1. Introduction

Bradley Armour-Garb and James A. Woodbridge, in *Pretense and Pathology,* make an ambitious and far-ranging case that philosophical fictionalism (particularly the pretence variety that they favour) illuminates several long-standing philosophical puzzles posed by words in ordinary language, such as ‘exist’, ‘true’ and ‘means that’, as well as the more technical, ‘refers to’, ‘proposition’ and ‘satisfies’. Along the way, Armour-Garb and Woodbridge discuss topics in the philosophy of language, philosophical logic, ontology, epistemology and more. An important aspect of their project is its nominalist aspiration: by showing (if they do) that pretence is involved when we use the foregoing terms, they hope to show that it’s false that these uses induce ontological commitments (to, e.g., propositions or properties). In this respect, their pretence approach is yet another attempt to undercut the family of indispensability arguments (pioneered by W.V.O. Quine) that prima facie force ontological commitments by means of indispensable language usage.

I cannot (of course) do full justice to their far-ranging discussion in the short space I have, but as with all thoughtful and ambitious work, there’s plenty for me to disagree with. I will, therefore, only evaluate three (although quite central) issues that their work faces. I’ll first raise a worry about whether their solution to what they call the ‘Engagement Complaint’ doesn’t in turn lead to a worse (or at least equally unsolvable) problem for their own approach. I’ll next raise a second worry about whether their cases of ‘semantic infelicity’ are genuine cases of such, and what resources they have to establish the presence of what they call ‘semantically infelicitous face-
value readings’ (7). And third, I’ll raise a ‘big picture’ issue about inference when involving both pretence and non-pretence discourse. This last concern bears not so much on the work they’ve done but on future work that (in my view) they need to do to support their pretence picture.

2. The Engagement Complaint

Our ordinary notion of pretence, and the way that Kendall Walton characterizes it in his very influential work2 (as well as similar notions, such as ‘make believe’), is primarily a psychological notion – in particular, it occurs centrally among the propositional attitudes we routinely attribute to cognitive agents. This means that the central way we understand pretence is as a distinctive family of psychological states that individuals are often in – and whom (when in these states) we routinely describe as ‘pretending’. There is also what’s natural to think of as completely derivative notions of pretence: these are the notions of an action of an individual being a pretence or an event that’s composed of a number of actions of individuals being a pretence – for example, when a theatrical play is described as a ‘pretence’. Here, the suggestion is that the acts or events are pretences in a derivative sense because those pretences are acts of individuals or events (composed of – in some sense – acts of one or more individuals), where what makes an act or event a ‘pretence’ is that the individual acting or the individuals participating in the event have the appropriate psychological attitudes. They are pretending.

This psychological interpretation of pretence does have a universally recognized caveat. Always allowed is that an individual (or many individuals) can be involved in a ‘pretence’ without knowing it. ‘It’s all a pretence’ can be (and often is – e.g. in movies) a frightening denouement about an event that one or more people are involved in. That the event is a pretence, however, is sustained by there being other individuals either knowingly engaged in the pretence or knowingly sponsoring it in some way – these are the people who are ‘fooling’ the ones who don’t realize they’re involved in a pretence.

Like many Gricean views of ordinary dialogue exchanges, this way of viewing pretence (as a species of conscious intentional action) induces empirical promissory notes. Gricean interpretations of dialogue forms, for example, at least prima facie require that certain psychological states are real – the possession of ‘communicative intentions’, for example: people have these intentions. There seems to be a similar requirement for pretence views: if we understand ‘pretence’ psychologically, we’re required to show that the individuals engaging in what we describe as a ‘pretence’ experience or intuit that they are pretending.

Armour-Garb and Woodbridge argue (quite cogently, in my view) that most (other) proponents of pretence approaches face this problem, either straightforwardly or because they don’t do enough to defang the requirement.

2 In Walton 1990 and elsewhere.
that agents engaging in a pretence are required to be aware that they are (at least in some empirically respectable sense). It seems to me that those (like myself) who resist pretence views resist it on just these grounds – individuals don’t experience themselves as pretending in all the many cases in which pretence theorists need them to be pretending. Armour-Garb and Woodbridge call this ‘the Engagement Complaint’ (hereafter, EC), and they target, specifically, a pragmatic approach to pretence (due to Kroon), as well as Walton’s pretence view of existence, Crimmins’s views and Yablo’s. They stress, in the case of Yablo, that he – correctly in their view – rejects EC; Yablo rejects, that is, any requirement on pretence views that the individuals engaged in a pretence be aware (in some sense) of that pretence. In their view, however, he doesn’t do enough to convince objective outsiders that he really avoids the requirement that pretenders know they’re pretending.

What needs to be done to avoid EC, according to Armour-Garb and Woodbridge, is a complete repudiation of any requirement of a recognition on the part of the participants in what are nevertheless pretences. According to them, ‘pretence’ occurs in the theoretical description of the linguistic behaviour of the pretenders – in the theoretical characterization of the semantics of their language. They claim that, therefore, there is no requirement on pretence views of linguistic behaviour that participants knowingly participate in pretence; their view is compatible, in fact (and they stress this), with participants sincerely denying that they are engaged in any pretence whatsoever.

Given that our ‘pretheoretical’ understanding of pretence is restricted to a psychological understanding of it (apart from the ‘being fooled’ caveat I described above), someone may be easily tempted to complain that Armour-Garb and Woodbridge are metaphorically stretching ‘pretence’ quite beyond our ability to understand why the resulting ‘pretence view’ is a pretence view. Armour-Garb and Woodbridge are (appropriately) very sensitive to this dangerous charge. Indeed, the first chapter (38 pages) is dedicated to making sharply drawn distinctions between genuine fictionalism, as an approach to philosophical theorizing that ‘must make some appeal to the notion of fiction’ (1) and, for example, the drawing of mere analogies of one’s view of a subject area with fiction. (They illustrate this distinction, with, among others, a denial of a claim some philosophers have made that van Fraassen’s approach to science is a fictionalist approach to science, instead of being merely analogous to fictional practices in certain ways.) Only when fiction (or fictional elements) genuinely plays a role in an approach to a philosophical subject area can that approach be described as fictionalist. This may strike some as ‘splitting hairs’, but I’m with them on this: the distinction is important.

Well, good. We can now certainly raise the same issue about Armour-Garb and Woodbridge’s own pretence approach. If it completely rejects a requirement of any psychological recognition of the participants in a pretence that
they are pretending, in what (reasonable) sense can their approach be described as a pretence approach?3

3. Pretence in semantics (according to Armour-Garb and Woodbridge)

The key to a ‘pretence’ approach being a genuine pretence approach in semantics is that significant elements of pretence must be involved in the posited semantic mechanisms. They demand, in particular, that all philosophical fictionalist accounts (19):

(i) are accounts of fragments of discourse;
(ii) hold that sentences from the target discourse would be semantically infelicitous, if given a face-value reading;
(iii) provide an account of linguistic functioning for the discourse involving semantic redirection away from what a face-value reading of the relevant sentences would underwrite;
(iv) apply the notion of fiction in the explanation of the semantic redirection effected in the linguistic functioning postulated for the sentences of the discourse.

The specific application (I presume) of their version of pretence fictionalism requires a rewrite of (iv) that is, ‘apply the notion of pretence . . .’.

But what does ‘apply the notion of pretence’ mean if no psychological recognition of pretending is required? This: significant devices first used (to my knowledge) by Walton – those of ‘props’, ‘principles of generation’ and so on-to study pretence, are employed in the semantic characterization of these locutions. That is:

(1) Certain locutions are singled out as ‘props’.
(2) Certain readings of these ‘props’ (or syntactic compositions of them) are described as ‘face-value’ ones, and described as ‘pretences’.
(3) Other readings of these ‘props’ (or syntactic compositions of them) are given by the semantics (and treated both as ‘semantic redirections’ and as involving ‘principles of generation’).

In particular, as in Walton’s approach, one may describe a face-value way $W_1$ of understanding a locution $L$ as a ‘pretence’, while a different reading $W_2$ supplied by the pretence semantics tells us what it is about the world (for example) that’s really being said by the use of $L$ that pretendedly is interpreted by $W_1$.

Why isn’t this a mere change of topic, the introduction of a new notion of ‘pretence’ that’s only somewhat related to the psychological notion of

3 The pretence theorist, it should be stressed, isn’t pretending to be offering a pretence theory or anything like that. That’s not how pretence is supposed to get into the machinery of the pretence theorist’s attribution of pretence to the behaviour of linguistic agents.
pretence that we all use the word (normally) to apply to? In fairness to Armour-Garb and Woodbridge, they have a rejoinder to this charge, which I’m going to accept for the purposes of argument (I don’t like it, actually, but never mind that). This is that these elements that Walton introduces into his analysis of pretence are essential to pretence. Their use in semantic theories, therefore, satisfies Armour-Garb and Woodbridge’s condition (iv) – mentioned above – that the notion of pretence be applied by an approach for that approach to be a pretence one. As I mentioned, these crucial pieces of apparatus in Walton’s characterization of pretence are (39) (i) props of some sort, (ii) stipulated pretences and (iii) principles of generation. The last are (39, italics theirs),

rules about how to take real-world conditions, typically involving the things serving as props in the game, along with various background pretences that the game stipulates – pretences that are expressly make-believe – in order to determine what else is to be pretended (or, as we will say, what further pretences are prescribed) in the game.

It should be noted that, although the pretended claims, when uttered, stand for real-world claims by virtue of the principles of generation, this isn’t always the case; sometimes pretended claims correspond to no real-world claims. Armour-Garb and Woodbridge distinguish cases along these lines: sometimes a locution characterizes a real-world condition (that we can recognize it’s characterizing by means of the principles of generation) and sometimes it doesn’t. For example, while cosplaying Star Trek, one might pretend to drop one’s phaser. The principles of generation might show (for this particular game) that the real-world event this corresponds to is one dropping one’s flashlight. That everyone in the game is a ‘member of the Federation’ might itself just be a pretended ‘fact’ corresponding to nothing real. That might just be something we pretend is the case without its having any consequences. They call this ‘worldly-content aspect of sentences’ ‘M-conditions’ (48).

4. An example

Here’s (pretty much) the pretence semantics that Armour-Garb and Woodbridge offer for a fragment of our ‘exist’ talk – it’s a fragment, of course, because they leave out, among other locutions, characterizations of quantifier expressions involving ‘exist’.

(E-I) The props for the game are: names, designation expressions and ‘exists’ and its cognates (for example, ‘is’, ‘has being’ and ‘subsists’). The following pretences are prescribed about these props,

4 I’ve condensed this. All the details that Armour-Garb and Woodbridge give can be found on pages 67–68.
(i) Every name or designation expression has a bearer.

(ii) ‘Exists’ is a genuinely descriptive predicate used to describe objects as having or lacking a property (‘existence’) that some things have and some things lack.

(E-II) \( \Pi n \text{(The pretences displayed in an utterance of } [n \text{ exists}] \text{ are prescribed iff } \exists x ([n]-\text{as-the-speaker-actually-understands-it has a singular-term long-arm conceptual\role, aspects of which content-\connect it somehow to } x) \).

(E-III) \( \Pi n \text{(The pretences displayed in an utterance of } [n \text{ does not exist}] \text{ are prescribed iff } \neg \exists x ([n]-\text{as-the-speaker-actually-understands-it has a singular-term long-arm conceptual role, aspects of which content-\connect it somehow to } x) \).

Notice that the props described in (E-I) are just the locutions (and syntactic constructions of such) that occur in any semantic theory. Conditions (i) and (ii), of course, don’t usually appear in a semantic theory; they codify the claims of Armour-Garb and Woodbridge that there are ‘face-value readings’ that are being semantically redirected. (E-II) and (E-III), however, should (apart from the jargon ‘prescribed’ and ‘pretences’) look like business-as-usual-semantics. Indeed, if ‘prescribed’ were replaced by ‘is true’, and ‘pretences’ were just dropped, we’d have a straightforward variant of a truth-conditional semantics for this restricted bit of discourse.

But this ought to be really upsetting because this strategy seems to make far too many semantic theories ‘pretence’ theories. Or, putting it another way, it seems far too easy to rewrite (primarily by the judicious insertion of words like ‘pretence’ and ‘prescribe’) most ordinary semantic theories as Armour-Garb-and-Woodbridge pretence theories. (The excluded semantic theories, actually, seem only to be the homophonic ones like: ‘John is running’, is true iff John is running.)

For consider. First, any semantic theory can be taken to utilize ‘props’ – ‘props’ so called are just the syntactic items described by all such theories. Second, the only restriction on ‘semantic redirection’ seems to be that there be a ‘face-value’ or appearance reading of the locution that the semantic theory doesn’t honour. On grounds like this, we can, for example, treat something as straightforward as Davidson’s (1977) theory of adverbial constructions as a pretence theory. This would be an ‘operational pretence’, in the sense that Armour-Garb and Woodbridge use it, that is, ‘an expression [is taken to perform] some linguistic job that, in fact, it does not perform’ (53).

In particular, certain words, ‘rapidly’, for example, pretend to perform an adverbial job that the Davidsonian semantic redirection shows they don’t perform. This trick is frighteningly generalizable, and as I show in the next section, can be applied quite beyond the kinds of semantic paraphrase common to semantic theories. It can be applied, in fact, whenever we can
label something a ‘prop’ and notice that there is something it does that isn’t what it appears to do.

5. A pretence theory of hallucination

Consider, for example, a pretence theory of hallucination. On those (unfortunate) days when I find myself hallucinating, I don’t think I’m engaged in a pretence. Furthermore, I don’t think I’m engaging in a pretence, regardless of whether I know or don’t know that I’m hallucinating. I never pretend to hallucinate – so I think – nor do I ever pretend to see things that aren’t there. Rather, I’m (unfortunately) just seeing things that aren’t there. This is what having hallucinations is. However, what I experience about my hallucinations, according to Armour-Garb and Woodbridge, doesn’t bear on the question of whether a pretence theory of hallucination is right. All that bears is whether such a theory can be constructed that applies the notion of pretence in the explanation of what corresponds to ‘semantic redirection’ in this case. So let’s do that.

Let’s start by characterizing my hallucinations as props. Then we can notice the pretence that’s prescribed: hallucinations are in space and time where they appear to be. (So the pretence here seems also to be an operational one in the sense that the items in question appear to be doing some visual job that they’re actually not doing.) And, of course, there are certainly real-world conditions that my seeing a hobbit (under such and such circumstances) corresponds to (namely, such-and-such neurological facts). So those are the M-conditions for my hallucinations (that the principles of generation yield). In short, everything is in place that’s required for a successful pretence theory of hallucination.

As I noted at the end of Section 4, this generalizes. As long as we have items of some sort that appear in some respect one way, but really are some other way, it seems that we can construct a theory of pretence for those items that’s fully in accord with the approach Armour-Garb and Woodbridge take. But then surely we need more constraints than the ones they give!5

6. Presumptive semantic infelicity

I turn to my second issue. Crucial to characterizing a semantic theory as a pretence approach is that there are ‘face-value’ prescribed interpretations of

5 But what further constraints are possible? ‘Props’ don’t have to be seen as props by participants – that’s why anything can be a prop. And as long as how the ‘props’ appear to be is different (in some way) from how they actually are, we’ve got a basis for introducing pretence according to Armour-Garb and Woodbridge. On the other hand, if we reintroduce psychological constraints, we’re trapped by the Engagement Complaint again – that’s why psychological constraints were dropped by Armour-Garb and Woodbridge in the first place.
locutions. In the example given in Section 3, conditions (E-Ii) and (E-Iii) prescribed the pretences that ‘every name or designation expression has a bearer and that “exists” is a genuinely descriptive predicate, used to describe objects as having or lacking a property (“existence”).’ How are these face-value interpretations recognized, and how is their semantic infelicity determined?

It can’t be that the face-value interpretations are given by whatever (in a semantic theory) corresponds to conditions (E-Ii) and (E-Iii). That would make the face-value interpretations purely stipulative. But, although both ‘Zeus’ and ‘Plato’ have the same grammatical role, these purely syntactic facts are insufficient to show that ‘Zeus’ has the face-value semantic interpretation of having a bearer rather than ‘Plato’ having the face-value semantic interpretation of not having a bearer. Apart from this, non-professional speakers have no problem using ‘Zeus’, and other non-referring words in all sorts of ways while remaining completely aware that these words don’t have bearers. They can wonder if Bigfoot exists – that is, they can wonder if ‘Bigfoot’ has a bearer; there seems to be no presumption in natural language that it, of course, does; consequently, there is no prima facie semantic infelicity to wondering if Bigfoot exists.6

For the same reasons, I find puzzling Armour-Garb and Woodbridge’s claim that a speaker, in saying that H2O and Water are identical, seems to be saying (according to a face-value interpretation) of two things that they’re one. No non-philosopher ever thinks this. Armour-Garb and Woodbridge (229) invoke the authority of the philosophers, Russell, Crimmins, Kroon and others, that ‘on a straightforward, literal reading of [identity sentences with, say, H2O and Water] the speaker appears to be saying of two things that they are just one thing’. Questions of authority aside, on what basis is this claim being made? Intuition? (Whose intuitions?) Syntax? Really? Two different names (face-value interpreted) refer to two different things? I can not only say that I don’t share these feelings about names, I can add that I’ve found it hard to get non-philosophers to feel this way as well. ‘I’m saying two things are identical even when I know they’re not?’ is the primary objection I hear about this. Non-philosophers are similarly unmoved by the mere grammatical fact that ‘Hesperus and Phosphorus are in fact identical’ contains a plural construction; that doesn’t suffice to elicit the intuition that the remark is ‘contradictory’ on the face of it. A similar claim, it seems, would reveal that the face-value interpretation of the French word ‘table’ is that it’s female. Again, I can only say: really?

6 Additionally, is it obvious that ‘exist’ has no descriptive content? That is, is it obvious that ‘exist’ is consequently semantically infelicitous? It isn’t obvious to me. What about the one or more many criteria for what exists that many philosophers have argued for (and thought natural)?
It’s worth noting that pragmatic approaches to pretence, such as Kroon’s, have at least an in-principle way of arguing for ‘face-value interpretations’: they can take these to be the interpretations of the locutions in question that are given by the semantics. In turn, there is (instead of a semantic redirection) a pragmatic redirection that alters the interpretation according to the intentions of the speaker. But this move isn’t open to Armour-Garb and Woodbridge. I can find no systematic discussion in their work of the reasons – principled or otherwise – that are behind their various choices for ‘face-value interpretations’. Once semantics is set aside as an option, and once it’s recognized that syntactic considerations are, strictly speaking, irrelevant, it’s hard to see what other reasons (reasons other than the sheer intuitions of the theorists) there are for determining the purported class of face-value interpretations.7

7. What’s the big picture here?

I’ll now raise an issue that, as far as I can tell, Armour-Garb and Woodbridge don’t address. (So what I’m going on to talk about isn’t, perhaps, an objection that I’m raising to anything in this book. It’s an issue for their next book.) Their project is to motivate pretence semantics as a useful way to solve a host of specific puzzles that certain locutions pose. In doing so, they naturally give restricted semantic theories for a number of fragments of discourse.

The issue is this. Inference, both in its narrowly deductive form, as well as in its confirmation-enhancing forms, is invariably language-wide in scope. Sentences, nearly enough, from any area of discourse, may be employed to deduce results. Related to this is that there are no restrictions on the vocabulary of either the premises of such inferences or their conclusions. Typically (notoriously so) is that, often, purely empirical results are deduced from a combination of both empirical assumptions and mathematical ones.

This phenomenon is hardly restricted to mathematics and empirical science. The reason is that our evidential practices can utilize (nearly enough) truths from any subject area. Even descriptions of the (sometimes quite silly) fictions we entertain one another with can prove evidentially valuable in psychology, sociology and the like. This means that transfictive descriptions of the characters in a story (that are regarded as pretence statements) may occur in inferences that show sociological results that themselves involve no pretence whatsoever.

7 I’ll add that I doubt that semantics – of any sort – can support many of the specific face-value interpretations for the terms that Armour-Garb and Woodbridge give. One reason is that these face-value interpretations often amount to (as their (E-li) does) ontological requirements, e.g. that names have bearers. But it’s disputable whether semantic theories are other than completely neutral on ontological questions. See Azzouni 2010: Ch. 5 for discussion.
I assume (but Armour-Garb and Woodbridge, to my knowledge, don’t explicitly say this one way or the other) that not all the sentences of our language are to be handled by pretence semantics. I assume this if only because some of our sentences surely don’t involve ‘face-value’ interpretations that are ‘semantically deviant’. (‘Semantic deviance’, after all, is a contrastive term.) Also, although Sections 4 and 5 raised the fear that Armour-Garb and Woodbridge’s pretence approach is far too generous in the semantic theories that it allows to be recalibrated as pretence theories, I couldn’t show this was true of every semantic theory. Those with homophonic truth conditions (generally, for straightforward indicatives like ‘John is human’ or ‘Mammals have bodies’) don’t seem open to their pretence approach.

But this raises an immediate issue: how are we to understand inferences when they involve both pretence and non-pretence sentences from which non-pretence conclusions are drawn? How are we to recognize that such inferences are valid? Consider the following example:8

Although there are detectives depicted as living in London in many short stories published prior to the 1930s, after that date no such character exists. Even Sherlock Holmes is depicted as living in New York in all the short stories published in the subsequent decades.

Both sentences involve pretence according to Armour-Garb and Woodbridge’s (E-I)–(E-III). However, it, along with several other empirical sociological generalizations, might yield the conclusion that, During the 1930s, New Yorkers had more discretionary income than Londoners.

Pretence sentences prescribe pretences (according to the pretence theorist); non-pretence sentences don’t. The literal content of a non-pretence sentence is simply its real-world content. A pretence sentence has as its real-world content (its M-conditions) only that content it’s deemed to have by the principles of generation given in the semantics for it.

If we draw an inference completely within a pretence, then, although the inference isn’t pretendedly drawn, the result is still a pretence sentence. But with the example inference I’ve given (and others like it), we don’t want the conclusion to be pretence; furthermore, we want to treat it like we do any other non-pretence sentences that we infer from non-pretence sentences. We don’t want, that is, pretence contagion; we don’t want pretence to infect the non-pretence sentences we draw as conclusions from pretence and non-pretence sentences.

It can only be the real-world content (the M-conditions) of the pretence sentences used that justifies these inferences. That is, the principles of generation must do this job. Consider an inference $A_1, A_2, P_1, P_2 \models C$, where $C$ is

8 This is modified from an example in Azzouni 2017: 114–15.
a non-pretence conclusion, $A_1$ and $A_2$ are non-pretence sentences, and $P_1$ and $P_2$ are pretence sentences. The conclusion C follows from these premises only if it follows from the premises, $A_1$, $A_2$, $P^*_1$, $P^*_2$, where $P^*_1$ and $P^*_2$ are the real-world contents of $P_1$ and $P_2$ (as determined by the principles of generation).

This places a powerful constraint on any pretence semantics: it must be shown to be compatible with the inference and representation practices *we already have in place* with respect to the sentences that the pretence theorist handles by pretence semantics. (In this sense, pretence semantics has to be conservative.) By ‘representation practices’, I mean the things we routinely say using the discourse targeted by the pretence theorist. (For example: the transfictive statements that arise in literary criticism and in sociology – see Azzouni 2010 for details.) By ‘inference practices’, I mean the routine inferences that are made on the basis of both the pretence-targeted discourse and the rest of our (non-pretence) discourse.

The above constraint is technical – it belongs to the soundness and Gödel completeness family of metalogical results; thus, it’s relatively nontrivial to show it’s satisfied, and, for that matter, it’s a highly nontrivial result when it can be shown at all. Indeed, certain pretence approaches have been *shown* to fail to satisfy it. What Armour-Garb and Woodbridge (2015: 34) call ‘prefix fictionalism’ (but what I would call ‘predicative intensionalism’) has been shown to *fail* to satisfy it pretty much because the position restricts what we can say in the targeted discourse to predicative intensional forms, namely sentences of the form, fictional prefix followed by content, $F \ldots c \ldots$ (e.g. $F \ldots (\exists x) \ldots x \ldots$). We need, however (for representational and inferential purposes), sentences that quantify into the scope of fictional prefixes, for example, $(\exists x) F \ldots x \ldots$ (see Azzouni 2017, 2012 for details on this).

Let me sum up my third concern this way. Any inference from a collection of pretence and non-pretence sentences to a non-pretence conclusion can only be valid on the basis of its M-conditions. Not every pretence sentence *has* M-conditions. Also, the M-conditions of any pretence sentence needn’t be obvious – this is especially the case with operational pretences where the syntax of the pretence sentences is different from the real-world content sentences. Because the syntax can change drastically, it needn’t be easy to show that the transcription of any proof to its ‘real-world’ correspondent is validity preserving. Armour-Garb and Woodbridge themselves stress that the real-world content of pretence statements can be quite hard to state and in certain cases, can’t be stated within ordinary language.9 Therefore, *there is no prima facie reason to think that the inferences that seem valid on the basis of ‘face*

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9 In their pretence analysis of truth-talk, the principles of generation help themselves to devices of substitutional quantification, and to infinite sentences, that aren’t in natural language at all. So the M-conditions are unstateable in natural languages. (See their 4.3.2 on this.)
value interpretations’ of sentences will be ratified as valid by their M-conditions. Indeed, there seem to be good reasons for thinking this generally isn’t the case; arbitrary semantic redirection can easily fail to respect existing logical implications. Thus, it’s required of the proponents of pretence semantics to show which inferences are licensed by the M-conditions of the discourse they apply pretence semantics to.

I’ll repeat: this is a substantial and interesting book. Its approach to pretence must be taken seriously. I have misgivings (as I’ve indicated) but that doesn’t diminish Armour-Garb and Woodbridge’s achievements.

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References

Pushing the Boundaries of Pretence

BY FREDERICK KROON

1. Pretendism

I’d like to express my pleasure at the invitation to comment on Brad Armour-Garb and James Woodbridge’s fine, carefully argued book Pretense and Pathology. I’d also like to thank John Woods for his commentary on the book, which neatly dovetails into some of the comments I want to make. For one thing, I want to borrow his phrase ‘pretendism’, which nicely captures the overarching philosophical position that Armour-Garb and Woodbridge (AGW for short) occupy. I also want to express sympathy with some of his doubts about AGW’s version of pretendism (but not too loudly since he is clearly sceptical of the entire Walton-inspired pretendist framework, and I am not).