

CHAPTER 3
ON THE ANALYTIC-
CONTINENTAL DIVIDE IN
PHILOSOPHY

NIETZSCHE'S LYING TRUTH,
HEIDEGGER'S SPEAKING LANGUAGE,
AND PHILOSOPHY

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It is the difference in the reply that can be made to the question, 'What is philosophy?' that constitutes the difference—and the divide—between analytic and Continental styles of thinking. For analytic purposes, philosophy may be defined, as Michael Dummett defines it in the *Origins of Analytic Philosophy*, in terms of "the belief, first, that a philosophical account of thought can be attained through a philosophical account of language, and, secondly, that a comprehensive account can only be so attained."¹ Like Dummett, Martin Heidegger too will define philosophy in terms of thought and of language, although conceiving both conceptions as intrinsically elusive rather than clearly available. In *What Is Called Thinking*, Heidegger reflects on the nature of thinking but declares, and repeatedly declares: "*Most thought-provoking is that we are still not thinking.*" And, as Heidegger admits, the claim that we are "still not thinking" seems annoyingly erroneous: "How dare anyone assert today that we are still not thinking, today when there is everywhere a lively and constantly more audible interest in philosophy, when almost everybody claims to know what philosophy is all about!"² For Heidegger, just as for Dummett, philos-

ophy is a matter of thinking; the difference is that for Heidegger, as also for Nietzsche, one cannot simply give an account of thinking: not only must we ask what thinking is, we have first to learn to think, which for Heidegger means we have to learn to listen, and he will even claim, learn to learn—and to let learn.³ In reference to language too,⁴ Heidegger is careful to remind us of the inherent ambiguity of what “plays with our speech”⁵ as language does: “We are moving on shifting ground, or, still better, on the billowing waters of an ocean” (p. 192). “Words,” for Heidegger, “are not terms, and thus are not like buckets and kegs from which we scoop a content that is not there. Words are wellsprings that must be found and dug up again and again, that easily cave in, but that at times also well up when least expected” (p. 130). Thus Heidegger can explain that “Thinking clears its way only by its own questioning advance. But this clearing of the way is curious. The way that is cleared does not remain behind, but is built into the next step, and is projected forward from it” (p. 172). Where Dummett advances propositions, Heidegger questions the logic of propositions and raises the question of what is called thinking as what withdraws, shifts, what wells up. Where Dummett can distinguish what belongs to the analytic nature of philosophy, Heidegger speaks of what differentiates thinking from what ordinarily passes for philosophy to remind us in a book addressed to the nature of thought itself that we are “still” not thinking. Evidently, there is a stylistic and indeed temperamental difference between the two approaches to the doing of philosophy even as an explication of the subject matter of philosophy. Temperament and style, however, do not exhaust the distinction to be made between analytic and Continental approaches to philosophy, for the distinction constitutes a divide: the parties in question are opposed one to another.

What makes (and breaks) Continental philosophy is its open embrace of philosophic questioning as questioning. This openness to sustained inquiry opposes “analyzing” (dissolving/resolving or eliminating/denying as unreal or as *pseudo*-problems) the perennially intractable questions of the philosophical tradition. Analytic philosophy, by contrast, features “a deflationary conception of philosophy—a conception according to which philosophical problems are pseudo-problems, problems to be dissolved not solved,”⁶ as John Skorupski

describes it in his contribution to a very slim volume entitled *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy*. The antithesis of such a smoothly, calculatedly understated attitude, Continental philosophy tends to intensify philosophic problems with its approach (resulting from Heidegger's passion for what he calls "thinking" as well as the kind of bombastic style one finds in Nietzsche or, latterly, Baudrillard.)

A consideration of the role of the philosophy of science (as conceived within these two traditions) highlights the methodological and stylistic distinction between the "deflationary" philosophic project of analytic philosophy and the convicted enthusiasm of Continental philosophy. To review this (superficially merely) temperamental distinction between analytic and Continental philosophy, it is important to note the role of science. Without specifically adverting to the influence of science on contemporary thought, analytic philosophy can be explicated just as Dummett explicates it above: as a matter of clarifying one's thinking and as thought is defined by language, analytic philosophy thus reduces to the analysis of language. What this definition omits, particularly as one encounters it in Dummett's defining discussion, is that the question of the cognitive referent is not to be decided by logical analysis but contemporary Western science. (And the timeliness of science's authority is important to emphasize for it excludes, say, out-of-date sciences such as those derived from the doctrine of signatures [homeopathy] or astrology [as Feyerabend teased], in addition to non-Western sciences like Ayurvedic medicine or acupuncture.) In this way, analytic philosophy stands to science as scholastic philosophy once did to theology.

Continental philosophy differs from analytic philosophy in its openness to questioning, which also means that it is less concerned with solutions than it is with critical questioning (including the question of its own presumptions or prejudices). But this focus on critical questioning also means, at least ideally, that Continental philosophy does not aspire to take its rational warrant from science itself as analytic philosophy does do.⁷ In this way, Edmund Husserl famously challenges scientific reason for the sake of the ideal of "scientific" or objective philosophy in his *Crisis*, and Heidegger notoriously observes that "science does not think,"⁸ and Friedrich Nietzsche bluntly overreaches his hand

as he identifies a particular brand of methodological “stupidity” as a prime characteristic of modern science.⁹ Intriguingly, albeit counterintuitively enough, Continental (rather than analytic) philosophy is thus positioned both critically and philosophically to raise the question of the nature of scientific inquiry.¹⁰

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: REGARDING A “DEFLATIONARY” APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

The story of the analytic mode of philosophy is currently being told by analysts from Michael Dummett and L. Jonathan Cohen to Ronald Giere and Alan Richardson to the more recent efforts of Michael Friedman.¹¹ In the Anglo-American context,¹² what is called analytic philosophy grew out of the so-called language philosophy that aspired to match the logically empiricist claims of the Vienna Circle (and its brand of logical positivism). It was this tradition, very much in the person of Rudolf Carnap and other refugees from fascism,¹³ that came to be poised against the vagaries (and the vagueness, especially the vagueness) of the historical tradition of philosophy and all it was associated with, notably Nietzsche and Heidegger, but it would also include Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and would eventually be deployed against Husserl who—given the commonalities between Husserl’s and Frege’s language or given Husserl’s epistemologically quite respectable interests—would have placed himself more in line with Frege than with Heidegger. The distinction would turn out to be ensured by the fortunes of world history following the end of the Second World War and determined by analytic philosophy’s subsequent accession to power as the putatively neo-Kantian program of deliberately redrawing philosophy in the image of science, or at least in the image of logical analysis.

Problems of philosophy would henceforth be resolved by linguistic clarification and logical analysis. In other words, to use Skorupski’s analytic contention: they would be “deflated” or unmasked as pseudo-problems. Any other philosophical approach would be misguided or erroneous, and in the light of the fortunes of the academy leading to the

institutional dominion of analytic philosophy: simply a bad way to do philosophy. Consequently enough, today's philosophic establishment prefers to refuse the distinction between philosophical kinds.¹⁴ Accordingly and from an analytic perspective, it is routine to argue that there is no such thing as a merely, sheerly stylistic divide between analytic and Continental philosophy. Instead, and again, one has only *good* and *bad* ways of doing philosophy. *Good* philosophy is well written, well formed and formulaic—or clearly argued and hence easy to understand (this ease of understanding counts for as much in the academy as it does on Madison Avenue and television programming), and that is, of course, a matter of clarity and of arguments, judged as such and articulated from an analytic viewpoint—which is also to say, with the late Quine and Davidson—from a logical point of view. *Bad* philosophy is thus anything that is not all that (i.e., every bit of what is counted as “good” philosophy) especially if it is reputed to be hard to read or understand. This is philosophy defined, as Nietzsche could have said it, for bad teeth.

What can be overlooked in this championing of clarity and simplicity is that the analytic tradition itself was institutionalized rather than vigorously argued into place. It was not a triumph of clarity which gained it the professional dominance it currently enjoys. Rather than the elegantly evolutionary culmination of philosophy as a kind of Copernican (or Galilean) revolution, analytic philosophy is a revolution of the ordinally Kuhnian kind: an exactly tactical program. Tracing the history of logical analysis shows this program in greater detail.¹⁵ In any case, and as some analysts might themselves concede, it was not inherently “clearer” to proceed as David Lewis or J.M.E. McTaggart would do rather than, say, to undertake to clarify ideology in terms of the Enlightenment project of reason in the manner of Adorno and Horkheimer, etc.¹⁶

The descriptive name of ‘analytic’ philosophy refers to language and to thought, the practical or evaluative assessment of arguments (as better and worse)—and hence it is a matter of truth and of approaching truth. This focus, as already noted, analytic philosophy shares with science. But the prime unifier between analytic philosophy and science is logic, and in the case of language, the deployment of logic corresponds

to a matter of formal clarity. The upshot of this formal idea has proven to be earth- (or at least tradition-) shattering: Eliminate ambiguity, and past problems in philosophy are revealed as so many bogus or "pseudo-problems."¹⁷ This leads to the almost unavoidable conclusion that with regard to what was once called *philosophia perennis*, analytic philosophy works by breaking down or literally dissolving the entire tradition of philosophy. And, following the model of science and at least seemingly following Kant's demand to set philosophy on the path of a science, analytic philosophy could at the very least promise to make headway in philosophy—as opposed to the traditional review of always the same set of problems with which philosophy had started.

In his careful precisions of the necessary extension of analytic philosophy beyond definitions that can be grounded in language—or in logic—L. Jonathan Cohen has recourse to what he calls "semantic ascent" (and semantic descent, as default). To do this, one needs to move, to use the language of the observation-correspondence rules-theory schema, from the word to the thing—especially hermeneutically ticklish when the "thing" is not an empirical object but a concept, convention, or use. Cohen characterizes the same aggressive trope of analytic philosophy in clearer terms than Skorupski's more quotable "deflationary approach," and in the process Cohen tracks this aggression back to its origins in the conflicts of the Vienna Circle itself.

... within the Vienna Circle, charges of meaninglessness were quite common in informal discussion, especially in the mouths of Schlick, Carnap and Waismann. It was not just that, by virtue of an argument about how meanings are taught, positivistic doctrines were ascribed a secure foundation in linguistic fact and metaphysical doctrines were rejected as nonsense because empirically unverifiable. Even positivistic colleagues could be accused of uttering meaningless sentences by a philosopher who was sufficiently convinced that his own views were the correct ones. After all, if you believe, as Ayer did, that all important philosophical propositions are analytic truths and that analytic truths are linguistic tautologies, then you must hold that any denial of your own philosophical thesis is a kind of nonsense, like something that is logically self-contradictory.¹⁸

For Cohen, and recalling the mathematical structure or essence of any axiomatic system, this kind of contentiousness could not be seriously maintained just because the thing about logic, as Carnap and Schlick could not but concede, was that there could be (and there are) more than one kind of logical system (or scheme). The compelling quality of this concession was the nod it gave to mathematics, including both set theory and geometry with its alternative metrics.¹⁹

PROGRAMATIC INTERLUDE

To explore the analytic side of the analytic-Continental divide, what follows offers a quasi-parodic challenge to the methodological program of analytic philosophy in a series of twenty-two paragraphs.²⁰ This (only in part) tongue-in-cheek provocation both reviews the historical fortunes of analytic philosophy and offers an object (or postmodern) illustration of the urgency of a critique of analytic philosophy by showing its inherent and hence incorrigible deficiencies as limitations operating both on the terms of Continental philosophy and on those of analytic philosophy itself (the analytic program has been consummately successful, which is why it is the dominant program and why it is redundant).

Following this moderately polemical exposition (for and in spite of the formative happenstance that the present author reads Nietzsche and hence knows what strong philosophical polemic can be, she hopes the reader will find a restrained voice throughout the helpfully numbered paragraphs *contra* analysis below), analytic philosophy's recurrent claim of a self-overcoming—which is offered less in terms of self-criticism than as an automatic affair of innate all-inclusiveness or comprehensiveness: analytic philosophy as *already* Continental, as *already* having done all the groundwork for an appropriation of Continental thought, etc.—will be examined in greater detail.

I address the nature of the differences inevitably to be found between analytic and Continental styles of philosophizing and discuss the matter not of a resolution of these differences but the question of the annexation of the philosophical themes of Continental philosophy

on the part of analytic philosophy—an annexation which, exactly because it is not dialogical or hermeneutical, ablates the distinction between styles altogether. And, finally and very briefly, I attempt to look at philosophy (as such) from a questioning or Continental perspective.

TWENTY-TWO PARAGRAPHS AGAINST ANALYSIS

1. The project of analytic style philosophy, whether the analytic frame be that of ordinary language or logic, is clarity. By clarity is meant clarity of expression. For Ludwig Wittgenstein, who coined the effective *Leitmotif* of analytic style philosophy in his *Tractatus*, “everything that can be put into words can be put clearly.”²¹ Thus, philosophy, “the critique of language,”²² is “the logical clarification of thoughts.” This clarity may be attained by definition (or fiat), but a clearly expressed proposition is, even if a statement of a problem, surely less mysterious than an unclear statement of the same perplexity. And just as the Greek origins of the word *analysis* can suggest and recalling Skorupski’s “deflationary” impetus, the point here is to reduce or dissolve philosophical problems.

1.1. Beyond an idealized articulative clarity, analytic style philosophy enjoys the streamlining images of two additional regulative ideals: intersubjectivity and verification. Intersubjectivity eliminates mysticism, esotericism, and private languages and inaugurates (as a solipsism writ as it were upon the world) the analytic problem of “other minds.” And by the simple expedient of bringing the “charwoman” or the “man in the street”—however quaint, however rhetorical in intent and practice—into the hallowed circle of Robert Boyle’s gentlemen observers and the noble assurance of objectivity, the intersubjective emphasis leads not to a circularity among elite subjects, but ordinary language philosophy instead.

1.2. For the second regulative ideal, as the question of the intersection between word and object, verification is an epistemological issue, an ontological question, and for analysts, a metaphysical quagmire. The

statement, "The meaning of a proposition is its method of verification" leads in its Tarskian formation to nothing else again but the ideal of clarity. With a thus impoverished empirical ideal of presumedly unproblematic reference (observation "sentences") there are propositional objects in the world of the analyst but only patterns or atoms of experience: pink patches—or pink ice cubes, a once-outré Sellarsism—or gruesome impressions.

2. The analytic ideal of the clarification of meaning is not only or ultimately a matter of the clarification of terms. Rather what is wanted is the reduction of problems, their revelation as pseudoproblems (non-problems). All problems that cannot be clearly stated are problematic statements.²³ Hence all problems that can be counted as such are analytic and hence lysible.

3. The success of analytic philosophy is intrinsically destructive. By definition, the philosophic project itself is repudiated in its ambitions, reduced to trivialities, and thereby overcome. This is why Wittgenstein's ideal involves disposing of the ladder (of analytic method) after reaching the heights of clarity.

4. By success is meant nothing more than the application or employment of analytic philosophy in practice. This is the triumph of use.

5. This is not true of all philosophic ventures (despite the Hegelian [both Hegel and the neo-Hegelian] inclination to assert the contrary). Hence the success of the Heideggerian project of the destruction of metaphysics does not equal or reduce to the destruction of Heidegger's project nor of metaphysics as such. Nor indeed does the success of the more notorious and more likely instance of deconstruction conduce to its own end. To the contrary.

6. At issue in the analytic project is the end of philosophy—taken in decidedly nonstructuralist guise. For analytic philosophy, all of metaphysics²⁴ together with the traditional problems of philosophy, is, as an accomplished and desired deed (*philosophia perennis confunditur*), already at an end and by definition (as meaningless or nonverifiable). What remains or is left over is to be resolved by analysis. Since traditional philosophy is set aside along with its perennial questions—these are philosophical questions disqualified as such because of their resistance

to analysis/resolution—an end is also made of the tradition of philosophy. In the place of the tradition we find science. Science, for its part, is an empirical enterprise, but devoted to clarity and committed to intersubjectivity (coherence or making sense) and the logical problem of verification appears to be the principle or fundamental concern of logical analysis or (analytic) philosophy of science. Hence the received view in the philosophy of science is developed in the analysis of theories in the hypothetico-deductive program.²⁵

7. Science is a suitable subject for analysis proximally because it is itself a body (theoretically expressed) of clearly stated propositions or claims that describe for language users (intersubjectivity), the structure of the world and are either true or false in that connection (verifiability). Science itself, it is said, is empirical analysis, a prime example of the productivity of analysis. Circularities would seem to abound here, as cannot be helped when tautology is one's stock in trade, but if they are not affirmed as they are in hermeneutic "circles," they nonetheless provide the advantage of certainty. As Philipp Frank, one of the founding members of the Vienna Circle, expressed the former virtue of scientific analyticity in a statement combining the insights of Mach with the Kantian conventions of Duhem, "the principles of pure science, of which the most important is the law of causality, are certain because they are only disguised definitions."²⁶

8. Empirical observation and experiment together with logical analysis is canonically held to decide the value of a claim or theory. Thus analytic philosophy of science has essentially been conducted within the spirit of the Vienna Circle. Despite Mach's "physicalism," the members of the Vienna Circle, in the words of one commentator, "wrote as though they believed science to be essentially a linguistic phenomenon."²⁷ This predilection for "language," be it ordinary or logical, together with a naive view of direct observation (i.e., observation sentences) means that the analytic concern of the philosophy of science has been restricted to the analysis of theory, in a word, the received view or hypothetico-deductive nomological ideal of science (theory).

8.1. Analytic statements are by definition tautologous and assert nothing about the world. This is their virtue and at the same time, this is their impotence. Empirical statements are what is wanted in science.

9. This focus on the elements of language—not Machian physical-physiological elements—dramatizes a rupture between language and world (the limits of language) which, as the essence of tautology or logical linguistic self-reference, is not problematic when what is analyzed is language use, the game, or its rules, but only when what is analyzed are empirical matters.

10. The sociohistorical turn in the philosophy of science, identified with, among others, the otherwise analytically sensitive Hanson, Kuhn, and Feyerabend, together with (and this is what must be seen to be decisive) the so-called strong program of the sociology of science (not knowledge) has yet to be accommodated in the philosophy of science. It is this that constitutes its continuing crisis. This crisis corresponds to its philosophical failure, a philosophical failure tied to the fundamental schizophrenia of its analytic origins. Despite a fascination with language, and thereby, in a kind of return of scholastic nominalism, with certainty and the idea of eliminating philosophical problems by the expedient of linguistic or logical clarification, a positive empirical reference remains relevant to science. This reference to empirical matters in the relevance of scientific practice is what analytic philosophers of science mean by naturalism.

11. Naturalism, which for Tom Sorell is itself a form of scientism,²⁸ is not philosophically distinguishable from the normative or analytic issues of verification or legitimation. The ultimate reference of the philosophy of science remains “natural” or actual science. As Rom Harré observes, as plainly as any analyst could wish, “the philosophy of science must be related to what scientists actually do, and how they actually think.”²⁹ The imperative to express such a relation to actual scientific practice derives not from ascendent realism but rather from the socio-historical turn that comes after the linguistic turn.

12. The sociohistorical turn seems unrelated to the analytic or linguistic turn. Yet the conviction held by philosophers of science from Carnap to Hempel to Suppe and beyond, that science is a formal, logical, or linguistic affair was not the result of a devotion to logic as such. Empiricism or positivism as it was understood by Auguste Comte—the first “positivist”—embraced a positive reference to facts. Thus Hacking recalls Comte’s ‘positivity’ as “ways to have a positive truth value, to be

up for grabs as true or false."³⁰ The ultimate appeal of Wittgenstein's logical program of linguistic therapy (analytic clarity), combined with Mach's physical critical-empiricism for the members of the Vienna Circle was in the celebration of and application to practical, actual science. Only in the era of the triumph of scientific reason would such an analytic program work as successfully and despite patent internal contradictions as long as it has without drawing undue attention to those same contradictions.

13. For even if the project of analytic philosophy had been shown to be bankrupt from a realist or empiricist or naturalist point of view, as long as science is associated with reason, and reason or rationality is equivalent to logical analysis, it will be analytic style which gives the imprimatur to proper philosophical approaches to the philosophy of science, no matter the actual success of analysis in offering an account or philosophy of science. For this reason, Rudolf Haller points out, talk of verification—an analytic specialty—works as a Popperian "*aqua fortis* for separating good and bad talk in science and philosophy."³¹ Analytic talk remains the dominant strategy of legitimacy and distinction in the demand for clarity and coherence. And it is fundamentally flawed, not just for the tastes of those who are not convinced of the salutary or edifying values of clarity and coherence, but according to its own rationalistic terms as well. For there is no obvious connection between deductive (or inductive or abductive) logic (or grammar or language) and the world. Assuming without the metaphysical faith of a Mach or the teasing leap of a Feyerabend such an elemental or obvious connection as axiomatic or given, the analyst ends up so preoccupied with refining his or her logical tools that he or she forgets having renounced contact with the world.

14. The history of scientific theory and experiment, popularly known as the "scientific revolution," is not the project of pure theory or metaphysical speculation. Instead, it is physical or "physicalist." It is the history of factual observation (controlled experiment) and theoretical explanation. For analysts, the former are to be expressed as empirical statements and, with the verification of such observations, converted into so-called protocol statements to which experimental or theoretical conclusions reduce now as theory with full-fledged propositional con-

tent. This is the ideal analytic recipe that guarantees scientific control (progress). This same program frees humanity from its (self- or deity-imposed) bonds of superstition and inhibition.

15. Yet it is just as clear from the reference to observation and experience that the history of experiment is also the history of power, manipulation, illusion. The project of experimental progress is, in short, that of the history of technology.

16. Separating the theoretical ideal of Newton's *hypothesis non fingo* from Boyle's celebration of neutral and observationally objective (subjectively independent or intersubjective) experiment is the tacit and practical rôle of evidence. This introduces the realist question of what evidence? evincing what? and the naturalist's but still more relevant sociologist's question of evidence obtained by and for whom? The issue of evidence is to be contrasted with theoretical truth. The last remains a matter of configured, what Nietzsche would name *fingirte*, hypotheses.

17. More than a conceptual net, one has an array of hypotheses and praxes, so that the infamous impotence of the *experimentum crucis* to decisively refute a scientific hypothesis or theory blinds one to the already given and far more pernicious matter of focal, selective choice. A given conceptual net is woven out of if not whatever we please surely what we happen to have on hand. Moreover, there is no way to imagine, beyond Duhem-Quine, as Davidson points out in his essay "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," that this or any other conceptual scheme represents the way things are (or are not).³² What once represented a psychological strategy, (proto-Peircean) quiescence of belief, *ataraxia*, or calming, Stoic equipollence, is today a feature of crisis. What works as therapy in one context is, as the ancient Greeks knew perhaps best of all, death in another.

18. More devastating than Duhem's instrumental critique of the use of experiment is that which follows from Mach's *Empiriokriticismus* and, in his view—a perspective shared by Polanyi, Hanson, and Fleck, and historically articulated by Kuhn—the ideal of a quasi-artistic invocation of research style and experimental tactic or technique or knack in the life of the researcher (also to be heard in Mach's conviction that experimental practice could not be taught—just as artistic talent is not

communicated by instruction). The notion of scientific schools, "invisible colleges," *Denkkollektiven*, knowledge communities, and so on, offer particular inspiration for sociological studies and observations.³³ The question of what, in Harré's words, "scientists actually do" remains the ultimate issue in a scientific era. It is this and the tracking of the question as a matter of a research discipline—not among philosophers, analytically or otherwise inclined, but scientists, albeit scientists of a social kind pursuing a discipline focused upon scientists themselves—which may be said to have added a kind of last straw to the woes of analytic philosophy.

19. Ultimately, the method of analysis is philosophically and scientifically impotent. Analysis has as it goes along, and this by its own rights, "less and less of what to analyze."³⁴ Note that reduction as such (the disgregational, dissolving, when not always dissolute gesture implied in the idea of analysis) was not opposed by Mach, who was, with Richard Avenarius, an enthusiast of the ideal of a scheme he imagined reflected in nature itself. But in spite of this latter realist (and here: metaphysical) resonance, Mach's ideal of *Denkökonomie* preserved its methodic function; it was a tactical, heuristic ideal, not an analytic end that simply reduced a problem to its linguistic, logical components and left it at that as if solved, whereupon one could, as it were, throw away the ladder. For Mach, everything could be reduced if one could assume, as he did and the Vienna Circle did not, that everything was convertibly elemental. The unified scheme of the received view of the philosophy of science reflected not Machian elements—constituting the physical, physiological, and psychological world—but observation sentences linked by correspondence rules to theorems, beginning and ending with units of logic/language. The world here is what is symbolizable, coordinative, resymbolizable: neither fact [*Tatsachen*] in the end (linked as facts are with theory) nor thing (whatever a thing may be).

DISCLAIMING ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Some might think it fair at this juncture to add the all-too-commonly heard disclaimer: analytic philosophy is far more advanced or sophisti-

cated than it once was. One no longer spends the whole of one's analytic philosophic energies analyzing (according to the exactitude and focus that is an irreducible part of such methodic precision) statements such as "The cat is on the mat," but one allows oneself the still unexhausted fit of fantasy indulged in by Tom Nagel who wondered "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" (with its predictable if not quite logical sequel: "The View From Nowhere"). Or, more appositely, one might follow the late David Lewis, who very charmingly begins his "Attitudes 'De Dicto' and 'De Se'" with the observation against expectations that is, ladies and gentlemen—just to be sure that you do not miss it—a joke, a piece of wit: "If I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat."³⁵ Of course, to the point of punning, the patter of little feet, not to mention the talk of expectations, refers, for speakers of ordinary idiomatic English, to children. The joke brings in Bruce the cat, and the reference to the cat takes us to the mat and the matter of reference. Lewis's observations are about Meinongian attitudes, which is to say (or to be read), as shorthand identification for psychologism (a bad thing) or intentionality (possibly a good thing, provided the intended intentionality is not that of the late Husserl but rather the early, now redeemed as the Frege-like and almost analytic Husserl). In this case the attitudes are explained as incomplete where such expectations may be diversely filled in divers houses (Lewis's specialty is possible worlds, so an array of possible houses is no strain for him). These attitudes then are best rendered, so Lewis, as having "propositional objects." We recall that for analysts, propositions are technical devices, having, as sentences do not always have, logical objects.

Note the utility of the style of this kind of talk for analytic purposes. It is because we may be expected to be concerned with what we mean by what we say (the charm of this concern is not least won from precisely that clean or neat reference and conceptual—if none too taxing—ideal of analytic clarity, which in turn consists in the play between notions of the expected and what is as such, in other words and in another sense, *de dicto* and *de se*) without at the same time and in fact *actually meaning* anything in particular by what we are saying that we are licensed to talk about cats, bats, and brains in vats. The result of this linguistic explosion of

deliberately irrelevant reference permits us for the first time, if also and admittedly only for the nonce, to consider meaning as such.

All of this can make for very entertaining reading (especially when it is David Lewis one is reading) but this appeal does not go very far—and this returns us once again to the problem at hand—with regard to the reference to the real world and when what is at stake matters as much as science does. It is then that the analytic style, tactic and schematic, runs into the proverbial ground and it does so without necessarily drawing attention to this fact among its practitioners.

The idea of going “to ground” or “seed” or better, with reference to analysis, the purer fantasy-ideal (and its curiouser ambition) of a “deflationary” approach to philosophy—whereby, as Bar-On notes above, the *successful* analyst finds himself at the end of the day with “less and less of what to analyze”—is manifest in the whimpering perpetuation of things as usual. This is the way the world ends in the face of everything: a heat death which Nietzsche, a famously nonanalytic philosopher, called nihilism.

And yet many argue that nary a practitioner of classically analytic philosophy, like a dyed-in-the-wool practitioner of the formerly received view in the philosophy of science, can be found on the books. The problem is (in the parlance of informal fallacies) a straw man. Analysis, it would seem, has long since been overcome. Against analytic philosophy as a limiting modality? Against method in the philosophy of science? Who—we might ask ourselves—isn't?

Indeed, quite some time ago now, a mainstream collection appeared with the title *Post-Analytic Philosophy*. Contributors (and putative post-analysts) included Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, Tom Nagel, Donald Davidson, Thomas Kuhn, all of whom were (and still are) said to have—and were accordingly lionized for their intellectual integrity for having done so—abjured analytic philosophy (and all its works). Yet it is evident enough, where what matters on the terms of analysis itself is style, analytic style and precisely not—such is the formal ideal—substance or content, that no one of the above is, in fact, anywhere near postanalytic and certainly none are what one would call “Continental.” You can be an anti-analytic philosopher, after all, as Rorty is, without turning into a “Continental philosopher.”³⁶ It is important to note that one can perse-

vere in one's allegiance to the analytic ideal and remain an analyst without the analytic program—and this is an essential survival strategy when its traditional adherents (Putnam, Nagel, Davidson) concede the flaws of the program.

Such a righteous confidence is characteristic of established power elites and a typical retort (“argument”) to a critique such as the foregoing need do no more than dispute the given definition. Thus one notes: X is averred (analysis is X). But, one counters to the contrary, analytic philosophy is in fact also $\neg X$. Thus analytic philosophy (X) is also some other thing $\neg X$ (“X” includes its opposite) and to avoid contradiction, this becomes a matter of scope.³⁷

These are analytic tactics: they sidestep the question, shifting debate to formal (analytic) grounds and they do so in perfectly good conscience (albeit perhaps not in perfect good faith). Like talk of “postmodern” philosophy of science (let alone postmodern science), talk of the end of philosophy, especially of analytic philosophy, is a piece of Francis Fukayama-style overkill. For even if, politically and otherwise, these are lively times we live in at the beginning of this new century, if we are ideologically bound, at least by popular convention, to be pluralistic, to be open to new ideas, to different perspectives on east-west, and to other ideologies, and if we are therefore, whether we like it or not, living in a “postmodern” world, it nonetheless remains the case that neither Richard Rorty and certainly not Jacques Derrida, nor the unnamed demon of irrelevance, irrationalism, or relativism have genuine influence in analytic philosophy. Nor are specialists in “irrationalism” (read: Continental-aka-hermeneutic-style philosophy)³⁸ recruited at the university level for whatever few positions there are in philosophy. The dominant departments remain analytic, and when they recruit, even for historical positions specified as dealing with more or less Continental thinkers (e.g., Husserl, hardly ever Heidegger, never exactly Nietzsche), recruit either newly minted or else retreat analysts (United Kingdom phenomenologists or German-trained analysts—the last being even more fun than the former). And if (of all philosophical subdisciplines) the philosophy of science is not nonanalytic, neither can it be said that the philosophy of science is postmodern (either “already” much less, let's be real: *in nuce*).

THE ANALYTIC-CONTINENTAL DIVIDE: A DEBATE ON DIFFERENCE AND THE QUESTION OF ANNEXATION

I have maintained that there *is* a difference between analytic and Continental approaches to philosophy, not only because it is obvious and not only because as a professor of philosophy I live on the terms of a profession dominated by this noisome distinction, but because the claim that there is no such distinctive divide is politically manipulative. Claiming there is no analytic-Continental divide is an important step in the analytic appropriation of the mantle (not the substance) of Continental philosophy. Why should the analysts want to appropriate the themes of Continental philosophy? The short answer is that analytic philosophy has exhausted itself; the extended and more interesting answer is because Continental philosophy is sexy: the grad students want it!

The difference between so-called analytic and so-called Continental styles of philosophy is a contentious matter of ideology and taste—"deflating questions" as opposed to reflecting on what is question-worthy, as Heidegger would say, in a question. This difference also refers to one's scholarly formation (the depth and breadth of the same, or calculated lack thereof), and it is a matter of definition. Thus, disputes that dissolve the difference (going in the presumably brave new direction of "just doing good work," or speaking only of "good"—and by neat exclusion "bad"—philosophy) reinstate in a rather more insidious and value-laden way the same distinction. Yet the advantage of denying any difference between modalities of philosophy is considerable, because once the denial is in place, Continental-style philosophy can be dismissed as bad or even as "just not" philosophy. This is needed both to justify one's inattention to the work done by scholars working in the contemporary tradition of Continental philosophy and, even more important, because analytic philosophy wants to try its hand at themes formerly left to Continental modes of thought. And such an annexation is securely under way. In addition to self-propounded and blatantly self-serving Internet-posted claims³⁹ that analytic schools offer students the best opportunities for studying Continental philosophy, there are established analytic traditions of interpreting (or criticizing) Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas, or Foucault.⁴⁰

What, for example, does it mean to say that a thinker like Nietzsche is already taught within the analytic tradition, as he has been, beginning with Arthur Danto and Bernd Magnus and continuing with Maudemarie Clark, Solomon/Schacht, and most recently, Robert Gooding-Williams? How can this work? Does one generate another "New" Nietzsche, on the model of reading Nietzsche through the lens of French and German thought?⁴¹ The answer to the narrower question here, is *prima facie* no, because to read a so-called Continental philosopher on the terms of analytic philosophy is exactly not to read him with a Continental lens—contra Leiter's opposed conviction on the matter. To answer the broader, more appropriative question, we recall that the ideal of clarity, which ideal presupposes a fundamental equality between styles of philosophical expression, typically excludes all but a certain kind of philosophy. It assumes there is only analytic philosophy and that is just what philosophy is. Hence, the ruling discourse—today and for the greater part of the last century—remains scientifically oriented or analytic philosophy. Within this discourse, that is, for the majority of professional philosophic thinkers, a philosopher like Nietzsche is condemned because what he writes contradicts not only his own claims (a cardinal offense from a logically analytic point of view) but more grievously still, the claims of philosophy itself. If, from its earliest beginnings, philosophy is traditionally conceived in didactic contrast with popular thought, the philosophic project also challenges itself. Nietzsche's critical philosophy does the same and it also undermines the means of philosophic challenge *per se*: questioning the tools of clear, logical thinking and rational argument by questioning nothing less than logic together with the very epistemological utility of language.

Nietzsche's philosophical achievement thus resists ordering in the received historical canon of philosophy, and throughout more than a century since his death, his writings have proven to be remarkably resistant to traditional comprehension. It turns out to be impossible to "translate" Nietzsche into ordinary language philosophy, as it were, although the analytic philosophic reception of his thought has sought to do exactly that. Apart from a sovereign failure to discuss Nietzsche or to conceive his contribution on a par with other philosophers (a failing as evident in "serious" German as well as in French or English-language

professional philosophical contexts), like the salacious aspects Nietzsche detected within the supposedly scientific basis of pragmatic world calculi, the then-equivalent to what today's scientists could regard as genomic or mitochondrial altruism (cf. the first section of *On the Genealogy of Morals*), Nietzsche's name is mostly used to add a "bit of spice."⁴² And if Nietzsche tends to be reduced to a philosopher of moral outrage and artistic excess among the majority of scholars specializing in his thought, Nietzsche's theory of truth and his concern with science seems tendentious at best.

Hence of all the things Nietzsche is famous for, his critique of truth has been his greatest liability, laying him open to the gleeful sophomoric refutation that, because Nietzsche claims there is no truth and as this proclamation itself claims truth, Nietzsche contradicts himself. A version of this exposé makes an appearance in almost every discussion of Nietzsche's theory of truth as a problem the interpretation first solemnly concedes and then offers to correct, or else, failing to find a way out of self-contradiction, to excuse for the sake of his moral or artistic or cultural insights. Nietzsche is much better known as the philosopher of nihilism, a radical new morality, prophet of the death of God, teacher of psychology as the royal road not to the Socratic legacy of the problem of good and evil in the human heart but to the unconscious of philosophy, that is exactly not scientific (i.e., neither psychoanalytic nor cognitive) psychology but observational, popular, and populist psychologizing; and most notoriously, as the philosopher of fascist power. The last thing Nietzsche's torrential style of philosophy wins praise for is its contribution to a philosophic understanding of the Western enterprise of science or truth.

Nevertheless, a number of books and essays treat exactly Nietzsche's "problem" of truth, in addition to my own (rather uncompromisingly Continental) studies discussing Nietzsche's epistemology and philosophy of science.⁴³ And rather than reflecting a development intrinsic to Continental philosophy, the growing interest in the question of Nietzsche and truth stems from analytic philosophy.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, and regrettably, such an analytic interest in Nietzsche's theory of truth builds nothing like a "bridge"⁴⁵ between Continental and analytic philosophy.⁴⁶

Thus, however intrinsically valuable, the increase in analytic interest in (not only Nietzsche but other traditionally named) “Continental” philosophers indicates nothing like a Continental turn within analytic philosophy—it is annexation without responsibility and without the rigors of a genuinely historical, authentically interpretive move. Nor is it a particular blessing in the case of Nietzsche studies because analytic philosophers typically take only as much as they can “stand” from Nietzsche, not puzzling over but instead (this is the classic analytic tactic) dismissing the rest as unsupportable, while maintaining that Nietzsche (had he sufficient sense—as he manifestly had not, hence the counterfactually rhetorical success of this claim) would have done so as well. But to test Nietzsche’s philosophy, not on his own complicated terms, but on the standards of logical exigence or the received discourses of the day leaves Nietzsche lacking (as it hamstringing Adorno, and Heidegger, and so many others, albeit in different ways, as varieties of so many different kinds of *Tödtuchweigerer*).

Beyond questions concerning the political tactic of appropriating a popular figure or movement (endemic as it is to the rhetorical advance and practice of power), I think it worthwhile to examine the reasons contemporary scholars who take themselves to be Continental are not concerned with Nietzsche’s critique of truth or theories of knowledge, but instead focus on Nietzsche’s aesthetics, his (anti) feminism, his (anti) theology, his (anti) political thinking. Contrary to what I have said about the legacy of Continental thought as it can be found in Heidegger and others, today’s Continental philosophy echoes the mainstream (and analytic) approach to Nietzsche’s thinking while sidestepping any reference that would cause it to raise epistemological questions in Nietzsche.

Constituted within the institutional bearing of the analytic tradition—from Europe to the United Kingdom to America and across the globe, including contemporary Germany and France—Continental philosophy increasingly reflects exactly the values and interests analytic philosophy relegates to it.⁴⁷ Analytic philosophy thus defines its language, its standards of rigor, its focal approach, its *style* as uniquely valid for crucial questions in philosophy.⁴⁸ This value idea refers to the approbation of good or quality (valid and valuable) work in philosophy. It is the difference between good (or clear) writing and what one wishes to condemn as

obscure (*not* transparent to the reading mind, *not* available in advance of a text to be read or discussed).⁴⁹ But at issue is a single question of style. Where analytic philosophy is the only game or stylistic scheme in town, its approach rules in the academy (which is, in our culture, increasingly the only surviving locus of philosophy)⁵⁰ and analytic philosophy collapses everything within its definitional, conceptual worldview, ken, or to use Nietzschean terms: perspective or conviction, prejudice or optic.

In a number of ways, the analytic reading of Nietzsche's philosophy reducing its importance to so-called value thinking thus crosses analytic and Continental boundaries.⁵¹ In the larger tradition of philosophy apart from Nietzsche, ethical, cultural, and sociopolitical, and, above all, theological questions are treated as subsequent to logic and apart from the theory of knowledge and philosophy of science.⁵² The problem is that this way of reading Nietzsche ineluctably overlooks or disregards what is most of philosophical value in Nietzsche. Contra analytic appropriations and critical corrections of Nietzsche's epistemological thinking and also exactly contra the majority of "Continental" appropriations, the notion of "truth and lie" is not to be reduced to the question of morality for Nietzsche, but rather the other way around. Nietzsche is much less the moral or ethical or cultural-political philosopher he is thought to be, than he is preoccupied (from start to finish and in the most rigorously scientific manner he knew) with the question of knowledge and truth. The moral problem of science for Nietzsche is that science (*scientia* or knowing) itself sets the standard for all accounts of scientific theory, practice, and progress. Like religion—and every other invention of the ascetic ideal—science cannot be questioned on terms other than its own.⁵³

For Nietzsche, the assumption that drives such compartmentalization is the key "conviction" or prejudice of the philosopher. In its current expression, this philosophic prejudice holds that philosophic questions on moral, political, cultural, theological, and rhetorical or philological issues are *secondary* issues ("values") and, so ordered, can be regarded as being without epistemological consequence. Such diverse and "soft" questions have no relevance for the philosophic questions of truth or epistemology and nothing to do with the "fact" or philosophy of science. The separation of issues of philosophic inquiry and the ideal estimation

of "significance" reflects the convictions of the philosophic tradition, analytic and otherwise.⁵⁴ It assumes a hierarchy between these separate issues (philosophy of truth is higher than moral or value philosophy) and it is the very core of what Nietzsche named "*the problem of science*" as a problem.⁵⁵

Although the Continental approach has nearly abandoned its own heritage by taking over its definition from analytic quarters, it can be argued that it is still possible for it to draw upon the basic historico-hermeneutic prerequisites for advertent to what Nietzsche has to offer in all its manifold philosophical complexity. This is important because, as Nietzsche wrote in a late draft note on the aphorisms prefacing his *Twilight of the Idols*, "Everything that is simple [*einfach*] is just plain imaginary, it is not 'true.'"⁵⁶ "Rather," Nietzsche observed favoring complexity in spite of its logical inconvenience, precisely as such complexity is relevant to science and its claims about the world: "What is actual, what is true, is neither One nor yet to be reduced to One."⁵⁷

Such an interest in complexity is the heart of Nietzsche's epistemology. Rather than simplicity, inspired by the sensibility of an Ockham or the very different operational concerns of a Quine, Nietzsche contends that getting at the truth of the world is the effort to articulate the unspeakably complicated.⁵⁸ Where Continental readings such as those of Heidegger or Löwith or Deleuze or Klossowski embrace and intensify the complexity of Nietzsche's thought, analytic readings by contrast, especially those concerned with Nietzsche's account of truth, simplify or clarify what Nietzsche meant, or else they propose to tell us—according to the title of one demystifying recent (stolidly deflationary) book—"What Nietzsche *Really* Said."

Even in the absence of a simple or straightforward bridge between analytic and Continental perspectives, the task of reading Nietzsche in terms of his relevance to truth and the project of knowing (including exactly scientific knowing) echoes across the philosophic differences and sensibilities constituting the analytic-Continental divide. In this esoteric/exoteric sense, it may be said that Nietzsche's thought persists as a kind of conceptual dynamite interior to philosophy, both Continental and analytic.

FROM NIETZSCHE'S COMPLEX TRUTH (AND LIE) TO HEIDEGGER'S TALK OF LANGUAGE AS SPEECH

In most defining accounts of analytic philosophy, the “deflationary” approach to philosophy as it was described at the start is evident, as is a relative nastiness vis-à-vis Continental approaches to philosophy. Thus one author contrives this demarcationalist definition: “If the term analytic philosophy is to be a useful classificatory term, it must do more work than merely to distinguish mainstream Western philosophy from the reflections of philosophical sages or prophets, such as Pascal or Nietzsche, and from the obscurities of speculative metaphysicians, such as Hegel, Bradley or Heidegger.”⁵⁹ This stolidly polemical move sidelines Nietzsche as a prophet (along with a no less religious thinker than Pascal) and calumniates the Heidegger who constantly refused the metaphysical label.

It is not the case that Continental philosophy is not concerned with language. It is. What it is not concerned with is logical analysis—and it seems to invite reflection on obscurity. Thus Heidegger can write, “Language speaks by saying, this is, by showing. What is said wells up from the formerly spoken and so far still unspoken saying which pervades the design of language. Language speaks in that it, as showing, reaching into all regions of presences, summons from them whatever is present to appear and to fade.”⁶⁰

Heidegger is not unaware that this style of writing leaves him open to the charge of unclarity, and he quite plainly adverts to his own reductive style: “Language itself is language. The understanding that is schooled in logic, thinking of everything in terms of calculation and hence usually overbearing, calls this proposition an empty tautology. Merely to say the identical thing twice—language is language—how is that supposed to get us anywhere?”⁶¹ Heidegger answers this critical question by affirming that progress is exactly *not* his goal: “But we do not want to get anywhere.”⁶² For Heidegger, the passion for novelty and the latest discoveries are distracting tendencies of the modern era and irrelevant to thought itself, especially to philosophy.⁶³ Heidegger was an indefatigable advocate of the impracticability—the uselessness—of

philosophy, but he was so for a very provocative reason: "Granted that we cannot do anything with philosophy, might not philosophy, if we concern ourselves with it, do something *with us*?"⁶⁴ This is an extraordinary query: it has something of that element which catches one up in considering the nature of philosophy and in thinking about thinking itself, particularly the kind of thinking concerning life.

Hannah Arendt recalls the rumor of Heidegger's "kingship among teachers." What she (and her fellow students) meant by such an expression reflected the excitement of thinking as a radically new and creative engagement with what invites reflection ("calls for thinking") and it was expressed as an invitation: "One can perhaps learn to think."⁶⁵ In Arendt's expression, "the rumor regarding Heidegger's kingship among teachers was simply this: the cultural treasures of the past, believed to be dead, are being made to speak, in the course of which it turns out that they propose things altogether different than what had been thought."⁶⁶

Arendt's reflections on the chance to learn to think as a possibility still reserved for us today, recollects what Heidegger had to say about philosophy:

To philosophize is to inquire into the *extra*-ordinary. But because as we have just suggested, this questioning recoils upon itself, not only what is asked after is extraordinary but also the asking itself. In other words: this questioning does not lie along the way so that one day, unexpectedly, we collide with it. Nor is it part of everyday life: there is no requirement or regulation that forces us into it: it gratifies no urgent or prevailing need. The questioning is "out of order." It is entirely voluntary, based wholly and uniquely on the mystery of freedom, on what we have called the leap. The same Nietzsche said "Philosophy . . . is a living amid ice and mountain heights." To philosophize we may now say, is an extra-ordinary inquiry into the extra-ordinary.⁶⁷

Thinking thus is above all *not* about making progress and for Heidegger, philosophy was anything but a matter of "solving problems," in Karl Popper's influential (and very positivist) definition of it. Thinking philosophically, to be distinguished for Heidegger from thinking practically or from scientifically involved questioning, exemplifies ques-

tioning as a search for understanding rather than as a search for an answer. Philosophy for Heidegger remains where it has its origin: in astonishment. Rather than killing or blunting it with pat answers, however coherent, however clear, philosophy keeps that wonder alive in us.

Although the subject matters of Continental and analytic approaches to philosophy may seem similar, their stylistic approaches differ and what they ask about is likewise different. Continental philosophy, in its many variations, and despite its recent weakening as it defers to the dominant perspective of analytic philosophy, attempts to keep the meaning of philosophy as the love of wisdom always within its purview. The pursuit of wisdom is all about meaning as it is understood by living beings. Thus the object of philosophy is often said to be the meaning of life. Analytic philosophy concerned with moral issues seeks to articulate rules and methods to resolve problems. Continental approaches to such moral questions—such as that exemplified in Nietzsche's genealogical critique of morality—emphasize the paradoxes of such issues so that even seemingly simple terms like good (even meaning I approve of this—in the simplified analysis of good) become fraught with self-interest and self-aggrandizement, and what hitherto seemed to embody altruistic motives is revealed instead as selfish and as opposed to altruism, and yet just this self-interest is revealed as the essence of altruistic behavior.

In addition to its more robust characterization of the subject of philosophy—concerning life- and human-meaning, born out of history, imbued with value, and limited by the contingencies of its own cultural and historical horizon, etc.—Continental philosophy also has a markedly different view of language. For Continental thinkers, language is inseparable from rhetoric, metaphor, context, history, and, again, life. There is, to quote Nietzsche's amusing statement of this limitation in *Daybreak*, no place for us to stand to take a look at the world as it would appear to us if we *did not* carry around these all-too-human heads. There is no way to afford ourselves the dream fantasm of a disembodied, utterly objective "view from nowhere," nor can we pretend to a god's-eye view. For the Continental thinker, the ideal of objectivity is correlate to the subject's own perspective. Hence the objective is the subjective: the perspective of the object as regarded from the point of view of the subject.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

The great disadvantage of dissolving the academic discipline with which you are engaged is that you eventually end up with nothing to think or talk about. This is the great danger of modeling one's profession on the ideal of the sciences, which themselves aim, eventually or "in theory," to explain everything. That is the ambition to know, in Stephen Hawking's unnervingly unsophisticated expression of the aim of science: "the mind of God." Trivially, for the philosopher, this is to talk oneself out of a job (this is more than merely cognitive redundancy) and to renounce philosophy—not, to be sure, as the Bible denounced philosophy in favor of the true knowledge of the Lord, but as a confining vessel of past mistakes, from which one has now, as a very clever fly, at last mapped an accurate flightpath carrying one out of the bottle and out of the game.

More seriously, and more reprehensibly, it is clear that to be able to resolve the problems of philosophy—the possibility of knowing the mind of God—does not necessarily mean that everything then makes sense. This is because what makes sense can do so only within a particular conceptual or cognitive scheme (and this is as true for Davidson or MacIntyre as it is for Nietzsche). One can explain what death is without being able to explain why a particular individual dies, much less being able to explain why some mortal beings happen to die, as all of them do, at one time rather than another: the contingent—the individual—eludes such comprehension. Beyond the question of the day and the hour is the question of the meaning of death which, for its part, is tied to the question of the meaning of life: in what way does the manner of our death punctuate our lives? Does it make a difference if we die at our own hands, whether in a suicide of impetuous youth or the practical choice of euthanasia for a latter management of pain and debility? If we die at a stranger's hand? If we die of cancer caused by a carcinogen disseminated from a local manufacturing plant or omnipresent in food, but differentially affecting human subjects, so that cancer is only a reaction in some of those individuals exposed to the same agent? If we die of a cancer we carry in our blood line? If we thin the ozone layer to the point that we die of cancer caused by irradiation?

If we bomb ourselves to death? And what does death mean for the one still living: does one simply live on in an absence or is it not much rather that the absence marks the life of the living, so that a kind of presence yet remains? What is the meaning of death?

What is the meaning of love? Analytic philosophers who write on this topic—and there are far more who do so than one would have supposed, even limiting suppositions to their own account of themselves and of their lives—generate very lengthy tomes about love.⁶⁸ In such treatments, love is typically redescribed and requalified to death. This is especially so, because the one thing such analysts do not begin to inquire about is the *nature* of love. Instead, what is taken to be love is what everyone already knows or, more commonly, what the author presumes he knows about love, redefined or redescribed: analyzed. But not everyone knows what love is; however, this suggestion would surprise our analysts, much less how to love (Nietzsche maintained that one needed to *learn* how to love just to start). But what is love? What is abundance and generosity? Forbearance and gratitude? Is love different, as Aristotle thought, for a child or a parent, a man or a woman, a beautiful friend, a clever companion? To begin to ask about love requires all the unclarity and all the paradox of love itself, which Gillian Rose, at the end of a life inspired by pain and the prospect of her own too-soon and all-too-knowable death, called the “work” of love. If one produces a definition of love that fails to capture that paradoxical elusive essence, one will not have begun even to think of love, much less to offer a philosophical account of it.⁶⁹

When Heidegger raises the question of death in his reflections on the limitations and ultimate possibilities of human being as circumscribed not by thought but the dynamic contours of time, the question of such a “being unto death” reflects not morbidity but life. And what is the meaning of God? What do we mean by speaking of a being defined as utterly beyond human comprehension? Can we think of God? What do we think of when we think we do? How can we know something we cannot know? Can we conceive a divinity, a being greater than which is not to be imagined, an infinite, omnipotent, self-caused creator of the world and everything in it? Or is our monotheistic thought of God, as Nietzsche wondered if it might be, nothing

more than a de-deification of a god-filled world, a “monotono-theism”⁷⁰—as Nietzsche named it—little better than, and more than half way to the disenchanting universe of a science bent on replacing divinity with a singularity at the beginning: the big bang as the boy scientist’s idea of God. The rationalistic justification of atheism, however, is itself only another kind of “better knowing.” As Nietzsche would say, the claim to know and the claim not to know are both overweening claims, presuming in each case to know too much.

And what does the question of God tell us about ourselves, if God is only our own all-too-Freudian illusion? Far more significantly, what do we learn about ourselves, as Nietzsche asks us to reflect, when we recall that it was we ourselves who killed God in the first place? And the question of freedom, tied to the question of self or the subject, who is it that speaks whenever one speaks? One is not transparent to oneself, one has no more certain knowledge of oneself than one has of the universe, of the past or the future. If one wills one’s subjugation is one less or no less subject? If there are unconscious motivations, if we are beings whose thoughts are manifestations of brain and body functions, what can be said of freedom? What is an illusion, what is truth? what is lie? Nietzsche, who began to raise questions of this kind, as we have seen, reaped a harvest of contradictions in his philosophy—but more insights into the nature of truth and indeed of human beings who use language to think about truth than many other, more sanguine and clear philosophers.

To questions like these, and certainly to ones far better framed, analytic philosophers have answers, rather a lot of them, carefully repeated in the literature. For their part (and this should be kept in mind when reading authors like Heidegger and Nietzsche), Continental philosophers tend less to answer or conclude inquiry than to compound their own (and our responding) questions—adverting to ambiguity, unclarity, complexity, and all the detail that ultimately is required to begin to think philosophy as the meaning of life.

It is significant that of the analytic answers given, none would seem to have purchase or staying power, not even for the analysts themselves. Hence, having seemingly exhausted their own mandate and with it their own project, analytic philosophy has begun to turn toward Con-

tinental philosophy. Not, alas, as a reprochement, not by inviting practitioners of Continental philosophy to join the discussion, but only, and as if bored to tears by their own analytic themes, taking up the themes (and the names, like Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Deleuze) of Continental philosophy. For the analytic tradition is intentionally bankrupt (this is the internal logic of the analytic method), but although rendered moribund at its own hand, within the profession (aka academic and editorial control) it enjoys the power of the majority or dominant tradition. To keep itself going it means to seize (but not to “think”) the spiritual capital of a tradition whose own authority is denounced as that of non- or “bad” philosophy.

The claim is thus that analytic philosophy can do what Continental philosophers do, only better. But this is ultimately unclear, not only because unclarity belongs to the essence of what it is that Continental philosophers do (and such unclarity is anathema to analytic philosophy) but also because the analytic method is intrinsically self-dissolving: whatever it takes into its mind, it ends up clarifying or analyzing away. Analytic philosophy as the clarification of questions or as the enterprise of problem solving works elegantly for idle problems of logic—one thinks of Russell’s “tea-table”⁷¹—or for crossword and other puzzles (or within a closed system or defined universe of variables), but it may be that there is still yet more in heaven (and out of it) than dreamt of in such a philosophy.

And Continental philosophy does know this and can share this. Ambiguity is part of reality (even science has to deal with this, as empirical scientists along with engineers and physicians know well enough) and ambiguity is part of being human. One cannot simply add analysis and stir—magically expecting to separate what one imagines to be the lead of philosophical ambiguity from the gold of clear insight.

It is high time to institute the possibility of a conversation between styles: Continental *and* analytic. As my own teacher, the late Hans-Georg Gadamer has reminded us, doing philosophy is more about conversation than arguments (“good or bad”). Beyond contentious estrangements, conversation is a mutually contaminating endeavor: one shares—one does not eliminate—prejudices between horizons.⁷²

NOTES

1. Michael Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1993) p. 4. Ray Monk expresses the most impatience with Dummett's definition of analytic philosophy via Frege. For Monk, Dummett's claim that "the philosophy of language is the foundation of all other philosophy" worked itself into what has in its reception likewise become "an unashamed piece of dogmatism" (Monk, "Was Russell an Analytic Philosopher," in *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy*, ed. Hans-Johann Glock [Oxford: Blackwell, 1977], p. 35).

2. Martin Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking*, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper, 1968), p. 4.

3. And Heidegger adds that to be capable of thought "we must before all else incline toward what addresses itself to thought," where what eludes and thus calls for thought draws us into thinking, and "drawn to what withdraws, we are drawing into what withdraws, into the enigmatic and therefore mutable nearness of its appeal" (Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking*, p. 17). Heidegger declares this at the beginning and repeats it at the conclusion of his book. Thus thinking, like questioning, is to be sustained even in the face of ambiguity and contradiction. What is essential for Heidegger is hearing the language of thought, and that involves the paradox of attending to what is unthought: "Letting every thinker's thought come to us as something in each case unique, never to be repeated, inexhaustible—and being shaken to the depths by what is unthought in his thought." What "is unthought in a thinker's thought," Heidegger takes care to remind us, "is not a lack inherent in his thought. What is *un-thought* is there in each case only as the *un-thought*. The more original the thinking, the richer will be what is unthought in it" (Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking*, p. 76).

4. Note that Heidegger is always careful to advert to the nature of logic in the context of language: "Logic as the doctrine of *logos*, considers thinking to be the assertion of something about something" (Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking*, p. 155). He also notes the evolution of logic beyond two-valued thinking: "For dialectic, a *logos* in the customary form of a proposition is never unequivocal" (p. 156), and he claims that "where thought encounters things that can no longer be apprehended by logic, those things which are by nature inapprehensible still are within the purview of logic—as a-logical, or no longer logical, or meta-logical (supra-logical)" (p. 157).

5. Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking*, p. 118.

6. John Skorupski, "Why Did Language Matter to Analytic Philosophy?" in Monk, *Rise of Analytic Philosophy*, p. 77.

7. Intriguingly, and perhaps counter to expectations, it is this latter distinction that entails that Continental philosophy (and only Continental philosophy) is critically poised to reflect on science. Such a claim for a special and critical privilege was one of Martin Heidegger's strongest assertions in the spirit of the later Edmund Husserl. Heidegger offered a two-fold challenge regarding the domination of logic in philosophy and as the sole guideline for thought as well as against science's claim to think or conceptualize its own nature. Regarding the power claim of what we today would recognize as analytic philosophy, he wrote: "In many places, above all in the Anglo-Saxon countries, logistics is today considered the only possible form of strict philosophy, because its result and procedures yield an assured profit for the construction of the technological universe. In America and elsewhere, logistics as the only proper philosophy of the future is thus beginning today to seize power over the intellectual world" (Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking*, p. 21). For Heidegger, the sciences were inevitably blind to their own nature; scientifically, Heidegger would argue, a science could not conduct an inquiry into itself. "By way of history, a man will never find out what history is; no more than a mathematician can show by way of mathematics—by means of his science, that is, and ultimately by mathematical formulae—what mathematics is. The essence of their spheres—history, art, poetry, language, nature, man, God—remains inaccessible to these disciplines" (Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking*, pp. 32–33). Inevitably, necessarily, the sciences, "are always in the dark about the origin of their own nature" (p. 43).

8. Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking*.

9. Friedrich Nietzsche, "Die größte Masse geistiger Arbeit in der Wissenschaft verschwendet—auch hier noch waltet das Princip der größtmöglichen Dummheit," *Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe* (Munich/Berlin, New York: DTV/De Gruyter, 1980) vol. 11, p. 90. (Subsequent references to *Kritische Studienausgabe* [KSA] indicate volume and page number alone.) It should be noted that, antecedent to historical and social studies of science, critical theory, another component of so-called Continental philosophy, went far to highlight the ideology embedded in the social practice of the natural sciences.

10. And this indeed is what Continental thinking does do in the persons of Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger, even Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard. See the many studies by Patrick A. Heelan, Joseph J. Kockelmans, Theodore Kisiel, Babette E. Babich, etc., as well as, in German and in French, Rainer Bast, Pierre Kerszberg, the late Dominique Janicaud, Thomas Seebohm, Jean Salanskis, and so on.

11. See citation for Dummett in note 1, and Cohen in note 18. See *Origins of Logical Empiricism*, ed. R. N. Giere and A. W. Richardson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Michael Friedman, *Reconsidering Logical Positivism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and *The Parting of the Ways* (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 2001).

12. Analytic philosophy is not only the reigning approach to philosophy in the U.S. and England, but also on the larger European continent, where the influence of analytic philosophy is arguably completely dominant in today's globalized era of uniformity.

13. Friedman's *The Parting of the Ways* is particularly sensitive to this issue.

14. Although one established analytic scholar (Stanley Cavell) laughs off the difference between continental and analytic philosophy, recent reviews of academic philosophy in the U.S. highlight the question or problem of Continental philosophy (Hilary Putnam, Alexander Nehamas in *Daedalus*, 1996). But Brian Leiter's line—analytic philosophy *is* Continental philosophy (only more so)—has increasingly come to be regarded as standard.

15. I refer to Friedman's "Reconsidering Logical Positivism" as well as his study of Heidegger and Carnap in *Origins of Logical Empiricism*, ed. Giere and Richardson, which latter study grew into Friedman's, *The Parting of the Ways*.

16. Linguistic analysis and critical theory deploy different methodic tools in different contexts for different ends.

17. See Roy A. Sorenson, *Pseudo-Problems: How Analytic Philosophy Gets Done* (London: Routledge, 1993) for an enthusiastic treatment of this approach to philosophy (and it should be noted that the author refines the definition of analytic philosophy by characterizing his own approach as "vigorously" American). See also Skorupski, "Why Did Language Matter to Analytic Philosophy?" in *Rise of Analytic Philosophy*, p. 77.

18. L. Jonathan Cohen, *The Dialogue of Reason: An Analysis of Analytical Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 31.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

20. Parody seems not out of place where the propositional claim uttered by Patrick A. Heelan (the Irishman who first taught me the philosophy of science), "If the moon is made of green cheese, I am a Dutchman," may continue to be counted as an implication that affords logically valid grounds for Feyerabend's favorite conclusion, "Anything goes." The series of paragraphs to follow are based on material originally included in my essay, "Against Analysis, Against Postmodernism" (the lead presentation for a conference on Postmodern Philosophy of Science held in Dubrovnik at one of the very last international conferences held there before war broke out later in 1991). In *Continental and Post-*

modern Perspectives in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Babette E. Babich, Debra B. Bergoffen, and Simon V. Glynn (Aldershot, U.K.: Avebury, 1995).

21. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 4.116.

22. *Ibid.*, 4.112.

23. To vary David Lewis's expression in his "Attitudes 'De Dicto' and 'De Se'" of the implications of Wittgenstein's notion of expression and clarity: If it is possible to have unclarifiable (unanalytic) problems but no unanalyzable propositions, anything propositionally articulated—which in this sense means clearly expressed—can be analysed. As Lewis states the virtues of propositional knowledge, "... if it is possible to lack knowledge and not to lack any propositional knowledge, then the lacked knowledge must not be propositional." See Lewis, "Attitudes 'De Dicto' and 'De Se,'" in *The Philosophical Review* 9 (1979). Also in *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 139.

24. This is not to say that *all* analytic philosophers are opposed to metaphysics; many are not. Nor does it mean that analytic philosophy excludes belief in God; it does not. But the analytic idea of metaphysics is not particularly—I use this adjective advisedly—*robust*. Likewise, the God of the analytic philosopher of religion would seem to be even further than the Cartesian conception of God from the God of the theologian, just as the God of all such scholarly reflections seems ineluctably distant from the God of faith or revelation. Note too that I am not here asserting that Continental philosophers of religion, such as John Caputo, Richard Kearney, or, indeed, Emmanuel Levinas, are necessarily any better off in this regard, though I do hold that they might be.

25. It is important to emphasize—as it otherwise could appear that one has to do with a tradition covering many more years than is actually the case for the philosophy of science, analytic, Continental, or any other kind—that the so-called received view in analytic philosophy of science has had an exceedingly short tenure for a defining philosophical structure. The Cartesian account of the role of the pineal gland could claim both a lengthier reign and greater fecundity. See Frederick Suppe's "The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories," in *The Structure of Scientific Theories*, ed. Frederick Suppe (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), pp. 3–232.

26. Philipp Frank, "Kausalgesetz und Erfahrung," *Ostwald's Annalen der Naturphilosophie* 6 (1907): 443–50.

27. Craig Dilworth, "Empiricism vs. Realism: High Points in the Debate During the Past 150 Years," *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science* 21, no. 3 (1990): 431–62.

28. Tom Sorrel, *Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science* (London: Routledge, 1991). It is significant in this context that the putatively pathbreaking collection by Werner Callebaut, *Taking the Naturalistic Turn or How the Real Philosophy of Science Is Done* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993) does not include Continentally minded practitioners in its seemingly exhaustive tour of the various historical, sociological, and anthropological currents parallel to and intersecting the philosophy of science. Thus John R. Wetterstein's 1982 essay "The Philosophy of Science and the History of Science: Separate Domains versus Separate Aspects," *The Philosophical Forum* xiv, no. 1 (1982): 59–79 and his effort to untangle the problems resulting from the division of intellectual labor whereby philosophers of science "have traditionally attempted to keep their philosophical problems separate from historical ones and historians of science have traditionally attempted to keep their historical problems separate from historical ones" (p. 59), has not seen overmuch progress despite, or much more likely, *because of* the spirit of Karl Popper.

29. Rom Harré, *The Philosophies of Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 29.

30. Ian Hacking, "'Style' for Historians and Philosophers," *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science* 23, no. 1 (1992): 12.

31. Rudolf Haller, "Atomism and Holism," in *Advances in Scientific Philosophy*, eds. Gerhard Schurz and George J. W. Dorn (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1991), p. 266

32. Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in Davidson, *Reference Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 183–98.

33. See Babette E. Babich, "From Fleck's *Denksitz* to Kuhn's Paradigm: Conceptual Schemes and Incommensurability," *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 71 (2003).

34. A. Z. Bar-On, "Wittgenstein and Post-Analytic Philosophy," in *Wittgenstein. Eine Neubewertung: Towards a New Reevaluation II*, ed. Leinfellner et al. (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1990), p. 260.

35. Lewis, "Attitudes 'De Dicto' and 'De Se,'" p. 133.

36. As we shall see in greater detail below, analytic style as such refers to little more than the ideal of expressive clarity.

37. See for an instantiation of such demarcational accommodation, P. M. S. Hacker, "The Rise of Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy," in *Rise of Analytic Philosophy*, p. 52.

38. This is especially true of that kind of Continental style philosophy associated not with the softer theories of ethics or the political world (critical

theory and so on) but with analytic turf-encroaching topics such as epistemology, in Husserlian phenomenology and (via Nietzsche and Heidegger) hermeneutics.

39. I refer to Brian Leiter's "guide" to graduate study in Continental philosophy in the U.S. See, in particular, www.philosophicalgourmet.com/analytic.htm. A controversy has grown up around the Internet site in question. The American Philosophical Association (APA) has undertaken to censure the site and a small bit of debate has emerged regarding the site in the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), a Continentally oriented society increasingly similar in terms of noninclusiveness and disenfranchised membership to the APA, etc. Leiter's self-posted site (now hosted by Blackwell Publishers) encourages the idea that the best places to "do" Continental philosophy are to be found in analytic departments and not necessarily the more Ivy League of all departments, hence the APAs (always Ivy-friendly) nonsupport. Leiter's idea is that Continental philosophy is a matter of theme or figure (Leiter, like Clark and Schacht and Richardson, reads Nietzsche) rather than style. This conviction yields the claim that analytic philosophy *is* Continental philosophy. Predictably then, in a recent defensive response to David Hoekhema's review of Bruce Wilshire's collection of essays, Leiter goes so far as to style *himself* a persecuted "Continental philosopher," thus refusing Wilshire's/Hoekhema's critique as "anti-Continental" inspired.

40. In addition to Bert Dreyfus's long-standing analytic clarification of Heidegger, there are studies by Guignon, Blattner, and Phipps. Nietzsche has long been gingerly managed by analytic purveyors such as Arthur Danto and Bernd Magnus, but with Maudemarie Clark's book analyzing *Nietzsche and Truth*, this trend is now mainstream (and this can be seen in younger scholars such as Anderson, Cox, Welshon, etc.), even beyond extremes such as, on the one hand, Leiter and Richardson on the other. In the case of Levinas, the most analytic account to date remains that of Simon Critchley, who also has a nicely analytic book on the theme, *Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

41. See David B. Allison, *The New Nietzsche* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).

42. Gerald Holton thus affects the Nietzschean terms Apollinian and Dionysian to distinguish philosophic approaches to characterizing the history of science, but his terms in fact have no particular relevance (nor do they refer) to Nietzsche.

43. See my *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and Life* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994) for a Conti-

mental reading that takes Nietzsche's critique of truth straight to the task of tracing its significance for articulating a philosophy of science worthy of the name. See also, on more widely received and very solidly analytic grounds: Maudemarie Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and more broadly, Barry Allen, *Truth in Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); as well as R. Lanier Anderson, "Truth and Objectivity in Perspectivism," *Synthese* 15 (1998): 1–32. See also Anderson, "Nietzsche's Will to Power as a Doctrine of the Unity of Science," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 25, no. 5 (1995): 729–50; Ken Gemes, "Nietzsche's Critique of Truth," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 52, no. 1 (March 1992): 47–65; Steven Hales and Rex Welshon, "Truth, Paradox, and Nietzsche's Perspectivism," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (1995): 101–19; Steven Schwartz, "The Status of Nietzsche's Theory of the Will to Power in the Light of Contemporary Philosophy of Science," *International Studies in Philosophy* 25, no. 2 (1993); and not including nonanalytic or historico-interpretive or Continental treatments. For a review of the Vienna Circle's original reception of Nietzsche, see Kurt Rudolf Fischer, "Nietzsche and the Vienna Circle," in *Nietzsche, Theories of Knowledge and Critical Theory: Nietzsche and the Sciences I*, ed. Babette E. Babich (Dordrecht, Ger.: Kluwer, 1999), pp. 119–28.

44. This includes Clark's influential study, *Nietzsche and Truth*, as well as the wide and growing range of contributions on the topical conjunction of Nietzsche, truth, and epistemology by analytically formed younger scholars. See Clark et al., as noted above.

45. I have been emphasizing the relevance of the detail that Continental philosophy is only so named in contrast to the Anglo-American or analytic philosophical tradition (the name 'Continental' betrays its origin 'from' the standpoint of the British Isle). *Neither* stylistic approach to philosophy is geographically specific and, to be sure, analytic philosophy is far and away the more universal approach to be found on any continent. Hence the program at the most recent World Congress was not essentially other than any other congress such as the APA, with the exception of the ethnic diversity of the participants. This is, I suppose, what globalization in philosophy looks like.

46. Such newer analytic approaches to issues of Nietzsche and truth represent an insulated complement to my own historically sensitive and interpretively contextualized (or hermeneutic) approach to *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science*, augmenting the separate but ineluctably historical tradition of European approaches to Nietzsche's critical epistemology ranging from Vaihinger to Habermas.

47. Paradoxically, perhaps, this same institutional conviction means that today's Continentally minded scholars, exactly *unlike* Nietzsche (indeed and

very significantly, unlike Husserl or Heidegger), are almost universally *more interested* in questions of popular ethics and politics (i.e., in telling people what to do) than in issues of truth and lie or questions relating art and knowledge or science and philosophy. In this direction, to note a Nietzschean reserve against Levinas's foundational ethics, to invert the ordering principle preserves the same distinction all over again.

48. Once again, we might note that Leiter invokes the analytic convention of reducing philosophical kinds to the difference between "good" or "quality" and bad work in "Continental" philosophy, defining good Continental philosophy as that done by analytically trained scholars in analytic departments.

49. This is how it happens that practitioners of so-called Continental philosophy, which is at times named "contemporary European" philosophy, can be as professionally marginalized in Europe (or on "the" continent) as in English-speaking countries. The kind of professional philosophy, as one's employed European colleagues will tell one, as currently practiced (or better, aspired to) on the continent is the kind to be found in Cambridge (on either side of the Atlantic). Such marginalization has many causes, although perhaps the most obvious derives from the rather universal scientism of our scientific technoinformation era, which remains evident in the still unquestioned prestige of logical and linguistic analytic approaches to philosophy and the growing importance of cognitive science in the same domain. For a discussion of the political contours and stakes of this opposition, see my essay, "Sokal's Hermeneutic Hoax: Physics and the New Inquisition," in *Hermeneutic Philosophy of Science, Van Gogh's Eyes, and God: Essays in Honor of Patrick A. Heelan, S.J.*, ed. Babette E. Babich (Dordrecht, Ger.: Kluwer, 2002), pp. 67–78.

50. It is not clear that Nietzsche, a man without an institutional affiliation, could have published any books at all in today's market-driven publishing world.

51. Thus Pierre Kerszberg writes, "Nietzsche certainly did not think that he epitomized so well the whole of critical philosophy when he exclaimed 'Will to truth, that might be a concealed will to death'" (*Critique and Totality* [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997], p. 251). See also Daniel Breazeale's comments in a footnote to his introduction to his translation of *Nietzsche's Philosophy and Truth*, where he identifies the galvanizing concern of Karl Schlechta's and Anni Anders's earlier reexamination of the edition of the notes for Nietzsche's *Philosophenbuch* (*Nietzsches Werke*, vol. 10, ed. Ernst Holzer and August Horneffer, [Leipzig, Ger.: Kröner, 1907], pp. 109–232; KSA 7: 417ff., and elsewhere), which they were able to unmask as an editorial attempt to eliminate references to the issue of truth in favor of that of culture: "In par-

ticular, they [the earlier editors] had omitted many of the notes in which Nietzsche poses most sharply the problem of the value of truth (which Schlechta and Anders take to be *the* theme of these notes . . .)" Breazeale, introduction to *Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870s* (Atlantic Heights, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979), p. liv. Cf. Karl Schlechta and Anni Anders, *Friedrich Nietzsche. Von den Verborgenen Anfängen seines Philosophierens* (Stuttgart—Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1982).

52. Sometimes this has unintentionally funny consequences, as in the variety of so-called Prisoner's Dilemmas, none of which have any bit of real-life plausibility or can be reasoned (or indeed, make sense) apart from a course in probability or logic. Contrast this with Sartre's much more coherent and less forced discussion of the same quandary in his essay "The Wall."

53. This is why Nietzsche finds that, far from being opposed pursuits, science and religion represent only variations upon the ascetic ideals of discipline and renunciation, sobriety and progressive hope. Science is as jealous a god of the tree of knowledge as the God of the Garden of the Old Testament, ergo only science, or philosophy construed as a science (i.e., analytic philosophy of science), gets to pass judgment on science, and its only judgment is approbation. See Paul Valadier's books, *Nietzsche et la critique du christianisme* (Paris: Cerf, 1974) and *Nietzsche, l'athée de rigueur* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1975) as well as Valadier's "Science as the New Religion" in *Nietzsche Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science*, ed. Babette E. Babich, pp. 241–52. For a different tack, see also the essays by Allen's "Forbidden Knowledge," *Monist* 79 (1996): 294–310 and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's chapter on Nietzsche in *Wahrnehmung der Neuzeit* (Munich: Hanser, 1983), pp. 70–106. I articulate this genealogical account of the ascetic ideal in religion and science, see my chapter "Nietzsche's Genealogy of Science: Morality and the Value of Modernity" in *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science*, pp. 175–225, as well as my review of the ultimate coincidence of postmodern (and associated putatively alternative) and New Age perspectives and the scientific ideal in "Sokal's Hermeneutic Hoax."

54. After a kind of hermeneutic infusion, the interpretation-intoxicated analyst is prepared to deal with a mobile army of metaphors, declaring it nothing but sound and fury: so much epistemological dynamite, so little danger. See Leiter's Web site (n. 39).

55. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Random House, 1969), preface, § 2.

56. KSA 13: 477. Cf. KSA 6: 59.

57. "Was aber wirklich, was wahr ist, ist weder Eins, noch auch nur reduzierbar auf Eins." KSA 13: 477.

58. Nietzsche's first reflections "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense" point to the complexities glossed over by words and concepts, and in *Twilight of the Idols*, challenges the truism, "All truths are simple," identifying it as a "compound lie" (KSA 6: 59). This complexity too is the point of his claim that the world is will to power (rather than a world of "simples," be they elemental or atomic substances). Thus Nietzsche criticizes the animating parsimony of the scientific knowledge ideal in terms of what he does not hesitate to name stupidity, reflecting that the challenge would appear to be to design or account for a mechanism of the greatest complexity and subtlety using the stupidest, most elementary—or elemental—elements. "Das Ideal ist, das complicirteste alle Maschinenwesen zu construiren entstanden durch die dümme aller möglichen Methoden" (KSA 11: 93. Cf. KSA 12: 36; KSA 12: 395). For Nietzsche, again and again, "Die Welt erscheint uns logisch, weil wir sie erst logisirt haben" (KSA 12: 418).

59. Hacker, "Rise of Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy," p. 52.

60. Heidegger, "The Way to Language," in *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper, 1982), p. 124.

61. Heidegger, "Language," in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper, 1971), p. 190.

62. Ibid.

63. Thus Heidegger concludes with an equally gnomic declaration: "We would like only, for once, to get to just where we are already" (ibid.).

64. Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 12.

65. Hannah Arendt, "Martin Heidegger at Eighty," in *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays*, ed. Michael Murray (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 294–95.

66. Ibid.

67. Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 2–13.

68. From Roger Scruton to Irving Singer to Robert Solomon, and on.

69. I try to do this in my essay "Nietzsche and Eros Between the Devil and God's Deep Blue Sea: The Erotic Valence of Art and the Artist as Actor—Jew—Woman," *Continental Philosophy Review* 33 (2000): 159–88; published in French as "Nietzsche et Eros entre le gouffre de Charybde et l'écueil de Dieu: La valence érotique de l'art et l'artiste comme acteur—Juif—Femme," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 211, no. 1 (2000): 15–55.

70. See Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols* (KSA 6: 74–75) and *The Antichrist* sec. p. 19 (KSA 6: 185).

71. Dagfinn Føllesdal comments on Russell's response to the later Wittgenstein's putative diffidence regarding argument in the context of

devising a comprehensive definition of analytic philosophy (and including rather than excluding such a quintessential analytic philosopher) "Analytic Philosophy: What Is It and Why Should One Engage in It?" in *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy*, ed. Glock, pp. 1–16. Føllesdal does not resolve the difficulty but he cites Russell as a kind of shoulder shrug "by authority."

72. For Hans-Georg Gadamer's discussion of conversation in the open context of questioning, see *Truth and Method* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1979), pp. 330ff. Thanks are due to Alasdair MacIntyre for valuable comments on an earlier version of this essay. The author also wishes to thank editor Carlos G. Prado and other readers for their suggestions.