

UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM

**TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE ROLE OF INTENTIONALITY IN THE
PHENOMENOLOGICAL GROUNDING OF PSYCHOLOGY**

- Thesis -

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1. INTRODUCTION

In this research we'll try to counter natural-reductionist tendencies in the contemporary psychological approach to materialized consciousness. Neuroscience defines consciousness as a physiological process that doesn't have any essential role in forming reality. Secondly, we'll try to demonstrate that transcendental phenomenology has an independent conceptual frame that can explain pure consciousness. What will emerge from these initial precepts is an interpretation of contemporary psychology and neuroscience that puts them into the context of a regional ontology and binds them back to their transcendental grounds. We are going to inquire into the main hypothesis of neurology and psychology according to which consciousness originates from the empirical/material strata of reality and attempts to found present day scientific studies of consciousness on the transcendental. Our main problem will therefore be how to attribute the scientific studies of the various positive sciences of the conscious to the application of a transcendental constitutive perspective. This investigation will conclude that both, the neurology of consciousness and the positivist psychological approach on the human soul, make use of an unrefined conceptual outlook that is inherited from traditional metaphysics so that some of the concepts used by both scientific disciplines need phenomenological refining. Phenomenology is better placed to understand consciousness because it relies on methods specifically designed to understand this particular entity, while empirical psychology borrows its methods from the natural sciences of the unconscious and inert being. In forwarding this critique we do not mean to argue that neuroscience cannot improve our understanding of the cognitive processes and their composition, but simply argue against some of the uncritical terminology that neuroscience uses in its description of consciousness. The method of transcendental phenomenology, especially the transcendental reduction, is not only a method of self-discovery, but about discovering the conceptual strata that lay within a certain science. Natural sciences are held to be prototypes in our age and it's difficult to bring about any phenomenological change in this regard. However, present-day science of consciousness is not yet a science, and phenomenology as a philosophical discipline that has a more advanced understanding of this topic than any other traditional view, may hold the key to unlocking a genuinely scientific perspective on this last residue of human spirituality. We are going to suggest a different definition of transcendental consciousness as an primordial being or behaving of reified nature. The for-itself (subjectivity) and the in-itself (matter, reality) don't take shape independently from one another, but are brought in a divergent relation through an transcendental act of behaving. The transcendental sphere of behaving structures the possibility of engagement between the body and the world, thus, setting them on the opposite sides.

The investigations ahead will examine the transcendental primacy of the conscious being in the phenomenological grounding of neuroscience. It's also going to propose a new understanding of the conscious being within the external actuality of behavior. This thesis will challenge the traditional understanding of the conscious as an internal property of the body, and propose that through behaving it can be conceived as the metaphysical principle of the world. First, I'm going to look at Husserl's phenomenology to see how he treats consciousness. Then, I am going to see if we can transcendently ground consciousness outside Husserl's egological definition and in the sphere of pure behaving. Thirdly, I'm going to inquire into neuroscience from the transcendental phenomenological perspective.

2. INTENTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In this section, we're going to examine Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. The aim of this research is to avail ourselves of crucial phenomenological tools to confront the naturalized perspective on consciousness later on. According to Husserl, every time we assert a meaning, our consciousness is moved by intentionality as directedness to something. "Under intentionality we understand the own peculiarity of mental processes "to be consciousness of something."¹ Husserl's explanations of consciousness in his initial works on pure phenomenology, relied heavily on metaphorical language, and he readily used terms like "radiation", illumination and emanation as a description of the very stuff that our regard of the world is made of.² Accordingly, conscious acts are a sort of light shed on the dark side of everything that stood in opposition to knowledge. In Husserl, the ego is the most fundamental possibility of the subjects experiences, while the cogito and the psyche are its first manifestations within the experiential stream of the subject. When he discussed that: "In every actional cogito a radiating "regard" is directed from the pure Ego to the "object" of the consciousness-correlate in question, to the physical thing, to the affair-complex, etc., and effects the very different kinds of consciousness of it."³, this is a functional expression that explained how consciousness reveals its objective correlate. However, when the "transcendental clue"⁴ (intuition of the eidos of things) is followed, in an elaborate transcendental environment that is solely constituted on the ideal ego or its communalized monads, then the explanatory role of the "light" metaphor is less reliable, and Husserl strictly relies on the following terms: noesis, the active side of consciousness that gave meaning to the rudimentary stuff or sensations (hyle) of these acts, and their co-product of meaning, or the noema seen as the sense of everything through which consciousness can live in experience, the very objective correlate of consciousness: the judged in the judgment, the imagined in the imagination, the perceived in perception. Their combination produce the mental processes of judging, imagination, perception, volition, etc. Contemporary approaches in neuroscience also include some of the features of the Cartesian lumen naturale, and it appears that we can make a step forward if we overcome the belief in the entrapped being of consciousness and its radiating-like experiences can be evaluated if we overcome the metaphysical believe in the interiority of the soul and regard it as the sphere of the immaterial summoning of one's behavior toward the world. The Intentional nature of the mental processes don't reduce consciousness to an internal manner of being, and here consciousness is conceived as something that puts the mental in the horizon of the world. According to our theory of the transcendental, the aboutness of imagination is not entrapped in the psyche.

When conscious contents are shown as something mental, the split between the hyle and the mental act is imposed by the conscious, that's neither the mental act nor the matter of an act, but something that navigates experience and sets it apart from both the external horizon of the world and the internal horizon of the psychical. Both the psyche and the external world are foreign

¹ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*. (1983). First book. 200.

² *ibid.*

³ *ibid.*

⁴ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*. (1980). Third book. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 22.

to the conscious being. Within a state of comport they are appropriated through a mode of an environment where the conscious designs the mentally produced appearance as an attribute of a physical thing. When we say that redness is the property of the rose, we mean that a mental image of perception is a subjectively (organic) embedded property of the conscious act that has the capacity to transcend this physiological quality of color and attribute it to the physical world. The rose is an environmental embeddedness of the conscious set in the exteriority of the subjective (organic) creature that consciousness brings into rapport with the world. Unlike Husserl and neuroscience, we claim that the psyche and the physiological are one of a kind without the ability to produce the externalizing feature of awareness of the physical surroundings that lay in the cognitional regard as comportment. Awareness spreads in the environment as a sort of transcendence of the organic.

In the following Husserlian constitutive turn of phenomenology, the noema is seen as the very essence of all conceivable empirical facts, both epistemologically and ontologically:

We can also express this as follows: Any science of matters of fact (any experiential science) has essential theoretical foundations in eidetic ontologies. For (in case the assumption made is correct) it is quite obvious that the abundant stock of cognitions relating in a pure, an unconditionally valid manner to all possible objects of the region — in so far as these cognitions belong partly to the empty form of any objectivity whatever and partly to the regional Eidos which, as it were, exhibits a necessary material form of all the objects in the region Q cannot lack significance for the exploration of empirical facts.⁵

Husserl's idea is that phenomenology has a richer account of experience when compared with empiricist approaches, and thus is appropriately placed to offer an account of the metaphysical grounds of scientific research (as such and specifically with respect to the mind). As Husserl points out, there are no royal roads into philosophy, and phenomenology must extend its investigations into all constitutive elements of experience in general that grow into scientific thinking.⁶ With this perspective any proper beginning of phenomenology is only possible if based on the idea of the composition and structure of the essential realm of consciousness. In early transcendental philosophy and later empirical psychology, consciousness is seen as a given fact that didn't need any further analysis. Asserting the natural origin of consciousness or the a priori character of consciousness makes a mystery out of consciousness. Phenomenology, by contrast, holds the promise of an elucidation of consciousness. Kant, for instance, referred to it as "apperception" and explained it on the a priori concepts of quantity, quality, relation and modality.⁷ These are the possibilities of making synthetic judgments a priori, but he never furthered his analysis beyond this abstract and formal appearance of apperception. Husserl, agrees with the Kantian view of reasoning as a mode of judgment based on concepts. However, he parenthesizes the innate being of these concepts, and conceive them to be derived of more basic properties of intentionality. Transcendental phenomenology then goes on to explore the transcendental dimension of Kant's philosophy in greater detail and in concrete intuitive rather than formal terms. Similarly to Kant's positions, psychology also fell for this naïve regard of consciousness, and instead of researching the universal basis of consciousness, it developed empirical theories of perception, memory, desire, etc.,

⁵ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas*. First Book. op. cit. 11.

⁶ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas*. First Book. op. cit. 235.

⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. (1996). Indianapolis: Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. 295.

and concluded that these could be empirically analyzed into their natural origins, into certain brain functions or other “real” states of the psyche. In Freud’s psychoanalysis, the principle of the unconscious is assumed in order to explain the nature of any adult desires and fixations that determined the stream of the ego experiences. As a sublime function of its physical basis, consciousness is a naturalized phenomenon in all psychologies other than Husserl’s. With phenomenology at hand, Husserl engaged in the different project of an a priori reflection on the true meaning of consciousness and defined the intentional analysis of its constituents as the main objective of his newly scoped transcendental-phenomenological method. Unlike empirical psychology, Husserl claimed that the ego/consciousness is a pure a priori regard of experiences. This task is unachievable by grounding the investigation in the thought of psychoanalysis and behavioral psychology. Both empirical theories supposed the sublime evolution of the physical into the mental. From the point of view of phenomenology, consciousness is not made of the unconscious, the complex mental processes or the innate concepts or propositions, but of essential conscious structures and correlates of the noesis and the noema. The mental acts of the psyche such as perception or imagination have their origins in the intentional eidos of the noetic act that synthesized the “hyle” into an objective noema that transcends it as its correlate. Only the paired experience of the noesis/hyle brings the possibility of an experience or its noema. Husserl concludes that the noema correlate of an intentional act is necessary for experience, in the sense that an experience wouldn’t be about anything were it not directed by a noema. Thus we can have a regard of the mental acts (noesis) but only as parts of other mental processes, like in memorizing perception, or imagining intuition. The intentional hyle is seen as a sense data of a sort that only “adumbrated” the fully constituted noema, a sort of a rudiment of a true perception of an objective color or any other possible correlate of consciousness.⁸ The noetic act alone is what the ego relies on in bestowing meaning on the sense data, and producing a full essential meanings, or the noema. It can be said that consciousness is the synthesis of the ego-cogito (noesis)-cogitatum (noema), and none of them stood alone as a thing-in-itself with an independent meaning. The ego is the referential point of all experiences seen only as intentional correlates along with its further combinations into more complex mental processes.

At first glance it would seem to be something obvious: Any consciousness is a consciousness of something, and the modes of consciousness are highly diversified. On approaching more closely, however, we became sensible of the great difficulties involved. They concern our understanding of the mode of being of the noema, the way in which it is “implicit” in the mental process, in which it is “intended to” in the mental process. Quite particularly they concern the clean separation of those things which, as its really inherent components, belong to the mental process itself and those which belong to the noema, which must be assigned to the noema as its own <components>.⁹

This gives us a basic outline of the noetic and noemata aspects of consciousness and of their constitutive role. It is obvious that Husserl is not proposing a solipsistic idealism of structuring the objective sense as a subjective realm. The only “inherent” qualities of the intentional acts of the ego are those of the noesis, and the noemata sphere that are constituted by this processes have a being of their own. Even internal acts of phantasy have their noema correlative to the mental being of the conscious processes. Only the mental processes are seen as part of the internal ego pole, and the

⁸ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas*. First Book. op. cit. 237.

⁹ Edmund Husserl, op. cit. 234.

constituted noema pole has to be a correlate pole, or consciousness will lose its intentional directedness. Husserl uses light metaphors to illustrate intentional consciousness. Consciousness emits rays with every intentional experience. These rays strike objects of experience, making these objects appear. Bringing out phenomena is the only purpose of these rays.¹⁰ Note how Husserl's metaphor departs from the ordinary picture in which the sun illuminates objects for us. In his illustration, the rays are ego-rays with their source in the subject.¹¹ However, what remains with the being of the object thus illuminated? Up to this point of his work, Husserl claims that "The "Object" is struck; it is the target, it is put into a relation to the Ego (and by the Ego itself) but is not "subjective"."¹² It is obvious that here lies a great difficulty in phenomenology that even Husserl didn't properly resolve. The question is why the ego is conditioned to behave "freely" in its relation to the object? Kant's answer here would have been rather simple because ultimately his philosophy grounds knowledge on basic concepts/categories, which, as it were, insert a prism between the subject and the object, organizing the attentive rays of the Husserlian like transcendental ego into distinct functions of subsumption. Phenomenology takes experience at a more fundamental, pre-reflective, level but nonetheless insists that awareness is object-awareness. If consciousness is an emanating light that lives through its inherent noesis, then it's not clear why the stuff itself should be inherent as well, since it's not conclusive to suppose that the transcendental reduction of the mental processes attaches the sensual stuff into the pure ego. If the ego is intentional directness, then the attributes that reflect variations in it are not necessarily part of the ego cogitation. The intuitive character of the transcendental clue forbids the presumption of the pre-existent empty category filled with intuitive or any other content or meaning.¹³

Recall that we are interested in phenomenology as an account of meaning which doesn't reduce to natural givens. That meaning is bound up with experiences the structure of which involves objective correlates, noemata, could give rise to an objection. Assuming that noemata have meaning of their own, meaning could be reduced to something objective and thus, ultimately, to something naturally given. If we take the phenomenological attitude into following the transcendental clue that prevents any distinction of noetic acts into various categorical clusters that produce the mental processes of cognition, judging, volition, etc., then it is clear that the ego and its noetic components are not the proper referent and sense bestowals, and that the only region of meaning within phenomenology lies within the noemata as a strict correlate of consciousness. This suggests a confusion between what is transcendent and what is immanent. Although Husserl insists on the centrality of the ego for phenomenological investigation, his ray-of-light metaphor may be misleading in the following sense: it suggests that everything is reduced to immanent structures of consciousness and by that token denies independent outside reality. The cause of this could be that there is no meaning beyond the ego-cogito-cogitatum (this threefold relation unifies conscious intentionality with its noema) and that phenomenology at this point of its development, rests on certain naively or metaphysically conceived axioms as other philosophical traditions. Intentional analysis into the noetic-noemata structure of intentionality, as the ultimate means of grounding phenomenology, neglects the proper finding of the function of sense as a designated area of the noemata, and compromises itself by transferring these findings on the phenomenological strata of

¹⁰ Edmund Husserl, op. cit. 225.

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² *ibid.*

¹³ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas*. Third Book. op. cit. 22.

the ego and its pure acts.¹⁴ This difficulty can be overcome, but only if we suppose that there is no sense stratum beyond the conscious intentionality of the noemata. Some of Husserl's observations at this stage acknowledge the complex being of the "sense realm":

If, in this manner, a perceiving, phantasying, judging, or the like, founds a stratum of valuing which overlays it completely, we have *different noemata* or senses in the *stratified whole* which is called a concrete mental process of valuing by being designated according to the highest level within it. The perceived as perceived specifically belongs as sense to the perceiving, but it is also included in the sense of the concrete valuing, founding the *latter's sense*.¹⁵

It is obvious here that a stratified whole can include various senses, or affair-complexes of noemata, that together form the value-consciousness.¹⁶ However, if meaning belongs to these complex acts of combination performed by the ego, the noesis and the noemata, then we can conclude from this that sense belongs indispensably to the constitutive side alone. The noesis and the ego participate in the sense region as much as the "hyle", they have sense only if attributed to each other and the pure life of the ego has no meaning alone. Noemata are different in this respect, since they are formed out of the complex of the noesis and the hyle right at the beginning of their being, so in this respect it can be argued that there is basic noemas and complex noemas, but no simple noemas. This is not the instance of the ego-cogito acts which can be transcendently reduced to some primordial or elemental level of intuitive residuum. Intuition as an intentional directedness to something includes the sense correlate of the noema, and phenomenologically speaking it's impossible to argue about the innate existence of the pure ego.

The consciousness of something, intentionality, and the transcendental condition of the noesis, only point to the phenomenological explanation of the noemata strata of consciousness as the objective correlate of the pure ego, and no implication can be drawn on the proper phenomenological founding of the sense of the ego pole. In other words, not only that the knowledge of the noemata correlate is the essence of the possibility of objective knowledge, but considering the transcendental clue, the eidos forms the grounds of any apodictic knowledge. The reflective knowledge of the immanent or the subjective is not a transcendental knowledge in the phenomenological sense of the word. When Husserl compares phenomenology to psychology he states categorically that lived experiences are primarily part of transcendental consciousness and not of the empirical ego.¹⁷ All acts of intentionality are manifold constructs that predetermine the meaning of empirical objects and experiences alike. However, what Husserl is not conclusive about at this stage of his philosophy, is that the transcendental as a manifold act, is also not reducible to the pure ego as such. Later on in his *Cartesian Meditations*, the ego is regarded as a complex constitution of simpler acts that participate in the conscious act of intentional directedness and transcendental intersubjectivity.¹⁸ The light-ray description of the ego is abandoned in late Husserl's phenomenology because it assumed the possibility of the solitude of the conscious being, whereas in the successive genetic phenomenology he incorporated the alter ego and the life-world, and the being of the ego was appropriated to the horizon of the transcendental community of monads.

¹⁴ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas*. First Book. op. cit., 233-34.

¹⁵ Edmund Husserl, op. cit. 231.

¹⁶ Edmund Husserl, op. cit. 232.

¹⁷ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas*. Third Book. op. cit. 64.

¹⁸ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*. (1960). The Hague: Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 137.

Husserl's critique of psychologism led him to the founding of a more prime philosophical doctrine than that of the initial eidetic phenomenology, called transcendental phenomenology. The theme of the newly established phenomenology is to give a more thorough account on the subject's experiences, and to overcome the narrow phenomenological findings presented in the *Logical Investigations*. His distinction between objective eidetic sciences and subjective eidetic science per se, or egology, is a mere stop-gap measure. Its true force only comes out in his later, transcendental phenomenology. Husserl's transcendental claim is that all theoretical and empirical sciences are based on certain a priori essences of knowledge that outline the domain of investigation of the given science. However, contrary to conventional philosophical approaches, the transcendental claim on the scientific a priori does not have a status of the categorical principles that would enable an axiomatic deduction of the science in question together with its domain. All empirical and a priori sciences are based on certain regional concepts and ontologies.¹⁹ However, unlike the rigid connection between meaning and essence peculiar to *Logical Investigations*, Husserl in his *Ideas* extends his reflection on the very formation of the grounding of science as such. Deductive explanations are not needed if we strictly apply phenomenological description. In Husserl words:

This derivation is not meant in the sense of a "transcendental deduction" from some postulate or other or from some system of thought that is not itself given through Intuition (like the system of the forms of judgment in the Kantian deduction of what he calls the categories), and yet according to an apodictically evident "transcendental clue," in following which we cannot *deduce* the concepts but rather can *find* them ourselves and step by step in seeing grasp them ourselves.²⁰

The region of each empirical science is not based on matter of facts but rather on the presupposed universal ontology and regional concepts. It's true that sciences rise from accumulating factual knowledge and from formulating theoretical laws of nature. However, in each science there are grounding axioms that are not the ultimate layer of possible reflection, but are further based on the life of conscious experiences as phenomena of intentionality. Transcendental phenomenology is not striving to achieve a Kant-like system of the possibilities of knowledge by providing a fixed and complete set of rational categories and intuitions, but has the more fundamental ambition of bringing to light the dynamic experiential flow of pure consciousness where all meanings are brought to life.

¹⁹ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas*. Third Book. op. cit. 22.

²⁰ *ibid.*

3. TRANSCENDENTAL REDUCTION

In this chapter, we are going to define transcendental reduction as a method of discovering the essential primacy of consciousness over existence. In Husserl, the being of consciousness as directedness to something is defined as intentionality or as the mental state of the outward behavior of the psychic experiences. In our research, consciousness is not going to be conceptualized as the escapee of anything internal but rather as that which enables such directedness of the psychic acts, the external principle of anything physiological that makes a mental phenomenon a designator of the world. Consciousness is not definable in the terms of the organic subject and the material object, but rather as a sphere of its own that sets an *eidos* between the entity of the subject and the object. This means that our transcendental theory explains the subjective states as preconditioned by an external force of assembling the inner and outer realms of being. The possibility of a reflective certainty of any psychological processes is determined by the state of experiencing the ideal meaning as inorganic. Phenomenology is a diverse philosophical tradition with a common beginning and its usual that some notions may resemble within its course. Thus, the concepts of the distance and the invisible realm of ideas presented in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, also have a role in our own theory but differ essentially.²¹ According to our investigation, there is no possibility of a preexisting material world and a subjectivity that awaits the colony of ideas. The conscious being is not the subject of experience that opposes the ideal but rather a sphere that holds the ideal circle outwardly from the body's capacities of perception or memory. Consciousness is the in-between entity of the subject and the object. Meanings don't preexist consciousness, but together form the conditions of subjectivity, experience and the existence of reified nature. Brute existence is impossible prior to the essences that externalize it in a state of behavior. What Merleau-Ponty assumes is that there can be an unmeant meaning that is brought into being by the existent flesh. His position seems to infer that flash makes up for brute existence. This stance doesn't overcome the dualism of essence and fact. The concept of a meaning that waits to be meant is a vague one inferring the possibility of co-existence of two ontological realms that start of existing independently and continue as a totality. He thinks that the world and body-subject constitute each other; they occur in the same ontological domain, or transcendental field. Flesh isn't physiological but transcendental or existential. We, on the other hand assume that there can't be a meaning that is not meant, waiting for the perceiver to open it. Physical laws are not meant by the objects in the manner that the intentional psyche grasps various principles in order to act effectively, but nonetheless, they outline the possibilities of behavior for the inert being. The conscious is not another depth of the psyche in its flesh, and neither are ideas the furrow of things. According to this research, thoughts are the flesh of ideas and awareness is the flesh of consciousness. Consciousness embeds itself into memory, perception, and movement, assembling thoughts through the various capacities of the body (organism). Consciousness and its ideas are metaphysical principles of the world that enable any possibility of an assembling horizon or behavior.

In this way, we can also examine the question of the essence of awareness. It seems that consciousness is an attribute of all man's activities and it's improbable that we'll have a deeper

²¹ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*. (1968). Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 151

understanding of the prime causes of being without explaining consciousness. Husserl's approach to consciousness is methodical and reductive. But the phenomenological reduction he proposes differs from common reductive approaches (e.g. materialism, physicalism, etc.) in that Husserl envisages a transcendental reduction. This reduction is crucial for any further analysis of various psychological and cognitive acts. It places the foundation of these acts in structures that are necessary for the possibility of these acts. The problem is discovering the location of the crucial point where certain states of experience are founded. In Husserl, the transcendental is based in the internal mental life of the psyche with its wide range of phenomena. According to Husserl, transcendental reduction means reducing the object's properties to the specified underlying strata of essences founded in the phenomenal life flow of the conscious being. The essential properties of phenomena are the non-material correlates of each conscious act seen as a mental phenomenon. Consciousness is always directed to something by taking a perspective, as an instance of an act of perception, or judging, and the opposite of these acts is assumed to have an eidetic presence that conditioned the contingent existence of empirical things.

According to Husserl, there is also an underlying transcendental being of consciousness that predates the psyche in the form of the pure ego. Consciousness, in the latter stages of Husserl's phenomenology, is not necessarily the egocentric ray-emitting act that departs from something that pre-existed the empirical conceived as the embedded phenomenon of the psyche. Although this view is part of Husserl's egology, it never succeeded in becoming a true matter of phenomenology; this is conclusive with some of the further developments of the traditions of phenomenology that, later on, completely abandoned this concept. This research finds egology problematic because it reflects on the being of consciousness in naturalistic terms. Consciousness is not outgrown by experiences like plants outgrow their seeds. Heidegger, Scheler, and Sartre are not in any way affiliated with egology, and Merleau-Ponty only mentions the ego in certain places but never attributes it any significant phenomenological strata. The transcendental usually refers to what we mean under the content of the "I" pronoun, and it's difficult to say what exactly is this realm made of. In the existentialist traditions that followed Husserl, the "I" didn't designate a singular cause of experience, and Sartre considered it to be a nonbeing rather than something concrete. Set in the terminology of the philosophy of existence, it involved pretty much everything ranging from perception, embodiment, freedom, and historicity. The transcendental for Merleau-Ponty is both the embedded subject and the world. They have a simultaneous existence. As much as consciousness tends to direct itself towards objectivity as something determining, it relies on objectivity that conditions its externalization. For Merleau-Ponty, the inner consciousness and the outer world are mutually conditioned. Thus the formal a priori of apperception that bridged its possibilities into grasping reality, is substituted by various sensorimotor capacities that are in turn conditioned by the wide social and historical milieu of the subject.²²

The possibility of embeddedness of the reflective I is presented in phenomenology from the early Husserlian era, where the transcendental is seen as a psychic phenomenon of memory or perception. The psyche is never truly reduced to any unempirical realm of being like the essence of color, except in the instance of pure egology and the intentional analysis of consciousness. Psychological processes are seen as eidetic at most; what phenomenological psychology simply takes for granted is the constitution of the psychological subject. If we see consciousness apart from the

²² Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch, *The Embodied Mind*. (1993). London: The MIT Press. 173.

given cognitive context then all there is left is a certain sparkle that stimulates light or life into the outer properties of the psyche. In Husserl, the psyche is an external feature of the pure ego. This means that the first instances of embeddedness of the phenomenological contents of consciousness are psychic phenomena like perception, memory, and phantasy. Embodiment was never a term used by Husserl, but he did infer something similar by his concept of animation.²³

However, if the psyche, in turn, is the internal being that additionally to consciousness opposes reified reality, then we can question the presence of consciousness as an internal state of the mental psyche. If there is a more primordial condition of the experiences of the internal psyche then it's not necessarily internal. Can we find a more basic structure of consciousness than that resembling the psyche, that's not a derivative state caused by external reflections of the world on the mind, but rather a condition that stands at the very margins of being instead of its center? Every transcendental reduction of Husserl's kind proposes an egocentric approach that inevitably results in a deductive system of continuation from the transcendental schemata into the rich milieu of the life-world. The unfolding of a purely spiritual being into the mental and the material world is an mind-dependent project of idealism that the phenomenological tradition rejects. This position also doesn't comply with some contemporary understandings of extensional meaning. The redefining of the spiritual or conscious being is necessary if we want fully to embrace the new project of transcendental phenomenology, one that sets the crucial insights into changing the current state of materialism and naturalism that prevails in the most advanced project of psychology as neuroscience. This stance suggests that the discovery of the regions of the brain that are most active in certain experiences of cognition and agency can lead to outlining the most fundamental strata of human existence, but not define it crucially. It was an obsolete prejudice that leads naturalism into assuming that experiences have their essential being in the internal state of the psyche and that the method of introspection can conclude with showing the structure of certainty as an internal quality of the psyche/brain. Rather than holding to the meaning of certainty as a subjective gut feeling, why not consider it as a property of a conscious principle that preconditions the coming to being of any organism and environment alike? If we can assume that consciousness predates mental phenomena similarly to Husserlian egology, then we can escape the narrow path that brought the horizon of the world to the solipsistic perspective of the subject. Certainty is not a hunch we have, and the experiences we're most sure of are those that are intersubjective. This can be easily explained if we compare the certainty we find in necessary truths and the experiential mental states we gain from verifying them through experiments and other similar applications. Even when we don't grasp the true meaning of necessary truths, this alone doesn't make them less certain. The independency of certain truths and other experiences from our attitudes, infers that they are part of different acts than the relative processes of the psyche. Our research grounds this difference on the basis of non-subjective consciousness. The experience of imagination is properly attained only when expressed in the form of art perceivable as intersubjective phenomena. Other instances of imagination may be products of delusion. Love is also an intersubjective experience not achievable by the subjective state of falling in. It's a sort of sharing and not as telepathy of subjective feelings but rather as their transcendence. It seems that psychic perspectives involve experiences that are not exclusively of

²³ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*. (1989). Second book. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 101-2.

subjective making but involve entities that transcend anything subjective. However, if experiences that we're certain of are not subjective, then what is the ultimate strata that underlies them?

Our transcendental view will conclude that consciousness prior to being a state of cognition or a sort of mental experience, has to be a universal state of the relation of things, something that resides on their outskirts, the empty immaterial space that outlines the layer of an organism and its environment. Our theory suggests that a new solution to the traditional theory of the origin of things from each other can be resolved if we decenter the place of beginning from the aggregated state of entities into the missing strata of comportment. When we assume the intentional or directed behavior of an organism or a physical thing, then we only consider the inner composition of the present entity, whether it's a psychical processes or the bodies mass. For example, when someone is eating then we naturally assume that the biological strata of the instinct of hunger fundamentally determines this act. However, there is also an entire social environment that chains this biological instinct to consumption. The framework of the biological, economical, and any other parameter of a kind linked in similar instances of behaving, is not reducible to any of the described areas of the engaged beings in the world. The direction of movement, the end of the action in the engaging boundary of the environment, is composed of different realms of being that are not like the one set in a state of comportment or movement. It appears that comportment arranges everything that surrounds the acting body, contrary to the traditional view where entities are seen as the fundamental possibility of the attitude of behaving or movement. Our main claim is that something goes on outside the possible area of the bodies movement that has an essential/ideal nature. According to this research, the questioned sphere is that of consciousness. So where lays comportment if it's neither the body in action nor its desired or determined result? Behavior is a feature of the universe that can't be reduced to any set of material arrangements. The conscious in this sense is transcendental in every possible regard and composes the outer essence of the behaving body. With this regard at hand, it's very likely if we presuppose that the conscious is a non-reified existence that creates the environment of the concrete matter of facts. Our thought of the transcendental considers the empty space lying in between the agent and his environment, or the similar structure of emptiness residing in every possible outer milieu. The subject-object relation in the conventional perspective, places the matter of fact on the side of objectivity and the ideal sphere of possibilities within the subject. However, what if prior to such constructs there is a range with a being of its own, that stimulates the subject-object duality into being, and if this particular instance is an event of its own that encompasses the ground where all bodily and physical probabilities have their actual being? Behavior like being appears to be part of everything but also without any particular designation. When we say that a student misbehaved, we naturally reckon that certain duties or moral principles were broken by his conduct. If we describe all the involved aspects of the related state of affairs, then we'll traditionally account the bodily and psychic manifestations that are regarded as bad, the social context where the act was committed, and the written rules of conduct that are to be regarded in every act of decency or its opposite. All these features must be present in order to observe and evaluate an act of behavior. If for instance, it is an act of nudity, then its quality would be determined by the social context of its appearance. Nudity is not a kind of misbehavior if performed in the space of the bathroom, and this is probably one of the most common spaces where this act will pass as appropriate for all age groups. Then it's conclusive to infer that behavior is something that goes on between the moral rules of behaving observed by our inner conscience and written in commandments, the others that internally observe the same

codes as we do and perceive behaving in their milieu, and the wide external area of interactions within a certain socially concomitant space. If this was all there is to comportment then it would certainly involve higher sort of regards that presuppose a purposeful engagement with the surrounding and others, which would mean that behaving is impossible by entities of the lesser chain of reality that don't possess the psyche. However, if the telos/virtues of morally correct acts is installed by the conscious sphere, then how this appropriates the range of physical and bodily acts that are involved in completing a proper behavior? Because the assumption is that the scope of the physical movements expressed by a subject involves a purpose that sets them in an orderly fashion. Maybe comportment is a state of physical affairs that follow our inner imagination of those relations. In the traditional behaviorist theory, a bodily movement follows the preceding mental projection as the objectification of an envisioned motion of the body in a certain environment. In this sense, the telos of an act lies in the internal states of the mental, and everything that lacks this psychical facility should lack behaving. But it doesn't, and behaving like being is a universal attribute of all possible things, and even stones behave in a principal fashion that is accorded with the laws of physics. If, as behavioral theory suggests, the telos of comportment is internal then why do we say that comportment is the making of the external arrangement of bodily movements set to achieve outer relations in the world? Behaving in a certain manner can result in the satisfaction of an inner need or ambition, like when a child behaves accordingly and gets chocolate, or when an officer acts courageously and gets promoted to a higher rank. But even in these instances, the ends of behaving are not made of internal satisfactions but of something rather external, the rewarded chocolate or the gained rank. Could it be that comportment has nothing to do with our mental reconstruction of the physical affairs that either antecedence (projects) them or succeeds (reflects) them in a certain fashion, and is a state of its own that conditions the manifestation of all known properties of the mental and the physical from their state of dormant? In this instance, the previously observed act of misbehavior would not account to either the inner layer of the conscience, the outer state of the social affairs and the present bodily act that is evaluated as an instance of misbehaving. If this was not the case, then all there would be left in the designated area of comportment would amount to the empty space between 1. the conscious state of affairs that are seen as nothing more than a mental imagination; 2. the social context; 3. and the timely appearance of certain bodily movements of a creature capable of psychic experiences. Comportment would be the encircled area between the hard fact of the world and the soft act of the psyche, or in other words, it would be nothing at all, a designated place without existence, and a continuum without any extension or anything visible for that matter.

Our transcendental theory would have to point to the content and the essence of precisely this invisible area which according to us is the designated dimension of the transcendental not only understood as the condition of the psychic processes but as the ultimate source of being of all possible realms of psychical and physical reality. Comportment is not the effected state of anything because it's nothing or the empty in-between of everything, however, the coming into existence of everything is precisely through this strata that is the pure telos, the blind physical law of either physical motion or the reason of psychical emotion and other acts of the higher species. By all our accounts, comportment is a form of transcendence from the physical, its abstract law of motion, and the transcendence of the subjective, the non-mental existence of the principles of reason and morals that appropriate the vast range of organic emotions and bodily appearances.

4. TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY

Neurophenomenology broadened the horizon of the reductionist research into the spheres of the psyche by a multidisciplinary study of the various forms of emotional attunement of cognition and the phenomenological theory of embodiment that explain experiences in pair with the brain functions that are entangled with the subjective introspection and the various cultural artefacts, such as language, society, culture, etc.²⁴ The main hypothesis of neurophenomenology is that man is not the physiological neural flow, but he's governed by different realms of reality and thus holistically theorized. This way, brain science is broadened by an interdisciplinary approach that navigates it into a more detailed account of the human experiences that are analyzed in laboratories in finding a more exact mapping of the brain functions that somehow attribute to this mental states and other facts of experience. "Following Francisco Varela (1996), neurophenomenology is defined as a way to understand first-person consciousness and lived experience through the use of phenomenological method and while relating the resulting discoveries of potential phenomenological invariants with third-person neurological findings."²⁵ Phenomenologically trained subjects can undergo a wide range of experiments and are able to detail their experiences of emotional, cognitive, perceptual and other elaborate states of consciousness, that are to be coordinated with neurobiological measurements of their parallel brain functions, navigating neurologists in making a more precise EEG screenings on brain patterns and their experiential coordinates.²⁶ This would eventually help neurology in discovering the various brain parts responsible for different psychic activities. However, neurophenomenology claims that it's not a reductionist science that sets strives to discover the hard natural fact that causes the clouded realm of the conscious processes, quantifying them on the factual chain of causality.²⁷ Instead, through its interdisciplinary and holistic account of the broad range of phenomena that are ascertained to human experience, neurophenomenology combines the scientific "hard problem" of the psyche with other areas of research of the human comportment through economics, psychology, and phenomenology.²⁸ The hard problem of consciousness means finding the biological correlate for the mind. The valuation of consciousness in its different modes of objectification in both the social and natural sciences opens a methodological gap that contrasts causal explanations with descriptive ones.

To begin with, the call for closing the gap between consciousness and neurophysiology reflects a reductionist desire, and as we've just suggested, this may not be the most scientific approach to understanding consciousness.²⁹

²⁴ Shaun Gallagher, Lauren Reinerman-Jones, Bruce Janz, Patricia Bockelman, and Jörg Trempler Ed., *New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science*. (2015). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 78.

²⁵ Shaun Gallagher, Lauren Reinerman-Jones, Bruce Janz, Patricia Bockelman, and Jörg Trempler Ed., op. cit., 34.

²⁶ Shaun Gallagher, Lauren Reinerman-Jones, Bruce Janz, Patricia Bockelman, and Jörg Trempler Ed., op. cit., 60.

²⁷ Shaun Gallagher, Lauren Reinerman-Jones, Bruce Janz, Patricia Bockelman, and Jörg Trempler Ed., op. cit., 67.

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ Shaun Gallagher, Lauren Reinerman-Jones, Bruce Janz, Patricia Bockelman, and Jörg Trempler Ed., op. cit., 68.

The first problem of neurophenomenology is that it's not systematic enough in explicating consciousness as such, primarily because it neglects the purpose of science in finding the ultimate axioms that set a system of knowledge. Generally speaking, theoretical interpretation involves simplification of complex objectivities into simpler principles, and having the interdisciplinary approach at hand doesn't help in this regard. Scientific anomalies such as consciousness can't be explained if we take two conflicting theories into a unified one.

The second problem of neurophenomenology is related to its method of thought that can be regarded as a sort of dualism of naturalistic and phenomenological principles, or as an eclectic approach situated in an intermediate discipline between the status quo of discovering the meaning of consciousness in the present day, and the eventual findings of its nature in the future. Neurophenomenologists like F. H. Peters are in full acknowledgment of this when stating that: "Neither psychology nor philosophy, then, provide the necessary objective window on the biological sphere within which the final explanation of consciousness and its phenomenal properties are to be found. That access can only be gained through recourse to neurological research."³⁰. This pessimistic account on philosophy is probably accurate from a certain historical perspective where all philosophy is seen as an initial stage of advance science. However, then we can question: why bother with philosophy at all when all its findings would prove to be futile? In this case, the only option is to examine a different account of philosophy that would be of importance to science.

Such a renewed theoretical position can be gained through transcendental phenomenology as a course of explaining the matters of facts related to consciousness and their origin within it as their basis. The transcendental view explains facts as products of consciousness and assumes that no amount of empirically acquired data can bring in the phenomenon of consciousness. The only definite proof of the empirical method in explaining consciousness can be gained by creating a free-willed A.I.

The method of epoche can be of value for a conclusive insight into the state of affairs of consciousness, mainly because it disregards the property of existence and assesses that of appearance. If an actualization of phenomenology is to be performed in modern-day neuroscience, then it's better if we hypothesized that neurology is part of a wider conscious eidetic framework in the Husserlian sense, that holds the key of unlocking the empirical implications of the ideal essence that presuppose the neural specter of brain activities. Empirical psychology can get a better perspective on its researched field if it investigates the non-facticity of conscious experiences that condition the possibility of the matter of fact. Since phenomenology investigates comprehensively how consciousness constitutes science, why not extend its claim into neurobiology? Our special hypothesis will be: neurobiology is a continuation of a modern-day eidetic framework that can be historically analyzed through the transcendental attitude. This doesn't exclude the implications of applied phenomenology into helping neurobiological research in training subjects exposed to experiments, but simply gives a philosophical perspective on neurology's ends in natural science. Consciousness is not nature, however, nature can be explained in the historical a priori phenomenology as an epoch where the prescientific life-world of experience is objectified as nature. This is metaphysical research in the phenomenological sense, seen as the first philosophy of the final

³⁰ Frederic H. Peters, "Neurophenomenology", in *Theory and Method in the Study of Religion*. (2000). Leiden: Brill. Page 387.

causes and not as a “degenerative” interpretation of modern sciences into the frames of an obsolete system of metaphysics.³¹

³¹ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*. op. cit., 139.

5. THE HISTORICAL A PRIORI OF SCIENCE AND NEUROBIOLOGY

5.1 THE HISTORICAL A PRIORI IN SCIENCE

This section addresses the transcendental constitution of neurobiology within the history of science. We are going to suppose that brain activities were set as causes to the conscious life because of the prevalence of the naturalized attitude in modern science. However, this fact alone can't justify any naturalistic definition of consciousness. The phenomenological tradition accepts that nature is objectified through the process of idealization made by consciousness into the prescientific life-world.³²

What Husserl had in mind in his investigations of the constitutive propositions and intentional acts that brought about the eidetic truths and the empirical matter of fact are the possibilities of the experiential life-world transcendently present for every theoretical inquiry. The "hard problem" of science for Husserl is not structured in the empirical grounding of the real attributes of the intentional acts and the consequent mental states, but of a sense realm that needed no further explications. The necessity of the "transcendental clue" can be demonstrated in an imaginary state of science where through the advanced research of neurobiology, science discovers the ultimate brain hard-wires that trigger all possible psychic experiences. Even with such knowledge at hand, a neuroscientist would have to consider the possibility that the totality of the cultural and natural world is somehow produced by various neural arrangements that pattern our perception and cultural production, rendering everything according to the laws of physiological activities that produce all spheres of being. The being of matter is the hidden supposition that neurobiology takes for granted, however, it neglects the property of transcendence ascribed to this self-sufficient entity. Before any account of the internal being of the mental phenomena that supposedly form correlatively with nature, neuroscience has to get hold of the transcendence of objectivity as an entity of its own. The discovery of different arrangements of mental phenomena that are reduced to the biological processes has to account for the full spectrum of its attitude and necessarily doesn't end with immanence but has to claim a correlation between the psyche and transcendent nature. What differs the introspection of the inner psychic experiences from our perception of objective reality, and does the one form without the other? If we could simply assume that there were facts and laws of nature separated from our own realm of introspective thought, then neuroscience has a tremendous task of explaining physical nature indifferently from psychological processes, without merely assuming that they were objectively present in our experience. No amount of experience will ever conclude that the mental property of its phenomena yields the reified existence of the outer being. After reducing all experiences to biological processes of the brain – this task may take us centuries – biology would still have to uncover the processes that make intentionality an unchained area to any of the realms that are unaccounted in its own psychological terms. The valuative sphere of each particular culture, the physical objects of science, technology, etc., are all domains that are not explicable in terms of brain functions. The being of transcendence can't be properly explained if we ground it on the simpler forms of biology, and this is precisely what Husserl's phenomenology explains in the conscious flow of experiences that are

³² Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. (1970). Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 348.

idealized in the unity of the sensible properties as the “thing in itself”.³³ Namely, neuroscience has to take a better perspective when it deals with ontological entities of inner and outer reality, especially when it collects various of experimental data regarding the brain as the fundamental layer of the possibility of knowledge and experience. The simple stipulation that we are not dealing with metaphysics but with an empirical science is not enough in clearing the area from the vast amount of inherited metaphysical tradition that constructs the world view inherited in neuroscience. Taking an account on what influenced the beginning of a certain scientific tradition, especially if it’s a science that deals with the most complex organ, can clear out the way for establishing definitive theories that would lead the investigation toward groundbreaking discoveries. Nowadays, neuroscience simply borrows some of the empirical approaches of classical psychology without taking into account that empiricism never brought psychology to a definitive stance of a theory that cleared the path for conclusive examinations of the listed phenomena. It also neglects the inevitable conclusion that investigating the basis of what makes the possibility of our understanding, will result in giving a definitive list of possibilities that allow us to grasp the secrets of our cosmos. With such responsibility, neuroscience should be more critical of its concepts in the pursuit of the ultimate saying in science and truth. The entirety of the universe will always be out of reach, however knowing the limits and grounds of our knowledge can yield rigorous means of revealing being. Following Husserl’s transcendental clue can guide science in giving a full map of the concerned processes without relying on deductively concluded facts from prejudiced premises.

When neurobiology evaluates such conscious formations, it has to consider the possibilities of a new metaphysics. Brain science with its summarizing of the biological brain processes that create our thoughts regarding reality, will also have to extend the naturalist account to the normative sphere. The claims of neurobiology will be so far reaching that it has to account for human cultural production, and how universal reason through mathematics and logic is formed. Neurology is in need of a defined method in its ambition to set the neural elements as the basis of the axiological sphere, and all other spiritual makings that are present through history. With such a tremendous task ahead, neuroscience has to consider non-empirical methods. As Sartre said: “The nerve is not meaningful; it is a colloidal substance which can be described in itself and which does not have the quality of transcendence; that is, it does not transcend itself in order to make known to itself by means of other realities what it is.”³⁴ The sense realm lies beyond the “hard problem” of naturalized science. By taking a transcendental position, any psychological discipline could sharpen its focus on the given facts that account different states of consciousness and the vastness of the social environment. Phenomenology is not only about training experimental subjects, but it can also help neurobiology in setting a more precise specter of the purpose of grounding its empirical data that came out in a particular setting of history governed by structures that are not reflected in neurology.

Not every communalized product that was inherited in a form of a tradition from one historical epoch in another, served as an invariable historical a priori that gave successive epochs the very roots of building their societies and sciences.³⁵ For a more self-evident thought of the history of science, it is necessary to distinguish the invariant content that is transcendental for all stages of

³³ Edmund Husserl, *Crisis*. op. cit., 347.

³⁴ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*. (2003). New York and London: Routledge. 581.

³⁵ Edmund Husserl, *Crisis*. op. cit., 28.

man's scientific and cultural development, from others that are not. Phenomenology is not a historicism that grasps everything through man's progression in history, but it's a transcendental doctrine of the possibilities of history that are the essential acts of man as the key historical figure. Neurology should consider the possibility of the constructive role of a historical a priori that defines man's and worlds nature in a certain tradition. No history of science claims that facts were given from the dawn of time and that our knowledge obtains them through historical bargaining with the world. Any attempt of neurobiology to discover the ultimate layers of knowledge and experience should clearly distinguish the origin of its metaphysical claim within history. In different circumstances like the ones proposed by our research, brain processes are viewed as instruments of experience. Thus, brain science could gain a more clear perspective in the legitimacy of the depths of its reductionist claim. It should carefully examine the alternatives of the argument that certain objectified neural arrangements are the basis of experience, and also to explore similar claims in classical psychology that led nowhere. According to Husserl, prescientific thought gives the fundamental layer of the possibilities of objectified science as a conscious act of idealization of the brute experiential data.³⁶ If there is the slightest possibility that there is a primordial experience that's not objective, and in turn creates objective knowledge from the conscious processes of idealization, then it's not conclusive to state that objective matters of facts are the true basis of consciousness. That's why it's important to draw the phenomenological boundaries that can set neurology on its right path in investigating the phenomena of experience, and not try to have everything that goes on in the conscious acts in check with certain lighted areas of the brain hard-wires.

5.2 HISTORICAL TRADITIONS INHERITED BY NEUROSCIENCE

Modern-day neurology attempts to overcome the phenomenological gap between the physical chain of events and the immanence of consciousness, with the biological appropriation of the concept of "core consciousness", a multi-layered phenomenon that includes awareness and the conscious extension to objectivity within the biological properties of the neural correlates.³⁷ "Elucidating the neurobiology of core consciousness requires the discovery of a composite neural map which brings together in time the pattern for the object, the pattern for the organism, and establishes the relationship between the two [2]."³⁸ In this completely naturalized study of cognition, the conscious act along with the wider frame of the subject's correlation to objectivity is entirely reduced to its biological brain-counterparts of the viscera, the vestibular apparatus, and the musculoskeletal frame.³⁹ The object, in turn, is reduced to the neural patterns of sensory association's cortices.⁴⁰

³⁶ Edmund Husserl, *Crisis*. op. cit., 349.

³⁷ Steven Laureys and Giulio Tononi, *Neurology of Consciousness, Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuropathology*. (2009). Amsterdam: Elsevier Ltd. 7.

³⁸ Steven Laureys and Giulio Tononi, op. cit., 8.

³⁹ *ibid*.

Although neurological studies hardly explain how the brain processes an object through experimental studies of the areas that are most active in perception, memory, and language, it fails to explain why the stored object in memory or any other brain activity had to rely on concepts and categories that never went through the process of naturalization. This account also fails to examine any biological naturalization of time as a neural event and accepts Newton's conception of time as something independent from the body. This obsolete definition of time shows how neuroscience dwells in the common sense attitude towards its basic propositions and concepts. Evaluating time as a property of the flux of core consciousness has to give a thorough examination of its biological formation which brings mental phenomena into the range of successive awareness of the past, the future, and the present. To naturalize consciousness with the use of immaterialized and ideal properties of cognition, like that of the universals and of time, is not conclusive in modern day science.

While physics requires rigorousness in explaining events based on abstract concepts, the "hard problem" in terms of neuroscience is the clarification of the neural origin of any sort of abstraction. Namely, how do the infinite phenomena of our consciousness are identified as objectivity itself? This naturalized theory of cognition is further developed with Peters NP arguments:

Research determined that nerve energy is not spiritistic but electrical energy (du Bois-Reymond 1843), that the basic component of the brain is the neuron, a normal biological cell specially adapted with axons and dendrites for signaling to other cells (Hanover 1840; Deiters 1865); that neurons were neither utterly separated nor thoroughly fused together but interconnected via axons and dendrites (Cajal 1888); that interactive communication between neurons takes place at a synapse (Sherrington 1897); that behavioral functions such as speech (Paul Broca 1861), language comprehension (Wernicke 1874) and processing in both the sensory (Muller 1826; Munk 1878; Ferrier 1876) and motor modes (Heitzif and Fritsch 1870) are localized in specific areas of the brain.⁴¹

Here we can reflect that the ultimate goal of neurobiology is to establish a causal relation from the brain energy into that of conscious acts of language and cognition, having the latter appropriated to the simpler biological strata. Such an experimental proof can only be obtained if we hypothetically take an isolated brain and have it attached to an outside wired source of stimuli related to the accounted brain activities producing all kinds of mental activities ranging from basic sensations and desires, right to the more complex ones of social interactions, poetry, and speculative thinking. However, in this instance, the biologically obtained means of developing all possible mental states will also have to attribute to their significance. The definition of truth and meaning as a correspondence between our thought representations and objects is becoming obsolete and other alternative theories of truth were formulated within the last century. Nevertheless, neuroscience at its present theoretical development, can't obtain any relevant experimental data without the theory of representation. Its main interest shows how the perception of an objective thing is related to the causal brain imaging set in the highest neural organization that cumulates in the cerebral cortex; however, this can only explain sense based on analogy and not apodictic truths or creative artefacts. Mental and physical entities can be only analog in each of others aspect, either mental or physical. If one doesn't constitute the other, and they don't since brain processes are separate from physical

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴¹ F. H. Peters, *op. cit.*, 399-89.

ones, then any representationally gained correspondence is impossible. So far, from our earlier account, neurology included two leveled layers of neural activities that contribute to conscious acts: 1. the viscera, the vestibular apparatus, and the musculoskeletal frame are the natural layers of subjectivity 2. and the neural patterns of sensory associations cortices contribute to the objective counterpart of consciousness. The relation between these two organic states that underlie a phenomenological act makes the latter something unaccountable in naturalistic terms. How neural finding of any sort can be held responsible for the correlation of a manifold imagination and its significance, as a sense constituent that surpasses the range of the mental/neural attitude as its ideality, is still unclear. Even if neurology could artificially stimulate a brain activity that produces combination of the sensible images of historic or other figures with the collective memory of the past or any other discipline, as a sensory and memory association of different areas of the brain, it's not categorical at this point of its development, that abstract categories and concepts are also neural features that reside within the physiological strata. Peters' claim that nerve energy is electric and not spiritistic, doesn't amount to the fact that the spiritistic is neural.

This obscurity contributed to the invention of what Peters called the basic brain hard-wired conceptual categories that condition our systematic understanding of the sensory data.⁴² It's clear from the very definition of the hard-wired category that there are two different strata's involved in that particular experiential formation, and abstract layer and an empirical one. Categories are called abstract for a reason; they don't precisely tie sensations as knots tie our shoes. They reside outside of the sense stimuli, and if naturalized, then there have to be an explicit finding of the brain points where sensory material is processed into causality, or substantiality in the same physiological manner like our hearing organ responds to noises, or our eyes amount to seeing, etc. Hard-wired categories have to be organs or brain processes resembling those of the neurons or the synapse that respond to sensory data in a constant manner of synthesis. In this instance, neurobiology would have to find a way to materially point to synthetic apperception in another compartment of the brain, which conditions the various interrelation of our category-neural brain functions with the sense-data. A core consciousness can only be experimentally proven if we discover four different levels of brain functions that contribute to experiencing. So far it only explained one. The deficiency of such findings is clear when neuroscience states that: "The ability of brains to become aware of their own operations and states could, thus, be due to an iteration of the same cognitive operations that support primary sensory processing."⁴³ The process of abstraction is still physiologically undefinable term.

Set in a historical context, neurology is a combination of psychology and biology. It is easy to understand the difficulty of setting it into further interdisciplinary integrations like the one of neurophenomenology, simply because its inherent psychological structure is of an empirical provenience that presupposes the research of the psyche on empirical inductions, similarly to biological processes. According to Husserl, what made psychology insufficient from its very beginnings was explaining consciousness in a causal relation with nature. Behaviorist psychology, for instance, in its third person observations and quantification of conscious acts, assumes, what David J. Chalmers called, an "easy theory" of consciousness that defines it as something that has no

⁴² F. H. Peters, op. cit., 395.

⁴³ Steven Laureys and Giulio Tononi, *Neurology of Consciousness, Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuropathology*. op. cit., 44.

independent existence.⁴⁴ Neurology holds the same perspective on consciousness and regards it only in instances where it attributes to measuring observations into results within the experimental neural sphere. Consciousness is simply a preliminary hypothesis in the process of obtaining hard neurological findings. With biology its different, and the systematization of the various scopes of chemical processes only contribute to the function of the organism, they never reduce its existence to the chemical level of being. The organism is a macro chemical process of simpler chemical processes and even though each aspect of biology is composed of chemistry, the two have different laws of organization.

In psychology or its modern-day experimental counterpart of neuroscience, the problem is finding a proper account for the mental phenomena. The ambition is clear: finding a neuronal substrate for phenomenal experiences, through investigating the points where the mental converges into observable neuronal codes that the cerebral cortex uses for representing external objects and internal states.⁴⁵ The requirement of the transcendental attitude is an epistemological one and states that it's necessary to distinguish between a theory and its foundations. The latter is attributed to cognition and its different sets of possibilities that require no further explication. Science per se has the world and its lawful behavior formulated on a mathematical scale and only to the extent of the space-time structure that subjectivity forms as the universal horizon of the world.⁴⁶ The way a subject grasps this or that aspect of reality is of no interest to science, and many novel theories have a whole set of different axioms and concepts that at their very beginning may seem counterintuitive. The business of science is not to make a theory explicable in the milieu of an old understanding, but to forward a new and more accurate predicament of worldly phenomena that the old theory failed to grasp. Transcendentally speaking, the problem with psychology is that it didn't define the nature of the very thing it was explaining. The psyche includes various processes that are crucial for every understanding. It was improper for psychology to have the world view on nature imposed on the possibilities of understanding in general. If we draw a parallel with physics, its formulated laws predict the behavior of things but it doesn't reduce a law to a thing. Psychology's goal is finding the reified being of principles and abstract acts of cognition. Saying that there is an understanding of objective nature and that the nature of understanding is objective, is a circular argument by any account. Whether nature exists independently from us or not, is of no interest for phenomenology. What phenomenology attempts to describe is the core of understanding as something self-evident, no matter what the object correlates may be. In Husserl, the theory of the rootedness of the objective world within the transcendental subject attempts to explicate the core causes that give this world a sense extrapolated from our inner intuition that eventually grows into the ultimate stage of any sort of understanding.

According to Husserl, transcendentalism is not science but only reflects the subjective grounds for objectivity. The difficulties that lie in science are not the same as those in neuroscience since some of its findings are not counter intuitive but in search of the non-intuitive nature of intuition. If each experiential act has an intuition or counter intuition at its basis then what is at the basis of a neurological explanation of intuition? Is it that it's not an intuition? Phenomenologically

⁴⁴ David J. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind*. (1996). New York: Oxford University Press. xii.

⁴⁵ Steven Laureys and Giulio Tononi, *Neurology of Consciousness, Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuropathology*. op. cit., 45.

⁴⁶ Edmund Husserl, *Crisis*. op. cit. 349.

it's impossible to reduce understanding or any of its forms into neural assemblies that will none intuitively forward a representation of an object into the cerebral cortex as an organic couple of awareness because each instance of the neural representation of an object requires reflection in order to produce or reproduce its object. It's true that neuroscience doesn't have to follow the phenomenological principle of reflection, however, representation is a phenomenological act that presupposes apperception otherwise it would be plain mirroring. This would mean that all neurons are required to possess a cerebral cortex in their basis if they bring the information to the higher organ of consciousness. The basic principle of any phenomenology or theory of knowledge is that any state of knowledge includes awareness in its basis. The problem with a third person examination of consciousness, is a fundamental one that fails to recognize that it deals with a first person perspective, a process that if seen from an outside source fails to be what it is. Phenomenology's own regards into the third person perspective of consciousness is that of "empathy", but its only ambition is to demonstrate the existence of the other person that resembled our own, that together constitute the further levels of objectivity. The main achievement of this phenomenological method is recognition of alter egos or different cultures, as irreducible alien objects within our own first person perspective.⁴⁷

Here we will inquire into the possibility of transcendental grounding of neuroscience as a means of outlining its proper field of research. This can be achieved through the examining of the process of "*oriented constitution*" set as a theory of the strata included within the domain of possible experiences and their formation into science.⁴⁸ An oriented constitution is the hidden asset of Husserl's phenomenology that gave birth to the successive theories of embodiment and existence. The first stream of experience of the ego is that of the subjective processes that form the noemata realm. The secondary constitution is an internal one and consists in the production of mental phenomena. The third is the world with its complex meanings that are included within the preceding acts of communal intentionality.⁴⁹ This is not to say that we have a strict forming of a world image made of spiritual quality, like that of the senses or ideas, but only that in each act of intentionality the eidetic underlies the factual as a necessary condition of its evidence. A transcendently reduced physical thing will continue to appear within objective nature and will comply with the set of physical laws attributed to the sphere of nature that it exists in. What are the transcendental strata as an ideal nature that underlies the physical one, and why the two can coexist without limiting the actuality of the other? According to Husserl, the primary (lower) strata of essential experiences amounts to the originality of the meanings of the fundamental concepts that in the "higher" strata constitute a different set of validity. The two instances of existence don't collide in any way, and the phenomenological regard of nature measures not the traveled distances of objects, but their intuitive formation. Physical reality on a phenomenological scale is intuitively definable in any of its regards. Nevertheless, intuition or knowledge is not reversible to nature but rather something preceding it.

Oriented constitution contributes to the phenomenological examination of different states of experience and in the instance of neurology of consciousness, can contribute to the evaluation of a foreign presence in the brain processes that together form experiences. Additionally, this can

⁴⁷ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*. op. cit., 134.

⁴⁸ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*. op. cit., 133.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

reevaluate the use of concepts and propositions within a neurobiological study of consciousness, and set the course of the research on a more rigorous path.

6. TRANSCENDENTAL CONSTITUTION OF SCIENCE AND NEUROSCIENCE

6.1. ESSENCES OVER FACTS

For Husserl's constitutional theory of consciousness, the first task is to have it methodically distinguished from that of other sciences.⁵⁰ The claim that transcendental phenomenology has to defend is that science is about the world, but no science is possible without a conscious being that transcends the natural world. This means that consciousness can relate to the world through science, but from the standpoint of Husserl's phenomenology there can't be a science of consciousness that makes it part of the natural world. This is because its objective strata or the regional ontology in question does not comply with that of any other science and all sciences have consciousness as their primordial possibility. In the instance of the intentional analysis, we conceived that the pure ego set as the meaning bestowal through the light ray metaphor is a paradoxical configuration which holds no sense of its own if comprehended outside of the objective constitution of the sense noemata. In the instance of the intentional analysis, the conclusion is that the sense bestowing pure ego can be structured only as lumen natural. Afterwards, we showed that this position has to amount to the possibility of meaning beyond the noema, which is not Husserlian explanation of the basic form of meaning paired with the noema. Phenomenology as pure egology lacks the ability to establish content within these supposed prime strata's because there is none, and all accounts lead to the description of a mystical entity that sheds knowledge on the external in the manner of lumen naturale. Egology is probably the inexplicable naturalized realm that's not phenomenologically conclusive. The crucial point where egology fails to satisfy phenomenology, is when it posits meaning into an naturally conceived source of the un-naturalized being of consciousness in the form of the ego. In Heidegger, being precedes meaning but this is not the case in Husserl where ideal structures condition the coming into being of everything. Essences don't predate consciousness because they are not existentials, nor does the ego/consciousness begins existing without a fundamental correlation within the essential realm of ideas. Stating this matter in any other way would drive transcendental phenomenology into philosophy of being or naturalism.

Nonetheless, neither empiricism nor rationalism can contradict that science or knowledge of any kind begins at a non-objective realm or awareness as intentionality, and even if we suppose that there is another cause of actuality, any inquiry into it, we have to be conscious in order to presuppose this. It is principally possible to conduct epistemological or metaphysical research without acknowledging this transcendental finding, however, once our gaze reflects it, a radical split of reality occurs, the division of pure illusion and hard fact. Any attempt of finding an all-embracing philosophy of science has to conceive what is transcendently primal within its successive constitutional investigations. What Husserl did in regard to founding an all-embracing philosophy, is the methodological division between the naïve attitude of common sense and science, and the reflective attitude of phenomenology. What distinguishes transcendental philosophy from science and other acts of knowledge is the method of immanent reflection oppose to a system of deductive theory.⁵¹ Phenomenologically speaking, naivety doesn't amount to inaccuracy, but simply to a common instance of our regard about reality. Every exact science relies on the latter attitude and

⁵⁰ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*. op. cit., 9.

⁵¹ Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. (1970). op. cit., 156.

presupposes a “computational” unity of its area of interest that can be grounded on a fundamental axiom definable in nature.⁵² Some pre-phenomenological philosophies also held various axioms within their metaphysical doctrines from which reality was ultimately deduced from. The reason why philosophy never emerged as science was probably because philosophers failed to find such an axiom that conclusively explained the creation of being. The closest philosophy ever got to be a science, was in antiquity, an age where science was not as experimental or mathematical as in the modern age, and various philosophical schools had wide social acknowledgment, but nevertheless, no doctrine of philosophy was ever as esteemed as modern day physics and astronomy.⁵³ Husserl was very much puzzled by this and thought of discovering a solution that would rid this philosophical controversy for good. His invention of the phenomenological method of self-investigation was acknowledging the possibility of founding an all-out theory of science as philosophy because his investigations naturally led him into the possibilities of cognition that ultimately grounded science. Science is never about cognition, but there is definitely cognition going on into every science, and a theory set to explain cognition is the one to find the grounding layer of any possible science. This is Husserl’s meaning of metaphysics.

Husserl’s final ambition was to have all theoretical sciences founded as branch forms emerging from an all-embracing a priori phenomenology, and their propositional meaning as a systematic unfolding of an encompassing a priori innate in the essential structure of subjectivity and intersubjectivity.⁵⁴ The a priori conditions of science and life are not formal categories but existential possibilities of all realms of being, as in a *constitutive universal ontology*.⁵⁵ Here lies the fundamental problem of the scientific ambition of Husserl’s phenomenology, namely how can ideas produce reality? In scientific terms, this is not much of a puzzle because the one thing that science will never assume is an interest in universal explanation, and all sciences have their material domain made of objective qualities opposed to any subjectivity that could’ve predetermine them. By not taking a transcendental attitude, science continues and has no need of any other claim that surpasses this naïve view. The only instance where science conflicts with its fundamental claims of objectively grounded quantitative and argumentative research is when it attempts an invasion of the transcendental domain in the manner of neuroscience. However, isn’t it a kind of prejudice to restrain science in its accumulative growth of the areas of its research by prematurely stating that a certain particular area is in conflict with some higher principles? Where would science be today if it had to comply with all known traditions of the past? By criticizing neurology from its scientific intrusion into the final remaining realm of sense-making spirituality, don’t we fall into the typically stereotyped conduct that phenomenology attempted to surpass? So what if spirituality is chased out of knowledge if science naturally progresses against all claims of metaphysical theory and religious superstition? It is possible that an age will come when humanity will be in no need of philosophy or moral codex’s, and all forms of truth and false, good and evil, will be founded in certain neural assembly’s that are processed by the brain and reflected into different mental states. Finding the proper biological format of these arrangements will be considered as the criteria of moral, logical, and esthetical judgments. The cerebral cortex could be proven to stand in opposition to the mystical entity of consciousness, as burning hydrogen is in opposition to Amon Ra. Sciences’ triumph over

⁵² *ibid.*

⁵³ Thomas S. Khun. *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*. (1996). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 10.

⁵⁴ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*. op. cit., 155.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*

nature is certain, and philosophy is the last resort of the evading spirits of past traditions and cultures that will inevitably perish. Mystical constructs are in no way relevant in explaining events of impending importance, and phenomenology will have to fall silent in the inevitable expansion of positive science.

Although this vision is to some extent correct and history has taught us that philosophy lost many of its proud possessions due to modern day science, it nonetheless shows the vitality and importance of holding on to consciousness as a last remaining field of philosophy that can restore its past glory. By proving that consciousness is a philosophical problem and not that of positive science, philosophy can win everything and reclaim the former throne over science. The way to this is through the finding of the transcendental constitution of the naturalized level of brain functions that are not liable in “producing” consciousness to any physical or chemical laws and other inorganic formal categories vaguely applied to the brain activities that may not be the sole causes of the psyche.

6.2. BEHAVIOUR AS THE IDEAL STATE OF ORGANIC CREATURES

The transcendental hypothesis would be that experience and behavior of the organic creates the very environment as the structuralized content of consciousness. Behavioral psychology defines comportment as a byproduct of intelligence that remains hidden behind the mammals’ skull. However, what if consciousness has nothing to do with the psyche as a mental faculty of concentrated brain activities, and forms the environment of the organic? Then the soul or consciousness would not be seen as phenomena that split from the content of the world, but as the milieu itself where organic creatures arrange their life-world. Merleau-Ponty’s embodiment theory supposes that something goes in and out of the conscious – like when perception is broadened through the flesh or when subjectively formed consciousness is enriched by culture – but still leaves unanswered questions relating to the world/culture constitution because of the subject-object split. Our position proposes that behavior is an outer and irreducible part to an organism that has as much in common with internal phenomena as with external. Consciousness is not an internal drive that spreads outwardly like a fountain, but a state of ideal affairs set in the oriented region of reality, an ideal space where all beings strive for in accordance to their physical or organic capacities that they constantly re-arrange according to the laws and relations of the essential or immaterial state of conscious behaving. Such a region of the conscious would hardly be inapplicable to other spheres of the cosmos, and conscious acts that were formerly seen as part of some developed organic structures are now paired with all possible behavior. The neural is an environment of the conscious as much as physical reality, and its capacities are furthered by evolution and growth in order to comply with the rational scope of the conscious. This account of the ideal would not have to face any of the traditional challenges of idealism, like how can thinking precede reality, because it doesn’t assume that ideality habituates the psyche. Merleau-Ponty defends this position when stating that the subject has a priority over the object.⁵⁶ In our research, the manner of the world, even at its

⁵⁶ Sebastian Gardner and Matthew Grist, *The Transcendental Turn*. (2015). New York: Oxford University Press. 301.

most elemental levels, is the non-subjective and essential being of comportment. In early behaviorist theories, comportment was seen as that which stretches out of the central nervous system outside in the open through the body's movements. Its meaning is entrapped in the features that are shown on the outlines of the moving body. It was the indescribable area that set a body towards its ends.

The world precedes the psyche and other aspects of the physiological, and the latter can adapt as the effect absorbs the energy of its cause, but only if there is a primordial state of comport that sets the telos of the organism within the external area of nature. The code of adaptation and evolution of species is not anything organic or a chemical counterpart of any polarity written either in the world or in the genes of the species, but a conscious constitution that brings the harsh fact of facing reality and getting ground suitable for the continuation of the biological strata in the transcendently constituted chain of events that are spiritual and teleological. Ensuring the species survival involves a wide prism of activities and objects that can be simply reduced to an all-out event of the transcendental telos that envelops the physical and the biological from the preexisting act of the conscious capable of making an externalized behavior. The horizon of experience of all known species has to be set by an external attitude like that of the behavior. Any sort of internalization of the natural into the internal state of the physiological and psychological originates from the primordial experience that forwards a behavioral attitude and its internal/external conditions. Instincts may be crucial for the survival of primitive species, but comportment is not of an instinctive making and surpasses all possibilities of physiological reduction on any aspect of the simple drive. Comportment like any other ideality has its own content and structure, and the impossibility of its categorization into the physiological or the physical is what makes it the foundational area of consciousness. If any behavior could be organically reduced, like eating to the neurologically patterned instinct of hunger, then its observable manifestations would've involved only the consumption of the environment. Similarly, the phenomenological description of love shows that it's not an internal feature of desire but involves the transcendence of the beloved other. Love is neither an intrinsic quality of the nervous system nor the external quality of anatomy, but a type of awareness that bridges over the two organisms in the transcendence of the organic symbiosis. In the observation of even the most primitive behaviors, the measurable constituent is not the organic absorption of the external but the immanent act of consciously construed events that give purpose to any of the processes involved in the conduct. Comportment as consciousness is basically the structure of space/time, and every entity infers its place, origin, and destination in the spatial/temporal arrangement of behaving. Time prior to being a horizon of the world is not anything subjective, but something that involves subjectivity in its comportment towards the world.

Accordingly, it's plausible that the beginning of life on our planet didn't emerge under the proposed conditions stated in the naturalized hypothesis of the molecular constitution into cells and bacteria, but as an instance of comportment. Molecules gain their environment through comport, and so does anything else of the world. It's very likely that the ideal laws of comportment determine the leap of lower creatures into more diverse organisms. This doesn't necessarily mean a creationist vision of origins but a teleological forming of centrally formed organisms toward their peripheral margins. Even atoms have a constitution in the periphery. Panpsychism seems plausible here but only if behaving lays within the sphere of the biologically formed entity of the psyche. Contrary to this view, we suggested that behavior precedes both the subject and the environment in its essential property of temporal-spatiality. In this regard, the structure of behaving is not linked to the capacity of the mental and its function is to project the mental above its inherent biological laws and within

the successive cultural and natural worlds. In assuming this position, we can attribute a state of behaving even to atoms, without asserting that they have to be conscious in the mental property of awareness with its internal assets. The fact that atoms group together to form more complex elements means that they have an environment that is not envisioned in any way, but rather constituted through various of external sets that we call chemical laws. What we call a law is something that's placed in various behavioral and external properties of simple elements that form into higher assembly's. The relatedness of the elemental physical entities that we call basic physical laws is something that forms the in-between space of particles, and that's the designated area of behaving. In this realm of being, we're discussing the ontology of the physical law and not the possibility of a cosmic mind. Our position states clearly that comportment as an ideal state of affairs is of limited range when conditioning events of physical nature, we don't suppose a mind dependent reality that's aware of its possible outcomes; where panpsychism's thesis is that there is a developed and superimposed telos within this lower hierarchies of being. In this sense, even the basic chemical law of conversion has to be seen apart from the particles and within the outer space that forms their movement and attachment into higher compositions that through comportment aggregate into chemical elements that eventually bring life. The organic entities didn't simply emerged from the lower realms but only after a more primordial behavioral rearrangement of the laws of composition into more complex events of the particular entities. That's why we have all natural sciences place in a hierarchy that begins with physics but could never be reduced to physics. The basic atomic components are one and the same in all reified entities, what makes them different is the property of formation into other realms that are made possible through the ideal sphere of comportment that drives the entity out of itself and into a differently organized environment. This field of empty distance is transcendence of the entity and something structured as the regularity of movement within nature that science mathematically describes as predictability of physical movement.

Consciousness could be examined as life itself if we presuppose that each organism has its world horizon as a certain environment. The transcendental or the conscious is neither the organic structure of assembled molecules nor the physical surroundings but that which relates the two in a constitutional manner. The very surrounding of a thing is a behavioral property as an act that drives the entity towards its outer regions. In the instance of the more developed species like the humans, the first act of the transcendental is that which constructs the biological compliance of the species with their surroundings. Neither the biological nor the environmental is the point of origin, but both emerge as instances of an act of transcendence that is part of the ideal, successively placing and directing the center toward the external peripheries. This can be explained if we analyze a personal attitude. The traditional naturalist assumption is that any caused motion or behavior of an individual is a projection of his internal psychic capabilities, say planning. Our assumption is that there is a more primordial relation determined by the exterior property of regulating one's bodies movements that consciousness sets within the environment. The involved range of actions that come from the emotional and physical assets of a body seems to be causally linked, nonetheless, the resulting performance and its outer effect don't comply deterministically. In writing, the movement of the hand is something physiologically describable but its product is not intrinsically connected with that act. The instinct of curiosity may motivate us into taking certain acts toward our surrounding, however, what comes after is not another instinct or anything biologically tied together. The mark left on the world even after instantly caused acts, differs essentially from our internal states. Nonetheless, they are group together as successive events because of the foundational being of

behaving. The vast hierarchy of the different strata's are joined together as manifestations of behaving. Behavior can be explained as the structural integration of the different outsets and causes that are later on embedded. If we define behaving in this way, then it's not necessary to explain it on the ground of the infinite system of lower relations that behaving involves into a concentrated stream of events. A higher level of organization of reality emerges in the instances when something gains the property of aligning the inner into an environment. The primordial relation between the organisms and their objects is the first appearance of the primitive conscious being in a state of awareness.

In this conception of the transcendental, the notion of the neural assembly's and other brain functions can be logically derived out of the spiritual by the pointed appropriation of the physical world as the setting for an organic creature that comports in a consciously arranged external environment.

7. DEFINING THE SPIRITUAL

7.1. CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLE OF THE WORLD

From the perspective of modern cognitive science, the prevailing definition of the spiritual or the conscious is what precedes a certain behavioral act as its internal basis that causes and explains any sort of observable behavior.⁵⁷ This also opens the question whether causal agency in the mind is conscious at all. In our view, the spiritual is not the internal psyche but the external principle of its movement in the world. The spiritual or conscious being is internalized in different mental states that contribute to the outcome of a physiological satisfaction of organisms. This way, we are going to attempt to overcome the prevailing epistemological theory that conceived the mind as a concomitant construct necessary only in explaining certain observable attitudes of humans and other creatures.⁵⁸ What this obsolete scientific explanation omits besides consciousness is the being of behavior. Our transcendental account explains conscious being not in the internal psychical milieu or its outward embeddedness in the body or in the cultural and physical environment, but more radically proposes to situate it within the sphere of that which encompasses both the internal and the external, a constitutive strata that makes the transcendence of the world and of the organic possible. The organism doesn't transcend the world on its own, but only through its unparticular possibilities that connect it with the environment through consciousness or behaving. Every instance of movement is a comport that facilitates the properties of a physical body in the acquired direction and in the lesser spheres of being it's attributed as a physical law that ensures the casuistic type of directedness that a thing partakes to achieve its predetermined event within reality. In the instance of the organic creatures, this comport outlines the bridging of an organism in the world's split that departs a biological creature from the physical or other organisms. Behavior is a transcendental feature of the organic or any other strata and not its caused embeddedness into the body and other areas of the external being. The reason why some less developed organisms or even matter don't comply with a conscious like behavior is because of their internal abilities that comportment activates as capacities of externalization. More developed organisms have a broader environment that is enriched by produced artefacts. In the instance of the human, these potencies are much more complex, and those of perception, memory, and imagination are his most complex spheres, but nonetheless, they are not consciousness or comportment and are internalize aspects of reality like any other physiological process that exists in the body, say digestion. What makes this mental states of affection properties that re-construct the world in its rich phenomenal ray of the senses, is not another drive of an organic sort that dwells behind them and takes them to their outskirts of the transcendently positioned horizon of the world, but rather a teleological property that sets the outer world in relation to this strictly internal capacities.

The first instance of the conscious is not the mental phenomena, like perception, but rather its transcendent content that resides outside and draws all possible capacities of a thing like existence to its outer surroundings. The mind is not an abstraction of existence that primarily sets the range of all possible manifestation of being in its instrumentality, like that of the handed thingness for the human being, but rather that which constructs such horizon within most layers of

⁵⁷ David J. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind*. (1996). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 11.

⁵⁸ David J. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind*. Op. cit., 5.

the world that are able to act. The physiological can't transcend its existence without decomposing, and this is the true being of all organs including the brain where initial psychic experiences take place. The conscious act is not within the domain of these mental phenomena but something that switches their place into one another, and into the physical strata, thus setting the world as a horizon of both material and psychical events. The being of the world in a directed manner means to be in comport to a predetermined horizon of events that are always related in a compact sense of outer relations. This doesn't mean that both lesser and advance beings have conscious awareness as part of their inner attributes, but rather that within their comportment an arch state of affairs is construed that opens the margins of their movement. In the physical things, this is limited to a horizontal manner of behaving, since their capacities are exhausted in the simplest act of movement. On the organic side of events, a vertical arrangement of the inner possibilities is driven into more complex directions of externalization that is phenomenologically completed in the human acts of cognition, agency, etc.

7.2. HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS

To bring the role of sense-making or spirituality into sharper relief, let's turn to the specifically human case and contrast the phenomenological perspective with a science-friendly one, with sense data theory. When within our perception a certain state is presented, its proper psychological content is that of the presence of certain sense stimulus, like color or a sound. This can be regarded as a psychological and neurological fact, except for the property that makes it a feature of the outer world set in certain space and time. In our transcendental stance, this doesn't mean that the particular property of the psyche is autonomously embedded in the scope of the world seen as a continuation of our internal milieu. The meaning of embeddedness is not associated with the notion of causality but is an event of transcendental consciousness that, firstly, makes any discontinuation and detection of processes possible; and, secondly, makes a transcendental act of substitution between these processes and other arrangements. Time-space is not an ability of the psyche that becomes a transcendental horizon because of its primitive range of construing the internal states, expressed to the world by a sudden glimpse of existence, but something of a transcendental making of the comported like being, and even simple things that predate the existence of more developed creatures, have this transcendental ability describable in their possibilities to take certain places within certain time. In their state of openness to the world from the range of comportment, whether as mere physical law or a principle of choice, all creatures exist in the ecstatic meaning of the word. An absolute being-in-itself can't gain any relations to other entities within the world. Consciousness can intuit temporal-spatiality within the mental predispositions of certain behavioral attitudes of even less developed organic creatures capable of taking certain acts towards each other. The presence of consciousness within physiological creatures can be measured by the emergence of an awareness of the internal and the environment. Certain psychological processes like that of memory are not of simple physiological making and have to obtain the external imprint that comportment

makes by creating directedness as the psychical frame of space and time. All the stored information's within memory can credit it with a psychical nature; however, no imprint can ever bring the possibility of memory within the actual state of things as a manner of awareness. This is done by a transcendental positing of existence in its exteriorizing feature of comportment that is either movement or awareness, and both are relative to the inner milieu of the involved creatures, but also to the immaterial laws of conscious constitutions. The footprint of either a mental event recorded in the brain or a fracture on a physical thing is something that is given away by its present state in the transcendences within the time-space frame of comportment. We don't suppose that time or space are an objective feature, a transcendent being of a sort, but only relative to the subject (organic or physical body) in the proper manner of its relatedness to its peripheries by an external act of comportment. Physiological processes are not physical so it takes a different set of external motions that puts them into live experiences. It's an ability of the brain to make past events come to live-like states of experience, but the internal flow that sets this chain of internal events is dictated by the time framing of the conscious act of the particular body within the past, the future and the present, and not vice versa. Stored information's within our brain become memory only if they attain this characteristic from the external realm of comportment that structures itself through time. If the organic is not brought in awareness of its current internally recorded experiences, then we can't tell that our internal experience is that of memory or something else. Physiological processes alone can't prescribe the time mapping of their internal imaging or other mental properties, as a designator that is set within the informational storage of the brain. The temporality of the inner being of the neurological processes is not another record of the chapters of the psychical events. Time makes the possibility of behaving because within this external feature of the conscious comport a body is taken from point A to point B through its act that sets experience as a state of outward actions. The act itself is neither the internal drive that pushes something from within, nor it's the passive effect caused on the flesh or in reality. The active side of nature resides in consciousness as the transitory state that brings certain aspects of being in relation to each other. The basic structure of a conscious being is that of space-time. In its comportment of the organic in the outward regions, it primarily reflects itself into anticipative acts of the consciously embedded parts of the body. The ability to anticipate certain aspects of the self and the world is the first fundamental act of embedded consciousness of the organic creatures. In the lower strata's manner of comportment, this fundamental act is the strict performance of the law. A physical body has an arrowed like movement through space and time, a biological one has a crisscross like movement because it can alter its path by anticipating the outcomes and obstacles that stand on its way. The latter we call behaving because of its intentional integrity. Both simple movement and complex behaving exhibit outer features of relatedness to peripheral entities that are not inherent either in their mass or their biological processes. Agency is possible only by creatures who's various internal capacities are distinctly externalized by the wide specter of behavioral principles that outline their embodiment through time.

An act of anticipation is advanced when a further abstraction of comportment through time is needed, such as in mathematics and logic. Abstraction is an ability of the conscious being that has its physiological capacities set through different behavioral directions in the environment. Abstract entities have a being of their own because they are transcendental constituents of a different level of experience than the organic, namely of pure conscious origination that attempts to further out in any way possible the comportment of the body in the world. Various arrangements of movements

and psychical acts are directed by a transcendently arranged specter of the eidetic, and only through this ideal sphere, they have the ability to perform and allocate their place and movement within the space/time horizon that created the world. In the transcendently arranged space-time of physical reality which befalls within the human sphere of influence, mathematical entities are the formal constitutive aspects that determine the outcome of most of our enterprises. This is why mathematics or logic can't be reduced to psychic states of being, and are regarded as separated spheres of existence, independent from both the physical and the psychical. It is hard to discuss whether other creatures have their own sort of a priori constituents particular to their externalizing act in the environment, and what are they, nevertheless its definitive that each instance of comport, whether aware or simple movement, has this "empty" range that determines its outcome within a sphere of the comport that is not material or an internal drive. In lesser realms of being, the all-abiding law that determines the seemingly physical like behavior makes the "conscious" property of the physical movement within space-time. The scope of application of this law is so simple that it determines future outcomes with high levels of determinacy. In the furthered instances of organic creatures, transcendental laws are horizontal due to the inner complexity of the embedded body, and no organic act has a strict outcome or effect measurable in mathematical terms. Consciousness always strives as if there is an act that is determinable in its manner of manifestation, what it doesn't achieve is the strict outcome in the materialized succession of events. However, through these transcendental formations, organic consciousness to a certain degree can measure the probability of the outcome of the entities of the psychical and the biological strata. The determinacy of the transcendental physical law for the behavior of a physical entity is apodictic. The determinacy of the transcendental law of the biological comport is probabilistic. Through all realms of being, the formal settings of the conscious principles and the related laws of behaving are set as apodictic. Mathematics and logic are the first instances of facilitating the space-time frame into the original horizon of the conscious bridging of the organic into its mental, social and physical milieu. That's why it's said that their truths are valid for all times and places. Consciousness can possibly obtain another formal structure when behaving in another instance of the organic to its environment, but in the instance of Homo sapiens, it's determined primarily by the sort of anticipation that is mathematically or logically construed prior to their state of embodiment either in the brain functions or elsewhere.

The second fundamental act of consciousness or comportment is the capacity of memorizing carried either by the brain or in the physical shape of a reified existence. This act when broadly embedded by the conscious, yields the principle of personification, where various accounts of experiencing the transcendences of either the mental or the physical, are stored as the past events or the history of our subjective (organic) being that will inevitably influence every possible range of future experiences, and which contribute to the making of our individual character. The so-called state of awareness of our inner mental states in their correlation to the physical strata accumulates in line with our stored embeddedness of the various acts of transcendence that grows along the timeline of our ever temporalizing being. It can be said that the most personalize being in the world is that which has the broadest range of capacities that can be sorted as experiences, made possible by the transcendental state of time consciousness. The ability to perceive or memorize is not what makes experience possible, but the experience is rather an encounter of the internal mental and the external (either another mental or something physical), in the exteriorizing act of the comport through which such engagements are made possible and make a biologic framing of space-time. In this respect, consciousness is not awareness per se, but rather the condition of awareness that it

designs in its mental embeddedness within the physiological, that it successively drives toward the time anticipation of the state of affairs of the organic, of the species and their furthered relations to other entities and the world. Awareness is the produced state that consciousness creates in the mental being.

Conscious experiences within the present are the third fundamental act, and this is the domain of the “living present” and the “primal impression”.⁵⁹ It’s obvious that what apparently shows itself as the most original stance of consciousness as awareness of experiences is the one that is the most complex and a derivative of the conscious acts of anticipating the future and remembering the past. Without the latter two, an act of comport would be set in a non-probabilistic and chaotic chain of events, where no regularity is possible. The organic creature is capable of acquiring experience only as a personal attitude that it makes on the outer spheres through the transcendental arching of consciousness. On this present state, awareness arises as a sort of ignition of all mental states in a concentrated fusion of life experience. This is not merely the embodied state of consciousness or its designated realm of being, nor is this the innate a priori that unfolds itself in its making of the environment. The act that radiates all previous and future states of experience, is a newly emerging stance of consciousness in its branched areas of the mental. The light theory of the conscious set by Husserl is accurate only in describing more complex and advanced states of the mental processes that emerge much later on than the transcendental foundational being of pure consciousness. Awareness or first-person experience is possible only as comport of the organic on the outer spheres set through the transcendental directedness of the organic in the environment, through certain possibilities encoded in the ideal realm of comportment.

As to the nature of consciousness, it can be said that it’s nothing subjective or objective, but an outer sphere where things take shape and diversity as they partake in the space-time fabric that personalizes or particularizes a directed type of behavior.

The subatomic realms of the universe lack an external milieu that comportment is striving for and also are defective of all corporal features necessary to memorize or store the past events of any comport within their textile. This results in the impossibility of particularization within the regularity of space/time, resulting in various instabilities like the two slit of the wave/particle and the quantum entanglement.

⁵⁹ Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*. (1991). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Page 40.

8. CONSCIOUSNESS

In the last chapter, we've achieved a broad understanding of consciousness. If we inquire into the origin of the objects under investigation, we see that both philosophy and science run into difficulties precisely at this stratum of interchange of that which is seen as the unconscious arrangement of facts and their development into conscious acts. So far this research pointed to the prevailing break that dominated the naturalistic attitude of making the conscious into backing strata of the hard facts of experience that in turn produce the qualities that inhabit the material world. Sartre's phenomenology can assist us in exemplifying the problem of origination. Namely, his proposed split of the being-in-itself and that of the for-it-self (consciousness) describes most of the possibilities of experience except for the most crucial one, that of the original upsurge of the inert being in the reflexive nonbeing.⁶⁰ The question of origin should be central in any attempt of giving either a realistic or idealistic account of being, and any explication of the wide area of established facts needs to give an proper grasp on their origin. Even explaining the origin of knowledge as an act of consciousness presupposes the unrevealed strata of origin that ultimately stands behind this and any other process. Husserl himself gave a thorough description of various aspects of origins and grasped their synthetic properties that gave meaning. The primitive synthesis is that of the hyle and the noesis that results in the prime constitution of the noemata as a condition of any possible sense, mental act or object. Husserl's conclusion is that there is a pure ego underlying everything else. However, the concept of radiating consciousness doesn't explain the given nature of the hyle whose being is thus illuminated, nor does it explain why awareness has to appropriate certain noetic shapes and not continuous symmetric streaming. Neuroscience takes the opposite stance and claims that certain biological processes of the neuron have transitive properties that carry the sensory data into the cerebral cortex as a biological intercrossing of all information chemically and electrically discharged from the cells that come from our senses. The fact that we as species have the most developed central nervous system conditions the proliferate area of our experiences that have various meanings bestowed by the wide array of consciousness. Reduction in the latter instance faces difficulties since no amount of neural discharges can account the originality of intuitive experience, and that at the basis of thought there is an underlying biological process fundamentally different from the essence of demonstrative thinking and intuiting. Laws of logic are not biologically formed and the physiological alone cannot prove anything, it only holds for the processes that organically maintain and extend life. The species organisms are driven by natural laws of survival, delaying organic death. This hard fact of biology misleads any epistemological inquiry when it exits its designated area by being posited as the non-biological principle of the worldly constitution. The hard fact of biology will never accommodate the various facts of the species environments since they're not exactly of the same making. Organisms are enclosed beings no matter what their diversification and evolution may be. If we suppose that an organism can consume its whole environment then its prime law of externalization will amount to its self-sufficiency and growth. The organic essence of the environment lays in its desire of absorption, as opposed to its phenomenal essence of shape and distance. Is there anything else that organisms strive for except their genetically encoded completion? Laws of evolution state only that organisms acquire bettered adaptation to the environment with lesser exhaustion of their own mechanisms. Organisms evolve

⁶⁰ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*. op. cit., 640.

by taking a leap into a better offset that can assimilate with greater ease the available means for survival. Instincts and other functions consume their surroundings into their own, but don't construct them in an opposite background set as a challenge to its own needs and gains. The environment that includes several chains of contents is very different from the codes of the organic being, and any comport toward the outer realm introduces relations between the two beings that can't be reduced to the hard fact of either the organic or the physical. Merleau-Ponty's and Varela's theory of embodiment, which speculates that there is a sort of imprint of the fact of the world into our conscious states and vice versa, presupposes a developed and dualistic notion of both the world and consciousness and fails to explain how the world emerges for an organism or why is there an organism in the world? Varela defines embodiment as:

By using the term embodied we mean to highlight two points: first that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological and cultural context.⁶¹

Varela is the protagonist of the pre-phenomenological attitude in the conduct of construing a model theory of knowledge that encompasses others without the need of explaining the fundamental origination of its key terms, such as organic capacities that originate experiences, and the succeeding embeddedness of the sensorimotor in the inorganic, the organic and the cultural context. Varela's method of explaining consciousness is that of dialectics of the opposites, but no relation of the opposites, whether dialectical or non-dialectical, will ever amount to the birth of the transcendent nature of the polarities. If organisms develop capacities that eventually sustain their form of being in life, it's plausible to say that any of its appropriated behaviors forwarded the world horizon or culture. If this was not the case then clearly biology would have replaced physics as paradigmatic natural science. The possibility of such a claim can face us with the philosophical emergence of solbiologism where every event of the world could be biologically reduced. Varela overlooks any rethinking on the origin of the given phenomena that his theory encompasses. The failure of the dialectical method in its universal ambitions is its inability to account for the minimal being of the prime realms. All strata's of reality can have dialectical interactions that ultimately improve or impoverish their quality, however, the point is to discover the basis of everything, its roots, and beginnings, and not set everything in a static model of simultaneous existence that may be furthered by the dialectical fabrications.

The possibility of grounding a new transcendental philosophy would certainly have to consider more closely the essence of origin. So far we concluded that it is difficult simply to suppose that consciousness inhabits some internal realm because this would place it in constant opposition to something external. Is there a possibility of simultaneous origination of the external and the internal from a transcendental area of consciousness that encompasses all beginnings? Such questions would have to consider the plain fact of the organic-environment pole in its proper transcendental constitution, and would eventually have to conclude: a. that the possibility of consciousness stands and falls with the possibility of having an environment; b. that consciousness extends to non-human species as far as they are capable of having an environment. The mind theory has to conclude with a broader investigation of consciousness and not only with the exterior possibility of meaning as opposed to the contingent state of the psyche. Phenomenology would

⁶¹ Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch, *The Embodied Mind*. op. cit. 172–3

inevitably have to deconstruct the interior hypothesis of the mind/driven experiences that draw their meanings from both the internal and the external. Stocker suggests that:

According to Derrida, if we are going to do more in the discussion of consciousness than create abstract transcendental schemata, we must acknowledge that the pure soliloquy is impossible. There is no consciousness that does not include the outside within itself, because of the nature of communication and language.⁶²

Derrida's account can be elaborated in the attempt of overcoming the former limitations of any theory of consciousness that failed to locate its proper origin. It's easy to begin with an explanation of consciousness in a manner that doesn't amount to explaining its origin. It seems that science and theory stop at the crucial splits where a new layer of reality has its beginning. These splits are the coming of matter out from nothing, life from the inorganic, and the conscious from its opposite. A theory set to explain these originations would probably have to redistribute the whole traditional view of meaning and ground a new metaphysics. In our investigations of the transcendental form of consciousness and the neurological, we can't simply rely on the three-layered being chained as proposed by traditional philosophy. In Russell's summary of philosophy, these are the entity of the universals, the entity of hard fact or matter, and the mental act of apprehension.⁶³ Most traditional problems of philosophy emerge from this split of being and regardless which of the three is conceived as the grounding principle, there's always a chance of contradicting it with the other two. These oppositions have to be deconstructed in order to alter the pre-assumed metaphysics. The problem with the traditional view is that of the developed sense, our comprehension of it, and the embryonic nature of facts. Even neopositivist thinkers like Russell discuss the necessity of separating the ideal from the factual and the principal role of the former in our understanding of anything empirical. The transcendental limitation of any empirical theory is related to its insight in the being of origin. It seems to claim that we can understand objectivity only through the application of the universals, or relational terms, but it fails to establish a fundamental explanation of this relation. Russell claims that knowledge of physical objects is gained by inference and that the sense stimuli remain the empirical residuum which stays intact by our synthetic operations. However, the sense stimuli can be an object of a more primitive conscious act than that of knowledge, and it's impossible to say that we have any unrefined perception of a biological or physical event. The hard thing about grounding a new transcendental theory is the possibility of finding it through the use of deconstruction as a solution to some prejudiced notions of classical phenomenology.

A phenomenological analysis must deliberate the essential properties of empirical facts, mental acts, and ideal objects. In the neo-positivist tradition, the universals are the only traits of the transcendental, and the question of the soul is systematically omitted. Common sense plainly supposes that consciousness is another thing of the world. Things cause other things and that's why positivism proposes the split between our mental acts, physical objects, and the universals since the latter two are clearly not part of our psychic laws of behavior and form independently. At the foundation of these dichotomies lies the magical being of comportment as a form of transcendence portrayed in the concept of luminosity that bridges over the void between the ideal, the psychical and the factual. It's through this internally produced luminosity that we can have the mystic acts of pure intuition of the eidos, synthetic knowledge of the hard facts that includes the ideal and the

⁶² Barry Stocker, *Derrida on Deconstruction*. (2006). New York: Routledge. 89.

⁶³ Bertrand Russell, *Problems of Philosophy*. 55. New York: Dover Publications, INC.

empirical, and knowledge of contingent facts. So far none of these layers has been explained as the origin of the others, however, all supposedly have some sort of external affliction on each other. The psyche is neither the ideal meaning nor the empirical matter of fact, and it's certainly not the residuum of plain senses. It was an ordinary fact of naïve experience that grounded the claim of the independent worlds and proposed to solve the question of man's nature by announcing that the internal is opposed to the external. However, if we attempt phenomenological submergence into the constituted nature of the entity of the soul, the empirical fact and the eidos, then we'll encounter thin barriers that can be easily deconstructed. Digestion can be seen as an internal physiological process that is divided from its external resources by the organism. Physiological processes can't exist in the outside environment like stones do, and have to be chained in an organism that acquires outside resources for the survival of their vital functions. The internal being of the psyche is also seen in this manner; however what splits its existence from that of any other being is not the skin or the skull, but the species facilitating of their acquaintance with the environment through different biological processes such as memory storage and perception. The central nervous system has a reproductive role in the mapping of its environment and propels the accuracy to which the species acquaints with it. Through the various compartments of the neural features of the brain and the senses, the psyche processes information to the individual in his struggle for survival. In this sense, the psyche can be seen as a natural phenomenon.

What escapes these interconnected layers is the soul or consciousness as such with the meaning strata, as un-reified entities that are not of any organic making but require it in one way or another in order to exist. The conscious is not the psychical function based on the physiological and it doesn't deal with reproduction of anything pre-existing, nor it's the unchained flight of the soul over the world. The conscious is the actuality of comportment that facades both the physical and the biological strata. The act of comportment is a purely conscious experience and not something that can be reduced to any single storage area of the brain or its intercrossing in the world that is governed by either biological or physical laws. It has its own laws of transcendence that originate the spheres of the psychical and the physical according to its intentional nature of directedness. It's through this process of intentionality that the reified environment and the organic subject primarily emerge. Comportment or consciousness is the very relation between the center toward its periphery, and it's noticeable at the most prime levels of the universe such as the atomic and the molecular. Both the organic and the material are construed in the prime layered essential sphere of comportment as the transcendental condition of the being's horizon, both inert and organic. The milieu of the distance between the first organisms and their habitat is not made after these two natural facts mystically emerged on the horizon of events, but it's something that inhabits them aprioristically and deterministically. The range is the origin of all possible environmental life and its consciousness per se, and its margins are its destined products of original constitution.

CONCLUSION

Transcendental phenomenology made a significant contribution to philosophy in an age of science and technology. Such was the historical setting of the era that continues to this day, where it's difficult to give a firmer recognition of any philosophical contribution to science and human civilization. When human sciences are at stake, it could be a task of immense importance to have some of the original visions of phenomenology, applied in an experimental approach that would further the investigations of our own inherent nature. The philosophical attitude might be obsolete in the search for definitive truths of man and nature; however, this is only the case in a handful of sciences. Neuroscience still hasn't had the ultimate saying on what is the natural root of consciousness, and phenomenology can have a tremendous effect of clearing the designated area of science from any uncertainty's and prejudices that hold the research from giving conclusive results.

This phenomenological research also inquired into behavior, and showed that it's an organizing horizon where the environment has its first manifestations for the organic creatures. Behavioral consciousness is the essential basis for all concomitant layers of nature.

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