instance, a language of psychoanalysis, fascism, journalism etc.).

The term "family deformation" is not the opposite of "family resemblance", on the contrary – it is a special type of the latter. But, as it was mentioned in the former examples, it includes a kind of "surplus" to "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small" (Wittgenstein 1999, 66). What we actually perceive by noticing a family deformation, are the similarities which differ only in a degree. They are not different to such an extent which would result in changing them into something else. The comparison of both objects makes us to look at the first object in a different fashion. We see the same thing, but we see it 'in a different light'. In the second part of *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein was preoccupied with the problem of seeing aspects. There are many different types of seeing aspects, e.g. when we see an aspect continuously, or when we experience a 'lightening up' of an aspect, knowing the aspect and seeing it. The family resemblance, conceived as an object of comparison, is a case of knowing the aspect, but to notice the similarities between different members of a family is to experience the abovementioned 'lightening up' of an aspect. The family deformations work in the similar way. The moment we see a person whom we adored in a different way, like Juan Pablo Castel, just because we have met his or her relative – it is not because something has really changed in this person, or that we have noticed a property which was previously hidden to us. As Wittgenstein wrote, "what we perceive in the lightening up of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects" (Wittgenstein 1999, PPF 247). What is characteristic for noticing a family deformation is that the object, which kept us captivated because of its beauty, pureness etc., loses its special value in our eyes. The 'fine shades of behaviour', as our attitude toward a particular object, change. To notice a family deformation in an object is to notice its similarities with other

objects, the similarities which differ in a degree. By noticing them, we perceive the object differently, it can be said, then, that it loses its uniqueness, its charm. This example shows that seeing (a visual representation) is immediately related with, or has an immediate effect on our emotions.

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Cora Diamond and Stanley Cavell on the Aesthetic in Wittgenstein

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Abstract

This paper compares how Cora Diamond and Stanley Cavell conceive of the Wittgensteinian aesthetic in the *Tractatus* and in *Philosophical Investigations*, respectively. I argue that for Diamond the Wittgensteinian aesthetic (and the ethical) is overcoming the illusion that we have meant something through the imaginative understanding of others, including literary works of art. For Cavell, in turn, the Wittgensteinian aesthetic is perspicuous representations, also mirrored in the *Investigations* itself, fighting lostness, resulting in the acknowledgement of our finitude. For both Diamond and Cavell, the aesthetic is (a change of) attitude.

When trying to find some common ground for the characterization of some aspects of the Wittgensteinian aesthetic in the work of Cora Diamond and Stanley Cavell – two masters of mine, one helping me to see new layers of significance in the *Tractatus*[1], the other guiding me how to read *Philosophical Investigations*[2] – it is Wittgenstein's *treatment of illusions*, especially philosophical ones, which offers itself, it seems to me, as a starting point. To sharpen my focus over a very broad landscape, from Diamond's rich output on Wittgenstein I have chosen some ideas of "Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*" (Diamond 2000, henceforth EIM), from Cavell's for a long time neglected, highly original contribution to Wittgenstein studies I will consider, painfully selectively as well, "The *Investigations*' Everyday Aesthetics of Itself" (Cavell 1996, henceforth IEAI), where the Wittgensteinian aesthetic is specifically addressed.

Diamond focuses on Wittgenstein's outlook on ethics, but there is the well-known dictum in 6.421: "(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same)" "(Ethik und Ästhetik sind Eins.)". There are of course many ways to interpret this sentence, especially because this is the first and last occurrence of the word "aesthetic" in the *Tractatus* and the sentence is famously between parentheses. I read it, following Diamond's essay, as saying

(1) that whatever applies to ethics, applies to aesthetics, too;

(2) so, if ethics is transcendental (cf. 6.421), then aesthetics, too, is transcendental, thus they lie outside the realm of empirical facts, and no factual propositions can describe them. Therefore, they cannot be put into words in the sense that there is no public, visible field of state-of-affairs which could factually back them up as true or false; they require a different perspective, and, thus, sense-making, than the factual;

(3) a person's ethical attitude to others and to the world is the same as her aesthetic attitude to others and to the world: one is the mirror of the other. If you want to be 'beautiful', be 'good', although these words *good* or *beautiful* do not refer to various features or characteristics of a person as if those were well-identifiable 'things' that could be attached to, or detached from, her. We might think of salt in a soup: it is neither 'here' nor 'there' and it is dissolved in the liquid; it permeates 'the whole', like an attitude, the way one casts herself upon the world and others all the time; it involves the whole of the self. I think that such words as *good* or *beautiful*, one typically occurring in ethical, the other in aesthetic discourses, are, according to the *Tractatus*, nonsensical because there they are used as names of qualities. They give us the impression (illusion) that they are manageable, possible to handle, since they are anchored in some specific 'things' the person 'has'. *Handle* has a meaning: 'a person's alias, nickname or username' as in 'what's your Facebook handle?'; Wittgenstein's fear is that when we use *good* or *beautiful* in theories, we use these words as names in *this* sense of *handle*: we think we have grasped, have a firm grip over a phenomenon, while in fact we do not. As Diamond's diagnosis goes, we think we have given some words meaning (because we believe they point at something concrete, they have reached their destination, they have done their job) whereas they have not (cf. e.g. EIM, 162-163, Diamond refers especially to 4. 002). They have not because '*in fact*' we have failed to endow them with proper meaning: the *good* and the *beautiful* (and lots of other words) are not things, objects or specific qualities which correspond, in a one-to-one fashion, to words (names) when we wish to describe human attitudes.

However, in Diamond's investigation of the ethical in the *Tractatus,* much more is at stake from the aesthetic because, to dissolve the (basically intellectual, epistemological) human inclination to relate to ethical issues as if they were 'handleable' things, she brings literary works of art into her discussion, e. g., in most detail, Nathaniel Hawthorne's short story, "The Birthmark" (to which I will return)[3]. One of her reasons is, I think, that works of art, like human beings, contain qualities we ascribe to them not as composites but as complexes: in our talk, because of the nature of our language, we inevitably mention 'features' of a work of art *as* being 'beautiful', 'ugly', 'good', 'bad', etc. but it makes – typically various – effects on us as 'wholes'; we appreciate them as 'wholes'.

However, there is trouble with our discourse even when we use the word *whole*, because this word is shorthand, i.e. abbreviated, simplified, illusion-raising communication, too: we hardly have the notion of what grasping the whole of a work of art would amount to and artworks do not have clear boundaries. Aesthetic approaches of the past 30-40 years have especially been keen on pointing out how a work of art gets recreated in the assessor, the viewer, the reader, who is not a 'unified subject', either. An artwork is constructed by, and in, previous and contextual discourses and practices; it is embedded in time and history. Diamond would claim that, according to the *Tractatus*, 'the whole' applied to an artwork is another piece of nonsense we can only understand through imagining how the Other may

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1 I will quote the *Tractatus* according to Wittgenstein 1961.
2 I will quote the *Investigations* according to Wittgenstein 2001.

3 I will quote "The Birthmark" (written in 1843, the final form appearing in *Mosses from an Old Manse,* 1846) according to Hawthorne 2003.

make sense of the world (her world), and how she uses words in that world (cf. EIM, 165).

This leads us to another reason why Diamond involves aesthetic attitudes in ethical investigations: for her it is an integral, imperative prerequisite of an ethical approach that it contains something that is indispensable in aesthetics, too: the use of our creative imagination in order to understand the way the Other tries to give sense to her words. Even those who find Diamond's Wittgensteinian approach to ethics too radical, e.g. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, point out that for Diamond the ethical attitude is impossible without mobilizing the aesthetic one (Moyal-Sharrock 2012)[4]. Yet before I go into one more detail about Diamond's view on the Wittgensteinian aesthetic, I ask how Cavell identifies it in Wittgenstein's later work.

Cavell's central idea is that the aesthetic mirrors itself, especially in the *Philosophical Investigations*; more precisely, the aesthetic is the mirror itself. The book does not talk about or describe the aesthetic but it puts it on display, it performs it in, and by, the text; it acts it out. Cavell identifies this aesthetic in the *Investigations* as an antidote to the lack of understanding in the broad sense. In § 122 Wittgenstein writes: "A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not *command a clear view* of the use of our words. – Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connections'. […] The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things." On the basis of this paragraph and several others (§§ 89-133), Cavell identifies the aesthetic in the *Investigations* as an antidote not only to the lack of understanding an intellectual problem, but to moments of "strangeness, sickness, disappointment, self-destructiveness, perversity, suffocation, torment, lostness" (IEAI, 383), i.e. moods, attitudes, "attunements", or the lack of them, in our everyday life. It is important to see that all these are *philosophical* problems for Wittgenstein. Cavell refers to § 123: "A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about'", "Ich kenne mich nicht aus", which Cavell translates as: "I cannot find myself" (IEAI, 379). The aesthetic is overcoming this lostness, this alienation from oneself – Diamond's instances of illusion, self-delusion – through the clear, perspicuous representation [übersichtliche Darstellung] of particular cases, of pertinent experiences, examples of lostness. This (re)presentation is as much a solution as we are able to find solutions to chronic problems of our life; a perspicuous presentation brings us not more – but not less, either – than the acknowledgement of our being separated from the Other, our being fragmented, our being finite, in order to see the benefits of our recognitions, our insights (Aristotle called this *anagnorisis*; cf. IEAI, 383). Clear presentations may result in not more than having some intimacy with, feeling at home among, and knowing how to go on with, our human lostness and illusion because we are to see connections, for example, between our failures and our finitude, our being sceptical and being separated. I take Cavell's interpretations of literary pieces, films, operas, done throughout his life, to be such perspicuous representations of lostness and illusions; for example, his interpretation of Shakespeare's *Othello* is a reading of tragedy as an instance of our fatal spearatedness from the Other (cf. Cavell 1979, 481-496). To achieve perspicuous presentations, Wittgenstein, still in § 122, recommends "finding and inventing *intermediate cases*" [*Zwischengliedern*]". This

Cavell identifies as ordering and reordering our ordinary language. This is what Wittgenstein calls "grammatical investigation" (cf. § 90), which, according to Cavell, appears in aphoristic forms and contexts, discussed in great detail (Cavell 1996, 385-388).

In Hawthorne's *The Birthmark* a man called Aylmer, who is "proficient in every branch of natural philosophy" (28), marries a beautiful woman, Georgiana who is "perfect" (cf. 41) except for a crimson-purple coloured birthmark on her left cheek, having the shape of a small hand, as if "some fairy at her birth hour had laid her tiny hand upon the infant's cheek" (29). Aylmer can make the birthmark disappear but Georgiana dies. Diamond interprets Aylmer as a genuinely "unhappy" man in the sense of the *Tractatus* (cf. 6.43) who will not tolerate anything in the world that goes against his will (cf. EIM, 167). What looks harmless and innocent, such as trying to make a small flaw, a birthmark vanish, hides some appalling monstrosity in Aylmer's heart. In a Cavellian reading the problem may be put this way: Aylmer treats the hand-shaped birthmark not as a *hand*some opportunity to shake hands with Nature but as a *handle* through which he can manipulate Nature. He also takes the hand to be a *handle* in the sense of 'alias' or 'name' which is able to fix the presence or absence of the quality of *beauty*. Thus he gets alienated from beauty *as the beauty of his wife*, and he remains alone, becoming, from an originally well-meaning person, a dangerous murderer. What is wrong with Aylmer, from the ethical and the aesthetic point of view, is not a particular feature, like a birthmark you can see and identify; it is a whole attitude, a way of living, a form of life.

The important thing to see is that in both Diamond's and Cavell's readings a discourse is neither epistemological, nor ontological, nor ethical, nor aesthetic, nor scientific, nor anything else but, potentially, all these simultaneously: various units of significance, various 'codes', 'media' are present in a parallel fashion. This is why one of the well-known models for the relationship between philosophy and literature will not do: 'when philosophy with its concepts breaks down (with explanations, as truth-revealer, etc.), then comes literature with its metaphors (the depth of poetry, the dialectics of drama, etc.)'. Neither one is a substitute for the Other: they deal with the same 'raw material' (what it means to be human and inhuman, what is our relation to the Others and the world) but differently, the difference being a function of the various perspectives (attitudes, stances) with which we relate to the 'raw material'. The perspectives, conventionally, do require certain language-games: tradition will assign a certain vocabulary, sentence formation, will demand linguistic innovations, extensions of meaning, etc. to each perspective. But no unit of significance is predestined to serve in this or that discourse; the 'proof' of this is that such perspectives may arise which nobody has thought before, giving new meanings to familiar words. Each unit of significance can be used in every discourse; sometimes this results in obscurity and misunderstanding, sometimes in perspicuous representations and it is the perspective, functioning as a contextual but never fixed system with certain values passed down by tradition that will decide which happens to be the case. Where I believe Cavell and Diamond both think that Wittgenstein differs from other philosophers is that Wittgenstein, throughout his life, was as much (or even more) interested in cases when we go astray, we misunderstand, we fail, we are under a certain illusion etc. as when we succeed. Even in cases when we directly strike home, he was concentrating on the halo of doubt which surrounds success. Consequently, the stories of why we harbour certain illusions count as (a kind of) success as well, but the

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[4] Here I sadly have to pass by Moyal-Sharrock's learned and subtle criticism, with which I partly agree, partly do not. I tried to formulate where I can no longer follow Diamond's highly original reading of the *Tractatus* in Kállay 2012.

sense of winning easily evokes new illusions: sometimes the greatest illusion is that we have got rid of our illusions.

I think various (traditional) discourses, from texts of novels, dramas and poems, to discourses of epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics, should be kept apart because otherwise they cannot get to know one another (cf. Cavell 1979, 496), and not only philosophy and literature should get acquainted but various (traditional) branches of philosophy, often drifting apart, should reintroduce themselves to one another and shake hands, too. Today they rather seem to compete than cooperate, often trying to replace one another, but, I wish to claim, they should rather complement than exclude one another.

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Der Nachlass zu Ludwig Wittgenstein in der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek
Ein Bericht zu seiner wissenschaftlichen Erschließung

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Abstract

Im Rahmen des von einem privaten Sponsor finanzierten seit Juni 2013 laufenden Forschungsprojekts werden bislang größtenteils unpublizierte 700 Fotos – darunter auch unbekannte Momentaufnahmen aus der Kindheit Ludwig Wittgensteins – wie auch Korrespondenzstücke und Objekte der wissenschaftlichen Forschung zugänglich gemacht. Anhand deren Analyse soll ein umfassenderes Bild der Familie wie ihrer kulturgeschichtlichen Bedeutung ermöglicht werden.
Die Österreichische Nationalbibliothek verfügt über eine umfangreiche Sammlung von Originalbriefen der Familie Wittgenstein, darunter circa 760 Briefe von beziehungsweise an Ludwig Wittgenstein. Feinerschlossen wurden auch circa 350 Korrespondenzstücke zwischen anderen Familienmitgliedern, die nicht in der Online-Edition des *Brenner-Archivs* enthalten sind, jedoch für die biographische Wittgenstein-Forschung und die Erschließung des Fotobestandes größte Relevanz haben.
Die Forschungsergebnisse sind über den Katalog der ÖNB frei verfügbar und ermöglichen es ForscherInnen verschiedenster Disziplinen die Inhalte über Suchfunktionen gezielt zu recherchieren wie zu nutzen.

Die Österreichische Nationalbibliothek verfügt über eine umfangreiche Sammlung an Originaldokumenten zu Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), nach den Beständen der Wren Library des Trinity College in Cambridge die zweitgrößte Wittgenstein-Sammlung weltweit. Darin enthalten ist ein größerer Nachlassbestand aus dem Besitz der Familie Stonborough (Cod. Ser. n. 37.580-27.669). Diese vielfältig informative wie heterogene Sammlung umfasst unter anderem Objekte von Wittgensteins Eltern Karl (1847-1913) und Leopoldine (1850-1926) wie der Geschwister Ludwigs. So auch Kompositionen von Hans Wittgenstein (1877-1902), Skizzenbücher von Hermine (1874-1950), Theaterlibretti von Margarethe (1882-1958) und Baupläne zum Haus in der Kundmanngasse von Paul Engelmann (1891-1965) und Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Teil der Sammlung Stonborough sind an die 700 Fotografien von biografisch wie kulturgeschichtlich höchstem Wert: drei Familien-Fotoalben sowie etwa 150 Einzelfotografien. Die meisten dieser Fotos sind bislang unpubliziert, darunter auch unbekannte Momentaufnahmen aus der Kindheit Ludwig Wittgensteins. Die Fotosammlung enthält neben Portraits der Familienmitglieder und der Freunde der Familie zahlreiche Aufnahmen der Familiensitze der Wittgensteins – besonders bedeutungsvoll die von Karl Wittgenstein erbaute und von seiner Familie ab den 1890er Jahren regelmäßig frequentierte Hochreith im südlichen Niederösterreich. Dazu kommen fotografische Dokumentationen der zahlreichen Reisen einzelner Familienmitglieder.

1. Erschließung des Fotobestandes der Sammlung „Nachlass der Familie Wittgenstein-Stonborough"

Im Rahmen des von einem privaten Sponsor finanzierten seit Juni 2013 laufenden Forschungsprojekts wurden die bislang größtenteils unpublizierten Fotos der wissenschaftlichen Forschung zugänglich gemacht sowie anhand deren Analyse ein fehlendes umfassendes Bild der Familie wie ihrer kulturgeschichtlichen Bedeutung ermöglicht.

Die genannten Fotoalben der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek wie die Einzelfotografien wurden im Hinblick auf alle relevanten Details erschlossen. Dazu gehören:

1. die Identifikation der dargestellten Personen
2. die Identifikation der Fotografen (private Person bzw. Fotoatelier)
3. Datierung
4. Ort der Aufnahme
5. Technik
6. Maße
7. Beschreibung des Inhalts / Anlasses
8. Kommentare wie Beschriftungen der Fotografien sowie der diesbezüglichen Hintergrundereignisse.

Die Identifikation der Fotografen umfasst auch die Erschließung der damals in Wien und in anderen europäischen Städten bekannten Fotoateliers des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts wie auch der angewandten Fototechniken. Dabei ist von Relevanz, ob es sich um professionelle Fotografien aus Fotostudios handelt, oder um sogenannte „Schnappschüsse" aus dem Familienkreis oder eines „Künstlerfreundes" der Familie – wie zum Beispiel des Malers und Stechers Ferdinand Schmutzer (1870-1928), des Malers Johann Victor Krämer (1861-1949) oder auch des Fotografen der Secession Moritz Nähr (1859-1945). Die beiden letztgenannten sind auch Freunde der Familie Wittgenstein. Ebenso sind die Arrangements und die Maße der in den Alben montierten Fotos von analytischer Relevanz – Indiz für die Vorliebe der Familie Wittgenstein, sie nach ihren ästhetischen Bedürfnissen und persönlichen Freiheiten zu bearbeiten. Dies wird sich auch später bei Ludwig Wittgensteins persönlichem Fotoalbum aus den 1930er Jahren zeigen.[1]

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1 Ludwig Wittgenstein beschreibt in einem Brief aus Cambridge vom 10.9.1938 an seinen Freund Ludwig Hänsel (1886-1959) seine Methode des Zuschneidens von Fotos bis sie seinen exakten Vorstellungen entsprechen, wie folgt: „Lieber Hänsel! Dank Dir für die Photographie. Ich gestehe, ein Bild, auf dem Du weniger – beinahe hätte ich gesagt, schelmisch ausschaust, wäre mir noch lieber gewesen. Aber ich habe es so beschnitten, daß nur die beiden Köpfe & etwas von Brust & Schultern zu sehen ist & jetzt gefällt es mir ganz gut. Ich weiß natürlich, daß der altväterisch lustige Eindruck des Bildes gänzlich unbeabsichtigt zustandegekommen ist; aber mir ist eine einfache, trockene &, womöglich, ernste Photographie immer lieber als eine Genrescene, so natürlich sie auch sein mag.— Ich werde einen Laokoon für Photographen schreiben.— […]". In: Somavilla, Unterkircher und Berger 1994, Brief 244, S. 150.

In Kooperation mit der Sammlung von Handschriften und Alten Drucken der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek wurde das Fotomaterial digitalisiert und ist über den zentralen Katalog der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek (Quicksearch) – wie auch über den Handschriftenkatalog (HANNA) – online zugänglich. Somit sind die Forschungsergebnisse über den Katalog frei verfügbar und ermöglichen es ForscherInnen verschiedenster Disziplinen die Inhalte über Suchfunktionen gezielt zu recherchieren wie zu nutzen.

Die Fotoalben und einzelnen Fotografien (Originale wie auch Abzüge von Originalen) umfassen den Zeitraum von 1865 bis zu den 1950er Jahren und dokumentieren die kulturhistorische Bedeutung der Familie Wittgenstein, so deren großes Interesse an Musik, Bildender Kunst, Architektur und nicht zuletzt an der damals noch jungen Technik der Fotografie.

Im Folgenden sollen in dezidierter Auswahl einige Ergebnisse bezüglich der Familienalben vorgestellt werden. Das älteste Album[2], datiert mit 15. November 1869, umfasst 13 Blatt, rekto wie verso eingeklebte 86 Fotografien im Format der Carte de Visite. Identifiziert werden konnten die Portraits vor allem von Familienmitgliedern und Freunden von Leopoldine und Karl Wittgenstein. Besonders prominent versammelt sind hier die Schwestern[3] von Leopoldine Wittgenstein und deren Kinder, aber auch Verwandte mütterlicherseits aus der Familie Stallner aus Cilli/heute Celje in Slowenien.[4]

Neben den Kindern von Leopoldine und Karl Wittgenstein finden sich auch Portraits der Kupelwiesers, Osers und der Familie von Brücke, Schwestern von Karl Wittgenstein, seine Schwestern Josefine, verheiratete Oser (1844-1933), und Bertha Kupelwieser (1848-1909) sind mit ihren Kleinkindern abgebildet.

In weiterer Folge finden sich auch Portraits der Familien Wessely und Wolfrum, Arbeitskollegen Karl Wittgensteins.[5]

Vermutlich war das älteste Album aus der Sammlung der ÖNB ursprünglich im Besitz von Leopoldine Wittgenstein.

Das in die Zeit von 1895 bis 1904 datierbare, mit höchster Wahrscheinlichkeit aus dem Besitz von Ludwig Wittgensteins Bruder Rudi (1880-1904) stammende Album[6] umfasst 225 Fotografien, meist Momentaufnahmen, vom Autor selbst beschnitten und individuell mehr oder weniger nach Themen geordnet, auf 25 Blatt rekto wie verso eingeklebt. So beinhaltet dieses Album Reisen nach Deutschland (Chiemsee, München, Karlsruhe[7]), Italien

(unter anderen Rom, Oberitalien, Mailand, Venedig und Verona) wie auch Städteaufnahmen von Wien und Brüssel.

Großes Interesse zeigt der Fotograf an Architektur und Landschaftsaufnahmen, hier vor allem für die familieneigenen Villen in Neuwaldegg und auf Hochreith, für die Parkanlagen in Laxenburg, Neuwaldegg beziehungsweise für die Umgebung der Landsitze von Miesenbach und der Hochreith in Niederösterreich.[8]

Feste wie Hochzeiten und Taufen der Nichten und Neffen der Geschwister Wittgensteins, Besuche von Verwandten und Ausflüge zu den diversen Familiensitzen werden zu relevanten Gegenständen fotografischer Dokumentation. Auch der jüngste Bruder Ludwig wird zu einem beliebten Motiv. Besonders erwähnenswert ist die fotografische Begleitung des ersten Kindes von Helene Wittgenstein-Salzer (1879-1956) und Max Salzer (1868-1941), Mariechen Salzer (1900-1948), geboren im März 1900.

Bei vielen der gewählten Motive lässt sich die Suche nach einer Charakterisierung der einzelnen Persönlichkeiten feststellen, so werden sie gerne vom Fotografen bei ihren Lieblingsbeschäftigungen „gezeichnet".

Manche Albumseiten erzählen ganze Geschichten und ergeben so ein höchst komplexes Bild der Familie.

Das dritte Album[9] beginnt mit Helene Wittgensteins Hochzeitsfest in Neuwaldegg im Mai 1899. Man sieht auch den zehnjährigen Ludwig Wittgenstein im Gespräch mit Ina-Maria von Schneller auf der berühmten Steinbank im Park der Villa von Neuwaldegg. Vermutlich ist dieses Album ein Geschenk an Marie Kallmus (1825-1911) – ein Monogramm in Gold „M.K." scheint dies zu bestätigen. Viele der Aufnahmen weisen bereits auf ihre Enkel und Urenkel hin und auch sie ist noch als alte Dame präsent auf den Fotos der Hochreith oder von Neuwaldegg. Die Familiengeschichte der Wittgensteins setzt sich auch in diesem Album fort. Die Rolle des Fotografen in der Familie könnte nach Rudis Tod im Jahr 1904 sein Bruder Kurt Wittgenstein (1878-1918)[10] übernommen haben.

Die 248 Aufnahmen umfassen den zeitlichen Rahmen von 1899 bis 1910. Viele der Fotografien beziehen sich wieder auf herausragende Ereignisse wie Hochzeit, Taufe und Besuche der nächsten Verwandten und Freunde der

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2 Fotoalbum ÖNB Cod. Ser. n. 37631 Han; kostbarer Ledereinband mit „turtelnden Tauben" im Oval als Motiv unter Glas (zum Teil zerstört). Maße: 27,5 x 21 x 3,5 cm, 13 Blatt, Fotos in Hermine Wittgensteins Handschrift teilweise identifiziert.
3 Maria Gabriele Sophie Gröger, geborene Kallmus (1846-1925) und Maria Sophie Aloisia Johanna von Bruckner, geborene Kallmus (1847-1903).
4 Wie zum Beispiel Moritz Stallner (1858-1921), Gutsbesitzer und Bürgermeister von Hochenegg/Vojnik, Slowenien, Landtagsabgeordneter und Landesausschussbeisitzer in der Steiermark, Bezirk Cillis MstLt (1896-1914), vermutlich Neffe von Marie Kallmus, geborene Stallner (1825-1911), Mutter von Leopoldine Wittgenstein (1850-1926).
5 Carl Ritter von Wessely (geboren am 1852, gestorben 27.8.1914), k.k. Baurat, Großgrundbesitzer, 1040 Wien, Alleegasse 23, Direktor der Staatseisenbahnen, Errichter der Arlberg-Bahn, Erhebung in den Ritterstand am 2.9.1879. Verheiratet mit Eleonore von Wessely geborene Korte. Wessely wie auch Wolfrum gehörten zum Freundeskreis von Karl Wittgenstein.
6 Fotoalbum ÖNB, Cod. Ser. n. 37630 Han; Einband ist mit Blumenmotiv gemusterter Stoff, Maße: 21, 2 x 29 x 3,5 cm, 25 Blatt, Fotos nicht durchgängig in fremder Hand nummeriert.
7 Rudi Wittgenstein schreibt an seine Schwester Hermine aus Karlsruhe folgende Zeilen: „Karlsruhe. Sonntag den 5te Nov. 1899
Liebe Minning,
Herzlichen Dank für deinen lieben Brief der mich gestern durch seine Ankunft erfreute. Ich bin, da du meine phot. Produkte so gelobt hast, so kühn dir hiermit noch 2 zu schicken die ich an dem herrlichen Allerheiligen Tage verbrochen habe. Die eine, die Aussicht vom Schlossthurm nach dem Walde hin

enthält den Punkt von dem aus ich ein dir schon gesendetes Bild aufgenommen hab; die andere ist im Walde rechts entstanden. [...] Arrivederci, mia sorrela, con amore tuo fratre Rudi." In: Brief, ÖNB, Autogr. 12921/68-1.
Ein weiteres Schreiben von Rudi Wittgenstein an seine Schwester Hermine: „27/VI 1900, abends
Liebe Minning
Herzlichen Dank Herzlichen Dank für Brief und Geschenk ... Auf Wiedersehen Rudi
Du hast doch das Bild von Greti erhalten!" In: Brief, ÖNB, Autogr. 12921/68-2.
8 Ludwig Wittgenstein beurteilt in seinem Tagebuch seinen Bruder in Zusammenhang mit dessen Leidenschaft für die Fotografie folgendermaßen: „Die Photographien meines Bruders Rudi haben etwas Oberländerisches, oder richtiger etwas vom Stil der guten Zeichner der alten ‚Fliegenden Blätter'." Wahrscheinlich eine Anspielung auf Adolf Oberländer, einen Karikaturisten der „Fliegenden Blätter". Die „Fliegenden Blätter" sind eine illustrierte humoristische Zeitschrift des Verlags Braun & Schneider, München. Erschienen von 1844 bis 1944. Bedeutende Mitarbeiter wie Wilhelm Busch, Adolf Oberländer, Moritz von Schwind, Carl Spitzweg, Felix Dahn, Ferdinand Freiligrath, Emanuel Geibel und Joseph Victor von Scheffel lieferten Texte und Graphiken für Karikaturen zeittypischer Verhaltensformen des deutschen Bürgertums. Zitiert nach: Wittgenstein, 1997, S. 49.
9 Fotoalbum ÖNB, Cod. Ser. n. 37632 Han, roter Ledereinband mit goldener Bordüre und Monogramm „M.K.", Maße 18 x 24 x 4,4 cm, 31 Blatt, nur Rektoseiten mit Fotos beklebt, in unbekannter Hand mit Bleistift zum Teil datiert.
10 In einem Schreiben vom 22. 3. [1919] an Ludwig Wittgenstein erwähnt Arvid Sjögren (1901-1970) die fotografische Ausrüstung des zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits verstorbenen Kurt Wittgenstein: „Wien 22.III. Lieber Ludwig. [...] Da schenkte mir Deine l. Mama 2 tadellose Hüte vom armen Kurt. Auch Fechtrequisiten habe ich und der Talla photographische Sachen bekommen. [...] He[r]zl. Grüße" [Arvid]. In: Brief, ÖNB, Autogr. 1275/16-16.

Familie Wittgenstein. Nicht ungern lässt man sich mit Jagdtrophäen fotografieren wie mit erlegten Hirschen und Auerhähnen auf der Hochreith wie auch beim Spiel mit den Kindern, beim Sticken und Nähen wie auch beim Lesen. Vor allem das Heranwachsen der Kinder in zweiter Generation der Familie Wittgenstein wie Mariechen (1900-1948), Friedrich (1902-1921) und Felix Salzer (1904-1986) – Kinder von Helene und Max Salzer – , Thomas Stonborough (1906-1986), erster Sohn von Margarethe und Jerome Stonborough (1873-1938), Tochter und Sohn Otto Grögers (1876-1953) aus der Schweiz wie auch die Kinder aus Teplitz von Elsa Stradal, Nichte und Neffe von Leopoldine Wittgenstein, werden hier dokumentiert. Die Entwicklung der nächsten Generation wird bis 1910 in diesem Album festgehalten.

Spätere Jahre werden in der Sammlung der einzelnen Fotos bis in die 1950er Jahre fortgeführt. Darauf näher einzugehen würde den Rahmen der hier vorliegenden Arbeit sprengen.

2. Erschließung der Korrespondenz der Familie Wittgenstein

Die Sammlung von Handschriften und Alten Drucken der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek verfügt auch über eine umfangreiche Sammlung von Originalbriefen der Familie Wittgenstein, darunter circa 760 Briefe von beziehungsweise an Ludwig Wittgenstein. Diese sind bereits über die Elektronische Edition des Gesamtbriefwechsels des *Brenner-Archivs* in Innsbruck online zugänglich und bilden wertvolles dokumentarisches Material für das vorliegende Projekt. Feinerschlossen wurden auch circa 350 Korrespondenzstücke zwischen anderen Familienmitgliedern, die nicht in der Online-Edition des *Brenner-Archivs* enthalten sind, jedoch für die biographische Wittgenstein-Forschung und die Erschließung des Fotobestandes größte Relevanz haben.

Die Aufarbeitung der Briefe erfolgte chronologisch und ist innerhalb der Chronologie nach Familienmitgliedern geordnet. In den Online-Katalog sollte dabei Folgendes einfließen:

1. Namen (Normierung und Verknüpfung mit Normdatei GND)
2. Inhalt (Zusammenfassung des Inhalts in Regesten)
3. ev. Korrekturen weiterer Angaben wie Datierung, Ort etc.

Als Ergänzung wurden auch zu jenen Korrespondenzen, die bereits im *Brenner-Archiv* publiziert sind, Inhaltsregesten formuliert und in den Online-Katalog eingegeben. Diese inhaltliche Feinerschließung stellt eine wesentliche analytische Bereicherung für die Wittgenstein-Forschung dar.

Diese nunmehr neu zugänglichen Fotobestände und Korrespondenzstücke aus der Sammlung der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek sind ein wichtiger Beitrag zum kulturellen und familiären Hintergrund Ludwig Wittgensteins wie auch sein eigenes großes Interesse an der Fotografie, das in seinem Fotoalbum aus den 1930er Jahren kulminiert.

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Abbildungen

Abb. 1: Ludwig Wittgenstein und Inky von Schneller, (Ina-Maria von Schneller, Tochter von Hans und Katharina Maria von Schneller, geborene Salzer) in Neuwaldegg anlässlich der Hochzeit von Helene und Max Salzer im Mai 1899 (Fotoalbum Cod. Ser. n. 37632 Han, Scan7)

Abb. 2: Karl Wittgenstein mit seinen Enkeln Marie, Friedrich und Felix Salzer (Kinder von Max Salzer und Helene Salzer, geborene Wittgenstein) im Park der Villa in Neuwaldegg im Juni 1905 (Fotoalbum Cod. Ser. n. 37632 Han, Scan 11)

123

Abb. 3: Die Familie Wittgenstein auf der Hochreith (Fotoalbum Cod. Ser. n. 37632 Han, Scan 19)
Bild links: Hermine Wittgenstein am Kamin, Hochreith 1905
Bild rechts oben: Die Hausdame Rosalie Herrmann mit Marie und Friedrich Salzer (Kinder von Max und Helene Salzer, geborene Wittgenstein), Hochreith 1905
Bild rechts unten: Die Hausdame Rosalie Herrmann, Hermine Wittgenstein, die Großmutter Marie Kallmus, Paul, Margarethe und Ludwig Wittgenstein, Hochreith 1905

Abb. 4: Ludwig Wittgenstein auf der Hochreith um 1900 (Fotoalbum Cod. Ser. n. 37630 Han, Scan 13)

Abb. 5: Ludwig Wittgenstein auf der Hochreith um 1900 (Fotoalbum Cod. Ser. n. 37630 Han, Scan 18)

Abb. 6: Der bekannte Geiger Joseph Joachim auf der Hochreith circa 1902 mit Marie Salzer, Tochter von Helene Salzer, geborene Wittgenstein (Fotoalbum Cod. Ser. n. 37630 Han, Scan 29)

Abb. 7: Brief von Paul Wittgenstein (Onkel) an Ludwig Wittgenstein vom 22. Oktober 1921, mit Selbstportrait: *„Ich trage immer noch den Bart und sehe ungefähr jetzt so aus."* (Brief, Autogr. 1277/9-11 Han)

On the Beauty of Equations or Formulas

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Abstract

Many pieces of music and many poems are beautiful. Many mathematical formulas and physical equations have also been regarded as beautiful. Do we have to do with the same notion of beauty or, in the case of equations and formulas, with a specific notion? I present examples of such equations, formulas, comments on them, and also the results of a neuroscientific study. I discuss the possible aesthetic properties of such equations and formulas. I conclude that the notion of beauty involved here is rather specific, mainly since it concerns non-material, but object-regarding relations of concepts or ideas. I also argue that, as a desideratum, the possible beauty of equations or formulas will remain secondary with respect to their truth.

1. Introduction

Many, very different kinds of things can be regarded as beautiful: landscapes, sunsets, paintings, sculptures, buildings, poems, melodies, symphonies, dances, horses, women, babies. For some, it might be surprising that there also have been many affirmations of the "beauty of equations or formulas". On the internet, one can find numerous websites under such names. They mostly concern mathematics and physics, although also equations in other fields, e.g. biology or economics, have been judged beautiful.

I present examples of such equations, formulas, comments on them, and also the results of a neuroscientific study. I discuss the possible aesthetic properties of such equations and formulas. I conclude that the notion of beauty involved here is rather specific, mainly since it concerns non-material relations of concepts or ideas about objective matters. I also argue that, as a desideratum, the possible beauty of equations or formulas will remain secondary with respect to their truth.

2. Candidates and Testimonies: Mathematics

There is a quite wide consensus that Euler's identity (or equality), namely

$$e^{i\pi} + 1 = 0$$

is one of the most beautiful equations. It connects apparently unrelated important fundamental numbers: Euler's number e, the base of natural logarithms; the imaginary unit i, which satisfies $i^2 = -1$; the well-known number π; the basic numbers 1 and 0; as well as the fundamental operations +, x, and exponentiations, and also of course the equality relation =.

Euler's identity is a *particular* equation. It does not contain any variables, thus lacks generality. One obtains it from the *general* equation $e^{ix} = \cos(x) + i \sin(x)$ by setting the variable $x = \pi$.

A famous beautiful *general* equation, also discovered by Euler, is the formula $v - e + f = 2$, which holds for any convex polyhedron (a pyramid, a cube etc.). It relates the number of vertices v, the number of edges e and the number of faces f.

In an interesting neuroscientific study, Semir Zeki and co-workers (2014) asked 16 mathematicians to rate 60 equations as beautiful, neutral or ugly. Two weeks later, they viewed and rated the same equations again while being scanned in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner. The finding was that the more beautiful an equation was to a mathematician, the more activity his or her brain showed in an area called the A1 field of the medial orbito-frontal cortex, which is associated with emotion. This particular area was shown in previous studies of the authors to be correlated with emotional responses to visual and musical beauty.

It turned out that Euler's identity here, too, was the most beautiful equation with 13 'beautiful' votes and two 'neutral' ones. There also was a most ugly equation, with 13 'ugly' votes, though with 2 'beautiful' votes as well. This equation expresses the inverse value of π as an infinite sum (formulated by Srinivasa Ramanujan), which looks like:

$$\frac{1}{\pi} = \sqrt{8} \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{(1103 + 26390\,n)(2\,n-1)!!\,(4\,n-1)}{99^{4n+2}\,32^n\,(n!)^3}$$

$$= \frac{\sqrt{8}}{9801} \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{(4\,n)!\,(1103 + 26390\,n)}{(n!)^4\,396^{4n}}$$

Let me mention that there are other mathematical matters that have been considered as beautiful: arrangements and regularities of numbers, geometrical patterns, and also methods of proof (cf. McAllister 2005)

Among the many pronouncements about mathematics in general (cf. Bogomolny), we have one by Bertrand Russell:

> Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty — a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show. The true spirit of delight, the exaltation, the sense of being more than Man, which is the touchstone of the highest excellence, is to be found in mathematics as surely as poetry. (Russell 1919, 60)

Or one by the mathematician Hardy:

> The mathematician's patterns, like the painter's or the poet's must be beautiful; the ideas, like the colors or the words must fit together in a harmonious way. Beauty is the first test: there is no permanent place in this world for ugly mathematics. (Hardy 1941, 14)

Hardy, apparently, would have to judge the infinite series for $1/\pi$, which is a good piece of mathematics, as not ugly.

3. Candidates and Testimonies: Physics

Undoubtedly, we all have seen and are familiar with Einstein's relativistic equation

$$E = mc^2$$

It has been said to be "the most famous equation in the world. […] The elegance with which it ties together three disparate parts of nature—energy, the speed of light and mass—is profound." (Lasky 2007).

Another equation, famous for its beauty, is Dirac's equation. In natural units, it takes on the simple form:

$$(i\not\partial - m)\psi = 0$$

It is, as it were, the "relativistic Schrödinger equation"; it dramatically implied the existence of anti-particles, e.g. that of positrons as anti-particles of electrons.

Other equations often called beautiful are the inverse square equations of Newton's law of gravitational attraction or Coulomb's law of electric attraction. Also Maxwell's equations score high on the beauty scale; they connect electric and magnetic fields and thus cover the whole spectrum of electromagnetic waves, including of course light. The general theory of relativity scores very high, too.

As far as I know, there has not been a study of physicists, comparable to the study of mathematicians' reaction to mathematical formulas. Yet, there have been many expressions of more personal appraisals of physical equations. Here is a supported appraisal by the philosopher and writer Jim Holt:

The gold standard for beauty in physics is Albert Einstein's theory of general relativity. What makes it beautiful? First, there is its simplicity. In a single equation, it explains the force of gravity as a curving in the geometry of space-time caused by the presence of mass: mass tells space-time how to curve, space-time tells mass how to move. Then, there is its surprise: who would have imagined that this whole theory would flow from the natural assumption that all frames of reference are equal, that the laws of physics should not change when you hop on a merry-go-round? Finally, there is its aura of inevitability. Nothing about it can be modified without destroying its logical structure. The physicist Steven Weinberg has compared it to Raphael's "Holy Family," in which every figure on the canvas is perfectly placed and there is nothing you would have wanted the artist to do differently. (Holt 2006)

4. Form and Content – Aesthetic Criteria

The field of aesthetics is known for its controversies between subjectivists and objectivists. For radical subjectivists, beauty is solely in the eye of the beholder: the same thing can be beautiful for one person and ugly for another. According to one form of objectivism, such judgments admittedly are personal, but they are based on certain intrinsic, aesthetic properties of the object judged. A piece of music can be judged beautiful because of objective features, like harmony, rhythm and overall dynamical movement. These are perceptible, sensible qualities. Other aspects, such as what is expressed and how it is expressed, e.g. joy or desperation, will also play a role.

Clearly, the properties and qualities of equations or formulas, and their significance and interconnections, are of a quite different nature. What is most important is their conceptual content. The specific graphical and thus perceptible as well as the particular notational representation of this content would seem to be purely subsidiary. In that sense, the beauty of the famous equation $E = mc^2$ should be the same as the beauty of the idea or statement: "The energy of a physical system is numerically equal to the product of its mass and the speed of light squared".

Yet, the beauty of this relation of ideas expressed in this way is much less obvious. Thus, the mathematical notation used in an equation plays a very important role, since the terms stand for important concepts. The resulting concise formal, graphical form has surely contributed to the fame of the equation. This definitely is so for people not versed in physics or mathematics.

In the neuroscientific study mentioned, a control group of 12 non-mathematicians were also asked to rate the equations (though without being scanned). Their ratings were quite different, because, as the researchers surmise, they only went by the graphical appearance of the equations. The full beauty of the content of equations can only been appreciated by expert practitioners in the respective scientific fields. No doubt, composers and other music experts can also appreciate the beauty of a piece of music much more than ordinary listeners. But this type of difference is much greater in the case of equations. Plato once wrote that "nothing without understanding would ever be more beauteous than with understanding". In this sense, we know, mathematical beauty was for him the highest form of beauty.

As regards the relation between content and form, beautiful equations can maybe be compared to works of the modern movement called 'conceptual art', known especially for its installations. This movement is characterized as art in which concepts or ideas take precedence over traditional aesthetic and material concerns.

What, then, are the aesthetic properties of the content of equations, of which quite a number of them have been mentioned in the foregoing. All of them are evaluative, but some are relatively objective:

Symmetrical, profound, fundamental, significant, balanced, harmonious, simple, compact, concise, deep, general, comprehensive, universal, elegant, perfect, self-similar, economical – also useful – or: elegantly connecting disparate ideas, concepts, disparate parts of nature.

Others are less objective:

Unexpected, surprising, amazing, dumbfounding, sensational, inevitable, serious, interesting, exciting, enthusiasmic, motivating, delighting, inspiring, to fall in love with, magic.

On the basis of what can be called aesthetic criteria, people will choose among such properties and give them relative weights, in their judgment of the beauty of equations. As also shown in the ratings of mathematicians in the neuroscientific study mentioned, people differ in their aesthetic criteria. Such criteria also undergo important changes historically (see McAllister 2005).

5. Beauty and Truth

Dirac (1939, 123) once said: "What makes the theory of relativity so acceptable to physicists in spite of its going against the principle of simplicity is its great mathematical beauty. [...] It is the essential beauty of the theory [of relativity] which I feel is the real reason for believing in it."

For Einstein himself, as reported (cf. Ball 2014), the general theory of relativity was "too beautiful to be wrong", and he held that "the only physical theories that we are willing to accept are the beautiful ones". He is also quoted as having stated: "I have deep faith that the principle of the universe will be beautiful and simple." (French 1979, 32)

Apart from a seeming disagreement about simplicity, the two eminent scientists share with many others the conviction that the beauty of an equation or theory is at least an indication of its truth. However, in fact, beauty and truth have little to do with each other inasmuch as they concern different relations. Truth is a relation between an equation and its object, whereas beauty plays its role in the relation between the equation and human subjects, as appreciating onlookers or as creators (cf. Ball 2014).

Of course, it still could be that, say statistically, beauty is positively correlated with truth. Yet, there are too many cases where something beautiful did not imply its truth. Think of Kepler's beautiful model of the solar system, with one of the 5 Platonic solids fitted between each pair of planetary spheres. It has been called "a most artistic contribution", but also "an excellent example of how truth and beauty are not always equivalent" (Hart 1998). According to the model, there should only be 6 planets; also, the implied interplanetary distances are far off the mark.

While in music, painting or poetry one can have the primary goal of creating something beautiful, this is not so in science. The primary goal of science is knowledge, the expansion of knowledge and understanding. All of these essentially have to do with truth. Thus, the primary criterion which also scientific equation and formulas have to satisfy also is truth. So departing a bit from Einstein and Dirac, as well as Plato, we have to say: Their possible beauty is a great value, but one secondary to truth.

6. Concluding Remarks

We have seen that the possible beauty of equations or formulas is a special kind of beauty, mainly since it concerns non-material relations of concepts or ideas about objective layered realms. Therefore, some of their possible aesthetic properties are also very specific, for instance, their possible fundamental or universal or self-similar character.

Their possible beauty is a great value. However, I argued, that their beauty remains a secondary goal, as contrasted with truth as the primary desideratum.

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Was änderte sich mit Nietzsche?
Über eine Wendung im ästhetischen Denken

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Abstract

Jedes philosophische, aber auch jedes dichterische Werk ändert die ‚Wirklichkeit', es macht die geistige, soziale und mentale Beschaffenheit dessen, was wir Lebenswelt oder Gesellschaft nennen, anders.
Dass Friedrich Nietzsche zu den Philosophen, aber auch Ästheten (und wenn man noch will: Dichtern) gehört, die diese schöpferische Funktion am vollständigsten erfüllt haben, gilt heute als allgemein eingesehenes Faktum.
Aktuell wird ein Versuch gemacht, Friedrich Nietzsches *Bilanz* auf dem Gebiete des ästhetischen Denkens zu ziehen.

Mit der allgemeinen historischen Einbettung von Nietzsches Innovationskraft hängt es zusammen, dass er es war, der die Kunstproblematik von dem Punkt der Vernichtung der metaphysischen Denksysteme aus neu rekonstruiert hatte.

Nietzsche formuliert die Notwendigkeit einer neuen ‚Wissenschaft der Kunst' auf das Ausdrücklichste. Schon im ersten Aphorismus seines in dieser Hinsicht wichtigsten Werkes, *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* formuliert er nicht nur generell die Notwendigkeit einer neuen Wissenschaft, sondern er versieht sie mit einem der generellen Aspekte seiner Philosophie:

> Der Künstler weiss, dass sein Werk nur voll wirkt, wenn es den Glauben an eine Improvisation, an eine wundergleiche Plötzlichkeit der Entstehung erregt; und so hilft er wohl dieser Illusion nach und führt jene Elemente der begeisterten Unruhe, der blind greifenden Unordnung, des aufhorchenden Träumens beim Beginn der Schöpfung in die Kunst ein, als Trugmittel, um die Seele des Schauers und Hörers so zu stimmen, dass sie an das plötzliche Hervorspringen des Vollkommenen glaubt. – Die Wissenschaft der Kunst hat dieser Illusion, wie es sich von selbst versteht, auf das bestimmteste zu widersprechen […]. (Nietzsche 1980a, 141)

Durch die Akzentuierung des Momentes der realen Entstehung bei der Analyse der Kunst macht somit Nietzsche seinen philosophischen Grundgedanken auch auf ästhetischem Gebiet geltend.

Fast ein ganzes Jahrhundert vor den rezeptionsästhetischen und den ihnen entwachsenden hermeneutischen Ansätzen führt Nietzsche seine Idee über die Entstehung(sgeschichte) des Kunstwerks in einen klaren rezeptionsästhetischen Ansatz hinüber.

Er weist nach, dass die Verabsolutierung des künstlerischen Genius in der ästhetischen Rezeption, die eine der primären Quellen der Ausklammerung des Entstehungsmomentes ist, konkreten psychologischen Motiven entstammt:

> Weil wir gut von uns denken, aber doch durchaus nicht von uns erwarten, dass wir je den Entwurf eines Rafaelischen Gemäldes oder eine solche Scene wie die eines Shakespeare'schen Drama's machen könnten, reden wir uns ein, das Vermögen dazu sei ganz übermässig wunderbar [...]. Nun kann Niemand beim Werke des Künstlers zusehen, wie es *geworden* ist; das ist sein Vortheil, denn überall, wo man das Werden sehen

kann, wird man etwas abgekühlt. (Nietzsche 1980a, 151 f.)[1]

Die Vernachlässigung der Momente der Entstehung bzw. des Werdens bei der ästhetischen Betrachtung lassen einen Kontext erstehen, welcher nicht nur für den Rezipienten, sondern auch für den Produzenten, mit gewaltigen Nachteilen einhergehen soll. Ein Beispiel:

> Es ist jedenfalls ein gefährliches Anzeichen, wenn den Menschen jener Schauder vor sich selbst überfällt, sei es nun jener berühmte Cäsaren-Schauder oder der hier in Betracht kommende Genie-Schauder; wenn der Opferduft, welchen man billigerweise allein einem Gotte bringt, dem Genie in's Gehirn dringt, so dass er zu schwanken und sich für etwas Übermenschliches zu halten beginnt. (Nietzsche 1980a, 154)

Das Werden, die Entstehungsgeschichte bedeutet für die Betrachtung der Kunst die notwendige und legitime Verwirklichung von Forderungen, die von einer gänzlich neuen Situation mit Selbstverständlichkeit vorgeschrieben werden.

Der Philosoph fühlt sich als Exponent von einer „höheren Stufe" auch der ganzen „Cultur", wie es in dem folgenden Text auch exemplarisch zum Vorschein kommt: „Die *höhere Stufe* der Cultur, welche sich unter die Herrschaft (wenn auch nicht unter die Tyrannei) der Erkenntnis stellt, hat eine grosse Ernüchterung des Gefühls und eine starke Concentration aller Werte vonnöten." (Nietzsche 1980b, 233)

Zu dieser von Nietzsche einerseits wahrgenommenen, andererseits selber mitvollzogenen ‚Wende' im ästhetischen Denken gehört auch die Einsicht in die bis dahin unbefragt bestandene Konnexion zwischen dem ‚Schönen' und dem ‚Guten', die in der Beleuchtung der neuen kritischen Kultur nicht mehr lange zu bestehen braucht: „[B]isher war es nur erlaubt, im *Moralisch-Guten* nach Schönheit zu suchen – Grund genug, dass man so wenig gefunden und sich so viel nach imaginären Schönheiten ohne Knochen hat umthun müssen!" (Nietzsche 1980b, 280f.)[2]

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[1] Eine weitere Konsequenz dieser Situation ist, dass der unter entstehungsgeschichtlichem Aspekt ‚naive' Kunstgenießer auch im Zusammenhang der dargestellten Charaktere im Kunstwerk mit Notwendigkeit eine ‚unwissende', d.h. ‚inadäquate' Position einnehmen muss: „Die Kunst geht von der natürlichen *Unwissenheit* des Menschen über sein Inneres (in Leib und Charakter) aus: sie ist nicht für Physiker und Philosophen da." (Nietzsche 1980a, 150)

[2] Die Abkehr des ‚Schönen' vom ‚Guten' und seine Zuwendung zum ‚Bösen' ist geradezu einer der Kristallisationspunkte der europäischen Moderne. Von den vielen diesbezüglichen Bearbeitungen s. Kiss 1984.

Eine Kunst, die den Voraussetzungen dieser neuen Zeit keine Rechnung trägt, muss in einen Zustand der *Ungleichzeitigkeit* zurückfallen:

> Wenn die Kunst ein Individuum gewaltig ergreift, dann zieht es dasselbe zu Anschauungen solcher Zeiten zurück, wo die Kunst am kräftigsten blühte [...]. An sich ist nun der Künstler schon ein zurückbleibendes Wesen, weil er beim Spiel stehen bleibt, welches zur Jugend und Kindheit gehört: dazu kommt noch, dass er allmählich in andere Zeiten zurückgebildet wird. So entsteht zuletzt ein heftiger Antagonismus zwischen ihm und den gleichaltrigen Menschen seiner Periode [...]. (Nietzsche 1980a, 149)[3]

Nietzsche gelingt es, das immanente Interesse des Künstlers (indem er an seinen früheren, jetzt schon aber als überholt geltenden Voraussetzungen festhält) als geradezu diametral *gegen* den Haupttrend neuzeitlicher Kultur und Gesellschaft zu diagnostizieren.

Indem man mit Max *Weber* als Hauptcharakteristikum der Moderne über eine ,Entzauberung' der Welt reden kann, weist Nietzsche nach, dass der Künstler im geradezu gegenteiligen Trend eine ,Wiederverzauberung der Welt' betreibt.

Es ist der konkrete Ort, an welchem ein sich mit den neuen Existenzbedingungen der Kunst nicht auseinandersetzender Künstler zu einem direkten Vertreter von Einstellungen wird, die *gegen* den Prozess der ,Entzauberung', d.h. *gegen* die neuzeitliche Rationalität gerichtet sind. Es geht hier nicht um das Inhaltliche oder das Formelle, nicht um das Konzeptionelle in der künstlerischen Sphäre, auch nicht um das Ethische oder Amoralische in der Kunst. Dieser Vorwurf formuliert die Forderung nach einer neuen fundamentalen Einstellung, die – in der Sprache des klassischen Idealismus gesagt – *gleichzeitig* mit dem (intellektuellen, moralischen, etc.) Stand der menschlichen Gattung kompatibel ist. Es geht also nicht um einen ästhetischen, es geht vielmehr um einen geschichtsphilosophischen Angriff, wobei die notwendige Entsprechung der einzelnen menschlichen Objektivationen (wie die der Kunst) mit dem allgemeinen Stand der Menschheit, ihre ,Gleichzeitigkeit', im Vorhinein angenommen wird.

Es kann nicht mehr überraschen, dass Nietzsche dem Begriff der künstlerischen *Inspiration* ein allseitiges Ende machen will. An ihrer Stelle erscheint die Visionierung des *wirklichen* Entstehungsvorganges des betreffenden Kunstwerks. Nietzsche gibt auch dafür eine Erklärung, warum das romantisch-mythologisierende Bild der künstlerischen Inspiration entstehen konnte: „Wenn sich die Productionskraft eine Zeit lang angestaut hat und am Ausfliessen durch ein Hemmnis gehindert worden ist, dann gibt es endlich einen so plötzlichen Erguss, als ob eine unmittelbare Inspiration, ohne vorhergegangenes inneres Arbeiten, also ein Wunder sich vollziehe." (Nietzsche 1980a, 147)

Realität und *Schein* werden einander gegenübergestellt. Die Wahrheit der Realität erhält ihre fundierte Begründung, und die alte Vorstellung, die ja *vor* der Entstehung dieser neuen Einsichten überhaupt gebildet worden ist, wird antiquiert. Es ist eine praktische Unmöglichkeit, in der Zukunft noch ,naiv' über die poetische Inspiration zu reden.

Nietzsche geht in seiner Umwertung auch noch weiter. Er begnügt sich nicht mit der Gegenüberstellung von Schein und Realität, er entlarvt auch die pragmatisch-interessengeleiteten Momente, die zu einer weiteren Fortsetzung der falschen Praxis motivieren könnten: „Die Künstler haben ein Interesse daran, dass man an die plötzlichen Eingebungen, die sogenannten Inspirationen glaubt; als ob die Idee des Kunstwerks, der Dichtung, der Grundgedanke einer Philosophie, wie ein Gnadenschein vom Himmel herableuchte." (Nietzsche 1980a, 146)

Ganz neu erscheint auch das Problem des *Bösen* in der Nietzscheschen Umwertung der bisherigen ästhetischen Kategorien. Seine Wendung auf diesem Gebiet meldet sich in der Verschiebung einer Ästhetik des Hässlichen (wie sie etwa beispielsweise bei Rosenkranz artikuliert worden ist) in eine Ästhetik (bzw. Kunst) der *hässlichen Seele*: „Wie in den bildenden Künsten, so auch gibt es in der Musik und Dichtung eine Kunst der hässlichen Seele, neben der Kunst der schönen Seele [...]." (Nietzsche 1980a, 145)[4]

Die umfassende entwicklungsgeschichtliche Perspektive führt zu einer neuen *quasi-epistemologischen* Ebene, von der aus die betreffenden Kategorien neu begründet werden können. Dass beispielsweise das Metrum eine Ästhetisierung der Wirklichkeit bewirkt, ist eine analytische Einsicht, die sowohl ihre positiv-sachliche, als auch ihre kritische Funktion erfüllen kann: „Das Metrum legt Flor über die Realität; es veranlasst einige Künstlichkeit des Geredes und Unreinheit des Denkens [...]. Die Kunst macht den Anblick des Lebens erträglich, dadurch dass sie den Flor des unreinen Denkens über dasselbe legt." (Nietzsche 1980a, 144)

Genealogische[5] und real-kausale[6] Erklärungen werden gesucht, um die traditionellen ästhetischen Fragestellungen adäquat zu ersetzen.

Nietzsches *produktionsästhetische* und *rezeptionsästhetische* Ansätze ergeben auch ein Ganzes, allerdings wieder eher in instrumentalisierter Intention. Die produktionsästhetischen und rezeptionsästhetischen Ansätze werden für Nietzsche nicht wichtig um ihrer selber willen, ihre Rekonstruktion *entlarvt* falsche Einstellungen und Erwartungen der Kunst gegenüber. So bezweifelt Nietzsche beispielsweise auf produktionsästhetischer Grundlage, dass alles im Kunstwerk ,notwendig' wäre[7], hebt hervor, dass auch das Publikum an der Entwicklung einer künstlerischen Gattung seinen produktiven Anteil hat[8]. Produktion und Rezeption werden in ihren Intentionen tiefgehend be-

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3 Es ist vielleicht nicht überflüssig, wenn darauf hingewiesen wird, wie sehr Nietzsche hier jenem Ernst *Bloch* zeitlich vorausgeht, zu dessen Namen man gewöhnlich den Begriff der 'Ungleichzeitigkeit' mit dem Anspruch auf Begründung assoziiert hatte.

4 Die ganze Bedeutung dieser Distinktion kann aber erst klar werden, wenn wir uns die Bedeutung der historisch ebenfalls durchaus vielfach bedingten ,Ästhetik des Hässlichen' von Rosenkranz bewusst machen. Das heißt, dass Nietzsche hier sozusagen schon *innerhalb* des neuen Paradigmas einer ,Ästhetik des Hässlichen' seine Wendung durchführt.
5 Beispiele dafür etwa: Genealogie des Komischen (Nietzsche 1980a, 169f.), Genealogie des Geniebewusstseins (ebenda, 151f.) etc.
6 Es ist der immer wieder sich artikulierende Kampf Nietzsches, die künstlerische Grundfunktion, die wir mit Abstand mit Aristoteles' Katharsis-Konzeption identifizieren würden (was Nietzsche in expliziter Form nie tut), positiv sachlich, d.h. im größten Maße ,real-kausal' zu erklären, womit er sich gleichzeitig auch für eine Meta-Kritik der Katharsis-Auffassung ausspricht.
7 „Die Formen eines Kunstwerks, welche seine Gedanken zum Reden bringen, also seine Art zu sprechen sind, haben immer etwas Lässliches [...]." (Nietzsche 1980a, 159)
8 „Der Fortgang von einer Stufe des Stils zur andern muss so langsam sein, dass nicht nur der Künstler, sondern auch die Zuhörer und Zuschauer diesen Fortgang mitmachen und genau wissen, was vorgeht." (Nietzsche 1980a, 157.) – Eine andere Facette des rezeptionstheoretischen Vorgehens s. ebda. - Ja, sogar die späteren Ansätze des notwendigen und bei einigen Autoren produktiven Missverständnisses als hermeneutisches Schlüsselphänomen wird auf dieser produktionsästhetischen Grundlage bei Nietzsche auf die expliziteste Weise ausgearbeitet: „Nicht die Schuld und deren schlimmer Ausgang liegt ihnen am Herzen, dem Shakespeare so wenig wie dem Sophokles [...]: so leicht es gewesen wäre, in den genannten Fällen die Schuld zum Hebel des Drama's zu machen, so bestimmt ist dies gerade vermieden. [...] So spricht er [der Dramatiker-E.K.] aus einer unruhigen und kraftvollen Zeit heraus […]." (Nietzsche 1980b, 202)

schrieben und theoretisch in gemeinsamem Kontext gesichtet.[9]

Die permanente Umwertung der ästhetischen Kategorie auf der Grundlage der Entstehungsgeschichte, auf derselben real-kausalen Motivation und intellektuellen Gleichzeitigkeit, führt ferner auch zur Vorwegnahme neuer ästhetischer Ansätze und Konzeptionen. In der späteren Ausführung werden wir dabei nicht immer wieder in jedem Falle darauf hinweisen, dass diese Neuansätze Nietzsches tatsächlich so produktiv waren, dass sie einer ganzen Reihe der Werke der modernen Kunst und der modernen Ästhetik zum Ausgangspunkt gedient haben.

Was beispielsweise Nietzsche in seinem nächstfolgenden Ansatz als „reliefartige, unvollständige Darstellung" bezeichnet, erscheint im Laufe der späteren Prozesse sowohl im konkreten wie auch im übertragenen Sinne als eine Vorwegnahme späterer Kunstentwicklung: „[S]o ist mitunter die reliefartig unvollständige Darstellung eines Gedankens, einer ganzen Philosophie wirksamer, als die erschöpfende Ausführung [...]." (Nietzsche 1980a, 161f.) Man könnte sogar im Anschluss dazu – in einer ästhetischen Überhebung der ursprünglichen Idee – sagen, dass sich die ganze spätere Entwicklung auf diesen Gebieten je nach dem qualifiziert, welche konkreten Inhalte und Verwirklichungsformen man jeweils eben dem Rahmen der „unvollständigen" Darstellung gab.[10]

Friedrich Nietzsches Umwertung der ästhetischen Kategorien sowie seine Betrachtung des Ästhetischen generell erwies sich sowohl als eine, die eine Reihe neuer Innovationen erzielte als auch aber als eine, die in den darauffolgenden Prozessen auch tatsächlich in jeder denkbaren Richtung gewirkt hat. Dies als Tatsache auszusagen, ist eine alltägliche Aufgabe der Nietzsche-Forschung. Die seriöse Reife dieser Gesamteinsicht kann aber nicht vergessen machen, dass in der Rekonstruktion sowohl der einzelnen rezeptionsgeschichtlichen Stränge als auch in derselben der inhaltlichen Momente noch eine enorme Arbeit vor der Forschung steht. Das Ausmaß dieses Feldes sollte die folgende Annahme veranschaulichen:

Gesetzt, dass ein Forscher sich in der europäischen Moderne vollkommen auskennt, wäre es doch kaum zu erwarten, dass er bei dem heutigen Stand der Forschung auch ein Gesamtbild über die wahre ästhetische Auswirkung des *dionysischen* Prinzips selbst noch in den wichtigsten Kunstgattungen zu geben imstande ist.

Friedrich Nietzsches Umwertung der ästhetischen Kategorialität gewinnt ihre Lebendigkeit und Frische auch aus der Tatsache, dass er mit der neuen (später: ‚modernen') Kunst seiner Zeit lange Zeit auf das Intensivste zusammen gelebt hatte. Es genügt, wenn wir die Länge, Komplexität und Intensität seiner Beziehung zu Richard Wagner kurz in Erinnerung rufen.

Dass seine Neubewertung in einen breiteren Prozess der philosophischen Neuorientierung nach 1848-1849 eingebettet war, sollte nur kurz heraufbeschworen werden, diesmal aber auch mit dem Ziel, dass man sieht: Diese Zeitgrenze erwies sich für das Ästhetische schon prinzipiell als entscheidend. In dieser Beleuchtung erscheinen auch Friedrich Nietzsches Innovationen als Antworten auf eine gänzlich neue Herausforderung. Antworten allerdings, über die Gottfried Benn später mit vollem Recht sagen konnte: „Eigentlich hat alles, was meine Generation diskutierte, innerlich sich auseinanderdachte, man kann sagen: erlitt, man kann auch sagen: breittrat – alles das hatte sich bereits bei Nietzsche ausgesprochen und erschöpft, definitive Formulierung gefunden, alles Weitere war Exegese." (Benn 1959, 542)

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9 Ein extrem wichtiges Beispiel: Nietzsche 1980a, 156.
10 Wieder anders formuliert erscheint diese Grundidee in Roman Ingardens Literatur- und Kunsttheorie als integrative Idee, man dürfte aber auch die Grundidee in den zahlreichen Formen der ‚negativen' Ästhetiken, der Ästhetiken des Fragments unschwer wieder entdecken.

Aspect Perception and Seeing Anew in Wittgenstein, Geertz, and Bruegel

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Abstract

Culture and Value (1998, 42) documents Wittgenstein arguing that: "People nowadays think scientists are there to instruct them, poets, and musicians etc. to entertain them. *That the latter have something to teach them*; that never occurs to them." This essay responds by exploring "aspect perception" and "seeing anew" in Wittgenstein and Pieter Bruegel the Elder (1525 - 1569). It addresses Wittgenstein's argument by showing how such explorations relate to challenges of taking the sciences, humanities and arts equally seriously.

Whereas philosophers and psychologists are fascinated by illusion […], artists have more often said that they are interested in nature, reality, and truth. […] But when we discover how differently their intentions were realized in paint, the appearance of unanimity vanishes before our eyes. And this makes it tempting to dismiss these remarks as lazy repetitions of stock phrases, which a sophisticated art theory will debunk.
This is the conclusion many philosophers have reached. [....] I doubt whether any of this is right. (Hyman 2006: xviii)

Promising Developments and New Challenges

The last two decades have seen remarkable parallels between rethinking the histories of science and art; and Wittgenstein in lights of the *Nachlaß* and collections of lectures and conversations (S. Koerner, IWS 2015). For a half century after World War II, opposed paradigms polarised art versus science; truth versus contingency; context versus comparison; text versus images; formalist aesthetics versus the social history of art; internalist versus externalist positions on science; and the 'early' versus 'late' works of many authors. Today deep shifts are taking place away from partitioning preoccupations:

- from determinist responses to 'crises over representation' - towards rethinking contextual motivations and eclipsed materials;
- from calls for 'going beyond' controversies towards intensely interdisciplinary studies of relationships between complex historically contingent materials;
- from polarisation of contexts versus comparison towards comparative micro-historical approaches to what is meant by a 'context' or 'culturally specific situation'.

It is difficult to overstate these developments' novelty and interfaces with themes in Wittgenstein relating to discussions of 'aesthetics today' (e.g., Baktin 2010; Elkins 2007). But serious challenges face rethinking what the arts can teach us, including those of:

- devoting equal attention to rethinking 'art/sci' and 'disenchantment' models of art history;
- examining the roles of artworks in polemic over whether modernity should be seen as a liberating triumph or lamentable tragedy;

- exploring the long history of innovations in the arts, as pedagogical resources for illuminating problematic presuppositions and seeing things anew.

Each deserves close attention. However this essay has a restricted and primarily constructive purpose. It responds to Wittgenstein's (1998) concerns about the pedagogical significance of the arts by exploring "aspect perception" and "seeing anew" in Wittgenstein and Bruegel.

Aesthetic Experience and Seeing Otherwise in Wittgenstein and Bruegel

The *Tractatus* (1922) ends with the brief section "7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." In the *Philosophical Investigations* (1958, 212), he said: "We find certain things about seeing puzzling because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough." This remarkable contrast provides insight of three areas in Wittgenstein concerning art's pedagogical significance.

- Conventional scientific method and theory are ill-suited for understanding the implications of how things are made and used for their meanings and aesthetic experience.
- Aesthetic experiences are not unique or reducible to timeless causes. A suitable approach situates them in interpretative contexts that render them analogically intelligible, instead of eclipsing complexity.
- The functions of things that elicit aesthetic interest are not restricted to illustrating already 'given' knowledge – they are means to new knowledge - as evidenced by 'seeing anew'.

It bears stressing that Bruegel comes late in the history of relevant innovations. Some of the earliest and most sophisticated interpretations of the cultural contingency of 'aesthetic interest', 'aspect blindness' and 'seeing anew' were expressed in such nonverbal arts as music, sculpture and painting.

Wittgenstein and Picturing Aesthetic Experience

Garry Hagsberg (2014) draws useful attention to how many things Wittgenstein (1966) might have meant by characterising aesthetics as both as "entirely misunderstood" and "very big." Wittgenstein may have been referring with "entirely misunderstood" to problems with the ideas of a "science of aesthetics" and "experiments" in

empirical psychology. There are many examples of how Wittgenstein distanced his aims from conventional portraits of science. Some have seen this as 'anti-scientism'. However here we attend to Wittgenstein's (1958, 232) worries about gaps between the complexity of aesthetic experience and that "experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by."

> The sort of explanation one is looking for when one is puzzled by an aesthetic impression is not a causal explanation, not one corroborated by experience or by statistics as to how people react. […] This is not what one means or what one is driving at by an investigation into aesthetics. (Wittgenstein 1966, 21)

By characterising aesthetics as "very big" Wittgenstein may have meant that: the arts figure in the minority of a diversity of aesthetic objects; aesthetics is central to a wide range of philosophical issues; and conventional disciplinary orientations impede its understanding. The range of philosophical issues at stake is indeed huge. The concepts Kant introduced in the *Critique of Judgement* (1790)*,* remain foundational today. Their reinterpretations have figured centrally in such paradigmatic 'turns' as those around language, practice and embodiment (or extended mind).

Wittgenstein argued for replacing universalising generalisations with investigations of the complexity of 'family resemblance' amongst 'language games', which elicit aesthetic interest in different cultural contexts. Like Clifford Geertz (1973, 1983), he stressed contrasts between our own aesthetic experience near and the experience far, and the need of contextual and comparative approaches to culture as a dynamic normative system: "To describe a set of aesthetic rules fully means really to describe the culture of a period." (Wittgenstein 1966, 8) Michael Baxandall's *Painting and Experience in Fifteen Century Italy* (1972) is exemplary. For Baxandall (ibid, 152) to study fifteenth century painting means to study how it was situated in relation to, for instance, music, social dancing, and practical activities of gauging - estimating quantities, volumes, proportions, ratios, and so on for commercial purposes: "If we observe that Piero della Francesca tends to a gauged sort of painting, Fra Angelico to a preached sort of painting, and Botticelli to a danced sort of painting, we are observing something not only about them but about their society." (Baxandall 1972, 152)

Comparison figures centrally to questions about "aesthetics appreciation" and "aspect perception" in Wittgenstein's (1958, 193) approach to the "puzzlement" of experiences of meaning: "I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience noticing an aspect." For Severin Schroeder (2010, 366) key questions include: (1) "How (or in what sense) is it possible to *experience* an aspect (a thought, the meaning of a picture) in an instant?" (2) "Are visual aspects (resemblances) actually *seen* or are they only *thought* of in an interpretation?"

Relating to question (1), Schroeder (ibid, 359) stresses that, in Wittgenstein (1958, 193), "seeing-as is essentially noticing a resemblance, an internal relation between an object and other objects, real or imagined [...]. But the act of noticing a visual resemblance cannot be construed as distinct from that of seeing (the resemblance). Of course you can see the same object without noticing the resemblance, but the noticing (when it occurs while looking) is not a mental operation distinct from seeing." Question (2) relates to Wittgenstein's discussions of "seeing anew". We experience the change as instantaneous because of our relationships to how we saw things before: "My visual impression has changed; what was it like before and what [is] it like now?" (Wittgenstein 1958, 196) What we took as self evident about the experience near and far (and our areas of "aspect blindness") changed. This has powerful critical and constructive implications. On the one hand, as Stanley Cavell (2005, 11) put it, the task of "criticism is to reveal its object as having yet to achieve its due effect. Something there, despite being fully open to the senses has been missed." On the other hand "seeing anew" means things can be otherwise.

The importance of pictures – (and other nonverbal arts) – to these themes is difficult to overstate. While the *Tractatus* (1922) stresses the limitations of language ("silence"), Wittgenstein's later emphasis falls upon nonverbal language games (Wittgenstein 1966, 11). The *Nachlaß* corroborates Wittgenstein's appreciation of picturing's philosophical significance. Pictures, gestures, aesthetic objects and practices are not simply illustrations of phenomenon already evident in texts or language. They illuminate realms of non-knowledge and enable us to see things otherwise. This might be one of the implications of Wittgenstein's critique of failures to appreciate the arts' pedagogical significance.

Aspect Blindness and Seeing Otherwise in Bruegel

> A *picture* held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. (Wittgenstein 1958, 115)

Few artists have been more recurrent foci in polemic over whether the supposed 'disenchantment' of art and modernity should be interpreted as a triumph or as a tragedy than Bruegel. His work figured centrally in polemic over notions, which attributed the Renaissance to the Flemish art's 'realism' and notions that idealise 'primitivism'. Such polemic eclipses the abundant evidence that long before the Scientific Revolution and early modern humanities, nonverbal arts such as music, sculpture and painting saw remarkable innovations in interpreting the cultural contingency of 'aesthetic interest', 'aspect blindness' and 'seeing anew'.

Much art history divides studies of how art is made from those concerning (supposedly 'hidden') meaning. Bruegel goes against the grain of these divisions. His use of materials (and motifs and styles of earlier and contemporary traditions) generate meanings. His "ground" is a smooth chalky surface painted on wood; and the more closely we examine his motifs – the more we see where the ground shows that "the real and the fictive" are "humanly made" (J.L. Koerner 2004, 240). Making and meaning are likewise linked in Bruegel's interpretations of the cultural contingency of aesthetic experience. For instance, the cluster of figures, in the right-hand foreground of *Jesus Carrying the Cross* (1565), refers to late medieval roots and those roots' cultural distance (J.L. Koerner 2004). There is something experience far about them. In Bruegel – as in Geertz, Baxandall and Wittgenstein – thick description does not remove the complexity of the experience near and far – it renders complexity (makes connections) analogically intelligible.

Bruegel provides marvellous interpretations of 'seeing anew'. Consider the small painting, *Peasant and Nest robber* (1568), named after the proverb: "He who knows where the nest is, has the knowledge, he who robs, has the nest."

132

At the seemingly ideal rural landscape's centre there is a large man – as ethnographically thickly described as the people in Bruegel's famous paintings of local forms of life. The man strides forward and seems at once to look at us, glance backwards, and point towards the other man in the painting, who is hanging onto a branch. His hat falls to the ground while he reaches for the eggs in a bird's nest. Bruegel's work brims with proverbs, and much research has been devoted to looking for texts to supposedly explain complexity away. However, if we heed warnings about prioritising texts and reduction, and attend to how the painting is made, we notice something new. Behind the man is a dense cluster of trees, and a hamlet in the distance on the bank of a lake or wide river, which bends on the right hand side of the painting and extends across the whole foreground. We are looking at the man, and he strides over the brink of it - while pointing backwards and looking at us. Both he (and we initially) do not notice that he is about to fall into the water. Bruegel's pointing peasant draws our attention to that – both he and we need to look at things otherwise.

All this critically engages claims about Bruegel's paintings (and the people in them) being 'primitive'. Writing on the *Peasant Dance* (1568) and "ethnography", Joseph Leo Koerner notes that at first glance "the foreground peasant" seems "weighed down by heavy shoes" and "turned the wrong direction" –

All the clumsiness disappears, however, the moment we catch sight of his left eye, which casts a perfectly aimed glance at his partner. [...] Bruegel teaches us to recognize and marvel at indigenous grace. [...] The awkwardness serves too as his own unmasking. An intimate of urbane humanist scholars, he becomes Peasant Bruegel and allows us to see *him*, not just the peasants and ourselves, as an example of the forms that human life takes in one place, in one world among worlds. (J.L. Koerner 2004, 249-251).

Seeing the Pedagogical Significance of the Arts Anew

John Hyman expresses doubts about conventional characterisations of art in the passage at this essay's beginning. We also noted Wittgenstein's concerns about failures to appreciate the arts' pedagogical potential. To what extent might his use of images and examples from the arts to discuss "aesthetic experience" and "aspect perception" be relevant for seeing the pedagogical significance of science, the humanities and the arts anew? Wittgenstein and Bruegel might have agreed that:

To see ourselves as others see us can be eye-opening. To see others as sharing a nature with ourselves is the merest decency. But it is from the far more difficult achievement of seeing ourselves amongst others, as a local example of the forms human life has locally taken, a case among cases, a world among worlds, that the largeness of mind, without which objectivity is self-congratulation and tolerance a sham. (Geertz 1983, 16)

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133

How Not to Argue That Wittgenstein Was a Moral Anti-Realist

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Abstract

Mario Brandhorst provides an interpretation of Rush Rhees' *Some Developments in Wittgenstein's Ethics* and Wittgenstein's *Lectures on Aesthetics* which ascribes a moral anti-realist position to Wittgenstein. In this paper, I show that at least two of his arguments are insufficient in order to support this claim. On the one hand, Brandhorst fails to capture Wittgenstein's distinction between the question what one ought to do and the question which ethical framework one ought to embrace. On the other hand, Brandhorst mistakenly assumes that Wittgenstein's rejection of Moore's particular kind of moral realism is sufficient for ascribing an anti-realist position to Wittgenstein.

Even though Wittgenstein has rarely addressed the matter of meta-ethics, Mario Brandhorst (2009) thinks that the little evidence we have suffices to ascribe an anti-realist position to him. In this paper I will show that at least two of his arguments do not suffice to defend this claim. Hence, I neither aim to provide a full-fledged account of Wittgenstein's stance towards meta-ethics nor on Brandhorst's interpretation of Wittgenstein as a whole.

First, a word about terminology: By *moral realism* I mean the position that a moral proposition bears a certain truth-value regardless of any subjective attitudes towards it. In contrast, by *moral anti-realism* I mean the position that the truth-value of a moral proposition depends on subjective attitudes towards it.

1. Brandhorst's First Argument

At first, Brandhorst draws attention to Rush Rhees' *Some Developments in Wittgenstein's View of Ethics*. Rhees reports that Wittgenstein discussed the matter of meta-ethics with him on several occasions. In 1942 for instance Rhees brought up the example of a man who has come to the conclusion that he must either leave his wife or abandon his work in cancer research.

Against this background, Brandhorst cites the following passage which Rhees ascribes to Wittgenstein:

> If he has, say, the Christian ethics, then he may say it is absolutely clear: he has got to stick to her come what may. And then his problem is different. It is: how to make the best of this situation, what he should do in order to be a decent husband in these greatly altered circumstances, and so forth. The question "Should I leave her or not?" is not a problem here. (Rhees 1965, 23)

According to Brandhorst, this quote sheds light on Wittgenstein's anti-realism. He ascribes the following line of thought to Wittgenstein: The truth value of a moral proposition like 'I ought to leave her' depends on the subjective attitudes towards the issue, e. g. the subjective attitudes concerned with embracing the Christian faith. Hence, Wittgenstein's position fulfills the criteria of being considered moral anti-realist.

Brandhorst continues to cite Wittgenstein in order to put forward further evidence for his anti-realist interpretation:

> Someone might ask whether the treatment of such a question in Christian ethics is *right* or not. I want to say that this question does not make sense. […] But we do not know what this decision would be like – how it could

be determined, what sort of criteria would be used, and so on. (Rhees 1965, 23)

According to Brandhorst, Wittgenstein believes that the question of what one ought to do 'does not make sense'. This is because we could only answer this question if we had ethical criteria which go beyond any ethical framework that we in fact embrace. But this surely is not possible. Hence, to hold that a certain action ought to be done is a mere expression of one's own ethical framework which is itself beyond any critique. Therefore, the truth-value of a sentence dealing with "what the man should do" (Brandhorst 2009, 2) depends merely on his attitudes laid down in his ethical framework.

2. Countering Brandhorst's First Argument

I believe that Brandhorst confuses two questions. On the one hand, Wittgenstein deals with the question of *what one ought to do*. On the other hand, he deals with the question of *which ethical framework one ought to choose*. According to Brandhorst's Wittgenstein, both questions do not make any sense. I suppose that Wittgenstein only thinks that the latter question is nonsensical whereas finding out what one ought to do should not be troubling at all.

To press this point, I want to draw attention to the beginning of Wittgenstein's *Lecture on Religious Belief* from 1938:

> Suppose I say that the body will rot, and another says "No. Particles will rejoin in a thousand years, and there will be a Resurrection of you." If some said: "Wittgenstein, do you believe in this?" I'd say: "No." "Do you contradict the man?" I'd say: "No."
>
> If you say this, the contradiction already lies in this.
>
> Would you say: "I believe the opposite", or "There is no reason to suppose such a thing"? I'd say neither. (Wittgenstein 1967, 53)

For Wittgenstein there is a general difference between a) having a subjective attitude and b) believing in a religion: If two people differ on subjective attitudes, then they are entitled to hold that they contradict each other. When someone e. g. says 'Mushrooms are delicious', his interlocutor may contradict by saying 'Ugh, we disagree on this issue! Mushrooms are disgusting'. On the other hand, when two people differ on religion, they are *not* entitled to hold that they contradict each other. When an atheist e. g. says 'The body will rot', a faithful interlocutor *cannot* simply contradict by saying 'We disagree on this point. Surely, there will be a

Resurrection'. Religious faith is deeply entrenched in the life of the faithful person and therefore not subject to critique like a mere attitude. It seems as if a religious person and an atheist are necessarily talking past each other and therefore no actual contradiction can emerge.

Now, let us get back to the realm of ethics. I assume that Wittgenstein's using Christian ethics as an example gives us reason to conceive ethics and religion along similar lines. When we acknowledge that Wittgenstein distinguishes unshakeable beliefs from subjective attitudes, we see that there is a difference between the attitude that one ought to act in a certain way and embracing an ethical framework which is inextricably linked to a certain life. In the quote cited above Wittgenstein merely says that the question "whether the treatment of such a question ['Should I leave her or not?'] in Christian ethics [!] is *right* or not" (Rhees 1965, 23) does not make sense. In order to give a meaningful answer to this question one would need to judge Christian ethics without relying on the unshakeable beliefs that are inextricably linked to my embracing an ethical framework. Since we cannot put ourselves in such a position, the question must be jettisoned.

Brandhorst correctly points this out. But Wittgenstein does *not* claim that it makes no sense to ask what one ought to do! Quite in the contrary, Wittgenstein holds that "[t]he question 'Should I leave her or not?' is not a problem here" (Rhees 1965, 23). One "may [even] say it is absolutely clear" (Rhees 1965, 23) what one ought to do. How can the answer to the question what one ought to do 'make no sense' and be 'absolutely clear' at the same time? I think it cannot. Therefore, Brandhorst's first argument for an anti-realist reading of Wittgenstein is not tenable.

Rather, if Wittgenstein really thinks that what one ought to do is 'absolutely clear', I think that we have reason to interpret the quotes cited above differently. The fog clears if we distinguish between the question what one ought to do and the question which ethical framework one ought to embrace. Only the latter question 'makes no sense' whereas the answer to the former question is 'absolutely clear' since it does *not* depend on any subjective attitude. Still, there might be other persons with entirely different ethical frameworks which do not agree that one ought to act in a certain way. But since we cannot make any sense of what these people say (just as in the case of differing religious beliefs), this does not suffice as a reason to think that our answer to the question what one ought to do merely expresses an attitude of approval for a certain ethical framework.

To put my proposed interpretation in a nutshell, one could say that Wittgenstein, at least in this passage, seems to be a realist about ethics even though he clearly rejects realism about what might be called the 'ethics of ethics'.

3. Brandhorst's Second Argument

Brandhorst puts forward another argument for his anti-realist reading of Wittgenstein. This argument draws from another discussion between Wittgenstein and Rhees held in 1945: According to Rhees' notes on the discussion, Wittgenstein criticises "the idea of finding the true nature of goodness or of duty" (Rhees 1965, 23). Now Brandhorst argues as follows: Moral realism presupposes that there is some reality to which true ethical propositions correspond. Since Wittgenstein rejects this presupposition, we can jus-

tifiably ascribe a moral anti-realism to him (Brandhorst 2009, 67).

4. Countering Brandhorst's Second Argument

My critique of Brandhorst's argument is simple: Brandhorst mistakenly assumes that moral realism must necessarily rely on the assumption that there is some reality to which true ethical propositions correspond. Hence, the fact that Wittgenstein rejects this particular form of moral realism does not suffice to ascribe anti-realism to him.

Rather, Wittgenstein merely seems to argue against a *particular* form of realism. Namely, I suppose he rejects Moore's realist approach on meta-ethics: Moore (1993, §§ 1-14) attempts to put forward an account on meta-ethics by analysing the word 'good'. Moore argues that 'good' is a simple and non-natural property which cannot be identified with any natural property without committing a logical fallacy.

In this section, I want to show that there are essentially two distinct ways of opposing Moore's realism of which Brandhorst takes only one into account.

a) On the one hand, the *anti-realists* argue that what Moore takes to be the property of goodness does not exist. They rather propose that we make use of the adjective 'good' in order to express a subjective attitude of approval. Hence, whether a certain moral proposition is true depends on our subjective attitudes towards it. Since Wittgenstein holds that there is no reality to which true ethical propositions correspond, Brandhorst takes Wittgenstein to side with this position.

b) However, there is another way of rejecting Moore's stance on meta-ethics which is compatible with moral realism. I think that it is no accident that many philosophers on which Wittgenstein had a huge impact followed this path. Namely, G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach are to be named in this context.

Geach (1956, 35-36) claims that anti-realists are right to hold that a simple and non-natural property called 'good' simply does not exist. Therefore, it is wrong to hold that all true moral propositions correspond to some sort of reality. However, the anti-realist critique is insufficient because it does not manage to overcome a deeply entrenched dogma of Moore-style realism. Both Moore and his anti-realist opponents take the adjective 'good' to be *predicative*.

What does he mean by this? In *Good and Evil*, Geach (1956, 33) reminds us of a distinction between what he calls 'predicative adjectives' and 'attributive adjectives'. An adjective A is *predicative* if whether a particular B is A does not depend on what we substitute for B. Geach uses the adjective 'red' as an example: whether something particular is 'red' does not depend on whether this particular thing is a pullover or a car. In contrast, an adjective A is *attributive* if whether a particular B is A radically depends on what we substitute for B. Geach uses the adjective 'big' as an example: Whether we employ the adjective 'big' in talking about a 'big elephant' or a 'big flea', makes a huge difference.

Now, how does this grammatical remark relate to ethics? Geach (1956, 36-38) complains that Moore as well as his anti-realist opponents take it for granted that 'good' is a predicative adjective. However, whether a particular B is good radically depends on what we substitute for B. The adjective 'good' e. g. means something entirely different if

it is used to describe a chess move or a tennis stroke. Geach admits that there might be contexts in which we make use of the adjective 'good' in order to express an attitude of approval. But it would be wrong to hold that the adjective 'good' is used like this in *all* contexts. Therefore, Geach argues that we should rather conceive 'good' as an attributive adjective instead of a predicative adjective. Hence, we have reason to reject Moore's realism as well as anti-realism since both assign a uniform meaning to the adjective 'good'.

Now, I want to show that Geach's critique of anti-realism is in accord with Wittgenstein's thought. Therefore, I want to draw attention to Wittgenstein's *Lectures on Aesthetics*. Since Wittgenstein himself links his thoughts on aesthetics to ethics (e. g. Wittgenstein 1967, 3), this comparison should not bother us.

In his *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Wittgenstein holds that a uniform analysis of the adjectives 'beautiful' and 'good' is doomed to failure. Wittgenstein explicitly links this failure to Moore's realism (Wittgenstein 1967, 2) as well as to the anti-realist idea that we can boil down our use of the adjectives 'beautiful' and 'good' to expressions of approval.

"What similarity has my admiring this person with my eating vanilla ice cream and liking it?" To compare them seems almost disgusting. (Wittgenstein 1967, 12)

Comparing aesthetic and ethical judgements in this respect would be 'almost disgusting' because it suggests that these language games are no more sophisticated than baby talk. Both Moore and the anti-realists fail to acknowledge that our language games are in fact much richer. Obviously, this account on meta-ethics resembles Geach's objection that we cannot understand the adjective 'good' without having a close look on the language games in which it is actually used.

Brandhorst even admits that "none of this discourages a realist who also waives all aspirations to a uniform analysis" (Brandhorst 2009, 67) but nevertheless he takes moral realism to be confused in general. Brandhorst does not consider that one can refrain from "the idea of finding the true nature of goodness or of duty" (Rhees 1965, 23) and at the same time hold that moral propositions have determinate truth-values irrespective of any subjective vantage point. Even though a mere analysis of the adjective 'good' will not suffice to find out under which circumstances moral propositions are true, a detailed analysis of our numerous language games dealing with ethics is a more promising candidate to serve this purpose.

My second counterargument does not serve as an argument for ascribing moral realism to Wittgenstein. We can only be sure that Wittgenstein rejects all sorts of uniform analyses of the adjective 'good' (including particular forms of anti-realism and realism). However, in the light of the arguments sketched so far, one could still defend that Wittgenstein holds a particular form of anti-realism which refrains from a uniform analysis of the adjective 'good'. Such an anti-realism could e. g. hold that whether a particular *action* is justifiably called 'good' depends on our subjective attitudes of approval towards the action in focus even though the adjective 'good' might be used differently in other contexts (e. g. judging tennis strokes). However, this objection does not threaten my argumentation. My aim in this paper was not to prove that Wittgenstein was a moral realist but rather that we cannot straightforwardly ascribe moral anti-realism to him. The fact that Wittgenstein opposes uniform analyses of the adjective 'good' in his *Lectures on Aesthetics* does neither suffice as an argument for realism nor for anti-realism (as Brandhorst thinks). And this was indeed what I set out to show.

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Remarks on Ferruccio Rossi-Landi's Interpretation of the Wittgenstein-Sraffa Relationship

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Abstract

In one of the very first articles that deal with the theme of the relationship between Wittgenstein and Sraffa, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi argues that Sraffa influenced Wittgenstein on the level of philosophical method, encouraging him to observe semantic phenomena through the new concepts of immanence, contextualism and relatedness. Rossi-Landi also states that unlike Marxian tradition, there is no historical dimension to semantics in late Wittgenstein. I disagree with the last statement. In this paper, I maintain that a dynamic and therefore historical dimension to semantics, connected to creativity of speakers, is present in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

1. One of the biggest mysteries surrounding Wittgenstein's late philosophy is the relationship between the Viennese philosopher and the Italian economist Sraffa. As is known, in the preface to the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI), Wittgenstein acknowledges his indebtedness to Sraffa in the formulation of the ideas included in the work. He attributes critical importance in the constitution of his new philosophy to the Italian economist, based on their discussions in Cambridge, in a period stretching from 1929 to 1950. The content of these discussions is poorly known, and, at best, there is speculation on that, now legendary, Neapolitan gesture that Sraffa made during one of these talks (Malcolm 1958, 7-8). This, it is believed, caused Wittgenstein to discredit the whole idea of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (TLP), that is, that propositions reflect states of affairs, and led Wittgenstein towards an anthropological view of semantics.

The first to speculate on Wittgenstein in his preface to the *Philosophical Investigations* is Ferruccio Rossi-Landi in a 1966 article (Rossi-Landi 1968). In this article, Rossi-Landi describes the later Wittgenstein as a *philosopher of life*: a philosopher who abandons all formalism of the TLP and is distant from existential practice, who instead gradually moves the axis of language and semantics to the context of life and social practices. Rossi-Landi says that late Wittgenstein deals with the *Tractatus* in a very similar way to that in which Feurbach and Marx dealt with Hegel: bringing the spirit to earth and especially among human social relations. So, in late Wittgenstein, semantics is produced and reproduced within a social context that moves through relationships which are exemplified by the metaphor of language game. According to Rossi-Landi, Wittgenstein probably owes this pronounced interest in social practices that constitute the environment of semantics to Sraffa.

Furthermore, Rossi-Landi identifies philosophical methodologies common to both late Wittgenstein and Sraffa's Marxism: *contextualism, contingency and the concept of relatedness*. The meaning of a sentence, like the value of a commodity, is not a substantial property, but a relational characteristic which depends on social choices (see also Davis 1988; Marion 2005). You must first specify a context to determine the meaning of a sentence and the value of a commodity. Secondly, you have to relate sentences and goods with everything that is around: you must create a relational framework, which is contingent and historical, in order to attach meaning to an expression and a value to a commodity. Goods and words have no value and no meaning beyond the context of human sociality, they re-main without a use. Thus, meaning and value have a relational and dynamic character, not a substantive one.

Linked to this point, there is also the fact, as mentioned before, that words and goods receive meaning through social actors, through players of the game. The life of social practice—a life interpreted from a political point of view and not biological—gives meaning and value to words and goods: a private language, like a private market, is a contradiction in terms. And, probably the theoretical hostility that Wittgenstein develops towards the possibility of a private language is to be brought back to the influence of Sraffa's Marxism. Therefore, if the meaning and the meaningfulness of linguistic expressions are to be found in social relations, which constitute the life of language games, it is impossible to think that there might be a meaning that is not publically shared, or a language that refers, for example, to private sensations that are kept in a secret part of the mind. The language of sensations and the sensations themselves are always shared in contexts of use. This does not mean that there are no psychological states, Wittgenstein is not a crypto behaviourist; rather, it means that a psychological state, albeit individual, is made manifest, or at least has strong resonance, in the public sphere and definitely has consequences in the dynamics and development of the game you are playing. It is very likely that Sraffa placed great emphasis on social sharing of meaning.

However in that article Rossi-Landi is strangely very sceptical and, in my opinion stumbles on some points, which he believes represent elements of distance between the philosophy of Wittgenstein and the Marxian tradition. Rossi-Landi excludes the idea that a historical dimension may be present in the *Philosophical Investigations*. In fact, he attributes a *public* vision of language to Wittgenstein, but not *social*. This has important theoretical consequences. Rossi-Landi finds elements of static in the notion of linguistic use present in PI: Wittgenstein does not question formation and development of word meaning. He refers only to the use of an object that already exists, and it is used in different ways in language games. In other words, the use which Wittgenstein discusses implies the presence of an already existing object which is then used in different contexts. In Wittgenstein, formulations that are directed towards *production* of meaning are lacking: in short, according to Rossi-Landi, Wittgenstein does not discuss the *creativity of the speakers* with regard to meaning. Wittgenstein is not therefore concerned to answer the question: "How was this word that I am using originally produced?" Rossi-Landi observes that Wittgenstein starts

from the presence of a linguistic object, and he is not interested in understanding how this linguistic object was created. To Wittgenstein, linguistic tools are *naturally given*; they are a kind of existing resource which we access freely. The level of speech production is not affected by Wittgenstein's analysis and therefore words, phrases and meaning are seen as a given whose origin is unexplained. In other words, Rossi-Landi believes Wittgenstein has no theory—in Marxian terms—of the value in relation to production and work. Aspects of social production of meaning, of linguistic work necessary for the production of meaning, are not theorized by the Viennese, and so he moves on from existing semantic objects as if they were already given.

I disagree with this last observation of Rossi-Landi. As I am going to try to show briefly, Wittgenstein is a refined theorist of linguistic creativity. Wittgenstein constantly strives to clarify how to develop creative processes from a regulated situation. In my opinion, his comments on creativity arise both from the rejection of the idea that meaning is an object, and from the idea, developed in his reflections on following a rule, that there is a radical unpredictability in the application of the rule to a new case.

In other words, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that meaning is a substance—a real, psychological or conceptual object. Instead, he believes that meaning is a move or a gesture in the game. Furthermore, meaning, since it is a gesture in a game, is a social habit, which is part of a series of shared behaviours encoded in rituals that constitute the form of life of a society. This dynamic vision brings flexibility to meaning, and the possibility that this can be created, recreated and modified within language games.

2. In the interest of brevity, in this section I would like to give a few examples that show how in the *Philosophical Investigations* there is a dynamic and therefore historical dimension, which however Rossi Landi does not seem to recognize. Wittgenstein often strives to show how it is possible for creative processes to come out from a regulated situation in the game. Where there is creativity, there is change, innovation which creates a historical watershed, a "before" and an "after" the change. Indeed, the dynamism of meaning, the ability to change and reformulate it, creates a time and therefore historical dimension to semantics.

In the section which includes and follows on from paragraph 138 of the PI, Wittgenstein provides a series of observations on what it means to understand an expression. His remarks gradually discard the possibility that understanding can be a strictly mental phenomenon, which can receive an explanation in mentalist, psychological or neuroscientific terms (Voltolini 1998). In his comments, he rejects the idea that understanding an expression can be reduced to an individual, internal mental process, enclosed in a psychological or cerebral sphere, and he comes to the conclusion that understanding an expression is inevitably a phenomenon linked to the practices of language games (Budd 1984). By learning the language game of algebra, for example, a pupil properly uses the expression "I understand the rule that governs a number series" within the dynamics and practices that he has been engaged in to solve mathematical problems (PI 154, 155 and 179). Therefore, the phenomenon of understanding is linked to the actions, activities and techniques that you learn in the language game of teaching/learning algebra.

Against the background of these observations, Wittgenstein then writes a few startling paragraphs, since they

open up the idea that the form of life is deviant and radically open to mutation. In a surreal dialogue with one of his imaginary interlocutors (see Pichler 2004), Wittgenstein says something like: if meaning lies in use, how can I understand a word in only one go? When I understood the word, did I have all the possible uses of the word in my mind? Use is extended over time, whereas understanding is immediate; so, how and where do we fill the vacuum that exists between the immediate understanding of a word and its contingent use?

Wittgenstein says that what fills the gap between the meaning of a word and its application is its use or practice in a context; therefore, the process of understanding is interpreted as exercise and acquisition of techniques that are performed within one or more games. The acquisition of these practices ensures that you are part of a life form. Life forms thus develop social practices that are learned and transmitted through language games. Through the practice of language games an existential order is accordingly acquired. Furthermore, practice opens the way to *the unexpected and to differentiation*.

Wittgenstein writes in paragraph 142: "It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly laid out in advance for us; we know, are in no doubt, what we have to say in this or that case". The practice of the use of words is repeated and standardized, but nonetheless lives within the praxis. The practices of life forms that are considered normal, and which give an order to life itself are not restricting because they take place within the praxis. You learn to behave in a certain way, in a regular and repetitive way, but behind the normality of use, an undefined, abnormal space opens up which can lead to escape from the ordinary and the "normal". The form of life is therefore structured with behavioural regularity, but it has the potential to slip elsewhere; thus, the life form can, of course, follow a historicized and established path, but has the potential for constructing another and different existence.

> And if things were quite different from what they actually are —— if there were, for instance, no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, of joy; if rule became exception, and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency —— our normal language-games would thereby lose their point. — The procedure of putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing the price by the turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently happened that such lumps suddenly grew or shrank with no obvious cause (PI 142).

Wittgenstein considers the possibility that our normal characteristic semantic behaviour can be reversed (PI 80). Considering the possibility that something characteristic might change means loosening every determinism, every legalism, and thus leaving room for differentiation and historicizing.

As Wittgenstein says, the establishment of regular practice rests on unjustified grounds (PI 241); certainly, it crystallizes in common use, but whenever there is application of a shared use, in theory there is always the possibility to choose whether to follow the crystallized use of a rule or deviate from orthodoxy. If the use is rejected, experimental ground opens up. In PI 186, Wittgenstein clearly says that it is necessary to make a new choice for every step in the application of the rule. These new choices can provide escape routes from the orthodoxy of rule application. When, in paragraph 186, Wittgenstein states that you must make a choice about how to proceed every time you apply the rule in effect, he shatters all determinism and accedes to cultural diversity. Advancing these ideas, Wittgenstein

moves between two extremes: on the one hand, there is the typical behaviour of a super-rigid machine that performs calculations, on the other there is territory with no landmarks, a land where every action can be in agreement and disagreement with the rule (PI 201). In the middle, there are regularities in behaviour, habits, uses that piece by piece form the identity of a rule (PI 202). In this middle ground, there is space for differentiation and creativity, since according to Wittgenstein we must make choices for each application of the rule; thus different gateways for future applications of the rule are opened. On the one hand, you can reproduce a paradigmatic application of the rule: what you have learned in language games. On the other, you can try to experiment, refusing in varying degrees what has been learned. Acceding to differentiation opens the way for the historicization of meaning, it means an evolution of meaning through processes of production and reproduction.

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„Welcome home, Mr Cobb!"
Zur Analyse und Interpretation der Schlusssequenz von *Inception*

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Abstract

Der Beitrag verfolgt zwei Ziele: *Erstens* soll anhand einer kurzen Analyse der Komposition der Schlusssequenz des Films *Inception* von Christopher Nolan gezeigt werden, dass es sich dabei um einen exemplarischen Mindgame-Movie handelt. Im Anschluss an Überlegungen Blumenbergs zur ästhetischen Transformation der Fraglosigkeit des Mythos und Cavells zum prekären Verhältnis zwischen Anerkennung und Skeptizismus wird *zweitens* die These vertreten, dass *Inception* beispielhaft den Zusammenhang von Ethik und Ästhetik performativ aushandelt: Wer überlegt, wie es um die Wirklichkeit des Glücks des Odysseus nachempfundenen Protagonisten steht, tut dies nur, weil der Film mit seinen ästhetisch-präsentativen Verfahren dessen Verlangen danach in seiner Zerbrechlichkeit und Illusionsanfälligkeit vorführt. Die völlige Aufgehobenheit aller Erfüllungsbehinderungen, wie sie im Bild der endlich gelingenden Rückkehr am Schluss des Films gezeigt wird, gehört selbst ins Reich der Fiktion. Der Film reflektiert darauf durch eine Infragestellung desjenigen Versprechens, das er um der Inszenierung der Heimkehr willen erfüllen zu können vorgegeben hat.

Es fällt nicht schwer, die formale Struktur der Odyssee als Grundriss der Geschichte von *Inception* zu erkennen. Ausfahrt, Irrwege und Heimkehr gehören, wie etwa Elisabeth Bronfen gezeigt hat, geradezu ins Zentrum des klassischen und des New Hollywood (vgl. Bronfen 1999). Was ich zeigen möchte, ist, dass *Inception* als ein an der Heimkehr orientiertes Mindgame-Movie (vgl. Elsaesser 2009) verstanden werden kann. Nolan erfindet das Rad nicht neu, so meine These, hält es aber überzeugend am Laufen. Zum Schluss befrage ich den Zusammenhang von Heimkehr und Glück in *Inception*.

1. Vertrauen und Kontrolle

Man könnte sagen, dass Nolans einziger, aber virtuos gehandhabter Kunstgriff in *Inception* die spiegelbildliche Umkehrung traditioneller filmischer Verfahrensweisen ist. Das ließe sich an einer Reihe von Beispielen belegen. Doch ich begnüge mich an dieser Stelle damit, zu zeigen wie die Umkehrung als Bauprinzip von *Inception* als Mindgame-Movie im Sinne Thomas Elsaessers funktioniert.

Unter Mindgame-Movies lässt sich allgemein die Tendenz von Filmen beschreiben, erkenntnistheoretische Fragen durchzuspielen, indem sie ihre eigene Wirklichkeitserfahrung und -konstitution zu einem innerdigetischen Problem machen. Wer sagen möchte, was er gesehen hat, muss angeben können, mit welchen Begriffen und Vorverständnissen von Wahrnehmung und Realität er operiert. Auf der Ebene einer derartigen Überprüfung leitender Begriffe spielen sich Mindgame-Movies ab, da sie die Selbstverständlichkeit eingespielter Wirklichkeitsvorstellungen auf nicht begriffliche Weise in Frage stellen.

Zunächst möchte ich einen Blick darauf werfen, wie Einreise und Rückkehr des Protagonisten Dominic Cobb, aus der das Finale des Films besteht, von Nolan inszeniert und aufgefasst wird.

"I'm asking you to take a leap of faith" sagen sich Cobb und Sato kurz vor Cobbs Einreise, um sich gegenseitig davon zu überzeugen, dass sie nicht voller Bedauern als alte, vereinsamte Männer sterben müssen. Interessant daran ist, dass das Vertrauen, das hier geschenkt und um das gebeten wird, ein soziales Band stiftet, das stark bindet, weil es freiwillig geknüpft wird und auf einer geteilten Erfahrung beruht. Die Gemeinschaft, die durch gegenseiti-

ges Vertrauen entsteht (vgl. Früchtl 2013), kontrastiert zu einem Verband aus rationalen Egoisten, die eine Verbindung nur aus strategischen Erwägungen einzugehen bereit sind und nur an harte biometrische Fakten wie die eines Ausweises glauben. Mit den Worten "Welcome home, Mr Cobb!" gibt der Zollbeamte Cobb seinen Ausweis am Flughafen wieder zurück. Einer Einreise in die USA, die im Literalsinn den Beginn der Rückkehr markiert und metaphorisch für die Heimkehr des Helden steht, steht nun nichts mehr entgegen. Die Einreise kennt zwei Identitätszuschreibungen: Kontrolle und Vertrauen. Die Ausweis-*kontrolle* ist eine Feststellung der Identität auf Grund des Vorliegens äußerlicher Merkmale. Das Wiedersehen zwischen Cobb und seiner Familie spielt sich auf eine emotional-vertrauensbasierten Ebene identitätsstiftender Anerkennung ab.

Vertrauen und Kontrolle markieren zwei Modelle zwischenmenschlicher Interaktion in *Inception*: Es gibt auf der Folie des klassischen Heist-Movies ein Team, dass zum Zwecke der Industriespionage durch manipulativen Einsatz fortgeschrittener technischer Mittel geistiges Eigentum einer Zielperson unbemerkt entwendet. Wirklichkeit ist in dieser Sicht eine apparativ erzeugte Illusion, um die eigenen Interessen durchsetzen zu können. Cobb ist ein Meister seines Fachs: Wie kein zweiter beherrscht er die Kunst, dem Bestohlenem vorzugaukeln, es sei alles in Ordnung mit seinem bewussten Erleben, während ein Stock tiefer im Unterbewusstsein damit ein böses Spiel gespielt wird.

Der Realitätseindruck, den der von Dritten konstruierte Traum beim Bestohlenen hinterlässt, sitzt parasitär auf der Gewissheit der Diebe auf, selbst nicht in die Falle einer Realitätsanmutung tappen zu können. Die Plausibilität der Illusion hängt davon ab, ob sie so inszeniert wird, dass sie vom Betroffenen als real erlebt wird, genauso wie das auch für das Team um Cobb der Fall ist. Sie haben einen konstruktivistischen Wirklichkeitsbegriff: Sie verfahren mit Wirklichkeitserleben als einplanbarem Zug in einem Spiel vor dem Hintergrund technisch-strategischer Ordnungsprinzipien, um manipulativ eine Realitätsimpression zu erzeugen, die es ihnen erlaubt die Zielperson darüber zu täuschen, was tatsächlich mit ihr geschieht.

Eine auf gegenseitigem Vertrauen beruhende Gemeinsamkeit gibt es hier nicht, ist aber vorausgesetzt: Die Kenntnis darüber, wie ein Realitätseindruck hervorzurufen

ist, bedient sich stillschweigend nicht-strategisch und nicht-manipulativ der eigenen unhintergehbaren Wirklichkeitserfahrung. Von wo sonst als vom eigenen Erfahren her sollte man auch wissen, wie man einen anderen erfolgreich an der Nase herumführt?

Cobb ist der Meister seines Fachs nicht zuletzt deswegen, weil er seine eigene Wirklichkeit nur noch als Inbegriff eigener Konstruktion erlebt. So gesehen ist der rationale Egoist die Folgeerscheinung eines Glaubens an sich als Verursacher und Autor der eigenen Wirklichkeit. Wer über sein eigenes Erleben nicht getäuscht werden will, weil er ständig andere genau darin täuscht, muss alles dafür tun, die Fäden seines Realitätseindrucks in der Hand zu halten, um nicht selbst einer Täuschung aufzusitzen. Er muss die Angewiesenheit auf Andere umarbeiten in eine selbstgeschaffene Welt, aus der alles verbannt ist, was daran erinnert, sich der Kontrolle der eigenen Planung zu entziehen.

Darin liegt aber ein Grundzug von Wirklichkeit, dass sie sich der planmäßigen Verfügung entzieht und so die vertrauensförmige Angewiesenheit auf Andere zum Ausdruck kommt. Reduziere ich den Anderen in meinem Weltentwurf nur auf seine biometrischen Merkmale oder sein potentiell entwendbares geistiges Eigentum, kann die Interaktion auch nur entsprechend ausfallen. Etwas hochgestochen könnte man fast sagen: Nolan führt in *Inception* die Welt eines biopolitischen und mentalen Kapitalismus par excellence vor.

Der von jedem Einspruch der Realität befreite Limbus ist in *Inception* der Ort, an dem das Oszillieren des freien Entwerfens zwischen Weltbildung und Selbstverfallenheit vor Augen geführt wird. Wer sich daran gewöhnt, dass es keinen Abstand mehr zwischen Idee und Realisierung gibt, vergisst ganz folgerichtig, dass die Realität nie das unmittelbare Ergebnis *ihres* Entwurfs war. Jedem imaginären Akt wohnt als solchem eine Derealisierung inne, der das Subjekt der Imagination über die Zwänge des In-der-Welt-seins hinausführt. Weltbildend kann Imagination genannt werden, wenn sie jenes Subjekt als Teil einer Welt präsentiert, zu der es eben auch gehört, frei entwerfen zu können, da man eben mehr und anderes ist als nackte Tatsachen (vgl. Cavell 1979, 95). Solipsistisch wird Imagination dann, wenn die Zugehörigkeit des Subjekts zur Welt nicht mehr die Imagination miteinschließt, sondern sie auf Konfrontationskurs zur Welt als Ganzer geht. Dann muss sich im widerstandslosen Entwerfen verlieren, wer glaubt, er sei eben nicht auch aus Fleisch und Blut.

Nolan überträgt die in Cobbs Selbstverhältnis angelegten beiden Begriffe von Realität auf das Geschehen des Films selbst: Einmal erscheint der Film als Illusionserzeugungsmaschine, die sich unser Erleben manipulativ zunutze macht, weil sie nichts anderes als eine dafür vorgesehene imaginäre Konstruktion ist, einmal erscheint er als integrativer imaginärer Anteil unserer gemeinsamen Wirklichkeitserfahrung, zu dem wir uns offen verhalten müssen und können, weil er uns zeigt, dass wir nicht zuletzt unserer Einbildungskraft frei in und zu dieser Welt sind. Diese durch eine Inversion der Verhältnisse von Innen und Außen, Oben und Unten in Gang gesetzte Metaphorisierung vom innerfilmischen Gang zum Ereignis des Films selbst im Film zeigt *Inception* als Mindgame-Movie, weil die Angewiesenheit auf unser Erleben und dessen Täuschungsanfälligkeit zugleich auf der Erzählebene *und* der Figur Cobbs verhandelt werden.

2. Zur Analyse des Finales

Die Schlusssequenz setzt allerdings bereits vor der Passkontrolle ein, nämlich beim Anflug auf den Zielflughafen. Cobb und sein Team erwachen aus dem Limbus und dem dreifachen Traum im Traum, von dem keine heile Rückkehr möglich schien, haben erfolgreich ihren Plan durchgeführt und teilen endlich wieder eine gemeinsame, offene Wirklichkeit miteinander.

Was nun folgt, ist eine Folge von drei Blicken Cobbs, die sich alle um den Zusammenhang von Sehen, Glauben und Wissen drehen. Der dritte Blick ist der entscheidende: Cobb betritt, begleitet von seinem Vater, durch den Flur das Wohnzimmer seines Hauses. Sein Unglauben, tatsächlich zu Hause zu sein, bringt ihn ein letztes Mal dazu, den Kreisel, sein Totem, mit dem er bisher feststellen zu können glaubte, ob er wacht oder träumt, zu drehen. Kippt der Kreisel nach einigen Umdrehungen, wacht er und kann entgegen seinem Unglauben davon ausgehen, wirklich wieder zu Hause bei seinen Kindern angekommen zu sein. Dreht der Kreisel sich unentwegt weiter, befindet er sich noch in einem Traum und die Heimkehr erweist sich als illusorisch. Das ist durchaus stimmig: Ein Kreisel, der wackelt, hat Realitätskontakt, einer der um und in sich kreist, bleibt aufs bloße Entwerfen beschränkt.

Kurz nachdem er den Kreisel angedreht hat, hebt Cobb seinen Blick und sieht auf dem Rasen vor seinem Haus seine beiden spielenden Kinder. Er traut buchstäblich seinen Augen nicht. Und genau in diesem Moment, in dem er seine Kinder im Kontext seiner Heimkehr wiedersieht, fällt jeder Zweifel, es könnte mit seiner Wahrnehmung nicht weit her sein, von ihm ab. Es ist ihm angesichts der Möglichkeit, seine Kinder wieder in den Arm zu nehmen, egal geworden, wie ihm das vergönnt ist.

Während Cobb mit seinen Kindern wiedervereint ist, geht dessen Vater aus dem Bild, die Kamera schwenkt von Cobb und seinen Kindern zurück auf den Kreisel, der sich immer noch dreht. Der Film endet mit einem leichten Wackeln des Kreises. Mir scheint die Pointe nun nicht darin zu liegen, zu knobeln, ob Cobb nun immer noch träumt oder nicht, sondern dass für ihn die Frage keine Wichtigkeit mehr besitzt und an das Publikum abgegeben wird. Für den Cobb, der nicht mehr im Bild ist, stellt sich die Frage nicht mehr, weil die Heimkehr selbst als heilsame Einbildung gezeigt wird. Sein vom Zweifel befreiter Glaube, wieder zu Hause bei seinen Lieben zu sein, allein zählt. Im letzten Moment derealisiert sich Cobb und wird Agent der Selbstkennzeichnung der filmischen Fiktion (vgl. Koch u. Voss 2006). Cavell bringt diesen Moment der Verbundenheit, in dem die Welt wieder ein Zuhause ist, auf den Punkt:

> Im Angesicht des Zweifels zu leben, die Augen glücklich geschlossen, hieße, sich in die Welt zu verlieben. Denn sollte es eine berechtigte Blindheit geben, gibt es sie nur in der Liebe. Und entdeckt man, dass man sich in die Welt verliebt hat, dann wäre man schlecht beraten, ihren Wert durch den Hinweis auf ihr System von Endursachen lobend zu unterstreichen. Denn dann schwände wohl die Verliebtheit und man könnte dadurch vergessen, daß die Welt, so wie sie ist, Wunder genug ist. (Cavell 2006, 684)

Es ließen sich dagegen keine noch so scharfsinnigen Gründe ins Treffen führen. Entscheidend ist, dass er sein Vertrauen in eine Wirklichkeit wiedergefunden hat, die *für ihn* zentrale Bedeutung besitzt. Dieser Wandel von einer ihn lähmenden Skepsis zu einem Glauben an seine Wirklichkeit, vollzieht sich mit einem Schlag, als Cobb seine

Kinder erblickt und uns den Zweifel daran, ob wir dem Glauben sollen, was wir sehen, überlässt.

An dieser Stelle gibt es einen überraschenden gedanklichen Konnex zwischen Cavells Weltverliebtheit und Hans Blumenbergs ins Ästhetische transformierter mythischer Fraglosigkeit, von der Cobbs Heimkehr und ihre Inszenierung zeugt:

> Der Mythos läßt das Nachfragen auf den Wall seiner Bilder und Geschichten auflaufen: nach der nächsten Geschichte kann gefragt werden, danach also, wie es weitergeht, wenn es weitergeht. Sonst fängt es wieder von vorn an. […] Wer Warum? fragt, ist selbst schuld, wenn er durch die Antwort geärgert wird. Er hat die Spielregel der mythischen Welt verletzt. (Blumenberg 1979, 286f.)

Ein kleines geschickt platziertes Detail unterstreicht die Delegation der Skepsis an die Zuschauer und fungiert als Selbstanzeige des Films, in ein imaginäres Geschehen übergegangen zu sein: Kurz bevor Cobb seine Kinder erblickt, läuft sein Vater in diese Richtung voraus und steht in der räumlichen Anordnung zwischen Cobb und seinen Kindern. Der in dieser Szene von Nolan gewählte Bildausschnitt überblendet nun Cobbs Blick auf die Kinder und die Rückenansicht seines dazwischen stehenden Vaters so, dass er nicht entsprechend der räumlichen Tiefe plastisch innerhalb des gezeigten Wohnzimmers steht, sondern als flacher Schatten gezeigt wird, wie man ihn aus dem Kinosaal kennt, wenn jemand rückwärtig vom Projektor angestrahlt seinen Schattenriss auf die Leinwand wirft. Der Vater tritt im Film aus dem innerfilmischen Geschehen heraus und bietet einen optischen Identifikationspunkt für das Publikum. Dem Zuschauer wird damit performativ zu verstehen gegeben, dass der Film selbst weder wahr noch falsch ist, sondern es Sache der reflektierenden Zuschauer ist, wie sie zu dem, was der Film ihnen zeigt, stehen möchten. Am Ende ist Cobb keiner mehr, der wissen möchte, ob er besser nur das glaubt, was er sieht. Er ist ganz einbehalten vom Wunder, etwas zu sehen, woran er glauben kann. Daran, ob er dieses Glück wiederum mit anderen teilen kann, besteht berechtigter Zweifel – aber nicht mehr für Cobb.

Es ist, als wäre Cobb ein anderer geworden, weil es keinen einstimmigen Übergang vom einen zum anderen gibt. Es ist ein Umspringen der leitenden Wirklichkeitsbegriffe, ihre durch den Film selbst betriebene Umkehrung, von einem, in dem die Imagination pathologisch Züge trägt zu einem, in dem ihr befreiendes Potential berücksichtigt ist. Daher kann dieser Irrglauben nur plötzlich verschwinden und rückwirkend als Obsession begriffen werden, die einem so irreal vorkommt wie ein böser Traum.

Der Augenblick, in dem sein Zweifel verschwindet, fällt mit dem zusammen, in dem der Film sich als imaginäre Welt zu erkennen gibt. Der Kameraschwenk zurück auf den Kreisel gilt dem Publikum: Das Finale von *Inception* als offenes Ende verweist über die letzte Einstellung hinaus auf die Rolle, die die Einbildungskraft *für uns* spielt.

3. Das fragile Glück der Heimkehr

Zum Schluss komme ich noch einmal auf die Bedeutung der Odyssee zurück. Formalisiert geht es um die Rückkehr des Helden nach Hause. Da diese Rückkehr aber mit der Relativierung des Realitätseindrucks zusammenfällt, steht am Ende für das Publikum eine skeptische Pointe: Wie ist es um das Glück der Heimkehr bestellt, wenn die Schwelle nur um den Preis der Ungewissheit, vielleicht doch nicht angekommen zu sein, überschritten werden kann. Wenn es stimmt, dass man illusionslos und deswegen glücklich lebt, heißt das aber nicht, dass die als realpräsent erfahrende Erfüllung des Ersehnten ohne Imagination auskommen könnte (vgl. Seel 1995, 159-176). Es dürfte wohl genau umgekehrt sein: Wo sind wir denn schon ganz bei uns, wenn nicht in unserer Vorstellung oder zumindest in einem Zustand, an dem die Einbildungskraft wesentlich mitbeteiligt ist?

Gibt es ein Glück der Heimkehr ohne ein Glück als Heimkehr? Hier geht es um das Heimatland der Phantasie, in das letztlich auch Cobb seinen Hauptwohnsitz verlegt. Da sich diese Frage aber für den Protagonisten von *Inception* offenkundig nicht mehr sinnvoll stellen kann, bleibt es dem Publikum überlassen, den fragilen Zusammenhang zwischen der jedem Glück innewohnenden Fraglosigkeit, es hier und jetzt zu erfahren, seiner ästhetischen Vergegenwärtigung im Film und der Unmöglichkeit, es unter die eigene Botmäßigkeit zu bringen, für sich zu entdecken.

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Relations Operationalized

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Abstract

It has recently been established that Tractarian logic is first-order quantification theory with identity. Due to restraints on definability, Tractarian logic admits only countably many objects. Taken together, these facts undercut a central argument for the longstanding interpretation that relations are named in the *Tractatus.*

Are relations among the simple constituents, which compose reality? This ancient question concerns whether relations are objects. For example, once a sentence like '*b* is the mother of *a*' is rendered as *aRb*, if '*a*' and '*b*' name objects, does '*R*' also name an object? Ludwig Wittgenstein c. 1919 treats this question by distinguishing "internal" from "external" relations (4.1213-4.1221). Of course, the *Tractatus* with its focus on logic is not concerned with the objects themselves, nor on their metaphysical nature, but instead with "formal concepts". We argue that arithmetical relations do not fall under the formal concept of object.

Jaakko Hintikka would disagree. He and others hold that there are certain well-defined relations like Skolem functions that the Tractarian formal system names. Since the system names them as objects, he concludes that relations are objects. But Copi and others do not agree that relations name objects. Johnston (2009; see this authority, and Rogers and Wehmeier 2012, for relevant literature and references) carefully sets out the debate, identifies the passages that each side has featured, then decides that there is nothing decisive in the debate and settles for a default position roughly like that of Hintikka. The tortured history of the interpretative struggle over Wittgenstein's picture of the relation seemed finally to have been put to rest by Johnston's balanced assessment; however, the recent clarification of Tractarian logic closes off a certain precise argument in favor of the view of taking relations as objects, an argument to which Johnston seemingly acquiesces.

The key technical advances are as follows. First came Hintikka's analysis of the identity relation. The experts agree on the weakly-exclusive interpretation (Rogers and Wehmeier 2012, p. 542). A significant series of papers by Kai Wehmeier on first-order quantification culminated in a joint 2012 work with Brian Rogers in which first-order logic is isolated in the *Tractatus.* Since then, there have been two additional relevant findings. Thomas Ricketts (2013, p. 130) shows how one can manage a first-order simulation of the second-order quantifiers. The simulation depends upon the *such that* locution (5.52 and in Geach). Just this year, Max Weiss has shown that Tractarian logic admits only countably many objects. The condition that restricts the number of objects is Wittgenstein's notion of definability (Weiss, sec. 4). Weiss also discerns a well-ordering principle (ibid. sec. 3.3). There are important implications.

In particular, one of the central arguments has begun by accepting the Quinean criterion of objecthood: relations, then, are objects insofar as they are quantified over once translated into the formal language. Then, so the argument goes, they are objects for Wittgenstein due to tacit quantification in the *Tractatus* over relations, however, since the formal system of the *Tractatus* does not quantify in an essential way over relations or concepts or predicates, this argument falls apart.

While "formal relations" are in some ways like objects, there are important differences. Of course, in one sense, and Johnston can be read this way, it doesn't matter one jot whether or not to understand the relation as an object. That would be just a question of playing one language game or another. It bears noting, however, that although scientific notation generalizes over predicates, there is a great philosophical tradition that distinguishes relations not only from objects, but also from predicates. Relations follow a *third way*. So, while it might seem at first that "this is not a worry, so go ahead and sort them as objects", this being one way to understand the famous 1933 remark to Desmond Lee, the unique status of relations from another perspective might be used as evidence that labeling them as objects is a misleading philosophical move. We argue that in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein's use of the term 'relation' follows a third way that reveals a sort of *in situ* approach to logic and, apparently, to mathematics.

In an early version of the *Tractatus,* Wittgenstein had written: "Men have always had a presentiment that there must be a realm in which the answers to questions are symmetrically combined--*a priori*--to form a self-contained system. A realm subject to the law: *Simplex sigillum veri*" (see 5.4541). Although we often think of the *a priori* as independent of experience, in this passage the idea seems to mean something more like *arising from merely logical grounds*. Here the grounds are not foundational. Arithmetic belongs to this realm.

The *vexed question* of the relation turns on the crucial distinction between internal and external relations. Wittgenstein uses formal features of the asymmetric relation to explicate the logicist reduction of arithmetic and the theory of types. Admittedly, what Wittgenstein writes about the theory of types is not always immediately clear, as Potter tells us. Still, he shows how the theory of types can be operationalized, which no doubt took some time to process. This reveals a cross-fertilization between his technical work and philosophical understanding.

We have to keep in mind that, although naturalism is an influential position for us in the contemporary realm, the *Tractatus* maintains a separation between the propositions of science and logic. The distinction between the internal and the external relation (4.122; and in Moore), reveals this complexity. The external relation belongs to the realm of natural science, while the internal relation is characteristic of the realm of logic, and (apparently) mathematics. Instead of naturalism, Wittgenstein is guided by two insights. The first insight is that the mathematical realm differs from the logical realm in the important respect that logic is neutral with respect to order. "The logical forms are anumeri-

cal" (4.128), he says. "There are no numbers in logic" (5.453). A picture represents its sense, but the logic of sentences, like the form of a concept, does not represent a sense (2.17-2.221). Logic concerns the means of representation, the way to picture. All pictures are logical, but only for a purely logical picture is the form of representation the logical form.

The second insight is that a sentence is self-standing in that one can understand it without knowing whether it is true or false. Wittgenstein treats an arithmetical equation as a kind of self-contained picture completely empty of any content beyond its purely formal nature. It is a blueprint. The building block idea is essential to that: the idea is that any recursion begins with a basis from which, once it is stipulated, the form of any series continues step by step, each further step the output of an operation on the previous step; identify the least element as the base in the series. So, for any series, we can look at any sub-series within it, then stipulate that the first member of that subseries is the basis of the sub-series. The building blocks for mathematics are "primitive signs" very securely founded on the underlying order (3.26). Now we turn to a key step in the development of Wittgenstein's thought on the relation: the sigma analysis.

From early in his career Wittgenstein took notes on the relation. He had an initial interest in a nice feature of the old subject-predicate logic, and so explored whether or not he could use the new mathematical logic to solve the old problem of the relation by reducing it to two predicates. Wittgenstein at one stage configured an analysis in terms of what have come to be called "flanking relations". But, as Pears tells us, by 1919 there is only one form, the form of the object. Already on 3 September 1914 Wittgenstein asks: "Does the relational form exist?"

Note the striking similarity between these signs: aRb and $a\sigma R \cdot R\sigma b$. The sigma analysis occurs first in Wittgenstein's notebooks on the 27th of September 1914. Two days before that he insists on the possibility not only of a correlation of situations but even a correlation of relations, a theme he returns to in the *Tractatus* when he discusses relations between structures. The components have to be correlated, he says on 25 September, on analogy of name and thing named.

A medieval analysis of the relation 'Anthony and Cleopatra are in love (with each other)' was to separate it into two predicates with a *quatenus* connective: Anthony is in love with Cleopatra insofar as Cleopatra is in love with Anthony. Wittgenstein gives the logical form of this sort of analysis as follows: "$\phi\alpha, \psi\beta, aRb$". He then writes: "It could be said that the situation aRb always has a certain property, if the first two propositions are true". That is an improvement on what he had on the fifth of September: "$\phi(a) \cdot \phi(b) . aRb = \mathrm{Def}\phi[aRb]$". The older definition does not capture the separation into two distinct predicates. The property of the situation must be internal, else there is no reason to think that the proper bonding up would happen such that if b changes and ψb goes false, this would impact and adjust the truth of ϕa. But what about unrequited love?

Or consider the sentence 'Socrates is taller than Theaetetus'. We can fix that in time, so that it is true when both men were younger and became false at some point as they aged. But is the relation between the two men self-standing, in which case it somehow influences them, or does it depend solely on the relata? Under the sigma analysis relations become more object-like because they are more predicate-like. But relations follow a third way

and are not entirely like predicates. In a sense they stand with one leg in one object and one leg in the other object, for there is no order of things prior to their description (5.634). We can exchange the analysis of aRb for two σ-style predications: R_ab and R_ba. If this is a symmetric relation, so far, so good: using these predicates we can gin up a way so that your being in the same room as I will secure my being in the same room as you. Perhaps we could do it like this:

$$R_ab . (R_ab \supset R_ba)$$

The idea is to translate this using a *quatenus* or an *eo ipso* locution. This gives a nice analysis; however, this expedient will not work in the case of asymmetric relations. In these cases the idea is to express that Socrates is taller than Theaetetus, which should hold only if Theaetetus is shorter than Socrates. But that requires two different sigma relations, T and S, say, whereas what we want is one combined relation. Further applications of the sigma analysis to these new *predicates* will set the analysis spiraling. This is true unless, perhaps, some *ad hoc* infinitary moves are utilized. But the numeric action, as we've said, is all countable. Luckily, Wittgenstein had the presence of mind to realize that the sigma theory cannot capture the asymmetry, and so he abandoned that project long before the *Prototractatus*. Instead, he operationalizes the problem, realizing the notion of succession in the operation. The successive outputs of the operation constitute a formal series. He exchanges the sigma analysis for the operational analysis.

The internal relation is what the form of the series comes to. A typed sentence also has an asymmetry, and this too now becomes operational. The theory of types presupposes the natural numbers. The Tractarian analysis refines the philosophical case for what must be presupposed at the minimum for an analysis of arithmetic. It accomplishes this by completely emptying mathematics of any conceptual content. But so much of mathematics goes with it. This is among the reasons no doubt why Charles Parsons refers to an analysis of arithmetic without content as a *desperate expedient*. Throughout, the analysis remains situated within the context of the logical scaffolding: "That which expresses *itself* in language, *we* cannot express by language".

The last detail is Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's Axiom of Reducibility (6.1232—6.1233, cf. Weyl). The Axiom remedies an issue in Russell's ramified theory of types by adding predicative objects, thus simplifying the order hierarchy. Wittgenstein remarks that the Axiom of Reducibility is true as a matter of chance, so not part of logic. That is an argument that the Axiom of Reducibility is not fully general, but not an argument that there aren't solid grounds for it. Apparently, then, Wittgenstein had not run into the paper Russell gave before the Cambridge Mathematical Club in 1907, where Russell himself acknowledges problems with the Axiom of Reducibility and produces an argument for the Axiom of Reducibility from coherence that some of what Wittgenstein writes could be interpreted as endorsing. Wittgenstein, for example, is explicit that logical laws are those that follow from logical laws, a position partly consonant with views tied to internal coherence (6.127).

In the second edition of the *Principia* Whitehead and Russell will write:

This axiom has a purely pragmatic justification: it leads to the desired results, and to no others. But clearly it is not the sort of axiom with which we can rest content. [...] There is another course recommended by Wittgen-

stein [*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* *5.54ff] for philosophical reasons". The "philosophical reasons" are, specifically, that the statement of the axiom asserts an external relation (cf. Wittgenstein 1979, p. 123).

We've seen a cross-fertilization between Wittgenstein's picture of the relation and of philosophy more broadly. He presumed the crystalline purity of logic, which led him to the project of the apparently internal analysis of arithmetic. He came to restate his early concerns about the Axiom of Reducibility, which had been existential. Wittgenstein's new formulation goes by way of the vexed question, for the Axiom of Reducibility contains an external relation posing as an internal one. Thus, he has changed modes by the time he writes the *Tractatus.* His analysis does not key off the worry about existence, for that was too metaphysical. But that is not to say he ended up reversing course and countenancing the existence of relations as objects, for the system he devised avoids that commitment.

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Paradigmatic Samples, Self-Reference and the White Knight's Paradox

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Abstract

The name of the name is not the name. This is the White Knight's paradox coined by Giorgio Agamben taking up a line from Lewis Carroll's *Through the Looking Glass*. I am going to show that there are rigorous formulations of this paradox in Frege and the early Wittgenstein. However, we can find almost an exact restatement of the White Knight's paradox in terms of paradigmatic samples in the later Wittgenstein: "one proposition can never describe the paradigm in another, unless it ceases to be a paradigm." (PG, p. 346) I shall argue that such self-referential propositions, which lie on the limit of language, can mark something radically new, something that marks a radical change of our language and the world, something that was inexpressible previously.

Frege (1892) famously claimed that the concept 'horse' is no concept. His main argument is based on the underlying distinction between concepts and objects, and it is derived from a grammatical analysis of the use of definite and indefinite articles. A noun with the definite article refers to an object ["auf einen Gegenstand hinweist"], whereas a noun with the indefinite article refers to a concept. Frege was aware of several exceptions to this rule (i.e. some logical imperfections of ordinary language). For although there is the definite article in the expression "the concept 'horse'", it does not refer to a concept, but rather to an object. We can restate the difference between concepts and objects in terms of completeness or saturation. Concepts are unsaturated entities, whereas objects are saturated or complete. An unsaturated entity (a function) gets saturated by a saturated entity (an argument) in the act of a predication. Frege can, thus, say that a concept is the reference ["Bedeutung"] of a linguistic predicate and an object is the reference of a linguistic subject. In the sentence "the concept 'horse' is no concept", the expression "the concept 'horse'" is in the subject position and therefore it refers to an object. We can't use the expression "the concept 'horse'" as a concept, i.e. in the predicate position.[1]

Why is the word "horse" written in inverted commas in "the concept 'horse'" (Frege used italics)? It seems that inverted commas make an object from a concept. There is no need for inverted commas in "the city Berlin is a city" as Frege pointed out. But one can raise, as with Carnap (1934, §41), the objection that we can use inverted commas to name the expression which appears within these commas. Following this suggestion, we can ask what is "'horse'" the name of? It would be absurd to say that "'horse'" is the name of a horse. Names of horses are Bucephalus, Rocinante or the like. We can, of course, stipulate that "'horse'" is the name of "horse". But then the semantic role of these inverted commas would be left unexplained, and the naming relation would be trivial. Reach (1938) showed, in fact, that what we cannot name in language is the naming relation itself.[2]

Giorgio Amgaben ([1990]/1999) follows Frege exactly in this point: "every time we *name* a concept (instead of using it as a predicate in a proposition), it ceases to function as a concept and appears as an object." (1999, 213) But Agamben, taking up a line from Lewis Carroll's *Through the Looking Glass*, generalized Frege's insight into the White Knight's paradox. The White Knight here provides for Alice a series of indirect naming of the song he is going to sing. The name of the song is called "Haddocks' Eyes". The name (not the song) really is "The Aged Aged Man". The song is called "Ways and Means". Alice is confused about which of these names is the name of the song. But the White Knight rejoins that the real name of the song is "A-sitting On a Gate". The point is that neither "Haddocks' Eyes", nor "The Aged Aged Man" refer to anything at all. The White Knight's paradox reads "a term cannot refer to something and, at the same time, refer to the fact that it refers to it", or "the name of the name is not the name".

Wittgenstein addressed this problem in the *Tractatus* where he maintained that names represent objects (3.22). These objects cannot be names of other objects, though. If they were, they would not be simple and primitive. Furthermore, sentences are not complex names as in Frege (3.143) and so there are no names of situations (3.144). Hence, no name can be a name of another name or other names. But for Wittgenstein the problem lies in the idea of assimilating philosophical (as well as logical and linguistic) vocabulary into language itself.[3] This vocabulary includes "concept", "object" or "name". These concepts cannot be simply avoided or banished to a meta-language.

This problem led Wittgenstein to distinguish between proper concepts and formal concepts (or between external and internal relations). Formal concepts are not concepts at all. "When something falls under a formal concept as one of its objects, this cannot be represented by means of proposition." (4.126) The claim "concept of 'horse' is a concept" as well as its negation "concept of 'horse' is not a concept" violate the principles of logical syntax.[4] A formal concept always expresses a propositional variable. A proposition containing a formal concept is, in the course of logical analysis, *dissolved* into a class of propositions. Formal concepts are, so to speak, analyzed away. A formal concept, thus, cannot refer to itself. In short: "What expresses *itself* in language, *we* cannot express by means of language." (4.121)

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1 It is absurd to say that Rocinante is the concept 'horse' (Stekeler-Weithofer 2011, 52).
2 We can name the name relation in a meta-language or (which comes to the same thing) we can name the name relation restricted by the theory of types – as Reach showed. These options are, however, not available in the present context.

3 Cf. Diamond (1995, 184): "The predicate 'concept' cannot be predicated of any concept: we think we want it in order to say things about concepts, but to think that it will enable us to do so is confusion, confusion about what a concept is. Wittgenstein thought that the *whole* philosophical vocabulary reflected confusion."
4 This is what Cora Diamond calls "chickening out" (1995, 194).

The general structure of these paradoxes is that they employ a peculiar kind of self-reference. That is *language refers to itself*, or more exactly, there is a certain linguistic device (e.g., concept, name) that refers to its own expression in language and that is, at the same time, treated as an object among others. But why this is to be prohibited altogether? The arguments that have been provided so far rest upon peculiarities of Frege's and the early Wittgenstein's conceptions of language which are not generally espoused today.

In Wittgenstein's later thinking the problem is restated in terms of rules and paradigmatic samples or prototypes.[5] Following a rule can be taken as a (at times complicated) praxis of comparing an actual situation with a paradigmatic sample or samples. Paradigmatic samples are real material things ranging from clearly defined objects like the meter stick or a color plate to intricate structures like formalizations of mathematical proofs or works of art. Let us pause for a moment to consider the question whether every rule must involve some comparison to a paradigmatic sample. Let us imagine a rule that does not recur to any paradigmatic sample. This means, however, that such a rule does not recur to any real object when one is asking whether a given situation is a case of following this rule. The only paradigm would be "a preconceived idea in my head" (PG, p. 186). This rule would be a private rule, that is, no rule at all.[6] Hence, every rule must be defined by means of a paradigmatic sample.

We can find an almost exact restatement of the White Knight's paradox in terms of paradigmatic samples in Wittgenstein: "one proposition can never describe the paradigm in another, unless it ceases to be a paradigm." (PG, p. 346)

This wording is striking for its generality which is unusual for Wittgenstein even in the 1930s. There are several instances spread throughout Wittgenstein's writings: "one cannot say of a group of strokes serving as a paradigm of 3, that it consists of 3 strokes" (PG, p. 346) – or of the standard meter rod that it is or is not one meter long, or of the standard sepia sample that it is of this color or it is not (PI, §50). Why cannot we say this? To be one meter long means having the same length when compared with the standard meter – and there must be a standard method of comparison.[7] To say that the standard meter is one meter long requires us to compare the standard meter with itself. If this peculiar kind of comparison should make sense, we have to lay down how it works. We can say that the length of the standard meter is always identical with itself. That is, the standard meter is always one meter long, whatever happens. But this is an ad hoc stipulation that, moreover, does not explain its negation, i.e. saying that the standard meter is not one meter long.

Let us look at the problem from a slightly different perspective. The standard meter, on the one hand, defines the whole class of objects that are one meter long and it, on the other hand, is treated as one of the members of this class. This is the structure of Russell's paradox. As was convincingly argued by Paul Livingston (2012), the White Knight's paradox is structurally equivalent to Russell's

paradox: An element which represents a whole class is asked whether it belongs also into this very class. In terms of paradigmatic samples, the paradox reads: A paradigmatic sample cannot be asked whether it possesses the property that it is a paradigm of, unless it ceases to be a paradigm.

One way of dealing with paradoxes is to develop a technique that prohibits formulating self-referential sentences. Russell's theory of types and Carnap's or Tarski's construction of metalanguages are such techniques. Wittgenstein's approach to paradoxes is different. Paradoxes arise, according to Wittgenstein, when we take sentences out of their context of use. "A proposition is a paradox only if we abstract from its use." (RPP I, §65; cf. also RFM VII, §43) A sentence is, thus, only seemingly paradoxical because we are not aware of the context of use. Our task is to figure out a language-game with such sentences and the paradox then vanishes. (This might be a general characterization of the later Wittgenstein's method.)

What are these uses? We can say, for instance, "The class of lions is not a lion, but the class of classes is a class" or ask whether "The class of cats is not a cat" (RFM VII, §36). Wittgenstein imagines that these sentences can draw our attention to the fact that each of these sentences contains two occurrences of a predicate ("lion", "class", "cat") which are used in a fundamentally different way – and which might be misleading when unnoticed. These words have two aspects ["Auffassungen"], an object-aspect and a class-aspect. These sentences might allow us to experience the change of the aspect ["Umwechseln der Auffassung"].

Yet there is another use of such paradoxical sentences:

The fable says: "The lion went for a walk with the fox", not a lion with a fox; nor yet the lion so-and-so with the fox so-and-so. And here it actually is as if the species lion came to be seen as a lion. […]

Imagine a language in which the class of lions is called "the lion of all lions", the class of trees "the tree of all trees", etc.—Because people imagine all lions as forming *one* big lion. (We say: "God created man [Gott hat den Menschen geschaffen]".) (RFM VII, §36; Ms-124, 125f.)

Similarly to Frege, Wittgenstein carries out a grammatical analysis of definite and indefinite articles. Sometimes we use the definite article (in German as well as in English) to refer to a set or species and, at the same time, to refer to a particular element of this set that can be involved in a particular situation. The fable speaks about lions and foxes in general, but places them in a particular plot. In "God created man" (in German with the definite article "den Menschen", accusative singular), man refers to all men and at the same time to a particular man Adam. The quotation from *Genesis* 1:27 continues with "in his own image, in the image of God, he created him". The first man and man, that is, the class of men, are created in the image of God. The first man is itself an image of man, it is, so to speak, an archetype of man – a paradigmatic sample. In the same way, the lion of all lions can refer to the paradigm of a lion, or the song of songs to a paradigmatic song.[8]

5 This approach is not completely new, for propositional variables from Wittgenstein's early thinking are a kind of prototype, cf. NB, p.65.

6 Even rules in mathematics, which are arguably the most abstract rules, must follow paradigms, which are symbolic expressions of these rules. Talking about the equation a + (b + c) = (a + b) +c, Wittgenstein says: "For if the proposition is a *rule*, a *paradigm*, which every calculation has to follow, then it makes no more sense to talk of working out the equation, than to talk of working out a definition." (PG, p. 395, my italics)

7 This is, of course, a crude simplification of the actual praxis, which, however, does not impact on the overall argument.

8 The construction "X of Xs" ("Song of songs", "holy of holies", "king of kings" etc.) is common in the Old Testament. It expresses a *superlative*. Although it is in the singular, it does not necessary express a single element. (Cf. Keel 1994, 38f.) Today, there is a similar idiomatic construction "the mother of all somethings", e.g. Douglas Engelbart's "The Mother of All Demos". It is a superlative not in having the greatest degree of a certain characteristic, but rather in having the greatest number of characteristics of X. There is a single thing that has the greatest number of characteristics of X, the most X, the paradigmatic sample of X.

What would be the use of the sentence "the standard meter is not one meter long"? To point out two different uses of "meter"? This would be too confusing, and besides, there is a better way of putting this. It cannot mean that the standard meter has changed its length either, for this must be put in terms of another paradigm, e.g. the standard meter is not 3.28 feet long anymore. The only reasonable employment of this sentence is to indicate a change in the praxis with the standard meter or, more precisely, a change of the method of comparison (e.g., with respect to the accuracy of the comparison this, the material the standard meter is made of, the storing of the standard meter in certain environment, or by replacing it with a beam of light). We can imagine that we can use the standard meter to measure another object using the old method, and subsequently we can use this object to measure the standard meter using the new method. Then we might say that the standard meter is *not* one meter long.

Perhaps there is a more general lesson to be drawn from the last few considerations. To treat a name of a class as a member of this class marks something radically new, a radical change of our language and of the world, something that was inexpressible previously. From this perspective, it is no coincidence that Wittgenstein took as examples fables (works of art) and God's creation of man. Wittgenstein comes close to contemporary continental philosophy. In Agamben: "Linguistic being is a class that both belongs and does not belong to itself, […] a set (the tree) that is at the same time a singularity (*the* tree, *a* tree, *this* tree)" (1993, 9). Event is for Alain Badiou a multiple belonging to itself; event is something that produced among its elements its own name.

The White Knight was joking, of course. There is indeed no name of the name – if the name refers to something definite. The name of the name marks, however, a creative act that has the potential to produce a new name.

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Wittgenstein's Therapeutic Method and His Patient's Problems

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Abstract

There has been much discussion about Wittgenstein's philosophical therapy, dealing with such questions as what objects of therapy are, why philosophy is therapeutic, what the goal of therapy is, and how Wittgenstein develops his therapeutic method. On the subject of therapeutic method, it has often been asserted that Wittgenstein barely tells his interlocutor the correct use of language, and rather, makes him reflect on his own expressions. This proposition seems to explain rightly how Wittgenstein exercises his method. However, the availability of a therapeutic method does not seem to have received sufficient deliberation. It may still be questioned whether Wittgenstein's therapeutic method is most suitable or merely adequate as a means of treatment.
The present study not only analyses treatment in *Philosophical Investigations* but also examines the nature of philosophical problems, proving that therapeutic method is not just one effective procedure but is necessary in its own right. Someone who understands a philosophical problem may see the matter differently from another person who has difficulty in finding the way to deal with it. We should not take a shortcut in therapy by merely disclosing grammatical misinterpretation.

1. Why does Wittgenstein make his interlocutor think?

Wittgenstein's philosophical therapy has attracted much scholarly interest. Some studies collectively present the total picture of philosophical therapy, covering: the objects of therapy (cf. Goldfarb 1983; Floyd 1991), the goal of therapy (cf. Rorty 1976; Peterman 1992), and the development of Wittgenstein's therapeutic method. Regarding this therapeutic method, some researchers have agreed that Wittgenstein hardly teaches his patient (interlocutor) the correct use of language, and rather, makes him reflect on his own expressions. Wittgenstein reminds him of his own actual use of words. This is the point on which Baker (1991), Diamond (2004), McGinn (2013), etc. all agree, despite their difference in finer details.

The grounds for the apparent cogency of their argument are given by analysing the specific features of Wittgenstein's treatment in *Philosophical Investigations* (hereafter PI), (and I will briefly discuss them in the next section). Even so, it seems to remain controversial why Wittgenstein gets his interlocutor to think. Although Wittgenstein is rightly said to make his interlocutor reflect on his own expressions, it may be questioned whether another way of treating philosophical diseases is available. Wittgenstein's successor may possibly produce a slightly different form of philosophical therapy. Indeed, Wittgenstein says in the Preface to PI (p. 4e), "I should have liked to produce a good book. It has not turned out that way, but the time is past in which I could improve it". The availability of philosophical therapy seems to be an under-discussed topic.

The main objective of this paper is to justify the proposition that Wittgenstein makes his interlocutor reflect on his own expressions. To do so, I not only analyse Wittgenstein's treatment but also examine the nature of philosophical problems.

2. Analysing Treatment in *Philosophical Investigations*

In this section, exploring Wittgenstein's treatment, I focus on the first confirmation of our proposition that Wittgenstein makes his interlocutor reflect on his own expressions. Verification of the proposition requires two conditions. The first condition is that treatment does not depend on whether or not Wittgenstein holds the basis for the correct use of language. This is relevant to what Wittgenstein (playing the part of a guide) should know. If Wittgenstein were to tell his interlocutor the correct use of language, it would be inevitable to then inquire into what the basis for that use is. Instead, in making the interlocutor consider his wording, Wittgenstein has to be familiar with this person's concealed standpoint.

There appears to be little doubt that Wittgenstein is aware of the interlocutor's standpoint. For example, Wittgenstein states, "That philosophical notion of meaning is at home in a primitive idea of the way language functions" (PI 2). He uncovers an assumption behind Augustine's picture of language. Another example is found in a page of the so-called Rule-Following considerations, where Wittgenstein says, "That there is a misunderstanding here is shown by the mere fact that in this chain of reasoning we place one interpretation behind another, as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another lying behind it" (PI 201). Wittgenstein perceives that his interlocutor unconsciously assumes something like an interpretation, which, independent of any rule, defines how people behave in agreement.

The second condition, which is more notable than the first, is that Wittgenstein can provide his interlocutor with an applicable way of thinking. This is relevant to what guidance Wittgenstein should offer his interlocutor. If our proposition is true, Wittgenstein has to help the interlocutor to recognize the strangeness of his own expressions.

Significant hints for the interlocutor are "language-games". Wittgenstein remarks, "the language-games stand there as *objects of comparison* which, through similarities and dissimilarities, are meant to throw light on features of our language" (PI 130). In treatment, Augustine's language model (PI 1) is likened to a primitive language-game, which embodies invisible philosophical notions (e.g. 'meaning' in PI 2) and has an imaginal character (cf. Baker 1991, p. 47; Diamond 2004, p. 217).

Within the scope of this brief consideration, it seems possible to accept as verifiable that Wittgenstein makes his interlocutor reflect on his own expressions. The two conditions thus support our proposition. First, it rarely matters whether or not Wittgenstein holds the basis for the correct use of language. Second, what is more notable is that

Wittgenstein can provide his interlocutor with an applicable way of thinking.

3. The Nature of Philosophical Problems

In this section, which examines the nature of philosophical problems, I enter into the second confirmation of our proposition. If the following consideration accords with the purport of this paper, it may also be reasonable to say that the interlocutor must be reminded of his peculiar manner of using words.

There are many ways to define or explain the nature of philosophical problems, but here I want to emphasize that philosophical problems, while being comprehensible to many people, affect only those who really feel challenged by them.

Philosophical problems have been common to many philosophers who have handed down their imaginative products from generation to generation. Even if philosophers are different in delicate and remarkable ways, their problems are understandable to both pursuing specialists and interested ordinary persons alike.

Nevertheless, there seems to be a noticeable distinction between the stage of appreciating a philosophical problem and that of feeling obliged to answer it. Comprehending philosophical questions with their backgrounds is not always equal to confronting difficulty in finding the way to respond.

Let me illustrate my point by referring to a philosophical problem in PI. Suppose that there was a person who was devoted to answering the question, "What is essential to a language-game, and so to language?" (PI 65). We may understand his question with its background by carefully listening to what he may possibly say: "Even though we have ordinarily used, and are using, language without concern, we know little about the very fundamental that makes language possible, normative, meaningful, regular, etc." We can barely answer these questions: "How can we use language correctly without a school teacher and a grammar book? How can we understand what a signpost signifies?"

We, in the role of the guide, should stay within the reach of his speech rather than interrupt him. He may go on speaking as follows: "That foundation that makes language possible must be a rigid rule, but this answer is just temporary. Then we should immediately ask questions one after another. What is that rule? Is it rigid or flexible? Where is it? How is it attained? How can we grasp it and correctly do so?"

Attentively listening to his speaking, we could make out his demand and difficulty. He calls for something that operates language, as it were. Two types of trouble torment him. The first type is failure in using a word comprehensibly. If someone hoped to use a word in a quite unusual way, it would not matter to others. (For example, if I called sky 'dog' and said "today's dog is clear", my utterance would have no influence on you.) Our speaker regards the word 'rule' as a special term that implies a capacity for operating language regularly, but this connotation has nothing to do with what we mean by it. Insofar as we retain the sense in which we say, "There are more regular verbs than irregular ones" or "When you do your paper, you have to follow the formal style", it is reasonable to say, "Language has regularity" or "The rule exists". However, what he really means by the word 'rule' is not anything like that at

all. He would fail to convey what he really intends to, if he said, "The rule exists".

The second type of trouble derives from his standpoint. In his view, that there must be a 'rule' is the foremost assumption which necessitates grasping the 'rule' that operates language. He could not abandon the assumption, otherwise, he would have to conclude that there is no ground which protects language from falling into disorder. He is thus exposed to a dilemma: to continue talking about the 'rule' while failing to say what he really means, or to despair of defining the 'rule' while admitting that nothing guarantees that language is communicative and meaningful.

While being cognizant of his demand and difficulty, we maintain a more commonsensical view. There seems to be a great discontinuity between our view and his. It would have little effect on him if we pointed out his grammatical misunderstanding, saying, "You mistake the grammar of the word 'rule' for that of e.g. 'mechanism', which means something according to which a machine operates". From his perspective, the most important thing is to represent his idea that the 'rule' works in language, no matter how extraordinary an expression he is forced to use.

4. The Reason Why We Should Not Use a Shortcut

Philosophical problems are intelligible to many people, but can provoke those who find them seriously challenging. Our consideration of the nature of philosophical problems provides sufficient evidence, consequent on which it is possible to say that the interlocutor has to be reminded of how he actually uses words. Go back to our supposed speaker. What we should primarily do is to bridge the gap between our view and his by supplying various examples which are modelled on his idea and through which he would come to see his use of words more objectively. If we say to him, "Let's imagine a machine which never warps or is rarely out of order", he may at once start wondering whether his own expressions are imaginable or not. He may finally come to think it is quite important to care about what we ordinarily understand by words.

In this treatment, we can provide an applicable way of thinking to our interlocutor, rather than teaching him the correct use of language, even though it is essential to discern the comprehensible use of words in any case. In philosophical therapy, it is rarely worthwhile to use a shortcut in the process, in which the interlocutor, facing a philosophical problem, reflects on his own expressions. This is because there is a great gap between us, who understand his philosophical problem but retain common sense, and the interlocutor, who confronts difficulty in discovering the way to respond. As long as he remains at his standpoint, it is almost fruitless to point out his misunderstanding in grammar. It is more significant to find a way of conforming his view to ours.

5. Conclusion

The method of philosophical therapy corresponds to the nature of the philosophical problems it treats. Philosophical problems are comprehensible to many people, who seem to easily notice grammatical mistakes in them. However, mere disclosure of a grammatical mistake is not a very effective measure to refute the person bothered with the problem.

As far as our illustration is in agreement with PI, it seems to be a matter of course to conclude that Wittgenstein hardly informs his interlocutor (the one who feels challenged by a philosophical question) of his grammatical misinterpretation but leads him to reflect on his own wording.

Hopefully, this conclusion may contribute to a better understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophical therapy not only by people who want to appreciate the method more accurately but also by those who need to grasp its availability and thus, to justify it. Here, we can take it for granted that Wittgenstein's philosophical activity has both generality and rationality.

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Beschreiben und Erinnern.
Über Iris Murdochs Anverwandlung einiger Wittgensteinischer Motive

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Abstract

In meinem Vortrag möchte ich neues Licht werfen auf Iris Murdochs ethisch-ästhetischen Holismus, den sie in kritischer Anverwandlung einiger Wittgensteinischer Motive entwickelt hat. Ausgehend von einer Neulektüre des berühmten Beispiels von M und D diskutiere ich Murdochs Verständnis der Tätigkeiten von Beschreiben und Erinnern sowie der Privatheit seelischer Zustände und des Aspektwechsels. Schließlich zeige ich, dass ihre „Idee der Vollkommenheit" nicht vorschnell in einem realistischen Sinn interpretiert werden darf, sondern vielmehr auf die Ganzheit des *erinnerten* Lebens verweist.

1.

Das Beispiel von M, der Schwiegermutter, und D, der Schwiegertochter, aus Murdochs Aufsatz „The Idea of Perfection" (1964) ist in zahllosen Monographien und Aufsätzen behandelt worden; erstaunlicherweise ist eine zentrale Pointe meist übersehen worden. Die Versuchsanordnung ist wie folgt: die Schwiegermutter sieht in ihrer Schwiegertochter zunächst eine ungehobelte, ja ordinäre Person; und diese Wahrnehmung speist sich insbesondere aus der Annahme, ihr Sohn habe „unter Wert" geheiratet. Eines Tages wird M jedoch gewahr, dass Eifersucht ihr Bild von D verzerrt haben könnte, und sie beschließt, sich Ds Charakter aufs Neue zu vergegenwärtigen. Durch einen Prozess des „Brütens" (*brood*) (Murdoch 2001, 19) gelangt sie schließlich zu einem neuen Bild: jetzt erscheinen ihr die Merkmale, die ihr zunächst negativ aufgestoßen waren, in einem positiven Licht: „unhöflich" wird zu „offenherzig", „schroff" wird zu „unprätentiös", „überdreht" wird zu „lebenslustig". Und genau in diesem „langsamen Wandel der Perspektiven" (Trampota 2003, 129) soll sich eine moralische Perspektive eröffnen, die Murdoch unter der Idee der „Vollkommenheit" (*perfection*) zusammenfasst.

Einer verbreiteten Lesart zufolge thematisiert die Philosophin in diesem Beispiel die Rolle der „liebevollen Aufmerksamkeit" (*loving attention*), mit der wir unsere Selbstzentriertheit und Engstirnigkeit überwinden und uns der Wirklichkeit eines anderen Menschen zuwenden können (Swanton 2003, 110ff.). So plausibel diese Lesart auch ist, die eigentliche Pointe Murdochs droht auf diese Weise aus dem Blick zu geraten: denn anstelle D noch einmal aufzusuchen und sie – etwa in einem Gespräch – erneut *wahrzunehmen*, richtet M ihre Aufmerksamkeit ausschließlich auf ihr Gedächtnisbild von D, also auf die Eindrücke und Empfindungen, die sich in ihrem Inneren mit D verbinden. Ms „innerer Kampf" kann sich nur in der Einsamkeit vollziehen, „privat" und in einem Prozess des schweigenden „Brütens", nicht aber im Gespräch mit einem anderen Menschen (Murdoch 2001, 22); und als wollte sie sichergehen, dass wir ihr Beispiel nicht missverstehen, fügt Murdoch hinzu, dass D vielleicht längst gestorben ist (ebd., 17). Dieser unscheinbar wirkende Nachsatz spiegelt Murdochs lebenslange Überzeugung wider, dass unsere moralische Subjektivität überhaupt erst in einem Zustand der „Privatheit" sichtbar wird, in kontemplativer Zurückgezogenheit – in eben dem Zustand, in dem sich auch Maggie Verver, die Hauptfigur in Henry James' Roman *The Golden Bowl*, befindet, als sie sich der Affäre ihres Ehemannes mit ihrer besten Freundin bewusst wird (Murdoch analysiert diese Passage in ihrem Hauptwerk *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals*; siehe Murdoch 2003, 170ff.; vgl. ebd., 23, 124, 348ff.).

Offenbar geht es nicht einfach darum, die Blickrichtung zu ändern und die Aufmerksamkeit von sich selbst auf die Wirklichkeit eines anderen Menschen zu richten; verlangt ist vielmehr, sich die Wirklichkeit des Anderen ins Gedächtnis zu rufen, so dass der Andere sich in der eigenen Innerlichkeit spiegelt. In mancher Hinsicht verwirrend ist nun, dass sich die Tätigkeiten des *Sehens* und des *Erinnerns* im Beispiel von M und D zu überlagern scheinen: obgleich M strenggenommen D überhaupt nicht sehen kann, greift Murdoch immer wieder auf visuelle Metaphern und Beschreibungen zurück; Ms „gerechter und liebevoller Blick" (ebd., 33) richtet sich jedoch ausschließlich auf das Gedächtnisbild von D. Und schließlich handelt es sich bei Ms Sehen auch nicht einfach um ein schlichtes, nichtpropositionales Wahrnehmen, sondern um Artikulation und Deutung des Vorhandenen; im Prozess des „Brütens" ergibt sich, wenn denn Ms Vergegenwärtigung von D liebevoll ist, eine Neubeschreibung von D („unhöflich" wird zu „offenherzig", „schroff" wird zu „unprätentiös", „überdreht" wird zu „lebenslustig"). Der Beschreibungsarbeit korrespondiert zudem ein Prozess des inneren Wandels auf Seiten von M; ihr Brüten ist „im wesentlichen etwas Fortschreitendes, etwas, das unendlich vervollkommnungsfähig" ist (Murdoch 2001, 23).

2

Es dürfte vielen PhilosophInnen rätselhaft scheinen, dass Murdoch an dieser Stelle die These vertritt, Ms Beschreibung sei desto vollkommener, je idiosynkratischer sie ausfällt (Murdoch 2001, 22, 25). Während einige Interpreten diese These entschärfen möchten und der Meinung sind, Ms Neubeschreibung sei durchaus für andere Menschen verständlich (z.B. Bagnoli 2012, 221), besteht Elijah Millgram zu Recht darauf, dass der „idiosyncracy claim" ernstgenommen werden muss: im Prozess des Brütens entfernt sich M tatsächlich immer weiter von der öffentlichen Welt, ihr Gebrauch der Sprache ist anderen Menschen immer weniger zugänglich (Millgram 2005, 180). Genau in diesem Sinne ist auch Murdochs Beispiel eines Mannes zu verstehen, der sich „privat" darüber vergewissern möchte, ob eine bestimmte Empfindung in seinem Inneren „Buße" sei (Murdoch 2001, 25).

Es fällt an dieser Stelle schwer, *nicht* an Wittgensteins berühmten Tagebuchschreiber zu denken (PU §258); oder auch an jene „Menschen", die „nur monologisch sprächen" (ebd., §243). In gewisser Weise sind Murdochs Beispiel und das Beispiel des Tagebuchschreibers kongruent: so als würde M ebenfalls ihr Gedächtnisbild von D mit einer Sprache zu beschreiben suchen, die nur ihr selbst zugänglich ist, mithilfe einer „privaten, hinweisenden Definition" (Murdoch 2003, 272). Obgleich Murdoch in der zweiten Hälfte ihres Aufsatzes betont, dass sich aus Ms neuer Beschreibung durchaus auch entsprechende Handlungsintentionen ergeben können (Murdoch 2001, 40f.), sind wir gewiss sehr weit entfernt von der öffentlichen Welt. Wittgenstein würde deshalb wahrscheinlich auch nicht zugeben wollen, dass es sich bei Ms Prozess des „Brütens" um einen Vorgang des Beschreibens handelt, denn ihm zufolge bedarf es bestimmter Merkmale, um einen solchen überhaupt identifizieren zu können (z.B. der Einbettung in ein Sprachspiel, Beobachten, Überlegen, Genauigkeitsstreben; vgl. Schulte 1990, 132f.). Anders als in vielen Beispielen Wittgensteins gibt es im Beispiel von M und D jedoch keinen externen Beobachter, der nach der Angemessenheit des Wortes „Beschreibung" oder der Richtigkeit von Ms Erinnerung fragen könnte. Murdoch wirft uns vielmehr radikal zurück auf die Erste-Person-Perspektive – man vergleiche damit Wittgensteins abfällige Bemerkung über den Versuch des Biografen Lytton Strachey, das Erleben von Königin Victoria unmittelbar vor ihrem Tode zu rekonstruieren (siehe Wittgenstein 1984b, 78)!

Murdochs Position kann nur deutlich werden, wenn zwei weitere Absetzbewegungen von dem österreichischen Philosophen bedacht werden. Erstens kritisiert sie Wittgenstein dafür, ein bestimmtes Bild der Sprache (und damit auch der Welt) „eingefroren" (*freeze*), also fixiert zu haben (Murdoch 2003, 274; vgl. Hämäläinena 2014, 218). – Der Blick der Medusa, der uns erstarren lässt, ist bereits in ihrem frühen Sartre-Buch ein zentrales Motiv (Murdoch 1999, 11, 106, 110, 125). – Dagegen favorisiert Murdoch ein vollzugsorientiertes Verständnis des menschlichen Lebens; im wirklichen Leben gehen die Tätigkeiten des Sehens, Erinnerns und Beschreibens ineinander über: M erinnert sich vielleicht eines Tages an eine gewisse Stimmung auf der Hochzeit ihres Sohnes und ihrer Schwiegertochter; sie konzentriert sich und fasst diese neue Empfindung, ausgelöst von der Erinnerung an jene Stimmung, vielleicht sogar in Worte (ohne doch ihre Lippen zu bewegen); sie vergisst diese Worte wieder; Tage später vergegenwärtigt sie sich ein anderes Detail (ein Kleidungsstück von D; eine Äußerung; eine Geste); doch dann versinkt sie wieder in ihrem selbstvergessenen „Brüten"; bis ihr etwas einfällt, das sie eigentlich schon die ganze Zeit über geahnt hatte und das sie zu einer Neubeschreibung von D veranlasst; usw. usf. All dies geschieht im Fluss des Lebens, nicht anderswo.

Und zweitens, behauptet Murdoch, habe wirkliche Erfahrung Wittgenstein derart „in Verlegenheit gebracht" (*embarrassed*), dass er es sich zum Ziel gemacht habe, diese ganz zu beseitigen (Murdoch 2003, 273; 278, 283). In Murdochs Augen liegt Wittgensteins philosophische Methode immer noch *außerhalb des wirklichen Lebens*. „Draußen im echten Leben", schreibt sie etwa über den berühmten Tagebuchschreiber in *PU* §258, „wäre der Besitzer von E [jener „gewissen Empfindung"; K.M.] ein Individuum, das in der Zeit lebt" (Murdoch 2003, 273). Im Fluss des Lebens zeige sich also die Begrenztheit von Wittgensteins Methode: sie ist darauf zugeschnitten, die „Leere des Inneren" zu demonstrieren, wenn es nicht in einer direkten Verbindung mit der äußeren Welt steht

(ebd.); im wirklichen Leben wären Innen und Außen jedoch unauflösbar miteinander verstrickt, und in der existentiellen Kontinuität unseres Lebens würde auch die Frage der „Richtigkeit" (in der Verwendung des Zeichens „E") früher oder später von selbst eine Antwort erhalten.

„Erfahrung ist Bewusstsein", schreibt Murdoch in *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals* (Murdoch 2003, 279). Wenn wir die bisherigen Einsichten ernstnehmen wollen, dann liegt die folgende Schlussfolgerung nahe: anders als Wittgenstein ist Murdoch der Überzeugung, dass das Erinnern durchaus einen Erlebnisinhalt hat: in der Introspektion vergegenwärtigt sich M ihr Gedächtnisbild von D und „brütet" darüber, sie stellt sich also noch einmal vor, was sie empfunden hat, und auf diese Weise findet sie zu einer Neubeschreibung von D. Durch den „gerechten und liebevollen Blick" verändert sich aber auch Ms Verständnis des Wortes „Liebe" (sowie der Wörter „offenherzig", „unprätentiös", „lebenslustig"). Anders als bei Wittgenstein kann Introspektion uns hier etwas über die Bedeutung einzelner Wörter mitteilen, einen Bedeutungsinhalt, der nur einer einzigen Person zueigen ist (vgl. Wittgenstein 1984a, 579; sowie Raatzsch 1995, 287ff.). Wir müssen dazu nur unserem Gedächtnis vertrauen.

3

Murdochs Versuchsanordnung erinnert darüber hinaus an Wittgensteins Bemerkungen zum Aspektwechsel. Die dritte Bemerkung in PU II.xi: „Ich *sehe*, daß es sich nicht geändert hat; und sehe es doch anders" (Wittgenstein 1984a, 518). Murdoch hat diese Verbindung selbst gezogen, in ihren Überlegungen zum Problem des Aspektsehens und der „einbildenden Selbstwahrnehmung" in *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals* (Murdoch 2003, 279f.). Im Falle des Beispiels von M und D liegt die Idee des Aspektwechsels gewiss auf der Hand; obgleich sich dieser über einen längeren Zeitraum hin ergibt, erscheint die Annahme sinnvoll, dass das Erinnern von M eine *„temporal togetherness"* der unterschiedlichen Aspekte von Ds Gedächtnisbild bewirkt (vgl. Wenzel 2010, 204). Den Aspektwechsel müssen wir uns hier weniger als ein Kippen, denn als ein graduelles Ineinanderüberfließen vorstellen.

Zugleich haben wir es mit einer kritischen Zuspitzung Wittgensteinischer Überlegungen zu tun: anders als der österreichische Philosoph, der allgemeine Kriterien für die Authentizität eines Aspektwechsels ausschließt, möchte Murdoch Ms revidierte Beschreibung von D als „vollkommener" verstanden wissen (vgl. Hagberg 2010, 113). Die unterschiedlichen Aspektwahrnehmungen können anders gesagt hierarchisch gestaffelt werden. Doch damit stellt sich die Frage nach den Kriterien für die Richtigkeit mit noch größerer Dringlichkeit: was ist eigentlich die „vollkommene" Beschreibung, was ist „Vollkommenheit"?

In der Forschungsliteratur finden sich unterschiedliche Antworten. In der Vergangenheit ist Murdoch mitunter als Platonikerin charakterisiert worden, die tatsächlich von der Existenz einer Idee des Guten überzeugt sei; dem entgegen stehen jedoch ihre zahlreichen Aussagen, in denen sie von dem Guten als einer negativen Größe spricht, sowie ihre eigenwillige Platon-Deutung und ihre Neubestimmung von Metaphysik als einer Tätigkeit der radikalen, im Medium der Metapher vollzogenen Selbstklärung (siehe insbesondere Hämäläinena 2014; vgl. Trampota 2003, 141ff.). Die bisherigen Überlegungen legen es nahe, dass es für Murdoch keine einzige, vollkommene Beschreibung des Guten (bzw. der Idee der „Vollkommenheit") geben kann; stattdessen ist Ms Brüten ein Prozess, der sie immer näher an diese „vollkommene" Beschreibung von D

heranführen wird, eine Beschreibung, die jedoch von ihrem eigenen Lebenskontext bestimmt wird. Die Beschreibungen des Guten sind anders gesagt „path-dependent": es geht darum, „überzeugende, einheitstiftende Neubeschreibungen" zu finden (Millgram 2005, 180). Daneben mag es weitere Kriterien geben, z.B. die „Wahrhaftigkeit" oder auch bestimmte Regeln, die unsere Beschreibungsarbeit anleiten, doch tragen sie eben nur solange, wie das Individuum an der öffentlichen Welt teilnimmt (vgl. Forsberg 2013, 139).

Wie Garry Hagberg gezeigt hat, steht im Hintergrund von Murdochs ethisch-ästhetischem Holismus der Gedanke einer epistemischen Priorität der Vergangenheit. Wir wissen nicht, wie unsere Vergangenheit *wirklich* gewesen ist, doch wir wissen, *dass* sie gewesen ist und dass wir nur in dem Teil der Vergangenheit die Wirklichkeit des Anderen, aber auch die Wirklichkeit des eigenen Selbst erschließen können, in dem noch ein Aspektwechsel stattfinden kann (Hagberg 2010, 114f.). Eine vollkommene Beschreibung von D kann deshalb nicht einfach darin bestehen, sämtliche Ereignisse in Ds Leben aufzureihen; es müsste vielmehr darum gehen, Ds Leben *in seiner Ganzheit* zu beschreiben und zwar *aus Ms Perspektive* (kein anderer könnte D genau *so* verstehen). Das Leben in seiner besonderen Färbung, in seiner Stimmung. Und so sind Merkmale wie „offenherzig", „unprätentiös" oder „lebenslustig" auch nicht Eigenschaften, die einfach einem Gegenstand zugehören – es handelt sich vielmehr um „eine interne Relation zwischen ihm und anderen Objekten" (Wittgenstein 1984a, 549; vgl. Hagberg 2010, 111). Die Ganzheit des erinnerten Lebens, das sich zugleich in Ms Leben reflektiert, ist der Horizont, aus dem heraus diese Eigenschaften überhaupt erst wahrnehmbar werden.

4

Murdoch ist bekannt dafür, Ethik und Ästhetik zusammengeführt zu haben. In mancher Hinsicht scheint Murdoch die Beschreibungsarbeit selbst mit dem Wahrnehmen eines Kunstwerkes gleichzusetzen: ein Kunstwerk wahrzunehmen ist eine Möglichkeit der Einheitserfahrung (Murdoch 2003, 1ff.). Dies heißt wohlgemerkt nicht, dass wir unser Leben in ein Kunstwerk verwandeln sollen, denn unser Selbstbezug im Fluss unseres Lebens lässt sich nicht einfügen in eine feste Form (Ms Selbstbild und ihr Bild von D sind nicht einfach Entitäten, die irgendwo aufgefunden werden könnten). Doch wir können auf solche Einheitsdarstellungen *zeigen* und *müssen* es auch – und die Darstellung des realistischen Romans, auf die schon der „Platoniker" Roquentin verwiesen hatte, ist dafür am besten geeignet (Murdoch 1999, 45ff.; Murdoch 2003, 504ff.). Vielleicht ist dies auch der Punkt, an dem ihre Beziehung zu Wittgenstein – wie Niklas Forsberg treffend schreibt – „undecided" geblieben ist (Forsberg 2013, 96).

Sie ist ihm in vielem gefolgt, gerade auch in seiner Distanziertheit zur modernen Moraltheorie; doch viel eher als Wittgenstein war sie bereit, an die moralische Tiefe des gewöhnlichen Lebens zu glauben.

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Ethik und Ironie in den *opening sections* der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*

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Abstract

Der Gebrauch ironischer Sprechweisen in den einleitenden Bemerkungen der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* hat, wie gezeigt werden soll, neben der stilistischen eine anthropologisch-ethische Seite. Erst die Ironie, die sich aus einer nicht eindeutigen Redeweise oder Anordnung der Wissensinhalte ergeben kann, entspricht dem provisorischen, weltbildrelativen Charakter des menschlichen Lebens. Damit ist nicht ein Unernst gemeint, der die Schwierigkeit des Lebens verkennen würde, sondern ein Bewußtsein der vorläufigen Form der Erkenntnismittel, das in der Darstellungsform der *undecidability* bei Wittgenstein einen Ausdruck findet, der die Einsicht der *Lecture on Ethics* bedenkt, dass Faktenaussagen keine absoluten Werturteile implizieren können und die Entscheidung für eine bestimmte Darstellungsform philosophischer Überlegungen Rückschlüsse auf das Menschenbild zulässt, das diesen zugrunde liegt.

In der Wittgenstein-Forschung wurde der differenzierte Gebrauch ironischer Stilmittel, die auch inhaltlich bedeutsam sind, für das Früh- und Spätwerk nachgewiesen und diskutiert (Raatzsch 1997, Schulte 2004). Es stellt sich die Frage, was zum Gebrauch ironischer Sprechweisen in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (Wittgenstein 2001) zu sagen ist, wenn damit nicht nur eine intentional in bestimmter Weise auf den Leser gerichtete Art der Rede gemeint ist, sondern eine ethische Bedeutung. Im Kontext des *Augustinian picture of language* scheint Ironie zunächst verbannt; der programmatische Beginn der *Untersuchungen* scheint auf einen Ernst eingeschworen, der das Augustinus-Beispiel als missverständliche Vorstellung mentalistischer Verirrung ohne jene Unentscheidbarkeit (*undecidability*) darbietet, die der Einsatzpunkt jener Ambivalenzen wäre, die ironische Rede gerade figurieren (vgl. Eldridge 1997). Im Folgenden soll dargelegt werden, wie in der Absicht, eine Gegenposition darzustellen, ironische Rede konstitutiv wird. Diese bedeutungskonstituierende Wirkung des Ironischen steht dabei im Dienste eines Erkenntnisziels, d.h. sie hat über die Funktion des Bruchs oder der Irritation eindeutiger Redeweisen hinaus eine epistemische Funktion. Mit dieser ändert sich die Beschaffenheit der Ironie: Sie hat eine ethische, anthropologische Bewandtnis, die aus der Bedingtheit des menschlichen Lebens kommt und zugleich etwas über das von Wittgenstein angestrebte Verständnis menschlicher Erkenntnisweisen, ihre Vielstimmigkeit und Unabschließbarkeit, aussagt. Am Ende ist es jene Unentscheidbarkeit, die als Darstellungsmodus des Ironischen gilt, die ironische Sprache als vorläufig erkennbar werden läßt. Im Wissen um diese Vorläufigkeit, d.h. den provisorischen Charakter von Darstellungsweise und Erkenntnismöglichkeit, werden Inhalt und Form legiert und das Bild des Menschen um jene Züge bereichert, die sich von der Vorstellung vollständiger, exakter und unzweifelhafter theoretischer Einsicht verabschiedet haben.

1. Das Augustinische Bild der Sprache als *target* kommender Kritik

Joachim Schulte beschreibt in seinem Aufsatz *The Builders' Language* (Schulte 2004) die zentrale Stelle der *opening sections* der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*, die vom Einkauf fünf roter Äpfel handelt, als eine, „which reads as if it reproduced a skit written by Beckett or Ionesco (plus two or three brief comments)." (Ebenda, 22) Darüber hin-

aus fungiere das präsentierte Augustinische Bild der Sprache für gewöhnlich als „main target of Wittgenstein's remarks on meaning and language." (Ebenda.) Als Ziel der Kritik ist das Augustinische Bild eben ein Bild, d.h. die Stillstellung eines möglicherweise dynamischen, prozesshaft sich verändernden und polyvalenten Verlaufs. Inwiefern Überlieferungsleistungen auf Stillstellungen beruhen, kann hier nicht weiter verfolgt werden. Es geht um die Frage, ob die Reduktion einer Sachlage zum „Bild" neben dem Effekt besserer Handhabbarkeit im Gang einer philosophischen Argumentation nicht einen weiteren Effekt hat, der meist unbemerkt bleibt, für die Konstitution von Wittgensteins philosophischer Schreibweise aber wichtig ist: Das reduzierte Bild lädt zur Kritik ein, zugleich lädt es so sehr zu ihr ein, dass auf textueller Ebene Gegenstrategien entwickelt werden, um die Eindeutigkeit des präsentierten Angriffziels selbst zu unterlaufen. Damit ist die Forderung erfüllt, in philosophischen Erkenntnisprozessen auch das Nichtoffensichtliche zu sehen, wie es im Motto Matthias Claudius' über den Mond herauskommt, „Er ist nur halb zu sehen,/Und ist doch rund und schön!" (vgl. Hrachovec 2011) Das allzu glatte, zu exponierte Angriffsziel verkennt diese notwendige Kehrseite der legitimen philosophischen Rede; was als Angriffsziel gelten kann, ist in einer Weise konsensuell abgesichert, die von Wittgensteins Kritik gerade irritiert werden soll. So erklärt sich die Rolle der Ironie in den *opening sections* auch damit, ein Gleichgewicht zwischen kritischer Brechung traditioneller Auffassungen wie der des Mentalismus und jener Fortschreibung traditioneller Ansichten herzustellen, deren Merkmal es ist, Positionen und Gegenpositionen zu vereindeutigen, um sie argumentativ vertreten zu können. Erst der Einsatz ironischer Mittel stellt dieses Gleichgewicht her, d.h. zeigt, dass Wittgensteins Argumentationsweise in der Darstellung der Gegenposition Signale setzt, die die vereinfachend zuspitzende Rede konterkarieren, da sie mit einer ethischen Auffassung vom Menschen nicht vereinbar wäre, die die Relativität und Faktenbasiertheit menschlich möglicher ethischer Rede jenseits absoluter Werturteile betont. (Wittgenstein 1989, 12) In PU 1 ist auffällig, dass der Abschnitt aus heterogenen Elementen besteht, die die oben zitierte Wirkung von Ironie im Sinne von Absurdität haben; wie im absurden Theater werden Gedanken aneinandergereiht, die erst durch die Rahmung einer bestimmten Präsentationsabsicht, z.B. der philosophischen, jene Kohärenz erhalten, die sie ohne diese nicht hätten. Damit wird Ironie nicht nur auf der Ebene explizit ironischer Sprechakte nachweisbar, wie dem vieldeutigen „Es wird sich oft nützlich erweisen,

wenn wir uns beim Philosophieren sagen: Etwas benennen, das ist etwas Ähnliches, wie einem Ding ein Namentäfelchen anheften" in PU 15. Liegt hier die ironische Wirkung in der perspektivisch immer mehr zu entlarvenden Falschheit dieser von Wittgenstein selbst überwundenen Position, die er hier – zunächst – noch einmal scheinbar deskriptiv konzediert, ist die Ironie im Sinne der Wirkung des absurden Theaters Ergebnis der Anordnung heterogener Teile und ihrer zeitweiligen, als solcher erkennbaren Unterordnung unter ein Darstellungsziel. Das *target* der Augustinischen Auffassung kann umso heller leuchten, je eindeutiger es, scheinbar unverbunden mit dem Beispiel des Kaufens fünf roter Äpfel, heraussticht. Zugleich hat Wittgenstein Vorkehrungen getroffen, diese Ironie, die sich einer Anordnung in einer Abschnittfolge und innerhalb eines Abschnitts verdankt, mit jener zu ergänzen, die expliziter ist und den Leser braucht, der weiß, wie Wittgensteins scheinbar deskriptiven Sätze, die jederzeit in den Modus der *voice of temptation* (Cavell 1976) kippen können, zu verstehen hat. Ein geübter Leser wird bei erneuter Lektüre feststellen, dass eine allzu gläubige Haltung der Struktur des vielstimmigen dialogischen Geflechts der *Untersuchungen* nicht entspricht. So ist auch die Rolle des Ironischen neben ihrer inhaltlichen Bewandtnis ein Signal: auf die Eindeutigkeit scheinbar klarer Zuordnungen zu verzichten, wenn es um die Nachzeichnung von Wittgensteins Argumentationsgang geht, der immer offen ist für die abweichende Überlegung, den Nebenweg, das Doppelsinnige.

2. Die epistemische Rolle der Ironie am Anfang der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*

Wenn eine philosophische Gegenposition wie die Augustinus' über das Sprachlernen exponiert wird, ist diese von vornherein von ihrem ursprünglichen Argumentationskontext isoliert; es liegt an der Verwendung, die ein Philosoph davon macht, ob Kriterien gerechter Darstellung und des *principle of charity* hier greifen. Wenn Wittgenstein das Augustinische Bild der Sprache beschreibt, sieht er es von Anfang an „nicht als eine Beschreibung der Ontogenese der Sprache" (Fortuna 2012, 221). Damit bewegt er sich auf dem Gebiet einer Reflexion, die keinen Anspruch macht, eine Ätiologie nachzuzeichnen oder etwas über die Gewordenheit des Sprachkörpers zu sagen. Das vermittelte Bild ist vielmehr eines, das mit einer bestimmten Vorstellung der Natur des Menschen verknüpft ist, andernfalls hätte Wittgenstein sich auch auf die – für seinen Kontext – klareren Ausführungen in *De Magistro* beziehen können. (Augustinus 1998) Es geht aber gerade um die Beobachtung, dass eine bestimmte Disposition des Menschen angesprochen ist, wenn es um das Lernen von Sprache geht. Hier tritt die allgemeine Beschreibung der Sprache als Medium zurück vor der Beschreibung ihrer tatsächlichen Funktion: Es sind Menschen, die mit der Sprache umzugehen lernen und diese über den initialen Moment hinaus weiter benutzen müssen. So lässt sich auch verstehen, was Kierkegaard meinte, als er die Ironie als Bedingung der menschlichen Würde betrachtete: „Ebenso wie die Philosophie mit dem Zweifel, ebenso beginnt ein Leben, das menschenwürdig genannt werden kann, mit der Ironie." (Kierkegaard 1961, 4) Diese Gleichsetzung von Zweifel und Ironie in Bezug auf die Kategorie der Würde zeigt, dass ironisches Sprechen nicht nur der Distanzierung oder Selbstdistanzierung dient, sondern einem Erkennen. Würde bedeutet, seine Fähigkeiten nutzen zu können, sie in Kontexten anzuwenden, die durch diese Fähigkeiten mitgestaltet werden. Ohne das Element des Zweifels blieben in der philosophischen Rede starre Lehrsätze scholastischer Art; wie der Zweifel Erkenntnis dyna-

misiert und prozesshaft organisiert, ermöglicht Ironie dem Menschen, von seinen unmittelbaren kreatürlichen Bedürfnissen zurückzutreten und zu erkennen, dass Erkenntnis des abweichenden Blicks, des Bruchs der Kategorienbildung, der Einsicht in den doppelten Boden der Vernunftkultur bedarf. All dies leistet die Ironie in den *Untersuchungen*. Die Einteilung in offene Abschnitte, das gerade in der Anfangssequenz des Augustinus-Beispiels sich stellende „Wer-spricht-Problem" (v. Savigny), die Verteilung von Aussagewerten auf mehrere Stimmen stehen im Dienste einer Ironie einsetzenden Argumentation, die stets weiß, dass epistemische Ziele in der Moderne auf neue Weise angegangen werden müssen. Vor dem Hintergrund einer Ästhetisierung, d.h. der Betonung des Darstellungsaspekts philosophischer Erkenntnis und einer Aufwertung stilistischer Fragen ist auch die Rolle der Ironie zu sehen: Augustinus wird als Figur der Tradition ganz im Blick auf Wittgensteins eigenes Erkenntnisziel präsentiert und pointiert; die Reihungsstruktur des ersten Abschnitts mit dem plötzlichen Übergang zum Beispiel des Einkaufens ist dabei gewollt und hat eine philosophische Pointe: Im ironischen Bruch, der nicht erwarteten und erwartbaren Anordnung liegt eine epistemische Möglichkeit. Diese epistemische Rolle der Ironie in den *Untersuchungen* hat dabei nichts mit einem Unernst zu tun oder einem Nicht-Ernstnehmen der gewöhnlichen argumentativen Verfahrensweise in philosophischen Texten. In der Traditionslinie Kants Überlegungen zu Geschmack und Genie im zweiten Teil der *Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft* oder Schillers Überlegungen der Doppelnatur des Menschen zwischen Natur und Vernunft (vgl. Lüthe 2002) liegt eine Gewöhnung an den ambivalenten Charakter menschlicher Erkenntnisproduktion: Das, was ist, ist durch das zu begleiten, was dieses angreifen kann. PU 1 zeigt, wie Unerwartetes in der Anordnung von Wissen zu Einsichten führt, die sich einem zeitweiligen Bruch der Lesererwartungen verdanken. Die beiläufige Überleitung von den Anfangssätzen „In diesen Worten erhalten wir, so scheint es mir, ein bestimmtes Bild von dem Wesen der menschlichen Sprache..." zu „Denke nun an diese Verwendung der Sprache: Ich schicke jemand einkaufen..." (PU 1) gibt Hinweise auf folgende, in späteren Abschnitten klar werdende Kritikpunkte, die das sichere, nicht-ambivalente Sprechen nicht zulassen und damit der Ironie zuneigen: Die Verwendung der Worte „Wesen der menschlichen Sprache" spricht von etwas, das es nach Wittgensteins weiteren Ausführungen gerade nicht gibt: Schon die Ausführungen über Familienähnlichkeiten greifen die scheinbare Gewissheit der Sätze an; der Fluchtpunkt von PU 371 zeigt dann die positive Auffassung, zu der die einleitenden Sätze ironisch hinführen. So hat die Ironie schon im ersten Abschnitt der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* eine epistemische Rolle, die neben der Unentscheidbarkeit ironischer Rede auf die ethische Bewandtnis hinweist, von der Kierkegaard gesprochen hatte und die bei Wittgenstein wieder in Erinnerung gerufen wird.

3. Die ethische Funktion der Ironie

Die ironische Rede bei Wittgenstein ergibt sich aus der unerwarteten Anordnung des Heterogenen wie in PU 1 oder der Verwendung hochaufgeladener Wörter wie „primitiv" am Beginn von PU 2, die Lesegewohnheiten irritieren (vgl. Schulte 2004), ohne Erklärungen für diese Irritationen zu liefern. Diese ergeben sich im weiteren Verlauf der Abschnitte, wenn der ambivalente Charakter der Sprecherrollen andauert, sich aber konstante Themenstränge herausbilden. Der provisorische Charakter der Sprache als Erkenntnismittel, deren bedeutungsvolle Verdichtungen stets erweiterbar sind, wiederholt die provisorische Natur des

menschlichen Lebens. Eine allzu eindeutige, auf bestimmte Parameter fixierte Beschreibung der *condition humaine* verkennt diese ebenso wie die unzweideutige Bindung des menschlichen Lebenswegs an den Ernst. Dem Ernst in der philosophischen Beschreibung des menschlichen Lebens nicht das letzte Wort einzuräumen, bedeutet nicht, von jener Ernsthaftigkeit abzurücken, die Wittgenstein in Reden und Schreiben wichtig war. Die Rolle der Ironie besteht vielmehr darin, an Unvollkommenheit, Unausdeutbarkeit und Fehlbarkeit des menschlichen Lebens zu erinnern. Als Unentscheidbarkeit eines Zustands zu einem gegebenen Zeitpunkt erinnert sie daran, dass Lebenszustände wie philosophische Theorien sich in längerfristiger Perspektive entscheiden – und dass diese Entscheidungen nicht von jener ehernen Klarheit sind, die im Frühwerk denkbar zu sein schien. So hat die Ironie in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* letztlich eine anthropologische und eine werkgeschichtliche Bewandtnis: Die provisorischen Umstände des menschlichen Lebens sowie die Unmöglichkeit absoluter ethischer Werturteile binden den Menschen an die Welt der Fakten (Wittgenstein 1989, 13), ohne diese zu eigenen Entitäten zu hypostasieren. Die Faktengebundenheit des menschlichen Lebens besagt vielmehr, die Natur der Fakten in der Darstellungsweise der Sprache zu berücksichtigen. Wie die gläserne Klarheit und Exaktheit des Frühwerks die Vielstimmigkeit des menschlichen Lebens nicht spiegelte, damit nicht ironieaffin war, ermöglicht die Sprechweise der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* von ihrem Beginn an ein Welt- und Menschenbild, das durch die Einsicht in die *undecidability* menschlicher Erkenntnis geleitet wird und mit dieser ein ganz eigenes Ausdrucksprinzip verbindet, das in der Macht der Darstellungsweise die große Wende vom Was zum Dass und Wie widerspiegelt, die philosophische Rede so unausdenkbar macht, wie die historisch varianten Bedingungen ihrer Entstehung.

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"Part of the pleasure in hearing Beethoven's Ninth Symphony is hearing the Ninth Symphony" Wittgensteins *Lectures on Aesthetics* (LA)

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Abstract

In this paper I have tried to analyse how Wittgenstein deals in these lectures with the notion of aesthetics. In Wittgenstein's oeuvre aesthetics occupies a radically different place than his philosophical, logical and mathematical outlook and methods. Out of these lectures I have formulated two types of languages games: *A)* Language games with intrinsic values of autonomous works of art, and *B)* language games with cultural values that are always contextual. This is set against the notion of explaining aesthetics by scientific models such as discomfort as explained by cause and effect.

1. Aesthetics

Wittgenstein's *Lectures on Aesthetics* (LA) were given to a small group of students in private rooms in Cambridge in the summer of 1938. Drury writes in *Conversations with Wittgenstein* that during the lecture that Drury attended one of his the students was rapidly writing notes. Wittgenstein told him not to do so. "If you write these spontaneous remarks down, someday someone may publish them as my considered opinions. I don't want that done. For I am now talking freely as my ideas come, but all this will need a lot more thought and better expression." (Drury 1976, 141) I will suggest in this paper however some connections for a better appreciation of these lectures, as in many ways they can be fitted in with his ideas expressed in other sources that are mainly in the Nachlass.

In his *Lectures on Aesthetics* we can retrace two main topics. The first is what Wittgenstein himself is hinting at when he tries to make his own ideas about aesthetics explicit, although the field he intends to cover is very large and extremely complex and most of his remarks in these lectures are very cryptic and difficult to interpret. The second topic is that what he presents to us as a kind of counter-example to his own views. These can be reduced to three paradigmatic models (1) the physical, mechanical or causal model, (2) juridical models based on principles and regulations established in a community by some authority, (3) the psychological model, and especially experimental psychology. All are meant to breakdown the idea of causality into the ways we experience and explain art works or the ways we understand and express these experiences. His basic claim is what he said in the first sentence of his first lecture: that "The subject (Aesthetics) is very big and entirely misunderstood as far as I can see." (I.1) The main reason for this is I think that exclusive aesthetical language games have not been developed by Wittgenstein himself nor by his interpreters.

Aesthetics is generally defined as the appreciation or attitude towards the beautiful. It is this understanding that Wittgenstein links up with his views on ethics, which he already had expressed in the *Tractatus*: that the beautiful and the good are one and the same (6.421). The same view he expressed again in his *Lecture on Ethics*: statements of ethical values about what is good can also mostly be applied to aesthetical values, or what is good can also be called beautiful. The understanding of these values can only be 'shown' as there are no ethical or aesthetical propositions. This view was again stated in his lectures in

the period 1930-33 as recorded by Moore: "Practically everything which I say about 'beautiful' applies in a slightly different way to 'good' " and "The question of Aesthetics, he said was not: 'Do you like this?' but 'Why do you like it?'" (MWL, 103) This comes out even more clearly when we read the notes that Moore directly recorded in the same period: "So when one asks: What words will go with this melody? What kind of activity is this? Surely not of psychological investigations. It is more like that of a painter, who is making psychological experiments with himself." (MWN, 190)

If we want to follow Wittgenstein's understanding of how the subject aesthetics should be dealt with we have, to my mind, to distinguish from the start sharply between, on the one hand, Wittgenstein as a philosopher of language, logic, mathematics and psychology and, on the other, Wittgenstein as a philosopher of culture, which includes his general remarks on culture, his remarks that are in a more aphoristic style and/or have a personal nature, and his remarks on aesthetics. Some of these remarks have been published in the collection: *Culture and Value* (CV). But here we have to so to speak take out his remarks on aesthetics, as here he is trying to express his long time intense involvement with the nature of art, especially in his remarks on music. The distinction between Wittgenstein as a cultural philosopher and as a philosopher of aesthetics is not made in CV, as there for instance his remarks about music are ordered chronologically, despite their having, once we have discovered how to deal with them, a systematic kind of approach; thus they should be dealt with in a methodological investigation as for instance why: "Aesthetics seeks for grounds and not causes." (Ms 156a 56/4)

2. Aesthetics and experiences

In the first lecture Wittgenstein attacks the notion of identity of qualities as in: 'is beautiful' when this 'is' refers to a property and does so 'as if' there is a property that is beautiful.

> We are concentrating, not on the words 'good' or 'beautiful', which are entirely uncharacteristic, generally just subject and predicate ('This is beautiful'), but on the occasions on which they are said – on the enormously complicated situation in which the aesthetic expression has a place, in which the expression itself has almost a negligible place. (I.5)

The subject with which aesthetics should in the primary or primitive sense deal is the active and not passive sense of our language games that we play with values, such as when children learn to paint or play an instrument. Then "We do not start from certain words, but from certain occasions or activities." (I.6). Or the use of 'this is lovely' has never the same order as these activities. "Here is the point of Behaviourism. It isn't that they deny there are feelings. But they say our description of behaviour *is* our description of feelings." (IV, 7) Or behaviour is not identical with the descriptions of our feelings.

3. Correct and incorrect

From the examples Wittgenstein gives with the uses of 'correct' and 'incorrect' we can formulate two criteria: 1) how their rules should be played according to models themselves; that is, in the technical or professional sense, and 2) by our appreciation and understanding. This he illustrates by examples that cover the applied arts, such as a tailor who knows and has learned after models with fixed rules how to make a suit; he has to have, in order to be able to do this, a proto-type of his craft in his mind, after which he makes suits for his clients. These proto-types he must have mastered before he can actually make a suit that fits his client perfectly, during this measuring we can hear expression like: "That's the right length", "That's too narrow" and even: "A good cutter may not use any words at all, but just make a chalk mark and later alter it." (I.13). Here the rules are internal and the products are to be considered as applied art, as in the relations between fashion and taste, in contrast to the art of music here we cannot apply our taste in the same way as we like our teapot or wear our clothes we like to wear.

When we come to the fine arts such as the art of music, we can distinguish between: how we learn and how we have learned these rules, when we are a professional musician we have been drilled in the art of harmony and counterpoint (I.15). As listeners we have to develop our own conceptions of these rules in order to be able to make judgments: "[I]f I hadn't learnt the rules, I wouldn't be able to make the aesthetic judgement." (I.15) We learn these rules when we are confronted with particular kinds of aesthetical visible or audible impressions that, when we are still children, our parents call 'art', and it is only in a gradual manner that we are able to react to them in the right way, and that in time this process leads to appreciation and understanding. When we make an aesthetic judgement about a thing we do not just gape or express ourselves only by primitive reactions like: "Oh! How marvellous!", "We distinguish between a person who knows what he is talking about and a person who doesn't", or "He must react in a consistent way over a long period. Must know all sorts of things." (I.17) Our language of appreciation must start in our internal understanding since we cannot use the word correctly externally before we can understand the music. Therefore, "[w]hen we talk of a Symphony of Beethoven we don't talk of correctness." (I.23) It is just this process that leads to understanding that also can be reconstructed by the process of learning specific language games like that of learning to identify a style. Our aesthetical reconstructive explanations cover always different types of art works that is different types of language games. As the understanding of a piece of music, like the "Pastoral" of Beethoven, is entirely different from when we are confronted with a Gothic cathedral that "plays an entirely different role with us." (I.23)

4. Cause and effect

Wittgenstein rejected the science of Aesthetics as too ridiculous for words (II.1/2). "An aesthetic explanation is not a causal explanation."(II.38) When we try to explain our original aesthetic experiences by scientific models as by cause and effect, we use models as for instance the paradigm of a mechanism, but our experiences themselves are not paradigmatic, our soul is not a mechanism (IV, 1). When we would try to explain why the height of the door makes us ill at ease, or when we feel its height should lower or higher, each time when we look at it we get irritated. Then we confuse an external with an internal type of explanation, in the case of aesthetics the correction of the height of a door starts with having knowledge of rules of proportions or the ways it can and cannot fit into a specific style. The criteria for art works lie in the art/technique and not in our personal feelings (II.20). Or how could we by mechanical models find a cause of what is wrong with this piece of music? Even when the music is mechanical the music cannot be mechanized, as music as a phenomenon of understanding music cannot be mechanized. "What kind of proposition is this: This must be played in this tempo. Or: this theme (9th Symphony) does not belong to the secretive but has clarity it has its greatness by its clarity. What are the reasons and what speaks for itself? And what is called: Yes, now I understand that is how it should be." (Ms 156a/54r). But how do we explain our perplexities that consist only of our own peculiar feelings when we look at this or that painted portrait, and not what we actually see? When we see different faces or different painted portraits of the same face and we compare we can exclaim: "It looks different, somehow." And: "This is enormously important for all philosophy." (IV.4)

5. From perplexity to appreciation and understanding

Aesthetical judgement has appreciation and/or understanding as its nature and these are also the criteria by which we have to reconstruct them. But our appreciation and understanding of art works is always directed at how these experiences enter our lives. When we are actually listening to music or perceiving art works - there is a subjectless concentration, as how otherwise would we come to that appreciation and understanding we have and can have of each individual work of art? The most difficult issue is in fact when we try to reconstruct Wittgenstein's understanding of the nature of aesthetics is how to bring these subjectless dimensions into language games, since: "A work of art does not aim to convey *something else*, just itself." (CV, 58) The notion of understanding and appreciation Wittgenstein should be understood as using aesthetics in, on the one hand, in a highly individual sense and, on the other, in a general or cultural sense, since paintings are also part of our history. In the individual sense understanding and appreciation is when a musical piece is understood, it is so to speak one whole with that person, which Wittgenstein formulated as: "For me the musical phase is a gesture. It insinuates itself into my life. I adopt it as my own." (CV, 73) When we are confronted with works of art, especially those works that have had already from the start a strong impression on us, we are then at first puzzled, perplexed even bewildered at the visual space we see. "Aesthetic puzzles – puzzles about the effects the arts have on us." (IV.1)

6. Language games

Out of these lectures I have formulated two types of language games. A) Language games with intrinsic values of autonomous works of art. These language games start in a passive sense with an onlooker or a listener experiencing a particular work of art that he can gradually organize and recollect and in this sense can become that what Wittgenstein calls a perspicuous or "surveyable representation". (PI 122) These experiences stand always in rule-type relations of learning to master the grammar of an aesthetical space. We first after a strong impressions or an imprint of art works these will produce internal proto-types in our minds that will cover the grammar of our basic understanding. These internal proto-types of art works can cover individual art works, but can also be taken when we have formed proto-types of a style by Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance, as in the case of Baroques paintings or paintings within the style of the Brueghel dynasty. When we are in the present directly confronted with these paintings themselves, as for instance with Rembrandt's Night Watch, then our proto-type retreats to the background as we organize the painting through our actual perceptions and are able also to see the details within that so organized whole. These language games should always be limited by autonomous works of art and have as a starting point original works. As our aesthetical experiences as such cannot be paradigmatic or hypothetical. A striking model in this process of understanding music is a conductor at work with an orchestra and to see the methods by which he manages that work and finally conducts one piece of music as one within the different parts in harmony with it. B) Language games with cultural values that we have integrated and form part of our forms of life and can as such not be pinned down. These language games exist without boundaries, and their practices can only be described by an understanding that is rooted in cultural upbringing and are always contextual. "The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from this can more complicated forms develop" (CV, 31). In the end "Aesthetics teaches us to get to know a system, she teaches us to see a system" (Ms 156a 55/2). These two types of language games, A and B, prevent us from going too easily over to notions such as 'seeing as,' which is a topic in the philosophy of psychology and not primarily in aesthetics, since 'seeing as' is an open concept and can be applied to many types of our perceptions. A) Aesthetic perceptions are always closed off from the outside and are from the inside an organic whole, as otherwise it could not keep its qualities. B) "What belongs to a language game is a whole culture." (I.26) But can we describe a whole culture? If we would attempt to describe a musical taste, we would have to describe a tradition (I.26). "It is not only difficult to describe what appreciation consists in, but impossible. To describe what it consist in we would have to describe the whole environment." (I.20) This certainly was not Wittgenstein's own intentions but rather: "I draw your attention to differences and say: 'Look how different these differences are!' - 'Look what is in common to the different cases', 'Look what is common to Aesthetic judgements'. An immensely complicated family of cases is left, with the highlight – the expression of admiration, a smile or a gesture, etc."(I.32)

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Wittgenstein – Aljoscha. Österreichische literarisch-philosophische Reflexionen auf Dostojewskij und Tolstoj

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Abstract

Die russische Literatur, beginnend bei Turgenjew, erfuhr in Österreich in den 70er-Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts eine starke Rezeption, welche im Weiteren dann Dostojewskij und Tolstoj mit einbezog. Bedeutende Erscheinungen der österreichischen Literatur wie Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach waren vor allem von Ethos und Moralität dieser Schriftsteller beeindruckt. Ebner-Eschenbach – für Wittgenstein eine Vorbildfigur – wurde eine Leitfigur einer ethisch ausgerichteten Kunst. Zumal sie, aber auch Karl Kraus schufen ein Klima, in welches Wittgenstein gleichsam hineingeboren wurde, so dass seine Beschäftigung mit Tolstoj und Dostojewskij durchaus auch hier eine Grundlage hat.

In seiner Erzählung „Der arme Spielmann" – erschienen 1848 – schildert Franz Grillparzer eine Persönlichkeit, welche nach Einschätzung der Gesellschaft als völlig gescheiterte Existenz anzusehen ist. In der Tat hat dieser Bettelmusikant – wiewohl durch die falsche Erziehung und den Starrsinn seines Vaters – sein Leben in bitterster Not vollbracht. Er hat allerdings dabei weder seine ethischen noch seine ästhetischen Überzeugungen preisgegeben.

Grillparzer zeigt an dieser Figur, dass – im Gegensatz etwa zur platonischen Tradition und der auf dieser fußenden Anschauung Schillers – das Schöne und das Gute keineswegs eine untrennbare Einheit bilden. Der arme Spielmann ist bei aller Fadenscheinigkeit seines Äußeren – seiner Umgebung, ja sogar seiner ans Lächerlichen grenzenden musikalischen Bemühungen ein schlechthin guter Mensch, welcher am Ende durch menschliches Handeln bei einer Überschwemmung seinen Tod findet. In dieser Gestalt äußert sich „in subtiler Weise eschatologische Hoffnung ausgedrückt, wobei sich ein spezifisch österreichisch geprägtes religiöses Denken mit all seinem Hoffnungspotential offenbart" (vgl. JL Mayer 2011, 193).

Franz Grillparzer gehört für Ludwig Wittgenstein gemeinsam mit Lenau, Bruckner und Labor zu Exponenten des „guten Österreichischen". Dieses „ist besonders schwer zu verstehen. Es ist in gewissem Sinne *subtiler* als alles andere, und seine Wahrheit ist nie auf Seiten der Wahrscheinlichkeit." (VB 454)

Bei der Gelegenheit ist auf eine gleichsam biographisch-anekdotische Gegebenheit, welche auf ihre Weise Nähe zum Ausdruck bringt, hinzuweisen: Grillparzer wohnte während seines Aufenthaltes in Puchberg am Schneeberg im Gasthof „Zur blauen Traube". Ab 1870 hieß diese Lokalität dann „Zum schwarzen Adler", wo später der Volksschullehrer Ludwig Wittgenstein seine Mahlzeithen einnahm Die „Grillparzer-Stube" ist aktuell ein Gastraum, auf dessen Bedeutung die Wirtsleute heute noch gerne hinweisen und sie erzählen auch aus der Überlieferung, dass Lehrer Wittgenstein meistens zwei verschieden Suppen hintereinander gegessen hat.

Franz Grillparzer spielte auch für die Dichterin Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach eine herausragende Rolle in der Art eines väterlichen Freundes und Lehrers. Sie gehörte als Literatin aber ebenso zu einem österreichischen Kreis von Pionieren, welche sich intensiv mit aktueller russischer Literatur auseinander setzten. Vor allem der soziale Blick von Iwan Sergejewitsch Turgenjew übte auf sie, aber gleichermaßen auf Ferdinand von Saar und erstaunlicherweise auf Leopold von Sacher-Masoch – auf ihn geht der

Begriff „Masochismus" zurück – einen entscheidenden Einfluss aus. Zudem war Turgenjew auch in der österreichischen Presse immer wieder ein Thema (Zeman 2014, 530-537).

In der Folge traten auch andere russische Literaten in das Blickfeld österreichischer Dichter. Zumal Anton Pawlowič Čechow erregte fürs Erste großes Interesse, etwa bei Arthur Schnitzler, Peter Altenberg und Karl Kraus. 1900 übersetzte Rainer Maria Rilke „Die Möwe" ins Deutsche (Fedjaewa 2009 , 215).

Hugo von Hofmannsthal hatte bereits als Gymnasiast ein Großteil der neueren russischen Literatur gelesen – inklusive Dostojewskij und Tolstoij. In seiner Erzählung „Die Wege und die Begegnungen" (1907) formulierte er:

> Wenn einer […] die Wege der Figuren Dostojewskis [vor sich hinzeichnen würde], die doch nur von einer Wohnung in eine andere führen, oder aus einem Keller auf einen öden Platz, hinter einen Schuppen, an eine traurige Feuermauer oder dergleichen. Denn ein ganz gewöhnliches Wohnzimmer, ein verwahrloster Schuppen oder eine abbröckelnde Mauer können ebensogut die endgültigen Wendepunkte eines Weges sein wie die Tore von Jerusalem oder die Gestade des Indus. Und das Zurückkehren des Raskolnikow in das Miethaus, in die Wohnung, wo er die Pfandleiherin erwürgt hat, ist nicht weniger ein Moment des Schicksals als das Heranschreiten von Hamlets Vaters Geist auf der Terrasse von Helsingör. Es ist nur sonderbar, dass alles immerfort auf dem Weg ist. (Hofmannsthal 1979, 159).

Hofmannsthals Bezugnahme auf Dostojewskijs Romanfigur ist insofern bemerkenswert, als ihm unter anderem von Karl Kraus ethische Indifferenz vorgeworfen worden war (Zeman 2014, 601f.).

Die im Hause Wittgenstein hochgeschätzte Ebner-Eschenbach (vgl. Wittgenstein 2000, 38f.) wusste demgegenüber aus den Lehren Grillparzers und ihren Erfahrungen mit Turgenjew Konsequenzen für ihre künstlerische Tätigkeit und ihr sich darin ausdrückendes Denken zu ziehen. So heißt es beispielsweise in ihren „Aphorismen":

> Aus dem Mitleid mit anderen erwächst die feurige, die mutige Barmherzigkeit; aus dem Mitleid mit uns selbst die weichliche, feige Sentimentalität. […]
> Die Kunst ist im Niedergang begriffen, die sich von der Darstellung der Leidenschaft zu der des Lasters wendet. […]

Der Geist einer Sprache offenbart sich am deutlichsten in ihren unübersetzbaren Worten. […]
(Ebner-Eschenbach 1953, 406-410)

Hier ist Zweierlei anzumerken:

1.) Ebner-Eschenbach stammte aus einem alten tschechisch mährischen Adelsgeschlecht und hatte von ihrer Kinderfrau schon als Kleinkind Tschechisch gelernt welches sie ebensogut wie Deutsch und Französisch beherrschte (vgl. A. Mayer 2006, 34-88).

2.) Ebner-Eschenbachs Aphorismen waren schon zu ihrer Zeit sehr populär und können in ihrer stilistischen Bedeutung für Wittgensteins aphoristisches Formulieren als Vorbild nicht unterschätzt werden.

In dem bisher Dargestellten wird eine Atmosphäre fassbar, welche das literarisch-geistige Leben Österreichs in den letzten Jahrzehnten des Kaiserstaates mit prägte. Die Bezugnahme zu den ethischen Forderungen, wie sie in den Werken der genannten russischen Dichter aufgestellt werden, stehen dabei durchaus im Gegensatz zur Amoralität, ja Unmoralität mancher österreichischer Kunstrichtungen. Hier wäre beispielsweise auf die banalen Frivolitäten der Operetten hinzuweisen (vgl. JL Mayer 2015). Mag auch die Rezeption des Ethos aus der russischen Literatur gegen die Popularität des unterhaltenden Musikdramas marginal gewesen sein, so war sie dennoch von großer Intensität. So wurden beispielsweise die Werke Tolstojs in den österreichischen Stiftsgymnasien bzw. -internaten gelesen, welche für die katholische Intelligenz des Österreichischen Kaiserstaates von allergrößter Bedeutung waren. Wenn Ludwig von Ficker in der „ergreifende[n]" Gestalt Wittgensteins Aljoscha, den heiligen Bruder der unheiligen Brüder Karamasow in Dostoijewskijs Bekenntnisroman sieht, so erweist er sich dieser kulturellen Sphäre Österreichs zugehörig (Ficker 1967, 199ff.). Zurecht betont die russische Philosophin Tatjana Fedjaewa, dass Dostojewskij einer der Schlüsselfiguren, für Ficker und seine Zeitschrift „Brenner" sowie den Kreis der dort Mitarbeitenden war (Fedjaewa 2009, 149). Einen späten Höhepunkt erlebt diese Atmosphäre in Heimito von Doderers mit Absicht so benannten Roman *Die Dämonen* (1956), hinsichtlich des Titels und formaler Konzeptionen mit Parallelen zu Dostojewsijs im Deutschen gleichnamigen Roman. Doderer spricht den Russen an als „heiliger Fjodor Michailowitsch" (Löffler 2000, 128f).

Wie schon vorher bemerkt, macht Grillparzer in seinem „Armen Spielmann" das Gute nicht mehr von einer gleichzeitigen Vorhandenheit des Schönen abhängig. Ähnliches vollzieht sich in der russischen Literatur bei Aleksandr Sergejewič Puškin. Die zerstörende doppeldeutige Kraft des Schönen, dass die Menschen vom Guten ablenkt führt soweit, dass etwa Nicolaj Wasiljewč Gogol die Einheit von Schönheit und Gutheit als tragischen Irrtum der Menschen erkennt (vgl. Fedjaewa 2009, 129). Tolstoij und Dostojeweskij ziehen daraus eine logische Konsequenz für ihr Denken und Schreiben:

Ethische Kunst und ethische Philosophie sind nur auf der Grundlage der Religion möglich. Daraus ergab sich die Suche nach den entsprechenden Sprachkonzepten und poetologischen Prinzipien, wenn die reale Welt, das reale Menschenleben als mystische Einheit empfunden und beschrieben wurden, wenn das Wahrnehmen der Materialität des Nichtmateriellen und umgekehrt aufs höchste entwickelt war. (Fedjaewa, 2009, 129)

Zumal bei der Lektüre des Neuen Testaments scheint Wittgenstein auf unterschiedliche poetologische Prinzipien gestoßen zu sein. So schreibt er:

Die Quelle, die in den Evangelien ruhig und durchsichtig fließt, scheint in den Briefen des Paulus zu *schäumen*. Oder , so scheint es *mir*. […] Aber *mir* ist es, als sähe ich hier menschliche Leidenschaft, etwas wie Stolz oder Zorn, was sich nicht mit der Demut der *Evangelien* reimt. Als wäre hier *doch* ein Betonen der eigenen Person, *und zwar als religiöser Akt*, was dem Evangelium fremd ist. Ich möchte fragen – und möge dies keine Blasphemie sein –: ‚Was hätte wohl Christus zu Paulus gesagt?'" (VB 492)

Es ist durchaus folgerichtig, dass Wittgenstein, philosophisch vom späten Tolstoj beeinflusst, dem literarischen Spätwerk dieses Dichters fremd gegenüberstand.

Ich habe einmal versucht, *Auferstehung* zu lesen, habe es aber nicht fertiggebracht. […] [W]enn Tolstoi einfach eine Geschichte erzählt, macht er auf mich unendlich mehr Eindruck als wenn er sich an den Leser wendet. Wenn er dem Leser den Rücken kehrt, schein er mir am *aller*eindrucksfolgsten. […] Seine Philosophie scheint mir durchaus wahr, wenn sie in der Erzählung verborgen ist." (Malcolm 1987, 157)

Das Zurücktreten des Dichter-Ichs zeigt sich bei Dostojewskij ganz deutlich ausgesprochen etwa im Roman *Der Idiot*, wo der Schriftsteller nach dem skandalösen Höhepunkt dessen Folgen in dem Gefühl zu beschreiben beabsichtige, „daß wir uns auf die einfache Darlegung der Tatsachen beschränken müssen, möglichst ohne alle besonderen Erklärungen, und dies aus einem sehr einfachen Grunde: weil wir in vielen Fällen selbst nicht recht wissen, wie wir das Geschehene erklären sollen.". Etwas später heißt es dann, gleichsam als Betonung eines Standpunktes: „Indem wir nun alle diese Tatsachen anführen und doch es ablehnen, sie zu erklären [...]." (Dostojewskij 1980, 705ff.)

Tolstoj nimmt einen solchen zurückgenommenen Dichterstandpunkt zumal in seinen Volkserzählungen ein, welche Wittgenstein beeindruckten. So schrieb er beispielsweise 1912 an Russell: „Ich habe gerade ‚Hadschi Murat' von Tolstoi gelesen! Haben Sie's je gelesen? Falls nicht, dann sollten Sie es tun, denn es ist wundervoll." (Briefe, 23)

Ähnliche poetologische Prinzipien hinsichtlich des Zurücktretens des Dichter-Ichs haben auch die großen Romane Dostojewskijs aufzuweisen, zumal *Die Brüder Karamsow*.

Sowohl Tolstoj, als auch Dostojewskij haben in diesen Werken dichterische Gestalten der geistig-religiösen Ideen geschaffen. Der Autor blieb dabei verborgen, die Erzählweise präsentierte sich mehr als ein Zeigen, denn als eine Beschreibung vom Autorenstand. Das Wort trug in diesem Fall darstellende, nicht beurteilende Funktionen." (Fedjaewa 2009, 129)

Durch das Zeigen mit Hilfe der darstellenden Funktion des Wortes löst Dostojewskij scheinbar eindeutig definierte Begriffe aus dieser eben nur scheinbaren Eindeutigkeit heraus. In seinem Roman *Der Idiot* lässt er Aglaja Iwanowna Jepančina zum „Idioten" Fürst Lej Nikolajewič Myškin, einer aljoschagleichen Person, sagen: „Was Sie sagen, ist nichts als Wahrheit und schon deshalb ist es ungerecht." Dieser Aussage stimmt Fürst Myškin mit der Zusatzbemerkung zu: „Das werde ich mir merken und darüber noch nachdenken." (Dostojewiskij 1980, 656)

162

Auch wenn Gott durch seinen menschgewordenen Sohn Jesus sagen lässt: „Ich bin der Weg, die Wahrheit und das Leben" (Joh. 14, 6) und Gott sich als höchste personifizierte Gerechtigkeit offenbart, so verwahrt sich der gläubige Christ Dostojewskij hier doch ganz eindeutig gegen eine bloß dem Dogma vertrauende Sicht und er zeigt seinen Lesenden damit ganz neue inhaltliche Aspekte der Begriffe „Wahrheit" und „Gerechtigkeit".

Diese menschliche Sicht auf göttliche Gebote und Wahrheiten macht Dostojewskij für Wittgenstein zu einem sogar andere große Menschen überragenden Mann.

Der Reine hat eine Härte die schwer zu ertragen ist. Darum nimmt man die Ermahnungen eines Dostojewski leichter an, als eines Kierkegaard. Der eine druckt noch, während der andere schon schneidet. […] Darum vernichtet Eitelkeit den Wert der Arbeit. So ist die Arbeit des Kraus, z.B., zur ‚klingenden Schelle' geworden (Kraus war ein, ausserordentlich begabter, Satzarchitekt.) (Wittgenstein 2000, 91)

Das Pauluszitat von der „klingenden Schelle" (1. Kor., 13) wirkt hier umso drastischer, da Wittgenstein gerade bei Paulus die Gefährdung durch Eitelkeit erkannte. Ganz anders ist die menschliche Sicht der Liebe bei Dostojewskij, zumal sie sich um das Verständnis der Liebesfähigkeit des Einzelnen kümmert. Im Roman *Der Idiot* stellt er demnach auch die Frage: „kann man aber alle lieben, alle Menschen, alle seine Nächsten? Ich habe oft diese Frage an mich gestellt. Gewiß nicht, und das ist sogar ganz natürlich. In der abstrakten Liebe zur Menschheit liebt man fast immer nur sich selbst." (Dostojewskij 1980, 695)

Es ist durchaus des Nachdenkens wert, ob Wittgenstein für diese Überlegungen Dostojewskijs durch die zu Beginn heraufbeschworene geistig literarische Atmosphäre in Österreich gleichsam von Jugend auf vorbereitet worden ist. So lässt Franz Grillparzer als Vertreter des wittgenstein'schen „guten Österreichischen" in seiner spezifischen österreichischen Religiosität und Frömmigkeit die mythische Tschechenfürstin Libussa ihren Gedanken zur Liebe folgenden Lauf:

Die Liebe, die nicht das Bedürfnis liebt,
Die selbst Bedürfnis ist, holdselge Liebe;
Im Drang der Kraft Bewußtsein eigner Ohnmacht;
Begeisterung, schon durch sich selbst verbürgt,
Die wahr ist, weil es wahr ist, dass ich fühle.
(Grillparzer 1981, 902)

Und ebenso aus der Perspektive ihres eigenen Menschenverständnisses, welches gleichermaßen ein Verständnis ihrer selbst einschließt, und ihrer Menschenkenntnis legt sie ihre Gedanken zum Recht dar:

Von allen Worten, die die Sprache nennt,
Ist keins mir so verhaßt als das vom Recht.
Ist es dein Recht, wenn Frucht dein Acker trägt,
Wenn du nicht hinfällst tot zu dieser Frist,
Ist es dein Recht auf Leben und auf Atem?
Ich sehe überall Gnade, Wohltat nur.
(Grillparzer 1981, 853)

Hier wie dort wird ein verallgemeinernder Begriff von Liebe und Recht in Frage gestellt. Denn nicht das Allgemeine kann das Wesen eines dieser Begriffe ausmachen, sondern nur die Art und Weise wie der Mensch als Einzelner und im Einzelnen diesen Begriffen Inhalt gibt, indem er sie lebt. Aber auch damit ist noch keineswegs eine Qualität im religiösen oder moralischen Sinne gewährleistet. Die Frage, wer denn „ein Recht hat" stellt Dostojewskij einfühl-

sam und nachhaltig in seinen Romanen *Der Idiot* und *Schuld und Sühne*. Franz Grillparzer gibt darauf eine drastische Antwort in seinem Schauspiel *Ein Bruderzwist in Habsburg*, wo es heißt:

Denn selbst der Bösewicht will nur für sich
Als einzeln ausgenommen sein von Recht,
Die andern wünscht er vom Gesetz gebunden,
Damit vor Räuberhand bewahrt sein Raub.
(Grillparzer 1981, 982)

Der tiefe Blick, den Dostoijewskij und Grillparzer in das menschliche Herz gewähren, stellt eben dieses menschliche Herz in den Mittelpunkt, an welchen sich Definitionen zu bewähren und zu bewahrheiten haben. Da sie nicht von Haus aus verallgemeinerbar sind, sondern ihr Maß ein menschliches sein muss, mag es wohl oft so sein, dass, wie es Wittgenstein sagt, ihre Wahrheit nur selten auf der Seite der Wahrscheinlichkeit ist. Denn, eine solche Wahrheit kann keine dogmatische sein, so wie Grillparzers österreichischer Katholizismus ohne Dogmatik das Sittengesetz bejaht. Aufgrund dessen erkennt der Literaturhistoriker Raoul Aurenhammer eine bedenkenswerte Parallele zwischen Dostojewskijs „Idiot" und „Bancban" aus Grillparzers *Ein treuer Diener seines Herrn* (Auernheimer 1972, 177, 277).

Wittgensteins Hauptentdeckung, die er durch die Bekanntschaft mit Tolstojs und Dostojewskijs Werken gemacht hat, ist anscheinend das Verständnis des Gotteswortes als Bereich der Freiheit, nicht als Bereich der eindeutigen Dogmen (Fedjaewa 2009, 198).

So mag es denn sein, dass „das gute Österreichische" in seiner Dogmenfreiheit und seiner unwahrscheinlichen, aber doch wahren Wahrheit Wittgenstein folgerichtig in seinem Denken und Fühlen das Tor zu den großen Gedanken Dostoijewskijs und Tolstois geöffnet hat.

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Ästhetik als Werkzeug des Inhaltes – eine kulturgeschichtliche Betrachtung

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Abstract

War zuerst ein Inhalt, der geformt werden wollte, oder ist Ästhetik ein unabhängiges Bedürfnis? Anhand von weit auseinanderliegenden Epochen – die Urnenfelderkultur und das 19. Jahrhundert – sollen Denk- und Handlungsmöglichkeiten beschrieben und überdacht werden.

„So standen die Bilder in dem grünen Saale,- es änderten sich die Farben derselben, wie es ihre Natur ist, und Staub fiel darauf […]. Jetzt werden sie immer noch aus Liebe zu den Personen gereinigt, einstens werden sie aus Liebe zu den Bildern gereinigt werden." (Stifter 2009, 1103)

Was Adalbert Stifter mit diesen Sätzen in seiner Erzählung „Prokopus" anspricht, das hat ihn gleichermaßen als Schriftsteller wie als Kulturverantwortlichen beschäftigt: Was geschieht, wenn Betrachtende einem Werk gegenüber zu keiner anderen Betrachtung mehr fähig sind als jener, darin „Kunst" wahrzunehmen? Stifter als Retter des spätgotischen Altares von Kefermarkt/Oberösterreich, aber ebenso als Verfasser historischer Romane hat diese Frage aus dem Vertrauen auf seine Kenntnis der Dinge und wie diese per traditionem ihre Eigenart behalten haben eindeutig und auf die Nachfolgenden weiterwirkend zu beantworten versucht. Sein Bestreben hat nichts mit romantisch-vordergründigem Historismus zu tun, sondern vielmehr mit der Wahrnahme, dass – nicht zuletzt durch den Historismus – allmählich Stil vor Inhalt ging. Künstlergruppen wie die „Nazarener" in der religiösen Malerei oder die „Caecilianer" in der Kirchenmusik beanspruchten durch die von ihnen geprägten historisierenden Stile eine Vormachtstellung in der katholischen Kunst. Dies deshalb, weil sie ihren Stil als nachhaltig „gereinigt" definierten und demnach als „rein" ansahen. Diese „Reinheit" sollte als unverzichtbarer Bestand der Kunst die „Reinheit" der Darstellung religiöser Motive garantieren. So wurde ein Stil absolut gesetzt, sodass sich die „Caecilianer" nicht scheuten, eine Dissonanz in einer Motette Bruckners zu zensurieren, die doch eine wichtige inhaltliche Funktion hat, diesem Stil aber zuwiderlief.

Hier zeigt sich, dass im 19. Jahrhundert einer Außenschicht Erkenntnisfunktion zukam, von wo aus Inneres erlebt werden konnte, aber nicht musste, weil durch „Reinheit" des Außenstiles per se „Richtigkeit" hinsichtlich der vertonten Texte hörbar wurde, was absolut genügte.

Stifter dahingegen wusste: Kunst geht in früheren Zeiten „noch im Leben auf. Sie ist als angewandte Kunst einer Lebensform dienstbar" (vgl. Huizinga 1975, 359f). Dies beinhaltet, dass Stil nur als „Anwendung" betrachtet wurde. Verdeutlicht er den Inhalt, dann – und nur dann – erfüllt er seine Aufgabe. Frömmigkeitsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zeigen, dass schriftunkundige Gläubige über Jahrhunderte die für sie bedeutsamen Geschehnisse und Gestalten – Bibelszenen und Heilige – im Bild erkannten. Dies hängt mit der „Angewandtheit" zusammen, die „Erkennbarkeiten" als Zentrum eines Werkes dem Stil überordnet.

So ist eine Frau mit Buch und einem jungen Mädchen zur Seite stets als Heilige Anna zu erkennen. Derart ge-

schieht Wahrnahme von Realität und Symbolgehalt als Gleichzeitiges (vgl. Brunner 2012, 109). Dies, weil „Rituale und Symbole nicht zum Schein, sondern wirklich angewandt wurden und für eine Wirklichkeit standen" (Wolfram 2000, 210). Demgemäß erschienen diesen Menschen folgerichtig bildlich dargestellte Wesen „so, als ob sie lebten" (Brunner w.o.).

Es ist zu bedenken, dass künstlerisches Handeln von der Antike bis ins ausgehende Mittelalter als Handwerk angesehen wurde – mit Ausnahme der Musik in deren Theorie, welche als eine der septem artes liberales beispielsweise der Arithmetik gleichgestellt war und als Wissenschaft galt. Demnach gibt es die musiktheoretischen Werke des Augustinus, welche um Fragen nach dem Wesen der Tonkunst kreisen, aus denen sich Anhaltspunkte für Ausführende ergeben, zumal solche hinsichtlich der Angemessenheit. Diese ist kein ästhetisch-stilistisches Konzept, sondern ein solches des Verständlichmachens – soll heißen: der Ermöglichung gleichzeitiger Wahrnahme von Realität und Symbolgehalt. Das schließt großartige künstlerisch-ästhetische und philophisch-theologische Konzepte keineswegs aus, wie es am Verduner Altar in Klosterneuburg/Niederösterreich von 1181 zu erkennen ist. Dessen Konzepte dienten der Realisierung einer biblia pauperum, deren Bilder Schriftunkundige belehren sollten. Da dies gelang, war das Konzept aufgegangen. Die Glaubenstatsachen bildeten hier als res prius factae für die Angewandtheit jene Grundlage, auf welcher ästhetische und theologische Konzeptionen aufzubauen hatten, wollte das Kunst-Handwerk Inhalt und somit Sinn haben.

Die nämlichen res prius factae bestimmen auch die Hinterglasbilder, gemalt von einer anonymen österreichischen Bäuerin, welche die Namenheiligen ihrer Lieben für den Herrgottswinkel, den familial-liturgischen und -kultischen Raum in der Stube malt – im Stile der „Naiven" oder einer „art brut", wie die Kunstgeschichte sie heute stilistisch zuordnen könnte. Mag dies vielleicht schlechte Kunst sein etwa bezüglich Handwerksbeherrschung – im Sinne der Verstehbarkeit ist es dennoch sinnvolle und somit gute angewandte Kunst, weil beispielsweise die Attribute der jeweiligen Heiligen deutlich erkennbar sind und damit eine Wahrnahme von Realität und Symbolgehalt in einem ermöglicht wird. Dies ist Absicht jenes Kunst-Handwerkes, weil damit der Bezug zur dargestellten heiligen Person ermöglicht wird, jedoch selbstredend nur solange, als die res prius factae gekannt und somit erkannt werden. Bei den geistigen wie handwerklichen Konzepten in Klosterneuburg wie bei der malenden Bäuerin liegt – mit Ferdinand Ebner gesprochen – noch kein geistiges Befangensein im Ästhetischen vor, welches Ursache einer Verwechslung des ästhetischen Moments mit dem religiösen verursachen würde. Aber „nur im religiösen hat der

Mensch sein wahres geistiges Leben." Folglich wird auch der Kulturhandwerker sein Thema „nur dann inwendig ganz erfassen, wenn er es auswendig zeichnen kann, gleichgültig, wie dann die Zeichnung ausfällt" (Ebner 2009, 57).

Dann kann das Kunst-Handwerk gar nicht anders als inhaltlich richtig ausfallen im Hinblick auf die res prius factae und die Rezipierenden – modern gesprochen: das Publikum. Einem Publikum, welches in den historischen Gegebenheiten von der Antike bis ins 19. Jahrhundert keinem „geistigen Befangensein im Ästhetischen" erliegt, weil ihm ja die Wahrnahme von Realität und Symbolgehalt als Gleichzeitigem gegeben ist. Somit schließt das Erkennen etwa religiöser Realität eines Werkes ästhetische Urteile fürs Erste als erkenntnisunnotwendig aus.

Dies heißt keineswegs, dass die Heilige Anna auf dem Hinterglasbild nicht „schön" sein soll – eine Heilige ist ja schön!

Was aber, wenn die Inhalte – etwa die heiligen Patrone – undeutbar werden und nunmehr „Bilder", „Kunst", sind und ästhetischen sowie künstlerischen Ansprüchen zu genügen haben? Attribute entziehen sich einer erlebnisbezogenen Deutung, weil deren Bedeutung verschüttet ist. Das Werk hat keine Realität hinsichtlich der Rezipierenden, sondern nur eine seiner selbst. Bei einem Werk „l'art pour l'art" geschieht dies mit dem Anspruch auf eine Qualität des Noch-Nie-Dagewesenen und Verhüllend-Enthüllenden.

Bei einem „Werk" der Prähistorie dagegen beruht die heutige Unerlebbarkeit von Realität und Symbolgehalt auf einem Verlust von Wissenskontinuität.

Die Eigenart des wissenschaftlichen Umganges mit solchen Erzeugnissen legt der Praehistoriker Otto Urban am Beispiel der „Frauenkröte von Maissau" aus dem 13.-11. vorchristlichen Jahrhundert dar. „Im Donauraum gibt es in jener Zeit außer dieser keine anthropomorphen Darstellungen. Diese Tonfigur in Form einer Kröte, die an der Unterseite eine Frau zeigt, ist eine seltene Ausnahme. Sie ist ein Fundstück mit reichhaltiger Symbolik, die dennoch oder gerade deshalb kaum verständlich ist" (Urban 2000, 191). Diese Symbolik ist durchaus an erkennbaren Realitäten wahrzunehmen. „Äußerst bemerkenswert und bedeutungsvoll ist es, daß auf die Darstellung der Vulva große Sorgfalt verwendet wurde. Oberhalb und links seitlich der Vulva sind Fingernägeleindrücke, aus deren Länge und Krümmung man schließen kann, wie die Finger bei den letzten Handgriffen gehalten haben […]. Man kann deutlich erkennen, daß die Oberschenkel etwas gespreizt waren. Dem entspricht die klaffend dargestellte Vulva. Dies läßt schließen, daß die Figur eine nackte Frau in Gebärstellung, oder, was wahrscheinlicher erscheint, in Coitusstellung wiedergibt." (Gulder 1960/62, 14)

Obwohl der schaffende Mensch selbst Spuren hinterlassen hat und einen Menschen in verstehbarer Position darstellt, gelangt der Symbolgehalt gerade wegen seiner reichhaltigen Eindeutigkeiten für uns nicht mehr zu seiner Realität. Interesse vorausgesetzt hat das Stück Kunst-Handwerk für Heutige eine Realität in der wissenschaftlichen Hilfsbenennung „Frauenkröte von Maissau". Aber was wird mit dieser Namensrealität umschrieben? Ein „Kunstwerk" als „Werk der Kunst", die ihre eigenen ästhetischen Ansprüche stellt? Ein Fetisch? Ein Heilsobjekt einer längst nicht mehr fassbaren Religion? Was bedeutet Letzteres einer religiös indifferenten Gesellschaft? Zudem: was ist „Ästhetik" 1300 vor Christus?

Und doch zeigt das Symbol einen Inhalt, der nach geschichtswissenschaftlich gut begründbarer Ansicht dem Numinosen zuzuordnen ist, den Bedürfnissen von Menschen gemäß, welche ihrer Beziehung zum Göttlichen und ihren Wünschen an dieses in jenem anthropomorphen – ja: was nun? – „Kunstwerk" Realität gegeben haben. Ist mit dieser verwirklichten Absicht automatisch ein „ästhetisches" Konzept verbunden? Ist dieses uns Heutigen unerkennbar, weil wir solche Konzepte aus der Urnenfelderkultur nicht mehr kennen? Oder ist es hinter dem Inhalt der „Frauenkröte" verborgen und würde sich erst entbergen, könnten wir diesen Tonklumpen in dem, was er sein soll, als Realität erleben? Und ist er in dem, was er ist eher der hinterglasmalenden Bäuerin oder den klosterneuburger Konzeptoren zuzuordnen?

Wohlgemerkt: Letztere Unterscheidung bedeutet keineswegs, dass etwa benannter Bäuerin oder den Menschen der Urnenfelderkultur ästhetische Bedürfnisse abgesprochen werden dürfen. Ein Qualitätsmerkmal bleibt auch diesbezüglich die Führung von Inhalt in erlebbare Realität. Geht beides verloren – was bleibt?

Ein „Werk" mit Anspruch auf ästhetische Bewertung, also der reinen Würdigung einer „Außenwendigkeit" ohne Kenntnis einer „Inwendigkeit"? Es ist geschichtswissenschaftlich kaum bezweifelbar, dass der „Frauenkröte" als einem zum Numinosen ausgerichteten Menschenwerk etwas in der Religion der Urnenfeldermenschen verankertes „Moralisches" innewohnt, was immer dies sein mag. Ein Kultusobjekt findet nur dann Verständnis bei Gott und Mensch, wenn es die Moralität des zu Tuenden und zu Erwartenden im Kontext einer Religion, dessen Kultus es verständnisbildend dient, ausdrückt. Für den Menschen, welcher ein solches Werk erzeugt, bedeutet dies nicht grundsätzlich konsequente Unterwerfung unter die Moralität, denn er ist ja vielleicht auch theologisch gesprochen ein Sünder, sondern Auseinandersetzung mit dieser – als Dienst an Gott und Mensch. Diesem darf – gemäß der „regula Benedicti" – nichts vorgezogen werden, sodass auch Kunst und deren Ästhetik vor allem Dienst am Dienst ist. Bis ins 19. Jahrhundert hat dies in einem hohen Maße Gültigkeit gehabt. Stifters Roman *Witiko* mit seiner rigorosen Zurückweisung gängiger Sprachästhetik zugunsten unmittelbar-genauen Erlebens ist dafür ein so beredtes wie geschmähtes Zeugnis. Das ethisch-moralische Handeln der Hauptakteure bestimmt die Moralästhetik einer Ritualsprache, welche zum Dienst am Inhalt wird, dessen Mittelpunkt die Liebe zwischen Witiko und Bertha ist. Aus dieser „erwächst die moralische Pflicht. Die Unauflöslichkeit des Bundes ist die Grundlage des privaten Glücks und des fruchtbaren Handelns, das selbst wieder an der Erhaltung eines gut regierten Staates beteiligt ist." (Zeman 2014, 460)

Mit dergleichen Inhalten, welche sich ihre Form suchen, ist es jedoch bald nach Stifter vorbei. „Modern" ist und bleibt ab nun das Zauberwort. Dieses gilt für alle Lebenslagen, die Wirtschaft, das Verhalten zueinander und selbstredend für die Kunst. Und – wie es Konrad Paul Liessmann treffend formuliert: „Seit Nietzsche weiß man, daß die moderne Kunst nicht zuletzt deshalb modern ist, weil sie amoralisch ist" (Liessmann 2014, 16). Wohlgemerkt: nicht unmoralisch, obwohl die Grenzen dorthin weit gesteckt sind. Das Wesentliche wird nun der Stil, der Inhalt in sich aufnimmt und von außen vollkommen repräsentiert. Die Bauten der Wiener Ringstraße zeigen dies sinnfällig. Aber es können eigenartigerweise auch konservative Strömungen wie Caecilianismus und Nazarener als „modern" erkannt werden, weil sie ihren Stil absolut setzen als jenen, dessen „Reinheit" für religiöse Thematik als einzig angemessen betrachtet wird. Dieser diktierende Anspruch

unterläuft – siehe die eigenmächtige „Reinigung" einer bruckner'schen Motette – die Frage nach Moralität.

Eine derartige Stilästhetik und eine damit zur Schau gestellte Amoralität erfordert ein hohes Maß an Fähigkeit zur Selbstinszenierung. Diese beherrschte das urbane Großbürgertum wie gesagt in allen Lebenslagen.

Hugo von Hofmannsthal zeigt dies drastisch am Beispiel von auf Bauernhöfen sommerfrischenden Damen aus dem urbanen Besitz- und Bildungsbürgertum, denen die religiösen Symbole der Bauern zum Bühnenbild werden: „In der Schlinge eines Rosenkranzes befestigen sie das Bild einer Schauspielerin, deren königliche Schultern und hochgezogenen Augenbrauen unvergleichlich einen großen Schmerz ausdrückten, die Bilder von jungen Männern und berühmten alten Menschen und von unnatürlich lächelnden Frauen lehnen sie an den Rücken eines kleinen wächsernen Lammes, das die Kreuzesfahne trägt, oder sie klemmen sie zwischen die Wand und ein vergoldetes Herz, in dessen purpurnen Wundmahlen kleine Schwerter stecken." (Hofmannsthal 1979, 100) Hofmannsthal beschreibt hier den Sieg des urbanen Ästhetizismus und von dessen Kunstreligion der Ästhetik über vorgefundene religiöse Inhalte, deren Realsymbole zu Versatzstücken der Selbstinszenierung sieghaft-fraglos missbraucht werden.

Es ist auffällig, dass er in diesem Abschnitt das Adjektiv „schön" im Zusammenhang mit dem Ausdruck eines Schmerzes anwendet. Der Verweis auf Bilder von jungen Männern und alten Berühmtheiten ist gleichermaßen bemerkenswert; der Ästhetizismus erhebt für sich im Sinne seiner Ästhetik Deutungsanspruch und -hoheit auf Inhalte: auf lebenszeitliche Allumfassendheit – jung und alt – sowie auf nichts weniger als Schönheit – gerade im „Schmerz", den eine Schauspielerin inszeniert. Dies alles geschieht auf der Grundlage einer Amoralität, die in der pietätlosen Verwendung heiliger Zeichen die Grenze zur Unmoral überschreitet. Und dies erst recht, wenn Gesellschaftsdamen sich – unwahrheitsgemäß – rühmen, Aktmodelle Hans Makarts gewesen zu sein.

Im Vergleich dazu: die Frauenkröte in ihrer eindeutigen Bildhafthaftigkeit der Coitusbereitschaft ist weder a-, geschweige denn unmoralisch. Auch wenn wir die Eindeutigkeit nicht zu deuten vermögen, so zeigt es sich dennoch, dass es hier einstmals um die gleichzeitige Wahrnahme von Realität und Symbolgehalt gegangen ist. Dieses anthropomorphe Werk ist somit Inhalt und Symbol, welches ästhetische Normen wie schön oder hässlich unausgesprochen in sich birgt. Dies jedoch nicht als Kunstwerk, sondern in der ihm zugedachten Funktion, bildliches Bindeglied zwischen dem Numinosen und dem Menschlichen zu sein, in welchem die Coitusstellung Teil und Realität des Inhaltes ist.

Ästhetik – und hier wird Moralität jenseits der Frage nach der „Reinheit" ebenso mit einbezogen – ist solchermaßen in der Tat handhabbares Werkzeug des Inhaltes. Dass

dies noch Jahrhunderte nach der „Frauenkröte" hierzulande möglicher Ausgangspunkt religiös motivierten künstlerischen Handelns war ist in Anton Bruckners e-moll Messe von 1866 zu vernehmen: ausgerechnet auf das Wort „coeli" im „Sanctus" erklingt eine Dissonanz, die noch dazu gegen jede Regel in eine weitere Dissonanz übergeht. Die Schöpfung Gottes ist voll der Ehre Gottes und voll aller möglichen Klänge jenseits aller Hierarchie einer Konsonanz über eine Dissonanz. Beide sind somit – jenseits aller menschlichen Ästhetiktheorien – im Inhalt geborgen.

Adalbert Stifter hat uns zu Beginn glasklar den Weg eines Kunstwerkes von dessen Primärfunktion als Realität eines geliebten und verstandenen Inhaltes zum verehrten Werk der Kunst ohne Inhalt beschrieben. Die menschliche Kategorie des „Ästhetischen" bleibt von Relevanz für das nunmehr Unverständliche, bis diese von anderen Menschen anders definiert wird. Dieser Dichter zeigt jedoch eine andere Möglichkeit. In seiner Erzählung „Die Narrenburg" beschreibt er eine junge Frau, welcher er ganz spontan „Schönheit" zuspricht, um sich ebenso spontan zu korrigieren: „nein, Schönheit kann man da nicht sagen – dieses Antlitz wäre dadurch entweiht […] ihre Gestalt war klein, wenn je überhaupt groß und klein dort anwendbar ist, wo völliges Ebenmaß herrscht" (Stifter 1996, 86). Da hat jemand vom Menschen gesetzte Maße als im Ernstfall auf Menschen nicht anwendbare menschliche Maße angezweifelt und nicht versucht, das Besondere dem Reglementierten anzupassen, sondern er nimmt das Maß am Inhalt – einem ganz bestimmten Menschen –, um Wahrnahme einer ganz konkreten Realität im Symbolgehalt ihrer selbst zu gewährleisten.

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Human "Form of Life" as Premise for Understanding Other Cultures: Wittgenstein's Perspective

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Abstract

The paper analyses the methodological significance of Wittgenstein's concept of a "form of life" for the problem of understanding other cultures. The category of a "form of life", containing biological and cultural elements, suggests universal patterns of human behaviour, on the basis of which one can achieve an understanding of the utterances in an unfamiliar language. The author argues that this interpretation of the notion of a "form of life" allows to escape the position of cultural relativism and to recognize the existence of the common ground for the cross-cultural interpretation.

The notion of a "form of life" is one of the most important and at the same time the most difficult in the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein. Its ambiguity provokes different interpretations, in which *relativistic* reading is directly adjacent to the opposite *universalist* reading. However, Wittgenstein himself did not intend to provide guaranteed benefits for relativistic interpretations. His arguments in using the term a "form of life" aimed mainly at solving the problem of linguistic meaning. The analysis of the human form of life, carried out through the technique of language use, served the starting point for Wittgenstein's reflections. It is the methodological significance of Wittgenstein's concept of a "form of life" for the problem of understanding other cultures that is in the focus of the given paper. Wittgenstein's using the notion a "form of life" in the singular and the plural is equally important. I argue however that the notion a "form of life" in the singular can be accepted by us as the main one. At the same time the pluralistic interpretation of forms of life as of the cultural contexts or linguistic practices also plays an important role in Wittgenstein's texts. "Forms of life" in their totality give us access to the comprehension of the human form of existence.

In Wittgenstein's classic work *Philosophical Investigations* we find five cases of using the category 'form of life' in various contexts. (I, §19, § 23, § 241, II, p. 174, p. 226.)

In all these examples Wittgenstein does not give a definition of the "form of life". J.F.M. Hunter analyzed this category (Hunter 1968), and suggested interpretations that can be reduced to four basic types: 1) a "form of life" is the same as a "language game"; 2) the psychological interpretation; 3) the cultural interpretation; 4) the naturalistic (or narrow-biological) interpretation.

Undoubtedly, any proposed interpretation has the right to existing, but none of them should be absolutized or considered as the only correct one. Trying to define strictly the limits of the use of this term means to get in conflict with Wittgenstein's approach. Wittgenstein's concept of a "form of life" is not subject to the strict definition; it has to be understood as a ground which contains both the biological and the cultural (Derry 2007, 36). Guided by the thematic focus of this research I offer the following specification of the notion of a "form of life": it means *universal patterns of human behaviour on the basis of which there is achieved an understanding of the utterances especially in situations when we are faced with a completely unfamiliar foreign language*. However if we accept such interpretation we have to factor out any consideration with respect to a variety of cultural contexts as the forms of life, including science and religion. But it allows us to identify the right way to solve the problem of understanding other cultures in accordance with Wittgenstein's perspective.

When Wittgenstein writes about "the given" (Wittgenstein 1953, 226), indicating the forms of life, he demonstrates the descriptive nature of philosophical activity. In this case we are dealing with human behaviour and its linguistic component as well as specific examples of social practices that are learned and reproduced by each person. This fact allows us to recognize each other in spite of existing cultural and geographical distance. However, the conversation about "the given" is not easy or obvious for us. It is important to understand the motives that prompted Wittgenstein to move in that direction; in turn it will help us to reveal some of his insights regarding the solution of the meaning problem.

According to Wittgenstein the given is what we take up before and without any doubt. Any reflection (or justification) has a limit. When justification procedure is coming to an end, no arguments or assumptions play any role. We act in a specific way for a specific purpose (Wittgenstein 2004, § 110). In this case, it is not the very intention or meaning of the action that is important, we'd rather consider the effect of not taking into account the specific validity, or rather the accuracy of the statements made on the basis of a certain action. There is some "area", which is encompassing any human behaviour, and it serves for final justifying all our linguistic meanings. This "area" as a 'factory of the meanings' of utterances is the given, as it is initially available to any human individual. *The given* is what we recognize as an essential component, "irremovable residue" in the activities of all people. We can say that we are pushed off from this *ground*. *The given* is what there is. This is something that exists, that people make, that ultimately allows us to identify a specific *human form of life*; it is something that applies to our natural history, say, eating, walking, or sleeping. Therefore, man as a special kind of being, his life, his particular form of relations with the outside world must be equally perceived by all of us.

The stumbling block for adequate understanding the metaphor of a "form of life" is the uncertainty of its language status: whether it is a practical or a purely linguistic activity. According to Wittgenstein, the language, and "forms of life" are inseparable from each other. The presentation of relevant circumstances of specific language game means the presentation of them together with a particular kind of social activity. Wittgenstein sought to embrace the social and cultural behaviour of human beings as meaningful using the notion of a "form of life". A "form of

life" functions as a socially organized activity of people where linguistic expressions acquire their meaning. Thus "forms of life" constitute common behavioural patterns of language community.

Wittgenstein in his last work *On Certainty* essentially identifies the concepts "language game" and "form of life". These categories represent the limit of the justification, what is not to be questioned, the given, as the fact that is accepted by the people for granted, the foundation of their behaviour. The "form of life" in a cultural/biological meaning is the "rock-bottom" of any culture, and it could not be analyzed. "Forms of life" (customs, rites, specific traditions) coincide with the propositions in the language-game that are accepted by us without any doubt. The language games with forms of life constitute the context of everyday life of a human being, they provide a basis for his or her actions. A language game forms the communicative foundation of human experience, a certain ground, on which a person begins to reflect, to question, to doubt, to participate in social activities, etc. Language game as a form of life is the preliminary structure of our knowledge and understanding. Shared agreement on the basis of a form of life determines an *a priori* vision and perception of the world. Everyone has his/her own worldview, depending on learning, education, and life conditions. A language game is what resides, what is not justified, it becomes something internal and inherent in human life (Wittgenstein 2004, § 559).

We need to isolate what is common, what we find in the background of any linguistic behaviour from the language games. I think when Wittgenstein discusses the unjustified nature of language games, he wants to emphasize that natural language is an essential element of the human form of life; language is a manifestation of the interests represented in various actions of individuals. We could say that we reside within the boundaries of something more primitive in the sense of origin. According to Wittgenstein, language is a reaction; in the beginning there was an action (Wittgenstein 2002, § 162): practice gives rise to the meanings of words. Therefore, the use of language is something given; but something that cannot be understood outside the specific acts committed by people. Simple actions and reactions of people act as starting points for primary, fundamental certainties, which serve as logical fastenings of the language games. It is significant that Wittgenstein identified and pointed to the area that gives rise to the primary meaning of life. It is people's social practice, their behaviour and reactions. This is the premise and the foundation of our objective (interpersonal) certainty.

I don't think that there rises a particular problem when we comprehend what Wittgenstein writes as certain facts that shape the universal way of our human existence. Facts can be manifested in different ways. That is, we talk about regularities manifested in characteristic ways of human behaviour as models, to which individuals in the course of their lives bring about something specific. These patterns of behaviour are open to a lot of people as the opportunities for their implementation and development. It allows persons to develop a symbolic language, along with a variety of human activities.

In conclusion it may be stated that the human form of life manifests itself in various types of human behaviour. The form of life reveals itself and becomes available to us through other (subordinate) forms of being which indicates the deep interconnection between all human beings. The indissoluble link language-behaviour allows us to determine the specific nature of the common human form of life; therefore "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him"

(Wittgenstein 1953, 223). What can prevent us from understanding the language of the lion (or some other animal), or translating it into our native language as we do, say, while transferring utterances from some foreign language? The real obstacle seems to be the lack of a common form of life, our inability to see the necessary, logical inner connection between language and the appropriate actions of the lion. Such actions would have been for us beyond comprehension (Finch 1977, 95). It allows us to understand why our attitude to the animal should not be judged as if we were dealing with a human being. Therefore our understanding of the members of other cultures is possible because we think of them as human beings. That is our attitude to them (not opinion) is such as they are themselves.

What characterizes us as human beings in comparison with higher animals? In some sense we have begun to comprehend this. Regardless of the details it should be something common, basic, unavoidable, so that we might identify other beings as similar to us. The procedure of explication of common and universal human behavioral patterns that inevitably occur in a more or less complex linguistic practice allows us to grasp what strangers imply, when they speak their native language. Could we take as people those individuals who, despite the external morphological similarity to us, have no feelings (love, sadness, joy, disgust)? We uncritically occupy such position, assuming that a certain sense must necessarily be expressed in their external behavior or language communication. From this we can understand Wittgenstein's famous statement: "The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language" (Wittgenstein 1953, § 206). For Wittgenstein, it seems clear that people can not realize their capacity of understanding or communicating, unless there is a close connection between human activities and utterances, or if there is no coherence between people's speaking and actions, what he calls the regularity and rule-following (Wittgenstein 1953, § 207). However, Wittgenstein himself did not clarify the mechanism of connection between the speech and social practices of people. One could try to identify and list all common patterns of behaviour that are characteristic of any human person in the course of his/her life. By implementing this project we could clearly indicate what is inherent in all people. Perhaps it would be consistent with the concept of human nature. This common is "the given", but not something that can be given. Certain abilities and actions of men are the basis for other more complex and advanced actions. As a result the synthesis of such abilities and actions constituted what could be called a human form of life. The foregoing factor allows us to identify ourselves with others, even with strangers. The available in common in terms of learning, rather than as a result of empirical research, allows us to understand other cultures. An education is something irrational: a person simply trusts and accepts it as a given, regardless of the reason for his confidence, because that is what the real relationship is, which manifests itself in our need for assimilation with others. Hence it becomes clear how important it is for to enter into a collective organization of people.

In Wittgenstein's view there is no doubt about the possibility of reaching an agreement and mutual understanding between different humans, despite their biological, cultural or social differences. Human "form of life" implies the existence of common patterns of behaviour (social practices, shared reactions), which serve as reliable indicators for an anthropologist in his recognizing meaningful actions in alien cultures. That allows him to interpret the language of other culture. Thus from Wittgenstein's perspective the

cultural relativism is limited by the universalist installation, assuming the existence of the general ground of cross-cultural interpretation in the form of common patterns of human behaviour that characterize a human form of life.

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The Concept of Abstract Painting: Proposing a Model for the Application of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Method

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Abstract

This paper uses the concept of abstract painting as a case study to propose a model for the application of Wittgenstein's philosophical method. The model seeks to produce *surveyable* representations of various uses of this concept as well as the *family resemblances* between them. The model introduces the use of spreadsheets and network interaction analysis software.

1. The Concept of Abstract Painting

A study of the subject of abstract painting reveals several challenges. Firstly, there is no single term that encompasses the character of what we normally refer to as abstract painting (Rosenthal 1996). Secondly, it is difficult to find sources that are aligned in their treatment. One may offer an art-historical study of a series of artists, describing their influences and their artistic development. Another may concentrate on a historical context that applies to a specific moment in time. Yet another may find an underlying philosophical thrust that drove a very limited number of artists to explore their visual expressions in certain terms. Several sources offer a synopsis of the different artistic movements associated with abstraction, and a vast number of works delve deeper into individual artists showcasing their originality.

Interestingly, these sources, including writings by abstract painters themselves, apparently do not function as building blocks towards a general structure of understanding on the matter. There are incommensurable elements in the literature, which is roughly divided into two fields of specialization: art history and philosophy (aesthetics).

Abstract painting through the lens of art history yields two fundamentally conflicting notions. One is the notion of abstract art as the visual expression of spiritual meaning; the other a notion of abstract art as the expression of the materiality of painting.

Within art history, some examples of notions of abstract painting are the following. There is a notion of abstract painting as a style that does not refer to a specific artistic way, but to an attitude. This implies that there are as many types of abstract art as there are artists, and no stylistic definition can embrace the diversity that occurs in the works of those like Kandinsky, Malevich, Mondrian or Pollock (Whitford 1987). Another view states that the approach shared by all works of abstract painting is its exclusive focus on arrangements of shape, line and colour (Rosenthal 1996). Another view maintains that the defining quality of abstraction is *openness*, understood as a break from inherited norms of painting that was originally informed by the spiritual pursuits of the artists (Mercer 2006). Yet another view defines abstract painting as a type of art that is *not* figurative art, which means that it is a form that does not attempt to create the illusion of reality, however simplified, distorted, exaggerated or heightened (Gooding 2001).

Philosophy takes different steps to define abstract painting. Among philosophical sources, one argues that the investigation of abstract art should be based on the subject-object relationship. Both the viewer and the artwork are understood as constituents of one larger entity referred to as the *artistic complex* (Strayer 2007). This relationship requires the presence of fourteen indispensable elements for the encounter with an abstract work to be fruitful, such as the space and time at the moment the object is apprehended, the historical relation between the viewer and the object, and their epistemological relation (Strayer 2007).

Within philosophy too, there is at least one attempt to develop a general theory of abstract painting, which argues that despite the fact that different expressions of abstract painting are historically specific, it is possible to develop a general theory by taking into account the notion of unity in cultural practice, which can be theorized in terms of a *functional* rather than an *essential* structure. This means that it is possible to find qualities that pertain to all instances by paying attention to how abstract paintings are used within the artworld and the greater cultural context, as opposed to focusing on their artistic properties or their originating ideologies (Crowther 2012). This general theory offers a solution to the tension between the extremes of meaning mentioned earlier, namely, the material type of meaning and the spiritual type of meaning. The solution proposes that, at a deeper level, these two extremes share presuppositions about the relation between reality and visual appearances. The relation refers to the effect that the optical illusion of an abstract painting produces on the viewer, suggesting an imaginary pictorial space, which in turn makes an allusion to the *transperceptual*, a realm that lies beyond the visible but still belongs to aspects of the natural world. This theory maintains that both extremes of meaning must presuppose these notions of optical illusion, pictorial space and the transperceptual, otherwise there would be no other way to explain how the physical form of a painting can become either aesthetically or spiritually expressive (Crowther 2012).

These examples show that different philosophical approaches to abstract painting yield different results. The question remains as to whether there are alternative ways to address the conceptual difficulties related to abstract painting. This shifts the inquiry towards methodology. The two approaches explained here produce theories that require proposing technical concepts such as indispensable elements and entities such as the artistic complex on one hand, or perceptual qualities and natural realms such as the transperceptual on the other. Both approaches seek a general explanation.

2. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Method

For Wittgenstein, it is precisely the drive to find general explanations that causes conceptual confusions. He points to this as an outstanding issue in philosophy, namely the

resistance to examine the details of particular cases (PI §52). He therefore advises to actually *look and see* whether there is anything common to all occurrences of a concept (PI §66), anything on which a general idea can be founded upon. He anticipates it will become obvious that there is not. Rather, one will find a complicated network of overlapping and criss-crossing affinities or similarities (PI §66) that Wittgenstein characterizes as *family resemblances* (PI §67).

Wittgenstein showed that an overlapping of affinities exposes a lack of precise conceptual boundaries. This, however, must not be attributed to ignorance, for boundaries can be drawn for particular purposes (PI §69). The overlapping is in fact what gives a concept its strength (PI §67).

To do philosophy then, explanations based on conforming actual cases to a generalized ideal must be replaced by the exclusive use of descriptions of such cases (PI §109). This is achieved by calling to mind the kinds of statements that we make about the specific phenomenon of interest (PI §90). The statements should then be ordered (PI §92) into a *surveyable* representation (PI §122) to allow for a witnessing of the entanglements that arise from the interaction of the rules laid down to establish definitions (PI §125). The survey should emphasize distinctions (PI §132).

3. Generating a *Surveyable* Representation of The Concept of Abstract Painting

An analysis of the concept of abstract painting according to Wittgenstein's method calls for an ordering of the different uses of that concept. For this paper, I have selected sixty-five statements referring to the nature of abstract painting, obtained from art historians, philosophers and three of the artists who are considered among the pioneers of this art form. The list is certainly not exhaustive. In fact, it only contains a small part of the expressions that can be obtained. Nevertheless, the model that I will propose allows for a systematic addition of further uses, their visual representation, their analysis and cataloguing. The model can potentially handle as many statements as there are.

There are two software tools required for developing the model. The first is a spreadsheet such as Excel or Numbers. This kind of software allows one to enter, organize and manipulate the statements with ease. I will now explain this first stage of the generation of the model using a spreadsheet.

On a blank sheet, the columns are labeled as follows. The first column is for the author of the statement, the second for the statement itself. The third column contains an abbreviated code-like form of the statement that starts with the first two letters of the author's last name, followed by conjoined abbreviations of the words in the statement in order to render the code somewhat readable. The fourth and subsequent columns are for specific parameters that will help to determine whether two or more statements have an affinity or family resemblance in that respect.

Author	Concept of Abstract Painting	Code	Affinity	Affinity	Affinity	Affinity
Mark Rosenthal	Simplification of recognizable subject matter (Rosenthal 1996)	RosSIMPL	Art Theory	Aesthetics		
Mark Cheetham	Search for an immutable essence or Truth (Cheetham 1991)	CheeSEARCHTRU	Art Theory	Aesthetics	Ethics	Spirituality
John Golding	A substitute for religious belief (Golding 2000)	GolSUBSTrelBelief		Aesthetics		Spirituality
Paul Crowther	Abandonment of conventions of pictorial representation, while still following conventional formats of presentation. (Crowther 2012)	CroABDconvREF		Aesthetics		
Dale Jacquette	A painting is the laboratory at the same time as the permanent report of the experiment (Jacquette 2006)	JacLABandREF	Art Theory	Aesthetics		
Piet Mondrian	Rendering the universal and infinite within the finite (Golding 2000)	MonUNIVinFINITE				Spirituality
Kazimir Malevich	Conveying a sense of profundity through simple forms (Golding 2000)	MalPROFthruSIMPL	Art Theory	Aesthetics		Spirituality

The fields of study from where the statements were obtained are mainly art history and philosophy. However, within these fields, the statements were made in a form that represents different *language-games.* This means that the statements play different roles and serve different purposes depending on whether they are part of one activity or another (PI §23). I have isolated four main language-games for this exercise: art theory, aesthetics, ethics and spirituality.

I developed working definitions for the language-games to show their function as follows: Art theory is about how art is created, its artistic means and goals. Aesthetics is the philosophical treatment of works of art, an investigation about the ontology and epistemology of the art form. Ethics describes the moral direction or imperative for creating art and the reasons why art should created. Spirituality refers to visual expressions of the attempt to awaken the viewer to deeper realities, or to express an inquiry into the meaning of life, or a teaching on how to perceive life. These working definitions are meant to simply give the reader an idea of why I selected them and what kind of notions they may point towards. They are the parameters. They are just points of comparison for relating statements by affinities.

Going back to the table, in order to group all statements that are related in terms of a specific affinity, say, spirituality, the *sort* function for the column of spirituality must be selected. The resulting table shows all the statements that share this affinity grouped towards the top.

Author	Concept of Abstract Painting	Code	Affinity	Affinity	Affinity	SORTED
Mark Cheetham	Search for an immutable essence or Truth	CheeSEARCHTRU	Art Theory	Aesthetics	Ethics	Spirituality
John Golding	Abstract painting as a substitute for religious belief	GolSUBSTrelBelief		Aesthetics		Spirituality
Piet Mondrian	Rendering the universal and infinite within the finite	MonUNIVinFINITE		Aesthetics		Spirituality
Kazimir Malevich	Conveying a sense of profundity through simple forms	MalPROFthruSIMPL	Art Theory	Aesthetics		Spirituality
Wassily Kandinsky	Expression of inner necessity (feeling over calculation) (Golding 2000)	KanEXPRofINnec	Art Theory		Ethics	Spirituality
Wassily Kandinsky	Pursuit of complete harmony in a combination of the internal and external (content and form) (Golding 2000)	KanHARBetINTandEXT	Art Theory			Spirituality
Mark Rosenthal	Result of the inner drive towards purity (originality as an ethical commitment) (Rosenthal 1996)	RosORIG			Ethics	Spirituality
Karsten Harries	Result of natural necessity that finds a way of becoming (Crowther 2012)	HarNATnesBEC		Aesthetics		Spirituality

Obtaining a list of all those statements that are related through the spiritual affinity leads to the creation of a third and final table. The last table determines that the code of each statement will function as a *source node* as well as a *target node* in the graph that is to follow. This just means that all statements will be linked together. To structure this table, I copied the first code of the list and entered it in the Source Node column. I then repeated that code as many times as there are other codes of interest to be matched with. Then I copied the list of spirituality codes, minus the one on the top and entered it in the Target Node column. I repeated this operation for all codes that share the spirituality resemblance. This table now explicitly shows the individual relationships between statements. Each statement with the spiritual affinity is linked to every other that shares the same affinity. These steps are required for the generation of a network graph.

Source Node	Target Node	Affinity
CheeSEARCHTRU	GolSUBSTrelBelief	Spirituality
CheeSEARCHTRU	MonUNIVinFINITE	Spirituality
CheeSEARCHTRU	MalPROFthruSIMPL	Spirituality
CheeSEARCHTRU	KanEXPRofINnec	Spirituality
CheeSEARCHTRU	KanHARBetINTandEXT	Spirituality
CheeSEARCHTRU	RosORIG	Spirituality
CheeSEARCHTRU	HarNATnesBEC	Spirituality

I can now introduce the next stage in the generation of the model and the second tool required, namely software that can visually represent interaction networks. For this paper, I selected *Cytoscape,* which is an open source software originally designed for biological research that can be used as a general platform for complex network analysis (www.cytoscape.org). The last table can now be imported

into Cytoscape to generate a network graph (see figure 1, p. 174).

The resulting graph is homogeneous because all statements are related to each other. As further graphs by various affinities are integrated, the network will become heterogeneous and behave differently, changing shape and properties.

The next graph is an example of the integration of another network based on another affinity, art theory. Merging both networks now links some statements by one affinity, others by two. The overlapping and criss-crossing of similarities now increases in complexity (see figure 2, p. 174).

4. Analytics

This software allows one to visualize interactions, see patterns, groups and incompatibilities. Nodes can be located with a search function, as well as selected to analyze which other nodes they are connected to, as the partial example above shows. The graph can be displayed in different arrangements to enhance visual analysis, such as organic, random, arranged by number of links, or in a grid, for example. Graphs can be rotated and scaled to make nodes more readable and links more noticeable. Nodes and links can be added, grouped and deleted.

Cytoscape offers tremendous flexibility in merging additional networks, deleting, changing and updating existing networks. The graphs can be archived, catalogued and compared.

In addition to visual manipulation, this kind of software offers quantitative capabilities. A statistical analysis, for example, reveals measures such as *centrality*, showing which statements are most connected, and on which statements the entire structure rests more heavily. The quantitative functions become more useful as the complexity of the network increases.

5. Conclusion

The model of conceptual analysis introduced here intends to assist in understanding Wittgenstein's philosophical method, its application, and possible effects in fields such as philosophy of science and the humanities. The model portrays the complex nature of concepts in a way that may distract from seeking general explanations. The model provides a framework and suggests steps to perform the analysis in a tutorial form.

There are, however, challenges that a framework is not designed to overcome. These include identifying affinities or determining language-games to expose the actual uses of concepts, as well as deciding on the number of uses and affinities to include in the analysis.

Research on implications and further possibilities derived from the software tools and analytical functions will follow.

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
Figure 1

Figure 2

Aesthetic Gestures: An Essay in the Frege–Wittgenstein Theory of Art

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Abstract

Frege's conception of works of art was scarcely discussed in the literature. This is a pity since, as we are going to see bellow, his innovative philosophy of language also outlined fruitful perspectives in the realm of aesthetics. In short, Frege holds that only complete sentences express thought. Sentences of literature express "mock thoughts". The early Wittgenstein closely followed Frege on this point. The *Tractatus* holds that only propositions model ("picture") states of affairs. Works of art are merely objects seen *sub specie aeternitatis*, beyond time (Wittgenstein 1961, 83). In the 1930s and 1940s, however, Wittgenstein started to claim that works of art *can* convey thoughts. To be more exact, successful (*gelungene*), or cogent works of art can play the role of gestures that show life directions. In this sense, artists "*have something to teach*" (Wittgenstein 1980, 36).

1. Frege: Works of Art as One and Many

We shall begin with Gottlob Frege's philosophy of language which claims that only complete sentences express thoughts. Sentences stating commands, wishes, requests, etc., are "exclamations in which one vents feelings, groans, sighs, laugh". (Frege 1918, 355) They are "mock thoughts" (*Scheingedanken*).

Starting from this position, Frege advanced an idiosyncratic theory of art. According to it, "the poet does not really depict (*malt*) anything: he only provides the impetus for others to do so, furnishing hints (*Winke*) to this end, and leaving it to the hearer to give his words body and shape." (Frege 1897, 140) In other words, works of art only tease our imagination in such a way that every one of us constructs her own, private work of art. "The real work of art is a structure of ideas within us. [...] The external thing—the painting, the statue—is only a means for producing the real work of art in us. On this view, anyone who enjoys a work of art has his own work of art [in her head]." (Ibid., 132)

To put Frege's conception in Wittgenstein's words: the task of the artists is not to picture facts but to make us believe a story or to follow a theme of music.[1] The semantics of mathematics and science is quite different: it is objective. The numbers, for example, exist in the "third world" and only wait to be discovered—like unexplored continents are discovered by geographic explorers. Objective semantics have also the propositions of everyday life when we speak "seriously", i.e. with practical intentions (for example, when we inform our interlocutor, who asks us about the weather outdoors, that "It's raining now"). The task in such cases is to state the truth.

Frege's conception further maintains that exactly because each work of art is constructed by its consumers in many different ways, there is no truth in this realm: everyone has her own, privately constructed aesthetic individual. In contrast, the individuals of the external world, of logic and mathematics—the individuals of the language and science—are public; they are not private.

With this conception Frege intended to save the objective character of science. Unfortunately, it gave rise to serious difficulties in the realm of aesthetics. The main problem is that the general public, the audience, can unmis-

takably identify a work of art as *one* individual, so that when we listen to a particular piece of music we can identify *it*, reproduce *it* without mistake. We can also distinguish an original work of art from its counterfeit; we can judge, for example, that the new melody that we now listen to is close to another one in style.

One solution of these difficulties is to assume that even if every one of us constructs her own work of art, different minds can unmistakably identify their "teaser" as the same work of art. In the same way, we can have many different photos of one individual but can unmistakably recognize them as pictures of that same person.

2. The Later Wittgenstein: Works of Art Communicate Thoughts

Frege's position on works of art was adopted by the early Wittgenstein. According to him, thoughts can be only expressed through propositions, not through works of art. To be more exact, in propositions language arranges things experimentally in an effort to model facts (states of affairs) of reality (Wittgenstein 1961, 13). But in order to qualify as models, propositions must be in a position to go proxy for possible facts. If not, they will be "senseless", and so will be neither true nor false.

Music (Wittgenstein was mainly interested in philosophy of music), in contrast, does not model reality. That is why pieces of music cannot be senseless—only propositions can be such. That is also why, while to every fact two propositions correspond, true and false, this is not the case with the note-script.

At the same time, Wittgenstein added an important point to Frege's theory of works of art. It was that "the work of art is the object seen *sub specie aeternitatis*." (1961, 83) This object lies at the boundary of the world and so is not one of them.

In the 1930s and 1940s, however, Wittgenstein changed his position. Now he underlined that music is akin to language, despite the fact that the two are not identical. Wittgenstein's next step was to set out that the composers and writers *can* think—despite the fact that not all of them do this. Beethoven and Brahms, for example, were good thinkers; Gustav Mahler was not. This means that music *can* express thoughts that, similarly to thoughts expressed in language, have their message. Moreover, the content of the musical thought can be communicated (conveyed). It is

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[1] A similar conception was developed a century later in Walton (1990), without reference to Frege.

true that this message can't be put into words: indeed, that is why people use to express it alternatively, not through language but through music. This message, however, can be very precise.

3. Works of Art are Source of Information

Let us recapitulate what we have learned in the previous section. The work of art does not refer to individuals or events with strictly fixed position in space and time. Nevertheless, it can express thoughts; it does not just express an amorphous feeling, as the logical positivists believed it does. Its task is also not simply to induce a specific kind of pleasure in us, as Immanuel Kant had suggested. This point is indicated by the fact that, in contrast to a piece of chocolate that can produce gastronomic pleasures in us, and similarly to other artifacts, the work of art has a specific structure that is embedded in the context of the specific art form. The work of art is articulated.

In an effort to further clarify the nature of the work of art, we shall refer to Wittgenstein's claim that "it creeps itself (*schleicht sich ein*) into my life. I adopt it as my own." (1980, 73) This point helps to understand better the message of the work of art—according to the later Wittgenstein. In short, it addresses problems of our life. It can show how we can solve problems of life, helping to change it so that it ceases to be problematic for us (27).

Exactly in this sense, works of art are also sources of information. That is why we believe that we can learn from a work of art. Or, as Wittgenstein put it, "poets, musicians, etc. … *have something to teach*" (36). In support of this claim, we can refer to Bob Dylan who maintained that "you could listen to his [Woody Guthrie's] songs and actually learn how to live." (Corliss 2005) That is also why works of art are sometime seen as pieces of "philosophy". In particular, Friedrich Nietzsche used to say that "music is the true philosophy: it can namely intimate us a higher form of knowledge, or wisdom" (Nietzsche 1888, 2–3). We joint here also Friedrich Schiller's claim that works of art can *teach* their consumers—despite the fact that we strongly diverge from Schiller on what exactly, and in what exactly way they can teach.

4. Ontology of Aesthetic Gestures

In the course of the transformation of Frege's philosophy of art, the later Wittgenstein replaced Frege's *hints* (*Winke*) with *gestures* (*Gebärden*). (As a matter of fact, already the meaning of Frege's German term *Wink(e)* is close to the English *gestures*.) Wittgenstein was explicit on this point: "For me this musical phrase is a gesture" (Wittgenstein 1980, 73); "architecture is a *gesture*."[2] (42)

In connection with the conclusion we reached in § 3, we can now say that aesthetic gestures can show us a new, specific life-*direction*. They can help us to find out what we want in life, how to act, to which social group we belong; etc.[3] In fact, there is a whole universe of aesthetic gestures that point at different directions of life. In our aesthetic ontology, we interpret them as "aesthetic vectors".

It deserves notice that there are other kinds of gestures that show life-directions: (i) Politicians and sages, to start with them, typically use to point different life directions of the communities they are supposed to lead. Indeed, we

can clearly differentiate the gestures of political life direction of Lenin, of Saddam Hussein, of Yassir Arafat, etc. (ii) As Wittgenstein has noted, miracles, too, can direct our life: they can be seen as "*gesture[s]* which God makes." (45) (iii) One of Wittgenstein closer followers, John Wisdom, had noted that a dream (but also a psychoanalytic session) can change the light in which we see the things and events in your life and so to change its direction (Wisdom 1973, 43). (iv) Finally, an event in life, too, can change the direction (the style) of our life. Typical case is Buddha's awakening from the lethargy of the mundane life after he witnessed examples of sick, aged and suffering persons.

5. Style

Every aesthetic gesture has a specific style. We further claim that exactly the style secures the connection (the bridge) between the work of art and the way of living that it *can* outline. To be more exact, the style of a work of art has the power to direct our life-style: love for freedom, strength of character, etc.

We are using the modal verb "can" here since only cases of, what we shall call, successful (*gelungene*), or cogent, work of art can do this job. To speak with Wittgenstein, cogent work of art is the work of art that achieves a vision of a single object *sub specie aeternitatis*.[4] The mediocre works of art, in contrast, are rather torpid gestures. They can communicate new direction in life only theoretically, not really. In fact, their main service is to convey entertainment, to bring their consumers away from the "necessities" of the external world—and nothing beyond this.

We shall start our analysis of style pointing out that it characterizes artifacts that we make with know-how (Ryle 1949, 48). There is no style of coughing or sneezing or eating. However, there is a style of chess-playing, of painting and of composing pieces of music. There is also a difference in the role style plays in producing different kinds of artifacts. The role of style in the works of art, in sports, in politics, and also in life is crucial. Apparently, this is the case since in these realms we express ourselves. Moreover, this point is connected with the fact that exactly in these realms we materialize the freedom of our will. In contrast, in artifacts (in grammar and in logic) which are determined through norms, so that in them the free will plays a minimal role (if any), the style is of lesser importance.

But how can a successful work of art change the style of living? Perhaps the following remark of the later Wittgenstein can help to understand this point: "the fact that life is problematic shows that the shape of your life does not fit into the life's mould. So you must change the way you live." (1980, 27) Apparently, a successful work of art can help exactly in such cases. It can change the perspective we see our life, so that after that change, your life better fits into the life mould.

We are going to make the next step in our analysis of style with the remark that exactly the style makes us see (or hear) the object of the cogent work of art *sub specie aeternitatis*. Especially helpful to better understand this point is a remark Wittgenstein made in 1934: the style is "the general necessity seen *sub specie aeternitatis*" (1997, 27). (Apparently, Wittgenstein meant here the style of a work of art, not the style of printing or of grammar.) We

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2 See more about the works of art as gestures in Gall (2014).
3 On how we joint social (mental) groups see Milkov (2012). A similar conception was also developed in Bourdieu (1979).

4 In a similar key, Hegel maintained that the successful work of art "touches" the Absolute. Unfortunately, it cannot fuse with the Absolute since art is not the appropriate form to this purpose in principle: we can reach fusion with the Absolute only in philosophy.

interpret this remark as meaning that being the necessity of the work of art, the style is the synthetic a priori that the artist creates. Moreover, this necessity is implied by, what can be called, the "law" of the style of the work of art. Interpretations of the same work of art (of a particular piece of music, for example) are different ways of following its law (its general necessity).

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"Seeing as" and Experiencing the Meaning of Poetry

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Abstract

In his *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Wittgenstein tackles the question "How should poetry be read?" giving an example of his understanding of Klopstock. A striking feature of Klopstock's poetry is that he indicates the rhythm with which his poems should be read. This discussion can be linked to Wittgenstein's reflection on "seeing as" in the second part of the *Philosophical Investigations*. More than "seeing as", Wittgenstein's remark on poetry is a matter of "reading as". In this paper, I explore the relation between "seeing as" or "reading as" and the interpretation of poetry following two of Wittgenstein's insights concerning the importance of context, imagination, and perspective in the act of "reading as".

As Wittgenstein notices, "seeing as" often occurs in aesthetic reflections (RPP 1, PI 2.178). This is especially the case concerning visual art forms, perhaps because of the word "seeing". However, Wittgenstein clearly distinguishes "seeing as" from "seeing" (PI 2.137), the former being "half visual experience half thought" (PI 2.140). Being "half thought", art forms which are not primarily visual can also be grasped under this notion and Wittgenstein's remarks on music and "hearing as" or "playing as" go in this direction. This notion can also be used to conceptualise what is at play in poetry, where "seeing as" becomes "reading as". In his *Lecture on Aesthetics*, Wittgenstein takes up this question of "how should poetry be read?":

> Take the question: "How should poetry be read? What is the correct way of reading it?" If you are talking about blank verse the right way of reading it might be stressing it correctly – you discuss how far you should stress the rhythm and how far you should hide it. A man says it ought to be read *this* way and reads it to you. You say: "Oh yes. Now it makes sense." […] I had an experience with the 18th century poet Klopstock. I found that the way to read him was to stress his metre abnormally. Klopstock put ∪–∪ (etc.) in front of his poems. When I read his poems in this new way, I said: "Ah-ha, now I know why he did this." (LA I.12)

There are ways of reading poetry which make more sense and the poet, like Klopstock, might give a few hints on how the poem should be read. Other poets on the contrary give no instructions at all, leaving the reader free to read as she likes. But this entails that there are different ways of reading: there are different interpretations. This notion of interpretation, which is central in art criticism, is, Wittgenstein suggests, related to "seeing as": "But we can also *see* the illustration now as one thing, now as another. – So we interpret it, and *see* it as we *interpret* it." (PI 2.116) There is interpretation in "seeing as", just as there is interpretation in "reading as". But how can we know how to read? I will explore the relation between "seeing as" and interpreting poetry following two of Wittgenstein's ideas on that matter: context and imagination.

1. "Seeing as…", interpretation and context

"Seeing as" brings up a new mode of comparison which does not rely on a general view of the object but on a specific perspective taken on it, namely "noticing an aspect" (PI 2.127). "Seeing as" is a contextual notion depending on the perceiver: everyone can notice different aspects and according to the importance given to this or that aspect, the understanding of the object can differ completely. This specific type of seeing does however not occur all the time and one domain in which it occurs frequently, as I have mentioned above, is art. In the everyday language-game, just as we follow a rule blindly, we see "blindly" along the everyday routine (PI 2.137). "The concept of seeing", Wittgenstein adds,

> makes a tangled impression. Well, that's how it is. – I look at the landscape; my gaze wanders over it, I see all sorts of distinct and indistinct movement; *this* impresses itself sharply on me, *that* very hazily. How completely piecemeal what we see can appear! And now look at all that can be meant by "description of what is seen"! – But this just is what is called "description of what is seen". There is not *one genuine*, proper case of such description – the rest just being unclear, awaiting clarification, or simply to be swept aside as rubbish. (PI 2.160)

There can be no "genuine descriptions" because they depend on who describes. This can be understood in a phenomenological and intentional fashion (with the various conceptions of intention elaborated by different phenomenologists) but Wittgenstein draws attention on the fact that the perceiver is "struck". The intentional part of "seeing as" is not the only one and certainly not the most important one for Wittgenstein. As we will see, "seeing as" is somehow linked to interpretation – a process which includes intentionality – but is not identified with it: there can be some "seeing as" without interpretation. If a change of aspect can follow our will (and our intention), "it can also occur against our will." (LW 1.612) A description will therefore always depend on which features struck the spectator and there can be no two identical descriptions of a landscape for instance, just as there can be no two identical paintings of this landscape. The danger in believing in a "*genuine* description" is, according to Wittgenstein, the danger of metaphysics, the danger of believing in a reality which can be described absolutely and objectively, independently from the spectator. The task of the painter can be to represent "faithfully" a landscape, but it can also be to create a language-game in which his description will fit. And the task of the critic or interpreter would be to find the right perspective under which to see it.

> Here it occurs to me that in conversation on aesthetic matters we use the words "You have to see it like *this*, this is how it is meant"; "When you see it like *this*, you see where it goes wrong"; "You have to hear these bars as an introduction"; "You must listen out for this key"; "You must phrase it like *this*" (which can refer to hearing as well as to playing). (PI 2.178)

In painting and music, one must often see something under a certain perspective to understand the work. Wittgenstein's remark in brackets is interesting because it shows that this applies not only to the spectator but also to the artist himself. The artist sees something as, notices an aspect from her surrounding world, and brings it to the fore. She is an interpreter whose interpretation will then be subject to the spectator-reader's interpretation. According to Wittgenstein, we do not always interpret because we often see things as (in the sense of taking them for) without any reflexive act. But understanding and meaning both depend on the context or the language-game in which an object appears. If two people play different language-games, they will never come to an understanding. One can see something in different ways, giving various interpretations and these interpretations all depend on the context in which she sees this thing, or the context she creates around it:

> I can imagine some arbitrary cipher – this, ⅌ for instance, to be a strictly correct letter of some foreign alphabet. Or again, to be a faultily written one, and faulty in this way or that: for example, it might be slapdash, or typical childish awkwardness, or, like the flourishes in an official document. It could deviate from the correctly written letter in a variety of ways. – And according to the fiction with which I surround it, I can see it in various aspects. And here there is a close kinship with 'experiencing the meaning of a word'. (PI 2.234)

Wittgenstein interestingly uses the word "fiction" to name the context. When there is no given context, when an object stands out and cannot be attached back to its original background, one creates a context in which the object makes or takes sense. Of course, an object is never seen out of any context and one can usually easily attach an object to the everyday world. But it can also happen that one finds an object and does not recognise it. She will therefore build fictions in order to find the use for the object. This also applies to works of art: a painting, whether seen in a museum or in a church, can be subject to various interpretations. The same goes with a poem, whether read in its original context or in a different one (in the original anthology or in a textbook for instance). For Wittgenstein, this importance of fiction and context links "seeing as" to "experiencing the meaning of a word". Noticing an aspect is identifying an element in a larger picture, among various other elements, just as "experiencing the meaning of a word" is identifying its use among the many possible ones. One art form in which experiencing meanings is central is poetry and Wittgenstein brings up this comparison:

> "When I read a poem or narrative with feeling, surely something goes on in me which does not go on when I merely skim the lines for information." – What processes am I alluding to? – The sentences have a different *ring*. I pay careful attention to intonation. Sometimes a word has the wrong intonation, stands out too much or too little. […] I can also give a word an intonation which makes its meaning stand out from the rest, almost as if the word were a portrait of the whole thing. (And this may, of course, depend on the structure of the sentence.) (PI 2.264)

Poetry, or any other "creative" use of language, draws attention to something which does not occur in the everyday language-game. In poetry, intonation makes a word stand out from the rest; this word gains an "outstanding" meaning which differs from its meaning in the everyday use and an "outstanding" position which differs from that of the other words. In the first part of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein relates the understanding of a poem to the positions of the words in the sentence.

We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another.)

In the one case, the thought in the sentence is what is common to different sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by these words in these positions. (Understanding a poem.) (PI 1.531)

Understanding a poem belongs to the second kind of understanding, similar to understanding a musical theme, and what Wittgenstein suggests here is the complex relation between a poetry and paraphrase Cavell discusses in "Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy" for instance. What matters in poetry is the position of the words and one cannot change them without changing the meaning of the poem. Understanding a poem differs from understanding a sentence in the everyday language-game: in the everyday one, it is possible to paraphrase; in poetry, the only paraphrase is repetition. Poetry is a specific language-game in which understanding does not follow the rules of the everyday one. Poetry is game with language which must be understood in its context. Interpretation is thus central in understanding the notion of "seeing as" but is not identified with it: "To interpret is to think, to do something; seeing is a state." (PI 2.248) Imagination is another component related to "seeing as": "In other words, the concept 'Now I see it as…' is related to 'Now I am imagining *that*'." (PI 2.254)

2. "Seeing as…", imagination, and perspective

Poetry cannot be understood in the everyday language-game (Z 160); poetry is a game which can be likened to the children's game Wittgenstein describes in PI 2.205-207 where the children take a chest for a house. We have seen that interpretation depends on a context which can be understood as the fiction created around an object. The same happens with children playing: they weave "a piece of fancy around [the chest]", they create a context in which the meaning is not the same, in which the interpretation of the object does not follow the lines of the everyday language-game. "Seeing as" is to some extent similar to interpreting. But the children's game example shows another aspect of "seeing as": it is also similar to imagining. To take the chest for a house does not call for interpretation but for imagination.

Wittgenstein's discussion of imagination brings the creative dimension of "seeing as" to the fore and its relation to the will: "Seeing an aspect and imagining are subject to the will." (PI 2.256) Imagination enables us not only to describe a change of aspect (as with interpretation) but to create it. This dimension reinforces the link between "seeing as" and the work of an artist. If a poet interprets the world to create her poem, she also needs imagination to do so. As Charles Altieri suggests, in matters of Wittgensteinian literary aesthetics, imagination is an essential feature (Altieri 2015, pp. 59-62).

Just like the children's game, poetry is a game in which the meanings of the words are changed. It is not the chest that becomes a house (because it can be used as a house) but the meaning of the word that becomes different from its meaning in the everyday language-game. And this game can lead to the creation of new meanings which can be used every day. The various language-games are not completely separated but are interrelated and the potenti-

alities of poetic language lie in the very heart of everyday language: "We don't notice the enormous variety of all the everyday language-games, because the clothing of our language makes them all alike." (PI 2.335)

There are many language-games but we do not notice them all. One of the characteristics of poetic language-games is that they reveal themselves as language-games, as games on or with language. This game is based on noticing aspects which can take different meanings according to which one is played. But the external appearance does not change, all language-games use the same material: words. And the meanings of these words vary according to their use, the language-game in which they appear. A poetic use of language might use a word in a yet unknown way and by doing so poetry reveals aspects of words and of the world we did not know, just as "a good simile refreshes the intellect." (CV, p. 3. MS 105 73c: 129) To that extent, poetry and other art forms, by forcing us to "noticing aspects", ask that we look with perspective. Similarly, if both the spectator and the artist "see as", the artist looks at the world with her perspective. A note from *Culture and Value* brings up this notion of perspective in art:

> Let's imagine a theatre, the curtain goes up & we see someone alone in his room walking up and down, lighting a cigarette, seating himself etc. so that suddenly we are observing a human being from outside in a way that ordinarily we can never observe ourselves; as if we were watching a chapter from a biography with our own eyes, – surely this would be at once uncanny and wonderful. More wonderful than anything that a playwright could cause to be acted or spoken on the stage. – But then we do see this every day & it makes not the slightest impression on us! True enough, but we do not see it from *that* point of view. […] The work of art compels us – as one might say – to see it in the right perspective, but without art the object is a piece of nature like any other & the fact that *we* may exalt it through our enthusiasm does not give anyone the right to display it to us. (CV, p. 7, MS 109 28: 22.8.1930)

Just as everyday language does not make much impression on us, precisely because we use it every day, a scene from the everyday life does not surprise us. But once transposed on stage, this scene takes another dimension, just like the poet gives to words a dimension they did not previously have. Some poets bring this to another level, and that is what makes them great poets: they are not only users of words but creators: "I do not think that Shakespeare can be set alongside any other poet. Was he perhaps a *creator of language* rather than a poet?" (CV, p. 95, MS 173 35r: 12.4.1950 or later) More than a "creator of language", Shakespeare and all great poets and artists are creators of perspectives which expand the scope of the everyday life.

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Wittgenstein on the Existence of Mind in the Physical World

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Abstract

In this paper I shall explore Wittgenstein's view on the existence of mind. The main concern is in this paper to give a positive theory of mind which can provide a method for understanding mind as a metaphysical reality. In this context the self is presupposed by which what we call the mental phenomena including consciousness, because without the self the mind will be meaningless in this physical world. That is, this phenomenon of world itself needs a self in which mind is the part of this phenomenal world. Wittgenstein takes mind to be in a continuation with language and world because, for him, mind is not an independent entity in this world, rather it is part of this world. Thus the existence of the mind itself in this physical world proves that mind is metaphysical.

The problem of mind is one of the important problems in science as well as in philosophy. There are different philosophical views about the mind and different scientists also define and explain mind differently. As far as our concept of mind is concerned, it does not permit a definition in terms of *genus* and *differentia* or a necessary and sufficient condition. Nonetheless, it is important to indicate what exactly are we talking about because the phenomenon of the consciousness that we are interested in needs to be distinguished from certain other phenomena of 'is consciousness' and 'of consciousness'. The phenomena of 'is consciousness' and 'of consciousness' are very much related to ideas, such as attention, knowledge and self-consciousness. Both the materialistic and mechanistic model of mind and the naturalistic model of mind try to give an epistemic explanation of mind from the third person perspective.

In this paper I shall explore the Wittgenstein's idea of the existence of mind in this physical world. The attempt in this paper is to give a positive theory of consciousness that can provide a method for understanding the mind as a metaphysical reality. The sciences of the mind have offered causal explanations of the how and what of mind, but they fail to explain the why of mind. Their explanation is based on the ground that mind is causally dependent on the material universe and that all the mental phenomena can be explained by mapping the physical universe. That is, they believe that mind is basically a natural phenomenon and that it can be explained only by the naturalistic methods of science. The naturalistic assumption is that consciousness and mind have a natural origin and therefore have to be understood within the naturalistic framework available in the sciences. Now, we can point out that the so called distinction between the 'easy problem of consciousness' and the 'hard problem of consciousness' (Chalmers 1999) has an epistemological basis because the so-called hard problem of consciousness is hard only in the relative sense, that is, it is hard relative to the current knowledge of cognitive science, which is engaged in decoding the structure of mind. The above argument suggests that the easy-hard distinction is an epistemological one and not ontological one. Again, this epistemological theory of mind is essentially committed to a scientific world view and it cannot avoid metaphysical implication of the very idea of hard problem of consciousness (Pradhan 2009, p. 79). Thus, the existence of mind in this physical world far exceeds the methods of science and needs a metaphysical explanation which is non-naturalistic and non- empirical in nature.

As we know, for Descartes mind is independent of language and the world. Unlike Descartes, Wittgenstein argues that mind is part of this world and language. Language becomes the main center of the world and it occupies a significant place in the universe. Language is embedded in the human community to express every sense of it, in which language is a part of the human organism (TLP 4.002). Yet it is the great mirror of the world (TLP 5.511), in which we express our thought and cognitive experiences. The cognitive agents do not choose to have language as the medium of representation of the world. Rather, language is the universal medium of thought and experience makes the world transparent because of the logical isomorphism of language and the world (see Hintikka and Hintikka 1986). This indicates the Wittgensteinian idea that the cognitive thinking 'I' becomes a part of the language using 'I'. This shows that mind ceases to be a substance and merges with the language centered activities called the language games. In the language game we find mental activities. Here, mind and mental activities become one. This leads to the view that mental representation merges with the linguistic representations which are nothing but language games. The question of the world being represented in language is still relevant but now the pictorial representations are grammatically secured at the very place where the language games lie, i.e., in our worldly activities. This point out the fact that the forms of life hold the promise of telling what the world is in its being interwoven with the world (Pradhan 1996, p. 128).

Wittgenstein aims at making mind available in the world. That is, he makes the mind as transparent as possible in the world in language itself. This results in making language the home of mind and the world, in the sense that our access to the mind and the world are necessarily through language alone. In this way, Wittgenstein not only demystifies mind but also makes a fresh attempt to make mind as transparent as worldly activities. On the other hand, in the case of the Cartesian framework, mind was the central concept that inherited the task of making thought, the inner core of all human activities. This led to the fact that mind belongs to the inner world (see Johnston 1994) and thought is pre-linguistic and hence an independent entity from the language. Thus mind is an autonomous and independent entity. The idea of the inner is the idea of making thought an inner process in the individual and subjective realm of the mind as distinguished from the body of man. According to this view, the inner mental process as distinguished from the bodily actions constitutes the mind (RPP II, 228). Thus mind is the storehouse of the mental process. Mind is the seat of these ac-

tivities and so consciousness becomes the innate nature of the mind. This idea of an inner aspect has been criticized by many materialist philosophers and they claim that the concept of inner is a myth.

Wittgenstein attempts to show that the idea of the inner arises because of a grammatical mistake (PI, p. 222), that is, because of the misunderstanding of the language in which we talk about the mental activities. The statements expressing mental activities like 'I am in pain' are distinct from such statement as 'I have a hand'. Statements about the mental activities like the above in the first person present tense are not descriptive statements at all. They are expressions of mental states and are not descriptive of what is happening in the mind (see Budd 1989). Therefore Wittgenstein characterizes first person present tense statements about mental activities as avowals (PI, §244) which cannot be assimilated to the third person statements about mental content (PI, §290). Wittgenstein shows that the conception of the inner is based on a grammatical mistake and that mind is real though not as a mental entity but as a mental activity. Mind is real in the sense that we are already playing the language games involving mind. That is why those who deny mind are as much at a fault as those who affirm the existence of mind. So is the case for world. Both mind and world go together in that language presupposes both as real.

Now the question arises: how does Wittgenstein conceive the relation between mind and the world in the absence of a substantial entity called mind? Wittgenstein's answer is that a mind-body dualism is not necessary to think of the mind-world relation. In fact, if mind and body are different then there can be no relation between the two. The mind belongs to the world as much as the body and so the mind is not something which is less related to the world than the body. The body, as Wittgenstein says, is the "best picture of human soul" (PI, p. 178) in that the body is not alien to the mind but is its spontaneous expression. In this sense the world is not alien to the mind as the mind requires the world and the bodies of its expression (Pradhan 1996, p. 133).

Wittgenstein argues for the mind mind-in-the-world rather than for the mind that is outside the world. The mind being part of the world is most intimately connected with the world since without the world we cannot think of what mind is. Mind is the minded being, i.e., the human being who has mind. In this sense it is not intelligible how there could be a mind beyond the world. Wittgenstein finds that what we call mental phenomena are all found in human beings. It is because only human beings or those which are closer to human beings that can be said to have mind (PI, §284). We can ascribe to them only the predicates of thinking, feeling, willing etc. But we cannot say that a dog hopes or a fish thinks (PI, §283).

However, moving beyond the reasons for the time being, it can be asked whether it is possible for a machine to be self-intelligent or self conscious? My answer is 'No'. Wittgenstein makes the following remark while answering this question in *Philosophical Investigations*: "Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious." (PI, §281) Again, he remarks, "We do indeed say of an inanimate thing that is in pain: when playing with dolls for example. But this use of the concept of pain is a secondary one. Imagine a case in which people ascribed pain only to inanimate things; pitied only dolls." (PI, §282) Thus, only of what behaves like a living thing can we say that it is conscious. This claim connects consciousness with life, but not with what constitutes life; rather, with what manifests or expresses it. A non-living thing might therefore in principle qualify for the ascription of consciousness, so long as it behaves like a conscious living thing. We are so prone to count the robots in science-fiction films as conscious beings, even though they are not alive; they act as if they are. We cannot think of a stone as conscious because the stone does not behave in ways in which we recognize it as expressive of mind or consciousness.

Now the question is: What is the nature of the self which is the subject of consciousness? The nature of the self is neither the material nor psychological experiences attached to it, but it is something more and is genuinely metaphysical. What I meant by 'metaphysics' however is clearly not just any metaphysics but rather the sort of self-centric nature of consciousness that does not prevent the possibility of a third person point of view but cannot be replaced by the latter. This self-centric point of view is the unique feature of human consciousness. Metaphysically speaking, consciousness is real in the sense that it is a part of the conscious subject. The self, which belongs to conscious subject, is an important category in metaphysics because metaphysics takes into account the general nature of reality which includes consciousness, knowledge, belief, etc. These phenomena cannot be explained unless we presuppose a conscious self to which they are attributable. There is a conscious subject which is conscious and which possesses knowledge and beliefs about the world. And that subject is the metaphysical ground of the mental phenomena and that is the metaphysical self. The concepts like consciousness, intentionality, beliefs, and other mental concepts raise such questions as: whose consciousness? whose belief?, etc. And these questions cannot be answered unless we introduce a subject, that is, self as the locus of the phenomena. The locus logically cannot be a part of the phenomena of which it is the locus. Therefore, the nature of mental phenomena like consciousness and intentionality is such that they demand a subject to which they are attributable and without which they remain meaningless. Here, conscious subject is the metaphysical ground of the mental phenomena and that is metaphysical conscious self. Thus we can hardly deny the mental world as real.

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The Voice of Wittgenstein? An Exploration of a Corpus of Kirchberg Contributions 2001-2010

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Abstract

At the time of Wittgenstein's death in 1951 only the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* had been published. Since then, a vast amount of material has been made available and put to use by scholars in a growing mass of commentary and secondary literature. In this article, we introduce and take some first steps in exploring a digital corpus which may be used to investigate the use of Wittgenstein's work and other aspects of the writing of Wittgenstein scholars.
Which sources do scholars cite, and how? On what themes are Wittgenstein's own words mostly used? What do citation practices of Wittgenstein scholars reveal about the implicit conventions of our research community?
The corpus of Kirchberg Wittgenstein-related conference pre-proceedings papers, published by the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 2001-2010, were digitized, marked up in XML format, and re-published Open Access by the Wittgenstein Archives in Bergen in 2013. Digital methods of structuring and searching the corpus bring new perspectives on Wittgenstein scholarship within reach.

I. Introduction

This paper explores some ways to investigate the practices behind the use of citations of and bibliographic references to Wittgenstein of a digital corpus of Kirchberg pre-proceeding papers. Apart from bibliographic referencing practices, the corpus already contains or can be developed to provide interesting possibilities of researching quotation practices by Wittgenstein researchers in detail. 'Citations' include quotes (block quotes and quotes marked by quotation marks) and other textual references to the work or words of other authors (Wittgenstein and others).

Citing other authors is not merely aimed at accurate attribution, but is also an aspect of constructing an authorial self. The corpus may provide empirical material for systematic study of the ways in which Wittgenstein enters in Wittgenstein studies, for writers in dialogue with Wittgenstein: as a more or less valued discussion partner, as an adversary or supporting theorist, as a theme or object of study.

II. The Corpus: Kirchberg Wittgenstein Papers 2001-2010

The digitally published corpus of Kirchberg Papers consists of 520 articles in English and German, altogether around 5000 pages of material. The papers were digitized and encoded at the Wittgenstein Archives in Bergen (WAB) under the auspices of the EU-funded project AGORA: Scholarly Open Access Research in European Philosophy in 2011-14. They include most of the papers pertaining to Wittgenstein or to associated themes which were published in the pre-proceedings during the 10-year period 2001-2010. Although ALWS granted WAB permission to republish, WAB contacted all authors about each of the papers, which were only marked up and published upon the explicit permission from the author. For only 12 out of 905 papers, authors declined republication. A further 89 papers were excluded as not Wittgenstein-related. That leaves 284 papers unpublished and unmarked, either because the WAB team weren't able to reach the author or because of missing replies. Altogether, the digital corpus includes 70% of the printed Wittgenstein-related material.

The body of material reflects Wittgenstein studies generally to some extent. The length limit of the papers in the corpus differs from normal research articles in that they are shorter, and in particular on that count, results drawn from the corpus should not be expected to be representative for a wider set of scholarly practices.

The articles in the corpus were encoded using XML (Extensible Markup Language), which is a system for tagging and annotating documents which functions widely across the Internet. The annotations are included in the files, distinguished from the text by brackets <> (thus differentiating markup and content) and follow a syntactic structure which can be expanded according to the specific needs for the particular document. The central citation-related encoding elements used in this material are <quote, <ref and <bibl. <quote is used only for direct quotations. <ref indicates a reference to a work in cases of paraphrase or mentioned works. And <bibl is used in the bibliography section of the papers, in which the authors list the various works quoted or referenced (directly or indirectly) in the text. All three elements can be further specified by adding attributes and attribute values; e.g. a quote may be tagged with the attribute "block" (in contrast to inline quotations which are distinguished from body text using quotation marks).

Such encoding makes references in the body text automatically retrievable. During the digitisation process, bibliographic references to references in the text which had been left out from the bibliography by the author were included and marked up as completions (<bibl type="plusPrimary">) by WAB's markup team. The bibliographic references were tagged with acronyms (W-TLP, W-PI, W-OC etc.).

During the first mark-up process, the attributions in the body text were not annotated using the acronym system due to time constraints. All quotes are marked up as quotes, but the accompanying references were tagged only occasionally. This means that in a paper, citations which were marked for instance "*ibid.*" or "(Wittgenstein 1967)" by the author are not automatically retrievable, sortable and categorizable. Although it would be possible to sift through all the material manually, this is a demonstration of one limitation of the digital material: it is a discovery which suggests the need for additional markup in

both the existing and future material in order to alleviate searching and navigation.

III. The corpus in context

Ken Hyland (2004) has conducted corpus studies on articles from a range of disciplines in order to elucidate the differences in academic culture between disciplines. As a discourse analyst, he understands academic attribution as a mode of interaction. In a citation study on philosophy journals, he found that in philosophy papers, when cited works were presented, 89% of citations were incorporated into the article in the form of a summary, 8% as generalizations (from several sources), 2% as quotes (direct quotes with quotation marks) and only 1 % in block quotes (marking an extended use of original wording) (Hyland 2004, 26). In Hyland's philosophy corpus, consisting of merely 10 research articles from journals published in 1997, the prevalence of citations were 10,8 per 1000 words.

Assuming that Kirchberg conference visitors follow their usual citation practices, Hyland's corpus suggests that most citations in the Kirchberg papers will occur as indirect discourse (summaries) and only around 3 % in direct quotations (block quotes and and quotes marked using quotation marks).

In philosophy, "knowledge is constructed through a dialogue with peers in which perennial problems are recycled through personal engagement" (Hyland 2004, 36), and "author visibility" is high compared to other disciplines: authors cited are explicitly and repeatedly mentioned. This suggests that investigation of citations of Wittgenstein should be possible on a corpus like the Kirchberg Wittgenstein Corpus.

IV. Citation practices in Wittgenstein studies

Our first analyses show that there is a wide variety in practical citation practice. To some extent, Wittgenstein's writings are referred to using a system of abbreviations (TLP, PI, PU etc.). In parallel, Wittgenstein's works are often referred to in the text by publication year (Wittgenstein 1997). In several of these cases, the reference in the body text is not complete (author, year, page).

The corpus also shows that in 146 of 520 papers (28%), one or more references to Wittgenstein's works or the Nachlass are left out of the bibliography (annotated <bibl type="plusPrimary">), leaving the reader to him- or herself to find the source. Rather than widespread sloppiness, this citation practice may be - in line with Hyland's perspective - a display of what is not explicitly said, that some Wittgenstein sources are taken for granted as the backdrop of discussion and therefore not perceived as standing in need of explicit and detailed referencing. It is possible to investigate this conjecture, however the references added would need to be explored in detail in their context.

The practices of citation discussed above are interesting, but more importantly, they may be of crucial importance for research practices in the future. Furthering the use of specific references may contribute to a better discussion, especially of Wittgenstein in studies with exegetic elements: a unified practice, i.e. the use of a standard referencing model, would make citations available in searches to a much greater extent than they are today, and in this way, research dialogue between readers of specific sections, works, or even paragraphs could be improved.

By subtracting the bibliographic details in the quotes for each of the papers from the bibliographic lists and comparing this with the remaining bibliographic items not paired with a "reference" (a reference which is not a quote), one would arrive at a list of citations which are not yet localised. This set of citations, if marked in an unclear manner or not at all in the body text, would be material evidence produced by corpus analysis of a direct imperative for improvement in citation practices.

Not only would author application of a standard set of abbreviations be needed, but completing the XML markup of the corpus would improve not only inquiries into citation practices or other quantitative corpus analyses, but also searches in the digital material by readers: a uniform and thorough markup practice would make searches less vulnerable to each reader's "searching style", since references could be categorized as instances of the same "general concept" of a work: e.g. "PI", "PU", "Philosophische Untersuchungen", "Wittgenstein 1951" and even "ibid." could all be marked up as instances or tokens of the "class" or "type" Philosophical Investigations. Cited works in parts or whole, or even particular remarks would be distinguishable.

V. Wittgenstein quoted

Picking out all those quotations which are marked with quotation marks and as block quotes automatically gives a result of 5348 items (including Wittgenstein and other authors). Of these, quotes of Wittgenstein which appear more than 10 times altogether are scarce. The most common one we were able to identify is §7 in the TLP, which appears 14 times, in different variations: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (3 instances), "Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent" (8 instances), "Wovon man nicht sprechen kann..." (3 instances). Our conclusion from this exercise is that no particular quotation or set of quotations stand out as statistically significantly the most common. This is an interesting finding as an expectation we had was that there would indeed be some clear trends. At the same time, this is a demonstration of the diversity of research themes which the corpus makes available.

A difficulty in retrieving quotes automatically lies in identifying the different variations due to the number of translations, differences in interpunctuation, the scope of material selected in the quotes (a few words or a part of a remark (which may of course also overlap in part)) etc. The variations of the quote above were extracted by retrieving the marked quotes from the XML files, assigning each a code, stripping them of punctuation etc., and ordering them in an Excel file, then skimming the quote column ocularly and finally searching by a string of the German counterpart. Furthermore, we used a concordance tool for corpus linguistics, AntConc, which confirmed the result that any exceptionally commonly quoted paragraphs do not seem to exist.

The two most common bibliographic items consisting of Wittgenstein's works refer to *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* (fig. 1 below). Note that W-BEE, Bergen Electronic Edition (48 references) includes the other works and that also some other sources may be overlapping.

Fig. 1 Bibliographic references to Wittgenstein

VI. Citation recommendations

A unified and consistent citation practice amongst authors would not only make citation research easier, but more importantly, it would give fellow researchers now and in the future better tools to search for and find and enter dialogue with authors using the same material. Consistent use of standardized modes of referencing would also aid digital material producers and the markup community in producing this easily searchable material. There is already to some extent a standard citation practice, which originates in von Wright's catalogue of Wittgenstein's works (von Wright 1982/1993), but there is room for a more consistent practice and renewed recommendations.

The explorations of the corpus, in combination with other sources, suggest the following citation practice regarding Wittgenstein's works.

- Using abbreviations ("citation keys") following the Pichler, Biggs & Szeltner 2011 bibliography <http://www.ilwg.eu/files/Wittgenstein_Bibliographie.pdf>

This practice is recommended by the publications *Wittgenstein Studien and Nordic Wittgenstein Review* (although not consistently applied in the latter case).

- Including abbreviation references with every quote or other form of attribution in the body text, for instance "(TLP 2.1)", hence avoiding 'ibid.' and "Wittgenstein [version publication year]" altogether.

- When possible, enter abbreviation references also for summaries of reasoning in the body text.

- Including in the bibliographic items all references to Wittgenstein's work (avoiding mere BEE reference).

- Avoid own translations when not necessary.

Further recommendations may include the following:

- For digital primary resources, for instance to Wittgenstein Source, provide direct links: Wittgenstein, L., Ms-141,<http://wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-141_n>.

It would be advisable to refer to Wittgenstein Source manuscripts rather than providing one bibliographic reference to BEE.

- For republished digital secondary resources, follow the Wittgenstein Repository recommendation: [author]: "[title]". In: [Resource title], <link>. [Republication body, year]. Original publication in: [complete traditional reference].

VII. Concluding words

This preliminary exploration into a recently created digital corpus and its possibilities of development shows how it may open routes for both recommendations for technicalities of scholarship but also to detailed studies of Wittgenstein reception. With our presentation we hope to have inspired to more research and a continued dialogue on citation practices within our field of research.

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Universals without Instantiations: A Metaphysical Implication of the *Tractatus*

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Abstract

My main concern of this paper is to make the two assertions. (A) We can see universals as the "objects" of the *Tractatus*. This will be established mainly through examining 3.315 of the *Tractatus*. On the other hand, (B) the idea of instantiations of universals is almost wholly lacking in the *Tractatus* (the idea is superseded by that of the existence of states of affairs). It follows from these two assertions that universals are seen in the *Tractatus* as "objects" without being accompanied by the idea of instantiations. This somewhat strange notion of universals without instantiations, however, will turn out to serve to evade Bradley's infinite regress.

1. The narrow reading

Now I like to sketch the general framework of the picture theory of the *Tractatus*, as far as it will be needed. (1.1) What constitutes a proposition is the fact that in it names stand in a determinate relation to one another (TLP 3.14, 2.14, 2.141). (1.2) The fact that in a proposition names are related to one another in a determinate way represents the fact that things named are related to one another in the same way, i.e., in the way that is symbolized by the relation between names (TLP 3.21, 4.0311, 2.15).

It seems to be natural to think that the picture theory implies a kind of nominalism. Since according to the thesis (1.2) a relation between names is supposed to symbolize a relation between things named, we don't need any signs for relations. Therefore there seems to be no need for any relations as universals. Besides that, since the same thing is true also of properties (i.e., a property of a name is supposed to symbolize a property of a thing named), universals in general seem not to be needed in the picture theory at all. From here some commentators concluded that Wittgenstein supported a kind of metaphysical nominalism in the *Tractatus* (e.g. Anscombe 1959, pp. 100-101, 108-111, Copi 1958, pp. 174-188).

Thus I will call the view that whatever can be the "names" in the *Tractatus* are only proper names in a strict sense and that whatever can be the "objects" in the *Tractatus* are only particulars or things the "narrow" reading of the *Tractatus* and its denial the "wide" reading of it (cf. Carruthers 1989, p. 108).

2. The narrow reading denied

The narrow reading seems to be natural, but it has a problem.

(2.1) First, this reading seems to conflict with 3.315 of the *Tractatus*.

If we turn a constituent of a proposition into a variable, there is a class of propositions all of which are values of the resulting variable proposition. In general, this class too will be dependent on the meaning that our arbitrary conventions have given to parts of the original proposition. But if all the signs in it that have arbitrarily determined meanings are turned into variables, we shall still get a class of this kind. This one, however, is not dependent on any convention, but solely on the nature of the proposition. It corresponds to a logical form — a logical prototype. (TLP 3.315, cf. NB, pp. 93, 101)

It is very difficult to find out an appropriate way of reading this paragraph under the narrow reading. In order to get a class that "is not dependent on any convention, but solely on the nature of the proposition", it must be possible that "all the signs in it that have arbitrarily determined meanings are turned into variables". For example, if we start from a proposition "aRb", we must be able to turn into variables not only the signs "a" and "b" but also the symbol "- R -", because this symbol also cannot but get its meaning through an "arbitrary convention".

But this symbol must be identified as a linguistic fact that *the sign "R" occurs between the signs "a" and "b"* under the narrow reading. But can we turn a linguistic fact itself into a variable? What we can do, I think, is only to turn into a variable *the sign* "R", *not* the symbol "- R -". But under the narrow reading the sign "R" can be at best an *index* of the Symbol "- R -" and does not constitute a semantic unit by itself. Therefore, if we turn the sign "R" into a variable stubbornly, then we have to think that the sign "R" is regarded *not* as only an index of a linguistic fact but as an independent semantic unit. In this case, I think, we have to say that the narrow reading has to be renounced.

On the other hand, if we adhere to the narrow reading, we must give up turning the symbol "- R -" into a variable (because we cannot turn a linguistic fact itself into a variable), together with this, we must give up also getting "a logical form" by means of turning into variables "all the signs ... that have arbitrarily determined meanings" as is said in 3.315 of the *Tractatus*. Thus it turns out to be clear that the narrow reading cannot accommodate 3.315 of the *Tractatus* into its framework.

(2.2) Second, we can note that Wittgenstein does not hesitate to quantify over predicates (e.g., TLP 5.5261, NB 17/10/14). But, as is seen in the above (2.1), we have to think that the narrow reading has been renounced when quantifying over predicates has been admitted.

(2.3) Third, if we adhere to the narrow reading, the following remarks concerning understandings of propositions seems to involve some problems.

[W]e understand the sense of a propositional sign without its having been explained to us. (TLP 4.02)

... I understand the proposition without having had its sense explained to me. (TLP 4.021)

It [a proposition] is understood by anyone who understands its constituents. (TLP 4.024)

It belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be able to communicate a *new* sense to us. (TLP 4.027)

Not only signs but also linguistic relations between signs can have their meanings only through our arbitrary conventions because otherwise written propositions can symbolize spatial relations between objects only and spoken propositions relations in time only. Therefore, it must be a mystery how we can understand a whole proposition through knowing only meanings of signs ("constituents") of it without knowing meanings of linguistic relations that occur in it.

3. The wide reading

Thus I conclude that *the narrow reading is wrong*[1]. This means that the picture theory does not imply nominalism. It follows that the correct reading of the *Tractatus* is the wide one: that not only particulars but also universals can be regarded as the "objects" of the *Tractatus* and signs for them can be regarded as the "names" of the *Tractatus* (NB 16/6/15, WLC, p.120, Hacker 1986, pp. 67-71). However, the following two questions arise here.

(3.1) What kind of universals can be admitted as the "objects"? This is the first question. A realism of the *Tractatus* is *not* one according to which a metaphysical universal is assigned to *every* predicative expression in our ordinary language as its referent. Although in the *Tractatus* the "objects" only are seen as genuine entities, in order for something to be an "object" a "name" of it must occur in an "elementary proposition" of the "completely analyzed" language.

But of course, it seems, almost all of predicative expressions that occur in an ordinary language must disappear in a way of the "analysis", because they seem not to be able to satisfy the conditions that are imposed on the "completely analyzed" language (e.g. the requirements that elementary propositions must be independent of each other (TLP 5.152) and that operation that generates propositions must be extensional (TLP 5, 5.54) and so on). Therefore we can say that the realism of the *Tractatus* is a sparse one[2].

(3.2) When we adopt the wide reading of the *Tractatus*, we cannot think that the point of the picture theory consists in a kind of nominalism. Then what is its point? This is the second question. However, the point of the picture theory can be thought to remain the same even if the wide reading is adopted. Namely, the point is that a proposition consists in the fact that in it names are related to one another in a determinate way and that a linguistic relation between names symbolizes a relation between things named. The only difference is that "names" are thought to accommodate also predicative expressions and "things" are thought to accommodate also universals.

However, of course, this is not a trivial difference. Let's sketch how different the way the "linguistic relations between names" are identified according to the narrow or wide readings. For example, in a proposition "aRb", according to the narrow reading, the linguistic relation is identified as the fact that the sign "R" lies between the names "a" and "b". It is the relation "- R -" that obtains between "a" and "b". Here, the sign "R" refers to nothing and is only an index of the linguistic relation between "a" and "b". On the other hand, according to the wide reading, the linguistic relation is identified as the fact that the names "a", "R" and "b" are juxtaposed in this order. It is the relation "- - -" that obtains between "a", "R" and "b". Here the sign "R" is thought to refer to something.

According to the narrow reading, the linguistic relation in "aRb" is identified as the relation "- R -" that obtains between the names "a" and "b" and this symbolizes a substantial relation that may obtain between the things *a* and *b* named. On the other hand, according to the wide reading, the linguistic relation is identified as the relation "- - -" that obtains between "a", "b" *and "R"* and this symbolizes a formal relation — that may be often called an "instantiation relation" — that may obtain between things *a*, *b* and R named. And in both readings, the proposition "aRb" is true, if and only if the relation between things that is symbolized by the linguistic relation between names obtains.

From the above contrast we will be able to understand the point of the wide reading to be that *a linguistic relation between names symbolizes a formal relation that can be compared to an instantiation relation*. And we can see that according to the wide reading all of the difficulties (2.1) - (2.3) that are pointed out concerning the narrow reading can be overcome easily. In the next and last section, I would like to make clear the importance of the point of the wide reading from the viewpoint of how to evade Bradley's infinite regress.

4. Bradley's infinite regress

How does the regress occur? For example, in order for *Fa* to be the case, *F* must be instantiated by *a*. But, since the instantiation of *F* by *a* is nothing but a relation between *F* and *a*, this also must be taken to be a universal. Calling it "I_1", it is the case that *Fa* iff $I_1(F, a)$. However, in order for $I_1(F, a)$ to be the case, I_1 must be instantiated by the pair of *F* and *a*. But, since the instantiation of I_1 by the pair of *F* and *a* is nothing but a relation between I_1, *F* and *a*, this also must be taken to be a universal. Calling it "I_2", it is the case that $I_1(F, a)$ iff $I_2(I_1, F, a)$. However, in order for $I_2(I_1, F, a)$ to be the case, ... *ad infinitum*. Thus, if we assume the instantiation relation to be a universal, then an infinite series of instantiations of instantiation relations seems to be needed even in order for *Fa* only to be the case.

We can point out at least two assumptions upon which Bradley's regress is thought to be based. (4.1) The instantiation relation must be also assumed to be a universal. (4.2) It must be assumed to be possible that the instantiation relation is itself instantiated (Freitag 2008). However, we can show that the *Tractatus* makes none of these assumptions.

(4.1) It seems to be natural that universals are introduced together with the idea of their instantiations (even if merely implicitly)[3]. Although in the framework of the picture theory with its wide reading, of course, universals are introduced, it is not clear for the present whether they are introduced together with the idea of their instantiations or not. I think that the idea of instantiation is avoided virtually

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1 3.1432 of the *Tractatus*, which seems to suggest the narrow reading strongly, is seen as emphasizing that a proposition is a fact, or that a linguistic relation between signs plays a very important role for a proposition to express its sense.

2 In Nomura 2001 it is shown that according to a somewhat technical analysis propositions describing sense-data can satisfy the independence requirements on elementary propositions, therefore that types of sensory qualities, which are of course thought to be universals, can be the "objects" of the *Tractatus*.

3 From this point of view, we can say that the early Russell is an exception (PoM, pp. 51-52).

as much as possible in the *Tractatus*. Let me show the evidences.

(4.1.1) The first evidence is the fact that universals are introduced as "objects" (NB 16/6/15). According to the wide reading, universals are also regarded as "objects", and "objects" are, of course, not thought to be instantiated at all. "Objects" are not entities that do or do not have their instantiations. Also in the *Tractatus* we cannot find any mention, or suggestion of the idea of the instantiations of the "objects" at all. Therefore, we seem to be able to say that in the *Tractatus* universals are introduced independent of, or without the idea of instantiations.

(4.1.2) Second, we can point out that the instantiation relation in general does not occur at all in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein, instead of saying that "the relation *R* is instantiated by the pair of *a* and *b*", says rather that "the state of affairs [aRb] exists". This means that the idea of the existence of a state of affairs (that contains a universal as its constituent) supersedes entirely that of an instantiation of a universal.

We can see that Wittgenstein does this intentionally from his metaphor of the "links of a chain". "In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain" (TLP 2.03). In his letter to C.K. Ogden, Wittgenstein notes to this remark that "*there isn't anything third* that connects the links but that the links *themselves* make connexion with one another" (LO, p. 23, cf., WLC, p. 120). For example, in a state of affairs *Fa* there is not "anything third that connects" the objects *F* and *a*, namely there is no instantiation relation that connects *F* and *a*, and *F* and *a* "themselves make [the] connect[x]ion with one another"[4]. Besides this, the conception of a state of affairs as a "combination of objects (things)" (TLP 2.01), or the conception of an elementary proposition as "consisting of names in immediate combination" (TLP 4.221) or as "a nexus, a concatenation, of names" (TLP 4.22), can be seen as showing the same point.

(4.2) Thus in the *Tractatus* the idea of instantiation relations seems to be avoided as much as possible. Therefore it is never thought at all that instantiation relations can be themselves instantiated. What corresponds to an instantiation relation in the *Tractatus* seems to be able to be called a "state-of-affairs-constituting-relation" or something. It is so, because, for example, we can say that "*R* is instantiated by *a* and *b*" if and only if "a state-of-affairs-constituting-relation obtains between *a*, *R* and *b*", i.e., "a state of affairs [aRb] exists". A state-of-affairs-constituting-relation, of course, is not any constituents of the state of affairs. Therefore, it is not the case that an existence of another state of affairs [S(a, R, b)], which contains the state-of-affairs-constituting-relation as its constituent, is needed for the existence of [aRb]. In this way the wide reading blocks Bradley's regress.

Conclusion

We have examined how universals are treated in the *Tractatus*. The conclusion is that in the *Tractatus* universals are seen as "objects" without instantiation relations, and that the idea of universals without instantiation relations gives no room for Bradley's regress.

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4 Where the narrow reading is adopted, Wittgenstein's note cited will be interpreted in a different way.

Avoiding the Myth of the Given: Wittgenstein's Way

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Abstract

In this paper I consider the relationship between Wittgenstein and Sellars. I first present the thinking of Sellars that I regard as most relevant for Wittgenstein's own, namely Sellars' identification of and attack on the Myth of the Given, and his account of psychological concepts. Furthermore, I briefly show how Wittgenstein's argues against the Myth of the Given in the Private Language Argument, and how he recommends we should think about psychological concepts. I conclude by comparing the two thinkers and suggest how Sellars can be criticized from a Wittgensteinian perspective.

In his celebrated essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (EPM) Wilfrid Sellars both made famous and attacked what he called the Myth of the Given. According to Sellars, the framework of givenness has "been so pervasive that few, if any, philosophers have been altogether free of it" (EPM 14). I clearly think Wittgenstein belongs to the label of the 'few'. Even so, his thought differs from Sellars. To see how, let me first present Sellars.

Sellars

Sellars notoriously neglects to explain in general terms what he means by 'the Myth of the Given'. However, if we want to pinpoint the most familiar version of the Myth, we could formulate it as often involving two claims: First, that awareness or experience entails having *knowledge* that one is in that state – possessed simply in virtue of being in that state. Let us call this *the epistemic doctrine* of the Myth. Second, that the capacity to have that awareness (being in that state) or experience does not presuppose the learning and mastering of *concepts* (cf. EPM 21). This point applies primarily to articulated (propositionally contentful) experience. Let us call this *the logical doctrine* of the Myth.

Although this is not the place to give an exhaustive account of Sellars' own way to avoid the Myth, it would be useful to have in mind some idea of what Sellars thinks of inner episodes to compare with Wittgenstein's thought. Let me draw a brief sketch of Sellars' account: According to Sellars, psychological concepts are akin to theoretical concepts, in that "the distinction between theoretical and observational discourse is involved in the logic of concepts pertaining to inner episodes. I say 'involved in' for it would be paradoxical and, indeed, incorrect, to say that these concepts *are* theoretical concepts." (EPM 97)

What the 'involved in' amounts to is not much elaborated upon, though Sellars emphasizes that concepts pertaining to inner episodes are primarily and essentially intersubjective and that the first-person reporting role of these concepts presupposes this intersubjective status in that overt behavioural symptoms being evidence for these episodes are "*built into the very logic of these concepts"* (EPM 107), just as "the fact that the observable behaviour of gases is evidence for molecular episodes is built into the very logic of molecule talk". (EPM 116). In other words, Sellars thinks that language being essentially an intersubjective achievement and learned in intersubjective contexts is compatible with the "privacy" of "inner episodes", i.e. reporting use in which one is not drawing inferences from behavioural evidence (EPM 107). The analogy with theoretical concepts is also specified in that these inner epi-

sodes "[…] are 'in' language speaking animals as molecular impacts are in gases […]" (EPM 104). Furthermore, Sellars claims that although our notion of thoughts is not yet a notion of physiological entities, but of unobservable 'inner' ones, there stands nothing in the way that they may "turn out" to be so, e.g. "identified" with complex events in the cerebral cortex (EPM 104-105).

To sum up then, Sellars proposes a notion of psychological concepts as functioning in important ways similar to theoretical concepts, according to which their third-person application rests (inferentially) on behavioural evidence, and first-person application rests (logically, i.e. conceptually) on the former intersubjective dimension, but is applied without behavioural evidence.

Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein is alluding to the epistemic doctrine of the Myth, when he says: "[O]nly I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it." (PI §246). But Wittgenstein thinks this (if conceived as an empirical proposition) is nonsense (PI §246). Why? The reason is neither ignorance, nor the difficulty of knowing it. Rather, the grammar of 'pain' does not allow this form of expression, for contrary to what one can say of others (in the second -or third-person) "I cannot be said to learn of them [sensations]. I *have* them." Likewise, one cannot say of oneself that one doubts one is in pain, though this does make sense to say of others (PI §246). At least two important points can be made of this: First, this grammatical argument indicates Wittgenstein's (at least partial) holism; that epistemic expressions such as "know" are interconnected in a way such that when it makes no sense to use the concepts of 'doubting', 'learning', 'recognizing', 'evidence'[1] etc., it makes no sense to use the concept of 'knowing' either. Also, if it makes sense to say that one knows one is in pain, it must make sense to say that one does not know it. But, as Hacker notes, although there is room for indeterminacy (pain vs. ache), there is no for ignorance; 'He was in pain but didn't know it' is excluded by our grammar, hence, the grammatical exclusion of ignorance must not be confused with the presence of knowledge, both are ruled out. For the (logical) 'cannot know' is not the same as the (epistemic) 'does not know' (Hacker p. 57-58, 203). The same point, i.e. exclusion of epistemic claims (in first-person, present-tense), Wittgenstein thinks, applies to all the psychological verbs (want, wish, believe and so forth) (PPF §309). Generally, Wittgenstein thinks

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1 In *On Certainty* Wittgenstein writes: "Whether I *know* something depends on whether the evidence backs me up or contradicts me. For to say one knows one is in pain means nothing." (OC §504).

the idea of the mind and its *immediately given* content as cognitively transparent to oneself (the epistemic doctrine of the Myth) is altogether misconceived.

The limits of this essay do not allow a detailed explication of Wittgenstein's many and complicated arguments against the logical doctrine of the Myth. But very briefly, the story of the private linguist exhibits the incoherence of the logical doctrine; the temptation to take the given 'present to my mind' for granted and construing a naming process establishing the meaning of words designating the given. But (as Sellars), Wittgenstein would ask: what is the logically independent *this* 'present to your mind', upon which you concentrate your attention? What kind of answer to this question makes sense? To recognize that *this* is so (for example that this colour is red) is already to master a language (PI §381). For this sort of articulate experience requires application of concept(s). Experiences (or concentration on a *this*) do not teach us the grammar of words – how to judge correctly, they are not the *grounds* for our game of judging (OC §§130-131). However, Wittgenstein does not think language-games are based on *any* grounds (*begründet*), but they are not *lacking* grounds either; they are there, like our lives (OC §559). Accordingly Wittgenstein says we should regard the language-game as the primary thing, as the 'proto-phenomenon' (*Urphänomen*) (PI §654, 656). Rather than looking upon utterances using psychological concepts as reports or descriptions of logically autonomous inner experiences, Wittgenstein urges us to describe the language-games in which these concepts figure, in their multiplicity of use and varieties of function. With that, Wittgenstein indicates how we can avoid the Myth of the Given.

As I see it, Wittgenstein is attacking the very same idea as Sellars. Both the epistemic and the logical doctrine are met with a battery of arguments in the Private Language Argument. As Sellars, he clearly rejects 'mental phenomena' as logically self-sufficient givens, indeed that idea is a mythology grounded *inter alia* in the Augustinian picture of language and thereby our failure to see the enormous diversity of our language-games. The Augustinian picture makes us inclined to think that psychological concepts always *stand for* something, either private mental objects accessible through introspection, or behaviour, or maybe neural events and processes as some hold. But this picture is deeply questionable. Accompanied by extensive argument, Wittgenstein suggests what could be regarded as the primary: "What has to be accepted, the given, is – one might say – *forms of life*." (PPF §345). And to speak a language is part of a form of life (PI §23). Hence, the use of our psychological concepts is part of and partly constitutive of our distinctive human form of life. Only in that context we can understand the significance of these forms of expression.

Clearly, the private linguist and others inclined to endorse the Myth of the Given would oppose the idea that the possibility of experience should be intelligible only with reference to its expression (whether verbal or pre-linguistic). Exactly because they are inclined to think of experience as *given*, their setting and expression seems irrelevant. But that this is a mythology becomes clear once Wittgenstein exorcises the idea of a private language and reminds us that the (logical) criteria for having a certain experience amounts to what the creature does and/or says; the possibility and intelligibility of its behavioural expression. For without behavioural criteria *nothing would count as such and such experiences*. But that is not to say that experiences *are* behavioural criteria. Against our (and the private linguist's) temptation to isolate elements of experience, Wittgenstein stresses that psychological concepts are given their significance and importance in their surroundings – viz. the situation which led up to the utterances in human life (PI §583) – the context of their use. We should draw our attention to the criteria of application of psychological concepts – which usually consist in behaviour (including verbal) in appropriate circumstances in the stream of human life. For "only of a living human being [*Mensch*] and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious." (PI §281)

Conclusion

There are clearly *some* similarities between Wittgenstein's and Sellars' thought: Both are hostile to the Myth of the Given, both think that linguistic skills condition articulate experiences, both think behaviour is crucial to the logic of concepts pertaining to inner episodes, and both think first-person use is logically dependent on third-person use. Nevertheless, beneath apparent convergences, deep differences reside. Let me point out some evident points of difference.

Firstly, Sellars' idea of behavioural symptoms which serve as evidence for and basis of inferential propositions about someone's inner episodes is not the same as Wittgenstein's idea of behaviour serving as logical criterion. Wittgenstein warns about confusing these distinct notions (PI §354). On Wittgenstein's view, 'the inner' is logically – or conceptually – connected with behaviour, not, of course, by entailment, but that e.g. a person's verbal behaviour constitutes a criterion to ascribing him such and such thoughts. Behavioural criteria are aspects of the grammar and meaning of the (psychological) expressions for the use of which they are criteria. This is not an inferential-inductive relation.

Secondly, although sometimes used to explain behaviour, Wittgenstein would insist that everyday psychological concepts are neither part of nor analogous to an explanatory theory *about* human psychology, they are rather partly constitutive of it and have many different uses than descriptive (such as expressive which Sellars neglects).

Thirdly, for this latter reason Wittgenstein would oppose any general *theory* about *the* function of psychological concepts and nature of inner episodes like that of Sellars'.

Fourthly, Sellars is right that molecules legitimately can be called 'entities' which are 'in' gases and in some sense 'unobservable'. But the grammar of language-games about physical entities, processes, states etc. and our observing and descriptions of them soon become very misleading if projected onto the mental. Conceiving sensations as private objects awaiting a name involves serious errors pointed out in the Private Language Argument. And to insist that inner episodes are "in" language-speaking animals (EPM 104) is at best a rather misleading grammatical proposition. Moreover, the unobservability of inner episodes (EPM 104), which follows from what Wittgenstein would have regarded as an inadequate symptom-conception of behaviour, is neither akin to realist conceptions (too small) nor anti-realist conceptions (postulated, theoretical) of molecules. For the sense in which they can be called unobservable (for indeed, we do *see* people manifest e.g. sensations and feelings such as pain and anger and *hear* people express their thoughts) is neither due to the shortcomings of human epistemic faculties, nor the theoretical nature of the episodes in question, but a *grammatical* unobservability. Observability is *excluded* by our grammar, for nothing would count as literally observing

a particular thought or a pain, as nothing would count as seeing a sound. It is not because there is a hidden and inaccessible realm of episodes indirectly known via symptoms. The (logical) exclusion of observability must not be confused with the (epistemic) presence of unobservability.

Fifthly, Sellars' brief remarks about (the possibility of) "identifying" inner episodes with physiological events – that inner, unobservable entities could "turn out" to be events in the cerebral cortex (EPM 104-105) – is fundamentally at odds with Wittgenstein. To begin with, it rests upon the (at best misleading) notion of 'inner, unobservable entities'. Next, if we grant Sellars' talk about entities, it is not clear what it would be like for 'entities' being identical to or turning out to be 'events', and thus whether the suggestion can be given a coherent sense at all. For entities and events belong to different conceptual categories: entities exist; events occur, happen or take place; events usually have a sequential structure, entities do not – to mention but a few of many grammatical differences. To be sure, one may very well introduce new ways of speaking. *But only to the extent one does not cross this new grammatical proposal with the ordinary*. One cannot show that our existing grammar is false, for as Wittgenstein makes clear, there is no such thing as false grammar. Besides, it will not help to say that one replaces or improves our theory of psychology, for our customary psychological concepts are not theoretical concepts (about imperceptible entities), but part of our distinctive human form of life.

It has not been my aim to argue sufficiently for vindicating one rather than the other. That would require an argumentative essay in its own right. Yet, my discussion of the two philosophers may serve as indicating possible paths for a Wittgensteinian strategy in such respect. For if Wittgenstein is right, Sellars himself is far from immune to critique.

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Wittgensteins „Gebetsstriche" in den Kriegstagebüchern (MSS 101–103)

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Abstract

In den MSS 101–103 finden sich in den codierten persönlichen Eintragungen zahlreiche waagrechte Striche von z.T. erheblicher Länge. Ihr auffälligstes Charakteristikum ist, daß diese Striche oftmals zwischen Interpunktionszeichen stehen. Eine genauere Untersuchung der Strichpraxis und ihres jeweiligen Kontexts zeigt, daß sie als Kürzel für wiederkehrende Gebetsformeln interpretiert werden können, die im engen Zusammenhang mit den bekannten, stark an Tolstoi angelehnten, ausgeschriebenen Kurzgebeten stehen. Der Beitrag ist zugleich ein Beispiel für die Verwendung der neuen Facsimilebilder im Rahmen der *Bergen Nachlass Edition* (BNE) auf www.wittgensteinsource.org.

Wittgensteins Kriegstagebücher 1914–1917 offenbaren neben den bekannten philosophischen Reflexionen über Religion, Gott, Seele und Welt in ihren persönlichen codierten Eintragungen auch eine intensive religiöse Praxis in der Form von zahlreichen Gebeten („Gott mit mir!" 9. 10. 1914), Anrufungen („Der Geist beschütze mich! 6. 12. 1914") und Selbstermahnungen („Nur dem eigenen Geist leben und alles Gott überlassen!" 30. 11. 1914). Den Hintergrund für diese persönliche Religiosität (vgl. McGuinness 1992, 344–347; Monk 1990, 134; Vossenkuhl 2003, 293 f.) bildet der Krieg, die persönliche Gefährdung darin, die Unannehmlichkeiten, aber mehr noch das Leiden an den Zumutungen durch andere Menschen. Die Umstände, in die Wittgenstein ab August 1914 durch seinen freiwilligen Kriegsdienst geraten ist, waren zunächst weniger durch reale Gefahr, in Kampfhandlungen zu geraten[1], geprägt, als durch Widrigkeiten im täglichen Leben, zunächst auf dem Weichselschiff Goplana, dem er zur Bedienung eines Scheinwerfers zugeteilt wurde, später ab Dezember 1914 in der Kanzlei des Auto-Detachements der Festung Krakau und in der neu eingerichteten Artilleriewerkstatt.

Gebete

Die für die Kriegstagebücher typischen kurzen Gebete und Anrufungen setzen nicht unmittelbar mit der Ankunft in Krakau ein. Anfangs dominiert in Wittgensteins Haltung noch die Neugier auf sein Leben im Krieg („Bin gespannt auf mein kommendes Leben!", GT 9. 8. 1914). Doch das erste entschiedene „Gott helfe mir!" steht kaum zwei Wochen später am Ende einer Reflexion über einen für ihn „furchtbaren Tag" auf der Goplana:

> Abends wollte der Scheinwerfer nicht funktionieren. Als ich ihn untersuchen wollte, wurde ich von der Mannschaft durch Zurufe, Grölen etc. gestört. Wollte ihn genauer untersuchen, da nahm ihn der Zugsführer mir aus der Hand. Ich kann gar nicht weiterschreiben. Es war entsetzlich. (GT 25. 8. 1914).

Es ist gut möglich, daß Wittgenstein zu diesem Zeitpunkt Tolstois *Kurze Darlegung des Evangelium* schon in Händen hatte. Die Goplana muß in diesen Tagen die Weichsel verlassen und auf dem Nebenfluß Dunajec bis Tarnow hinaufgefahren sein. Dort hat Wittgenstein auf einem Landgang ein Exemplar von Tolstois eigenwilliger Auslegung der Evangelien erworben und dieses Buch wurde ihm zum lebensrettenden Trostspender, wie er später an

von Ficker berichtete (Ficker 2014: Nr. 36, 83). Die bald einsetzende in MS 101 sichtbare Gebetspraxis steht jedenfalls in einem offensichtlichen und engen Zusammenhang mit der Tolstoilektüre. Am 1. 9. 1914 beginnt Wittgenstein in der *Darlegung* zu lesen, am 3. 9. hält er fest: „Gestern nicht ganz erfolglos gearbeitet. In Tolstoi gelesen mit großem Gewinn.", am 8.9. hat er „viel in Tolstois ‚Erläuterungen zu den Evangelien' gelesen" kurz darauf, am 12. 9., beginnen die Gebete unmittelbar im Anschluß an ein Tolstoizitat:

> Ich arbeite täglich mehr oder weniger und recht zuversichtlich. Immer wieder sage ich mir im Geiste die Worte Tolstois vor: ‚Der Mensch ist <u>ohnmächtig</u> im Fleische, aber <u>frei</u> durch den Geist.' Möge der Geist in mir sein! […] Ich fürchte mich nicht davor, erschossen zu werden, aber davor, meine Pflicht nicht ordentlich zu erfüllen. Gott gebe mir die Kraft! Amen. Amen. Amen.

Die Gebete 1914/1915 (in MSS 101 und 102) gliedern sich grob in drei Typen: 1) an Gott gerichtete Gebete (z.B. „Gott steh mir bei" oder „Gott gebe mir Vernunft und Kraft!!!"), 2) Anrufungen des „Geistes" (z.B. „Der Geist mit mir." oder „Möge der Geist mir Kraft geben.") und 3) die Zeile „Dein Wille geschehe" aus dem *Pater Noster*. Dazu kommen noch zahlreiche Selbstermunterungen („aber nur Mut!", „Tue keinem ein Unrecht!" u. dgl.).

Alle drei Gebetsformen können mit Tolstois gnostischer Evangelienauslegung in Zusammenhang gebracht werden. Im Zentrum dieser steht die Erkenntnis des Lebens, die Tolstoi aus einer bis zur Unkenntlichkeit umgedichteten Version des Prologs zum Johannesevangelium rechtfertigt (Tolstoi 1872: 30 f.). Christus ist der, der für alle Menschen vorbildgebend erkannt hat, daß Gott der Geist ist, dem es zu leben gilt – darum nennt er ihn Vater, wie das alle tun sollen, die im Geiste und nicht im Fleische leben wollen. Es ist die Freiheit in diesem „Geist", die Wittgenstein im ungewohnten Umgang mit der „Gemeinheit" in seiner Umgebung anspricht und die ihm hilft, Distanz zu halten. Gott ist also v.a. dieser Geist, den jeder Menschen in sich selbst suchen und finden muß. Tolstoi organisiert seine *Darlegung* zugleich auch nach den Versen des *Pater Noster*, die der Reihe nach jedem Kapitel zugeordnet sind, so daß auch das bei Wittgenstein wiederkehrende „Dein Wille geschehe" im Tolstoitext präfiguriert ist.

Es ist ein recht eigenwilliges „Christentum", das Wittgenstein hier zur Bewältigung der traumatischen Erfahrungen verinnerlicht, denn Tolstoi distanziert sich nicht nur von der Göttlichkeit Christi, sondern auch von der traditionellen Vorstellung eines Schöpfergottes:

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[1] Diese Situation ändert sich dann grundlegend mit seiner Versetzung an die Front am 21. 3. 1916.

Jeder Mensch erkennt in sich [...] einen freien, vernünftigen und vom Fleische unabhängigen Geist. Dieser Geist, unendlich und aus dem Unendlichen stammend, ist der All-Ursprung, das, was wir Gott nennen. Allein in uns kennen wir ihn. Dieser Geist ist der Ursprung unseres Lebens, ihn muß man höher stellen als alles, ihm muß man leben. Haben wir diesen Geist zur Grundlage für das Leben gemacht, so empfangen wir das wahre, unendliche Leben. [...] Das Leben ist im Geiste, der Tod ist im Fleische. Das Leben des Geistes ist gut, ist Licht; das Leben des Fleisches ist böse, ist Finsternis. [...] Einen Gott, äußeren Schöpfer, Ursprung aller Ursprünge kennen wir nicht. [...] Nur der Geist giebt den Menschen das Leben, von den Menschen aber hängt es ab, es zu bewahren, oder zu verlieren. (Tolstoi 1872, 50 f.)

Wittgenstein versucht angestrengt und mit wechselndem Erfolg sein Leben im Krieg genau entlang dieser gleichgerichteten Dichotomien von Geist/Fleisch, arbeiten/sinnlich sein, gut/böse, glücklich/unglücklich auszurichten und im Sinne Tolstois „dem Geist zu leben" (dazu ausführlich Somavilla 2002).

Striche

Ein flüchtiger Blick wird die zahlreichen waagrechten Striche in den Manuskripten, v.a. jene in MS 101, für Gedankenstriche oder Trennstriche halten, deren Funktion allein in der Textgliederung liegt. Solche eindeutigen Trenn- und Gedankenstriche finden sich auch, sowohl in den codierten persönlichen als auch in den philosophischen Eintragungen. Daneben gibt es aber einen wiederkehrenden Typus von Strichen, die nur schwerlich als Textgliederungselemente deutbar sind. Die Serie der in den Kriegstagebüchern insgesamt ca. 230 Striche dieses Typus beginnt in MS 101 am 15. 9. 1914 mit der Eintragung „Aber nur Mut! Wen der Genius nicht verläßt – – – –!" Vier kurze Striche, die einen Satz (vermutlich eine Anspielung auf Goethes Gedicht *Wandrers Sturmlied*; so Biesenbach 2015: 230 f.) vervollständigen; es steht wohl jeder kurze Strich für ein Wort. Drei Tage später, am 18. 9. schließt die codierte Eintragung mit: „Etwas gearbeitet. ——— ".

Am Tag darauf finden sich zwei ähnliche Striche, wobei der zweite wieder den Abschluß der codierten Eintragung für diesen Tag bildet und erstmals eindeutig zwischen Interpunktionszeichen steht, zwischen einem Punkt als Abschluß für den vorangehenden Satz und einem Rufzeichen. Es ist diese ungewöhnliche Verwendung zwischen Satzzeichen, die vermuten läßt, die Striche könnten für einen selbständigen, womöglich wiederkehrenden Inhalt stehen, der aus besonderen Gründen nicht – d.h. nicht einmal in codierter Form – ausgeschrieben wird. Am 21. und 22. 9. wiederholen sich gleichlange Striche zwischen Punkten am jeweiligen Ende der Eintragungen. Bis zum Ende von MS 101 bleibt dies das typische Erscheinungsbild. Am 6. 10. und 12. 10. finden sich als Abschluß keine Striche, dafür Kurzgebete („Gott mit mir.", „Gott ist mit mir!"), am 11. und 20. 10. wird beides kombiniert („Gott mit mir. ——— "). Die Gestaltung der Striche wird in MS 102, das die Praxis auf den codierten verso-Seiten des Manuskripts offensichtlich fortführt, mit der Zeit immer variantenreicher. Es werden z.B. mehrere Striche hintereinander gesetzt (mit und ohne Trennung durch Satzzeichen) oder länger werdende Striche reichen über eine ganze oder über mehrere Zeilen (die Entwicklung ist in der Tabelle am Ende zusammengefaßt). Auch scheint die Länge der Striche signifikant zu sein (am 18. 1. 1915 wird z.B. – in derselben Zeile – ein auffallend kurzer mit einem sehr langen Strich kombiniert). Als Besonderheit kommt zwischen dem 5. und 13. 3. 1915, als Wittgenstein mit schwerwiegenden

disziplinären Problemen in seiner Aufsichtsfunktion in der Schmiede der Artilleriewerkstatt zu kämpfen hatte (er spricht in diesem Zusammenhang, weil er für seine Aufsicht nicht mit einem entsprechenden offiziellen militärischen Rang ausgestattet worden war, von seiner „unwürdigen Stellung" gegenüber der Mannschaft), sieben Mal ein kurzer Doppelstrich hinzu: „ —— ."

Am 16. 3. 1915 besteht die gesamte Eintragung zum Tag im codierten Teil ausschließlich aus einem einzigen langen Strich. Am 27. 3. sind es ebenfalls nur Striche, ohne jeden weiteren Text. Die Wintermonate 1915 bilden eine Phase, in der einerseits die Striche immer länger werden, teilweise schon mehrere Zeilen ausfüllen (z.B. am 17. 2 und 7. 3.), die philosophischen Eintragungen andererseits aber fast zum Erliegen kommen (schon am 9.2. schreibt Wittgenstein an von Ficker: „Ich bin jetzt in einer sterilen Zeit [...] Aber – leider – fühle ich mich jetzt ganz ausgebrannt." Ficker 2014, Nr. 33, 74). In der Folge mehren sich die Zeichen der Verzweiflung über seine Stellung und darüber, außerstande zu sein „zu arbeiten", d.h. an seinen logischen Problemen arbeiten zu können.

Der Höhepunkt dieser Frustration und der jähe Umschwung in eine neue produktive Arbeitsphase am 15. und 16. 4. 1915 weisen auch Besonderheiten hinsichtlich der Striche auf. Sie treten nämlich in vergleichbarer Weise am 15. und 18. 4. ausnahmsweise auch bei den nichtcodierten philosophischen Eintragungen auf. Die im Bereich der nichtcodierten philosophischen Bemerkungen auf den recto-Seiten in MS 102 sonst vorfindbaren (i.d.R. deutlich kürzeren) Striche dienen ersichtlich der Satzgliederung. Mit einer Ausnahme,

„Aus q folgt ~p, aus q nicht ~p. ——— ?",
(11. 6. 1915),

stehen sie auch nicht zwischen Satzzeichen. Vereinzelt haben Absätze auf den recto-Seiten jedoch am Schluß einen etwas längeren Strich (15. u. 25. 11. 1914, 5., 11. u. 13. 5. 1915, 16. – 20. 6. 1915), vielleicht zur Abgrenzung von Gedankengängen.

Gebetsstriche

Das selbständige Auftreten zwischen Interpunktionszeichen läßt vermuten, daß den Strichen eine konkrete inhaltliche und nicht eine bloß formale Bedeutung zukommt. Zur Begründung der weitergehenden Vermutung, daß es sich beim codierten Inhalt der Striche um kurze, in ihrer Länge variierende Gebete handelt, lassen sich vier Argumente anführen:

1. Die ausformulierten Kurzgebete bilden bei ihrem anfänglichen Auftreten in MS 101 zumeist den Abschluß der codierten persönlichen Eintragungen zum jeweiligen Datum; sie beschließen den Tag. Die Striche treten ebenfalls gehäuft am Ende der Eintragungen auf und machen so den Eindruck, die an den Tagen zuvor ausgeschriebenen Schlußgebete zu vertreten. Dreimal in MS 101 (und weitere 15 mal in MS 102) werden explizite Gebetsformel und Striche am Schluß kombiniert, z.B.:

„ ——————— . Dein wille geschehe.——— ——— ."[2]
(28. 10. 1914)
„ ——— ! Gott gebe mir vernunft & kraft !!! ——— ."
(13. 11. 1914)

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2 Die Übertragung von Baum (GT: 35) mißdeutet hier den letzten Strich als Unterstreichung von "Dein wille".

2. Striche im Inneren der Eintragungen stehen immer im Zusammenhang mit emotionalen Passagen, entweder weil eine besondere Gefahr reflektiert wird,

> „Also heute nacht! —— !"
> (12. 10. 1914)

> „Starke kanonade. —— ."
> (20. 11. 1914),

weil widrige Umstände zu beklagen sind,

> „Und jedes laute wort das ich höre tut mir weh. Ganz ohne Grund!! ———— "
> (14. 11. 1914)

> „wenn ich mich nur einmal ausschlafen könnte ehe die Geschichte anfängt. ———————— !"
> (7. 10. 1914)

> „Kein fühlendes herz soweit mein auge reicht!!!
> ————————— ."
> (9. 11. 1914)

oder weil Wittgenstein sich Mut zuspricht:

> „Aber wir werden ja sehen. —— ."
> (26. 11. 1914)

> „Ich habe viel hoffnung. —— ."
> (4. 12. 1914)

> „Verliere nur nicht dich selbst!!————. ———— ."
> (27. 2. 1915)

Striche schließen auch an Ausdrücke der Erleichterung an (gleich kurzen Dankgebeten) und stehen oft im Zusammenhang mit dem Memorieren der „Arbeit", d.h. den Fortschritt mit seinen logischen Problemen. „Arbeit" hat stets, schon in ihrem dichotomischen Gegensatz zur „Sinnlichkeit", eine religiöse Dimension:
„Die Gnade der Arbeit! —— " (1. 5. 1915)

Die Intensität der Emotion spiegelt sich dabei in der Verwendung der Striche, z.B. bei der Vorstellung, wie es seiner Mutter bei der Nachricht gehen müsse, daß sein Bruder Paul einen Arm verloren hat:

> „Die arme, arme Mama!!! ———— ———— . —— "
> (28. 10. 1914)

3. Die Zahl der ausformulierten Gebete nimmt im Laufe des MS 102 ab, sie reichen bis Anfang Dezember (mit zwei Nachzüglern am 13. 2. und 7. 3. 1915). Mit dem Wechsel in die Artilleriewerkstatt vermindert sich zwar die persönliche Gefährdung, die Probleme mit Kammeraden nehmen aber stark zu, die Stimmung steigert sich bis zur Verzweiflung und die philosophische Arbeit stagniert in einem Zustand der Erschöpfung:

> „Denke an Selbstmord. Werde ich je wieder arbeiten??! —— ———————— ."
> (26. 2. 1915)

Zugleich mit dem Verschwinden der explizit ausgeschriebenen Gebete intensiviert sich immer variantenreicher der Gebrauch der Striche (siehe Tabelle am Ende). Ray Monk liegt darum mit seiner Einschätzung,

> „In den Wintermonaten 1914/15 trug Wittgenstein kaum noch etwas über seinen Glauben ins Tagebuch ein. Er rief Gott nicht mehr an, ihm Kraft zu geben, und Schlußformeln wie ‚Gott helfe mir', ‚Alles in Gottes Hand', ‚Gott steh mir bei' oder ‚Dein Wille geschehe' werden nun seltener." (Monk 1992, 141)

(bei vordergründig korrekter Beobachtung) wahrscheinlich falsch, weil er nicht berücksichtigt, daß Wittgenstein für seine Gebete zunehmend die codierenden Striche als Platzhalter heranzieht. An zwei Tagen im März (16. bzw. 27. 3.) findet er überhaupt keine Worte mehr, seinen depressiven Zustand zu beschreiben, die Eintragungen bestehen nur noch aus Datum und Strichen.

4. Im letzten der erhaltenen Kriegstagebücher (MS 103) ist die Praxis der codierenden Striche wieder weitgehend verschwunden (nur zwei Eintragungen – zum 10. 5. und 13. 8. 1916 – weisen die charakteristischen Striche auf). Dafür gibt es wieder, wie im Herbst 1914, zahlreiche ausgeschriebene Gebetsformeln. Die Gebete finden sich, vergleicht man sie mit der Strichpraxis in MSS 101 und 102, ebenfalls v.a. am Schluß der jeweiligen Eintragungen und sie stehen auch wieder in einem sehr emotionalen, teilweise existentiellen Kontext. Im Unterschied zu Wittgensteins Situation von 1914 bis März 1916 ist sein Leben jetzt im unmittelbaren Fronteinsatz auf dem Beobachtungsstand tatsächlich extrem gefährdet.

Welche Gebete oder wiederkehrende Gebetsformeln die Striche im Einzelnen konkret vertreten, bleibt unklar. Es liegt ihr eigentlicher Zweck vermutlich auch gar nicht darin, den konkreten Inhalt zu verbergen, als den faktischen Vollzug dieser Gebete, v.a. am Ende jedes im Krieg heil überstandenen Tages, i.S. einer persönlichen rituellen Praxis schriftlich festzuhalten.

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Anhang

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
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
MS 102 fol. 66v: www.wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/Ms-102,66v_f

Strichformen	Datum	Anmerkungen
	9.8.14	Beginn MS 101
	15.9.14	vier kurze Striche
	18.9.14	erster langer Strich (noch ohne Endpunkt)
	19.9.14	erstmals Strich selbständig zwischen Satzzeichen
	21.9.14	
	23.10.14	erstmals zwei Striche hintereinander
	25.10.14	
	28.10.14	drei Striche hinter die „Die arme, arme Mama!!!"
	30.10.14	Ende MS 101/Beginn MS 102
	10.11.14	zwei Rufzeichen, in der Zeile das Folgedatum gestrichen
	12.11.14	
	16.11.14	erstmals Striche in zwei Zeilen
	18.11.14	
	10.12.14	
	16.1.15	erstmals Strich über die ganze Zeile
	18.1.15	kurz – lang
	20.1.15	am Ende der nichtcodierten Eintragungen (nach „Das erlösende Wort")
	17.2.15	kräftige Strich(e) zwei ganze Zeilen bis zum Ende
	5.3.15	erstmals kurzer Doppelstrich (nach „Vielleicht gehe ich als Infanterist an die Front.")
	6.3.15	Doppelstrich am Anfang einer Eintragung
	7.3.15	wieder Strich(e) über drei Zeilen Punkt am Schluß auffällig eingeringelt
	8.3.15	
	10.3.15	
	13.3.15	letztmaliger Doppelstrich
	16.3.15	Eintragung, die nur aus einem langen Strich besteht
	27.3.15	Eintragung besteht nur aus Strichen
	15.4.15	erstmals lange Striche *im nichtcodierten Text*
	18.4.15	Strich mit Punkt *im nichtcodierten Text*
	8. 6. 15	letzter Strich im codierten Text von MS 102
	11.6.15	*im nichtcodierten Text* (nach "Aus p folgt ¬q, aus q nicht ¬p.")
	16.6.15	*im nichtcodierten Text* Strich nach 6 Punkten
	22.6.15	Ende MS 102
	29.3.16	Beginn MS 103
	10.5.16	1. Beleg für Gebetsstriche in MS 103
	13.8.16	2. Beleg für Gebetsstriche in MS 103

Art in the Face of the Absurd

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Abstract

Many works of art are valuable. Do they have their value in themselves or is it rather derived from some external source? And why do they have this value? In this paper I interpret and critically assess Albert Camus' answers to these questions. Camus' theory of the value of art is based on his "logic of the absurd", i.e., the idea that the human condition is absurd and that we therefore ought to adopt an attitude of revolt. This idea entails that art lacks any intrinsic value. Rather, Camus argues, art is valuable only insofar as it promotes creators' or recipients' awareness of the absurd and their attitude of revolt. The main problem with this theory is that it exaggerates the significance of the logic of the absurd for art. Even if the human condition is absurd and we ought to revolt, artistic value cannot be reduced to these facts.

Many works of art are valuable. It is not clear how to best account for this value, though. Debates have among others focused on the following two questions. First, is art intrinsically valuable (i.e., valuable in and on itself), or it its value rather derived from some external source? And second, *why* do some instances of art have value? Are they valuable because they arouse certain aesthetic experiences, for example, or because they provide us with knowledge, or because they lead to morally good actions?[1]

One of many theorists who set out to answer these questions is Albert Camus. Camus is probably best known as a practitioner of art. He wrote classics such as *The Stranger* (1989b), *The Plague* (1991b) and *The Fall* (1991a), and was even awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature. Both in his early and late period, however, Camus also extensively wrote *about* art. In this paper I am interested in Camus' early theory of the value of art (as it was mainly expressed in *The Myth of Sisyphus*). My aim is to provide one of the first detailed interpretations of this theory and to critically assess it.

Camus' theory of the value of art is based on his "logic of the absurd", i.e., his idea that the human condition is absurd and that we therefore ought to adopt an attitude of revolt. Accordingly, I will begin by briefly introducing you to this idea (sections 1 and 2).[2] Then I will explain how Camus believes his logic of the absurd grounds answers to the above questions about the location (intrinsic/extrinsic) and the justification (aesthetic/cognitive/moral …) of the value of art (sections 3 to 5).[3] Finally, I will consider the plausibility of Camus' theory (section 6).

1. The Absurd

Camus takes the absurd to denote a relation, in particular a relation between an aspiration and a reality which does not meet this aspiration (2005, 28-29). His most famous illustration of this conception traces back to the Greek myth of Sisyphus (2005, 115-119). Sisyphus is sentenced to eternally roll a rock to the top of a mountain from where it will, due to its own weight, roll back down again. In serving this sentence he aims at anchoring his rock at the top. However, he is put in a world which continuously frustrates

this aim. Whatever Sisyphus does, whatever pains he takes, the rock necessarily rolls back down again.

Camus argues that the *conditio humana* is characterized by an analogous relation of tension. While humans naturally search for meaning, the world could only satisfy this search if there were a God, and hence life after death. But God does not exist. Thus, we struggle to realize meaning, but like Sisyphus we are put in a world in which our efforts will never be rewarded: "At this point of his effort man stands face to face with the irrational. He feels within him his longing for happiness and for reason. The absurd is born of this confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world" (2005, 26).

2. The Normative Implications of the Absurd

Suppose Camus is right that the human condition is characterized by the absurd. How ought one to respond to this recognition? Two natural responses are physical and what Camus calls "philosophical" suicide. Being aware that regardless of how hard I try, I will remain unable to achieve what I desire most, is there any reason for me to continue living at all (physical suicide)? And if I do hold on to life, why should I go on actively searching for meaning, given that I cannot realize it anyway? Wouldn't it be wiser to stop doing so, and instead set my hope in God, life after death, reason, or some other idea that transcends existence (philosophical suicide)?

However, Camus rejects both of these conclusions (2005, 29-30, 51-53). Instead, he urges us to adopt an attitude of "revolt". In Camus' interpretation Sisyphus responds to his sentence by accepting it as a fact (he makes the rock "his thing" (2005, 118); he says „yes" (2005, 119)), but rejecting it as a norm (he confronts his fate with "scorn" (2005, 117); he has a "hatred of death" (2005, 116)). Such an attitude of simultaneous yes and no, Camus believes, is demanded by the absurd as well. As a fact humans should accept the absurd. They should accept that they search for meaning and that this search will never be successful. At the same time, however, we should also confront the absurd with contempt and spite; we should regard its existence as a scandal, an injustice (2005, 53).

3. The Intrinsic Value of Art

Most contemporary art theorists believe that valuable instances of art are valuable in and on themselves — "l'art

pour l'art" (art for art's sake), as a famous 19th century slogan goes. Camus rejects this popular view about the location of the value of art: "the work of art", he writes (2005, 94), "cannot be the end, the meaning, and the consolation of a life. Creating or not creating changes nothing." In fact, Camus' postulation of the absurd even *logically entails* that art lacks any intrinsic value.

In his early philosophy Camus understands the term "meaning" in a highly ambitious sense. To strive for meaning is assumed to be to strive for the perfect and continuous realization of three closely related states. One of these states, besides unity with the non-conscious world and intellectual clarity, is the realization of intrinsic value. Camus believes that humans want to achieve aims which are not only means to realizing other aims, but are valuable in and on themselves. They want an ultimate answer to the question "why" (2005, 11). The absurd, which involves humans' inability to realize meaning, thus entails that nothing has intrinsic value. And if nothing has intrinsic value then art cannot have such value either.

Certain passages in the *Myth of Sisyphus* (e.g., 2005, 58-59, 64-66) as well as early literary works such as *Caligula* (1984) and *The Stranger* (1989b) suggest that Camus might not only deny intrinsic value, but any value whatsoever. In fact, however, he regards certain instances of art as good in an extrinsic, or more precisely in an instrumental sense. On Camus' view art has such extrinsic value to the extent that it fulfills both a certain cognitive and a certain moral function. In particular, it must promote our awareness of the absurd and our attitude of revolt — it must lead us towards "absurd existence" (2005, 64-67). In the following two sections I will explain how Camus believes art can fulfill this function with regard to the artist and with regard to the recipient.

4. The Extrinsic Value of the Process of Creation

Camus believes that artistic creation is valuable because it is more likely to lead us towards absurd existence than other forms of life (2005, 66-67, 88-89). Somewhat exaggerated, he even claims that for any person "the work of art is [...] the sole [sic!] chance of keeping his consciousness and of fixing its adventures (2005, 91). But of course Camus does not mean that *any* kind of artistic creation reliably promotes awareness of the absurd and an attitude of revolt. In order for this to be the case, he suggests, three conditions must be fulfilled.

First, the artist must not ascribe intrinsic value to his work (2005, 99-100). Doing so would commit him to the achievability of (a certain aspect of) meaning, and would therefore be incompatible with accepting the absurd: "To work and create 'for nothing', to sculpture in clay, to know that one's creation has no future, to see one's work destroyed in a day while being aware that, fundamentally, this has no more importance than building for centuries – this is the difficult wisdom that absurd thought sanctions" (2005, 110-111).

Second, to the extent that an art form admits of doing so[4], artistic value also requires that the artist "illustrates" (2005, 99) the absurd and the attitude of revolt. Such illustrations need not be straightforward depictions, but can also take allegoric, metaphoric or other indirect forms. For

example, a novelist's likelihood of revolting may well increase by him/her showing how alternative responses to the absurd (such as physical or philosophical suicide) fail. In fact, even Camus' own literary oeuvre predominantly consists of such cautionary tales. Caligula, for example, not only mistakenly infers a rampant nihilism from the absurd, but also deliberately lets himself be killed (1984). And Meursault in *The Stranger* only breaks through to revolt after he was sentenced to death (1989b).

Finally, in art forms where it arises, the artist must also resist the temptation to *explain* the experiences that his/her work addresses; for in the face of the absurd any explanation is ultimately futile. However hard we try (scientifically, philosophically, etc.), we cannot get to the ultimate bottom of reality; we cannot reduce its divergent and complex phenomena to one single explanatory principle. All that we are left with is thus to "enumerate" and "describe" the experiences that we make (2005, 42; see also 2005, 91-92, 94-95, 97-99, 112).

5. The Extrinsic Value of the Product of Creation

Camus believes that the value of certain instances of art cannot only be grounded from the perspective of artists, but also from the perspective of recipients. Recipients too can be led to see the absurd and to revolt (Davis 2014, 28; Sefler 1974, 416). Typically, he argues, works of art fulfill this function when they spring from a valuable process of creation, as explained above (2005, 97).

First, the work of art must reflect a certain kind of freedom of thought and action (which Camus considers to be entailed by the absurd (2005, 54-58)). In this regard it is again most important that the artist does not ascribe any intrinsic value to his/her work. Being aware that this work "may well not be", "freeing" oneself from it, spontaneity and creativity flow naturally, and become reflected in one's work (2005, 114).

Second, to the extent that they can, works of art must "illustrate" the absurd and the revolt in the (liberal) sense explained above. Camus believes that many famous works fail to do so. One of his examples is Franz Kafka's novel *The Castle*. K.'s futile attempts to gain access to the mysterious castle that summoned him may readily be seen as a metaphor for the absurd. However, at least on Camus' interpretation, K. in the end gives up his struggle and indulges in irrational hopes. He commits "philosophical suicide" (2005, 128-129).[5]

Finally, in order for a work of art to promote absurd existence it must also only *describe* rather than *explain* the experiences it addresses, i.e., it must not pretend intellectual clarity where there is none. Camus believes that Kafka's *The Trial* fulfills this condition. In this earlier novel Joseph K. is prosecuted and punished by an unknown authority for an unknown crime. In the end he is killed for no apparent reason (2005, 122).

6. Critical Assessment

In the preceding sections I explained Camus' theory of the value of art. How plausible is this theory? Elsewhere (Pölzler 2011, 110-114, 2014, 2016) I argued that interpreted in a philosophical sense, Camus' early logic of the

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4 Camus is of course aware that compared to literature, other forms of art (such as visual arts and music) are less able to illustrate the absurd and the revolt, and less able to provide explanations of the phenomena they address (2005, 95-96).

5 This is thought to be exemplified, among others, by K. turning from his previous lover Frieda to the Barnabas sisters, who have a very troubled relation to the castle.

absurd is incoherent. In addition, his specifically art-related considerations appear problematic in at least two respects as well.

First, promoting absurd existence does not seem *sufficient* for a process or product of creation to be valuable. Suppose I hastily scrawl the following text on a blank canvas: "Your existence is absurd (i.e., you search for meaning, but will never be able to achieve it), therefore you ought to revolt (i.e., accept the absurd as a fact and reject it as a norm)". The resulting work may qualify as a work of art, and may lead some persons towards absurd existence. But would this work really have any artistic value? Even in a universe characterized by the absurd, it seems, such value requires other than absurdity-promoting qualities as well: qualities such as artistic skill, style, or beauty, say (Lamarque and Olsen 1994).

Second, increasing our awareness of the absurd and our likelihood of revolting does not seem *necessary* for a process or product of creation to be valuable either. Plenty of valuable art, from political paintings to comic poetry, fails to fulfill one or both of these conditions. Kafka's *The Castle* is a prime example. As another one, consider Truman Capote's famous true crime novel *In Cold Blood*. With its focus on murders and executions the novel may draw some attention to the meaninglessness of the world. Far from promoting one's attitude of revolt, however, it rather seems to have a discouraging effect. Both the fate and the attitude of the protagonists are depicted as completely determined by earlier events in their lives. However, given its original style and concept, its psychological accuracy, etc., *In Cold Blood* nevertheless is a highly valuable work of art.

None of this is to say that promoting absurd existence should not play any role in evaluating art in a universe characterized by the absurd. But Camus clearly exaggerates this role. In fact, over the years he seems to have become aware of this weakness of his original theory of the value of art himself; for in later works such as the *The Rebel* (1989a) and *Summer* (1995) he also inferred stylistic criteria for judging art from his logic of the absurd, and put much stronger emphasis on the value of beauty.

Conclusion

In this paper I attempted to provide an interpretation and critical assessment of Camus' early theory of the value of art. It turned out that based on his logic of the absurd, Camus denies that art has any intrinsic value. Rather, he argues, art is valuable only insofar as it promotes creators' or recipients' awareness of the absurd and their attitude of revolt. The main problem with this theory is that it exaggerates the significance of the logic of the absurd for art. Even if Camus is right that the human condition is absurd and we ought to revolt, artistic value cannot be reduced to these facts, but depends on various other issues as well.

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Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, the Foundations of Philosophy, and the Theory of Meaning

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Abstract

In the past decades, due to the impact of the *Philosophical Investigations*, the related historiography sought to revisit the *Tractatus* as if this work anticipated to some extent the theory of meaning in the former. The author, placing the *Tractatus* in the history of philosophy, discusses this presupposition. He holds that Wittgenstein in the latter, following Frege and (especially) Russell's investigations on logic, addresses the ultimate foundations of philosophy and human knowledge in general, and that this desideratum resumes in new terms Descartes' and Kant's modern conceptions of such foundations. It is in the light of this framework that one must understand the theory of meaning presented in that work. While the *Philosophical Investigations*, in some sense, are a post-modern work that breaks with the foundationalist ideal, the *Tractatus*, on the other hand, clearly falls within the scope of philosophical modernity.

The temptation to re-read *Tractatus* according to the fundamental findings of the *Philosophical Investigations* has been recurrent over the past decades (Iglesias 1977; Hylton 1990; Hacker 1996). The dominant interpretation is that, since the theory of meaning and associated theses are the fundamental subject matter of the latter, Wittgenstein was already working precisely in this sense in the former: i.e. he was already working on a conception of such theory exempt from false epistemological and metaphysical assumptions like those found, at the time, in Russell's philosophy of logical atomism. With the *Tractatus* we would have, from the point of view of logic, "pure" metaphysics and epistemology, without Russell's inconsistencies and contradictions. So, the main concern of Wittgenstein in that book would be, anticipating the *Philosophical Investigations*, the theory of meaning. Meaning would be, from the beginning, the central subject of philosophy; in fact, *the only true subject in philosophy*. But, regarding the *Tractatus*, for what reasons? It remains to be explained how, in this context, several sections of that book are understood, including those which concern the metaphysical and ontological framework of the theory of proposition, and those on the status of logic and its applications to physics (mechanics) and, hereby, to human knowledge overall. It is far from clear how a theory of meaning which, in principle, evacuates and dismisses epistemology and metaphysics and is developed in behaviourist terms, as is the case in the *Philosophical Investigations*, can be reconciled with another arising precisely from assumptions of the kind, as with the *Tractatus*. How this work, in spite of its novelty and originality, will reconcile - without compromise or sharing of assumptions – with the philosophy of its time and relevant purposes, in particular with that of Russell in *The Principles of Mathematics, Principia Mathematica* and *Our Knowledge of the External World,* is far from clear. To sacrifice the enhanced comprehensibility of history of philosophy history on the pretext of greater coherence of our interpretations, such as those that seek to explain the link between the two fundamental works of Wittgenstein solely on the grounds of the theory of meaning, does not appear to be appropriate hermeneutics.

What the present paper sets out to do, rather provocatively, is to revisit the *Tractatus* based on the following assumptions: (1) Wittgenstein embraced the same foundationalist purpose of philosophy as presented by Russell in the aforementioned books, to justify it radically and analyse its limits (it is basically hereby, i.e. by sharing and committing to the essential assumptions of the English philosopher, that the differences with him arise, and not, as often alleged, by more or less extreme opposition between both); (2) such desideratum, historically speaking, is precisely that in which, particularly since Kant and absolute German idealism, logic (conceived and designated this way or that [Wittgenstein, right away in the title of the *Tractatus*, speaks of a "philosophical logic"]) arises as the founding matrix of human knowledge and action overall; (3) it is within this foundationalist context and framework, which is characteristic of modernity in general and is clearly epistemological and metaphysical, that we can talk of a "theory of meaning" in the *Tractatus*.

That logic, well before it became "mathematics", formed the aforementioned matrix, is something that may be seen in the second part of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, which he precisely called "transcendental logic" (Kant 1998, Part II). It was already a "philosophical logic": logic identifies itself with the discursive processes of pure reason, insofar as it seeks to justify, through mathematics and physics, the possibility of human knowledge overall. Absolute German idealism, under the elimination of the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon, expands the Kantian concept of logic, which Hegel addresses as a "science" (Hegel 1969). However, without mentioning logic and associating it with philosophy, Descartes' main goal in *Meditations,* and particularly in *Principles of Philosophy*, was latently the same as Kant's: in the latter book Descartes introduces the famous "tree of knowledge", in which philosophy (or metaphysics) is the trunk and the different sciences are the branches (Descartes 1985, 177ff.). Therefore, philosophy is responsible for the foundation of the other sciences and knowledge as a whole. The desideratum of Descartes and Kant regarding the foundations, as Rorty and others in the 1980s showed (Rorty 1979; Lyotard 1979), made a decisive contribution towards philosophical modernity in general up to the contemporary era and the beginning of post-modernity, after the Second World War. It is in it that we must contextualise Russell's researches on logic from 1900 onwards, in *The Principles of Mathematics* and other works. It is important to remember that Russell had been a neo-Hegelian before the 1900s, when, as he highlights in his auto-biography, every time he had to decide between Hegel and Kant, he usually "took the side" of the first of the two great philosophers (Russell 1959, chap. 4). The core idea of what we came to call "logicism" is that *mathematical* logic took over the

place, in new terms, that traditionally belonged to philosophy and metaphysics in particular: inasmuch as physics can be reduced to mathematics, which, in turn, can be reduced to logic (as Frege and Russell himself showed), the latter would be the ultimate foundation of human knowledge as a whole. However, such mathematical logic of Russell was in its own manner a philosophical logic. Logic, as mentioned in *Our Knowledge of the External World*, is the "essence of philosophy" (Russell 1914, chap. II), because all there is to be said on the latter involves fundamentally logic (Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* states just that.) It was an optimistic idea from the start that is since *The Principles of Mathematics*: to reduce mathematics to logic goes hand in hand with the intent to eliminate or, at least, to delimit traditional epistemology and metaphysics, including therein Kant's philosophy, and in particular his idea of "synthetic *a priori*" (the English philosopher's flagship in that book). However, on the other hand, as Wittgenstein suggested, even before the *Tractatus* (Wittgenstein 1969)*,* about multiple questions connected with Russell's philosophy at the time, it was clearly an inconsistent and contradictory idea in itself, because, in principle, its vocation had to be epistemological and metaphysical: Russell's philosophy of logical atomism and (especially) his programme of the "construction of the external world" attest exactly to it. Is it possible to justify logic as the ultimate foundation of human knowledge, without becoming involved in the constraints and contradictions featuring in a project like Russell's? Such is the ambition of the *Tractatus*. Its Russellian origins, whose more remote roots are Cartesian and Kantian, are clear.

That logic must play the foundational role we have just mentioned and that it must be, as Wittgenstein says somewhat enigmatically, a "philosophical logic," is obvious in the *Tractatus*, right in the first two sections, with the metaphysical and ontological foundations of the theory of proposition. It is also particularly evident that such role covers all domains of traditional philosophy, including what, for it, was the actual epistemological scope of knowledge (the references of Wittgenstein that concern physics, and mechanics in particular, have to do with that scope, since, as in Descartes and in Kant, it is through them that such scope is justified) or of ethics, and which are now reinterpreted, in a more or less radical fashion, in line with the new foundations delivered by logic. This conception derives directly from Russell, regardless of the special developments given by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*, and which entail, as previously suggested and highlighted further ahead, a new theory of meaning. However, Russell's philosophy of logical atomism, and particularly his conception of a "logically perfect language" (see Russell 1986; 1988), as I sustained in some papers (see Ribeiro 2005; 2010), also suggested that logic is not only the "essence of philosophy" but, ultimately, *the essence of the world*, metaphysically and ontologically understood. Wittgenstein agrees with this conception in the light of his own philosophy: the innovation is in the introduction of the meta-philosophical problem of the meaning of logic and the desideratum itself of a foundation, which Russell never really submitted. As he said:

Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.—We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is the world, that there is not.—For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also.—What we cannot think, that we cannot think; we cannot therefore *say* what we cannot think. (TLP 5.61)

Through this perspective, as is known, *Tractatus* announces the end of philosophy (at least as systematic research).

It follows from the above that Wittgenstein's main concern in the *Tractatus*, after Russell, concerns precisely the issue of the foundations of knowledge and human action overall through logic, and that such a problem arises for him, critically and originally, as that of the foundations of philosophy itself. From this standpoint, logic in that book is a "philosophical logic". As I have suggested, it is a problem—perhaps even the ultimate problem—of philosophical modernity. Incidentally, this was how Wittgenstein interpreted it in his exchanges with Russell, even before he published the *Tractatus*. The only reason in my view for it not having been suitably underlined and analysed by specialised literature in the last decades is that the respective authors wished to clearly distinguish between Wittgenstein and Russell, polarising their differences, as if there were no philosophically constitutional connection between them, with the relevant commitments and complicities. (Therefore the emphasis on what, in the *Tractatus*, regardless of the aforementioned connection, preceded and anticipated the new theory of meaning in the *Investigations*.) In effect, according to the above stated, the *Tractatus* may and should be read as a tribute to the English philosopher paid by the Austrian author, not withstanding, as is known, all misunderstandings between the two triggered by Russell's "Introduction" to that work.

Through the problem of the foundations of philosophy one may speak of an actual theory of meaning in *Tractatus*, but its reach can also be interpreted basically from the perspective of modernity. As Pears suggested: while Kant's question in the *Critique of Pure Reason* was "What can I know?" Witgenstein's question in the *Tractatus*, closing the magnificent cycle of that modernity, was "What can I say?" or more specifically "What can I say with sense?" (Pears 1987, Part I) The epistemological and metaphysical question of *knowledge* appears, epistemologically and metaphysically still, as a question about *meaning* in language. In effect, as is known, in the first sections of the book he looks into the conditions of possibility of meaning in ordinary language in general, and then extends that investigation to logic itself and its applications. This does not mean that Wittgenstein was interested in that theory by itself, in contrast with what happens in the *Philosophical Investigations*, where he introduced and developed it in entirely different terms and assumptions, in particular, independently of traditional metaphysics and epistemology. That research into meaning in the *Tratactus* is at the same time research into the foundations of logic itself; and it is precisely from this point of view that it is relevant. The main point is that, in the *Investigations*, there are no grounds—via logic or otherwise—for knowledge and human action, besides, paradoxically, the absence thereof. Like other great philosophers of his time (for example Quine) Wittgenstein clearly abandons the foundationalist paradigm, of Descartes and Kant, in philosophy. If the *Tractatus* is a modern work, the *Philosophical Investigations* are post-modern. It is clear that, from my perspective in this paper, one may always state that the main problem of the former *concerns essentially* the role that a theory of meaning can play in the foundations of philosophy.

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Pentagon und Pentagramm – Wittgensteins grafische Transformation der Kappschen Technikphilosophie

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Abstract

In Wittgensteins posthum veröffentlichten *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik* (BGM) findet sich eine Serie von Zeichnungen, deren Figuren „Hand" und „Drudenfuß" genannt werden und die untereinander mit „Projektionslinien" verbunden sind. Die Gleichzahligkeit der beiden Figuren wird offenbar demonstriert, um hiermit die Geltungsbedingungen geometrischer Beweise zu hinterfragen. Ein ähnlich unvermittelter und irritierender Einsatz des gezeichneten Pentagramms fand sich bereits in den Vorlesungen von 1935. Als Quelle für die Herkunft des Pentagramm-Motivs lassen sich drei Manuskripte Wittgensteins angeben (MS 148, 117 und 118), in denen es über viele Manuskriptseiten hinweg sowohl grafisch als auch thematisch variiert wird. Wo es jedoch herkommt und warum Wittgenstein ihm überhaupt diese intensive und über Jahre anhaltende Aufmerksamkeit widmet, bleibt dabei unausgesprochen. Der Vortrag resümiert den philosophischen Ertrag dieser Faszinationsgeschichte, die auch den Aspektwechsel vorwegnimmt und versucht dabei nachzuweisen, dass Wittgenstein Thema und Zeichnung aus der Lektüre von Ernst Kapps „Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik" bezogen hat.

1.

Der ehemalige Student des Ingenieurwesens Ludwig Wittgenstein kannte Techniktheorien wie die „Theoretische Kinematik" (1875) von Franz Reuleaux bereits aus dem Elternhaus. Die in den Vorlesungen und den BGM (83ff., 235, 249, 434) immer wieder angeführte Frage, ob ein zeichnerisch dargestellter Mechanismus mit den Gesetzen eines physischen übereinstimme, nimmt bis in die Illustration auf Reuleaux Bezug. Ob sich in der elterlichen Bibliothek ebenfalls Ernst Kapps *Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik* (1877) befunden haben, wissen wir nicht. Kapp zitierte darin Reuleaux intensiv und meist zustimmend, um gleichwohl seine eigene Hauptthese, das Prinzip der Organprojektion, zu untermauern. Es bezeichnet eine doppelte Projektionsbeziehung zwischen Mensch und Technik, die für die gesamte Kulturgeschichte nachgewiesen werden soll. Demnach ‚projizieren' sich in einem ersten Schritt ‚unbewußt' Form- und Funktionsverhältnisse des menschlichen Körpers in die Technik und tragen, dermaßen externalisiert, „als wissenschaftlicher Forschungsapparat retrospektiv zur Selbsterkenntnis" (Kapp 2015, 96) bei.

Im Anschluss an Aristoteles versteht Kapp die Hand als das „Werkzeug der Werkzeuge" und sieht „aus dem unversiegbaren Reichtum ihrer Organisation die gesamte Kulturwelt" (Kapp 2015, 76) hervorgehen. Sie wird auch zum Vorbild für Maße und Maßstäbe, zwischen denen Kapp deutlich unterscheidet: „Nur in der Hand, aus welcher Werkzeuge und Geräte hervorgingen, konnte neben den Maßen derselben auch die Elementarvorschrift für den Zählmodus eingebettet sein. Zugleich mit dem Werkzeug projizierte die Hand die ihr von Natur einhaftenden Maße und deren Zahlenwerte." (Ebd.) Das Maß bezeichnet die im menschlichen Körper und insbesondere in der Hand enthaltenen Proportionsverhältnisse, die erst in mechanischen Maßstäben messbare, quantifizierbare Relationen anzeigen. Die Hand verkörpere deshalb eine *Inzahl*, keine nummerische *Anzahl* (vgl. ebd., 221ff.).

Zu den Maßen gehören im Unterschied zu arithmetischen Maßstäben daher auch Proportionsregeln wie die „Goldene Schnitt", der als Problem der stetigen Teilung bereits den Pythagoräern bekannt war, als morphologisches Paradigma aber erst 1854 mit einer Schrift von Adolf Zeising begründet wurde. Kapp widmet ihm das längste Kapitel seines Buches, „Das morphologische Grundgesetz". Die menschliche Hand ‚projiziert' sich demnach in jene ideale harmonische Proportionsregel des Goldenen Schnittes, die Kapp in der letzten Illustration seines Buches mit der Doppelfigur von Pentagon und Pentagramm illustriert (Abb.1).

Ich möchte im Folgenden zeigen, dass sich Wittgensteins Pentagrammzeichnungen, die ab den Vorlesungen von 1935 und im parallel angefertigten Manuskript 148 auftreten, direkt an Kapps Pentagon-Pentagramm-Figur anschließen. Ab dem Sommer 1937 wird sie in den Manuskripten 118 und 117 erneut variiert und geht in das Typoskript 222 sowie weitere Teile der späteren BGM ein (Abb. 2). Dabei greift Wittgenstein mindestens zwei Themen auf: Erstens wird die von Kapp beschriebene grafische Überführbarkeit von Pentagon und Pentagramm für Wittgenstein zum Anlass, das angeführte „Schaubild" (V 374) in sequentiellen Zeichnungen zu demontieren, wobei er die Differenz zwischen einem zeichnerischen Experiment und einem regelbasierten geometrischen Beweis verhandelt. Zweitens integriert Wittgenstein auch die Rede von der Hand als der „Spenderin der Zählwerte" (Kapp 2015, 243) in seine Diskussion der Gleichzahligkeit und der grafisch demonstrierten Zuordnung der Elemente zweier Klassen.


Abb. 1

Abb. 2

Für den korrekten Nachweis dieser Beziehung muss ausgeschlossen werden können, dass Wittgenstein und Kapp auf eine gemeinsame Quelle rekurrieren. Das ist nicht einfach, weil beide meist ohne Quellennachweis zitieren. Da Kapp ausführlich den Erfinder des Goldenen Schnittes, Adolf Zeising, und die Rezeption seines Werkes diskutiert, habe ich vor allem überprüft, ob sich Wittgenstein ebenfalls auf diese Literatur bezogen hat.[1] Dabei fand sich für die Wittgensteinsche Kombination der Hand als Vorbild der Zahl mit der grafischen Transformierbarkeit von Pentagon und Pentagramm keine weitere Übereinstimmung, sodass Kapps *Grundlinien* als Anlass wahrscheinlich werden, obwohl Wittgenstein ihn nie erwähnt hat (vgl. Biesenbach 2011). Allerdings modifiziert Wittgenstein Kapps Themen auch, wenn er den Goldenen Schnitt unerwähnt lässt, die Motive Hand, Zahl und Pentagramm direkt miteinander verbindet und nach intensiver grafischer Variation in philosophische Fragen zur Geltung und Überzeugungsleistung von Beweisbildern überführt.

2.

Wittgenstein geht erstmals in den Vorlesungen von 1935 und im parallel angefertigten Manuskript 148 auf das Pentagrammmotiv ein. Im Rahmen seiner Kritik an Freges und Russells Begriff der Zahl hatte er sich in den letzten Vorlesungen des Frühjahrstrimesters 1935 mit dem Problem der Zuordnung der Elemente zweier Klassen beschäftigt und gefragt, wie ihre Gleichzahligkeit demonstriert wird. Anfangs spricht er davon, „alle Dinge von der Art des Verbindungslinienziehens, Schnürespannens und Händehaltens als Zuordnungen [zu] bezeichnen." (V 340). In der 14. Vorlesung wird dann die Differenz zwischen einer geometrischen und einer gezeichneten Linie diskutiert, wobei die erste sich zur zweiten verhalte, wie ein „dünner Faden" zu einem „dicken Strick", denn eine geometrische Linie habe „im Gegensatz zu einer gezeichneten Linie keine Breite" (V 353). „Die Beziehung zwischen dem geometrischen Axiom und der grob gezeichneten Linie ist die Beziehung zwischen einer Regel und ihrer Anwendung." (V 353), heißt es.

In der dritten Vorlesung des folgenden Ostertrimesters bringt Wittgenstein diese Fragen dann mit der Kappschen Pentagon-Pentagramm-Figur zusammen. „Der Gedanke der eineindeutigen Zuordnung ist ein Bild, durch das wir eine bestimmte Tatsache betrachten [...]." (V 368). Nun geht es also nicht mehr um den Status der Verbindungslinien, sondern um den des Bildes, das zwischen geometrischem Beweis und zeichnerischem Experiment oszilliert: „Im Gegensatz zum Experiment ist das Ergebnis bei einem sogenannten demonstrativen Beweis kein Satz, sondern eine Regel der Grammatik. Habe ich ein Experiment durchgeführt, wenn ich ein umschriebenes Pentagramm zeichne und feststelle, daß es fünf äußere Eckpunkte hat?" (V 369f.)

Ursprünglich irritiert und fasziniert Wittgenstein am Pentagon-Pentagramm-Motiv offenbar seine zeichnerische Transformierbarkeit, die er im Manuskript 148 auf den Doppelseiten 8-15 wiederholt praktiziert. Eine Sequenz, die klar zu Kapps Ausführungen passt, ist dort am Seitenrand sogar mit drei senkrechten Linien markiert, die Wittgenstein sonst nutzt, um wichtige Aufzeichnungen hervorzuheben. Im Notizbuch gehen dem folgenden Eintrag diese Sätze voraus: „I dont know whether the pentagram fits the pentagon. If so the diagonals of a pentagon must give a pentagram. Let's try it.'" (MS 148, 14 v., Abb. 3)

Abb. 3

Die prinzipielle geometrische Transformierbarkeit der Figuren kann gewusst und auch beschrieben werden, wie es Kapp ja macht. Gleichwohl eröffnet sich in der Praxis des Zeichnens ein anderer Erfahrungsraum für die Verwandtschaft der Figuren: „It seems we are learning by experiment a timeless truth about the shape of a Pentagon or of a Pentagram." (Abb.3) Aber ist diese zeitlose Wahrheit nicht bereits in jenen Regeln angelegt, die im Zeichnen bloß reproduziert werden? Versuchsweise assoziiert Wittgenstein den geometrischen Kontext von Pentagon und Pentagramm mit Wilhelm Buschs *Anleitung zur Zeichnung historischer Porträts*: „If you draw the diagonals in P you get p. If you do this + this + this + this you get Napoleon.'" (MS 148, 15 v, sowie: V 383)

Kapps schriftsprachliche Darstellung der regelhaften Transformation: „Zieht man im regelmäßigen Fünfeck die Diagonalen so durchschneiden sich dieselben genau nach der Proportion des Goldenen Schnittes" (Kapp 2015, 243), kommentiert Wittgenstein mit: „Was in der Zeit geschieht, wenn [...] wir eine Diagonale zeichnen, spielt im Beweis gar keine Rolle." (V 373f.) Und doch überprüft er jede nur denkbare Variante zeichnerisch.

So lässt sowohl die Einzeichnung von Diagonalen in ein Pentagon als auch die Verlängerung seiner fünf Außenseiten bis zu den jeweils neu entstehenden Schnittpunkten

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1 Weder bei Adolf Zeising, *Neue Lehre von den Proportionen des menschlichen Körpers* (Leipzig 1854), noch bei seinen von Kapp zitierten Nachfolgern Gustav Theodor Fechner, Conrad Hermann, Theodor Wittstein und Richard Hasenclever, findet sich eine Erwähnung oder Illustration des Pentagramm-Motivs. Seine Abbildungen übernimmt Kapp, abgesehen vom Pentagramm-Motiv, aus der genannten Literatur.

ein Pentagramm entstehen. Umgekehrt lässt sich ein Pentagramm durch eine Verbindung seiner fünf Ecken miteinander wiederum in ein Pentagon transformieren. „Diese nach auswärts oder einwärts beliebig wiederholbare Prozedur führt immer zu den nämlichen Resultaten [...]" (Kapp 2015, 243), heißt es bei Kapp.

Wittgensteins Kritik richtet sich gegen die fixierende Darstellung dieser „Resultate" im schematisierenden Einzelbild, das ihm als „Schaubild" oder „Diagramm" gilt: „Und dann sei das, was man sieht, die Zeichnung als Ganzes, ähnlich einem vollständigen Experiment, dessen Anfang und Ende man in einer Abbildung dargestellt sieht. So verhält es sich jedoch nicht, sondern es ist ein Bild dessen, wie ein Experiment beschaffen wäre, wenn es dieses Resultat ergäbe. Das Bild eines Experiments ist seinerseits gar kein Experiment." (V 374f.) Vielmehr „gebrauchen" wir das „Bild als Maßstab" (V 375).

Jenseits dieses fixierenden Gebrauchs weist das Pentagon-Pentagramm-Motiv aber keine stabile Bedeutung auf: „Durch verschiedene Aufmerksamkeitsakte läßt sich eine Figur in verschiedener Weise aufteilen" (V 385) heißt es, wobei es sich schon um „ein Phänomen des Sehens bestimmter Aspekte" (ebd.) handelt. „Wenn die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Tatsache gelenkt wird, daß ein Pentagramm aus einem Fünfeck und fünf Dreiecken besteht, scheint man etwas zu sehen, was unabhängig davon, ob die Aufmerksamkeit darauf gelenkt ist oder nicht, vorhanden ist. Daß das Pentagramm aus diesen Teilen besteht, dauert jedoch nur solange, wie wir es unter diesem Aspekt sehen." (V 386) Dieses bildrezeptive Phänomen ist aber zugleich in bildgebende Praktiken eingebunden: „Daraus geht hervor, welche Rolle die Aufmerksamkeit auf einen Aspekt bei einem demonstrativen Beweis spielen kann." (V 386)

Für W.J.T. Mitchell war das spätere Hase-Ente-Bild deshalb ein „Metapicture", weil es bildtheoretische Grundsatzfragen thematisierte. Das gilt noch viel deutlicher für das wiederholt variierte Pentagon-Pentagramm-Bild.

3.

Stand in den Vorlesungen und besonders im Manuskript 148 die Kappsche Kippfigur im Zentrum der Pentagramm-thematik, so konzentrierte sich Wittgenstein spätestens ab dem Sommer 1937 auf die grafische Verbindung von Hand und Fünfeck. Man kann sagen, er greift nun Kapps These auf, wonach „die Hand mit dem Pentagramm in mystische Berührung geraten ist" und als „Spenderin der Zählwerte" (Kapp 2015:242f.) fungiert. Gemäß seiner Kritik am „Schaubild" präsentiert Wittgenstein diese Projektionsbeziehung in einer dreiteiligen Anordnung (Abb.4), die uns auch jene fehlenden Zwischenglieder übersichtlicher Darstellungen zeigt, die er im Frazer-Text eingefordert hatte (vgl. Frazer 37).

Die stilisierte „Form der Hand" (BGM 49), die Wittgenstein ab Manuskript 118 zeichnet, unterscheidet sich deutlich von seinen anderen Strichlisten im Kontext der Gleichzahligkeit, denn sie ahmt tatsächlich die Längendifferenz der einzelnen Finger nach. Damit naturalisiert Wittgenstein das Motiv der Hand und lässt sie wie bei Kapp als organisches Vorbild der Zahl 5 gelten. Als Zahlwert gebendes Organ wurde sie erstmalig in den Vorlesungen genannt und zwar genau dort, wo auch die Pentagon-Pentagramm-Illustration auftrat: „Nehmen wir an, die menschliche Hand gelte als Muster der 5. Dann gliche die Feststellung, dass die Hand fünf Finger hat, der über das Pentagramm" (V 372) und seine fünf äußeren Eckpunkte, hieß es dort.

Das Manuskript 118 enthält vier Pentagramm- und drei Pentagonzeichnungen, in denen die Relationen zwischen Hand und Pentagon-Pentagramm grafisch variiert werden sowie dreimal das Sechseck- oder Polygon-Motiv, an dem sich Kapps „nach auswärts gerichtete Prozedur" wiederholt: das Sechseck wird ein Dreieck (MS 118, 86f.) und das Achteck (Polygon genannt) zum Quadrat (MS 118, 56). Im Unterschied zum Pentagon sind diese Operationen allerdings nicht umkehrbar.

Abb.4, MS 118, 52.

In der Übertragung der Aufzeichnungen in das Manuskript 117 (begonnen ab 11. 9. 1937) behält Wittgenstein die dreiteilige Argumentationsfolge bei und verändert nur die Illustration: das Pentagon wird ein Pentagramm (MS 117 enthält vier Pentagramm- aber keine Pentagonzeichnung mehr). Die finale Zeichnung der Serie wird dabei anhand ihrer je eigentümlichen Konnotationen beurteilt, wenn einmal von einem „Fünfeck mit Fortsätzen (an den Ecken) die wie Staubgefäße aussehen" gesprochen wird und in der Übertragung der Serie dann von „einem Stern mit fadenförmigen Fortsätzen" (MS 117, 40) die Rede ist. Deutlich ist in diesen Varianten zu sehen, wie Wittgenstein die Verbindungslinien dünner zu zeichnen versucht als die Figuren selbst.

Die schematisierten Figuren erhalten Namen, die wie beim späteren Entenhasen in Versalien ausgedrückt werden (ein Verfahren, das bereits Reuleaux für seine „Kinematische Zeichensprache" vorgeschlagen hatte, vgl. ders. 1875, 249).

4.

Wittgenstein zeichnet diese dreiteilige Serie und ihre Varianten auch in das Typoskript 222, das den ersten Teil der BGM ausmacht. Das „Bild (Beweisbild)" gilt nun als „ein Instrument des Überzeugens" (BGM 435), wobei seine spezifische Evidenz explizit in die zeichnerische Ausfüh-

rung verlegt wird, wenn der Beweis der „anschauliche Vorgang" (BGM 173) ist oder während des Beweises „unsere Anschauung geändert" (BGM 239) wird. So diskutiert Wittgenstein am Beweisbild den Zwang einer Überzeugung, die sich visuell konstituiert: „Wenn wir beim Beweis sagen: ‚Das *muß* herauskommen' – so nicht aus Gründen, die wir nicht *sehen*." (BGM 171) Dieses „Phänomen des unmittelbaren Einsehens" wird zugleich als ein im bildproduktiven „Handeln des Menschen" (BGM 241) konstituiertes Ereignis aufgefasst, das sich nicht aus einer Konstruktionsanleitung deduzieren lässt. Erst im „Ziehen der Projektionslinien" entsteht jene Überzeugung, die den geführten Beweis vom Einzelfall löst und für weitere Anwendungen qualifiziert: „Und so prägt der Beweis durch Ziehen der Projektionslinien einen Vorgang ein, den der eins-zu-eins Zuordnung der H und des D. – ‚Aber *überzeugt* er mich nicht auch davon, daß diese Zuordnung *möglich* ist?'" (BGM 53) Damit hebt Wittgenstein die „epistemische Grundfunktion der Linie" hervor, die nach Sibylle Krämer eben genau in dieser „Transfiguration von Anschaulichem in Denkbares und von Denkbarem in Anschauliches" (Krämer 2010, 93) besteht. Indem Wittgenstein diese Hybridität des Beweisbildes grafisch erkundet, synthetisiert er letztlich wieder Beweis und Experiment. (Ramharter u. Weiberg 2014, 90 deuten die Pentagramm-Illustration deshalb als Beispiel eines nicht-mathematischen Beweises.)

Diese in der Hybridität des Beweisbildes vereinten und doch widerstrebenden Komponenten bezeichnet Wittgenstein konsequent als das *Wie* und das *Dass* des Bildes: „Aber kann ich denn nicht sagen, die Figur zeige, *wie* eine solche Zuordnung möglich ist – und muß sie darum nicht auch zeigen, *daß* sie möglich ist?" (BGM 53) Das *Dass* betont die regelgemäßen Komponenten des Beweises, es

ist gleichsam der Übergang des Bildes in die Propositionalität und impliziert eine jenseits des singulären Bildes „mögliche" Wiederholbarkeit des Bewiesenen.

Das *Wie* des Beweisbildes steht im Unterschied hierzu für die visuelle Exemplifikation im Einzelfall, also für die Tatsache, dass ich erst „durch das Ziehen der Projektionslinien [...] überzeugt" (BGM 48 u. 53) werde. Vielleicht hat Wittgenstein auch deshalb nicht aufgehört, das Pentagon-Pentagramm-Motiv weiterhin zu zeichnen oder sogar in Farbflächen aufzulösen (BGM 429). Während die mathematisch-geometrische Regelhaftigkeit der Figur längst feststeht, hebt er mit ihrer wiederholten zeichnerischen Variation auch die epistemischen Qualitäten des Zeichnens und das Potential jeder ihrer Linien hervor.

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Wittgensteins Zettelsammlung TS212 – *The Proto-Big Typescript* – Ein Paradebeispiel für innovative Möglichkeiten der digitalen und virtuellen Nachlassforschung (BEE, BNE, Wittgenstein Source, HyperWittgenstein, WITTFind)

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Abstract

Wittgensteins Typoskript TS212, das so genannte *Proto-Big Typescript*, ist ein höchst bedeutendes Dokument in Wittgensteins Nachlass. Bis jetzt wird es aber bei der Erforschung der Genese des Œuvres dieses Philosophen weitestgehend übergangen. TS212 umfasst nahezu 2000 Zetteln, welche aus TS208, TS210 und TS211 stammen. Zudem ist TS212 komplexer und enthält weit mehr Informationen als TS213, das so genannte *Big Typescript*, denn es dokumentiert sowohl eine alphabetische als auch eine thematische Ordnung.

„Digital Humanities" geben der Forschung nun Werkzeuge in die Hand, um innovative Recherchen am und im Wittgenstein-Nachlass anstellen zu können.

Mit und an TS212 wird im Workshop exemplarisch demonstriert, wie unter Verwendung digitaler und virtueller Techniken – wie sie am „Wittgenstein Archiv" in Bergen und am „Center for Information and Language Processing" in München entwickelt sind und werden – Wittgensteins Œuvres kompetent philologisch untersucht und adäquate philosophisch interpretiert werden kann.

> Bisher ist Ts 212 in der Forschung so gut wie nicht wahrgenommen worden, wohl unter anderem auch deshalb, weil es rein äußerlich eine äußerst komplexe und unübersichtliche Zettelsammlung darstellt und so rein optisch von der Form des Buches extrem weit entfernt ist. Tatsächlich aber ist Ts 212 in beinahe allen relevanten Belangen äquivalent mit Ts 213. Die Disparatheit der unterschiedlichen Teile des Big Typescript wird in Ts 212 auch optisch augenfällig, so daß diese Sammlung in ihrer ganzen Unhandlichkeit für die Forschung weitaus aufschlussreicher ist als die äußerlich geglättete Version von Ts 213. (Kienzler 2006, S. 21, Anm. 39)

Diesem Votum von Wolfgang Kienzler ist uneingeschränkt zuzustimmen. Wie aufschlussreich und interessant das Studium dieses riesigen Zettel-Typoskripts TS212 ist, wird hier nun demonstriert. Insbesondere auf die Bildung und Handhabung von Themengruppen für und in TS212 durch Wittgenstein ist dabei auch der Fokus zu richten, denn die Entdeckung und das minutiöse Nachzeichnen dieses bisher gänzlich unbekannten und daher unbeachteten Sachverhaltes ist ein wichtiger Beitrag zum Verständnis der komplizierten Nachlassgenese im ersten Drittel der 30er Jahre.[1] Darauf aufbauend und weiterführend werden hier im Beitrag alsdann exemplarisch an TS212 die Möglichkeiten der digitalen und virtuellen Nachlassforschung aufgezeigt.

Alle drei Typoskriptquellen für die Erstellung der Zettelsammlung TS212 – nämlich: der zweite TS208-Komplex, TS210 und TS211 – wurden von Wittgenstein jeweils in einem eigenen Arbeitsgang gesichtet und einem Auswahl- bzw. Wertungsverfahren unterzogen. So enthalten diese drei Typoskripte mehrere Anzeichen und Parameter dieser Wittgensteinschen Typoskriptsichtung. „Nun aber müßte das Getippte gesichtet & ein wenig geordnet werden" – so schrieb Wittgenstein hauptsächlich bezogen auf TS211 bereits am 30.10.1931 an Schlick.

TS212 wurde von Wittgenstein sodann mittels einer Masse von nahezu 2000 Zetteln aus eben diesen drei Quelltyposkripten erstellt. Da viele Zettel mehrere Sektionen enthalten, ist die Sektionenzahl in TS212 mehr als doppelt so groß. TS212, das so genannte *Proto-Big Typescript*[2], muß also nicht nur in philologischen und topologischen Details gesichtet, sondern auch in seiner Gesamtheit in Augenschein genommen und einer weiterführenden Untersuchung unterzogen werden. Als wichtigster topographischer Parameter, der sich über die gesamte Zettelsammlung erstreckt, ist die Nummerierung der einzelnen Sektion mit einer bestimmten Zahl oder mit mehreren Zahlen anzusehen. Die Anbringung dieser besonderen Zahlensystematik wird hier als das von Wittgenstein selbst erarbeitete und realisierte System von Themengruppennummern bezeichnet, welches die Themen in alphabetischer Reihenfolge anordnet. Zur Entschlüsselung der Bedeutung dieser Themengruppennummernsystematik mussten mehrere sehr arbeits- und zeitaufwendige Arbeitsschritte bei der Erforschung von TS212 unternommen werden[3], nämlich:

1) Die durchnummerierende Erfassung aller einzelner Zettel und aller darauf befindlichen Sektionen in TS212. Die Angabe der Reihenfolge in TS213-TS218. Die Nennung der Titel der Teile und die Angabe der Überschriften der Abschnitte in den Teilen von TS213. Die Auflistung der Themengruppennummern der Sektionen auf den Zetteln. Die zusätzliche Anzeige der bisher nicht erfassten Rückseitenbeschriftungen auf Zetteln in TS212. Dazu wurde die LISTE DER ZETTEL IN TS212 MIT THEMENGRUPPENNUMMERN IN DER REIHENFOLGE VON TS213 erarbeitet.

2) Die Anfertigung einer LISTE ZUM SYSTEM DER ALPHABETISCH GEORDNETEN THEMENGRUPPEN FÜR TS212 UND IN TS212 auf Grundlage der in Punkt 1 genannten LISTE.

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[1] Diese Thematik wurde erstmals in Rothhaupt 2008 in einem eigenen Kapitel ausführlich behandelt. Die hier im Beitrag angeführten „Listen" sind dort als Anhänge enthalten.

[2] Es ist jedoch darauf hinzuweisen, dass der Umfang des *Proto-Big Typescripes*, also von TS212, größer als jener des *Big Typescript*, also von TS213, ist, denn erst TS213 zusammen mit TS214-TS218 erreichen den Umfang von TS212.

[3] Listen sind in der Habilitationsschrift Rothhaupt 2008. Dies hier ist ein Auszug aus dieser Habilitationsschrift.

3) Tatsächliche Bildung der Themengruppen durch Verzettelung von Kopien der drei Typoskripte TS208, TS210, TS211 und Zusammenordnung der Zettel bzw. Sektionen in diese Themengruppen.

4) Rekonstruktionsversuch der von Wittgenstein selbst bereits vor dem Anbringen der Themengruppennummern bei den ausgewählten Sektionen der Typoskripte TS208, TS210 und TS211 erstellten LISTE DER ALPHABETISCH GEORDNETEN THEMENGRUPPEN FÜR TS212 UND IN TS212.

Zu Punkt 1: Um keine Konfusionen zu schaffen, wurde dabei die Ordnung und Durchnummerierung von TS212 in der Faksimilereproduktion der *Bergen Electronic Edition* beibehalten. TS212 ist Grundlage zur und war Vorlage für die Erstellung von TS213 und TS214-TS218. Die Gruppierung der TS212-Zettelsammlung in einzelne Umschläge führte zu den 140 Abschnitten in TS213. Und die Gruppierung mehrerer Umschläge führte zu den 19 Teilen in TS213. Bestimmte Materialien in TS212 wurden zwar von Wittgenstein noch in Abschnitte in TS214 bis TS218 zusammengefügt, aber nicht bzw. nicht mehr in TS213 eingefügt bzw. angehängt. Die gesamte Ordnung, wie sie nun in der originalen Zettelsammlung TS212 vorliegt, kann und darf aber keinesfalls (mehr) als definitiv und authentisch angesehen werden. Die durchnummerierende Erfassung der Zettel in TS212 und der auf ihnen befindlichen Sektionen wurde in einer eigenen umfassenden LISTE DER ZETTEL IN TS212 MIT THEMENGRUPPENNUMMERN IN DER REIHENFOLGE VON TS213 übersichtlich zusammengestellt. Für die insgesamt 1952 erfassten Zettel wird in einer ersten Spalte die laufende Durchnummerierung der BEE-Edition angeführt. In einer zweiten Spalte wird die Abfolge – sowohl der 19 Teile als auch der 140 Kapitel – angezeigt, wie sie in TS213-TS218 vorhanden ist. Zudem werden die Titel der Teile und die Überschriften der Abschnitte in TS213-TS218 wiedergegeben. Eine dritte Spalte verzeichnet die auf den einzelnen Zetteln bei jeder Sektion von Wittgenstein angebrachten Themengruppennummern.

Zu Punkt 2: Sind die Zettel in TS212 erfasst, durchlaufend mit einer Zettelnummer zur eindeutigen Identifizierung versehen und die auf diesen Zetteln befindlichen Sektionen und die ihnen von Wittgenstein zugeschriebenen Themengruppennummern vermerkt, so kann man in einem weiterführenden ersten Arbeitsgang herausfinden, welche Themengruppennummern überhaupt vergeben wurden, und in einem weiterführenden zweiten Arbeitsgang alle Zettel (und so die darauf befindlichen Sektionen) mit gemeinsamer Themengruppennummer ausfindig machen. Die Ergebnisse dieser beiden Arbeitsgänge sind in der LISTE ZUM SYSTEM DER ALPHABETISCH GEORDNETEN THEMENGRUPPEN FÜR TS212 UND IN TS212 enthalten. Eine erste Spalte verzeichnet alle von Wittgenstein vergebenen Themengruppennummern, nämlich von 1 bis 99. Dabei zeigt sich aber auch, dass diese Themengruppennummern weiter untergliedert sein können, nämlich: Zunächst die Hinzufügung von a, b, c etc. und möglicherweise dann noch durch die, zusätzlich zur Hinzufügung a, b, c etc. vorhandene, Hinzufügung von .1, .2, .3 etc., also: .1a, .1b, 1c etc. In der hier gebotenen Liste wurden alle Untergruppen zwar als solche erfasst, aber bei der jeweiligen Hauptgruppe belassen. Die Untergruppenbildung mit a, b, c etc. ist die meistvorkommende und die Untergruppenbildung mit .1, .2, .3 etc. kommt recht selten vor (nämlich nur bei den Themengruppen 4, 7, 38, 76). Neben den 99 Hauptgruppen existieren insgesamt nochmals 90 Untergruppen, insgesamt also 189 Gruppen. Und ebendiesen Themengruppen wurden in einer zweiten Spalte der Liste alle Referenzvermerke per Zettelnummer in TS212 hinzugefügt.

Zu Punkt 3: Für die inhaltliche Analyse der einzelnen Themengruppen war alsdann die Bildung dieser Themengruppen durch Zusammenführung aller Zettel mit der entsprechenden Themengruppennummer unumgänglich. Die effektivste und aufschlussreichste Art und Weise der Durchführung dieser Aufgabe war die physische Simulation der Zusammenstellung all dieser Gruppen. Im Anschluss an diesen Arbeitsprozess der Verzettelung und Gruppierung von Bemerkungen, bei dem sich übrigens – ähnlich wie bei einem Versuch der experimentellen Archäologie – zeigte, wie umfangreich, wie kompliziert, wie arbeits- und wie zeitaufwendig diese für Wittgenstein gewesen ist, konnte der Inhalt jeder einzelnen Zettelgruppe eingehender untersucht werden. Und ebendiese Studien führten zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Gruppen einerseits einzeln für sich thematisch gebildet und andererseits in ihrer Gesamtheit alphabetisch angeordnet sind. Die ersten beiden Themengruppen (Nr. 1 und Nr. 2) enthalten Bemerkungen zu Stichwort „Abbild" und „Absicht", eine mittlere Themengruppe (Nr. 42) erfasst die Themengruppe „Hypothese", sieben der mittleren Themengruppen (Nr. 60, 60a, 60b, 61, 61a, 62, 62a) beinhalten die, zusätzlich in Untergruppen gegliederte, Themengruppe „Philosophie" und die letzte Themengruppe (Nr. 99) umfasst Bemerkungen zur „Zeit". Die so recherchierten Themengruppen wurden daher auch in der in Punkt 2 vorgestellten LISTE ZUM SYSTEM DER ALPHABETISCH GEORDNETEN THEMENGRUPPEN FÜR TS212 UND IN TS212 eingetragen. Eine thematisch weiter verfeinerte Themenzuschreibung ist, insbesondere für die Untergruppen, ganz sicher möglich.

Zu Punkt 4: Das Vergeben und Anbringen der Themengruppennummern bei den ausgewählten Sektionen der drei Quelltyposkripte zur Bildung von TS212 setzt voraus, dass eine von Wittgenstein selbst erstellte Systematik existiert hat. Und es ist nun anhand der thematisch ausgerichteten und alphabetisch angeordneten Stichworte zu den Themengruppennummern möglich, die von Wittgenstein verwendete Themenliste in etwa zu rekonstruieren. So entstand als eine erste Rekonstruktion die LISTE ZUM SYSTEM DER ALPHABETHISCH GEORDNETEN NUMMERIERTEN THEMENGRUPPEN IN ALPHABETISCHER FOLGE. (Siehe hier die Abb. zu den Themengruppen dieser Liste.) In weiterführenden, differenzierenden Arbeitsschritten könnte diese Liste ausgebaut und verfeinert werden. Sind für ein Thema (oder Themenstichwort) mehrere Gruppennummern angegeben (etwa die Gruppennummern 3 bis 6 für „Allgemeinheit", 30 bis 35 für „Gesichtsraum", 60 bis 63 für „Philosophie" etc.), können sicher die von Wittgenstein veranschlagten Untergliederungen eruiert werden. Und auch für die Untergruppen einer Hauptgruppe lassen sich sicher genauere Angaben herausfinden. Der bis jetzt herausdestillierte und hier präsentierte alphabetische Themenkatalog ist daher als ein Prototyp anzusehen. Für vier (Unter-)Gruppennummern (13, 15, 56 und 56a) wurden (noch) keine Stichworte veranschlagt, da die Informationsbasis entweder nicht vorhanden (bei 15 existiert kein Zettel) oder zu gering ist (für 13 existiert nur ein Zettel; für 56 und 56a sind nur acht Zettel vorhanden). Für drei (Unter-)Gruppen (15, 37, 77c) sind in TS212 keine Zettelvorkommnisse nachweisbar. Entweder hat Wittgenstein das entsprechende Gruppenthema zwar angelegt, aber dann keine Sektionen dafür ausgewählt, oder es waren Zettel damit belegt, die dann aber entweder nicht in TS212 gelangten oder daraus später wieder entfernt wurden.

Gr.-Nr.	THEMENGRUPPEN	An-zahl
1	ABBILD / ABSICHT	23
2	ABSICHT	8
3	ALLGEMEINHEIT	17
3a		3
3b		26
3c		12
4	ALLGEMEINHEIT	7
4a		2
4b		8
4.1		2
5	ALLGEMEINHEIT	2
5a		1
5b		1
6	ALLGEMEINHEIT (ARITHMETIK)	38
6a		21
6b		6
7	ANWENDUNG	1
7a		12
7b		3
7c		1
7.1		4
7.1a		6
7.1b		2
8	BEDEUTUNG	37
8a		2
8b		11
9	BEDEUTUNG	1
9a		11
9b		4
9c		1
9d		4
10	BEDEUTUNG	22
10a		10
10b		9
11	BEGRIFF	6
12	BEHAUPTUNG	18
12a		4
13	Xxx	1
14	BEWEIS	95
15	Xxx	0
16	DENKEN	37
16a		1
17	DENKEN	4
17a		4
18	DENKENS, GRUND DES	12
19	ENTDECKUNG	8
20	ERWARTUNG & ERFÜLLUNG	7
20a		2
21	ERWARTUNG & ERFÜLLUNG	30
21a		2
22	FÄHIGKEIT (?)	10
22a		3
23	FARBEN & FARBENMISCHUNG	12
24	FARBEN & FARBENMISCHUNG	7
25	FOLGE(R)N	22
25a		12
25b		3
25c		6
26	GEBRAUCH	12
27	GEDANKE	35
27a		33
27b		7
28	GEDANKE	7
28a		10

29	GEGENSTAND	7
29a		7
29b		1
30	GESICHTSRAUM	5
31	GESICHTSRAUM	1
32	GESICHTSRAUM	32
32a		4
33	GESICHTSRAUM	6
34	GESICHTSRAUM	13
35	GESICHTSRAUM	15
36	GLAUBE	13
37	„GLEICH"	0
37a		1
38	GRAMMATIK	26
38a		4
38.1		10
38.2		53
39	GRAMMATIK	6
39a		13
40	GRUND	3
41	HYPOTHESE	12
41a		9
41b		2
42	HYPOTHESE	4
43	IDEALISMUS	9
44	INDUKTION, INDUKTIONSBEWEIS	90
45	„JETZT"	15
46	KARDINALZAHLEN	29
46a		7
46b		10
46c		6
47	KLASSE	2
48	LOGIK	13
48a		4
48b		4
49	LOGIK	18
49a		22
49b		1
50	LOGISCHE FORM	31
51	MATHEMATIK	31
51a		3
51b	METAMATHEMATIK	5
52	MATHEMATIK	11
53	MATHEMATIK	7
53a		12
54	MEINEN	34
54a		8
55	MENGENLEHRE	29
56	Xxx	4
56a		4
57	MINIMA VISIBILIA	8
58	„NICHT"	20
58a		5
59	PHÄNOMENOLOGIE	47
60	PHILOSOPHIE	56
60a		15
60b		2
61	PHILOSOPHIE	42
61a		6
62	PHILOSOPHIE	11
62a		5
63	physikalische Sprache	19
64	PROBLEM	53
65	RAUM, PHYSIKALISCHER	3

Nr.	Thema	Anzahl
66	**REGEL / ERFAHRUNGSSATZ**	19
66a		1
66b		1
67	**REGEL**	18
67a		10
68	**SCHACH (?)**	6
69	**SATZ**	32
69a		1
70	**SATZ**	27
70a		65
71	**SCHMERZEN**	20
71a		1
72	**SINN**	7
72a		6
72b		10
72c		2
73	**SINN**	3
73a		10
73b		1
74	**SINN, IM SELBEN**	6
75	**SINN (GEHÖRSINN)**	1
76	**SPRACHE**	20
76a		6
76.1		1
77	**SPRACHE / SPRACHSPIEL**	20
77a		2
77b		13
77c		0
77d		6
78	**SPRACHE / SPRACHSPIEL**	23
79	**TABELLE**	5
79a		54
80	**TONFOLGE**	2
81	**UNDEUTLICHKEIT**	1
82	**VERSUCHEN / SUCHEN**	4
83	**UNENDLICHKEIT „UNENDLICH LANG"**	26
83a		5
83b		2
84	**„UNENDL. MÖGLICHKEIT"**	10
85	**„UNGEFÄHR"**	24
86	**UNMITTELBARES**	11
87	**URSACHE**	7
88	**VERIFIKATION**	13
88a		2
89	**VERSTEHEN**	77
89a		7
90	**VORSTELLUNG**	1
90a		9
91	**W-F-NOTATION**	1
92	**W-F-NOTATION**	14
92a		2
93	**WAHRSCHEINLICHKEIT**	16
94	**WISSEN**	2
95	**ZAHLEN**	14
95a		8
96	**ZEICHEN**	15
96a		1
97	**ZEICHEN**	8
98	**ZEIT (GEGENWARTSZEIT)**	6
98a		6
99	**ZEIT**	10
99a		1

TS212,790 – Themengruppennummer 1: Abbildung

TS212,778 – Themengruppennummer 1 (und 67): Absicht (und Regel)

TS212,418 – Themengruppennummer 42: Hypothese

TS212,381 – Themengruppennummer 99: Zeit

Mit der Entdeckung und Präsentation der von Wittgenstein selbst kreierten Themengruppennummern für TS212 und in TS212 kann man aber noch einen weiteren und für die Rekonstruktion der Gesamtgenese des Wittgensteinschen Nachlasses sehr bedeutenden Sachverhalt eruieren. Im Jahre 1932, also in jener Zeit, als Wittgenstein sich mit der Erstellung von TS212 bzw. noch mit der Vervollständigung der dazu erforderlichen Quelltyposkripte TS210 und TS211 beschäftigte, um daraus dann wiederum seine umfangreiche „große Maschinschrift" verfertigen zu können, finden sich zwei Bemerkungen von ihm, die man bisher höchstens als einen bloßen, zwar kreativen, aber unrealistischen Einfall Wittgensteins ansehen konnte und auch angesehen hat. Dass es für ihn dabei aber nicht nur um eine ungewöhnliche Idee ging, sondern um ein Konzept zur Erstellung seines Buches, das er auch praktisch mit großem Aufwand zu realisieren versucht hat, kann man auf Grund der Kenntnis der Bedeutung der Themengruppennummernsystematik jetzt auch nachweisen. Nämlich: Wittgenstein hatte während einer bestimmten, wichtigen Arbeitsphase 1932 (und möglicherweise auch noch 1933) vor, sein monumentales Buch nach philosophisch-thematischen Stichworten in alphabetischer Reihenfolge zu gliedern und aufzubauen. In seinem Taschennotizbuch MS154,9v/2 findet sich dazu nämlich folgende (vor April 1932 niedergeschriebene) aussagekräftige Bemerkung:

Weniger versprechen als man halten will ist oft schön, aber es kann auch aus einer Anmaßung entspringen; dann, wenn man sich auch etwas darauf einbildet weniger zu versprechen als man halten wird. – Ist es richtig oder unrichtig mein Buch nicht „Philosophische Betrachtungen etc." zu nennen, sondern „Philosophische Bemerkungen, nach ~~ihren Gegenständen alphabetisch~~

geordnet"? [nach Stichwörtern alphabetisch geordnet]
<[alphabetisch nach Stichwörtern angeordnet]>

Bereits zu Beginn dieses Taschennotizbuches findet sich bei MS154,1r/2 eine Bemerkung, die sich auf dieses Vorhaben bezieht, wenn es dort heißt:

Der Titel meines Buches: „Philosophische Betrachtungen. Alphabetisch nach ihren Gegenständen <Themen> geordnet <aneinandergereiht>." [nach Stichwörtern angeordnet.

Da die nächstfolgende Bemerkung in MS154,1r/3 von Wittgenstein am 27.4.1932 in MS113,59r übertragen wurde, muss diese Bemerkung und also auch die vorhergehende und hier zitierte vor dem 27. April 1932 entstanden sein. Wittgenstein hatte sich also zuerst den Buchtitel „Philosophische Betrachtungen. Alphabetisch nach Stichwörtern angeordnet" zurechtgelegt, dann aber noch die Alternativformulierung „Philosophische Bemerkungen alphabetisch nach Stichwörtern geordnet" hinzugefügt. Vom Wortlaut „Ist es richtig oder unrichtig mein Buch nicht „Philosophische Betrachtung etc." zu nennen […]" her wird offen gelassen, ob die Formulierung „Bemerkungen" tiefstapelt bzw. die Formulierung „Betrachtungen" hochstapelt.

MS154,1r/2

Im Sammeltyposkript TS212 befinden sich also zwei unterschiedliche und unterscheidbare Ordnungssysteme für das gesamte umfangreiche Bemerkungsmaterial, nämlich:

A) Die frühere Ordnung der Bemerkungen nach durchnummerierten Themengruppen in alphabetischer Stichwörterreihung. Insgesamt handelt es sich dabei insgesamt um 187 Themengruppen, die sich aus 99 Themenhauptgruppen und 88 Themenuntergruppen zusammensetzen.

B) Die spätere Ordnung der Bemerkungen nach Themenabschnitten und in Typoskriptteilen. Insgesamt handelt es sich dabei um 140 Themenabschnitte verteilt auf 19 Typoskriptteile. Diese Anordnung war Grundlage für die Erstellung der „großen Maschinenschrift" TS213.

In der Nachlassforschung wird bisher nur die Ordnung in Themenabschnitte in Typoskriptteilen wahrgenommen. So wird TS212 ausschließlich auf seine Funktion als Vorgänger Typoskript zur „großen Maschinenschrift" reduziert; damit wird TS212 gegenüber dem *Big Typescript* TS213 zum bloßen *Proto-Big Typescript* degradiert. Die zusätzlich in dieser monumentalen Zettelsammlung TS212 enthaltenen Dimensionen, Ordnungsgefüge und Parameter werden damit negiert bzw. ignoriert.

Hier folgt nun exemplarisch für TS212 die Auflistung der Möglichkeiten der digitalen und virtuellen Nachlassforschung:

1) Zugang zu und Umgang mit TS212 als Faksimile in der *Bergen Electronic Edition* (DVD-Edition, Oxford 2000).

2) Zugang zu und Umgang mit TS212 als neue Faksimile in *Wittgenstein Source* (http://www.wittgensteinsource.org).

3) Zugang zu und Umgang mit TS212 in der Transkription (diplomatisch oder normalisiert in der *Bergen Electronic Edition* (DVD-Edition, Oxford 2000).

4) Zugang zu und Umgang mit TS212 in der Transkription (diplomatisch oder normalisiert in der *Bergen Nachlass Edition* (http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/).

5) Möglichkeit des Vergleiches von TS212 und TS213 um die Gemeinsamkeiten, aber eben auch die Unterschiede festzustellen in *Wittgenstein Source* und *HyperWittgenstein* (http://wab.uib.no/wab_hw.page/).

6) Recherchen in TS212 mit WITTFind und *Wittgenstein Advanced Search Tools* (WAST) wie vom Centrum für Informations- und Sprachverarbeitung (CIS) an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in München entwickelt und bereitgestellt (http://wittfind.cis.uni-muenchen.de).

7) Bildung der in TS212 vorhandenen Themengruppen nach Themengruppennummern mit *Wittgenstein Advanced Search Tools* und *HyperWittgenstein*.

8) Eigenständiger Umgang mit den und Weiterbearbeitung der gebildeten Themengruppen mit *Wittgenstein Advanced Search Tools* und HyperWittgenstein.

9) Erstellung der Transferprofile für die einzelnen Sektionen in TS212 mit *Wittgenstein Advanved Search Tools* und *HyperWittgenstein*.

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Ästhetische Eigenschaften, Dispositionen und Interpretationen zwischen Ontologie und Ästhetik

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Abstract

In diesem Beitrag wird zuerst die dispositionelle Theorie von ästhetischen Eigenschaften als eine solche vorgestellt, die den interpretativen Pluralismus annehmen kann, ohne auf den ästhetischen Realismus verzichten zu müssen; zweitens werden drei mögliche Versionen bzw. ontologische Auffassungen des Begriffs *Disposition* präsentiert; drittens wird eine Entsprechung zwischen diesen drei Versionen der dispositionellen Theorie und drei in der Tradition der Hermeneutik verwurzelten Theorien der *Interpretation* vorgeschlagen, die uns ein Kriterium bieten kann, um eine Auswahl zwischen den drei *Theoriepaaren* zu treffen. Durch diese drei *Hauptziele* möchte ich auch zwei *Nebenziele* erreichen: zuerst eine Verbindung zwischen zwei Hauptbegriffen der philosophischen Ästhetik (ästhetische Eigenschaft und Interpretation) nicht nur generisch, sondern auch spezifisch zu bestimmen; zweitens, eine Verbindung zwischen Begriffen von zwei verschiedenen philosophischen Traditionen (der analytischen Philosophie und Hermeneutik) zu bestimmen, die zu oft als selbstreferentielle Paradigmen behandelt werden.

1. Einleitung

Der Status von ästhetischen Eigenschaften ist ein wichtiges, mit dem Problem der Objektivität der ästhetischen Urteile verbundenes Thema der analytischen Ästhetik: Die Objektivität unserer ästhetischen Urteile hängt davon ab, ob wir eine realistische Auffassung der ästhetischen Eigenschaften formulieren können. Nur dadurch können ästhetische Prädikate eine Verankerung in der Wirklichkeit gewinnen.

Die Diskussion wurde hauptsächlich von zwei Tatsachen angetrieben: einerseits der Objektivitätsanspruch unserer ästhetischen Urteile, der für ästhetischen Realismus plädiert. Andererseits die Pluralität unserer ästhetischen Urteile, die für ästhetischen Subjektivismus plädiert.

Viel weniger untersucht wurde das Verhältnis zwischen unserer Auffassung von ästhetischen Eigenschaften und dem Begriff von *Interpretation*. Das ist merkwürdig, da das oben genannte Pluralitätsproblem auch dieses Thema betrifft. So kann die Frage auch hier lauten: Wenn ästhetische Eigenschaften objektiv sind, wie ist es möglich, dass dasselbe Kunstwerk in verschiedenen Weisen überzeugend bzw. angemessen interpretiert werden kann? Man kann einfach realisieren, wie in diesem Kontext eine spezifische ästhetische Stellungnahme (interpretativer Pluralismus) ontologische Konsequenzen hat. Wie Joseph Margolis überzeugend betont hat (Margolis 2009), wenn man ästhetischen Realismus und interpretativen Pluralismus zusammen retten will, muss man ästhetische Eigenschaften in einer ontologischen, mit diesem Pluralismus kompatiblen Weise charakterisieren. In der nächsten Sektion möchte ich zeigen, dass der Begriff *Disposition* eine solche Kompatibilität anbieten kann.

2. Ästhetische Eigenschaften als Dispositionen

Die These, dass ästhetische Eigenschaften Dispositionen sind, ist gut vertreten (Stecker [2]2010, Compton 2012, Reicher [3]2015). Das Hauptmerkmal von dispositionellen Eigenschaften ist, dass sie sich nur unter bestimmten Umständen manifestieren. Anscheinend soll diese Charakterisierung *per se* die Pluralität von Interpretationen erlauben: Die Unterscheidungen der verschiedenen Interpretationen werden durch die Manifestation von verschiedenen ästhe-

tischen Dispositionen in den verschiedenen Kontexten erklärt. Doch ist die Sache nicht so einfach. Während in nichtästhetischen Bereichen (z.B. im Fall von Farben) der Begriff von *Normalbedingungen* benutzt wird, um zu erklären, dass die Manifestation jener Disposition keine besonderen Umstände braucht (wie z.B. die Disposition von Lösbarkeit), wird im Fall von ästhetischen Eigenschaften der Begriff von *Idealbedingungen* benutzt, um zu betonen, dass man besondere Fähigkeiten oft braucht, um bestimmte ästhetische Eigenschaften erfassen zu können. So ist z.B. die harmonische Modernität Schuberts letzter Klaviersonaten nur von jemandem begreifbar, der eine mindestens grundlegende Kenntnis der Harmonie hat.

Der Begriff von Idealbedingungen bzw. von Idealrezipienten soll in diesem Kontext nicht erörtert, sondern vorläufig angenommen werden, um eher den folgenden Punkt zu betonen. Dieser Begriff wird oft zusammen mit der Idee zusammengefasst, dass es eine einzige ideale Interpretation bzw. Auffassung eines Kunstwerks geben soll. Vermutlich sollen die Urteile von idealen Rezeptoren notwendigerweise über die ästhetischen Qualitäten bzw. Dispositionen eines Kunstwerks einstimmen. Das ist z.B. Alan Goldmans Stellungnahme (Goldman 1995), die einfach auf das Interpretationsgebiet angewendet werden kann. Doch ist diese These auf eine weitere Annahme gegründet, nämlich dass ein Idealrezipient auf die *Totalität* der ästhetischen Eigenschaften zugreifen kann. Diese Annahme ist aber keine notwendige: Man kann den Begriff *kontextuell indexieren*, und behaupten, dass *ein* Idealrezipient *ein solcher* ist, der die Totalität der *in einem bestimmten historischen und kulturellen Kontext zugreifbaren* ästhetischen Eigenschaften erfasst:

> Even for members of an „ideal audience," however, the aesthetic properties of *The Lost Pleiad* may fail to be completely manifested at times. The conditions of aesthetic property manifestation include more than just the presence of a qualified viewer. [...] Adequate lighting, freedom from sensory distractions, and so on all contribute to meeting the conditions for aesthetic property manifestation. Varying degrees of success in meeting such environmental conditions can, I think, explain a great deal of our differences in aesthetic judgment [...]. I believe that a good deal of further differences should be traceable to variations in our cultural backgrounds and understandings of artistic context. (Compton 2012, 152-153)

Ich glaube, dass diese kontextuelle Indexierung entscheidend ist, um die Kompatibilität der Dispositionstheorie der ästhetischen Eigenschaften mit dem Interpretationspluralismus zu bewahren. Denn nur dadurch können wir erklären, wieso zwei gleich qualifizierte Rezeptoren über eine ästhetische Eigenschaft nicht übereinstimmen können, ohne all dies rein epistemologisch (als zwei verschiedene Perspektiven) erklären zu müssen und damit auf die Idealität des Rezeptors zu verzichten. Die Nicht-Übereinstimmung hat vielmehr mit der Ontologie bzw. mit der Aktivierung von bestimmten Dispositionen zu tun, die in einem entsprechenden Kontext stattfindet, in einem anderen aber nicht.

Eine erste These dieses Beitrags, durch die ich diesen Abschnitt schliessen will, lautet deshalb wie folgend: *Nur durch eine kontextuelle Indexierung des Begriffs vom Idealrezeptor können wir der dispositionellen Theorie von ästhetischen Eigenschaften die erklärende Rolle für die Pluralität von angemessenen Interpretationen eines Kunstwerks zuschreiben.*

3. Drei ontologische Auffassungen von Dispositionen

Der nächste Schritt ist, zu verstehen, wie der Begriff *Disposition* am besten diese erklärende Rolle ausfüllen kann. Dieser Schritt ist durch die Tatsache gefordert, dass die Literatur über dieses Thema keine eindeutige ontologische Auffassung von Dispositionen anbietet.

Der Begriff von Disposition wurde ursprünglich im Gebiet der generellen Ontologie benutzt, um Eigenschaften von natürlichen Gegenständen oder Artefakten zu erklären (wie. Z.B. Lösbarkeit oder Entzündbarkeit), die sich nur unter gewissen Umständen manifestieren. Aus diesem Grund haben eminente Philosophen (Ryle 1949, Goodman 1955, Quine 1960) die Zuschreibung von Dispositionen als eine solche charakterisiert, die durch eine konditionale, d. h. eine *wenn…dann* Form formuliert wird.

Diese Charakterisierung wurde in verschiedenen Kontexten (Popper 1959, Mellor 1974) und besonders in einem wichtigen Artikel von Charles B. Martin (1994) überzeugend kritisiert, was die Suche nach alternativen theoretischen Erklärungen für den Begriff Disposition gefördert hat. Wie Stephen Mumford (1996) überzeugend beschrieben hat, wurde diese Suche von zwei, spezifischen Elementen gefördert: a) Einerseits hat Martins Kritik des konditionalen Reduktionismus von Dispositionen einen Anlass zum dispositionellen Realismus produziert; statt Dispositionen auf konditionale Sätze zu reduzieren, muss man sie als *Eigenschaften einer besonderen Art* beschreiben; b) andererseits bietet Martins Artikel kein Kriterium an, um Dispositionen von anderen Eigenschaften unterschieden zu können.

In dieser Hinsicht wurden drei Erklärungen formuliert, um dieses *ontologisches Vakuum* zu füllen. Eine erste Lösung ist, Dispositionen mit *Möglichkeiten* zu identifizieren. Zu behaupten, dass ein Gegenstand die Disposition A hat, ist, zu behaupten, dass es möglich ist, dass dieser Gegenstand die Eigenschaft A in einem Moment manifestieren wird: „The basic idea is that the objects around us possess certain dispositions, and that these dispositions are all we need to ground possibilia. If the world contains some disposition such that its manifestation is the state of affairs S, then S is possible." (Borghini u. Williams 2008, 26)

Eine zweite Lösung besteht in der Behauptung, dass Dispositionen als *Intentionen* zu beschreiben sind, weil sie

die Eigenschaft besitzen, *auf etwas gerichtet zu sein*, was Merkmal der Intentionalität ist:

A state is T-intenTional [linguistic device to clearly distinguish intentionality from intensionality] if it is directed towards an object which need not or does not yet exist and is, therefore, indeterminate. It also appears that every disposition, whether mental or ‚physical‘ satisfies this criterion and that every state that satisfies it is a disposition. It follows that T-intenTionality as defined by this criterion is the mark not of the mental, but of the dispositional. (Place 1996, 104, 119)

Eine dritte Lösung besteht in der Aussage, dass Dispositionen als *Funktionen* beschrieben werden sollen, da sie eine kausale Rolle zwischen einem Stimulus und einer besonderen Manifestation spielen:

That dispositions are functional characterizations of states or properties amounts to the following two claims: 1. What it is that makes any property or state d of an object a dispositional property or state is that it is a conceptual truth that d causally mediates from stimulus events to manifestation events. 2. What it is that makes a disposition d the type of disposition it is consists in the specific stimulus and manifestation events to which it bears the relation of causal mediation. (Mumford 1999, 223)

Es wurden verschiedene *ontologische Argumente* formuliert, um jede von diesen Versionen zu verteidigen bzw. zu attackieren. Statt diesen Argumenten zu folgen, möchte ich im nächsten Abschnitt diese drei Versionen von Dispositionen mit drei Theorien der Interpretation verbinden und dadurch *ästhetische Argumente* gewinnen, um eine von diesen Versionen den anderen vorzuziehen.

4. Dispositionstheorien und Interpretationstheorie: ein Vergleich und eine Bewertung

Die erste Theorie der Interpretation, die ich berücksichtigen will, wurde von Paul Ricoeur formuliert: „Aber vor allem will man, indem man die Interpretation als Aneignung kennzeichnet, den ‚gegenwärtigen‘ Charakter der Interpretation unterstreichen: Die Lektüre ist wie eine Ausführung einer musikalischen Partitur, sie markiert die Verwirklichung, die Realisierung der semantischen Möglichkeiten des Textes." (Ricoeur 2005, 100) Ricoeurs Formulierung wiederholt fast buchstäblich die erste Auffassung der Dispositionen als Möglichkeiten. Die Exemplifizierung einer ästhetischen Eigenschaft von einem Kunstwerk wäre in diesem Fall mit der Möglichkeit identifiziert, die das Kunstwerk dank dieser Eigenschaft besitzt, in einer Weise interpretiert zu werden, die diese ästhetische Eigenschaft sich manifestieren lassen würde.

Die intentionale Auffassung von Dispositionen findet man in Umberto Ecos formulierten Begriff von *Intentio Operis,* der ein *tertium datur* neben *Intentio Autoris* und *Intentio Lectoris* konstituiert:

In meinen neueren Schriften habe ich eine dritte Möglichkeit zwischen der Absicht des Autors […] und der Absicht des Interpreten vorgeschlagen […]: Es gibt eine *Textintention.* […] Ich selbst versuche, eine dialektische Beziehung zwischen *intentio operis* und *intentio lectoris* zu wahren. Dabei stellt sich jedoch das Problem: Auch wenn man wissen mag, was „Leserintention" bedeuten soll, lässt sich kaum abstrakt definieren, was mit „Textintention" gemeint sein könnte. […] Von einer Textintention kann man […] nur infolge einer Unterstellung seitens des Lesers sprechen. Die Initiative des Lesers liegt

demnach vor allem darin, über Textintention zu mutmaßen. […] Wie erhärtet man eine Hypothese über die *intentio operis*? Man kann die Vermutung nur am Text als einem kohärenten Ganzen überprüfen. (Eco 1996, 31, 71-73)

Die funktionale Auffassung können wir in Gadamers Begriff von *Verstehen als Wirkung* finden. Demgemäß kann die Bedeutung eines Textes nur durch seine Anwendung in einem konkreten Kontext gewonnen werden: „Applikation ist keine nachträgliche Anwendung von etwas gegebenem Allgemeinen, das zunächst in sich verstanden würde, auf einen konkreten Fall, sondern ist erst das wirkliche Verständnis des Allgemeinen selbst, das der gegebene Text für uns ist. Das Verstehen erweist sich als eine Weise von Wirkung und weiß sich als eine solche Wirkung." (Gadamer [6]1990, 323) Dass diese *Wirkung* letztendlich eine *Mitwirkung* ist, durch die das Werk seine Dispositionen in den konkreten interpretativen Kontexten manifestieren kann, wird u.a. durch den Begriff der *Horizontverschmelzung* erklärt, der auf die Tatsache hinweist, dass unserer Zugang zu Kunstwerken und generell zu historischen Entitäten ein solcher ist, in dem Gegenwart und Vergangenheit, Interpret und interpretierter Gegenstand zusammen wirken. Die Reihe dieser Mitwirkung wird von Gadamer als *Wirkungsgeschichte* bezeichnet.

Diese Korrespondenz zwischen drei Versionen der Dispositionen und dem Begriff *Interpretation* soll nicht als bloße theoretische Übung verstanden werden. Die Idee ist, dadurch ein ästhetisches bzw. hermeneutisches Kriterium zu finden, um eine Bewertung zu entwerfen. Wir können deshalb jetzt die Frage stellen: *Wenn wir ästhetische Eigenschaften als Dispositionen verstehen wollen, welche ontologische Auffassung von Disposition ist für dieses Verständnis optimal?*

Wir können per sofort bemerken, dass die erste Auffassung als erste eliminiert werden kann. Eigentlich ist der Begriff von Möglichkeit, als solches, zu generisch, um uns ein Verständnis anzubieten, wie die ästhetischen Eigenschaften von einer Interpretation realisiert werden können. Die *Angemessenheit* einer Interpretation schliesst Kriterien ein, die strenger als der bloße logische Begriff von Möglichkeit aussehen. Nicht alles, was möglich ist, ist auch angemessen.

In diesem Sinn ist der Begriff von *Intention* sehr versprechend, da er auf die Tatsache hinweist, dass ein Kunstwerk *auf mögliche Realisierungen bzw. Manifestationen gerichtet ist*. Wenn wir aber die dritte Lösung lieber auswählen, ist es wegen ihrer intrinsischen kausalen Charakterisierung und somit ihres intrinsischen Hinweises auf die Aktion (Wirkung) des Interpreten als notwendige Bedingung für die Manifestation einer dispositionellen Eigenschaft. Diese Auswahl hat deshalb viel mehr mit unserer ästhetischen (und besonders musikalischen) Idee der Interpretation als mit ontologischen Gründen zu tun. Wir sind merkwürdigerweise mit der Behauptung von Aaron Ridley einverstanden, der in seinem Beitrag *Against Musical Ontology* eine Behauptung über das Verhältnis zwischen Werksinhalt und Interpretationen formuliert, die eine bestimmte Ontologie der Musik voraussetzt:

Much of the „content" of a given work is only revealed in the understandings that faithful performances of it evince. And that means that any attempt to specify that content—the content to which a good performance is faithful—in advance of evaluative judgments about particular performances of it, or independently of such judgments, must be futile and self-defeating. (Ridley 2003, 213)

Wir glauben dass der Begriff von Disposition uns erlaubt, einer solchen Behauptung eine *ontologische Darstellbarkeit* zu gewähren. Was uns u.a. zeigt, dass (*pace* Ridley) nicht nur die Ontologie der Musik, sondern die Ontologie der Kunst überhaupt sehr nützlich sein kann, um die verschiedenen Aspekte der musikalischen und generell der künstlerischen Praxis besser zu verstehen.

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Das Problem des Selbstbezuges in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* und die Verwendung des Wortes „ich"

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Abstract

Das Wort „ich" bezeichnet nach Wittgenstein keinen privaten Gegenstand, und sein Verwender sei nicht imstande, sich selbst mit dem Wort „ich" zu identifizieren. Mit anderen Worten, der Sprecher des Wortes „ich" ermögliche nur Dritten die Identifizierung des Sprechers als Person, und er selbst könne sich selbst nicht identifizieren, weder durch das Wort „ich" noch durch andere, weil eine Identifikation nicht aus der Perspektive der ersten Person möglich sei, sondern nur aus der Perspektive der dritten Person. Es sei aus der Perspektive der dritten Person möglich, nicht nur weil man einen Gegenstand der Beobachtung hätte, welchen man als eine bestimmte Person identifizieren könne, sondern weil es möglich sei, Kriterien zu erstellen, welche durch eine sprachliche Gemeinschaft geprüft werden könnten, weil es einen öffentlichen Zugang gäbe. Nun ist die Frage: Mit welchen Kriterien könnte man eine Person identifizieren?

Wittgenstein behandelt in den Paragraphen 398 bis 411 der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (PU) in seinen Argumentationen mit seinem Gegner das Problem des Selbstbezugs und der Verwendung des Wortes „ich". Er macht uns in PU § 398 auf verschiedene Verwendungen von „haben" aufmerksam. Dies wird uns für die Behandlung der Verwendung des Wortes „ich" hilfreich sein, weil das Wort „haben" auch „verfügen" bedeuten kann, wenn die Aussage: „Ich habe …" den anderen nicht ausschließt. Wenn „Ich habe …" die Möglichkeit, dass auch andere dies haben könnten, ausschließt, dann wird „haben" in einem anderen Sinn verwendet. Ähnlich ist es auch bei der Verwendung von „ich".

Folgen wir dieser Diskussion anhand der Interpretation einiger der Paragraphen zwischen 398 bis 411 der PU: Im Paragraphen 398 behandelt Wittgenstein die Frage, ob ein Mensch über seine eigenen Vorstellungen oder auch seine eigenen visuellen Eindrücke verfügt. Er beginnt den Paragraphen 398 mit der Aussage seiner Gegner: „Aber wenn ich mir etwas vorstelle, oder auch wirklich Gegenstände sähe, so habe ich doch etwas, was mein Nachbar nicht hat." Hier behauptet der Gegner das Verfügen über den Besitz seiner Vorstellungen oder seiner visuellen Eindrücke. Dann kritisiert Wittgenstein die Behauptung der Gegner, indem er diese Behauptung in folgendem Ausdruck ausformuliert: "Nur *ich* habe doch DIESES". Die deiktische Verwendung von „dieses" passt nicht zum Argument für die Verteidigung des Verfügens über die eigenen Vorstellungen. Die Verwendung von „dieses" setzt einen anderen Sprachspiel-Teilnehmer voraus, weil man zum Beispiel mit einen deiktischen Ausdruck anderen zeigen möchte, worauf man sich beziehen möchte. Deswegen hat es keinen Sinn, einen deiktischen Ausdruck aus der Perspektive der ersten Person zu verwenden, um zum Beispiel etwas für sich selber zu zeigen (PU § 411). Würde man einen deiktischen Ausdruck in der ersten Person verwenden wollen, käme man zum Problem, dass man selber keine Kriterien haben würde, um die korrekte Verwendung eines Ausdrucks zu überprüfen, und auch andere könnten das nicht überprüfen. Im Beispiel des eigenen Verfügens kann ich nicht anderen etwas zeigen wollen, wozu nur ich Zugang habe bzw. was nur ich besitzen kann.

Wittgenstein wendet das Prinzip an, dass, wenn man die Möglichkeit des Verfügens eines anderen ausschließt, es auch keinen Sinn hat, zu behaupten, dass man es hat, weil es dann kein Kriterium gibt, um festzustellen,

dass man dies hat, weil in der Perspektive der ersten Person es nicht möglich ist, Kriterien über die Verwendung eines Ausdrucks festzustellen.

Im Abschnitt b des Paragraphen PU 398 verwendet Wittgenstein das Beispiel des „visuellen Zimmers", um die Grammatik von „haben" zu erklären. Angenommen, eine Person sitzt in einem normalen (materiellen) Zimmer und schaut sich darin um. Die „visuellen Eindrücke", die derjenige von dem Zimmer hat, könnte man das „visuelle Zimmer" nennen. Obwohl der Solipsist den Besitz des „visuellen Zimmers" beansprucht, argumentiert Wittgenstein, dass das „visuelle Zimmer" keineswegs einen Besitzer hat. Z.B. eine Person A steht in einem Zimmer im Punkt P und hat visuelle Eindrücke des Zimmers. Danach stellt sich eine Person B auf denselben Punkt P, wo vorher A war, und hat ebenfalls einen visuellen Eindruck des Zimmers aus derselben Perspektive wie Person A. Nun ist die Frage, ob man sagen könnte, dass A und B dieselben visuellen Eindrücke haben könnten? Würde man den Solipsisten fragen, die Antwort wäre nein, da der Träger der visuellen Eindrücke für ihn auch als Identitätskriterium der visuellen Eindrücke dient. Doch Wittgenstein analysiert die Verwendung von „haben" und stellt fest: das materielle Zimmer kann einen Besitzer haben, und es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, dass ein anderer außer mir es besitzen kann. In den Fällen, in denen es logisch ausgeschlossen ist, dass ein anderer außer mir Besitzer sein kann, verwendet man nicht mehr die Grammatik des Wortes „haben" wie beim normalen Gebrauch. Also würde man „haben" wie gewöhnlich gebrauchen, dann sollte es auch möglich sein, dass z.B. Person A und Person B dieselben visuellen Eindrücke des Zimmers haben könnten.

Nach Wittgenstein will der Solipsist die gleiche Ausdruckform des Besitzens des materiellen Zimmers auch für das „visuelle Zimmer" verwenden, deswegen verfällt er in das Missverständnis, den Besitz des „visuellen Zimmers" als etwas Privates, das nur ich haben kann, anzusehen.

Im PU § 399 behandelt Wittgenstein das Problem der Verwendung des „visuellen Zimmers" durch den Gegner, als wäre das „visuelle Zimmer" ein neuer Gegenstand und dieser neue Gegenstand hätte einen Besitzer, nämlich das solipsistische Subjekt, das „Ich".

Nach Wittgenstein müsste, wenn das „visuelle Zimmer" einen Besitzer hätte, der Besitzer entweder Bestandteil

des visuellen Zimmers oder außerhalb des visuellen Zimmers sein. Um es deutlicher zu machen, können wir den Ausdruck „visuelles Zimmer" durch „meine Sicht vom Zimmer" ersetzen. Das würde heißen, wenn ich als Besitzer wesensgleich mit „meine Sicht vom Zimmer" wäre, dann kann ich nicht im Außen und nicht im Inneren von „meiner Sicht vom Zimmer" sein. Diese Perspektive, wesensgleich mit „meiner Sicht vom Zimmer" zu sein, schließt die Möglichkeit des Besitzes aus.

Da es sich um einen „visuellen Raum" handelt, gibt es kein Innen und kein Außen, wie man diese Wörter alltagssprachlich für die Beschreibung eines physischen Raums verwendet. Nach Hacker (1990, S. 497) ist der angebliche Besitzer des „visuellen Zimmers" nicht in seinem eigenen visuellen Feld zu finden, und das „visuelle Zimmer" ist nicht ein Teil von einem größeren Raum, in dem sein Besitzer sich befinden könnte. In dieser Perspektive ist er nicht Teil des „visuellen Zimmers" und ist auch nicht außerhalb des „visuellen Zimmers".

Nach Wittgenstein hat sein Gegner, der über das „visuelle Zimmer" redet, eine neue Sprechweise gefunden, weil er sich nicht mehr auf die Beschreibung der Gegenstände der physischen Welt beschränkt, sondern er beschreibt seine visuellen Eindrücke der Gegenstände. Diese neue Redeweise führt nicht zur Beschreibung von neuen Gegenständen in der physischen Welt, sondern zur Beschreibung von Eindrücken der Gegenstände. Dadurch entsteht auch ein neues Sprachspiel, wie zum Beispiel die Beschreibung von dem, wie ich etwas sehe. Es entsteht ein neuer Vergleich, weil er die Sprache der sichtbaren Gegenstände verwendet, um über die visuellen Eindrücke zu sprechen. Eine neue Sprechweise ist im Prinzip weder falsch noch richtig, man muss sich klar machen, wie sie verwendet wird, und deswegen ist es wichtig für Wittgenstein zu untersuchen, wie der Gegner seine Ausdrücke verwendet (siehe PU § 409).

In PU § 410 behauptet Wittgenstein, dass der Ausdruck „ich" keine Person benennt, aber er ist mit Namen in verschiedenen Kontexten verbunden. Gleicherweise bezeichnet der Ausdruck „hier" keinen Ort und der Ausdruck „dieses" keinen Gegenstand. Wittgenstein kritisiert, dass man geneigt ist, die Ausdrücke „dieser" und „mein" als hinweisende Ausdrücke, die sich auf einen privaten Gegenstand beziehen, zu konzipieren. Wenn man diesen Ausdruck in der Perspektive der dritten Person korrekt verwendet, dann besteht die Möglichkeit der Identifizierung des Gegenstandes, der Person usw. In diesem Sinn ist etwas, das meines ist, nichts Privates, sonst könnten die anderen meine Verwendung dieses Wortes nicht verstehen, und ich hätte auch keine Kriterien zur Verwendung eines Wortes. Etwas ist meines, insofern andere dies auch haben können. Dies ist mit dem Beispiel der Empfindung in PU §411 dargestellt. In diesem Paragraphen stellt Wittgenstein die Frage nach Kriterien, die es ermöglichen zu sagen, dass etwas meines ist. Es gibt verschiedene Verwendungen des Ausdrucks „mein". Dafür gibt er vier Beispiele: „1) „Sind diese Bücher *meine* Bücher? 2) „Ist dieser Fuß *mein* Fuß?" 3) „Ist dieser Körper *mein* Körper?" 4) „Ist diese Empfindung *meine* Empfindung?" In dem ersten Beispiel handelt es sich um eine possessive Verwendung des Ausdrucks „mein". Man kann mit ostensiven Gesten auf die Bücher zeigen, und sie sind meine, weil ich sie erworben oder als Geschenk erhalten habe o.ä. Es gibt dann auch öffentliche Kriterien für das Eigentum (Besitz). Diese Bücher können sowohl meine sein als auch die von einem anderen. Es heißt, dass die Möglichkeit, dass diese Bücher zu einem anderen gehören, besteht, z. B. durch Verkauf, Geschenk u.ä.

Im zweiten Beispiel ist die Verwendung von „mein" anders. Hier ist die Verwendung von „mein" reflexiv. Es handelt sich um die Frage, mit welchen Kriterien ich feststellen kann, dass dieser Fuß meiner und nicht der von anderen ist. Es ist reflexiv, weil ich auf meinen eigenen Fuß zeige. „Mein" wird nicht als Besitz wie im Beispiel der Bücher verwendet, und das Kriterium, damit dieser Fuß mein ist, ist auch ein anderes. Im Fall von einer Lähmung oder einer Anästhesie könnte dieser Zweifel aufkommen, ob dieser Fuß wirklich meiner ist. Ein mögliches Kriterium, das Wittgenstein gibt, ist, ob ich Schmerzen in ihm fühle, ein anderes Kriterium ist, dass dieser Fuß meiner ist, weil er mit meinem Bein verbunden ist. Nach Hacker (1990, S. 289) ist zu bemerken, dass Besitz im Fall von Gliedern eines Körpers etwas Anderes ist als im Fall von Organen, weil die Organe ihre Besitzer wechseln können, indem sie z. B. durch Transplantate zu anderen Personen gehören, während ein Glied eines Körpers im Prinzip zu dem jeweiligen Körper gehört. Diese zwei möglichen Kriterien führen uns zu den anderen zwei Beispielen Wittgensteins, dem Beispiel der Empfindung (ob diese Empfindung meine Empfindung ist) und dem Beispiel des Körpers (ob dieser Körper mein Körper ist). Wenn ich frage, ob dieser Körper mein Körper ist, zeige ich auf meinen Körper und verwende das Wort „mein" in einer reflexiven Weise. Diese Frage wäre sinnvoll z. B., wenn man, nach Hacker, einem Kind erklärt, welches der Unterschied ist zwischen meinem Körper und seinem Körper. Oder wenn man in einen Spiegel schaut.

In dem anderen Beispiel geht es um die Frage, „ob diese Empfindung meine Empfindung ist". Ein Punkt ist, dass die Feststellung, dass diese Empfindung meine Empfindung ist, nicht möglich ist in der Perspektive der ersten Person, weil man durchs Konzentrieren auf die Empfindung kein Kriterium für die Empfindung als privaten Gegenstand feststellen kann. Etwas kann nur Meines sein, wenn die Möglichkeit, dass es zu einem Anderen gehören kann, nicht ausgeschlossen ist. Diese Voraussetzung macht es unmöglich, dass man einen privaten Gegenstand im solipsistischen Sinne hat. Die Verwendung von „mein" im Beispiel der Empfindung deutet nicht auf eine private Empfindung hin im Sinne, dass nur ich allein sie haben könnte. Damit der andere mich versteht, muss der andere wissen, wie ich das Wort „mein" verwende, und wenn „mein" sich auf einen privaten Gegenstand im solipsistischen Sinne bezöge, dann könnten die anderen nicht nachvollziehen, wie ich dieses Wort verwende. Außerdem gehört das Wort „mein" zur deutschen Sprache, und diese ist eine öffentliche Sprache wie jede andere Sprache auch.

Ein Selbstbezug erfordert, dass es private Kriterien zur Identifikation der Person gibt, aber diese sind nicht möglich, weil man keine Instanz in der Perspektive der ersten Person hat, in der man die Fehler korrigieren oder zwischen wahr und falsch unterscheiden könnte. Daher ist auch ein Selbstbezug nicht möglich.

Wittgenstein warnt vor dem Missverständnis, die Wörter „diese" und „meine" in dem Satz „Ist diese Empfindung meine Empfindung?" in einer ostensiven Definition zu verwenden, in der eine Empfindung ein privater Gegenstand wäre: „Verwirrungen entstehen hier wieder dadurch, daß man sich einbildet, man zeige auf eine Empfindung, indem man seine Aufmerksamkeit auf sie richtet" (PU § 411). In diesem Fall haben „diese" und „meine" keine ostensive Rolle, weil man in der Perspektive der ersten Person gar keinen Gegenstand hat, worauf man zeigen könnte.

Wittgenstein zeigt uns, dass die Wörter „ich" und „mein" keine referenzielle Verwendung haben müssen, wie in den Beispielen des Paragraphen 411. Das Wort „ich" aus der Perspektive der ersten Person benennt dann auch keine Person (PU § 404) und mit ihr werden Namen erklärt. Der Satz „Ich habe Schmerzen" ist eine Äußerung und behauptet nichts über den Sprecher. Nach Wittgenstein kann man dann dieses Wort mit einem Stöhnen vergleichen. Das Wort „ich" aus der Perspektive der ersten Person identifiziert dann keine Person. Die Identifizierung einer Person ist nur möglich in der Perspektive der dritten Person. Die Identifikation einer Person setzt eine andere voraus.

Das Wort „ich" ist nicht überall gleich zu setzen mit „Fernando Scherer" oder „N. N.", weil „Fernando Scherer" eine referenzielle Funktion hat und ein Name ist, der sich auf eine Person bezieht. Diese Person wird in der Perspektive der dritten Person anerkannt. Ein Name von einer Person hat den Zweck, eine Person in einer Gemeinschaft zu identifizieren. Wenn man „ich" sagt, identifiziert man keine Person in einer Gemeinschaft, weil ein anderer genauso das Wort „ich" verwenden könnte. Das Wort „ich" kann auch die Funktion haben, in einer Gemeinschaft die Aufmerksamkeit der anderen auf den Sprechenden zu richten, aber es identifiziert nicht den Sprechenden, so

wenig, wie ein Stöhnen jemanden identifiziert aus der Perspektive der ersten Person. Die Identifikation des Sprechenden oder des Stöhnenden kommt nicht von dem Sprechenden oder dem Stöhnenden selbst, es sind die anderen, die ihn als Sprechenden oder Stöhnenden identifizieren und entsprechend handeln.

Das Wort „ich" hilft in der Identifizierung einer Person oder einer Erklärung von Namen, in dem Sinn, dass das Wort „ich" wie ein „Stöhnen" die Aufmerksamkeit der anderen auf den Sprechenden oder den Stöhnenden richtet. Wenn jemand sagt „Ich habe Schmerzen", identifiziert er sich nicht selbst, sondern er macht eine Äußerung. Die anderen identifizieren die Person, die diese Äußerung gemacht hat.

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Kunst- und Musiktherapie bei Demenz
Ethische Überlegungen

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Abstract

Menschen mit Demenz bedürfen der besonderen Unterstützung in unserer Gesellschaft. Da es noch keine heilsamen Medikamente gegen Demenz gibt und auch präventive Maßnahmen noch nicht ausreichend auf ihre Wirksamkeit erforscht sind, muss ein Weg gefunden werden, die Lebensqualität von Menschen mit Demenz positiv zu beeinflussen. Kunst- und Musiktherapien sind nicht-medikamentöse Interventionen, die nachweislich die Lebensqualität von Menschen mit Demenz verbessern.
Es soll überlegt werden, was Lebensqualität bei Demenz sein kann, wie diese durch Musik- und Kunsttherapien gestärkt werden kann und warum es ethisch geboten ist, diese in unserer Gesellschaft zu forcieren.

Aufgrund des demographischen Wandels und der leistungsstarken technisierten Medizin, die uns ein immer längeres Leben ermöglicht, sind stetig mehr Menschen von Demenz betroffen. Die Zunahme der Erkrankung in unserer Gesellschaft erfordert einen adäquaten Umgang mit den betroffenen Menschen.

Im Folgenden verwende ich den Oberbegriff „Demenz", der für ein Krankheitsbild steht, das verschiedene Formen der Erkrankung umfasst. Alzheimer ist mit ca. 70 Prozent aller Demenzen die häufigste Form, die zweithäufigste ist mit 10 bis 30 Prozent die vaskuläre Demenz. Schwierig stellt sich die Abgrenzung der Demenz zur Depression dar, weil die Symptome vor allem im Anfangsstadium sehr ähnlich sein können. Depressive Symptome treten häufig in der frühen Demenzphase auf und Menschen mit depressiven Störungen haben wiederum Merk- und Gedächtnisstörungen, die einer Demenz ähneln können. Die Depression, das Vergessen und die Verwirrtheitszustände sind für die Betroffenen eine erhebliche Belastung und insofern eine Beeinträchtigung ihrer Lebensqualität. Es gibt umfassende Diskussionen darüber, ob es überhaupt sinnvoll ist, eine frühe Diagnose bei Demenz zu stellen, weil das Wissen um die Erkrankung eine so starke Belastung sein kann, sodass das Nicht-Wissen bevorzugt wird. Die Frage, ob Wissen oder Nicht-Wissen hilfreicher ist, kann allerdings nicht pauschal beantwortet werden. Manchen Menschen hilft es, zu wissen, was mit ihnen los ist, warum sie verschiedene Symptome haben und wollen nicht nur ahnen, dass es eine schwere Erkrankung ist. Andere wiederum suspendieren unangenehme Tatsachen gerne und machen lieber Gebrauch von ihrem Recht auf Nicht-Wissen. Was nun für eine höhere Lebensqualität spricht – das Wissen oder das Nicht-Wissen der Diagnose – ist entsprechend individuell.

Aus ethischer Sicht unbestritten ist jedoch, dass die Gesellschaft einen Beitrag leisten muss, um Menschen mit Demenz noch möglichst lange ein gutes Leben zu ermöglichen (ich verwende im Folgenden die Begriffe „gutes Leben" und „Lebensqualität" synonym). Allerdings stellt sich diesbezüglich die Frage, was denn Lebensqualität bei Demenz sein kann. Menschen im gesunden Zustand neigen dazu, ein Leben mit Demenz nicht mehr als ein gutes Leben zu verstehen. Das liegt vor allem daran, dass wir als gesunde, selbstbestimmte Wesen, unsere Autonomie sehr hoch schätzen, unser Leben selbst gestalten und planen wollen. Hingegen das Angewiesen-Sein auf andere, das Nachlassen der kognitiven Fähigkeiten und das eigene Leben nicht mehr planen zu können, scheint gesunden Menschen ein massiver Verlust zu sein, der das

Leben nahezu sinnlos resp. nicht mehr lebenswert erscheinen lässt. Dass dies teilweise so empfunden wird, zeigen Fälle von Menschen, die sich nach der Demenz-Diagnose suizidiert haben (Gunther Sachs ist eines der prominenten Beispiele). Die Sorge, sich selbst nicht mehr bestimmen zu können und vollkommen auf andere angewiesen zu sein, ist immens. Die Angst vor diesem Verlust, lässt daran zweifeln, dass ein Leben mit Demenz noch in irgendeiner Form Qualität aufweisen könnte.

Freilich muss bei Menschen mit Demenz ein anderer Maßstab für Lebensqualität angelegt werden. Es geht sowohl aus empirischen Studien, in denen Menschen mit Demenz im frühen Stadium zu ihrer (Vorstellung von) Lebensqualität befragt wurden als auch aus Aussagen pflegender Angehöriger hervor, dass der Moment, der Augenblick an Bedeutung gewinnt. Als wichtig erachtet werden u.a. angenehme soziale Kontakte, positive Emotionen, Sicherheitsgefühl, Glaube/Spiritualität, Freude an bevorzugten Aktivitäten (vgl. Dichter et al. 2016, 287-302). Die Bedeutung, Dinge für die Zukunft zu planen und sein Leben selbst zu bestimmen, nimmt also ab, es geht vielmehr darum, sich gut und wohl zu fühlen, auch wenn man dabei auf andere angewiesen ist. Das Wohlbefinden resp. die Lebensqualität von Menschen mit Demenz zu fördern, ist ein wesentliches Ziel von Kunst- und Musiktherapie.

Kunst- und Musiktherapien helfen nachweislich, positive Emotionen hervorzurufen. Auch Bewegung und Tanz sind künstlerische Therapieformen, die bei Menschen mit Demenz angewandt werden. Im Folgenden werden aber lediglich Musik und bildende Künste als Therapieformen in den Blick genommen.

Musik wird in verschiedenen Kontexten immer wieder zu Heilzwecken eingesetzt, sie hat Einfluss auf messbare klinische Parameter wie Puls, Blutdruck, Herz- und Atemfrequenz. Unter Musiktherapie versteht man die wissenschaftliche fundierte Nutzung von Musik oder musikalischen Elementen zu Heilzwecken (Müller-Schwarz 1994, 159). Musiktherapie wird sowohl in der Gruppe als auch als Einzeltherapie durchgeführt und ist auch Teil mancher Psychotherapien. Wie sehr Musik Emotionen anspricht und beeinflusst, sieht man auch daran, wie sie in Filmen und in der Werbung gezielt eingebaut wird. Wesentlich ist, dass die Musik richtig resp. für den Betroffenen wohltuend eingesetzt wird, denn sie kann freilich auch negative Emotionen auslösen. So besteht bei einer Reihe von Liedern der Generation, die heute von Demenz betroffen ist, eine Verbindung zum Nationalsozialismus. Denn in der NS-Diktatur wurde die Wirkkraft von Musik auch besonders

genutzt. Diese Musik kann Scham bei den Betroffenen auslösen (vgl. Fröhlich-Güzelsoy 2015, 82). Zudem ist zu berücksichtigen, dass sich das Erleben von Musik von Generation zu Generation grundsätzlich verändert. Während man früher Volkslieder in der Freizeit sang, werden die nachfolgenden Generationen Musik eher mit Filmen und Computerspielen verbinden. Die ethische Herausforderung in der Musiktherapie besteht also darin, zu einer besseren Lebensqualität mittels bestimmter, für den Menschen mit Demenz individuell angemessener Musik beizutragen. Eine gute Beziehung zwischen dem Musiktherapeuten und dem Patienten ist dafür eine wesentliche Voraussetzung. Denn nur mit einer gewissen Sensibilität wird der Therapeut wahrnehmen, was dem Betroffenen gut tut, vor allem dann, wenn er sich aufgrund der Erkrankung verbal nicht mehr adäquat mitteilen kann.

Fröhlich-Güzelsoy nennt neben der identitätsstiftenden, erinnerungsauslösenden und emotionalisierenden Wirkung von Musik noch fünf weitere mögliche Funktionen: Sie (1) kann Orientierung und Struktur schaffen und in diesem Zuge Vertrauen, (2) bietet eine Möglichkeit zur Expression von Befinden, (3) dient der Kommunikation und fördert Interaktion, (4) kann beruhigend, aber auch bewegungsfördernd wirken, (5) kann Angst und Schmerz vermindern (Fröhlich-Güzelsoy 2015, 84).

Vor allem die biographieorientierte Musiktherapie kann früher erlebte Emotionen wieder hervorrufen und zu einem positiven Lebensgefühl beitragen (vgl. Fröhlich-Güzelsoy 2015, 73). Aufgrund all dieser erwiesenen wohltuenden, die Lebensqualität steigernden Aspekte der Musiktherapie lässt sich konstatieren, dass die Anwendung dieser Therapie ethisch geboten ist:

> Da die Musik eng mit Emotionen verknüpft ist, kann die Musiktherapie ein ideales, weitgehend nebenwirkungsfreies Zugangsmedium zur Lebenswelt demenziell Betroffener sein und stellt zudem eine gute Ausdrucksmöglichkeit für die Betroffenen dar. (Fröhlich-Güzelsoy 2015, 87)

Kunsttherapie wird meist mit Gestaltung verbunden: Malen, Basteln oder Modellieren sind Möglichkeiten, sich kreativ zu betätigen und rufen positive Emotionen hervor.

> Kunsttherapie sollte vor allem da angewandt werden, wo der Mensch den Bezug zu sich und seiner Umwelt verloren hat; wo er durch Depression, Angst und Verbitterungsgefühle seelisch und leiblich verkümmert. Hier gilt es, den Menschen aus der Tiefe seiner apathischteilnahmslosen Grundhaltung – aus seinen festgefahrenen Vorstellungen und Phantasien zu lösen und ihn wieder an einem lebendigen Geschehen zu beteiligen. (Dunker 1994, 167)

Auch auf Menschen mit Demenz hat Kunst eine besondere Wirkung wie verschiedene Forschungsprojekte zeigen. So belegt dies etwa die zwei Jahre dauernde wissenschaftlich begleitete Pilotstudie ARTEMIS (ART Encounters: Museum Intervention Study) für Menschen mit leichter bis mittelgradiger Demenz und ihre Angehörigen. Die Anregung zu dieser Studie kam aus den USA. Die amerikanische Studie zu Demenz und Kunst hatte nachweislich gezeigt, dass sich die Stimmung, das Wohlbefinden und das Selbstwertgefühl der Teilnehmenden verbessert hatten. ARTEMIS bietet Führungen im Städel-Museum in Frankfurt am Main für Menschen mit Demenz und ihre Angehörigen an. Diese Führungen dienen weniger der Kunstvermittlung als vielmehr dazu, ins Gespräch zu kommen und Erinnerungen zu wecken. Ein weiterer Teil des Projekts besteht darin, dass sich die Teilnehmenden auch selbst künstlerisch betätigen. Es werden an unter-

schiedlichen Tagen verschiedene Formen der bildenden Kunst angeboten: Collagetechniken, Malen, Druck mit Styroporplatten und das Arbeiten mit Ton. Die Teilnehmenden werden während ihrer Tätigkeit für die wissenschaftliche Auswertung in Bezug auf Kommunikationsfähigkeit, Wohlbefinden und das emotionale Ausdrucksverhalten gefilmt (vgl. Hardy 2015).

Diese evidenz-basierten positiven Forschungsergebnisse werden auch in Projekten genutzt, die über Kunst- und Musiktherapie hinausgehen, in denen diese aber wesentliche Elemente sind. So etwa das Projekt MAKS. Das Akronym MAKS steht für motorische, alltagspraktische und kognitive Fähigkeiten, die mit Spiritualität ergänzt werden (vgl. Eichenseer u. Gräßel 2011). In diesem Konzept spielen Musik, Tanz und Kreativität eine wesentliche Rolle. MAKS ist eine am Universitätsklinikum Erlangen entwickelte Therapie, welche Spielerisches wie Tanzen, Ballspiele sowie Sportliches wie Wassergymnastik und kognitive Übungen mit Zahlen, Sätzen und Wörtern umfasst, aber auch Kochen und Weben stehen auf dem Programm. Über den Zeitraum von zwölf Monaten mit sechs Mal zwei Stunden pro Woche konnte MAKS nachweislich das Nachlassen der Fähigkeiten ein halbes Jahr lang aufhalten. Darüber hinaus war das Verhalten der Gruppe von Menschen mit Demenz, die mit dem Konzept betreut wurde, weniger aggressiv, die Betroffenen waren weniger depressiv und auch ihr Sozialverhalten verbesserte sich. Das bedeutet, dass MAKS als nicht-medikamentöse Therapie deutlich zur Lebensqualität von Menschen mit Demenz beitragen konnte. Die individuelle Abstimmung der Tätigkeiten auf die jeweiligen Präferenzen des Patienten und die Möglichkeit zur Aktivität scheint dabei besonders wirksam zu sein.

Empirisch ist also belegt, dass die Lebensqualität von Menschen mit Demenz mittels Kunst- und Musiktherapie gesteigert werden kann. Es lässt sich daraus folgern, dass es deshalb ethisch geboten ist, Angebote dieser Art zu forcieren, finanziell zu unterstützen und als spezielle Form der Fürsorge für vulnerable Menschen unserer Gesellschaft zu verstehen. Lebensqualität, so wurde eingangs konstatiert, ist bei Menschen mit Demenz als momentanes Wohlbefinden zu verstehen und weniger als die Option der Umsetzung eines selbst gestalteten Plans der Zukunft.

Die vier medizinethischen Prinzipien von Beauchamp und Childress (2009) sind Autonomie, Nicht-Schaden, Fürsorge und Gerechtigkeit. Diese gelten als Maßstab für gutes ärztliches Handeln. Wendet man diese Prinzipien nun auf Menschen mit Demenz an, zeigt sich schnell, dass die Fürsorge, im Gegensatz zur Autonomie, immer wichtiger wird und auch das Prinzip der Gerechtigkeit eine maßgebliche Bedeutung hat. Denn in einer gerechten Gesellschaft ist es erforderlich, sich um jene Menschen zu kümmern, die besonders vulnerabel sind. Dazu zählen neben Kindern, Behinderten und Kranken eben auch Menschen mit Demenz.

Es herrscht Uneinigkeit darüber, ob es ethisch angemessen ist, Menschen mit Demenz in Analogie zu Kindern zu verstehen, um eine gute Behandlung für sie zu erzielen. Ein wesentliches kritisches Argument gegen diese Analogie ist, dass bei Kindern das Potenzial besteht, sich weiterzuentwickeln, dass sie dazulernen und sich entfalten. Bei Menschen mit Demenz ist das Gegenteil der Fall, der Abbau aller im Laufe des Lebens erworbenen Fähigkeiten ist vorhersehbar. Was allerdings dafür spricht, sich an der Erziehung von Kindern zu orientieren, ist der Umgang mit ihnen und der Fokus darauf, was ihnen gut tut. Sie bedürfen der Fürsorge anderer und brauchen Unterstützung. Kinder sind gerne kreativ, bewegen sich üblicherweise gerne und lassen sich auf Musik ein. Das ist auf jeden Fall

eine wichtige Analogie zwischen Kindern und Menschen mit Demenz. Auch wenn sich nicht alles von Kindern auf Menschen mit Demenz übertragen lässt, so kann doch mit Martha Nussbaum konstatiert werden:

> Gute Fürsorge für Menschen, die auf andere angewiesen sind, ob nun Kinder, ältere, kranke oder behinderte Menschen, stellt die Förderung der Fähigkeiten in den Bereichen des Lebens, der Gesundheit und der körperlichen Unversehrtheit in den Mittelpunkt. Sie sorgt außerdem dafür, dass die Sinne, die Einbildungskraft und die kognitiven Fähigkeiten stimuliert werden. Emotionale Bindungen werden unterstützt und „überwältigende Angst und Sorge" abgebaut. (Nussbaum 2010, 235)

Da, wie exemplarisch aufgezeigt, empirische Belege für eine Steigerung der Lebensqualität von Menschen mit Demenz durch Kunst- und Musiktherapie bestehen, gebietet es eine gute Gesellschaft diese Therapieformen zu forcieren und zu finanzieren.

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219

Noticing Deep Aspects as Other Aim of Philosophy – Besides a Therapeutic Reading of the Later Wittgenstein

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Abstract

In this article I argue that besides the widely discussed therapeutic method of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, there is another important movement of thought or methodological intention in his later work, which has to do with noticing "deep aspects". My suggestion is to read the well known remarks about aspect seeing in PI II, XI (=PPF 111 ff.) together with PI 129, showing a distinction of "Gestalt-aspects" and "deep aspects".

The intention of this paper is to work out a second important aim or methodological movement in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, besides - or additional to - what is commonly called his therapeutic method. This presupposes at least to give a short and simplified sketch of the latter.

(1) Philosophy as therapy

Wittgenstein developed his therapeutic philosophy already in the early 1930s, expressed in the central remarks 107-133 of the PI (corresponding to interpretations like that of P.M.S. Hacker, (e.g. Hacker 2012)):

— Philosophical problems–or "puzzles"– derive from *misunderstandings of our language* (PI 111).
— They occur when language is celebrating, not working as in ordinary use (PI 132).
— Philosophical therapy has to lead words back from their metaphysical to their ordinary use (PI 116).
— By finding synoptical presentations ("übersichtliche Darstellung") of the ordinary use (grammar) of our words (PI 122), we can clarify these confusions.

Without going into any details here I only want to point out the general result of this method. What we achieve is "complete clarity", because the philosophical problems "*completely* disappear" (PI 133). As he expressed in another picture in the *Big Typescript*: "Philosophical puzzles are dissolved as such like a piece of sugar in water." (Ts 213, 421) Wittgenstein was aware that this method may be felt as disappointing and frustrating because "it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is all that is great and important" (PI 118, analogous already in TLP 6.53). The only comfort Wittgenstein can give us is that what is destroyed are only 'Luftgebäude' (= 'castles in the air'), or idols (Ms 112, 10v) and we "are clearing the ground of language, on which they stood" (PI 118).

(2) The other aim of philosophy

The other important movement of thought in Wittgenstein's later philosophy - besides his therapeutic method - is not so prominent, but nevertheless noticed by numerous Wittgenstein interpreters. I want to mention only a few: Stanley Cavell, Ray Monk or Judith Genova. In her book *Wittgenstein. A way of Seeing* Genova states: "Change in all manifestations is Wittgenstein's life-long target."(Genova 1995, XV), and Ray Monk stresses: "But it is less often realized in seeking to change nothing but the way we look at things, he was tempting to change everything." (Monk 1990, 533)

To approach this other intention in Wittgenstein's philosophy we should remember remarks like: "What is your aim in philosophy? – To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle." (PI 309).

Another simile of the same kind in Ms 125 (p. 57v): "Someone is imprisoned in a room if the door is unlocked, opens inwards, but it doesn't occur to him to pull, rather than push against it."

How can the fly find its way out of the fly-bottle? How can this man find his way out of the unlocked room? Answer: they have to change their view, they have to recognize a new aspect, hidden in front of their eyes. It is exactly this topic that Wittgenstein expressed in PI 129, a remark which includes in short a whole philosophical program:

> The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless *that* fact has at some time struck him.—And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. (PI 129)

But in what sense can "the hidden" be subject to Wittgenstein's philosophy at all? Here we face a strange paradox.

(2.1) The riddle of the hidden in front of our eyes

In PI 129 Wittgenstein says "The aspects of things that are most important for us *are hidden*" (emphasis added), but three remarks above he declares: „Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For *whatever may be hidden, is of no interest to us*."(PI 126; emphasis added). We need an explanation how these two contradictory remarks fit together. When Wittgenstein speaks about "hidden aspects" he neither means:

— New scientific discoveries, new facts or new theories (like the discovery of new galaxies etc.). Above all for Wittgenstein - here very much in a classical tradition - philosophy has nothing to do with (the improvement of) empirical knowledge (e.g. PI 109).We need not wait for any new knowledge in philosophy, we already have all knowledge we need.
— Nor does he mean any kind of eidetic insight to find hidden Platonic essences behind the phenomena (PI 92).

Wittgenstein's philosophical method opens a small gate in between: philosophy can teach us to notice hidden aspects in well known things.

(2.2) Two dimensions of aspect seeing

Wittgenstein's prominent topic of aspects-seeing has two levels: the first may be called "Gestalt-aspects" – the other deeper, or more general level, I want to call "profound" or "deep aspects".

The first type of aspects deals with sensual perception. Wittgenstein's preferred examples are Joseph Jastrow's *duck-rabbit* (PPF, 118), other kinds of "*Kippbilder*" (foreground/background changes*)*, also the recognition of a likeness in two faces (PPF 111), or a certain mood in a face. All these examples refer to a phenomenon, which is well known from *Gestalt psychology*. Here he was obviously influenced by Wolfgang Köhler, who published a book with this title in 1929 (Köhler 1929). Wittgenstein is referring to Wolfgang Köhler many times in his later manuscripts beginning from 1947 (see: Mss 134, 135,136, 137). One of his students, Frank C. Jackson, reports that in the late 1940ies Wittgenstein used to start his lectures with a quotation from Köhler's book (Hallett 1985, 769).

There are only a few remarks, where Wittgenstein indicates that Gestalt-aspects may only be examples for a more general and profound meaning of aspect-change. When Wittgenstein indicates in PI 387 that "The deep aspect easily eludes." (MS 130, 179), he is not speaking of ducks and rabbits, as well in PI 144: "I have changed his *way of looking at things*. (Indian mathematicians: 'Look at this!')*"*. And in one of his very late manuscripts we read: "Für den Menschen ist das Ewige, Wichtige, oft durch einen undurchdringlichen Schleier verdeckt. Er weiß da darunter ist etwas, aber er sieht es nicht; der Schleier reflektiert das Tageslicht.*"* (Ms 128, 9a).

Here we are reminded of PI 129, though this remark belongs to a much earlier period (1931). Wittgenstein calls these deep aspects which are always *open before* us but usually unnoticed "most striking and most powerful". Not being aware of them we live in habitual dullness. As Avner Baz expressed it: *"The continual danger, in other words, is that, succumbing to habitual and convenient ways of treating, or regarding things, we will lose our ability to see them."* (Baz 2010, 248)

At that point it may be helpful to take a closer look at the origin of PI 129. It is composed of two parts, both from 1931, which are brought together in the *Big Typescript* (TS 213, 419):

"The philosophically most important aspects of things [of language] are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one's eyes. (The real achievement of a Copernicus or a Darwin is not the discovery of a true theory but of a fertile new aspect.)"	"The real foundations of their inquiry do not strike people at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck them.—And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. (Frazer etc. etc.)."
Ms 153b, 24r (01.11.1931; my translation)	Ms 110, 259 (02.07.1931; my translation)

There are some interesting changes compared with the later version of PI 129. In the 153b notebook Wittgenstein

refers to Darwin and Copernicus as examples indicating that their scientific revolutions led to a totally new view of well known phenomena. James Frazer – in the other part – is a (negative) example for a typical representative of Victorian English culture, who he did not realize his own cultural presuppositions. Here Wittgenstein speaks about something like a "Weltbild", which determines our view of everything, but without us being aware of it.

I my view, there is no *general* explanation what these hidden, most striking and most important aspects are. They can be found only individually, case by case. This relates to Wittgenstein's general rejection of a philosophical theory. But at least good similes can be found. The US writer David Foster Wallace provides us a perfect example in a speech at Kenyon College 2005:

> There are these two young fish swimming along and they happen to meet an older fish swimming the other way, who nods at them and says "Morning, boys. How's the water?" And the two young fish swim on for a bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at the other and says "What the hell is water?" […]
> The point of the fish story is merely that the most obvious, ubiquitous, important realities are often the ones that are hardest to see and talk about. (Wallace 2012, 40)

Is Wallace implicitly referring to PI 129 here? – He studied philosophy and did know Wittgenstein very well. His story of the fish and the unnoticed water is a perfect simile for PI 129.

There is an important difference or asymmetry between Gestalt- and deep aspects. Once noticed, we can switch between duck and rabbit intentionally. Not so with "deep aspects": once they struck us, we can never come back to the state of mind as before. Once the fish noticed the water, they will never again forget it. They lost their innocence or naivety, we could say pathetically.

(3) Conclusion: Two methods in Wittgenstein's philosophy

	Philosophy as therapy	Noticing new aspects
premisses	(1) no theory / thesis (2) no empirical investigations (no search for new facts) (3) no search for hidden essences (PI 92)	
method	destructive ("castles in the air destroyed")	constructive ("way out of the fly bottle")
	synoptic presentation of grammar finding and inventing intermediate links	noticing new (deep) aspects in well known things
	no surprises in logic / grammar	abrupt aspect switch (no intermediate links)
result	**complete clarity** philosophical puzzles completely disappear (PI 133)	**amazement** nothing has changed, but everything is different
	"Philosophy leaves everything as it is." (PI 123)	**change** of our view/ attitude

Beside Wittgenstein's (destructive) therapeutic method, he introduces another constructive philosophical method: noticing new aspect in the well known. They differ in method and in their result.

It is essential for the therapeutic method to find – and even invent – intermediate links ("*Zwischenglieder*", PI 122) to get a synoptic presentation of the grammar, that's why in the therapeutic method, there is no space for surprises (Ts 213, 63; also TLP 6.1251). In opposite a switch of aspects happens suddenly, without any transitions or intermediate links. Noticing new aspects evokes essentially amazement (Staunen): "…essential for the aspect change is amazement. And being amazed is thinking." (Ms 137, 132b; my translation). And at another place: "Striking is related to thinking." (Ms 138, 3b; my translation).We are amazed, because suddenly everything is different, although nothing has changed. Also for Plato and Aristotle the origin of philosophy was amazement.

Already in Wittgenstein's *Lecture on Ethics* from 1929 amazement is a central topic. In speaking about an absolute – but indescribable - ethical value he points at a kind of mystical experience: "In fact what I then called to wonder at the existence of the world I might have equally well described as the experience of looking at existence as a miracle." (MS 139b, 19; in the same sense: TLP 6.44). To see the existence of the world as a miracle is a perfect example for aspect seeing in its profound, deep sense.

With his focus on noticing aspects Wittgenstein opens a sublime and undogmatic space for philosophy. It is nothing one can learn by a theory at all. We cannot force anybody to notice a certain aspect, e.g. the likeness of two faces. One can try to help, but everybody has to find it out himself. That brings Wittgenstein close to Socrates' maieutic method. And that is why Wittgenstein characterizes philosophy in a well known remark as "working on oneself, on one's way <u>of seeing</u> things" (Culture & Value, 17).

There is *one* question concerning aspect-seeing, which is completely inappropriate and senseless, the question: Which is the *correct* way of seeing e.g. the duck-rabbit? Is it a duck or a rabbit? If somebody tries to tell us, there is only *one correct way* of seeing it, this is exactly what we call dogmatism. In this regard Wittgenstein's philosophy of aspects is as an important contribution of a theory of tolerance.

In its extreme form this change of our view or attitude may concern our whole life. Our implicit system of convictions (*On Certainty*, no. 102) may change as a whole. In this context the topic of aspect-seeing gets an existential or ethical dimension.

Noticing hidden aspects gives us the chance to free our self from self-made mental cages of habitual dullness. Wittgenstein's texts are a permanent invitation to do so, - to see things anew, but without giving us a rigid order or proof for doing so. It is up to us. And that - I think - has much to do with his style of writing[1].

I close with another quotation from D.F. Wallace speech from 2005:

The capital-T Truth is about life BEFORE death. It is about the real value of a real education, which has almost nothing to do with knowledge, and everything to do with simple awareness; awareness of what is so real and essential, so hidden in plain sight all around us, all the time, that we have to keep reminding ourselves over and over: "This is water." (Wallace 2012, 61)

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1 Compare Allan Janik's remark (2000, 204): „Thus the sense of an aphorism […] is to help us to take a second look at something whose very familiarity permits us to take it for granted and thus to ignore it in everyday life."

Planen und Kartographieren

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Abstract

Wo wir in der Philosophie auf Formen sinnen, die einem zunächst nicht hinlänglich ausbuchstabierten Problem erst Bedeutung verleihen, dort haben wir uns gegen Forderungen des vorwegnehmenden Planens philosophischer Projekte sperrig zu verhalten. Diesem Gedanken möchte ich dadurch Sinn geben, dass ich den Begriffen des Planens und Kartographierens ein Stück weit nachgehe.

> *Man muß in der Philosophie nicht nur in jedem Fall lernen,* was *über einen Gegenstand zu sagen ist, sondern* wie *man über ihn zu reden hat. Man muß immer wieder erst die Methode lernen, wie er anzugehen ist.* (BF III, § 43)

Pläne schmieden

Wenn wir einen Plan entwerfen, so tun wir dies zu einem bestimmten Ende. Wir haben ein Ziel im Auge und sinnen auf Mittel, es zu erreichen. Die Schärfegrade, in denen uns die jeweiligen Zwecke vorschweben, mögen dabei freilich sehr verschieden sein. Wenn ich mir z. B. vornehme, morgen einen Freund zu besuchen, so sind die alternativen Wege, auf denen dieses Vorhaben verwirklicht werden könnte, leichter bestimmbar als dies etwa der Fall wäre, wenn ich am morgigen Tag tunlichst jede Aufregung vermeiden will. Der zweite Fall lässt ohne genauere Spezifizierung des Äußerungskontextes ein breites Spektrum an Deutungen dessen zu, was genau unter Aufregung zu verstehen wäre und welches die probaten Mittel sind, ihr aus dem Weg zu gehen. Gleichwohl ist überall dort, wo ich einen Plan entwerfe, das Ziel festgesetzt und es wird bloß relativ dazu auf Mittel gesonnen, um es auch zu erlangen. Ein Plan, heißt das, ist ein Instrument der methodischen Annäherung an ein Ziel, das zuvor bereits markiert worden war. Wann immer wir Pläne schmieden, besteht ein Unterschied zwischen dem (einen) Zweck und den (verschiedenen) Mitteln, derer wir uns zu seiner Einlösung bedienen.

Dieses Begriffsmerkmal festhaltend, wäre andererseits überall dort nicht von Plänen zu sprechen, wo man von den Mitteln nicht absehen kann, ohne zugleich der durch sie erschlossenen Zwecke verlustig zu gehen. Das vielleicht beste Beispiel für das Zusammenfallen von Mittel und Zweck ist der Begriff des Begriffes selbst. Insofern uns ein Begriff etwas zu begreifen erlaubt, das anders als durch ihn selbst nicht begriffen werden kann, ist er zugleich Existenzgrund und Identifikationsmittel für den durch ihn gesetzten Zweck, d. i. seinen Sinn. Zwar bedienen wir uns der Sprache oft genug nur als eines Mittels für einen Zweck, der unabhängig von ihr Bestand hat und zu seiner Identifikation nicht an dieses Mittel gebunden bleibt. In solchen Fällen, wo also der Zweck außerhalb der Sprache liegt, können wir uns zumeist verschiedenster sprachlicher Ausdrucksmittel bedienen, die innerhalb dieses Kontextes doch allesamt denselben Dienst leisten. Wo es einzig auf Brauchbarkeit ankommt, ist der genaue Wortlaut unserer Befehle, Instruktionen und Mitteilungen für gewöhnlich nur von zweitrangiger Bedeutung. Der Zweck entschuldigt hier gleichsam die Mittel.

Sobald wir dagegen an dem eigentümlichen Sinn eines Begriffsausdrucks interessiert sind, haben wir die jeweilige Gebrauchspraxis als funktionale Bedingung dieses Sinns zu begreifen und können sie nicht durch eine andere Gebrauchspraxis substituieren, ohne dass wir ihre Bedeutungseigenart aus den Augen verlören. Die Weise des Gebrauchs eines Wortes zu betrachten (und zu skizzieren) stellt dann den alleinigen Zugang zum Verständnis seines Sinnes dar, indem dieser Sinn von der Betrachtungsart (und den gewählten Beschreibungsmodi) abhängig ist. Wenn wir daher den Zweck unserer Untersuchung in das Verständnis der Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks legen, so ist der Gang und die Eigenart der Untersuchung nicht ein bloßes Mittel zur Erlangung dieses Zwecks, sondern bedingt diesen vielmehr. Eine begriffliche Untersuchung, heißt das, stiftet selbst erst den Zweck, um dessentwillen sie angestellt wird. Die Art und Weise, in der ich sprachlich verfahre, ist dabei entscheidend dafür, wovon ich in ihr handle. Diesen Zweck vorwegnehmen zu wollen, ohne die Untersuchung selbst durchzuführen, ist dann so ähnlich als prophezeite man ein Ereignis, von dem man doch nicht zu sagen wüsste, welcher Art es eigentlich sei. Es stellt daher ein grobes Missverständnis dar, wenn man begriffliche Untersuchungen *planen* möchte. — Ich will versuchen, dies näher zu erläutern.

Das akademische Plansoll

Ein philosophisches Selbstverständnis spricht sich nicht in einzelnen Lehrsätzen und Thesen aus, als dass es sich durch Verfahrensweisen und Reaktionsmuster bekundet, denen das Denken folgt. Es ist daher die Maserung und weniger das Material der Untersuchung, auf die wir bei der Lektüre fremder ebenso wie beim Verfassen eigener Texte vorrangig unser Augenmerk legen sollten. In akademischen Kreisen wird jedoch aus dem Befund, dass die Methoden und Muster des Argumentierens für die Philosophie von entscheidender Bedeutung seien, eine oft völlig überzogene und ins gerade Gegenteil umschlagende Konsequenz gezogen. Vielerorts hat man sich nämlich zu der Ansicht gedrängt gesehen, die Qualität philosophischer Untersuchungen sei geradezu bedingt dadurch, dass man sie zuvor methodisch plant. Diese Tendenz zur Vorwegnahme philosophischer Denkbewegungen lässt sich aus einer Vielzahl an Determinanten ablesen, die unter dem Credo der Wissenschaftlichkeit als verbindliche Voraussetzungen für ein gelingendes Philosophieren in die Curricula und Forschungsstandards eingeschrieben wurden. Gleich, ob Drittmittel lukriert, ein Stipendium beantragt oder eine Seminararbeit verfasst werden soll: Wer heute philosophisch forscht, hat eine sogenannte Forschungslücke, den sie umgebenden Forschungsstand, die einzusetzenden Methoden und womöglich gar den genauen Zeitplan seines Projektes festzusetzen, lang bevor die tatsächliche Arbeit beginnen kann.

Diese Praktiken des Planens und Vorwegnehmens sind keine bloßen Rahmenbedingungen, welche die Inhalte nicht tangierten. Sie wirken unmittelbar auf unser philosophisches Selbstverständnis, insofern die Existenz philosophischer Fakten suggeriert wird, die markiert und beschrieben werden könnten, ehe eine philosophische Untersuchung überhaupt angehoben hat. Das führt dann dazu, dass die sprachliche Gestaltungskraft in den Hintergrund rückt, weil man in dem Glauben befangen ist, die jeweils gewählten Worte stellten ohnedies nur eine unter vielen alternativen Weisen der Annäherung an den davon weitestgehend unberührt bleibenden Gegenstand des Denkens dar. Obwohl das im akademischen Betrieb vorherrschende Planungsideal unter Umständen sogar aus dem Anspruch geboren wurde, die methodischen und darstellerischen Momente des Philosophierens hervorzukehren, fördert und repetiert es daher letztlich ein Bild der Philosophie, dem das Bewusstsein für die formierende Gewalt der Sprache völlig äußerlich bleibt. Die Sprache wird dabei zu einem bloßen Mittel degradiert, dessen man bedarf, um einen davon geschiedenen philosophischen Gegenstand zu identifizieren.

Erblickt man dagegen das genuin philosophische Moment eines Textes in den durch seine spezifische sprachliche Ausgestaltung eröffneten Denkmodi, dann erweist sich die Vorstellung, vorab einen Querschnitt durch den erst noch abzusteckenden Denkhorizont zu geben, als widersinnig. Die Abfolge der Sätze, das Arrangement der Bemerkungen, die Rhythmik des Fortschreitens und Retardierens, ja selbst das Nachzeichnen von Wegen, die in eine Sackgasse führten – all das und eine Vielzahl anders gearteter Weisen des Darstellens bekunden dann erst die einem/r Philosophen/in eigentümlichen Betrachtungsmodi und deren Transformationen. Jene Denkbewegungen müssen mitvollzogen werden, um ihre Logik und damit den genauen Sinn der sich ergebenden Stellungen zu verstehen. Wo wir daher die Philosophie als eine Praxis des Entwerfens von Denkformen begreifen, dort kann es keine Abkürzungen durch sie geben – nicht im Nachhinein und schon gar nicht im Voraus.

Philosophische Kartographie

Ich sagte, ein philosophisches Projekt könne man nicht planen, sofern man deren eigenstes Merkmal in die Formen setzt, in denen sich dies Denken gestaltet. Wenn die Inhalte (im Sinne philosophischer Lehrsätze oder Thesen) bedingt sind durch die Weise, in der man sie begrifflich verortet, dann ist es wenig fruchtbar, im Rahmen eines kursorischen Exposés zu umreißen, welche Inhalte man behandeln werde, da schließlich alles an der *Art* dieser Behandlung hängt. Soweit scheint das Anfertigen eines Planes, in dem dargelegt wird, welcher Methoden man sich bedienen, welche Themen man behandeln und auf welche Literatur man sich stützen werde, ein zwar entbehrliches, aber letztlich unschädliches Unterfangen zu sein. Anderseits aber versperrt man sich mit der Verpflichtung auf bestimmte vorweg festgesetzte Darstellungsmodi in systematischer Weise die Möglichkeit, im Zuge eines offenen Denkens selbst welche hervorzubringen. Hält man die Genese einer ihm eigentümlichen Betrachtungsform als ein wesentliches Merkmal des Philosophierens fest, sollte man daher tunlichst vermeiden, eine Praxis zu repetieren, die darauf dringt, Formen festzulegen, ehe man ans Philosophieren geht.

An Wittgenstein anschließend, der von sich selbst zuweilen als Landschaftszeichner (PU, Vorwort) oder Begriffstopograph (LFM, S. 44) spricht, begreife ich die philosophische Tätigkeit als eine des Kartographierens sprachlicher Ausdrucksformen. Überlappungen, Kreuzungen und Parallelen zwischen den verschiedensten Begriffsbahnen nachzeichnend, versuchen wir einen Überblick über jene sprachlichen Zusammenhänge zu gewinnen, deren Unkenntnis uns in Verlegenheit stürzte. Das Philosophieren hebt so nicht mit einer bereits vorliegenden Methodologie an, sondern entwickelt ausgehend von dem zunächst nicht hinlänglich ausbuchstabierten Unbehagen erst die Begriffe, durch welche es näher bestimmt werden kann. Die Maserung des zur Charakterisierung des Problems aufgebotenen Denkens bleibt diesem Problem dann nicht äußerlich, es stellt vielmehr seinen eigentümlichsten Ausdruck dar. Die Begrifflichkeit, derer ich mich z. B. bediente, um das Unbehagen mit vorherrschenden Praktiken der planenden Vorwegnahme philosophischer Resultate zu artikulieren, kann nicht durch eine andere ersetzt werden, ohne das Problem in entscheidender Weise zu verschieben.

Ich habe das Verhältnis zwischen den Begriffen der Kartographie und des Planens in der Art bestimmt, dass letzterer einen bereits erschlossenen logischen Raum voraussetzt, innerhalb dessen sich Hypothesen (als Aussagen über die relative Lage der darin verortbaren Gegenstände) formulieren lassen. Ein Plan ist nach diesem Verständnis ein genuin hypothetisches Konstrukt, zu dessen Verständnis man auf Darstellungsformen angewiesen bleibt, an welche nicht weiter gerührt wird. Begreift man demgegenüber die Philosophie als Arbeit an den Formen des Darstellens, sollte für Hypothesen gerade *kein* Platz sein. Als eigenständige Form kann nämlich nur anerkannt werden, was für sich und ohne weitere (oder gar andernorts anzustellende) Untersuchungen als eingängiges Vergleichsobjekt identifizierbar ist. Wenn manche Philosoph/inn/en im Sinne einer Hypothese sagen, es müsse sich erst noch zeigen, ob sich die Dinge „so oder anders" verhielten, dann ist dies der Ausdruck eines Missverständnisses, welches daher rührt, dass man eine sachliche Frage mit einer begrifflichen vermengt. In einer begrifflichen Untersuchung kann sich zwar freilich alles Denkbare er-geben; vorausgesetzt ist nur, dass man die Begriffe entsprechend einrichtet, *wir* der Betrachtung also eine bestimmte Form *geben*.

Wissenschaft und Dichtung

Eine solche Charakterisierung der Philosophie, mit der man sich gegen die fraglose Übernahme etablierter Parameter der wissenschaftlichen Aufbereitung sperrt, ist fast reflexartig mit dem Verdikt konfrontiert, in Indifferenz zu münden. Wenn jede philosophische Untersuchung die Form aufweisen dürfte, die der Autor oder die Autorin gerade geben möchte, wo kämen wir da nur hin? — Um diesem Vorwurf den Wind aus den Segeln zu nehmen, wäre zunächst daran zu erinnern, dass es weder leicht noch auch der Beliebigkeit überantwortet ist, einen Begriff, eine Darstellungsform zu entwickeln, von der oder dem sich sagen ließe: „Ja, dies ist ein taugliches Instrument, die Dinge zu betrachten." Die von Wittgenstein konstruierten Sprachspiele etwa, die, wie er sagt, „als *Vergleichsobjekte* […] ein Licht in die Verhältnisse unserer Sprache werfen sollen" (PU, § 130), müssen, um diesen Dienst überhaupt leisten zu können, hinsichtlich des in ihnen dargestellten begrifflichen Zusammenhangs einprägsam und zweifelsfrei identifizierbar sein. Ein Begriffsvorbild, das unsere Betrachtung leiten soll, ist dies schließlich einzig dadurch, dass *wir* es gelten lassen und als solches heranziehen (vgl. PU, § 144). Jeder philosophische Text appelliert daher ein Stück weit an das Wohlwollen und die Imaginationskraft der Leser/innen, da letztlich sie es sind, die ihm dadurch, dass sie die aufgebotenen Vergleichsobjekte

auch als Maßstäbe gebrauchen, erst den Status eines *philosophischen* Textes verleihen.

Nun ist es keineswegs so, dass jeder beliebige Entwurf diesem Anspruch auch gerecht zu werden vermag. Es kann oft vergebliche Mühe sein, die man für den Nachvollzug eines Gedankens, der sich als philosophisch gebärdet, aufwendet. Wo wir dies jedoch ausloten wollen, dort ist es nicht damit getan, mit vorgefertigten Schemata des Argumentierens und Folgerns an einen vorgeblich philosophischen Text heranzugehen, sondern wir haben uns in die darin aufgebotenen Begriffe selbst hineinzubewegen, um uns derer Plastizität ebenso wie ihrer Brauchbarkeit zur Erfassung des fraglichen Zusammenhangs zu versichern. „*In* einer Demonstration *einigen* wir uns mit jemand. Einigen wir uns in ihr nicht, so trennen sich unsere Wege, ehe es zu einem Verkehr mittels dieser Sprache kommt." (BGM I, § 66) Dieses Sich-Einlassen auf die Eigenarten der begrifflichen Ausgestaltung („credo, ut intelligam") wird im akademischen Betrieb aber zusehends unterwandert, da vorrangig nur jene Formen als taugliche Mittel des Darstellens akzeptiert sind, die auf Vergleichbarkeit und Vorhersehbarkeit dringen.

Hiermit komme ich zuletzt an einen Punkt, der die Thematik des diesjährigen Symposiums betrifft. Was hat, so könnte man fragen, dies alles mit Ästhetik zu tun? Ich will eine Antwort hier nur andeuten (und zugleich auf Joachim Schultes Text „Wittgenstein on Philosophy as Poetry" verweisen). Wenn der Philosophie die konkrete Erscheinung der Gedanken und das in ihren Bewegungen mitgeteilte Gesetz wesentlich ist, dann steht man mit jedem ihrer Schritte vor einer Herausforderung ästhetischer Natur. Auf eine Darstellung sinnend, die dem bis dahin nicht ausgedrückten Unbehagen zur Konkretion verhelfen soll, ist mir mit dem Verweis auf eine etablierte Methodologie wenig gedient. Wessen es vielmehr bedarf, das ist eine (z. B. an Schriftstellerinnen und Dichtern geschulte) Sensibilität für den Einsatz der Sprache; sowohl im Hinhören auf Rhythmik und Tonfolge als auch in Hinsicht auf die der jeweiligen Sache anzumessenden Gleichnisse und Bilder. Nicht

allein anderen, sondern zuallererst auch mir selber, habe ich eine begriffliche Transformation in derart plastischer Weise vor Augen zu führen, dass sie zu einer geschmeidigen, gleichsam natürlichen, Bewegung wird. Denn nur jene Gedankenabfolge vermag den Ausblick weitreichend zu bestimmen, die problemlos identifiziert, wiederholt und von anderen auch mitvollzogen werden kann. Wenn Wittgenstein schreibt, man dürfe Philosophie „eigentlich nur *dichten*" (VB, S. 53), so deute ich dies daher als einen Ausdruck dafür, dass es die Formen stets aufs Neue zu bedenken gilt, durch die man ein philosophisches Problem artikulieren und damit, im Glücksfall, einer Lösung zuführen kann. Wo es eine Geometrie zu *erfinden* gilt, steht uns jedoch ein Plan, welcher sagt, wo was zu *finden* wäre, nur im Weg.

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Wittgenstein on Probability: Walking the Line between Logic and Epistemology

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Abstract

It is supposed that after Wittgenstein had abandoned the doctrine of elementary proposition his thinking about probability moved from the logical to the epistemological aspect. However, as I show in the first part of this paper, the logical definition of probability also has its constitutive epistemological basis, namely in our knowledge of hypothetically assumed laws of nature. The second part is focused on Wittgenstein's later analyses of observed relative frequencies which still appeal to a priori logical calculus. In conclusion, I argue that the seemingly indecisive results of Wittgenstein's analyses prove that we use judgments of probability because we are reluctant to switch over from logic to epistemology and vice versa by means of induction.

It may be expected (comp. e.g. von Wright 1969) that after Wittgenstein had abandoned the doctrine of elementary proposition his thinking about probability moved from the logical to the epistemological aspect. The following exposition shows (1.) that the logical definition of probability has also its constitutive epistemological basis, namely in our knowledge of hypothetically assumed laws of nature, and (2.) that Wittgenstein's later analyses of observed relative frequencies still appeal to a priori logical calculus. Furthermore I argue (3.) that the seemingly indecisive results of Wittgenstein's analyses prove that we use judgements of probability because we are reluctant to switch over from logic to epistemology and vice versa by means of induction.

1. Logical Definition of Probability in *Tractatus*

In accordance with the skeptical approach to inductive reasoning in *Tractatus,* probability (TLP 5.15-5.156) - similarly as causation (TLP 5.136), is not considered to be either a real nexus between events nor a specific logical constant. Instead Wittgenstein expounds probability as a special case of inference, i.e. as a form of relation between the structures of propositions in the sense that one proposition gives some degree of probability to another one. His logical theory of probability is founded on the assumptions that molecular propositions are truth functions of elementary propositions, which cannot be deduced one from another (TLP 5; 5.134) and that truth-functions can be arranged in series (TLP 5.1). The theory transforms the classical definition – probability of the occurrence of an event as a ratio of the number of cases favorable to an event and the number of overall possible cases – into the logical one, but it leaves the requirement of equal possibility applied for all particular cases.

The degree of probability that a proposition r gives to a proposition s is the ratio of the number of truth-grounds of the proposition s that are at the same time truth-grounds of the proposition r (T_{rs}) and the number of the truth-grounds of the proposition r (T_r):

$$P(r, s) = T_{rs} : T_r$$
$$\text{where } 0 \le P(r,s) \le 1$$

Wittgenstein calls "truth-grounds" (*Wahrheitsgründe*) of a proposition those truth-possibilities of truth-arguments of the proposition that make it true. (TLP 5.101)

Let us, for example, have two elementary propositions p and q, they give each other the same degree of probability $P(p,q) = P(q,p) = 1/2$. If we then have two molecular propositions r and s that are true-functions of the elementary propositions p and q representing, for instance, logical disjunction and conjunction respectively then r gives s the degree of probability $P(r,s) = 1/3$ whereas s gives r the degree of probability $P(s,r) = 1$. In the latter case, where all the truth-grounds of s are at the same time truth-grounds of r, we say that r follows from s. (See truth-table.)

p	q	$r\ [p \lor q]$	$s[p \land q]$	$P(p,q)$	$P(r,s)$	$P(s,r)$
T	T	T	T			
F	T	T	F	1/2	1/3	1/1
T	F	T	F			
F	F	F	F			

A proposition, which is not contradictory, gives a proposition which is either a tautology or a contradiction the degree of probability 1 or 0 respectively. If two molecular propositions are logically independent and share no truth-grounds then the degree of probability equals 0.

After Wittgenstein defines probability as part of logical calculus and the limiting case of probability as the certainty of logical inference, he tries to explain how probability is related to our statistical observations on relative frequencies. He describes an experiment in which balls are drawn from and put back into un urn that contains black and white balls in equal numbers. As the draw continues (Wittgenstein does not specify how long), the number of black balls drawn approximates to the number of white balls drawn. Thus we tend to say that the probability of drawing a white ball is equal to the probability of drawing a black one, i.e. 1/2. However, according to Wittgenstein this is not a mathematical truth. The experiment only confirms that all the known circumstances, including the laws of nature assumed as hypotheses, give the occurrence of one event – the white ball being drawn, the same probability 1/2, as to the occurrence of the other event – the black ball being drawn. In other words, the experiment shows that the occurrence of the two events is independent of the circumstances which are unknown. (TLP 5.154)

2. Wittgenstein's Account of Probability in his Transitive Period

In the conversation with Waismann and Schlick from the 5th of January in 1930 Wittgenstein still treats probability as an internal relation between propositions or as a form of

description: "statements of probability do not describe probability but use the form of probability to describe reality". He also connects it with incompleteness of our description of states of affairs in the sense that statements of equiprobability mean that we do not know what the particular outcome will be, but all the circumstances we know, give no better reason for one outcome than for another. But at the same time Wittgenstein admits: "My conception of probability must be a different one now, since my conception of elementary propositions has fundamentally changed." (Waismann 1979, p. 93)

Although Wittgenstein had abandoned the logical definition of probability with the idea of logically independent elementary propositions, he then continued in his endeavor to explain the difference between a priori probabilistic statements and statistical observations on relative frequency. His interest in the subject lasted his transitive period from 1930 to 33, as we can learn from his overlapping texts from that time, namely from the books *Philosophical Remarks* (Wittgenstein 1975, §§229-238), *Philosophical Grammar* (Wittgenstein 1974, 224-235) and *The Big Typescript* (Wittgenstein 2005, §33). Apparently after that, Wittgenstein's inquiry about probability ceased without any clear and convincing conception being reached.

There is then only one passage (except irrelevant §158) in which probability is mentioned – in *Philosophical Investigations*. And this takes part in the context of discussion about playing a game with statements about the past; such statements are called "grounds" for assuming what will happen in the future, but not in the sense of logical inference. Wittgenstein says: "We are misled by this way of putting it: 'This is a good ground, for it makes the occurrence of the event probable.' That is as if we had asserted something further about the ground, which justified it as a ground; whereas to say that this ground makes the occurrence probable is to say nothing except that this ground comes up to a particular standard of good grounds—but the standard has no grounds!" (Wittgenstein 2009, § 482)

In all the transitive texts mentioned above Wittgenstein's analyses of probability follow his peculiar account of hypothesis and verification. A hypothesis is treated as a law for forming propositions, or for forming expectations. Whereas propositions are sections of a hypothesis at certain points. And it is questionable whether there are any primary propositions that are conclusively verifiable and not just facets of a hypothesis. A hypothesis turns into a proposition when its facet is laid alongside reality. What a hypothesis explains can be itself expressed only by a hypothesis. What is essential to a hypothesis is, according to Wittgenstein, that it arouses an expectation, which means that its confirmation can never be completed. In our expectation, in which it is likely that the sun will rise again tomorrow, the expression "likely" has a different meaning than when we say that it is equally likely that we will throw heads or tails, because the expectation must be comparable with reality and make sense in the present.

Wittgenstein distinguishes two "completely different" meanings of "probability" a confusion which leads to misunderstandings. On the one hand, we have a priori probability - the probability of calculus, on the other hand, a posteriori probability - the probability of an induction in everyday life, which is connected with our experience and statistical observations of relative frequencies (Wittgenstein discusses e.g. prediction/prophecy of an insurance company or a gambler's strategy). Although we incline to understand the former kind of probability in terms of the latter, Wittgenstein's analyses show that it is misleading, since our observations of relative frequencies are limited in

time and cannot confirm or refute a priori probability statements.

However, Wittgenstein, on the one hand, claims that our expectation that the relative frequency of an event and which has been experienced so far, will continue in the future must itself refer to some definite point in time, for "we can't say that we expect that an event will occur eventually – in the infinite future". On the other hand, he promptly adds: "Any 'reasonable expectation' is an expectation that a rule that has been followed up until now will continue to hold. (But the rule must have been followed, and can't itself be merely expected.)" (Wittgenstein 2005, p. 102e) Thus Wittgenstein admits that we "infer" the relative frequency of an event in the future only from the frequency that has been observed so far and that we usually base our actions on it. But at the same time he denies that such inference is based on "a frequency we have got by applying some process of the probability calculus to the one we've observed. For since it leaves the time open, the probability we calculate agrees with any frequency we actually observe." (Wittgenstein 2005, p. 104e)

3. The Thin Line between Logic and Epistemology

Let us try to sum up the riddle of probability Wittgenstein deals with: our probabilistic reasoning that extrapolates expectations about the future from the past statistical observations seems to be inductive. These particular expectations are hypothetical and should be confirmed by further experience. Nevertheless induction itself cannot be vindicated by the a priori probability calculus since whatever happens in the future can be made to agree with the calculus. But at the same time, the probability calculus, or to be more precise – its meaningful application even without the doctrine of elementary propositions, relies on our overall knowledge of the world with all its frequencies and continuing regularities, which we take for granted and call them the laws of nature. (If I put my head into the bonfire it burns me. I am certain about it, although after all it is only in the past when my head got burnt. Comp. Wittgenstein 2009, §§ 472-474.)

Wittgenstein's groping between the logical and the epistemological perspective appears to be the ground for von Wright's criticism of Wittgenstein's logical definition of probability as "superfluous as a method for computing probability-values" (von Wright 1969, p. 275). Since Wittgenstein seems to initially appeal to the laws of nature that are assumed as hypotheses from which a judgement of probability should be calculated, and then it is supposed that the judgement is to be confirmed or refuted by statistical experiences, which can leads to possible revision of the assumed laws of nature (comp. Wittgenstein 1975, §233). Hence the mediating role of the logical definition is, according to von Wright, needless because "statistical experiences 'inspire' directly hypothetical assignments of probabilities" (von Wright 1969, p. 276).

On the contrary, McGuinness, taking into account both the logical and the epistemological aspect, argues that it is not the observed relative frequency which provides the basis for judgements of probability, but the general form of hypothetical laws of nature, which is posited as a fixed background and which Wittgenstein later calls a world-picture. McGuinness suggests that the logical definition of probability is rested on "a fundamental insight or tenet' that remained with Wittgenstein in various forms throughout his philosophic life: In *Tractatus* "it is to be seen in his view of the most general propositions of science as a network that,

once elected, determines our description of the world. The network imports necessary propositions and inferences which logic alone would not suffice to produce". And in *On Certainty* "it reappears in his notion of a world-picture, which embodies the way of life of a community: such a world-picture too, like the network of the *Tractatus*, issues in certainties that are not those of logic". (McGuinness 2002, p. 212)

I dare say that Wittgenstein keeps both the logical and the epistemological aspect in all his investigations into probability intentionally, since it enables him to reveal the tangle of *a priori* and *a posteriori* features in our judgements of probability as their inherent nature. And precisely on this *a priori-a posteriori* tangle – the fluidness of the two faces of the judgments of probability, we rely on in our quest of knowledge. Since the probability reasoning and usage of the statements of probability allow us to walk the line between logic and epistemology and not to succumb to the temptation, offered by the inductive reasoning, to break through the line. For induction demands for its smuggling from one realm to the other the obol we are not able to pay – infinity.

Such consideration, I believe, offers also an answer for Wittgenstein's solicitous inquiry: "Why was it said that the ass would starve between two identical bundles of hay and not that he would eat from both with an equal average frequency? (Wittgenstein 2005, p. 102e)

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Non-Natural Nonsense: Wittgenstein's *Lecture on Ethics* as a Response to Moore's *Principia Ethica*

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Abstract

This paper offers a reading of Wittgenstein's *Lecture on Ethics* as a response to Moore. It argues Wittgenstein and Moore begin from a shared conviction – the falsity of ethical naturalism – but respond to this conclusion in different ways. While Moore develops a "non-natural" account of value, Wittgenstein offers a critique of just such an account in his lecture. It concludes by suggesting that this reading helps to best position Wittgenstein's lecture in its historical context.

"My subject, as you know, is Ethics and I will adopt the explanation of that term which Prof. Moore has given in his book *Principia Ethica*. He says: 'Ethics is the general enquiry into what is good'" (LE 1965, 4).[1] So begins Wittgenstein's *Lecture on Ethics*. These opening words clearly indicate that Wittgenstein, at least in part, has G.E. Moore in mind. This ought to prompt questions about the relationship between Wittgenstein's and Moore's ethical thought.

This paper argues that *Lecture on Ethics* can be read as a systematic critique of Moore's ethical thought. It argues that Wittgenstein and Moore begin from a shared starting point: namely, the failure of ethical naturalism. What distinguishes their views from one another is how they respond to this failure. While Moore tries to rescue the idea of philosophical ethics through his own distinctive brand of non-naturalism, Wittgenstein offers an argument against just such a conception of value. After offering a reading of what that argument is, the paper concludes by suggesting that viewing the lecture as a response to Moore best allows us to historically position Wittgenstein's conclusions in the lecture in relation to his contemporaries.

I. Background: Moore and Wittgenstein against Ethical Naturalism

It is known that Wittgenstein read Moore's *Principia Ethica*. The primary evidence comes from the following 1912 letter to Russell:

> I have just been reading a part of Moore's *Principia Ethica* (now please don't be shocked). I do not like it at all. (Mind you quite apart from disagreeing with most of it.) (WC 2008, 29).

Wittgenstein's letter primarily voices his distaste for the imprecise style of Moore's writing, and does not discuss Moore's ethical views in detail. Yet, it suggests Wittgenstein was familiar enough with *Principia* to disagree substantively with (at least some of) its conclusions.

Wittgenstein's negative reaction to Moore's book might suggest he shares nothing in common with Moore's ethical views. However, Wittgenstein says himself that he disagrees only with "most" –that is, not all—of the book. In order to understand Wittgenstein's lecture, it is crucial to realize that he endorsed one of *Principia*'s central contentions: namely, its rejection of ethical naturalism.

Naturalism, in its broadest sense, is the view that the 'natural facts' are all the facts there are. On Moore's understanding, natural facts are the sorts of facts with which empirical science (including psychology) deals.[2] The kind of ethical naturalism with which Moore was concerned applies this general doctrine to ethics. It holds moral facts and properties are just natural facts and properties. Moore was particularly concerned to deny versions of naturalism which took this claim to be analytic (Feldman 2006).

Moore's central charge against ethical naturalism is that it "confuses good, which is not in the same sense a natural object, with any natural object whatever" (Moore 1993, 65). In other words, naturalism commits the naturalistic fallacy. Roughly, one commits the naturalistic fallacy just in case one takes good to be analyzable in terms of natural or metaphysical properties. Moore's famed open question argument –"whatever definition [of good] may be offered, it may always be asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good" (ibid, 67)—is meant to bring this out.

The point behind the argument is that naturalism fails to adequately grasp the distinctive nature of the ethical. Moore sometimes puts this point as follows: one cannot get at 'goodness' by decomposing some state of affairs and looking for the "good" component. That kind of analysis is a dead end because the ethical does not lie in the world – the world of facts – as if it were an object.[3] Putting the point this way helps to bring out how close Moore's view is to Wittgenstein's. In the *Lecture on Ethics*, Wittgenstein notes that all the natural properties of objects and all natural facts "stand on the same level" when considered scientifically (LE 1965, 6). Even if we were to investigate a murder, in "all its details physical and psychological, the mere description of these facts will contain nothing which we could call an *ethical* proposition" (Ibid). These points can and should be read as expressing arguments against ethical naturalism.[4] This much should not be controversial.

What *is* controversial is the following: Wittgenstein's motivation for this position stems –at least in part—from Moorean considerations. That is, Wittgenstein accepted Moore's central argument against naturalism: namely, the open question argument. The strongest evidence for this

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1 Citations to Wittgenstein's work follow Pichler, Biggs, Szeltner 2011.

2 Moore's understanding of 'naturalism' is muddled in *Principia* (see Baldwin 1993 for a discussion). But the characterization in terms of natural science seems to best approximate what he had in mind.
3 "It is immediately obvious that when we see a thing to be good, its goodness is not a property which we can take up in our hands, or separate from it even by the most delicate scientific instruments, and transfer to something else. It is not, in fact, like most of the predicates which we ascribe to things, a part of the thing to which we ascribe it (Moore, 175; see also Donatelli 2005).
4 Further support comes from Wittgenstein's statement, two days before the *Lecture on Ethics* that the good "lies outside the space of facts" (VB 1980, 3).

claim comes from a 1929 discussion with recorded by Schlick:

> I think it is definitely important to put an end to all the claptrap [Geschwätz] about ethics – whether intuitive knowledge exists, whether value exists, whether the good is definable [etc.]. In ethics we are always making the attempt to say something that cannot be said, something that does not and never will touch the essence of the matter "It is a priori certain that whatever definition of the good may be given – it will always be merely a misunderstanding to say that the essential thing, that what is really meant, corresponds to what is expressed (Moore)" (WWK 1979, 68).

The remark has a more complicated structure than often noticed by commentators.

The first sentence of the remark is a critique of Moore's moral philosophy. This is patent from the particular questions he mentions, all of which are central to *Principia*. The second sentence expresses Wittgenstein's conviction that the ethical is inexpressible. Yet, the important point for our purposes comes in the next sentence. This sentence offers *an explanation* of the former sentence: that is, it provides us with an explanation of *why* ethics is inexpressible. Yet, in so doing, it cites with approval a line of thought that is strongly related to Moore's open question argument (the parenthetical indicates that Wittgenstein sees the thought as indebted to Moore).

However, although Wittgenstein here endorses at least one conclusion of the open question argument – that 'good' is indefinable—he takes this conclusion to *speak in favor of* the claim that ethics is inexpressible. This differs markedly from the lessons Moore himself drew from the open question argument. What Moore took the open question argument to demonstrate was that good is a simple, *non-natural* property. This conclusion, moreover, was supposed to form the foundation of a new kind of ethics, and to put the discipline on scientific footing (Moore 1993, 35). Here, Wittgenstein disagreed emphatically: ethics "can be no science" (LE 1965, 12).

Thus, while both Moore and Wittgenstein begin with a rejection of naturalism, Moore goes to great lengths to salvage the idea of value. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, deploys Moore's own anti-naturalist argument to suggest that ethical judgments are nonsensical. The important question for our purposes is what licenses Wittgenstein to move from the open question argument to this conclusion. In order to answer that question, let us examine Wittgenstein's lecture in more detail.

II. Non-Naturalism

Wittgenstein begins by drawing a distinction between relative and absolute value. His particular characterization of absolute value is, terminologically and substantively, quite close to Moore's. Wittgenstein's arguments against absolute value are thus arguments against Moore's version of non-naturalism. Let us now consider those arguments.

In my view, Wittgenstein's lecture is constructed around a single master argument, which is found in the following passages:

(1) "No statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value" (LE 1965, 6).
(2) "Our words used as we use them in science, are vessels capable only of containing and conveying meaning and sense, natural meaning and sense.

Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water" (ibid, 7).
Therefore,
(3) "[T]hese nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very essence. For all I wanted to do with them was just *to go beyond* the world and that is to say beyond significant language." (Ibid, 11).

According to (1), statements of fact cannot be, or imply, evaluative judgments. According to (2), our language is only capable of expressing natural facts. Therefore, absolute value statements must be nonsensical, for they fail to describe natural facts.

This terse argument forms the backbone of *Lecture on Ethics.* It is worth considering why Wittgenstein adopts each of these premises. Wittgenstein does very little to motivate the second premise. This is most likely because he took it to express a truism. Wittgenstein in 1929 remained wedded to the Tractarian view that only propositions have a sense, which they have in virtue of depicting states of affairs. He takes the totality of states of affairs to be coextensive with the totality of facts as described by natural science (TLP 1961, 4.1-4.11).

In contrast, Wittgenstein does motivate the first premise in his lecture. The key argument—for our purposes, at least— comes in the following passage:

> And similarly the absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about. And I want to say that such a state of affairs is a chimera. No state of affairs has, in itself, what I would like to call the coercive power of an absolute judge (LE 1965, 7).

The argument here runs as follows. First, the absolute good *qua* state of affairs would be one which everyone 'independent of their particular tastes and inclinations' necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about. This disjunctive claim is explained by an underlying point about motivation: if there were an absolute good, we would be necessarily *motivated* to bring about. However, no state of affairs is intrinsically motivating; rather, states of affairs, considered in themselves, are *motivationally neutral*. Since states of affairs lack motivational content, such states are chimerical (ibid).

Thus, the thought here is that the kind of state of affairs an "absolutely" valuable state of affairs would have to be is nonsensical: it violates any sensible conception of what a "fact" would be. The larger point here is that the idea of non-natural seems metaphysically mysterious: it seems not to fit within any reasonable picture of the natural world.

III. Conclusion

Although Wittgenstein and Moore shared a common rejection of ethical naturalism, Wittgenstein rejected Moore's non-naturalism for two reasons. First, Wittgenstein had a certain conception of a fact, one which he was not willing to stretch to accommodate the idea of the non-natural facts required by Moore. There are only natural facts. Second, Wittgenstein thought Moore's non-naturalism carried metaphysical commitments that were untenable: what non-natural value would have to be, he thought, it could not be. Therefore, since ethical statements do not express facts, they are simply nonsense.

Wittgenstein's *Lecture on Ethics* often appears as something of an anomaly in the history of analytic moral philosophy. Perhaps this is true, for my reading has certainly not dealt with all aspects of the lecture. However, my reading of the argument allows us to see similarities between Wittgenstein and his contemporaries in their respective responses to Moore. Like Moore, Wittgenstein, convinced in part by the open question argument, rejected naturalism in ethics. This conclusion was characteristic of the attitudes of philosophers at the time. Like his contemporaries, moreover, Wittgenstein found Moore's non-naturalism impalpable. It implied a commitment to a mysterious kind of property that Wittgenstein could not stomach.

This predicament pushed many to question whether the naturalism/non-naturalism binary was exhaustive, and to adopt various non-cognitivist positions. One commentator describes the predicament as follows:

> [T]wentieth century British ethical theory is unintelligible without reference to *Principia Ethica*; its history until 1960 or so being, in brief, that although Moore was taken to have refuted 'ethical naturalism', Moore's own brand of 'ethical non-naturalism' was thought to make unacceptable metaphysical and epistemological demands; so the only recourse was to abandon belief in an objective moral reality and accept an emotivist, prescriptivist or otherwise anti-realist, account of ethical values." (Baldwin 1990, 66)

This predicament pushed philosophers like Ayer (1936) and Stevenson (1937) to develop their emotivist own views. Wittgenstein, in 1929, did not opt for such an account (though there are some suggestive notebook remarks that point (inconclusively) in similar directions).[5] However, Wittgenstein was responding to the same predicament. Having rejected naturalism and non-naturalism, his particular response was forced by his views on language. Given this these views, his conclusion – that the ethical is nonsensical – was Wittgenstein's only recourse.[6]

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5 The idea that ethics is about "attitudes" towards the world, for example, is one such idea (TB 1979, 86-86).

6 Although, non-cognitivism of the sort popular in the 1930s was not incompatible with Wittgenstein's views in the lecture, he does not develop a robust version of such an account. Strictly speaking, though, Wittgenstein would have been committed to the claim that ethical utterances are non-sensical (in the sense that they fail to depict a state of affairs) *even if* he had accepted a non-cognitivist view.

The Landscape Fallacy in Environmental Aesthetics

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Abstract

The field of environmental aesthetics has been deeply affected by its connection to landscape painting. I argue that this is a mistake. Landscape painting even by masters such as Alfred Bierstadt or Andreas Achenbach is static. The painting will remain as it is for centuries. But nature itself changes constantly. The two essential features of nature, stability and change, are best captured in an aesthetics of music.

In the first line of the most widely used American text book in aesthetics in the last 60 years Monroe Beardsley wrote: "There would be no problems of aesthetics in the sense in which I propose to mark out this field of study if no one ever talked about works of art." (Beardsley 1958, 1)

This limitation of the field of aesthetics to "works of art" has, of course, been superseded by a renewed interest in the aesthetics of nature in the last 30 years. The original framework of aesthetics as a study of art works has, however, remained in the background of much of environmental aesthetics. For example, in the article by Ronald Hepburn from 1966 that is widely regarded as opening up the field of the aesthetics of nature to serious inquiry, Hepburn almost always writes of "natural objects" e.g. trees, mountains, rivers, etc. Thinking in this manner about nature, however, deeply influences us to think of natural beauty as something like the beauty of sculpture or painting. (Hepburn 1966) No thinker has been more fruitful in developing natural aesthetics than the Canadian philosopher Allen Carlson, whose work I shall start with here. (Carlson 2009, 200, Carlson and Berlant 2004)

In analyzing the problem of environmental aesthetics and criticizing the emphasis of many writers, especially Carlson, I shall largely employ a method as old as Plato but whose greatest modern exponent is Ludwig Wittgenstein. This is the method of showing by example as distinct from telling the reader what the right answer must be and providing a discursive argument for that conclusion.

One of Carlson's most helpful starting points is his distinction between three ways of thinking about the aesthetics of nature:

1 The Object Model

This model is best represented by sculpture, e.g. Rodin's *The Thinker,* or the *Golden Madonna* of Essen. In nature *Mont Blanc* or the well-known *Delicate Arch* in southern Utah represents this model.

This approach to the aesthetics of nature is prominent in Kant's third critique. Almost all of his examples of natural beauty are objects: plants, flowers, birds, animals, fish, etc. There is virtually no discussion of the surrounding environment of these objects. (Kan, 2000)

The limitations of the object model are obvious, even when the "object" is not a human creation, e.g. Niagara Falls. As Carlson writes: " The object model imposes a certain limitation on our appreciation of natural objects. The limitation is the removal of the object from its surroundings which the object model requires […]." (Carlson 1979, 269)

Even if the "object" has not been physically removed, as has the wall of an Egyptian tomb been removed to the Metropolitan Museum in New York, this model removes from our attention the surroundings of the object on which our attention is to be focused. We see the tree but miss the forest.

2. The Scenery or Landscape Model

Carlson's second model is the "scenery or landscape" model. The key analogy here is landscape painting. This model focuses our attention on color, form, and design which seemingly capture the visual aesthetic attention and are pictured at some distance. This model for aesthetic appreciation of nature has historically been extremely important. It remains so. In western America road signs mark "scenic viewpoint" or "scenic overlook" where drivers can turn off the see a majestic vista.

This model too has 18th century roots. The pioneering work of Joseph Addison and Francis Hutcheson, a generation earlier than Kant, had made natural beauty central to aesthetics. Their examples of this beauty were fundamentally landscapes or "scenery." (Hutcheson 2008; Addison 2013)

While better than the object model, this model is still, according to Carlson, not correct. This view involves cutting up the environment into chunks or "blocks" of attractive scenery . In his words "a drive through the countryside is not unlike a walk through a gallery of landscape paintings." (Carlson 1979, 270) This model sees the environment as a representation, two dimensional and static. Nature itself is neither of these.

Carlson's preferred model, he calls "the environmental model" which he describes thus. "We must experience our background setting in all those ways we normally experience it, by sight, smell touch and whatever. However, we must experience it not as unobtrusive background but as obtrusive foreground." (Carlson 1979, 272)

Carlson's critiques of the object and landscape models are well taken and his argument for the need of a richer model points in the right direction. Yet, in the end he does not exploit his insight. "The approach which I have suggested, the environmental model, yet follows closely the general structure of our aesthetic appreciation of art." (Carlson 1979, 274)

Carlson's "environmental model" still sees the aesthetics of nature in the context of a visual aesthetic that adds to but does not fundamentally challenge the landscape painting framework.

Let us then see some examples of the two models:

OBJECTS
1. *Golden Madonna of Essen*
2. *Mount Rushmore*
3. *Delicate Arch*

LANDSCAPES
1. Albert Bierstadt *Storm in the Rocky Mountains*
2. Andreas Achenbach *Wildbach*
3. Joseph Thoma *Alpine Scene*

My argument is that an environmental aesthetic connected to landscape painting cannot capture the fluidity of actual nature. Consider one of the paintings I just showed, that of Josef Thoma. It is an entirely static representation of one moment and one place in the fabric to time and space. But this moment, captured in this painting will change in minutes. At other times of the year the snow on the peak will be differently shaped and larger or smaller. The tree leaves will be yellow, red or gone completely.

Bierstadt's storm must be painted from memory. But even if it were a photograph the scene would change immediately after the photograph were taken. The clouds would have moved and the light and shadows on the lake and the vegetation would be different. Furthermore, a landscape framework cannot reflect the coldness of the lake, the smell of the pine trees, the sounds of birds or wind.

There are two fundamental ways in which the analysis of the aesthetics of nature has been distorted by either of these starting points.

1. The first, which I shall not treat, is that the experience of nature involves many senses while a visual aesthetic cannot. The experience of nature involves the sight of a deer, the music of birds or waves crashing against rocks on a seashore, the smell of a wildflower or a pine tree, and the touch of a tree stump or leaf. A visual aesthetic cannot capture this complexity.
2. The second, which the rest of this paper will treat, is that a visual aesthetic cannot capture the fluidity of nature. Turner's paintings of boats on stormy seas are world-renowned. Yet by the time he finished one painting the actual scene would be different from when he started, perhaps markedly. The lilies would have drifted. Casper David Friedrich's *Tree of Crows* from 1822 cannot capture the actual scene. From one moment to the next the crows will have moved or flown away.

If an aesthetics of nature cannot be reflected or expressed by analogizing it to any art form that remains stationary, then what form of human of human artistic creation might be a better framework for thinking about the aesthetics of nature?

To begin to think about this question we must note that any attempt to capture the aesthetics of nature must reflect two qualities of any part of nature: 1) stability and 2) change.

1. Stability. This is foundational in any understanding of nature. The Danube has been pretty much where it is for ages. So too has the Matterhorn, Niagara Falls, or the Amazon. Earlier I have called attention to parts of the three pictures I have shown that will change: clouds, color, light, water levels or lakes or rivers, leaves and tree heights.
But consider also what remains: the mountains that frame the Thoma painting, the cliffs and the river

gorge in Achenbach, the mountains and the lake in Bierstadt.
2. Change. I have already emphasized change in nature in my criticisms of the object and landscape models of the aesthetics of nature as well as Carlson's "environmental" model insofar as it is connected to the landscape model.

Of any human creation that might plausibly considered as art only music can reflect these two qualities of stability and change. Unfortunately music is an art form that has been seriously understudied by aesthetic thinkers. For example, when one examines the major anthologies edited by philosophers dealing with aesthetics over the last half century one finds almost no treatment of music. Yet music has a unique role to play, especially in environmental aesthetics.

In any musical composition the structure remains stable. Beethoven's 9th symphony, the *Ode to Joy*, will have the same notes, chords, and structure whether it is played in Vienna, Berlin, London or by the Utah Symphony in Salt Lake City. Mozart's *Don Giovanni* will have the same roles for voices and the same structure whether it is performed in Milan, Paris, or New York.

Yet, every time Beethoven is performed it is performed differently. Every time Mozart is sung it is sung differently. No two performances can be the same. This fact is for two reasons. First, because we are human beings, not robots. Secondly, because each conductor or singer treats a work differently.

An example of this fact comes from a recent student of mine. He was a major in both philosophy and piano performance. As a brilliant pianist he could always tell the difference between Arthur Rubenstein and Vladimir Horowitz playing the same piece. I know because I tested him. The notes were the same, but the music heard, played by two pianists who are universally regarded as the greatest of the last century, was different.

Mozart will be played differently under the baton of Leonard Bernstein, Herbert von Karajan, or Mstislav Rostropovich. Beethoven will sound different conducted by George Szell or Erich Leinsdorf. These differences in performers, conductors, and performances can reflect the fluidity in nature in the context of nature's stability. The notes are the same but every time a work is performed there are differences.

There are many issues that I cannot even touch upon here. e.g. major, sudden changes in nature such as those after a volcanic eruption, earthquake, or hurricane. These changes are different in degree, though not in kind, from those exemplified by conductors or performers of classical music.

Finally, we must treat the beauty of nature, if only in the most sketchy manner. The beauty of nature, I believe, is one part of a much larger topic: what is beauty as such? In my view the eminent philosopher, especially of aesthetics, Roger Scruton is correct in seeing "fittingness" as central to aesthetic beauty. As an aside for this conference we should note that Scruton regards Wittgenstein as the greatest philosopher of the 20th century. (Scruton 1997, 2011, 2014)

A picture of Virgin Mary with the baby Jesus, such as those by Raphael, DaVinci, or Bellini shows a powerfully fitting scene. If instead the Virgin is replaced by a satanic figure the discordance would be obvious and disturbing.

A Turner watercolor or Monet's water lilies please the observer. All parts of the painting are fitting and the painting as a whole is attractive. But being pleasing is not essential. When Brunhilde throws herself on Siegfried's funeral pyre at the end of Wagner's "Ring" cycle the act is not what we would typically refer to as pleasing. But the act is entirely fitting. If, instead, Brunhilde waltzed of into the sunset then this end would be so discordant with the ring cycle that we would reasonably think that the manuscript had been altered by someone else. All parts of each of Manet's versions of *The Execution of Maximillian* are entirely fitting. Though one finds it difficult to consider the event portrayed as attractive.

Landscape paintings represent a specific scene. Music, however, is better understood as expressive of aesthetic qualities such as form, content, and flow. So too is nature not representative of anything more. Nature may evoke a sense of wonder or majesty. It may point to transcendence, as Scruton has so brilliantly argued. But nature elicits a sense of wonder. It does not represent it. And nature is definitely not God.

Conclusion

The landscape approach to environmental aesthetics is seriously defective. I am suggesting that one of the least developed areas of aesthetic study, music, may better capture both the stability and change inherent in nature itself. Much more needs to be done in this regard.

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Schweigen als Protest
Ingeborg Bachmann über Wittgensteins *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*

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Abstract

Am Ende ihres Radio-Essays „Sagbares und Unsagbares" deutet Ingeborg Bachmann das Schweigen, das sich Wittgenstein im Schlusssatz des *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* selbst auferlegt, als „Protest" gegen zwei bedeutende Denkströmungen seiner Zeit. Diese Aussage soll anhand einer Rekonstruktion von Bachmanns Auseinandersetzung mit Wittgenstein in den Jahren 1949-1954 erläutert werden.

1. Einleitung

Ingeborg Bachmann (1926-1973) ist eine der bedeutendsten österreichischen Schriftstellerinnen der Nachkriegszeit. Die Bedeutung der Philosophie Wittgensteins für ihr Werk ist so weitgehend anerkannt, dass Sigrid Weigel in ihrer Monographie bereits von „überstrapazierten Bezügen" (Weigel 1999, 6) spricht. Bachmann selbst hat diese Bedeutung Wittgensteins für ihr Denken auf Nachfragen hin stets bestätigt (vgl. Bachmann 1983, 12, 58, 124), sich aber gleichzeitig gegen eine dabei oft unterstellte, zu einfach gedachte Beeinflussung ihres Schreibens durch die Philosophie Wittgensteins verwehrt. In einem späten Interview ersetzt sie dieses unzureichende Modell des „Einflusses" daher kurzerhand durch die Rede von „Affinitäten", Berührungspunkten im Denken, die der Auseinandersetzung mit einem Text bereits vorausgehen: „Deswegen glaube ich auch weniger an Einfluß als an Affinitäten. Man stößt nicht ganz zufällig mit den Büchern zusammen, die für einen die wichtigsten werden." (Bachmann 1983, 125)

Den vielbeachteten Wittgenstein-Bezügen in Bachmanns literarischen und poetologischen Schriften steht eine weniger bekannte Phase der Auseinandersetzung Bachmanns mit Wittgenstein aus dezidiert philosophischer Perspektive gegenüber. Im Anschluss an ihr Philosophiestudium verfasste Bachmann einige Texte über Wittgenstein, die einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Bekanntmachung der Philosophie Wittgensteins im deutschen Sprachraum leisteten. Darüber hinaus war sie maßgeblich an der ersten deutschsprachigen Ausgabe von Wittgensteins *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* und den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* beteiligt, die im Jahr 1960 im Suhrkamp Verlag erschien. Ihr Essay „Ludwig Wittgenstein – Zu einem Kapitel der jüngsten Philosophiegeschichte", der erstmals 1953 in den *Frankfurter Heften* veröffentlicht wurde, ist im Beiheft zu dieser Ausgabe wieder abgedruckt.

In diesem Beitrag soll Bachmanns Interpretation des *Tractatus*, wie sie sie in den Jahren 1949-1954 entwickelt hat, rekonstruiert werden. Die Textgrundlage dazu bilden Bachmanns Dissertation aus dem Jahr 1949 sowie vier verschiedene Texte aus den Jahren nach der Promotion im Jahr 1950. Dabei handelt es sich neben dem genannten Wittgenstein-Essay um zwei Radio-Essays, denen aufgrund ihrer Komposition als „mehrstimmiges Gespräch" (Weigel 1999, 87) eine Zwischenstellung zwischen Philosophie und Literatur zukommt, sowie ein unveröffentlichtes Manuskript, das den Titel „Philosophie der Gegenwart" trägt und zwischen 1952 und 1953 entstanden ist. In diesen Texten entwickelt Bachmann eine eigenständige Lek-

türe von Wittgensteins *Tractatus*, die bewusst „über das von ihm selbst Gesagte" (Bachmann 2005, 138) hinaus geht und eine Deutung des in Satz 7 formulierten „Schweigegebots", „Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen" (T 7), beinhaltet. Bachmann zufolge ist der Grund zu dieser Haltung „in der historischen Situation zu suchen, in der Wittgenstein sich fand" und „als Protest aufzufassen" (Bachmann 2005, 143). Dieser richtet sich gegen zwei verschiedene Denkrichtungen seiner Zeit, die Bachmann als einen Gegensatz von „Rationalismus" und „Irrationalismus" beschreibt. Ziel der in diesem Beitrag angestrebten Rekonstruktion von Bachmanns früher Auseinandersetzung mit Wittgenstein ist es, diese Deutung von Wittgensteins Schweigen als „Protest" zu erläutern.

2. Ausgangspunkt: Die Dissertation

Bachmanns Auseinandersetzung mit Wittgensteins *Tractatus*, wie sie sich anhand ihrer Texte nachzeichnen lässt, beginnt mit ihrer Dissertation aus dem Jahr 1949. Bachmann hatte unmittelbar nach Kriegsende begonnen Philosophie zu studieren und dieses Studium nach je einem Semester in Innsbruck und Graz ab dem Wintersemester 1946/47 am Institut für Philosophie der Universität Wien fortgesetzt, wo sie mit einer Arbeit über Heidegger promovierte. Die Dissertation trägt den von Bachmann in einem späteren Interview als „monströs" (Bachmann 1983, 42) bezeichneten Titel: „Die kritische Aufnahme der Existenzialphilosophie Martin Heideggers".

Bachmanns „Doktorvater" war mit Viktor Kraft das letzte in Wien verbliebene Mitglied des aus Wien während des Nationalsozialismus vertriebenen Wiener Kreises. Kraft war, so wie Alois Dempf, bei dem Bachmann „mündlichen Überlieferungen" zufolge zunächst eine Arbeit über den „Typus des Heiligen" schreiben wollte (vgl. Weigel 1999, 90), 1938 die Lehrbefugnis entzogen worden. Er konnte nach 1945 an die Universität zurückkehren, blieb aber bis zu seiner Emeritierung aufgrund der „Dominanz einer klerikal-konservativen Kultur" (Stadler 2005, 123) am Institut für Philosophie isoliert. Obwohl die Arbeit bei Kraft – der Überlieferung zufolge – nur eine „Notlösung" darstellen soll, da Dempf einen Ruf aus München annahm und Bachmann daher nicht betreuen konnte, misst Bachmann dem Wiener Kreis in ihren eigenen Aussagen große Bedeutung zu. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei oft die mit der Philosophie des logischen Empirismus verbundene metaphysikkritische Haltung. In einem späten Interview formuliert Bachmann pointiert: „Ungeheuer wichtig war für mich dann ein anderer Einfluß: die Wiener Schule. Man hat schon

immer in Wien einen scharfen Kampf gegen die deutsche Metaphysik geführt: Nieder mit der deutschen Metaphysik, die unser Unglück ist!" (Bachmann 1983, 136)

Bachmanns Dissertation, in der sie die Kritiken, die Heidegger von verschiedenen deutschsprachigen philosophischen Schulen ihrer Zeit entgegengebracht wurden, zusammenträgt, ist von dieser Perspektive der Metaphysikkritik des Wiener Kreises geprägt. Das drückt sich darin aus, dass der Kritik Rudolf Carnaps in ihrer Darstellung besonderes Gewicht zukommt. Bachmann zitiert ausführlich aus Carnaps „Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache", in dem Carnap zu zeigen versucht, dass einige Sätze aus Heideggers Antrittsvorlesung „Was ist Metaphysik?" sich bei näherer Betrachtung als bedeutungslos herausstellen, da sie sich nicht im Symbolismus der Logik darstellen lassen.

Obwohl sich Bachmann mit eigenen Einschätzungen weitgehend zurückhält und sich über weite Strecken auf eine zusammenfassende Darstellung der verschiedenen Kritiken, die je eigene, einander teils widersprechende Rekonstruktionen der Philosophie Heideggers voraussetzen, beschränkt, wird ihre eigene, kritische Haltung Heidegger gegenüber deutlich. Aus der abschließenden Zusammenfassung, die den am stärksten eigenständigen Teil der Arbeit darstellt, geht hervor, dass sich Bachmann zur Zeit der Arbeit an der Dissertation mit der Position des Wiener Kreises identifiziert, insbesondere mit der Forderung, Philosophie müsse Wissenschaft sein:

> Eine Rekapitulation der wesentlichen Einwände gegen die Existentialphilosophie Heideggers führt zur Frage, ob das Anliegen dieses Denkers, Metaphysik geben zu wollen, in einer Zeit gut geheissen werden kann, *in der erkannt worden ist, dass Philosophie notwendig wissenschaftlichen Charakter haben muss*, um neben den Realwissenschaften nicht ein beziehungsloses, fruchtloses Sonderdasein zu führen, und daher auf die Erkenntnisweise der Realwissenschaften verwiesen werden muss. (Bachmann 1985, 127, meine Hervorhebung)

Bachmann stellt hier abschließend die Frage ob sich Heideggers Philosophie angesichts der von ihr zusammengetragenen Einwände rechtfertigen lasse und kommt – wenig überraschend – zu einer negativen Antwort. Interessant ist ihre Begründung, in der sie sich auf Wittgenstein beruft. Ihrer Meinung nach müsse Heideggers Philosophieren scheitern, da es sich um den Versuch handelt eine „Sphäre" zu rationalisieren, „die mit einem Wort Wittgensteins berührt werden kann. ,Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.'" (Bachmann 1985, 129)

Bachmann zitiert Wittgenstein an dieser Stelle, um eine Schlussfolgerung zu untermauern, die sie von Carnap übernommen hat: aus dessen Perspektive ist Heideggers Philosophieren als der zum Scheitern verurteilte Versuch zu begreifen, etwas auszudrücken, das sich nicht in der Form einer philosophischen Theorie zum Ausdruck bringen lässt, sondern nur in der Kunst. Dass sich Bachmann an dieser Stelle überhaupt auf Wittgenstein bezieht, belegt, dass sie den *Tractatus* zu dieser Zeit (zumindest in Auszügen) gekannt hat. Die Bezugnahme kann aber höchstens als der Ansatz zu einer eigenen Interpretation gelesen werden. Durch die Art, auf die das Zitat in die Arbeit eingebaut ist, lässt sich Wittgensteins Position nicht von der Position des Wiener Kreises, die Bachmann an dieser Stelle teilt, unterscheiden. Die Bedeutung der Dissertation für Bachmanns Wittgenstein-Lektüre liegt daher nicht in einer darin geleisteten Deutung, sondern darin, dass durch sie ein Bezugsrahmen für die spätere Interpretation gesetzt wird: Diesen Rahmen bildet die Opposition

zwischen Heidegger und dem Wiener Kreis. Die Konstellation Heidegger – Wittgenstein – Wiener Kreis ist für die weitere Auseinandersetzung Bachmanns mit Wittgensteins *Tractatus* entscheidend.

3. Bachmanns *Tractatus*-Interpretation in den Jahren 1950-1954

Auch in den Jahren unmittelbar nach der Dissertation bleibt Bachmanns *Tractatus*-Lektüre zunächst stark von der Perspektive des Wiener Kreises geprägt. Das gilt vor allem für die Texte „Philosophie der Gegenwart" (Bachmann 2005) – eine zusammenfassende Darstellung verschiedener philosophischer Schulen, in der dem Wiener Kreis besonders viel Raum gegeben wird – und Bachmanns Radio-Essay „Der Wiener Kreis. Logischer Empirismus – Philosophie als Wissenschaft" (Bachmann 2005) aus den Jahren 1952-1953. In diesen beiden Texten wird Wittgenstein zwar mehr Raum gegeben als in der Dissertation, in der lediglich ein Satz zitiert wird, das eigentliche Thema bleibt aber zunächst der Wiener Kreis. Wittgenstein kommt dabei die Rolle des Stichwortgebers zu, in dessen Werk die „Hauptthesen des Neopositivismus" bereits angedeutet sind (vgl. Bachmann 2005, 36f.).

Gleichzeitig wird im Radio-Essay im Vergleich zur Dissertation auch eine beginnende Abgrenzung vom Wiener Kreis deutlich, im Zuge derer Bachmann auch stärker zwischen Wittgensteins Philosophie und dem logischen Empirismus zu unterscheiden beginnt. Gegen Ende des Essays lässt Bachmann die Figur des Kritikers sagen: „[I]ch glaube, daß dieser übertriebene Szientismus den logischen Positivismus *anderem* gegenüber mit Blindheit geschlagen hat. Man gewinnt den Eindruck, daß allen Fragen, die den Menschen selbst betreffen, ausgewichen wird." (Bachmann 2005, 51) Dass sie diesen Kritikpunkt bis zu einem gewissen Grad teilt, geht aus dem Schluss des Essays hervor. Bachmann lässt den „Erzähler" in einer Entgegnung auf den „Kritiker" von der Vertreibung des Wiener Kreises aus Wien und der gegenwärtigen Situation der Mitglieder berichten. Der Erzähler würdigt in diesem Zusammenhang die Rolle der Mitglieder als Kritiker der Metaphysik, die er als „Bedrohung der abendländischen Kultur durch einen verhängnisvollen Irrationalismus und Subjektivismus" (Bachmann 2005, 53) bezeichnet. Abschließend lässt Bachmann ihn aber sagen:

> Wo heute der Hebel angesetzt werden müßte? – Bei Ludwig Wittgenstein vielleicht, der noch entdeckt werden muß, dem größten und zugleich unbekanntesten Philosophen unserer Epoche. – Es stehen auf den letzten Seiten seines „Tractatus logico-philosophicus" Sätze, die die Wende bringen könnten, das Ende des Positivismus, ohne daß seine Einsichten aufgegeben werden müßten. (Bachmann 2005, 53)

Wittgenstein rückt so am Ende des Radio-Essays über den Wiener Kreis in den Mittelpunkt von Bachmanns philosophischer Auseinandersetzung. Seine Philosophie bietet das Potential, die „Einsichten" des Positivismus, die eine kritische Haltung der Metaphysik gegenüber ermöglichen, zu erhalten und gleichzeitig die vom „Kritiker" angesprochenen Einschränkung, die mit einer Verabsolutierung von Logik und Wissenschaft einhergeht, zu überwinden.

Trotz dieser beginnenden Abgrenzung bleibt der Wiener Kreis auch in den beiden explizit Wittgenstein gewidmeten Texten aus dem Jahr 1953 – dem Essay „Ludwig Wittgenstein – Zu einem Kapitel der jüngsten Philosophiegeschichte" (Bachmann 2005) und dem Radio-Essay „Sagbares und Unsagbares" (Bachmann 2005) – Thema.

Gleichzeitig spricht sich Bachmann nun gegen eine Identifizierung Wittgensteins mit dem Wiener Kreis aus: „Doch wäre es falsch Wittgenstein – was fortwährend geschieht – mit dieser Schule zu identifizieren […]." (Bachmann 2005, 65) Im Zuge der fortschreitenden Loslösung von der Position des Wiener Kreises geraten auch jene Aspekte des *Tractatus* in den Blick, die aus der Perspektive des logischen Empirismus unberücksichtigt bleiben. Die größte Bedeutung wird nun nicht den vom Wiener Kreis rezipierten Elementen des *Tractatus* zugemessen, sondern Wittgensteins „verzweifelte[r] Bemühung um das Unaussprechliche" (Bachmann 2005, 65).

Bisher thematisierte Bachmann das Unsagbare in ihren Texten lediglich im Zusammenhang mit Wittgensteins sprachphilosophischen Überlegungen. Diesen zufolge ist die „logische Form", die als Gemeinsamkeit von Sprache und Welt die Bedingung der Darstellbarkeit der Wirklichkeit in der Sprache ist, selbst nicht darstellbar: „Der Satz kann die gesamte Wirklichkeit darstellen, aber er kann nicht das darstellen, was er mit der Wirklichkeit gemein haben muss, um sie darstellen zu können – die logische Form." (T 4.12) Aus der Sicht des logischen Empirismus, die Bachmann im Radio-Essay über den Wiener Kreis teilt, ist das Interessante daran, dass Carnap dieses Problem sozusagen „löst", indem er auf eine Metasprache ausweicht (vgl. Bachmann 2005, 42). Nachdem sich Bachmann von der Perspektive des Wiener Kreises abzugrenzen beginnt, tritt das Unsagbare in seiner existenziellen Bedeutung in den Blick. In diesem Zusammenhang entwickelt Bachmann ihre Deutung von Wittgensteins Haltung dem Unsagbaren gegenüber als Protest.

4. Schweigen als Protest

Der Radio-Essay „Sagbares und Unsagbares" stellt Bachmanns eigenständigste Interpretation des *Tractatus* dar und bildet gleichzeitig den Schlusspunkt ihrer explizit philosophischen Auseinandersetzung mit Wittgenstein, wenngleich nicht ihrer Auseinandersetzung mit Wittgenstein überhaupt. In diesem Text setzt sich Bachmann ausführlich mit den letzten Sätzen des *Tractatus* auseinander, in denen Wittgenstein „einen neuen Ton an[schlägt], den er bis zum Ende des Buches durchhält und der die eigentliche Problematik dieses problemfeindlichen Denkens enthüllt" (Bachmann 2005, 131). Die Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Teil des Buches beginnt im Essay mit dem folgenden Satz, den Bachmann die Figur „Wittgenstein" sprechen lässt: „Wie die Welt ist, ist für das Höhere vollkommen gleichgültig. Nicht wie die Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondern daß sie ist." (Bachmann 2005, 131, vgl. T 6.432, 6.44)

Im weiteren Verlauf setzt Bachmann sich mit Wittgensteins Auffassung vom „Mystischen", das sich nicht aussprechen lässt, sondern sich nur zeigen kann (vgl. T 6.522) und von Wittgenstein mit Gott (vgl. T 6.432) sowie mit dem Ethischen und Ästhetischen (vgl. T 6.42, 6421) in Verbindung gebracht wird, auseinander. Sie gelangt dabei zu einer Einschätzung von Wittgensteins Schweigen über diese Themen, das im letzten Satz des *Tractatus* angesprochen ist (vgl. T 7), die über das von Wittgenstein selbst Gesagte hinausgeht:

> Den Grund zu seiner Haltung haben wir in der historischen Situation zu suchen, in der Wittgenstein sich fand. Sein Schweigen ist durchaus als Protest aufzufassen gegen den spezifischen Antirationalismus der Zeit, gegen das metaphysisch verseuchte westliche Denken, vor allem das deutsche, das sich in Sinnverlustklagen und Besinnungsaufrufen, in Untergangs-, Übergangs- und Aufgangsprognosen des Abendlandes

gefällt, Ströme eines vernunftfeindlichen Denkens gegen die „gefährlichen" positiven Wissenschaften und die „entfesselte" Technik mobilisiert, um die Menschheit in einem primitiven Denkzustand verharren zu lassen.

> Und das Schweigen ist auch als Protest aufzufassen gegen die wissenschafts- und fortschrittsgläubigen Tendenzen dieser Zeit, die Ignoranz gegenüber der „ganzen Wirklichkeit", wie sie sich häufig in der von seinem Werk ihren Ausgang nehmenden neopositivistischen Schule und unter den ihr verwandten scientistischen Denkern breit macht. (Bachmann 2005, 143)

In dieser abschließenden Einschätzung grenzt Bachmann Wittgenstein von den beiden durch die Dissertation gesetzten Bezugspunkten – Heidegger und dem Wiener Kreis – gleichermaßen ab. Bachmann formuliert diese Verortung als zweiseitige Abgrenzung gegen einen „Rationalismus", der die Wissenschaft verabsolutiert, sowie gegen einen „Anti-" bzw. „Irrationalismus", der mit einem „metaphysischen" Denken assoziiert ist. Im Zusammenhang mit den Tendenzen des „Rationalismus" und „Szientismus" verweist Bachmann explizit auf die „neopositivistische Schule". Darauf, dass mit dem diesem entgegengesetzten „Anti-" oder „Irrationalismus" auch Heidegger gemeint ist, deutet unter anderem Bachmanns „Sprachregelung", Heideggers Philosophie – entgegen dessen eigener Einschätzung – „umstandslos" als „Metaphysik" zu bezeichnen, die von Sigrid Weigel auf die Entstehungszeit der Dissertation sowie die „Beurteilung Heideggers aus dem Blickwinkel des Neopositivismus" (Weigel 1999, 92) zurückgeführt wird. Auch Bachmanns Verwendung von Ausdrücken wie „Irrationalismus" in Kontexten, in denen explizit von Heidegger die Rede ist (vgl. Bachmann 2005, 66), stützt diese Interpretation.

Bachmann deutet Wittgensteins Schweigen als Protest gegen beide Tendenzen gleichermaßen: Der positive Bezug auf das Schweigen ermöglicht ihm, die metaphysikkritische Haltung des Wiener Kreises beizubehalten ohne den Wirklichkeitsbereich, dem Heidegger sich widmet, als solchen, der sich der Wissenschaft entzieht, zu verleugnen. Diese doppelseitige Abgrenzung könnte dazu verleiten, Wittgensteins Philosophie als Synthese von „Rationalismus" und Irrationalismus" aufzufassen. Bachmann weist eine solche Vereinfachung allerdings abschließend zurück:

> Wittgenstein wurde von einem Wiener Philosophen einmal janusköpfig genannt: und es ist wahr, daß er wie niemand anderer die Gefahren der sich verhärtenden Antagonismen des Denkens seines Jahrhunderts: Irrationalismus und Rationalismus, erkannte, sie in seinem Werk bestand und schon überwand. Freilich ist er ohne das billige Rezept für die oft verlangte Synthese gekommen, aber mit dem zur Heilung – als Therapeut. (Bachmann 2005, 143)

Die Phase zwischen der Promotion 1950 und dem Jahr 1954 stellt für Bachmann, wie Sigrid Weigel herausgearbeitet hat, eine Phase der „doppelten Autorschaft" dar, in der sie sowohl philosophische als auch literarische Texte verfasst. Das Jahr 1955, in dem Bachmann den Plan eine Wittgenstein-Monographie zu verfassen verwirft, bezeichnet das Ende von Bachmanns Arbeit im Rahmen der akademischen Philosophie (vgl. Weigel 1999, 88). Spuren einer andersartigen Auseinandersetzung finden sich in ihren späteren literarischen und poetologischen Texten. Diese lassen auch Anknüpfungspunkte an Bachmanns frühe Auseinandersetzung mir Wittgenstein erkennen, etwa über das Motiv des „Schweigens", das auch in Bachmanns Frankfurter Poetik-Vorlesungen eine wichtige Rolle spielt (vgl. Bachmann 2005, 259).

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„Im guten & schönen zu leben bis das leben von selbst aufhört…."

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Abstract

Ausgehend von Wittgensteins Eintragung im MS 101 – "Im guten & schönen zu leben bis das leben von selbst aufhört" – geht es in meinem Beitrag um den Zusammenhang zwischen Ethik und Ästhetik, den Wittgenstein im MS 103 unter dem Begriff *sub specie aeternitatis* thematisiert. Darüber hinaus soll der Bezug zu Schopenhauer erörtert werden, dessen Ästhetik in ähnlicher Weise ethisch bestimmt ist, und wie bei Wittgenstein als eine Möglichkeit betrachtet wird, in Zeiten der Not und des Leidens zu bestehen.

Ausgehend von dieser Bemerkung Wittgensteins vom 7. Oktober 1914 im MS 101 möchte ich im Folgenden über den Zusammenhang zwischen seinen Reflexionen über Ethik und Ästhetik sprechen. Darüber hinaus soll der Bezug zu Schopenhauer erörtert werden, dessen Ästhetik gleichermaßen ethisch bestimmt ist, ja Ausgangspunkt zu seiner „Metaphysik der Sitten" war.

Das oben angeführte Zitat stammt aus Wittgensteins verschlüsselten Eintragungen, die er während des Ersten Weltkriegs parallel zu seinen in Normalschrift verfassten philosophischen Aufzeichnungen führte. In dieser Zeit, als er sich fast täglich in der Nähe des Todes befand, kreisen seine Gedanken um den Sinn des Lebens, den er bekannter Weise „außerhalb der Welt der Tatsachen" sah. Als er auf eigenen Wunsch zu den Aufklärern geschickt werden sollte, schrieb er: „Dann wird für mich erst der krieg anfangen. Und kann sein – auch das leben! Vielleicht bringt mir die Nähe des todes das licht des lebens." (MS 103, 8v; 4.5.1916)

Die Nähe des Todes erschloss Wittgenstein die Bedeutung des Lebens, dessen Kostbarkeit ihm durch das „Gute und Schöne" bewusst wurde. Ein Gedanke, der sich auch in Dostojewskis Roman – *Die Brüder Karamasoff* – findet, wo in Auswegsituationen wie denen der Schuld (bei Mitja) oder der Krankheit (bei Markéll, dem Bruder des Staretz Sossima) das Leben als ein „Paradies auf Erden" wahrgenommen wird – es sei denn, wir streben danach, die Aufgabe, glücklich zu sein, zu erfüllen, wie es der Staretz formuliert. (Vgl. Dostojewski 1994, 89, 470ff.).

Am 6.7.1916 verweist Wittgenstein ausdrücklich auf Dostojewski: „Und insofern hat wohl auch Dostojewski recht, wenn er sagt, daß der, welcher glücklich ist, den Zweck des Daseins erfüllt."

Glücklich zu sein bedeutet, frei von Sünde, im Geistigen zu leben und Gutes zu tun.

Darüber hinaus versteht Wittgenstein darunter, auf die sogenannten Güter des Lebens – von ihm als „Annehmlichkeiten der Welt" (TB, 13.8.16) bezeichnet – zu verzichten. Ein Leben, das keinen Zweck außer dem Leben braucht und in einer gelassenen, stoisch anmutenden Haltung besteht. Demgemäß ermahnt er sich immer wieder, sich dem Schicksal nicht zu widersetzen, sondern sich zu ergeben bzw. auf Gott zu vertrauen.

Diese, an Spinoza anmutende Ergebenheit in die „Allmacht der Gottesnatur", erfährt bei Wittgenstein zusätzlich zum ethischen Aspekt einen ästhetischen. In Ungewissheit darüber, ob er in einer oder in zwei Stunden, oder erst in ein paar Jahren sterben würde, schreibt er im verschlüsselten Teil der Kriegstagebücher: „Ich kann es nicht wissen & nichts dafür oder dagegen tun: <u>So ist dies</u> leben. Wie muss ich also leben um in jenem augenblick zu bestehen? Im guten & schönen zu leben bis das leben von selbst aufhört." (MS 101, 35v; 7.10.14)

Unter dem „guten & schönen" ist der Zusammenhang zwischen Ethik und Ästhetik angesprochen, den Wittgenstein zwei Jahre später im philosophischen und in Normalschrift gehaltenen Teil der *Tagebücher 1914-1916* (und im *Tractatus*, 6.45) unter dem von Spinoza geprägten Begriff *sub specie aeternitatis* thematisiert.[1]

Abgesehen vom Anklang an Spinoza, ist zu der Zeit der Einfluss Schopenhauers zu spüren, dessen Gedanken zur ästhetischen Betrachtung Wittgensteins Reflexionen über das „Gute und Schöne" nahe kommen. Denn gerade bei Schopenhauer spielt die ethische Komponente in der Ästhetik eine entscheidende Rolle. In seiner Beschreibung der Betrachtung von etwas Schönem – sei es in der Natur oder in der Kunst – ist es für den Betrachter unerlässlich, sich über seinen „Willen" d.h. seine persönlichen Wünsche und Affekte – kurz, über Sinnlichkeit – zu erheben und als reines Geistwesen – Schopenhauer spricht vom „reinen Subjekt des Erkennens" – dem Objekt seiner Betrachtung zu begegnen. Dies ist Voraussetzung, um die dem Objekt zugrundeliegende „Idee im Platonischen Sinne" zu erkennen. Allerdings entspricht Schopenhauers Idee nicht ganz der Idee im Sinne Platons, sondern stellt eine Art Zwischenglied zwischen Platons Ideen und Erscheinungen dar. Schopenhauer unterscheidet zwischen dem Willen als Ding an sich, der Idee als adäquate Manifestation des Willens und der Erscheinung als inadäquate Manifestation des Willens.

Abgesehen von der oben erwähnten Ähnlichkeit zwischen Schopenhauer und Wittgenstein im Hinblick auf die ästhetische Betrachtung lassen sich auch Parallelen hinsichtlich des Begriffs „Willen" beobachten, dies vor allem an jenen Stellen, wo man bei Wittgenstein von mystisch-pantheistischen Stellen sprechen kann. Schopenhauers Ästhetik ist stark metaphysisch, stellenweise mystisch gefärbt. Ähnlich Wittgenstein, ging es ihm nicht um eine Ästhetik im Sinne einer Theorie, sondern um eine *Metaphysik des Schönen*, in anderen Worten, um das *innere Wesen*

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1 Vgl. 7.10.1916: „Das Kunstwerk ist der Gegenstand sub specie aeternitatis gesehen; und das gute Leben ist die Welt sub specie aeternitatis gesehen. Dies ist der Zusammenhang zwischen Kunst und Ethik.
Die gewöhnliche Betrachtungsweise sieht die Gegenstände gleichsam aus ihrer Mitte, die Betrachtung sub specie aeternitatis von außerhalb.
So daß sie die ganze Welt als Hintergrund haben.
Ist es etwa das, daß sie den Gegenstand *mit* Raum und Zeit sieht statt *in* Raum und Zeit?
Jedes Ding bedingt die ganze logische Welt, sozusagen den ganzen logischen Raum. (Es drängt sich der Gedanke auf): Das Ding sub specie aeternitatis gesehen ist das Ding mit dem ganzen logischen Raum gesehen."

der Kunst, wie er sich ausdrückt. Darum, was das Schöne im betrachtenden Subjekt hervorrufe und was das Schöne an einem Objekt ausmache.

Der metaphysische Aspekt ist vor allem in der Erkenntnis der Ideen zu sehen, da diese über Raum und Zeit erhaben sind, den ewigen, unveränderlichen Urbildern der Platonischen Ideen gleichkommen. Doch auch im Betrachter geht eine Veränderung vor sich, er erhebt sich über Wünsche und Nöte egoistischer und weltlicher Art, ist nur mehr Intellekt und befindet sich nun gleichermaßen in „höheren Sphären". Sowohl betrachtendes Subjekt als auch betrachtete Idee stehen über der gewöhnlichen Sinneswelt. Die Ideen haben die erste und allgemeinste Form aller Erfahrung – die des Objektseins für ein Subjekt – beibehalten, ansonsten die untergeordneten Formen der Erscheinung abgelegt, d.h. sie sind aus Raum, Zeit und Kausalität heraus getreten. Nicht das Einzelne, Konkrete wird wahrgenommen, sondern das Allgemeine, Unvergängliche. Allerdings bleibt es nicht bei der anschaulich-schweigenden Kontemplation – dies gilt nur für die Zeit der Erkenntnis der Idee. Nachher will Schopenhauer diesen Augenblick durch Reflexion und begriffliches Denken sozusagen einfangen und beschreibt dies folgendermaßen: „Mein Kniff ist, das lebhafteste Anschauen oder das tiefste Empfinden, wann die gute Stunde es herbeigeführt hat, plötzlich und im selben Moment mit der kältesten Reflexion zu übergießen und es dadurch erstarrt aufzubewahren. Also ein hoher Grad an Besonnenheit." (Schopenhauer 1974, 4. Bd., 1. Teil, Cogitata I, 59)

Somit versucht Schopenhauer, an sich Unmögliches möglich zu machen, d.h. die Lebendigkeit der ästhetischen Augenblickserfahrung, die er jenseits begrifflicher Erfassung ortet, schließlich doch begrifflich festzumachen. In der Kritik an Schopenhauer stellt sich in dieser Hinsicht die Frage, ob philosophische Erkenntnis überhaupt darstellbar bzw. mitteilbar ist. Um seinen ambivalenten Zugang zu rechtfertigen, schreibt er: „Wenn es [das Genie] auch nicht die ewigen Verhältnisse fassen kann, so sieht es doch schon etwas tiefer in die Dinge dieser Welt, *attamen est quadam prodire tenus* [aber dennoch ist's recht, bis zur Grenze zu gehen (wenn weiter kein Weg ist); Horaz, Epistulae, I, I, 32]" (vgl. Spierling 1985, 29).

Die Einhaltung der Grenzen wissenschaftlicher Erklärung ist bei Wittgenstein bekannt – insbesondere bei Fragen der Ethik, insofern auch bei der damit in Zusammenhang stehenden Ästhetik. Man denke nur an seinen *Vortrag über Ethik*, wo er das Anrennen der Menschen gegen die Grenzen der Sprache mit einem Anrennen gegen die Wände eines Käfigs vergleicht. Doch bereits im *Tractatus* spricht er vom philosophierenden Ich als „Grenze zur Welt".

Es gibt also wirklich einen Sinn, in welchem in der Philosophie nichtpsychologisch vom Ich die Rede sein kann.
Das Ich tritt in die Philosophie dadurch ein, daß „die Welt meine Welt ist".
Das philosophische Ich ist nicht der Mensch, nicht der menschliche Körper, oder die menschliche Seele, von der die Psychologie handelt, sondern das metaphysische Subjekt, die Grenze – nicht ein Teil – der Welt. (TLP, 5.641)

Trotz der unterschiedlichen Herangehensweise an Probleme der Ethik und Ästhetik bei Wittgenstein und Schopenhauer sind Gemeinsamkeiten feststellbar, insbesondere, wie erwähnt, hinsichtlich der ethischen Komponente im Ästhetischen. Wittgensteins Bemerkung „Ethik und Ästhetik sind Eins" könnte demnach als weiterer Punkt für die

Ähnlichkeit zwischen ihm und Schopenhauer hinsichtlich deren Auffassung von Ethik und Ästhetik angeführt werden. Die Bemerkung kommt erstmals in Wittgensteins *Tagebüchern 1914-1916* vor:

Die Welt und das Leben sind Eins. Das physiologische Leben ist natürlich nicht „das Leben". Und auch nicht das psychologische. Das Leben ist die Welt.
Die Ethik handelt nicht von der Welt. Die Ethik muß eine Bedingung der Welt sein, wie die Logik.
Ethik und Aesthetik sind Eins. (TB, 24.7.1916)

Im *Tractatus* wirft er die Frage der Problematik ethischer Sätze erneut auf und weist darauf hin, dass der Sinn der Welt außerhalb ihrer liege, und es keinen Wert in der Welt gebe, da alles Geschehen und So-Sein zufällig sei. (Vgl. TLP, 6.41.) Und er folgert:

6.42 „Darum kann es auch keine Sätze der Ethik geben. Sätze können nichts Höheres ausdrücken."
6.421 „Es ist klar, daß sich die Ethik nicht aussprechen läßt.
Die Ethik ist transzendental.
(Ethik und Ästhetik sind Eins.)"

Sinnvolle, wissenschaftlich erklärbare Sätze haben nur in der Welt der Tatsachen ihre Berechtigung – außerhalb der Welt der Tatsachen, im sogenannten höheren, aber nicht zugänglichen Bereich, führt jeder Versuch einer Verbalisierung zu Unsinn. Doch auch die Logik kann nicht dargestellt werden, fungiert als „Spiegelbild der Welt", und wird wie Ethik und Ästhetik als „transzendental" bezeichnet.

Der Satz „Ethik und Ästhetik sind Eins" steht bei Wittgenstein sozusagen „im Raum", ohne nähere Erläuterungen, weshalb eine Interpretation nicht unproblematisch ist. Allerdings lässt sich aufgrund anderer Aufzeichnungen Wittgensteins erahnen, was er damit gemeint haben könnte und ebenso lässt sich hier meines Erachtens eine Verbindung zu Schopenhauer herstellen. Eines muss man ausschließen, nämlich, dass mit dem Satz eine Identität von Ethik und Ästhetik gemeint sein könnte. Ethik und Ästhetik sind keineswegs ein- und dasselbe, haben aber eine wechselseitige Beziehung zueinander.

Die ethische Komponente im Ästhetischen wird in Schopenhauers Ästhetik deutlich – in der ästhetischen Kontemplation, in der der Betrachter sich von persönlichen Interessen löst und als reines Subjekt des Erkennens in der Betrachtung des Objekts aufgeht. Kant spricht in ähnlicher Weise vom „interesselosen Wohlgefallen". Auch bei Wittgenstein gibt es Passagen, wo vom Sich-Verlieren in der Anschauung eines Gegenstandes die Rede ist. Dabei kann auch ein ganz gewöhnlicher Gegenstand wie z.B. ein Ofen zum Objekt der ästhetischen Kontemplation werden. Während dieser in gewöhnlicher Betrachtung als „Ding unter Dingen" nicht von Bedeutung ist, so wird er, *sub specie aeternitatis* gesehen, für den Betrachter zu *seiner* Welt, in anderen Worten, zur „wahren Welt unter Schatten", während alles andere dagegen verblasse. (Vgl. TB, 8.10.16.) In dieser ästhetischen Erfahrung werden Zeit und Raum transzendiert, worin das „Sich glücklich Fühlen" liegt – Schopenhauer spricht von den „einzig glücklichen Augenblicken" im ansonsten düsteren Dasein, und Wittgenstein hält fest: „Nur wer nicht in der Zeit, sondern in der Gegenwart lebt, ist glücklich. Für das Leben in der Gegenwart gibt es keinen Tod." (8.7.16) Im *Tractatus* schreibt er: „Wenn man unter Ewigkeit nicht unendliche Zeitdauer, sondern Unzeitlichkeit versteht, dann lebt der ewig, der in der Gegenwart lebt." (*Tractatus* 6.4311) Furcht vor der Zukunft oder vor dem Tode ist für ihn Zeichen eines „falschen, d.h. schlechten" und damit unglücklichen Lebens.

Unter dem guten Leben versteht Wittgenstein das glückliche Leben – der „Not der Welt zum Trotz" (TB. 13.8.16) – es bedeutet ein Leben in der Erkenntnis, in Geistigkeit, dem Augenblick hingegeben wie bei der ästhetischen Betrachtung. Diese „Welt des Glücklichen ist eine andere als die des Unglücklichen" (TLP, 6.43) – wobei unter dem Unglücklichen der in Zeit und Raum befindliche Mensch zu verstehen ist, der über rein persönliche Interessen und Bedürfnisse sich nicht zu erheben vermag. Wie vorhin erörtert, kommt es auf das Nicht-Wünschen an, obwohl Wittgenstein in diesem Punkt Unsicherheit äußert und die Frage stellt, ob seinem Nächsten *nichts* (weder Gutes noch Schlechtes) zu wünschen, gut sei? (Vgl. TB, 29.7.1916.) Schließlich meint er, es käme darauf an, *wie* man wünsche und notiert den lapidaren Satz: „Lebe glücklich!" (ebenda). Einen Tag später betont er, dass es kein objektives Merkmal für ein glückliches, harmonisches Leben gebe, das sich beschreiben ließe. Dieses Merkmal könne also kein physisches, sondern nur ein metaphysisches sein. Fazit: „Die Ethik ist transcendent." (Vgl. TB, 30.7.16.)

Anstatt der Begriffe „gut" und „böse", unterscheidet Wittgenstein zwischen „glücklich" und „unglücklich", wobei er das in Übereinstimmung mit dem Schicksal glückliche Leben als ein Leben in Übereinstimmung mit der Welt bzw. einem „fremden Willen" – bzw. Gott – sieht. (Vgl. TB, 8.7.16.). Insofern als aber ein schlechtes Gewissen (als innere Stimme oder „Stimme Gottes") ihn aus dieser Übereinstimmung bringen kann, macht das ethisch Gute oder Böse im Ich als „Träger der Ethik" doch zum Tragen. (Vgl. TB, 5.8.16.)

Diese hier erörterten Beispiele von Wittgensteins ethischen und ästhetischen, daher dem Bereich außerhalb der Welt der Tatsachen zuzuordnenden, Reflexionen unterscheiden sich von seinen, den Tatsachenraum betreffenden und innerhalb seiner philosophischen Diskussionen geäußerten Bemerkungen, wo er sich von metaphysischen Problemen entschieden distanziert, oder – wie im *Tractatus* – sich diesen lediglich in einzelnen, mystisch und kryptisch anmutenden Bemerkungen nähert, im allgemeinen aber den Weg des Schweigens wählt.

Wie aus Friedrich Waismanns Aufzeichnungen der Gespräche Wittgensteins mit dem *Wiener Kreis* aus den 1930er Jahren hervorgeht, sprach er dort über Fragen der Ethik, über Werte und dergleichen nur in knappen, nüchternen Worten, und in Vermeidung jedweden theoretischen Ansatzes.

In den in Cambridge im Sommer 1938 stattgefundenen *Vorlesungen über Ästhetik* spricht er über Ästhetik nur in Zusammenhang mit der *Bedeutung*, dem *Gebrauch* von Wörtern, in denen sich ästhetische Urteile usw. zeigen. Doch er wehrt sich auch hier entschieden gegen eine Theorie der Ästhetik, bzw. sich mit der Form von Wörtern wie „schön", gut" etc. auseinanderzusetzen. Er gibt Beispiele für den Gebrauch dieser Wörter bzw. von Gelegenheiten, wo diese vorkommen und spricht von den komplizierten Situationen, in welchem der ästhetische Ausdruck einen Platz habe, wie der Ausdruck selbst aber beinahe nebensächlich sei. Dafür spielen Gesten, Lächeln usw. als eine Art Zustimmung eine Rolle.

Diese Art der Auseinandersetzung mit Ästhetik führt weit von der traditionellen Ästhetik im Sinne einer wissenschaftlichen Disziplin weg. Wittgenstein beginnt nicht mit bestimmten Wörtern, sondern mit bestimmten Handlungen, Gelegenheiten; er verweist darauf, dass Wörter wie „schön" oder „hinreißend" eher als Ausrufe benutzt werden, oder auch durch Zeichnungen, Musikstücke oder Bilder ausgedrückt werden können. Die Beschreibung der

Empfindung beim Hören einer Melodie oder bei der Betrachtung eines Bildes sei problematisch, könnte wiederum nur durch ein Bild wiedergegeben bzw. gemalt werden.

Wie in der Ethik, liegt die Betonung auf *Handlung*, auf Gesten, auf Mitteln der Kunst.

Durch Zeichnungen von Gesichtern könnten Ausdrücke wie z.B. ein melancholischer Ausdruck besser wiedergegeben werden als durch den Ausdruck von Adjektiven. Gedichte sollte man daher immer wieder lesen, in stets anderer Betonung, begleitet von Gesten. Ästhetische Urteile spielen dabei kaum eine Rolle. Für das Wort „richtig" bringt Wittgenstein als Beispiel einen Schneider, der Regeln lerne, wie lang ein Mantel sein solle, wie weit die Ärmel etc. Man lerne also Regeln, um ein ästhetisches Urteil abzugeben, wie auch in der Musik Regeln der Harmonielehre befolgt werden.

Ganz wie Schopenhauer hält Wittgenstein nichts von einer Ästhetik als Wissenschaft, vielmehr würde er davon reden, was mit Ästhetik gemeint sein könnte. „Man könnte glauben, Ästhetik sei eine Wissenschaft, die uns sagt, was schön ist – beinahe zu lächerlich für Worte." (VG, 24)

Doch er weist auf Unterschiede und Wandlungen im Kulturverständnis der Menschen hin:

> Die Wörter, die wir Ausdrücke von ästhetischen Urteilen nennen, spielen eine sehr komplizierte, aber genau festgelegte Rolle in der Kultur einer Epoche. Um ihren Gebrauch zu beschreiben, oder um zu beschreiben, was mit kultiviertem Geschmack gemeint ist, muß man eine Kultur beschreiben. Was wir jetzt kultivierten Geschmack nennen, existierte vielleicht im Mittelalter gar nicht. Ein völlig anderes Spiel wird zu verschiedenen Zeiten gespielt. (VG, 20)

Es geht also immer um Sprachspiele, um Lebensformen, in denen bestimmte Wörter gebraucht werden und somit unterscheiden diese sich je nach Kultur. Das Verständnis von Kunst ist daher nicht nur unterschiedlichen Kulturen, sondern auch zeitbedingten Veränderungen unterworfen. Allerdings lässt sich bei Wittgenstein eine hohe Wertschätzung sogenannter traditioneller Kunst beobachten – insbesondere hinsichtlich der Musik, doch auch der Architektur. Gemäß seiner Auffassung von Ästhetik, gilt sein Interesse auch hier dem Allgemeinen, „Ewigen", dem unter dem Blickwinkel *sub specie aeternitatis* Gesehenen und Geschaffenen, und er spricht von Architektur als einer *Geste*, die etwas „verewigen" und „verherrlichen" könne. (Vgl. VB, 127.)

Trotz der Auffassung der Relativität von ästhetischen und ethischen Urteilen ist also Wittgenstein etwas Grundlegendes wichtig, dies nicht nur im Sinne einer Betrachtung *sub specie aeternitatis*, sondern auch als etwas für den Einzelnen Gültiges – insofern als dieser sich in aller Strenge persönlichen ethischen Maßstäben – seinem Gewissen entsprechend – verhalten müsse, wie er es selbst in rigoroser Weise praktizierte. Doch hütet Wittgenstein sich davor, seinen persönlichen ethischen Anspruch als Richtlinie für Andere bzw. als allgemeingültige Regeln vorzuschreiben oder deren ästhetische Urteile aus seiner subjektiven Sicht zu bewerten. Dafür ist sein Appell an das Verantwortungsbewusstsein des Einzelnen, als Anregung zu eigenen Gedanken und aufmerksamer Wahrnehmung der phänomenalen Welt in seinen Bemerkungen durchwegs spürbar, und dabei auch als eine Möglichkeit zu sehen, in Zeiten der Not und des Leidens zu bestehen.

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Was ist ein musikalisches Werk?

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Abstract

Ein musikalisches Werk hat einen besonderen ontologischen Status. Ich werde zeigen, dass es weder Partitur, noch Aufführung oder ein psychisches Erlebnis ist. Danach begründe ich die Auffassung, dass es ein abstraktes, intentionales Objekt ist.

Bereits Popper zeigte sich erstaunt über die Besonderheit des ontologischen Status' eines musikalischen Werkes (vgl. Popper 1983, 449f.). In seiner Drei-Welten-Theorie – wobei er der Welt W_1 alle physischen, Welt W_2 alle Bewusstseinszustände und Welt W_3 objektives und kulturelles Wissen zuordnet – befinden sich musikalische Werke (ab sofort kurz: MW), wie u.a. auch literarische Werke und außerdem Probleme, Hypothesen, Gesetze und Theoreme in der von ihm eingeführten Welt W_3.

Bisher konnte ein MW nicht mit Bestimmtheit adäquat definiert werden. Auch ich halte mich vorerst bei der Auseinandersetzung mit der Frage auf, was ein MW *nicht* oder *nicht nur* ist: Im ersten Abschnitt gehe ich der Frage nach, warum ein MW nicht seine Partitur sein kann. Im zweiten Abschnitt, diskutiere ich den Vorschlag, ein MW sei seine Ausführung. Im dritten Abschnitt werde ich erklären, warum ein MW nicht die psychischen Erlebnisse oder Eindrücke sind, die wir haben, wenn wir ein aufgeführtes Musikstück hören, und argumentiere schließlich im vierten gegen die Auffassung, dass ein MW ein konkreter Gegenstand ist.

1. Der Irrtum, ein musikalisches Werk sei seine Partitur

Ein Notensatz hat eine Symbolisierungsfunktion, durch die Komponisten musische Prozesse – d. s. u. a. Melodien, Harmonien und Artikulationen wie Staccato und Legato – festsetzen können. Mit Symbolisierungsfunktionen kann ein verfeinertes Verständnis der Partitur erreicht werden, sie werden meist als Spielanweisung verstanden und können als eine intentionale Funktion des Bedeutens und Hinweisens betrachtet werden. Ingarden bezeichnet Noten deshalb als „imperativistische Symbole" (Ingarden 1962, 26). Aber wofür brauchen wir eine Symbolisierung, wenn Musiker das Werk nicht ausführen würden? Abgesehen von reinen Übungen und musiktheoretischen Spielereien, von denen zumindest anfangs nicht beabsichtigt wurde, sie auszuführen, scheint es in den allermeisten Fällen eine wesentliche Funktion der Musik zu sein, ausgeführt und gehört zu werden. Wäre aber das MW als Partitur definiert, könnten wir bei dessen Ausführung nicht von einem MW sprechen, da dieses dann nur gelesen, aber nicht gehört werden könnte. Es gibt nun verschiedene Notensysteme: Wenn ein MW aber nur seine Partitur wäre und wir diese als Token auffassen würden, hieße das, man könnte zwei unterschiedlich notierte, aber gleich ausführbare Stücke, nicht als dasselbe MW bezeichnen. Die Zuordnung von Partitur zum Werk wäre somit nicht mehr eindeutig. Ebenso müssten wir dann konsequent verneinen, dass sämtliche gestaltgleiche Kopien des originalen MWs dasselbe MW sind. Selbst wenn wir von einer Ähnlichkeitsrelation oder absoluten Übereinstimmung aller Zeichen in sämtlichen Kopien des originalen MWs ausgehen würden, könn-

ten wir diese Relation nicht exakt und ausführlich beschreiben, weshalb ein MW unbestimmt bleiben müsste.

Das Problem der Ähnlichkeit zeigt sich nicht nur an den unterschiedlichen Notationssystemen, sondern auch bei den unterschiedlichen „Lücken" in einem MW – z. B. die Länge der Pausen oder Fermaten – oder in der nicht immer eindeutig von Komponisten bestimmten Spiel- oder Ausdrucksweise, die dann erhebliche Unterschiede in den Interpretationen und Ausführungen aufweisen.

Dass ein MW seine wesentliche Funktion in der Ausführung zu haben scheint, wird besonders durch virtuose Improvisation bekräftigt. Würden wir also sagen, ein MW sei nur seine Partitur, wäre das Gespielte, aber nicht Notierte, kein MW. Damit würden viele allgemeinhin als solche angesehenen, nur spielerisch realisierten MWe aus dem Definitionsbereich fallen: Selbst wenn sich darüber streiten lässt, ab wann eine musische Weise ein MW ist, also zusätzliche bestimmte ästhetische Eigenschaften hat, die es als ein MW auszeichnen, gehe ich hier aus pragmatischen Gründen davon aus, dass jede musikalische Weise ein MW ist. Würden wir nämlich im Vorhinein irgendwelche Einschränkungen treffen, was ein MW sei und was nicht, würden wir schon einen Begriff vom MW voraussetzen. Ein MW kann aber zweifelsohne auf einer Partitur beruhen: Melodien oder Harmonien sind zwar in der Partitur vertreten, bilden selbst aber keinen Bestandteil der Partitur – und zwar weil wir diese nur im Zustand des Hörens zusammenfügen und das Auf und Ab der Töne als Melodie wahrnehmen können, wobei die Partitur beim ästhetischen Erfassen keine Rolle spielt (vgl. Ingarden 1962, 25f. und 1983, 26f.).

Allerdings gab und gibt es auch interessante Ausnahmen, wie Komponisten, die das Hörerlebnis nicht brauchen, um zu wissen wie ihr Musikstück klingen wird, und es nur Kraft ihrer Vorstellung oder ihres „inneren Ohres" als Partitur aufschrieben. Ein bekanntes Beispiel für dieses Phänomen ist Beethoven, der ab seinem 31. Lebensjahr langsam an zunehmendem und schließlich völligem Gehörverlust litt, aber trotzdem noch bedeutende Werke schuf.

Im Gegensatz zu Roman Ingarden vertritt Jerrold Levinson eher einen historisch-kontextbezogenen Zugang zur Ontologie der Musik und hebt besonders die Ausführungen eines MWs hervor. Diese hätten, wie auch literarische Werke, keine bestimmten physischen Eigenschaften, mit denen man plausibel argumentieren könnte, dass diese das Kunstwerk selbst seien (vgl. Levinson, 1980, 5).

Die Partitur kann die Grundlage eines MWs sein, es muss aber nicht für jedes eine solche vorliegen. Ein MW ist somit nicht allein seine Partitur.

2. Der Irrtum, ein musikalisches Werk sei seine Ausführung

Jede Ausführung ist ein akustischer Vorgang, bei dem Hörer gewisse Schallerlebnisse haben. Wie bereits Ingarden betont, ist eine Ausführung ontologisch gesehen mit sich selbst identisch, wird als individueller Gegenstand oder Vorgang betrachtet und ist i. d. R. sowohl räumlich als auch zeitlich eindeutig bestimmt (vgl. Ingarden 1962, 7f.; 1986, 10). Das Hören selbst würde als wichtigste Grundlage der Erfassung eines MWs dienen, sei allerdings auch subjektiv abhängig – immerhin gebe es ebenso viele Hörerlebnisse wie Hörer selbst. Somit stehen wir einer Wahrnehmungsmannigfaltigkeit gegenüber, die impliziert, dass wir uns nie sicher sein könnten, dasselbe zu hören wie alle anderen, und umgekehrt, dass sich jeder andere nicht sicher sein kann, dasselbe zu hören wie wir (vgl. Ingarden 1962, 8). Die Schallerlebnisse sind immer anders, was nicht nur abhängig vom subjektiven Hören eines Zuhörers ist, sondern auch von der Akustik im Raum und dem Platz, an dem sich der Hörer befindet. Nach Ingarden könnten wir ein und dasselbe Werk aber aus unterschiedlichen Raumperspektiven wahrnehmen (vgl. Ingarden 1986, 11) – würden wir z.B. von der linken Seite des Konzertsaales auf die rechte Seite wechseln, so könnten wir unter Umständen gewisse Unterschiede feststellen, beispielsweise wäre es möglich, dass wir andere Instrumente auf einmal besonders heraushören. Wir könnten diese Unterschiedlichkeit der raumabhängigen Rezeption allerdings nur behaupten, wenn wir einen direkten Vergleich haben, d. h. die Musik gleichzeitig aus beiden Perspektiven erfassen könnten, was durch eine gleichzeitige Aufnahme von beiden Raumseiten versucht werden könnte.

Angenommen aber, dass ein MW an verschiedenen Orten zu verschiedenen Zeiten ausgeführt wird, dann ist es nicht mehr eindeutig lokalisierbar. Verschiedene Ausführungen eines MW sind *nicht* miteinander identisch: Nicht nur die Musiker wechseln, auch Instrumente, Dirigent, Raumakustik und Zuhörer sind nicht immer dieselben. Selbst wenn sich von dem eben Aufgezählten nichts veränderte, ist zumindest die Ausführungszeit verschieden. Letztendlich hätten wir so viele Werke wie Ausführungen. Auch wenn wir die Ausführungen als *Teil* eines MWs verstünden, müssten wir jene immer detailliert beschreiben und hinter den Namen des Werkes anführen, um genau zu wissen, welches Werk gemeint ist. Wir können nicht einmal davon ausgehen, dass ein Werk immer gleich klingt.

Interessant ist auch, was mit Behauptungen über die Spielweise eines MW wie „schlecht gespielt", „falsch interpretiert" oder „war zu schwach" gemeint ist. Wir reden, so Ingarden, von Eigenschaften, die ein MW idealerweise haben *sollte*. Das bedeutet aber, dass wir bei einer schlechten Bewertung das gemeinte MW überhaupt nicht gehört haben. Was wir wohl damit meinen, ist, dass der Künstler zwar die Intention hatte, das Werk zu spielen, dieses aber eine schlechtere Version des Werkes war und es idealerweise anders klingen müsste. Bei Veränderungen in einem MW ist es in unserem Sprachgebrauch nicht üblich zu behaupten, dass wir bei verschiedenen Ausführungen eines MW unterschiedliche Werke hören; sie haben zumindest sehr viele Gemeinsamkeiten und sind sich sehr ähnlich. Doch Abweichungen und interpretatorische Freiräume scheinen vorprogrammiert zu sein, allein dadurch, dass immer mal wieder „Fehler" entstehen könnten, die nicht unbedingt als solche interpretiert werden müssen oder dadurch, dass verschiedene Stellen in einem Stück generell anders interpretiert werden – wie z. B. Tempo, Zeitstruktur oder Rhythmus – oder wegen der Lücken in der Partitur oder der nicht vorhandenen Möglichkeit, ein

Werk genau so exakt zu notieren, wie es vom Komponisten selbst intendiert ist (vgl. Ingarden 1962, 51ff.). Auch eine Ähnlichkeitsrelation zwischen den einzelnen Ausführungen scheint das Problem nicht zu lösen, da wir immer auf der Grundlage einer bestimmten Ausführung vergleichen müssten und somit schon einen Begriff vom MW und seiner individuellen als ideal gehaltenen Ausführung voraussetzen. Die Auswahl so einer Grundlage lässt sich nur schwer begründen, weil v. a. geklärt werden müsste, was ästhetische Attribute in diesem Fall sind, was es heißen soll, dass diese von der Ausführung abhängen, und was die Kriterien für eine ästhetische Wertung sind.

Nach Levinson besteht ein Werk im Wesentlichen aus zwei Strukturen: den Klängen und der Ausführung dieser Klänge. Dabei ist die Ausführung der Klänge von einem individuellen Vorgang des Künstlers insofern abhängig, als dass dieser selbst in seiner geschaffenen Komposition festlegt, wie und wann Klänge gespielt werden sollen (vgl. Levinson 1980, 19). Dass ausgeführte Klänge zu einem MW in irgendeiner Weise in Beziehung stehen, scheint trivial zu sein – aber auf welche Weise stehen sie in Beziehung? Könnte es ein Melodiekriterium geben, das Regeln bietet, wann Klänge zu Klangsequenzen, Klangsequenzen zu einer Melodie und Melodiesequenzen zu einem Musikstück werden, so wie es ein Textkriterium in Form von Regeln gibt, durch die wir ungefähr angeben können, wie Buchstabenfolgen zu Wörtern, Wortfolgen zu Wortsequenzen, Wortsequenzen zu Sätzen und Satzsequenzen zu einem Text gebildet werden?

Wir haben auch ein sprachliches Problem, wenn wir über die Ausführungen eines MWs reden wollen: Denn die Rede über die Ausführung eines MWs impliziert, dass es schon eine Entität vor der Ausführung derselben geben muss. Dieser Einwand könnte versuchsweise mit der Behauptung umgangen werden, dass Musiker einfach spielen und durch diese Art von Ausführung ein MW entsteht. Doch so redet niemand. – Wir gehen in ein Konzert und wissen, dass ein gewisses MW ausgeführt wird. Es entsteht in der Regel nicht durch das Gespielte, sondern wird durch das Spielen nur hörbar gemacht. Wir können aus den eben angeführten Gründen also nicht behaupten, dass ein MW eine Ausführung desselben ist und auch nicht mehrere Ausführungen (vgl. zu diesem Punkt auch Reicher 1998, 11-17).

3. Der Irrtum, ein musikalisches Werk seien psychische Erlebnisse

Gemäß dem psychologistischen Argument ist ein MW ein System von Tönen, die mit Gefühlen, Vorstellungen und Gedanken verknüpft sind, sodass psychische Bewusstseinserlebnisse mit dem MW verbunden sind (vgl. Ingarden 1962, 17). So kann, wie bereits erwähnt, ein MW streng genommen niemals mehrmals gehört werden. Vertreter dieses Argumentes greifen damit den alltäglichen Sprachgebrauch an. Doch jeder versteht es, wenn ich behauptete, dasselbe Stück zehn Mal hintereinander gehört zu haben. Mit der psychologistischen Behauptung, dass ein MW etwas Psychisches ist, kann gemäß Ingarden ein „Bewusstseinsinhalt" oder eine „Mannigfaltigkeit desselben" gemeint sein (Ingarden 1962, 18). Zwar sind die Begriffe nicht gänzlich geklärt, trotzdem wird angenommen, dass allein materielle Dinge oder Prozesse subjektunabhängig sind. Ein MW wäre demnach ein Erlebnisinhalt. Melodien, Rhythmen, Akkorde und dergleichen sind nach dem psychologistischen Argument Gegenstände, d. h. bereits interpretierte Empfindungsdaten, der Gehör*wahrnehmung*, auf die sich die entsprechenden Bewusstseinsakte

beziehen. Sinnliche akustische Empfindungsdaten allein sind aber keine Gegenstände der Gehör*wahrnehmung*. Ingarden argumentiert dann in Anlehnung an Husserl, dass die Gehör*wahrnehmung* von den Erlebnisdaten grundverschieden ist (vgl. Ingarden 1962, 19f.). Erst durch die Deutung und damit zusammenhängenden Zusammensetzungen der verschiedensten Wahrnehmungen kommt man zu dem wahrgenommenen Gegenstand, dem MW. Die gehörten Tongebilde wie Melodien hängen dann zwar von unseren Erlebnisdaten ab, sind aber nicht identisch mit denselben, sondern einander nur zugeordnet. Abgesehen davon, wie wir uns das „Melodiehören" verständlich machen, hängt das unausweichlich mit dem Haben von Bewusstseinsinhalten zusammen. Obwohl es wahr ist, dass MWe nicht ohne psychische Akte – wie den schöpferischen Akt des Komponisten und der Erfassung dieses Werkes durch dessen Hörer -- entstehen können, dürfen wir nicht den Fehler begehen, ein MW mit psychischen Erlebnissen *gleichzusetzen*. Wir beziehen uns somit zwar intentional auf die Ausführung eines MWs, dürfen es aber nicht mit den Bewusstseinsinhalten verwechseln (vgl. Ingarden 1962, 21). Ein MW ist also weder etwas rein „Psychisches" noch etwas rein „Subjektives", sondern derart, dass wir uns dank unserer Wahrnehmung Zugang verschaffen können.

4. Der Irrtum, ein musikalisches Werk sei ein konkreter Gegenstand

Ein MW ist nicht eindeutig örtlich oder zeitlich bestimmbar. Die Frage danach, wo denn ein MW lokalisiert werden könne, lässt nur wenige gleichermaßen nicht überzeugende Antwortmöglichkeiten zu: im Raum, im Instrument, im Bewusstsein? Das Problem wird deutlicher wenn wir ein MW gleichzeitig an verschiedenen Orten ausführen: Ist das MW dann an allen diesen Orten gleichzeitig?

Diese Überlegung wäre widersinnig, so Ingarden, da es schon allein keine Elemente in diesem Werk gibt, die auf ein Sich-irgendwo-Befinden hinweisen würden. Vielmehr würden wir die einzelnen Tongebilde einer individuellen Ausführung hören, gleichzeitig abstrahieren und „aus dem eben gehörten individuellen Concretum ausschließlich die reinen Qualitäten der Tongebilde heraus[schälen]" (Ingarden 1962, 38). Ingarden bezeichnet ein MW auch als „überindividuelles Gebilde" (Ingarden 1962, 39), das nicht nur durch die Einzigartigkeit seiner Ausführung, sondern auch durch die Einzigartigkeit seiner Rezeption charakterisiert ist. Wegen der Aufeinanderfolge der einzelnen Teile eines MWs, die sich in der Zeit, in der es gespielt wird,

entfalten, ist ein MW gemäß Ingarden außerdem ein „überzeitliches Gebilde", d.h. ein nur quasi-zeitlicher Gegenstand (Ingarden 1962, 48). Ingarden versteht ein MW letztlich als einheitliche Gestalt, aber nicht als realen, sondern intentionalen Gegenstand, der seine Seinsquelle in den schöpferischen Akten des Komponisten bzw. Musikers und sein Seinsfundament in der Partitur findet. Das erklärt trotzdem noch nicht, von welcher Art ein MW ist: Könnte es abstrakt sein?

Auch für Levinson ist ein MW von irgendeiner strukturierten Art (vgl. Levinson 1980, 6) und zumindest mehr als eine reine Klangstruktur, da es außerdem von einem Musiker kreativ und in einer bestimmten Absicht erschaffen wurde und die Ausführung desselben dazugehört. Diese Strukturen machen das MW aus. Insofern deckt sich Levinsons Auffassung bis auf ein paar Kleinigkeiten sogar mit der von Ingarden. Ein MW kann also kein konkreter Gegenstand sein.

5. Fazit

Ein MW ist nicht seine Partitur oder seine Ausführung oder die Gesamtheit der Ausführungen, es ist weder ein psychisches Erlebnis noch realer Gegenstand. Es muss somit abstrakt sein. Verstehen wir ein MW aber als Type (Universalie), dann können wir es weder hören noch darüber sprechen, weil sich durch Gehörtes und Empfundenes nur erschließen lässt, was wir überhaupt mit dem Begriff des MWs meinen. Das vorläufige Ergebnis ist, dass uns ein musikalisches Werk selbst nur durch Abstraktion zugänglich zu sein scheint.

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Some Remarks on Grammar in the *Big Typescript*

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Abstract

Using the Nachlass facsimiles available on Wittgenstein Source as a primary source, I will show that in the *Big Typescript* Wittgenstein conceives of grammar as a complete system of rules, while on the other hand he also criticises the very idea of grammar being complete. He eventually resolves this struggle by realising that language is not completely governed by rules, and hence that grammar is not complete. This shift in his thinking is induced in the BT. It is an important step in the development of the notion of grammar in Wittgenstein's philosophy.

1. *The Big Typescript*

With more than 700 typed pages, the *Big Typescript* (BT) is one of the biggest typescripts in Wittgenstein's Nachlass.[1] It consists of a selection of remarks from 1929 to 1932 in the typed body of the text and a great number of handwritten revisions and additions, often on the verso pages of the typescript, that Wittgenstein most probably added during the years 1932 to 1937. Thus, the BT is of crucial importance for any research on Wittgenstein's so-called "middle period" between the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (TLP) and the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI).

For this reason, it is very fortunate that on *wittgensteinsource.org* and the HyperWittgenstein site (http://wab.uib.no/wab_hw.page/) the whole text of the BT is available free of charge for all interested researchers with internet access. Users can choose between the facsimiles of the original typescript and two transcriptions. On the HyperWittgenstein site, they have additional features to modify the display of the text. What is more, the metadata on Wittgenstein Source provide technical information about the BT, including a genetic-philosophical note by Joachim Schulte.

The purpose of this paper is to present some results of my research on Wittgenstein's notion of grammar, using *wittgensteinsource.org* as the primary source. Except for references to the TLP and the PI, all quotations will be taken from the facsimiles available there. I will show that Wittgenstein in the BT conceives of grammar as a complete calculus of rules, while on the other hand he criticises the very idea of grammar being complete. This ambiguity can be found in both the typed text and the handwritten revisions and additions. Even though Rhush Rhees's choice of the title "Philosophical Grammar" for his edition of Wittgenstein's revisions of the BT is very adequate since Wittgenstein's use of the notion of grammar reaches its peak in the BT, it can also be misleading: such a title suggests a consistency that the BT is in fact lacking. It is not only absent in the edition of *Philosophical Grammar*, but also in the actual Nachlass document Ts 213. The BT lacks consistency because it contains both, Wittgenstein's old views that he had been developing since 1929, and his newer ideas that were emerging since 1931 and eventually turn out to be ground-breaking for the *Brown Book* and the PI. Thus, in BT the old and the new are enmeshed with one another.

2. The completeness of grammar

In the BT, Wittgenstein describes grammar as the complete account book of language: "[…] dass jener Satz ohne eine solche Ergänzung nichts sagt, muss die *Grammatik* sagen. Wenn sie das vollständige Geschäftsbuch der Sprache sein soll (wie ich es meine)." (http://wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-213,526r_f)[2] The same comparison occurs in three other remarks in the BT (Ts-213,58r; Ts-213,526r; Ts-213,538r). It suggests that it is possible to capture grammar in a book. But what could such a book of grammar look like? We can imagine it to contain a list of all the words of a language, including all possible ways of using them. The requirement of the book of grammar being complete calls for completeness in two ways: first, it must contain all the words of a language (thus, the number of words has to be finite); second, it has to contain all possible ways of using each word, which implies that all possible ways are already given and no more can be added, unless a rule is given which says precisely in which way more usages could be added (Ts-213,63r).

The idea of grammar as a complete book (or system) is very similar to the TLP's conception of logic as a complete possibility space. In the TLP, Wittgenstein maintains that nothing is accidental in logic: "Wenn das Ding im Sachverhalt vorkommen *kann*, so muß die Möglichkeit des Sachverhaltes im Ding bereits präjudiziert sein." (TLP 2.012) If we know an object, we also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs (atomic facts). (TLP 2.0123) If this is the case, and if we are dealing with a finite number of words, then all possible atomic facts are given. (TLP 2.0124) Hence: "Jedes Ding ist, gleichsam, in einem Raume möglicher Sachverhalte." (TLP 2.013) This space of possible state of affairs is logical space in the TLP. In analogy, Wittgenstein in the BT uses the notion of "grammatical space" (Ts-213,Ir; Ts-213,30r; Ts-213,389r) to describe the space of all possible (i.e., meaningful) usages of a word. The idea of a complete grammar also suits Wittgenstein's characterisation of grammar as a pure calculus: "Die Grammatik ist für uns ein reiner Kalkül. (Nicht die Anwendung eines auf die Realität.)" (Ts-213,558r) Wittgenstein chooses the notion of a calculus to emphasise that language is governed by rules. As he states himself, to look at language as a calculus ("unter der Gesichtspunkt des Kalküls") means to conceive it as "Operieren […] nach festgelegten Regeln" (Ts-213,258r). In this sense, he sometimes uses the words "Grammatik" and "Kalkül" inter-

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1 Considering only the typed text, the BT consist of 768 pages plus a table of contents (8 pages). Without counting the table of contents, Ts 211 has more typed pages (771) than the BT.

2 This link leads directly to the page 526r of the BT on *Wittgenstein Source* and is the full reference to the page quoted. In the following I will shorten references by leaving out "http://wittgensteinsource.org/" and "_f" (which indicates that the quote is taken from the facsimile rather than one of the transcriptions).

changeably in the BT. This is evident, for example, in the following remark: "Und das Wort 'jetzt' bedeutet hier: 'in *diesem* Kalkül'/*dieser* Grammatik', oder: 'wenn die Worte mit *diesen* grammatischen Regeln gebraucht werden'." (Ts 213: 63)

Wittgenstein's assumption of grammar being complete can be traced back to his writings in 1929 and 1930. In Ms 107, for example, he remarks that only *all* the grammatical rules of a word determine its word category (Wortart) (Ms-107,211). The metaphor of grammar as the account book of language first appears in Ms 109 (Ms-109,122; Ms-109,129). In the same manuscript, Wittgenstein mentions different chapters of grammar (Ms-109,121; Ms-109,132), and in Ms 110 he distinguishes between the heading of a part of grammar and the heading of grammar as a whole (Ms-110,65). This distinction of different chapters of grammar suggests that he indeed considered putting the entirety of grammar down in a book. He never started to write it in the classical, hierarchical style, but it still might have been his long-term project in the background of his philosophical work. This assumption is supported by the fact that two of his manuscript volumes, Ms 113 (1931) and Ms 114 (1932), bear the title "Philosophische Grammatik".[3]

3. The incompleteness of grammar

On the other hand, however, Wittgenstein slowly begins to call the completeness of grammar into question. In September 1931 he takes a note of a "serious objection": "Wohl aber könnte man fragen, ob denn die Grammatik überhaupt abgeschlossen sei; oder, ob wir sagen können, wir kennen alle Regeln über die / der Anwendung eines Wortes." (Ms-111,176) Likewise, already in Ms 109, when considering the different chapters of grammar, he asked how we could know if they are *all* chapters (Ms-109,132). His worries continue up until the BT where we find a great number of remarks pointing towards the incompleteness of grammar. Wittgenstein asks, for example, how we use the expression "all the rules" of a game, e.g. tennis. Do we mean all the rules written in a certain book? Or all the rules the players have in mind? Or all the rules that have ever been put forward? Or indeed all the rules that *can* be put forward? He concludes from this ambiguity that we should rather avoid speaking of *all* the rules of tennis and instead speak of *certain* rules of the game, or, more precisely, about all the rules written in a *certain book*, and so on. The same, he suggests, applies to the rules for the use of our words. (Ts-213,255r)

Many more passages in the BT point to the same conclusion. How about, for example, if there is a shooting competition and, after the winner has been announced, someone says that the competition is invalid because there is a lack of rules for a particular special case? Would we then agree that the competition is indeed invalid? Or would we rather reply that it is valid nonetheless since all the rules of the game, which had been determined before the competition started, were considered and obliged? (Ts-213,250r) We would probably tend to do the latter.

Later, in the PI, Wittgenstein will say that our use of words "is not everywhere bounded by rules; but no more are there any rules for how high one may throw the ball in tennis, or how hard, yet tennis is a game for all that, and has rules too." (PI §68; see also Ts-213,249r) Such as

tennis, a shooting competition is a game and has rules, but is not everywhere determined by rules. The idea expressed in PI §68 is already present in the BT: we can play (language-)games even if there are no rules for all possible cases that may occur during the game. The question is, however, if the idea of a calculus, "die Idee des Kalküls" (Ts-213,249r), with a clear and complete set of rules can be applied to such examples; and the answer to this questions seems to be a clear no.

4. The Struggle

In the BT, Wittgenstein is struggling to find a way out of this difficulty. He admits that he is aiming at putting forward a catalogue of the rules of language: "Ich mache mich doch anheischig, das Regelverzeichnis unserer Sprache aufzustellen." (Ts-213, 250r) Yet he does not know how to deal with the examples of incompleteness that he considers. He is especially worried about the example of the word "plant" that he brings up repeatedly in this context. "Was soll ich nun in einem Fall wie dem des Begriffes 'Pflanze' tun?", he asks. (Ts-213,250r) The problem with the word "plant" is discussed on page 248 and 249 in the BT: We use the word plant not only without being able to give a clear-cut definition of it, but also without being able to accept any precise explanation of it, since in a certain particular case in which we have used it we might have meant again something different. That is, we use the word 'plant' without being aware of all its possible usages, and without it being completely governed by rules.

According to my understanding of the BT, Wittgenstein's question "what should I now do in such a case?" is not a rhetorical one. Rather, Wittgenstein does indeed not know what to do here. On the one hand, he still wants to hold on to the idea that grammar is a complete set (or calculus) of rules, which implies that all the rules for all the words of our language are given. On the other hand, he realises not only that we can, but also that we *do* use words without knowing all their possible applications. That is, we play our language-games without them being completely governed by rules; or, as he later puts it, we "make up the rules as we go along" (PI §83).

Eventually, Wittgenstein will maintain that the use of a word is *not* completely determined by rules. He escapes the conflict between the completeness and incompleteness of grammar, "[der] strikten grammatischen Spielregeln und de[m] schwankende[n] Sprachgebrauch" (Ts-213,248r), by giving up his intention to display the entirety of grammar: "Ich mache mich nicht anheischig, das Regelverzeichnis unserer Sprache aufzustellen, das alle unsere Sprachhandlungen regelt; so wenig ein Jurist es versucht, für sämtliche Handlungen der Menschen Gesetze zu geben" (Ts-213,249v), he adds in a handwritten remark on a back page in the BT. Thus, he turns his original endeavour into the opposite.

However, the BT, the typed version as well the complete text including the handwritten remarks, contains all of the following: (a) remarks that assert the completeness of grammar, (b) remarks where Wittgenstein admits that the assumption of grammar being complete does not hold water against the objection that our language use is not completely governed by rules, and (c) remarks in which he explicitly rejects the attempt of putting down all the rules of grammar. Even though remarks suggesting the incompleteness of grammar predominate in the BT, they still stand side by side with remarks suggesting its completeness. Only in the *Brown Book Corpus* (Ts 310, Ms 115ii,

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3 Of course, this title is ambiguous. It could mean that (1) the book displays the philosophical grammar, or (2) that it introduces a method called "philosophical grammar", or (3) that it is about philosophical grammar (either conceived as a subject matter or a method).

Ms 142) and after will Wittgenstein have eventually dropped the idea of a complete grammar.

5. A short outlook on the notion of grammar in Wittgenstein's philosophy

This example of Wittgenstein's struggle with the notion of grammar indicates that the concept of grammar in his philosophy is not static, but changes over time. In the BT, the old and the new conceptions clash with one another. Wittgenstein's old ideas are still rooted in his *Tractatus*-conception of language, whereas his new ideas are path-breaking for the PI. Grammar slowly evolves from a complete calculus — a complete set of rules, a possibility space for the use of words — to the (description of the) use of a word in any particular case. Wittgenstein's insight that grammar is not complete, and indeed does not need to be complete, is one important step in this development.

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Identity of Art Objects—A Mereological Analysis

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Abstract

This short essay will look into how changes of parts of a piece of art affect its identity. It will argue that if a piece of art is physical, its identity may not be solely determined by its proper parts, but at the same time there could be some of its proper parts which are essential to its identity. The same remarks will also hold for an art object which contains no physical parts. It will also propose that in order to account for changes of its parts, an art object which contains no physical parts should be viewed as a class of types instead of a type. Some further issues will also be suggested at the end of the essay.

1. Physical Art Objects

Consider a statue. Suppose the statue was knocked into a pile of small pieces at time T1 and then that pile of small pieces was reassembled at time T2 into a statue which looks exactly the same in every aspect (even microscopically) as the original one. Call the original statue S1 and the restored one S2. Is S1 identical with S2? (Stories similar to this one have been told in the literature, for instance, The Ship of Theseus (Rea 1997). However, owing to the limitation of length, the present writer will quickly note what he thinks about the issues without engaging in a literature survey. Furthermore, the present writer is more concerned with accommodating commonsense thinking and hence may leave some subtle metaphysical issues aside.

Normally we will think that S1 is gone after T1 and that S2 comes into existence after T2. So it might be suggested that by Leibniz's law, S1 cannot be identical with S2. However, such a reading will make "resurrection" logically impossible, which might be too strict.

In our scenario, S1 and S2 share the same physical proper parts. Hence even if we adopt strict mereological essentialism, which proposes that every proper part of an object is essential to its identity, we will tend to think that S1 and S2 are identical (here we assume that any part of a physical object must also be physical). Strict mereological essentialism is in effect still too strict to fit in with our conception of identity in the ordinary discourse. For example, a very small piece, say, an atom, of a statue is of course a proper part of it, but normally losing that kind of small part won't change its identity.

Now let's take S1 as a piece of art and ask the same question again. Will we still tend to think with the same confidence that S1 and S2 are identical? It seems that on top of the material constitution, other factors will naturally also come into the scene here. For example, we might take the authorship into account. If the one who did the reassembling is not the original sculptor, we might be less confident in saying that S1 and S2 are identical even though they share the same material constitution. In short, here some historical facts about S1 and S2 might play a role in the issue of identity.

As mentioned above, strict mereological essentialism is too strict to be tenable. But in any case, some parts of a physical object are essential to its identity. For instance, if we cut away the upper half of a statue, it will normally be destroyed, which implies that the remaining thing cannot be identical to the original statue. Moreover, even if we repair the statue by putting back a copy of the upper half, which is not the original upper half, so as to make the

statue after repair look exactly the same as the original one, we might still think that the statue after repair is not the same as the original one (the point is that a large portion of replacement might affect the identity of an object). This observation suggests that the upper half of a statue might be an essential part of it.

So some proper parts of S1 might be essential to S1's identity when we are only concerned with the material constitution. Those parts of S1 should also be essential to its identity as a piece of art. However, S1 as a piece of art might have more essential parts, for it is possible that some of its parts which are not essential in terms of the material constitution will turn out to be essential to its beauty (or to its aesthetic value) and hence might affect its identity as a piece of art.

2. Art Objects Without Physical Parts

Now let's consider a poem. It is certainly not a physical object. Usually, we will think of it as a "type". Of course, in that case, all of its parts are also types. One might argue that the identity of a poem is very sensitive to any change of its parts, that is, even the change of a single word would spoil a poem, and hence strict mereological essentialism should be the choice here. But this still might not be enough. Suppose two poets who don't know each other nor each other's works have accidentally written two poems which use the same words and the same sentences and which share the same structure. Even though there is just one type, we might tend to think that there are two poems instead of just one, for the authorship should play a role in determining the identity of a poem.

When it comes to a novel (or a piece of music), strict mereological essentialism might be untenable, for normally the change of a single word (or a single note) is not essential to its identity. However, similar to the case of physical art objects, some parts will indeed be essential.

In light of mereology, there is an important difference between physical objects and types. Consider the following mereological principle: if every proper part of A is a part of B, then A is a part of B. This principle is true of physical objects (here we assume that two distinct physical objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time) but not of types. A toy counterexample for types is as follows. Consider two sequence types "ab" and "atb". Any proper part of "ab", that is, "a" or "b", is also a part of "atb", but "ab" itself is not a part of "atb". It is also possible that any proper part of a sentence occurs in a novel but the whole sentence never occurs in that novel. Moreover, the following principle should also be true of physical objects. If

every proper part of A is a part of B and there is a part of A which is an essential part of B, then A is an essential part of B. But again this is not true of types, because even if a certain proper part of A is an essential part of B, A might not be an essential part of B, for it might not be a part of B, let alone an essential one.

We can talk about the history of a physical object, for it comes into existence at some point of time and ceases to exist at a later point of time (and might come into existence again after that). However, a type as some kind of abstract existence is always there (here let's leave aside the reductionist proposal in which the existence of a type depends on the existence of its tokens) and hence it does not seem to make sense to talk about the history of a type. However, we do talk about the history of a poem or of a novel, but here the history is about "token producing". For instance, what a poet does is to bring a token of the type of a poem into existence and that poet's contribution consists in directing our attention to that type by showing us a token of it. Normally, the author is one who produces the first token.

Moreover, it might not make sense either to talk about changes of parts of a type. A statue might lose a physical part at some moment but a type strictly speaking cannot lose a part, for again it is always there and we can never cause changes in an abstract object. In this light, the strict mereological essentialism must be true of types. The foregoing remarks might be fine for, say, poems but not good for novels. Nonetheless, we'd better come up with one story to cover both cases and it goes as follows. We cannot change parts of a type but can access tokens of distinct types. To decide whether a poem or a novel can keep its identity over a change of some of its parts, we actually check a token of a type which is different from the original one in some parts, and then by some criteria we decide whether such a type is "tolerable" in the sense that when accessing a token of it, we would think that we are reading "the same" poem or novel. Formally, in the aforementioned way, we are defining a subclass of types which stands for a poem or a novel. That is, we should rather think of a poem or a novel as a class of types instead of as just one type. When we say that the strict mereological essentialism is true of poems, we actually mean that the class of types which stands for a poem has only one member. It might be difficult to come up with a clear-cut class of types to stand for a novel, for we would probably have to deal with vagueness when defining such a class. But vagueness is a problem haunting a lot of philosophical issues and so we should leave it aside here.

3. Concluding Remarks

The main task of this short essay is to look into how changes of parts of a piece of art affect its identity. Here we have considered two categories: physical art objects and art objects without any physical parts. Let's briefly summarize and generalize what have been said above as follows. For a physical art object, its identity might not be determined solely by its material constitution and some historical facts about such an object would have to be considered. Nonetheless, some parts of it might indeed be essential to its identity and some of them being so might be owing to the consideration of the aesthetic properties of that object. The foregoing remarks still apply when it comes to art objects without any physical parts, such as literary works or music. Besides, first we may classify the said kind of art objects as types. However, a type is always there. So in order to make sense of talking about the history of, say, a literary work, we suggest that such a kind of talk should be interpreted as a talk about the history of producing tokens of the type in question. Moreover, a type cannot undergo any change in any of its parts. So in order to accommodate the commonsensical thinking that some literary works can maintain their identity over changes of parts, our proposal is to use a class of types instead of just one type to stand for a literary work and such a class will be defined by assessing tokens of types.

There are some further issues which might be worth looking into. First, there might be some art objects which are mixtures of physical objects and abstract ones. How changes of parts affect the identity of that kind of object might be an interesting issue. Second, even though it is widely thought that the aesthetic value emerges only on the whole object, we can still ask how the parts of an art object contribute to the aesthetic value of that object as a whole or at least we can try to clarify the issue as best we can (indeed we cannot say that the value of an object is just the sum of the values of its parts, but it would also be too quick to say that the value of an object has nothing to do with the values of its parts). Third, similarly we can look into how our aesthetic experience aroused by parts contribute to our aesthetic experience aroused by the whole (for instance, we never listen to a piece of music as a whole but always listen to part after part of it).

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Film Language Games: Seeing-As and Simple Objects of Comparison in *Mulholland Drive*

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Abstract

This paper argues for the relevance of the later Wittgenstein for film analysis. It explores parallels between the discussion of language games and of seeing aspects in the *Philosophical Investigations*. These combined conceptual tools help us see narrative films anew, as I show with a reading of the self-reflexive aspects of David Lynch's *Mulholland Drive* (USA 2001).

There is a scene in David Lynch's film *Mulholland Drive* (USA 2001) in which the two female protagonists enter a very strange establishment, the *Club Silencio*, where they witness a strange show. A trumpet player enters the stage, and a showman announces in a mix of Spanish, French, and English: "No hay banda. Il n'y a pas d'orchestre. It's all a tape recording. No hay banda, and yet, we hear a band." Consequently the trumpet player plays the trumpet, and suddenly breaks off – but the sound of trumpet playing continues. The same pattern is then repeated with a singer who sings "Llorando" (which translates to "I'm crying") with great intensity – we see her body shaking as she draws breath, and the two protagonists start crying. The singer then faints, but her voice still continues singing. Eventually the announcer vanishes and the microphone on the stage starts shining in a bright blue light. In a way, this scene is extremely literal: it does precisely what the showman says. In my discussion of the scene I want to focus on the way in which this scene works as what Citron in his discussion of language games in the later Wittgenstein draws attention to as a "simple object of comparison": it demonstrates how cinema works in a simplified way, without claiming that all of cinema necessarily works like this (cf. PI § 130/ 131, Citron 2011). As a first step, we need to sketch the relationship between what Wittgenstein says about seeing and language-games, before returning to *Mulholland Drive*.

In the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI), Wittgenstein tells us "don't think, but look" (§ 66). Here and elsewhere, seeing and the visual plays a central role to his philosophy (both early and late). As Sybille Krämer remarks in her concise reflection on Wittgenstein in relation to other philosophical "positions" on language and communication: in regard to language, a categorical distinction between language and image cannot be sustained (Krämer 2001, p. 265). Krämer explains this by pointing out that Wittgenstein developed his "language game method" from a reading of Goethe's morphological approach (ibid., p.114. Goethe's influence on Wittgenstein has similarly been shown by Schulte 1989, p. 108, and Schulte 1990, pp. 11-42). Language games are helpful in clarifying our knowledge about language; we use them as "objects of comparison", as images, which are useful as a method of measurement for comparison (Krämer 2001, pp. 115-121).

Wittgenstein's later philosophy, both in the PI and *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* (PPF), takes the form of more or less connected remarks, investigations of different lengths, sometimes connected over several paragraphs, sometimes jumping from theme to theme, "criss-crossing through a philosophical landscape" (as he describes it in the preface) – never settling into a simple, orderly system, which would give us a sense of a complete image, or a complete overview. Instead, the paragraphs likewise offer aspects, posing questions, and in this way they discourage a passive attitude in the readers, but instead work "to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own" (PI preface). In this way, the *Investigations* enable the reader to unfold their own philosophical project instead of imposing a doctrine; we train ourselves as readers to be critical of simplistic, generalising "images" that can hold us "captive" (PI §115), and which arise from the ways we use language.

One tool within this method is the approach to look at "uses" of language, and to consider it in context of the (grammatical) rules of its everyday use in a particular "form of life": "I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the 'language-game'" (PI § 7). So language-games bring into focus the unacknowledged rules of a shared activity; Wittgenstein often constructs little peculiar scenes in which we can investigate how these rules work in defamiliarised cases of language-use. Just like language-use, seeing is to some degree shaped by shared practices that we are trained in as we grow up in a community. The argument that training shapes the ways in which we see can be found throughout the PPF (e.g. §168). This training certainly has an impact on an individual's ability to 'judge' and even to describe art, images, and what we look at in our everyday lives. However, we will not always be aware of the training, the shared assumptions, the shared agreements. Where these are not acknowledged, disagreements will hit us as a surprise. Wittgenstein reminds us of these underlying assumptions, these implicit conventions, and makes this even clearer by looking at some examples of such ongoing shared activities. For instance, he imagines children who agree to play with a box and use it as a house in their game (PPF §205). The shared game allows the box to be seen as, and to function as, a house. Just like in the *Investigations*, the simple game here is used as a reference point, a "simple object of comparison". We can compare our own activities, in which seeing is embedded, to the simple activity presented here, and (re)discover how much of our perception relies on training. According to the PI, in many cases the meaning of words is their use in a language (PI §43). Wittgenstein similarly directs our attention to the way we "use" images in our life (PPF §195). Through family resemblances with other situations, we can acknowledge that "seeing as" will be a kind of training that shapes our visual perception in many intermediate cases that will be less clear than the game of children: Often, we will forget the habits of seeing, and will assume that this is the "natural" or "direct" way of seeing something. Wittgenstein clarifies that this kind of certainty in seeing is not simply available to us by another example:

251

§325. Wir sagen auch von einem Menschen, er sei uns durchsichtig. Aber es ist für diese Betrachtung wichtig, dass ein Mensch für einen andern ein völliges Rätsel sein kann. Das erfährt man, wenn man in ein fremdes Land mit gänzlich fremden Traditionen kommt; und zwar auch dann, wenn man die Sprache des Landes beherrscht. Man *versteht* die Menschen nicht. (Und nicht darum, weil man nicht weiß, was sie zu sich selber sprechen.) Wir können uns nicht in sie finden.

As this example points out, seeing the same visual cues will not deliver the same kind of insight to everybody. The right kind of training, enabling the participation in a shared practice or culture, allows people's reasons for doing things to appear transparent. We know what they are up to, because we understand the underlying logic of their behaviour, but this requires a kind of tacit knowledge of the social situation and its rules and conventions.

Turning now back to *Mulholland Drive*, we need to acknowledge the context in which this scene is set: The *Club Silencio* scene is a central moment in the film insofar as we move with this scene from the mostly linear storytelling of the first 90 minutes into a very confusing, non-linear movement of repetition and variation that shapes the last 40 minutes. The first 90 minutes are framed as a dream sequence by a scene at the very beginning, in which the camera delves "into" a sleeping person, who will be seen waking up soon after the *Club Silencio* scene. So the scene provides a threshold for the film and its characters into a process of awakening.

Within this complicated overall structure of the film, the scene is itself very simply structured. The characters take a seat, we have a clear overview of the room in which the scene takes place, and the scene itself is so clear and simple that it would almost be silly, if it weren't for the highly serious and mysterious tone of the scene. The show on the stage is similar to a revue; the presenter uses the grand gestures of a showman. We also know that the theatre is on an empty backlot. It's the middle of the night but there are about 15 people in the auditorium. It's unclear if the show has just started or if it has been going on for a while. The mysterious tone of the scene also has to do with the very emphatic use of voice and gestures by the presenter. He uses his staff like a necromancer or animal trainer to conduct instruments that we hear from off-stage, body-less in a sense. The presenter lets us know that the singer is Rebekah del Rio, who is doing a cameo in the film as herself. She sings Roy Orbison's und Joe Nelson's „Crying" in Spanish, before fainting, or dying, while her voice carries on singing, obviously because her performance is pre-recorded. If this is supposed to be a "magic trick", then it is very easy to see through. What we see re-duplicates what the dialogue says: While Rebekah del Rio sings of crying, she has a black tear painted on her cheek, and both Betty und Diane, our main characters, start to cry uncontrollably. Through all of this immediateness, and re-duplication the scene itself stays ambiguous and strange. Are we witnessing a theatre performance, a magic show, a ritual, a satanic mass, or a parody of all this?

In this ambiguity, the *Club Silencio* considers the family resemblances of fiction film with different neighbouring art forms. There is an audience looking at a screen, which resembles the spatial set-up of a theatre. But even though the audience sees and hears bodies perform, these bodies are not there. Still, even if film is just light and sound, as the second-to-last shot implies by showing just the glowing microphone, film offers an intellectual and emotional experience to its audience, as we saw in Betty's and Diane's reactions.

So seeing cinema through the language game presented by the *Club Silencio* scene lets us acknowledge all of the different resemblances of film as an art form to other aesthetic practices. The scene is part of a Hollywood film, which is itself set in Hollywood, and features actresses, actors, directors, producers, recording studios, and obscure money-givers possibly associated with the mafia. So it's quite clear that *Mulholland Drive* is a film reflecting on filmmaking in many of its scenes, and, in the *Club Silencio* scene it reflects on film-watching. By contextualising and relating film-viewing and filmmaking in this simple and slightly defamiliarised way, the film allows us to explore the grammar of the various language games that different groups play with film, and through this investigation into filmmaking and film-viewing we gain some overview. This overview is itself of course only one possible aspect of film, a way of seeing film as a shared practice under particular circumstances, not a claim to an "absolute" overview.

Mulholland Drive does not simply take apart cinema by unmasking its supposedly "illusory" nature to get somehow "behind" the mask, to a "deeper" level of truth imagined to be "underneath" the surface, nor does the scene atomise film form so that we see the ways in which it is (socially/ industrially) produced. Rather, the scene leaves the ways in which film works intact and clarifies the ways in which film (can) work for those involved in the shared practices of viewing and/ or making it. Film can thus have an emotional power, even after we have rationally analysed it, even after we have fully acknowledged that film is produced, that it is part of a business, and that it employs optical and audiovisual tricks: The depiction of Betty's profoundly emotional reaction to a somewhat kitschy song is a perspicuous presentation of how film can have effects on viewers. While the scene has a mysterious atmosphere, it works to demystify the viewing experience, without ridiculing it, without unfair generalisations: Watching the show arguably changes Betty's way of seeing herself; that is why the rest of the film offers variations of disillusion and awakening, but eventually ends with the blue light in the Club, and the word "silencio": Eventually the film leads to a place of calm – a balance, a sense of overview, without pretensions to be an absolute or detached overview.

The reasons for having an emotional experience while watching a film can be manifold: One might recognise one's own life experience in the processes shown on-screen. Films can also offer insights into completely unfamiliar places and contexts, and then film works as a sort of training, a process of familiarising the audience with the tacit knowledge that allows understanding behaviour. In the *Club Silencio* scene, I may not understand why Betty is so moved by the show, but I recognise the pattern: Betty interacts with the show as I interact with film.

Lynch, seen with Wittgenstein, allows us to see film not as an illusion to be unmasked. Not as a calculated emotional rollercoaster that pushes the right buttons, as if the audience were automatons. Lynch counters those many attacks on fiction film that argue film shows a distorted reality, which leads in this line of argument to the judgement that fiction film must be the equivalent of lying or pretending or manipulation. Against this charge, *Mulholland Drive* investigates the possibility for film to be open about the ways, in which it is produced, and the ways, in which it works as a show, but also the ways, in which it is a dream, a memory space, an investigation, and an emotional experience. Various images of life and film are considered in a process of discernment, to gain an overview: Lynch's approach for getting there is as unsystematic as Wittgenstein's criss-crossing journey. Here, fiction film invites its

252

audience to join in its investigations and its approach to discernment; the audience can train to see things anew.

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The Emotion of Awe in the Experience of Art

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Abstract

What is the role of awe in the aesthetic experience of fine arts? To answer this question, I will firstly give an explication of the emotion of awe in general as the emotion in which we feel humbled yet elevated. Secondly, I will sketch two accounts in which ways the role of awe in aesthetic experience has been presented recently (by Kendall Walton and Jesse Prinz) and offer some criticisms of these reductionist accounts. Against this background, I will thirdly sketch a pluralistic account of aesthetic experience in which awe is not the central emotion but one important emotion among others in a process of aesthetic experience involving different stages.

What is the role of awe in the aesthetic experience of works of fine arts? This paper has three parts. Firstly, I will give an account of the emotion of awe in general starting from premises drawn from a contemporary theory of emotions. Secondly, I will sketch and criticize two different reductionist accounts of aesthetic valuing with awe at the center (Kendall Walton and Jesse Prinz) in order to sketch, in opposition, a pluralistic account of aesthetic experience in which awe is not the central emotion one but one important emotion among others.

1. Awe as an emotion

I assume that awe is an emotion. Some well-known examples for emotions are joy, grief, anger etc. In accordance with the dominant strand in current philosophy of emotions, I take emotions to be specific intentional attitudes (cf. Döring 2009, 31ff.). As such they are generally defined by at least the following properties:

    a) intentionality: they refer to objects (to a concrete and to a formal object).
    b) phenomenal quality
    c) hedonic aspect: positive, negative, neutral
    d) action tendency/ motivation

How should we describe awe using these terms? The phenomenological aspect is the most central and the least controversial aspect. In most writings about awe, in historical as well as contemporary texts, you find similar remarks on the phenomenological and hedonic aspects of awe: It is a mixed feeling between something positive and something negative (cf. Burke 1757, Kant 1790, Bollnow 1958, Keltner and Haidt 2003). One way to spell this out more precisely is to say that awe consists in the feeling of being frightened on the one hand and pleased on the other hand; another way is to say it is the feeling of being *humbled and elevated* at the same time (cf. Wettstein 2012). This suggests it is the feeling of being small in comparison to or in the face of something without being crushed by it or terribly frightened; rather, the same thing that makes one feel little also lifts one up phenomenologically to a higher level. The concrete object may be nature, a work of art or maybe even an extraordinary person. As regards the formal object of awe as an emotion, one can distinguish (with Burke and the tradition) between an emotion regarding beauty and awe as an emotion regarding the sublime. This fits well with the phenomenology. The sublime is something above what is normal and can be described as something elevated. The formal object of awe is something that is at a higher level where this higher level is associated with a (good) value. "Elevated" does not simply mean "high" or

"big" or "of great value" here; it means that something is above all normal standards in a field so you cannot grasp it immediately (it may be power, beauty, intellectuality etc.). This is connected, finally, with a motivational aspect: Because your normal capacities are swamped, you have to deal with the object in a special way. This idea can be supported well by considerations offered by the psychologists Dacher Kelter and Jonathan Haidt. They propose that awe is directed at "vastness" (what they take to be a more general term for what can be, in concrete cases, power, or as I said, something sublime or elevated). The vastness one perceives is something that one cannot fully grasp. The interesting point is that they argue that awe always entails a need for accommodation (Kelter and Haidt 2003, 303). This means that feeling humbled yet elevated is not a state in which one can relax comfortably. Rather, this state involves a yearning for something: either to be at the same level as the elevated thing, or to be protected by its power, or to stand in some (positive) relation with respect to it – another way to say this is that one wishes to understand what is beyond the normal.

So far we can sum this up in a rough explication of the emotion of awe:

    1) It is directed at something elevated with a (positive) value: the sublime.
    2) It is the feeling of being humbled yet elevated.
    3) It is hedonically ambivalent.
    4) There is a motivation to understand or to get in some relationship with the elevated thing (yearning for accommodation).

2. Awe in two reductionist accounts

What is the role of awe in aesthetic experience when conceived of in the way I have sketched? I assume that aesthetic experience and aesthetic valuing are interconnected with each other without going into detail here about the precise nature of this connection. I take it that there is no genuine aesthetic valuing without any aesthetic experience being involved at some point. Jesse Prinz (2011) and Kendall Walton (1993) both provide an account of aesthetic valuing in which they assign a role to awe. They both assume that we can distinguish two different stages in our engagement with artworks. There is an initial response to the work, and there is a second response that they hold to be the attitude of actual aesthetic valuing. Besides this common point, they differ in many aspects.

Walton foregrounds admiration as the central experiential aspect of evaluating artworks and speaks of awe as more or less equivalent to admiration.

"[…] unlike some pleasures produced by hot showers and walks around the block, 'aesthetic' pleasure includes the pleasure of finding something valuable, of admiring it" (Walton 1993, 504).

"Sometimes our attitude toward what we take to be aesthetically valuable is better described as one of awe or wonder than of admiration" (Walton 1993, 508).

In this account, it is firstly questionable whether positive aesthetic valuing is always manifested in a pleasurable state as he claims. Pleasure in the sense of a pure positive hedonic state seems too simple to describe the state we are in when we evaluate artworks as good. This holds especially if the artworks do not elicit pleasurable affects in our initial response, as is the case with works depicting sad or cruel scenes or works made of disgusting material, for example. Secondly, and more importantly, in Walton's account, aesthetic evaluation is focused on the achievement or output of the artist so it seems to miss the qualities of the work itself beyond the aspect of achievement.

Prinz tackles these two points (pleasure and admiration) when he develops his own account on aesthetic valuing.

[A]dmiration often seems to be a consequence of appreciation rather than a constituting part. We admire the artist because we appreciate the work. […] Appreciation generally seems directed toward the artwork, not toward its creator (Prinz 2011, 82).

He says that aesthetic valuing is not about the pleasurable admiration of artistic achievement but about wonder in the face of the work itself.

Wonder captures the features of pleasure, admiration, and interest that seem central to appreciation. Like pleasure it is a positive emotion, though not always pleasant. Like admiration it involves a feeling of elevation: the wondrous thing has an elevated status, and we are elevated by it. Like interest, wonder is a kind of regard, though whereas interest can be characterized as a way of looking, wonder might be better characterized as a way of seeing: we see things with wonder. (Prinz 2011, 84)

In other texts, Prinz states that awe might be a stronger version of the emotion of wonder – it has the same role in the process of aesthetic valuing (Prinz 2007, Prinz forthcoming).

The advantages of the wonder-thesis over the admiration-thesis are convincing. But there are also at least two problems with Prinz's account. Firstly, wonder as marveling in the face of something that is a riddle seems not only phenomenologically but even evaluatively neutral. This is why it is hard to see why it could be the core of aesthetic valuing. Secondly, even if wonder was a kind of aesthetic valuing, I am not convinced that wonder is the *only* emotion in which aesthetic evaluation manifests itself – but this is what Prinz proposes. He speaks of a family of very similar emotions around wonder and introduces amazement and awe as more intense forms of wonder. I think it is right to mention these other emotions, but I think it is important to distinguish between them in order to grasp the diversity of artworks and their value. Prinz presents a reductionist account whereas I am proposing a pluralistic account of emotional aesthetic valuing.

3. Awe in a pluralistic account

Following the conception of awe that I presented earlier, neither of the two accounts offers a place where the precise emotion of awe would fit in. Awe, as I explained it before, is far more different from admiration, on the one hand, and wonder, on the other hand, than the two authors assume. In awe, one feels at the same time frightened and delighted, humbled yet elevated etc. This is different from admiration as a way of acknowledging certain efforts or values, and it is different from wondering in the sense of marveling at something one does not understand. Wonder is closer to awe as it also entails a moment of non-understanding. But it lacks the aspect of intimidation and attraction since it lacks the aspect of feeling small in the face of something elevated. Obviously, awe plays a role in the contemplation of some works of art, but it does not play a role in all of them. And the difference is not one of the degree of intensity of a work but one of a totally different character or different kind of artwork – even in the same discipline, even by the same artist.

Think, for example, of two works of art by Gerhard Richter. "Party" (1963) is a great work of art, but there is no reason why it should elicit awe. It is agreeable to look at the happy party scene, and it is a bit creepy to see the vampire-like man in the middle. It is also an invitation to reflect about parties and their ambivalent character. But there is no feeling of being humbled yet elevated, no relation to something sublime, nor is there even the motivation to understand the work better because it does not really offer a riddle but very straightforwardly presents a certain ambivalence. Now think of one of Richter's many abstract paintings, which are huge and colorful (for example "Abstraktes Bild" 1981). In this case, there is no invitation to meditate on a specific topic; there is no unusual perspective given on a common scene. It is all about color, and (the loss of) form, and the material. Standing in front of this painting it is very probable to feel awe: to feel humbled by the size, the overwhelming resplendence and radiation of the colors – and yet not being crushed but imaginatively elevated into a sphere of experiences that lay beyond everyday life. "Party" and "Abstraktes Bild" are both good works of art, but only the second one elicits awe. So the question arises once again: Can awe play a role in aesthetic experience and valuing, and in what respect?

Like Walton and Prinz and many others, I also think it is right to distinguish between different aspects of the process of aesthetic valuing. But I suggest starting from two different kinds of responses that do not necessarily follow each other in time in the way an initial response and a secondary response follow each other in time. Rather, I suggest distinguishing firstly between a simple and a complex response that can take place at the same time, where the complex response is the aesthetic response in the stronger sense. And this is where I think awe can play a role in the process: There are simple responses to an artwork where different normal emotions can occur (joy, disgust,…); there is a complex response where awe can be (but does not have to be) elicited (as is the case with wonder as well, for example); and as a third stage there is a reflective response where a differentiated, justified aesthetic judgment is given.

In other words: On the one hand, we can observe a work of art as an object tout court. This means we can recognize its form, color and material as well as its (superficial) topic such as figures or a represented object. Through this kind of observation alone, we can be moved by feelings or even emotions. For example, we may feel joy if the topic is a nice one or disgust if something disgusting is repre-

sented or something nice is represented in a disgusting way. I call all of these parts of a simple response to objects of arts. As soon as we contemplate the artwork as an artwork (in a more emphatic sense) our responses will (at least if it is a good artwork) become more complex. This response may entail intellectual aspects as well as emotional ones. This is the place for awe or wonder or other complex attitudes. We can be overwhelmed by the topic of a work of art, but more often and more specifically we are overwhelmed by the specific forms of the specific art discipline and what their formation offers us. Some artworks, such as the big abstracts by Richter, have the capacity to challenge our (sensual) perception and our (intellectual) grasping or understanding of something in a way that can be described as being overwhelmed by something that is far beyond the normal. Think of the Barnett Newman painting "Who's Afraid of Red, Yellow and Blue" (2.45 meters high, 5.44 meters long), and imagine yourself standing right in front of it at a distance of only one to two meters. There is nothing to grasp, no topic to think about. If there is something to think about, it is perception and thinking itself. Or it is the question of what art is – which is related to the question of what we, as humans, are. All of this, one might well say, is something elevated, something far from the normal.

The role of awe in this pluralistic account of aesthetic experience and valuing is, to sum up, the following: It is one of several possible special experiences that good art can provide, and that is why it is an important starting point for a reflective aesthetic judgment. But awe is not the defining response for artworks in general.

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On the Demarcation between Art and Non-Art

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Abstract

The paper proposes a demarcation between art and non-art and a criterion for being closer to art (focused on drawing and painting) based on the concepts of entropy and information. Moreover some different levels of order in art are defined.

1. Introduction

The purpose of the paper is to show that the concepts of order and information and that of symmetry and entropy, as they are used in natural science, can be successfully applied to investigations of the concept of art and non-art. Although we think that such an application works well with any kind of art we shall deal in this paper only with one type, namely the pictorial two-dimensional type of art (i. e. painting or drawing).

The paper is divided into two parts: In the first part a rough demarcation is provided between art and non-art. In the second part different types of levels within art are distinguished, which correspond to different levels of order.

2. Art and Non-Art

Imagine a picture which is maximal symmetric. You could turn it around in any direction and it looks always the same. An example is TV-snow. Such maximal symmetric pictures have no order and provide no information. We can describe such a picture in several ways:

(i) One way is to say that by any movement or reorientation the picture is transferred into itself; i. e. the picture s is transferred into s again.
(ii) Another way of saying is that one can replace any part of the picture by an arbitrary part of the picture without changing the picture; i. e. by such replacements the picture s is transferred to s again.
The expression "part" has to be understood as being visible with normal eyes: art-pictures are not looked upon with the microscope (except for scientific usage). Therefore, a certain minimum-size (to be visible by normal eyes) is presupposed concerning "parts of the picture".

It seems there can be widespread agreement that if (i) or (ii) is the case, the respective picture does not belong to art. Accordingly we may formulate the following definition:

> *D 1* Picture s belongs to *non-art* if one of the following conditions are satisfied:
> (i) By any movement or reorientation of the picture s, s is transferred into s again.
> (ii) By replacement of any part of the picture s by any arbitrary part of s, s is transferred into s again.

One might object to this definition that a uniformly coloured picture would give still some minimum information, – i. e. the information "green" if the colour is green – and therefore the picture could still belong to art. However, we require also a minimum of form-difference of the parts of a picture in order to belong to art. In other words, if a picture belongs to art, none of the above two conditions (i) and (ii)

can be fulfilled. For an art-picture we require therefore the following art-postulate *AP*:

> *AP* If a picture s belongs to art then neither of the two conditions (i) and (ii) hold for s.

Next we want to provide a criterion for deciding whether a picture of painting or drawing is closer or less close to art. To give a precise criterion of that sort we need first some further definitions:

> *D 2* r is a picture-replacement of (picture) s iff for any parts $x, y, (x{\neq}y)$ of s it holds: r is a replacement of x by y where x and y have the same form and the same size.

We can now define the *art-entropy* of a picture s of painting or drawing in loose analogy to the physical entropy defined by Boltzmann. Boltzmann defined the entropy as the logarithm of the number of microstates which can realize a macrostate. As an example take the macrostate of a litre of air at room-temperature. It can be realized by a huge number of different microstates, where one microstate is the configuration or constellation of atoms and molecules at the present point of time. For breathing this litre of air it does not matter which one of the different possible microstates realizes the macrostate "litre of air at room-temperature". It will be understood that if a part of that litre of air has a higher temperature (perhaps because it was inhaled) the litre of air which is inhomogenous w. r. t. temperature can be realized by a smaller number of microstates than the homogenous one. An equilibrium can be realized by a maximum number of microstates (cf. Mittelstaedt and Weingartner (2005) p. 161; Ruelle (1991) chs. 16 and 17.). Using the analogy with the physical entropy we define the art-entropy in the following way:

> *D 3* Art-entropy of picture s =df the number of possible picture-replacements that transform s into s again.

From this definition it will be understood that, for example, the picture (portrait) of the old woman of Rembrandt will have a much lower art-entropy then the picture "Black Square" of Malevic. This is so, because in the picture of Rembrandt much less picture-replacements that preserve the picture can be done than in the picture of Malevic which tolerates much more picture-replacements that preserve the picture.

The Black Square satisfies both conditions of *D 1* – provided, we do not incorporate the white frame of the picture into the picture – and belongs therefore to non-art according to our demarcation.

If we incorporate the white frame into the picture then (ii) is satisfied by the black square inside the white frame and by the white frame separately, at least to a great extend.

An example which lies between Rembrandt's old woman and Malevic's Black Square is Mondrians's "Tableau No. 1". Here several picture-replacements that preserve the picture, i. e. replacements of squares and rectangles of same size and colour, can be done.

Thus, the art-entropy of Mondrian's Tableau No. 1 is higher than that of Rembrandt's old woman but lower than that of Malevic's Black Square.

A concept which is opposite to that of entropy is that of *information*. And this opposition holds analogously also for the art-entropy. Whereas Rembrandt's picture of the old woman has very low art-entropy it has very high art-information. And whereas Malevic's Black Square has very high art-entropy, it has very low art-information. Mondrian's Tableau No. 1 lies in between the two.

> *D 4   Art-information of picture s =df the number of possible picture-replacements that are excluded when s is transferred into s again.*

It is plain that Rembrandt's picture (of the old woman) excludes much more picture-replacements when it is preserved (transferred into oneself) than Malevic's Black Square and also more than Mondrian's Tableau No. 1.

From definition *D 4* it follows that art-information increases when average-symmetries are thrown out. On the other hand *selected* symmetries, since they exclude a lot of picture-replacements, lead to increasing of art-information.[1]

With the help of definitions *D 3* and *D 4* we can now formulate our criterion for saying that one picture s_1 is closer to art than another picture s_2:

> *D 5   Picture s_1 is closer to art than picture s_2 iff both of the following conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied:*
> (i) s_1 has a higher art-information than s_2.
> (ii) s_1 has a lower art-entropy than s_2.

3. Levels within Art

As has been said in the introduction, we want to distinguish different levels which concern the order of pictures of painting and drawing. To do that, we have to introduce some definitions. We begin to define the *composition* (*Comp*) of a picture *s* as the set of its parts:

> *D 6   Comp(s) =df the set of the parts of s*

Then, we want to define the environment of the picture. Here, we distinguish its *causal environment* (*CausEnv*) from its *valuation environment* (*ValEnv*). The first concerns the causal influences between picture *s* and environment, the second concerns affection and valuation between picture *s* and spectator:

> *D 7   CausEnv(s) =df those things y (which are not part of s) such that:*
> (i)   *s* or some part of *s* acts causally on *y* or
> (ii) *y* acts on *s* or on some part of *s*.
> Example: A painting or drawing reflects a certain part of the optical spectrum and absorbs another.

> *D 8   ValEnv(s) =df those spectators y such that*
> (i)   *s* or some part of *s* affects *y* or
> (ii) *y* evaluates *s* or some part of *s*.
> Example: An art-historian is affected by an original of Rembrandt and the art-historian evaluates this picture.

We want to provide now a definition of the *structure* (*Struct*) of a picture (of a drawing or painting). We understand the structure of a picture as kinds of relations between its parts; more accurately as relations which represent a linkage or a non-linkage, either internally or externally between the parts and the environment:

> *D 9   Struct(s) =df those relations R (R may be two-place or n-place) such that*
> (i)   *R* are linkage or non-linkage relations
> (ii) *R* hold internally between the parts of *s*
> (iii) *R* hold externally between the parts of *s* on the one hand and the things or spectators of the causal and valuation environment on the other.[2]

Examples: Linkage-relations in a picture are for instance those between a human body and its arm or leg; or between the branches of a tree and its trunk. Non-linkage-relations in a picture are for instance those between a branch of a tree and a stone somewhere in the picture.

The special composition of the picture as a whole and of the interrelations of the parts is described well by Aristotle in his poetics and metaphysics (cf. Aristotle (Poet) 1450b 34 ff. and (Met) 1078a 36).

We shall now define the *art-level* 1 or *order-level* 1 of a picture by saying that a picture has *art-level* 1 or *order-level* 1 just in case the picture has structure:

> *D 10 Art-level 1(s) iff Struct(s)*

From the definition *D 9* it follows that if a picture has structure it cannot belong to non-art, i. e. it cannot satisfy one of the conditions (i) or (ii) of *D 1*. Furthermore, it can be easily seen that if a picture has structure it must have art-information (*D 4*): Replacements of parts with linkage relations by parts with non-linkage-relations are ruled out; so are replacements of parts with internal relations by parts with external relations. For this reason a picture that has structure must have also a low art-entropy (*D 3*) since many possible picture-replacements will not transform picture *s* into *s* again.

Art-level 1 will be used as a basic level for defining further levels which have some specific properties concerning the internal and external relations among the parts of the picture:

> *D 11 Art-level 1 A(s) iff*
> (i)   *Struct(s)*
> (ii) The *ValEnv(s)* is such that
>   a. the form of *s* and the form of the parts of *s* (internal relations) affect the spectators of *s*, and
>   b. the spectators of *s* evaluate the form of *s* and the form of the parts of *s*.

D 11 characterizes a picture which attracts by its form.

> *D 12 Art-level 1 B(s) iff*
> (i)   *Struct(s)*
> (ii) The *ValEnv(s)* is such that
>   a. there are special geometrical forms or patterns of the picture *s* or its parts (internal relations) which affect the spectators of *s*,
>   b. the spectators of *s* evaluate these geometrical forms or patterns.

D 12 characterizes a picture which attracts by its special geometrical forms or patterns. Examples are pictures of cubism or of Escher.

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1 The importance of selected symmetries in nature and in art has been described very well by Reichholf (2011) part II.

2 The analogous but more general forms of definitions D 7 and D 9 are due to Bunge (1979) ch. 1. Cf. Weingartner (2015) p. 32f.

D 13 Art-level 1 C(s) iff
  (i) *Struct(s)*
  (ii) The *ValEnv(s)* is such that
      a. the centre of *s* and its internal relations of the parts of the centre and with the parts outside the centre affect the spectators of *s*, and
      b. the spectators of *s* evaluate the centre and the parts inside and outside of it.

D 13 characterizes pictures according to theories of art which interpret the picture as possessing a more or less hierarchical composition with a centre and periphery. An example of a corresponding theory of art is that of Hans Sedlmayr (cf. Sedlmayr (1948)).

D 14 Art-level 1 D(s) iff
  (i) *Struct(s)*
  (ii) The *ValEnv(s)* is such that
      a. the colour of *s* and the colours of its parts with their internal relations affect the spectators of *s*, and
      b. the spectators of *s* evaluate the colours and the colours of its parts with their internal relations.

D 14 characterizes pictures in which the colour is very important. Observe however, that a picture like the Black Square, where the colour black is replaced by another colour, would not count as art according to *D 1*, since both conditions of *D 1* would be satisfied.

One could go on with further characterizations. For example spectators could also be attracted by the causal environment (D 7) of pictures. Such ramifications will be left for further investigation.

One further point, however, should be mentioned: Applying the criterion for *being closer to art* to *art-levels* 1 A-D we cannot say at face value that one of them is closer to art than another. It certainly can be said that a picture with structure is closer to art than a picture without structure (or one that does not fulfil definition *D 9*). But a comparison for being closer to art depends on a sophisticated investigation of the individual picture concerning its art-entropy and its art-information.

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Aesthetics and Rule-Following

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Abstract

In this essay I will point out parallels between Kant's theory of aesthetics and Wittgenstein's discussion of rule following. Although Wittgenstein did not write an aesthetics and Kant did not discuss Wittgensteinian rule-following problems, and although both Kant and Wittgenstein begin at very different starting points and use different methods, they end up dealing with similar issues, namely issues about rules, particularity, exemplarity, objectivity, practice, and as-if statements.

Kant wondered whether a theory of aesthetics would be possible within his transcendental philosophy. In his *Critique of Pure Reason* he said the answer should be "no." But later, when he was writing the *Critique of Judgment*, he realized that the answer should be "yes." He then argued that judgments of taste make what he calls "subjective claims to universality." If I find something beautiful, I will think that everyone should agree. When I look at a painting or hear a symphony that I find beautiful, I think that everyone should find it beautiful as well. This is Kant's starting point. According to him, these are claims to universality and such claims require a priori grounds. The ground is found in what he calls the "principle of subjective purposiveness" (*subjektive Zweckmäßigkeit*). When we perceive an object and find it beautiful, we find it suitable (*zweckmäßig*) for a "free play" (*freies Spiel*) of our faculties of cognition (imagination and understanding) and we find pleasure in this play. Pleasure is always subjective and therefore this principle of purposiveness is subjective and not objective.

I have suggested that this subjective purposiveness comes about in three ways (Wenzel 2005, p. 62): (1) The object is purposive for a play between our faculties; (2) the faculties find themselves purposive for each other; and (3) this play in turn is purposive for "*Erkenntnis überhaupt*," that is, cognition in general, or cognition as such. This is not any particular cognition, but something more indeterminate. Judgments of taste are never objective judgments. Nor do they aim at such judgments. In matters of taste there are no objective rules, but the principle of subjective purposiveness is some kind of substitute for such rules.

Based on this principle we imaginatively reach out to others and think that they should agree. Others normally have the same faculties that we have, and they can perceive the object as well as we do. Hence they should be able to contemplate it and engage in the same kind of free play we are engaging in and thereby find it beautiful. Instead of an objective rule of beauty, which does not exist, we rely on this a priori principle of subjective purposiveness; based upon it we demand agreement from others. This agreement does not arise via rules, but through acts of making judgments of taste. More precisely: instead of being guaranteed necessary agreement via objective rules, we make demands for agreement and we do so implicitly in the act of making the judgment. In the former case we deal with cognitive judgments, in the latter with judgments of taste.

For Wittgenstein the problem begins at a very different point, namely with the observation that words and rules are not mechanisms. One wants to say that there is an agreement (*Übereinstimmung*, PI 201) between act and rules and that there is some kind of quasi-mechanical guidance by rules. But in fact there is no such agreement and no such guidance. He says that although the words "rule" and "agreement" are "related" (*verwandt*, PI 224) the agreement does not arise via rules. It is rather that we intersubjectively agree in our actions as if we were guided by such rules. Instead of an agreement between rule and action, we find more basically an agreement between actions. That agreement can be implicit, when there is simply no disagreement among the participants. It can also be explicit, when people say: "that is right." The agreement shows in such behavior and this is the basis for the existence of rules. Thus Wittgenstein has tuned things upside down.

When we come to another country where people speak a language we do not understand, we will rely on intersubjective common grounds. Wittgenstein once went so far as to speak of a "common human way of acting" (*eine gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise*). Anscombe translated this as a "common behavior of mankind." Wittgenstein wrote: "The common behavior of mankind [*die gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise*] is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language" (PI 206). But how is this supposed to work and what exactly is this "system of reference" (*Bezugssystem*)?

In our everyday lives we observe "regularity" (*Regelmäßigkeit*) and "agreement" (*Übereinstimmung*). We can say that this comes about in three ways: (a) between words and behavior, as if there were a mechanism connecting the two; (b) between the repetitions from one instant to another; and (c) between the people who use the same words. Thus we have three kinds of agreement: between words and behavior, between repetitions, and between people. Wittgenstein became increasingly interested in the latter two, the agreement between repetitions and especially between people. To challenge this idea, he once asked himself whether it might not be possible that one follows a rule privately and only once (PI 199). This would go against the requirement of repetition (b), because one does it only once; and it would go against the requirement of agreement between different people (c), because one does it alone.

A basic point in Wittgenstein is that people need to agree in shared practices and that these practices have wide horizons. This is Frege's context principle turned intersubjective. There must even be agreement not only in "opinions but in form of life" (PI 241). This of course creates problems if we take "form of life" in the plural: You have your form of life, and I have mine; because then the question arises who is right and what a common ground might be (Wenzel 2012). The idea of a "common behavior of mankind" (PI 206) would of course help in avoiding this relativism. But what exactly is this "common behavior of

mankind"? Wittgenstein, it seems to me, is rather quiet on this issue, at least in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Very differently from Kant, Wittgenstein did not venture into any kind of faculty talk. Nor did he discuss some kind of categorical imperative. He did not try to resolve issues about rule following by turning to faculties of cognition, such as a faculty of imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) and a faculty of understanding (*Verstand*). Nor did he turn to any kind of a priori categories, time and space, schemata, or even reason (*Vernunft*), and try to build on them. It is as if he wanted to avoid Nietzsche's criticism, who accused Kant of solving problems "*vermöge eines Vermögens*," that is by invoking faculties. To bring out Nietzsche's joke and play with words in English, we may say that Kant solved his problems "by means of means." For Kant there were explanations of this kind, not so for Wittgenstein. This is a central difference between the two. But if we look into the details, similarities will become apparent, particularly in Kant's third *Critique*. Many of the later Wittgensteinian considerations have an aesthetic touch and this allows for connections with Kant.

1. The as-if. When dealing with objective judgments, we think it is the object that forces two judgments to agree with each other. If you say the house is made of stone and I say it is made of wood, then we will go and see and let the facts decide. The house is a third element mediating between your judgment and my judgment. Kant in the first *Critique* uses the Latin phrase "*consentientia uni tertio, consentiunt inter se*" (A 820/B 848). If two judgments agree with the object, they must agree with each other. For Kant, predicates such as "being made of stone" and "being made of wood" come with rules of application. Kant is aware that this is problematic and leads to a regress as soon as we ask by means of which further rules these rules are applied. Although Kant is aware of the problem, he does not go into it. Wittgenstein is very different here, as we see in his rule-following discussions.

But in the third *Critique* Kant is clear from the start that in matters of taste this does not work anyway. The predicate "beautiful" is fundamentally different from a predicate such as "being made of wood." There is no rule of application that would come with it. The object cannot function as a third and mediating element, a "*uni tertio*," by means of which you and I would be forced to agree. An objective rule is completely missing.

Instead, according to Kant, when I make a judgment of taste, I simply demand that others must agree, and I base my demand on the free play that I happen to engage in and on the feeling of pleasure that I feel in this play. On the one hand, I demand agreement *as if* my judgment was objective, which it is not. It is *my* free play and *my* feeling of pleasure and not that of others. There is no objective rule. On the other hand it is *as if* my judgment were merely subjective, which it is not either, because my feeling is based on an a priori principle, namely the principle of subjective purposiveness, and based on it I demand agreement from others. But this agreement is demanded and not guaranteed. The principle cannot fully take the place of the third element, the *uni tertio*. Instead, I must reach out to others more directly. I must demand of others to engage in such a play with their own faculties. They must do something, and I imagine others doing something. This is not quite a shared practice as Wittgenstein has in mind, but it gets close.

But there is a difference. In Kant there is an *intra-subjective* play going on, namely my play of faculties. Kant is here doing some kind of transcendental psychology. Al-

though it is my play, it is not private either; Kant says it is not "personal," because certain ingredients are universally shared, namely the faculties and the principle of subjective purposiveness. But Wittgenstein shies away from trying to give reasons from the inside, the intra-subjective. He prefers to stay more outside, so to speak, on the level of the *inter-subjective*. He observes agreement between practices, and instead of looking for common grounds on the inside he looks for something common on the outside, in traditions, practices, and forms of life.

According to Kant's aesthetics you play with your representations of the object and I play with my representations. We are not identical, neither are our plays. We are individuals, the judgments are particular acts, and there is no rule forcing us to agree. "Beautiful" is not an objective predicate. But from a transcendental point of view, we share the same faculties and the a priori principle of purposiveness is available to all human beings. We are not completely separate individuals, which is important for Kant. Although Wittgenstein once mentions the "common behavior of mankind," he does not give a positive account, and the "forms of life" tend to remain local and in the plural.

2. Exemplarity. Wittgenstein in his rule-following discussions avoids generalizations and prefers to focuses on particularity and situatedness. I teach you something, and you try to get it right. You do this by intuition and trial and error until it seems to you that you know what I mean. In the end I might be content with your performance and say "right, this is what I mean," even though I do not know what went on in your head. There is something similar in Kant. For him the free play is not determined by rules. Hence there is something ineffable about beauty and one must play with the object oneself. Objects of art and nature that we find beautiful are exemplars, and so are our judgments of taste. Each judgment is new and unique. It is itself an exemplar. It seems to us that we cannot but find the object beautiful; we demand that others agree. Kant speaks of a "necessity of the assent of all to a judgment that is regarded as an example of a universal rule that one cannot produce" (Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, section 18; see Wenzel 2005, p. 78). Artists produce works of art that incorporate such judgments. Other artists contemplate their works and take them as exemplars, trying to read off the rules as if there were any.

Similar in Wittgenstein, each calculation is something new, a new act happening right there and then. The question of right and wrong relies on communication and agreement through others (Kusch 2006, pp. 177-206). Calculation is social and culturally imbedded. It needs to be taught and the teacher explains a rule by showing and giving examples to the pupil. Although there are objective rules, Wittgenstein points out the basic need for inter-subjective agreement in practice. This is comparable to the Kantian demand for agreement in judgments of taste. Furthermore, often the examples Wittgenstein considers are delicate and fine-tuned, and sometimes they are related to aesthetics, such as aspect switches and absolute pitch (see Wenzel 2010).

3. Free play. In Kant, the free play of our faculties is a play with rules. It is imagination and understanding that play with each other when we contemplate a painting or when we listen to a piece of music. Understanding is the faculty that provides rules, for instance about colors, shapes, rhythm, or meter, when we recognize something as having a certain color, shape, rhythm, or meter. Imagination on the other hand is more like phantasy. It freely combines what is given and produces something new. Imagination plays with those rules of colors, shapes, rhythm, and meter

that the understanding provides. Nevertheless, what imagination produces is not chaos. The free play it is not completely without rules either. It plays with them. It does not produce white noise.

Similarly Wittgenstein often imagines new ways of understanding what someone might have meant in saying or doing something. He often opens new horizons. This is an aesthetic aspect in many of his observations. Even when the object is not meant to be beautiful, for instance when thinking about how to continue a mathematical sequence, there is a certain freedom and openness revealed in Wittgenstein's ways of asking questions. His skepticism about rules creates room for imagination, and his pointing out practices shows interactions between participants in which the rules might be playful and change any time. This play is not meant to be *intra-subjective*. It is *inter-subjective*, but a play it still is.

4. Genius. According to Kant, a work of art seems natural, as if it were produced without any purpose or intention. Art looks like nature. Similarly, nature looks like art when we find it beautiful. It looks like designed or being made for us. We feel that we are part of nature. A genius produces works of art and is like a mouthpiece of nature speaking to us. Geniuses themselves cannot fully explain how they produce their works and where the ideas come from. Other artists try to imitate and to follow them. They try to read off rules although there are no rules of beauty. Similarly, Wittgenstein's skepticism about rule-following practices reveals limitations of rules and replaces these rules by those practices that are more open, flexible, and subject to interpretation and change. Wittgensteinian participants do not fully understand what they are doing, as Kantian geniuses do not fully understand what they are producing. In Kant it is about taste and works of art. In Wittgenstein it is about everyday activities. But there are often traces of aesthetics, even Kantian aesthetics, in those everyday activities as described by Wittgenstein.

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Understanding a Greek Tragedy

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Abstract

This paper examines three uses of 'understanding' in the *Philosophical Investigations* in order to consider Wittgenstein's question whether we can 'understand a Greek tragedy'. The examination shows that we can say we understand no matter which use we employ. Also, using the imagined performance of a Greek tragedy, the paper tries to make sense of Wittgenstein's thought that even if we can speak the language we may not understand someone from a strange country with strange customs.

I

In *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology* (Vol. I, 1982), Wittgenstein raises a parenthetical question during remarks on dissimulation: "(Indeed, *is* Greek tragedy comprehensible to us?)" (§266). And in his discussion of the inner in Part II, section xi of the *Philosophical Investigations* he writes:

> We also say of some people that they are transparent to us. It is, however, important as regards this observation that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even given a mastery of the country's language. We do not *understand* the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with them. (p. 223)

Individually and together I find these two thoughts perplexing. First, why would Wittgenstein wonder whether a Greek tragedy is comprehensible to us? Aren't there scores of books which attempt to explain individual Greek tragedies? Doesn't Aristotle give us an analysis of and definition for Greek tragedy? So, why does Wittgenstein even raise this question?

Second, if we have a mastery of a language, and if, for Wittgenstein, a language is connected to the form of life of the people speaking the language, how could we (1) fail to understand another speaker of the language, since we understand his language, and (2) find the customs and traditions of the people so strange that we could not understand them when they are explained to us?

Third, if we combine these two thoughts, then even those with a knowledge of classical Greek, a mastery of the language, may not understand a Greek tragedy because of the strange traditions embedded in the performance. Yet, again, scores of commentaries have been written in an attempt to explain the language, customs, and myths which are the background within which the tragedy is performed. Does Wittgenstein want to say that even in these cases we may not understand, that the tragedy is not comprehensible to us?

II

There are at least three uses of 'understand' that Wittgenstein considers in the *Philosophical Investigations*, which I want to examine in connection with these two thoughts about understanding: (1) Understanding as akin to mastery of a technique (§§150, 151), (2) that understanding which consists in 'seeing connections' (§122), and (3) "We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but, also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other. [...] (Understanding a poem.)" (§531)

Let's examine these uses of 'understand' as they apply to understanding a Greek tragedy. First, the mastery of what techniques are relevant to saying that someone understands, does not understand, or has some understanding of a Greek tragedy? Would it suffice, following Aristotle in the *Poetics (*1450a7-10), to be able to describe the plot, after seeing or reading *Antigone* or *Oedipus Rex* or, must one also be able to describe 'the spectacle, character, diction, melody, and thought', as Aristotle uses these terms, if we are able to say that one understands the play? So, if the technique to be mastered is to be able to identify these elements of any of the Greek tragedies, then being so able is our criterion for saying that the person understands the play. Presumably, Wittgenstein does not mean that since we lack the stage directions and the music for the plays of Sophocles we cannot understand the plays? For that would seem to imply that unless we were present in the time of Sophocles to see the performance of the play, then we could not understand it. Aristotle did not see the original production; so, do we want to say that he did not understand the play for the play he saw might have had different stage directions and music; and so, that only those who saw the original production of *Oedipus Rex* would have understood the play?

Given these consequences, we seem to be justified in saying that at some point in the description of the plot, etc., of *Oedipus Rex*, a person understands the play or has some understanding of the play.

The second use of understanding is 'seeing connections'. One meaning of 'seeing connections' in this context might be seeing the connection between the main character's dramatic flaw and what happens to him or her during the play, another might be to make a connection between the play and the times in which Sophocles wrote – the suffering of the people of Thebes in *Oedipus Rex* and the suffering of the Athenian people due to war. Or, one might see the connection between a theme of the play and our own times – say, the conflict between individual conscience and the rule of law in *Antigone* and civil disobedience as practiced by Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Being able to make these connections, both within the play, and to events at the same time as the play's creation, and to events of our own time, seems to provide good reasons to say that the person understands or has some understanding of the tragedy.

What of Wittgenstein's third use of 'understand', in particular, to 'understand a poem'? Let's take a section of *Antigone* and try to give some criterion for saying a person

understands the poetic elements of the play. Let's use the famous chorus 'Many wonders there be, but naught more wondrous than man' (lines 362-383). One can examine the Greek meter, the translations of the Greek words, the structure of the poem; we can argue and try to decide whether one translation is better than another, whether it is closer to the Greek or better conveys what Sophocles is saying. All of these ways are open to us in trying to understand, to explain, these lines of Sophocles' play. And, a person can be praised or criticized for his translations of the lines or for his explanation of the meaning of the poem. All of this, as applied to these lines of Sophocles, seem to answer Wittgenstein's question in PI §533: "How does one *lead* anyone to comprehension of a poem or a theme? The answer to this tells us how meaning is explained here."

Under each use of 'understanding' then, it seems we have good reason to say that we can understand a Greek play. But, what about the second thought of Wittgenstein which perplexes me? Aren't Greek plays very strange? Can we give any sense to the idea that in viewing them we may not understand?

III

Can we imagine ourselves in ancient Greece at a performance of *Antigone* and being able to understand the dialogue that is, being able to translate what we hear in Greek to our own English language? How strange would the play be? Well, there is a stone (the altar to Dionysius) in the orchestra, and the performers are pouring some liquid near it (libations). A group marches in, in formation, singing and dancing and accompanied by musical instruments (the chorus). People appear on a stage above the orchestra wearing costumes and masks; we hear male voices speaking what seem to be female lines. We may find many of the ideas expressed by the characters difficult to accept: for example, their belief in prophesy, Oedipus is abandoned because of a prophesy and Oedipus consults a prophet to learn the cause of the city's distress, and their belief in inescapable fate, for Oedipus does kill his father and marry his mother as he is fated to do. And so, we may find these actions and these consequences so strange that we say 'Who are these people, why are they saying and doing these things, I don't understand?' We cannot understand the motives for why they are speaking and acting in the way that they do.

Yet, as was argued in the previous section, we do understand the play. Since we can understand the dialogue we could presumably explain the plot, describe and talk about the costumes, and the singing and dancing. What it seems we cannot do, however, is to see reasons why they hold the beliefs they have, or to explain why the stone is set in the orchestra, or why they pour libations around it. Nor, perhaps, do we see a connection between the lives of the characters in the play and our own lives; for, we don't believe in the gods they believe in, nor that we are fated to do certain things, nor in the importance of prophesy like the characters in the play. Nor are we used to having men play women's roles; nor does the chorus play such a central role in our productions of drama; and, the gods of the ancient Greeks do not have such a place in our explanations of events.

We seem then to have the result that on one use of 'understand' we are able to understand a Greek play since we've mastered the technique of the language yet with another use we cannot for we cannot make connections between their actions and our own. Given this, we can remove the perplexity from Wittgenstein's thought in the *In-vestigations* that even though we can speak the language, the strange traditions of a strange country may keep us from understanding another because we cannot make connections either between their own attitudes and beliefs and their actions, or between their beliefs, attitudes and actions and our own.

And, because we can make connections between the actions and speech of the characters within the play and between their lives and our own, we can understand a Greek tragedy. And, some plays, and some parts of plays, may be more understandable than others. For example, we may understand Antigone's actions and motivations in wanting to bury her brother, even in the face of her possible death as a martyr to her religious beliefs, whereas we have a hard time understanding Agamemnon's sacrifice of his daughter, or his boldness in bringing his mistress Cassandra to his wife and home.

Regarding the third use of understanding, understanding a poem, although we may understand the elements of the play, and although we might see the connection between the plot or characters and our own lives, we may still be oblivious to the beauty and structure of the language; and, in that sense we may not understand the poetic aspect of the play.

By making distinctions between different uses of understanding, we can make sense of the two quotations from the beginning of this paper. We can answer positively to the question 'Can we understand a Greek play' given any of the three different uses of understanding. On the other hand, there may be aspects of a Greek play that we do understand, the plot and the connection with our life, while not being able to understand other aspects, such as the poetic beauty. And, we may be able to describe the plot, but not be able to see the connection with our own lives, nor understand the poetic effect of the language.

What is the relationship between these different uses? Is one use dependent on another or others? It seems unlikely that you could see a connection between the play and one's own life if one did not understand the plot, for one would not be able to say what was going on in the play, so one could not say it was related to what was going on in one's own life. But, it does seem one could understand some of the poetic aspects of the play, at least some of the choral parts or soliloquies, as with the ode to man in *Antigone*, without knowing the plot, though it doesn't seem one could understand Sophocles' meaning in that choral ode without making a connection to all men, including oneself.

Perhaps too we can use these three uses of understanding together as a criterion for saying someone has a good understanding of a play, a better understanding of the play and the best understanding of the play when he or she can describe Aristotle's elements of a tragedy, can draw connections with Sophocles' time and our own and can point to the poetic meter and structure and beauty of the language which Sophocles employs.

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The Interplay of Various Forms of Artistic Knowing

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Abstract

My analysis of the creative process uses empirical material (interviews, diaries, sketches, and video) that stems from five case studies to document composition processes in actu from the beginning of the work up until the last rehearsal. The general theoretical aim is to move from the description of artistic practices to a deeper understanding of artistic agency.

In the creative process composers in art music use various cognitive and material tools to create, try out, form and elaborate ideas that finally have to be written down in an appropriate way. These various tools are used on the basis of composers' distinct practical experiences, sensual perceptions, embodied emotions and intuitive valuations, which are usually expressed in words like "I feel it fits". Theoretical musical knowledge too (e.g. aesthetic ideas, notational systems) becomes actionable knowledge, because, in the case of composing, theoretical knowledge is embedded in specific artistic paradigms and established practices.

Introduction

One might think that the study of the creative process in art music is a core topic of musicology. This is partly true with reference to textual analysis of sketches usually by great classical composers (Sallis 2015; for contemporary composers Collins 2012). Composing *practices*, however, have been neglected, as if they were captured in a "black box". Well, sometimes composers give public talks or publish articles on their own creative process, yet their narratives are retrospective and mostly unsystematic – not to speak of the susceptibility to error in introspection (McCutchan 1999). It is also partly true, that music psychology has already investigated the role of cognitive aspects in creative processes (perception, memory, flexibility, analytical and synthetic thinking). The focus is usually put on musicians but very seldom on composers (Deliège 2006). However, psychological empirical studies do not investigate the creative process in its whole range – that is, from the first ideas to the final alterations – but analyse small fragments. Furthermore, most psychologists seek to identify various personality-related cognitive features that influence a person's creative potential, leaving out of scope the role of material objects such as music computers, which play a pivotal role in electronic music (Csikszentmihalyi 1996, 58ff., 110ff.). Finally, while most psychologists conceptualise creativity as a problem-solving competence (see e.g. McAdams 2004) I shall interpret this competence in context of shared artistic practices embedded in artistic communities and particular compositional situations.

A short note on the terminology: The term "knowing" in distinction to "knowledge" marks a basic difference between *doing* something that requires skills and abilities, and the acquisition of formal knowledge *about* something. Knowledge is fixed for instance in linguistic propositions, maths equations and software programs. In contrast, knowing is elusive: it is not an object that we can point to. As researchers we do not observe knowing, but only doings and sayings. Therefore knowing is a concept that I use as an interpretative conceptual tool. Focusing on compositional practices I will try to show how the concept of artistic knowing can help us to understand artistic agency.

Empirical basis

The analysis I will present is based on a research project with the title "Tacit Knowing in Musical Composition Pro-

cess" (see acknowledgement). The research design includes five case studies that documented the composition process from the first musical idea until the last rehearsal. Additionally, 28 one-off interviews with other art music composers were conducted. Most of them are experienced composers living in Vienna with a professional background of more than 15 years. The case studies consist of oral or written composition diaries, sketches, and in three cases observations of rehearsals. Furthermore, we conducted four interviews with each case-study composer in different phases of the creative process. During the interviews we talked about the progress of the composition, which tools they use, their problems, emotions and doubts. The whole documentation is based on a non-invasive approach, since we sought to avoid any irritation and any attempt to rationalise the working process. Afterwards we had a three-step analysis: after the transcription we began with a content analysis to establish analytical codes; then we conducted a comparative analysis, added several memos and finished with an interpretation. Our methodological approach is related to grounded theory (see Strauss/Corbin 2008).

Forms of artistic knowing in composing

My presentation consists of three parts:
  a) The first part discusses the accumulation of an extensive background of working experiences, in other words of *experiential knowing*.
  b) The second part focuses on *auditory-situational knowing*.
  c) The third part concerns *knowing through the body*.

ad a: experiential knowing

The expression "being experienced" refers to (a1) *the accumulated knowing of the working process*. A broad wealth of experience usually leads to fundamental trust in one's own competence. This phenomenon has long been known in the research of expertise and in the psychology of work. This fundamental trust is effective not only in familiar action situations, but also in view of new challenges that always demand a heightened degree of attention and effort. To quote Marko Ciciliani, a 45-year-old composer:

> "For me the difficulties are always new, that is they feel new every time. I think what has changed is perhaps a certain confidence so that nowadays I do not panic and think 'I'll never get the piece finished'."

Being experienced is expressed by an awareness of the conditions and characteristics of working processes. Composers pay attention to such aspects. That means their experiential knowing is evident in their everyday practice, for example when the composer Karlheinz Essl is in a composing phase he sets his alarm in the morning even if he does not have an appointment. Free artistic-creative work always contains (a2) *a certain routine*, but working routines are not "dull" habits, but in most cases a form of intelligent and disciplined action without reflective monitoring.

Of course routines vary, since what individual composers have recognised as sensible for their own way of working does not have to hold true for other composers. As Judit Varga says:

> "What I also very often do if I don't know how to carry on at all, then I put the work away and before I go to bed I force myself to write or improvise something. But not much. Not until very negative feelings arise; half an hour. I don't attempt to judge how bad it is either. That doesn't matter. Then I go to bed."

Occasionally Judit Varga has to protect the developing work from her own doubt and her own reflective criticism. Too much self-examination, too much self-analysis can have negative effects on the creative process. Experienced composers seek to avoid this.

Another kind of knowing of the working process, which develops on the basis of experience, is technical expertise that is (a3) *knowing how one uses instruments and apparatus skilfully* in order to achieve particular results efficiently. This expertise is not just formal or theoretical – even if there are often technical instructions or textbooks about it. Technical knowing how can indeed be articulated and demonstrated without any great effort, but its application in a specific compositional situation nevertheless remains subtle. Theorisation and formalisation of technical-practical knowing makes little sense for compositional practice, because the application is usually coupled with the sense of hearing. The situative hearing experience eludes the theoretical grasp, because it is fundamentally case-specific and tacit.

Ad b: auditory-situational knowing

So far, the issue has been about knowing of working processes that forms cumulatively out of past experience. The second part of my paper deals with sensory (especially auditory) situational knowing.

Acts of perception generate new experiences *in situ*, because perception always takes place in the here and now and is therefore situation-linked. (b1) *The tactile, proprioceptive, and kinaesthetic perception of the music instrument in playing, as well as the hearing of sounds* that the instrument directly produces, are meaning-determining acts. In most cases the meaning is fully integrated in the accomplishment of the action and does not emerge from subsequent consideration. Therefore composing, sensory perception and situative knowing merge and form a unity. This unity can be recognised when we analyse how composers try things out. Let me quote two composers:

> Karlheinz Essl: "Hearing is important here, because the things that I try out are then not somehow abstract, but I listen and the hearing is actually the control, which also tells me whether that really now works. So it is an interactive loop."

> Christoph Dienz: "I'm now writing this [piece] for three wind instruments. Thus I join in myself, I play bassoon and two clarinets, or just what works. And then I naturally try out whether it makes sense or not."

Particular insights and solutions can only be made possible experimentally that is only (b2) *by playing around and trying things out*. Auditory and experiential judgements are indeed prerequisites, because they are possible against a practical, cultural and epistemic background, but judgement formation is intuitive – "you hear it", "you feel it" as composers say.

To sum up: "Trying out" is the expression of an abductive and explorative approach, not one that is planned or guided by strict rules or principles. The knowing that comes from it is "personal" (Polanyi 1958), because it is associated with a person who is trying out something particular in a specific situation and perceiving it with his or her senses.

Ad c: knowing through the body

First of all, (c1) *the body is trained to cope with complex tasks*. The composer Karlheinz Essl addresses this point when he uses a mixer console for electronic music – I quote:

> "This demands a lot of fine motor skills, because this controller [on the mixer] is so small. It is really millimetre work. So when I am playing with these three controllers there are so many interdependences that it is incredibly complicated to control it. That means I have to practise an incredible amount so that I know exactly which controller does which position and how I balance it."

Essl speaks of the necessary practice so that the application know how is *incorporated* or *implanted* in the fingers. (I am using metaphorical expressions here because the location of the knowing in the fingers is itself metaphorical. At any case it makes no sense at all to speak of a disembodied mind. "Knowing of the fingers" is meant metaphorically, since knowing does not have a separate being and it is not an object. In this case "knowing" arises out of the synergetic effect of many different abilities, such as auditory sensory, musical imagination, sensing, reflection-in-action, aesthetic agenda etc.)

Yet the body is not determined by training and drill, since (c2) *it constantly acquires new experience* and therefore does not just reproduce what it has practised. This means that the body can have a *generative* effect. For this, composers have to get their bodies into a particular mood. This concerns very subtle aspects: the body tension that one achieves for example when one works standing up, the relaxation when one lies down comfortably, the body stimulation from the enjoyment of chocolate, coffee, a glass of wine. This everyday approach to one's own body usually happens below the perception threshold. Physical activities are most aware when they are carried out intentionally in order to master a task better, as for example Karlheinz Essl says in relation to his posture during a performance:

> "The hands are important in playing. That is the whole physicality through the fingers and also the movement when standing. That is why I play standing and not sitting. I mean, when I am developing it, then I sit. But in playing I stand if I can [. . .] Then you have a different body tension than when you are sitting. You get into the swing, and by getting into the swing yet other movements develop. And that again influences the auditory

result. So, I am completely convinced that if I do the whole thing sitting down I am not as responsive as if I do it standing up."

There is a final aspect: (c3) *knowing and anticipating other bodies*. Other bodies, such as the bodies of the musicians who are going to perform the composition, also play a role in the composition process. The composer Christoph Dienz gives an example of this here:

"If you want a super-fast trill on a clarinet or a trill at a large interval then there are positions that work well and some that are torture. You can seek advice from an experienced person, then you don't torture the instrumentalist."

The physical playing of the music instrument is the critical part of writing, because it is important to be able to understand what it feels like to be in the body of the instrumentalist. This knowledge is not a "knowing that", but a practical anchoring.

Conclusions

Let me conclude: The compositional process has two outputs: the developing artwork and the generated artistic practical knowing. While musicologists traditionally focus on artworks and cognitive psychologists on creativity, I am trying to open a complementary perspective on epistemics, precisely on various forms of knowing. This practical epistemic perspective has been rather neglected as a by-product or a parergon. Why this special focus? Artistic practical knowing is key for understanding artistic agency.

The subject matter, epistemics of practice, is among other things rooted in Ludwig Wittgenstein's understanding of practice (see Schatzki 1996; Zembylas 2016). Accordingly theoretical and practical knowledge are not just linguistic or mental entities, but phenomena that emerge in and through social practices. Here, the cognitive dimension of practices is not negated, but alongside the mind, the situation and the social interactions must also be taken into consideration in the analysis of artistic creation processes (see Schatzki 2001).

The present paper has elaborated the concept of artistic practical knowing and developed three sub-categories: experiential knowing of the working process, perceptual (for composers especially auditory) situational knowing, and corporeal knowing. These three forms of knowing function simultaneously, with different weightings. It is notable that this conceptualisation of artistic-practical knowing does not seek to explain agency. Indeed, artistic

agency is a dynamic, uncloseable process. It remains fragile because it is related to an evaluating field of artistic practice that is itself constantly changing. It is in this sense that we should understand artistic agency and mastery in their fundamentally social nature (see Zembylas 2014, 7–16).

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Anything Goes = Anything Says… Anything?
Predicability in Contemporary Cross-Cultural Aesthetics

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Abstract

Inheriting and interpreting Wittgenstein's ideas, the postmodern 'aesthetic turn' in philosophy has created a dilemma for the academic discipline of aesthetics because it loses its ability to make assertions as it risks being either inflated to a meta-science or deflated to calculable production standards. This raises the questions, how can aesthetics satisfy the obligation imposed on it by our aestheticized society and how can it restore its predicability? This presentation traces the trajectory from Wittgenstein to current propositions in aesthetics and tries to discover possible ways out of the deadlock.

1. The dilemma of predicability

Within this paper, there is just a single question I want to tackle in a short range of perspectives, starting from Wittgenstein via some postmodern long-term effects of his thinking up until contemporary aestheticians. The question is, can we–and if yes, how and why can we–actually say anything about cross-cultural aesthetics in academia? Or to put another way, what determines predications in any discipline of aesthetics that seeks to think outside its cultural box? I am currently working on a thesis that tries to explain the emergence of a shared discourse on aesthetics between Europe and Japan in the 19th century. Between postcolonial rebukes, postmodern disillusionment, poststructuralist instability and the ambiguous heritage of the linguistic turn, I am simply doubting if anything can be predicated at all.

2. Wittgenstein's view on aesthetics and its implications for a discipline of aesthetics

Let me start by recalling some of Wittgenstein's sparse remarks on aesthetics that have inspired ample interpretations. Wittgenstein's representation theory entertained the idea that the respective *form of representation* of results confines the scope of predications in science (Glock 2000, 382). Philosophers, too, because their task resembles a craft, must be aware of the aesthetic quality constitutive of scholarship in general. Aesthetics, however, seems disqualified from forming a discipline of its own (LAPR II. 1, 2). This is because aesthetics and ethics share an ineffable character: their sentences are neither meaningful (like empirical sentences), nor useful (like logical sentences, albeit those are meaningless), but principally nonsense, if their symbolic elements are not actively filled by the subject (Bastianelli 2007). While logical sentences define the realm of facts, logic itself is transcendental–in the same way as ethics and aesthetics are, if we understand Wittgenstein's famous equation accordingly (TLP 6.13, 6.421). Logic, ethics and aesthetics thus compose the preconditions of the possibility of the world (Glock 2000, 252).

Ethics and aesthetics both require and convey an attitude that exercises withdrawal and humbleness, giving room for experiencing the object or counterpart. Interpreted epistemologically, both types of sentences can help us to accept and to survey the world in its finite totality, while they demand conviction or belief. All that aesthetic sentences can do is to *show us* the wonder of being (Janik 2007). Consequently, they can never express any knowledge or truth, as these are categories within the logical world of facts (TLP 6.41, 6.42).

Wittgenstein's lectures about aesthetics are even more direct in deriding the idea of psychological or theoretical aesthetics (LAPR II. 35, 36, 38). Our aesthetic experiences are too complex for any categorization, while categories usually applied in aesthetics miss the point completely (PI 72). Aesthetic experience cannot be evoked, measured or predicted (LAPR III. 7, 11). The only thing that qualifies an explanation of aesthetic value is our intuitive approval, while the best explanation in aesthetics is to throw light on specific aspects, contrasts, or relations (LAPR III. 9, IV. 1, 2). Aesthetic language games determine under which conditions such an explanation takes place, and as language games are culturally or linguistically bound, Wittgenstein sums up that to explain a set of aesthetic rules, one has to describe the whole culture of the respective epoch and place (LAPR I. 21-29). Hence, we can infer the following: (1) aesthetics cannot be realized as a predicating science, because it rather (2) resembles metaphysics wherein truth resembles a mythical experience of the world. Therefore, communication about aesthetic experience is only (3) describable as a phenomenon of culture with its culturally restricted understanding.

3. Wittgenstein's heritage in postmodernism, postcolonialism, and poststructuralism: The loss of predicability

Current presentations of aesthetics show an opportunistic reading of Wittgenstein to justify contrasting approaches: While *analytic aesthetics* struggles with cyclical definitions until it is forced to leave certain terms open for common sense understanding to sneak in, *phenomenological aesthetics* dissolves its object involuntarily until it has to piggyback on the undoubted presence of the aesthetic object. This very dichotomy between language relativism in analytic aesthetics and ontological claims in phenomenology illustrates an aspect that I found handily entitled the *diagnostic and subversive potential of aesthetics* (Barck 2006). Aesthetics tends to reveal an era's epistemological uncertainties and the fluctuation of paradigms. This capability becomes much more crucial if a worldview's main characteristic is aestheticization, as is the case today.

The *aesthetic turn in philosophy* has debunked every perception, description, or concept as artificial and of qualified significance. If philosophy–understood in Wittgenstein's way as reflector and referee of science– becomes aesthetics, then it reveals its own (and every science's)

groundlessness. Aesthetics would then indeed form some transcendental discourse, albeit not for setting preconditions of thought but of representation. Representation is, if we think with Lyotard and Derrida, condemned to persistent difference, though. Difference itself would become the object of aesthetics; remember Lyotard's claim that it is also the aesthetic object. The unsayable, unportrayable remainder is what causes aesthetic experience in art. Conversely, art becomes the only medium able to show it (Tholen 2005). Here we have an overstretched consequence of the idea that the very form of representation limits the scope of predications. Yet, this is why Danto, Adorno and other 20th century aestheticians declared art the complement of philosophy: both 'languages' are incomplete, incapable of expressing truth if not supplemented by the other (Koppelberg 2005).

What are the consequences? Aesthetics appear everywhere–but disposed of all the three markers I would deem constitutive for every academic discipline. The *object* of aesthetics, firstly, has become everything or something only expressed in art. This reminds us of Wittgenstein's doubts if aesthetic judgement could be described somehow better than with a gesture. Secondly, the *research questions* become cyclical as aesthetics cares for the aesthetic aspect in each and everything, including the questions themselves, which are abandoned by a stable subject or object and therefore, reminiscent of Wittgenstein, meaningless and useless phrases. Lastly, *methodology* also becomes fragmented into philosophical descriptions and artistic expressions, in which the former is caught up in a floatation of signifiers and the latter left undefined. Regarding aesthetics from a cross-cultural perspective, the situation gets even worse: the postcolonial turn has–rightly–deconstructed Eurocentric categories and methods and prefixed an additional, hermeneutic qualifying of our understandings. Everything we say is subjected to dialogical review. Since, in order to say anything about another culture, one would indeed have to become the other.

4. Recovering aesthetics: Current variants of cross-cultural aesthetics

The question is: does this really inhibit every realization of aesthetics as a form of academic discourse? I do not think so and I will try to present some attempts to decrease the harmful exaggeration in aesthetics. Of course there is a huge and growing field of *applied aesthetics* in design, computing, multimedia, etc. that does not care for theory, but puts into practice the cause-effect relationship Wittgenstein refused so eagerly. Predications are limited to statistical prognoses. Aesthetics becomes economic, as does art.

Another type of aesthetics cares for the *demarcation and justification of art*. It is hardly surprising that postmodern philosophers conceive of art as a sphere of freedom and consolation because it asserts a kind of pre-conceptual meaning and ultimately relieves the philosopher of the obligation to formulate conclusive reasoning. But by focusing on art as the object of aesthetics, we are negligent of the presence of aesthetics in our everyday life as well as of the potentials of aesthetics for cross-cultural understanding.

Antoon van den Braembussche suggests *intercultural aesthetics* as the attempt to widen the scope of Western worldviews by mutual interpretative research. While addressing art is not compulsory here, he advocates seeing art's rhizomatic and innovative structure as a prototype of globalized knowledge formation. Aesthetics appears as a human universal. Yet, as Braembussche dismisses all

former aesthetic concepts, a theory to base his apparently comparative approach on has still to be formulated (Braembussche 2009).

Ryōsuke Ōhashi has made a formal criticism of cultural comparisons in aesthetics by shedding light on the fact that not only an observer's perspective, i.e. transcendent of compared cultures, is impossible but that every single-cultural position already emerges from a process of self-reflection. Because cultures today are deeply entangled, the other is already part of the self. Aesthetics can work as a *hermeneutical tool for self-constitution* and as a *hermeneutical bridge between cultures*. Still, the question remains which authority ensures that the examples selected for comparison (art, aesthetic theories, cultural phenomena) are of comparable nature (Ōhashi 1998).

While Ōhashi's concerns relate to a formal problem, Ram Adhar Mall's understanding of *intercultural philosophy* rather originates from ethical questions: It demands 'centrism in a weak sense,' wherein the irreducibility of one's own cultural preconceptions is acknowledged while the mutual acceptance of cultural stances, neither commensurable nor incommensurable, is expected to bring about *overlaps*. Those overlaps are the cornerstone for Mall's 'analogous hermeneutics.' It maintains that every culture produces philosophy, knows a form of aesthetic response, and exercises a form of hermeneutical interpretation, whereby the latter is geared to intra- and intercultural variations (Mall 2010). The attitude promoted here leads us back to Wittgenstein's juxtaposition of ethics and aesthetics. Like preconditions for any epistemological approach to the world, they demand self-restraint as well as self-assurance, thus inducing an attitude surely beneficial for every cross-cultural endeavor. However, because Mall's concept is aimed at philosophy in general and because the range of possible objects of study becomes broad enough to encompass whole traditions of thought, it cannot provide for a demarcation of aesthetics.

Although Wolfgang Welsch shares central premises with Mall, they differ in their justification and objective: while Mall naturally believes aesthetics to emerge from a reworking of philosophy, Welsch seeks to clarify the competences and limits of aesthetics. I cannot go into detail about the terminological negotiation between intercultural and *transcultural aesthetics* (Pacyna 2016). Instead I want to highlight how the diagnostic potential I mentioned at the beginning is implemented differently: while intercultural aesthetics is mindful of the moral need in contemporary scholarship, transcultural aesthetics represents the desideratum of a discipline that mirrors the ubiquitous presence of aesthetics in our lives. This is why Welsch promotes "aesthetics beyond aesthetics", draws on Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance to claim that the object of aesthetics is as wide as our use of the term, and considers findings from evolutionary theory and neuroscience as relevant evidence for the universal validity of aesthetics (Welsch 1997, 2012). Such an all-embracing approach is impressive, but its intense use of scientific justification and the transcultural perspective it insists on gives it an absolutizing note.

We do in fact find this note much more strongly expressed in *empirical aesthetics*. By this I am grouping several approaches which do not necessarily share the same ambitions, yet which rely on experiments and testing to *predict* aesthetics. Aesthetics becomes what it had been at the beginning of its academic career: *aísthēsis*, the science of sensual perception. At the Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, research takes its name literally. The results in accordance with MRI and MRT, questionnaire

evaluation, and statistics are indeed, as Wittgenstein remarks (LAPR III. 39), convincing. But this is partly achieved by the fact that non-professionals struggle to track their formation, wherefore results are broken down into aesthetically presented findings. When going back to Wittgenstein's consideration about the form of representation, one could doubt whether empirical aesthetics can truly predicate anything that exceeds the expressive resources of public discourse. Or, to tackle this issue from another angle: the crucial transfer happens when numerical facts are allocated to concepts developed by the philosophical discourse. In this case, the only way to safeguard this transfer is by having it reviewed by philosophy, linguistics and social sciences.

On the contrary, as Welsch exemplarily demonstrated, even philosophical aesthetics can only acceptably predicate anything if it consults the sciences. This very need for *mutual review* is the truth behind interdisciplinarity: it lies within the discipline, just as interculturality begins within a single culture.

5. Outlook: A way out of the deadlock via restraint and recognition

The reciprocity I just indicated leads me to summarize: Wittgenstein's challenge to *describe the actual aesthetic activity* has been realized in several variants: observing the language we use when expressing aesthetic appreciation, comparing aesthetic productions and reflections between cultures, or measuring our bodily reactions when exposed to an aesthetic object–all of these are legitimate interpretations. What they share, still, is a kind of *family resemblance* in their linkage to a tradition and in their obligation to coherence with the pertinent discourse, i.e. the *aesthetic language game*. Might it be a rare advantage of the postmodern loss of identity that it allows us to constitute a discipline of aesthetics without any stable constituent? Nevertheless, to make the family stick together, each variant will have to exercise *self-restraint and self-assurance,* which naturally implies *acknowledgement of the other*.

So as to ensure predicability, all three constituents of aesthetics must be subjected to critical aestheticiziation: Objects are historicized, questions contextualized and methods individualized so as to meet with the authentic individuality of subjects. Every predication will necessarily bear the double nature of aesthetics to be a predication (science) of an unstable object and to be (part of) a self-reflective discourse that over and again reveals its own bias. It will be valid exclusively by being *accepted*–just as Wittgenstein forecasted.

Still, showing how this new kind of assurance enables orientation is precisely what aesthetics, as the predestined discipline in a world of aestheticziation, ought to do.

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