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Doctoral student

Institute of Oriental Studies named after Academician Ziya Bunyadov
of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences
115, H. Javid ave., Baku, Azerbaijan Republic
orcid.org/0000-0002-2976-2119

SADRADDIN SHIRAZI'S CORPOREAL ORIGINATED AND SPIRITUAL SUBSISTED SOUL CONCEPT AS AN ANSWER TO THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

The nature of the soul and its relationship with the body have always been a matter of concern for philosophers throughout the history of philosophy. Today, this and other related issues are discussed within the philosophy of mind under the name of mind-body problem. The issue of the mind-body problem, or the soul and its relation to the body, has received special attention in Islamic philosophy. One of the Muslim philosophers who extensively wrote on this issue was Sadraddin Shirazi, widely known as Mulla Sadra. This paper examines Sadraddin Shirazi's approach to the mind-body problem. It is known that historically, most philosophers regarded human beings as a composition of a material body and an immaterial soul. Although this dualistic approach to human beings has a long history, it became more popular due to French philosopher René Descartes' endeavors. Generally, Muslim philosophers were also dualists, like Descartes. However, Sadraddin Shirazi, who was Descartes' contemporary, rejects earlier philosophers' theories on human nature. He claims that a human being, when it comes into existence, is material, while this material being gradually evolves into an immaterial being. The soul's journey from material being to immaterial one becomes possible thanks to substantial motion. Shirazi's famous theory on this issue is known as the soul's corporeal origination and spiritual subsistence. Though this paper acknowledges Shirazi's theory's originality and coherence, it remains skeptical about the issue that whether his theory corresponds to dualism or monism. Now, after discussing Sadraddin Shirazi's view on the issue, I can make the case that his corporeal origin soul theory is quite a revolutionary idea. In terms of the mind-body problem, even at the beginning, it solves the issue. Shirazi considers the soul bodily at its early stage. If the soul is not spiritual, then there is a material body and a material soul, and they can interact and unify. Therefore, there is no mind-body problem. However, then spirituality emerges, as do the mind-body problem.

Key words: Mulla Sadra, soul-body problem, corporeal origination spiritual subsistence, Dualism, Monism.

Introduction. Being one of the most significant topics in the history of philosophy, mind-body or soul-body problem is currently discussed in the philosophy of mind [32, p. 36]. The first philosopher who comes to mind in the discussions on the mind-body problem is French philosopher René Descartes. For he is widely considered the thinker who initially formulated the mind-body problem. Nevertheless, there are some who believe that the systematic discussions of the mind-body problem go further back than Descartes. Henri Lagerlund argues that it is possible to pursue the traces of the mind-body problem back to the transmission of Islamic and Aristotelian philosophy to the Latin world through the translation movement in the 12th century. According to him, more specifically, ongoing contemporary discourses on the mind-body problem first occurred after the translation of Avicenna's *De Anima* and subsequent translations of Aristotle's *De Anima* and Averroes' commentaries on the latter [20].

There are two main questions, in the most general sense, that constitute the core of the mind-body problem: What is the nature of the soul? And how is it related to the body? Likewise, there are two main answers to these questions in general. The first and most famous one is known as dualism, and the second is monism. Dualism asserts that the soul is a spatially unextended, immaterial thing. Moreover, according to dualists, there are two kinds of substances in the universe fundamentally different from each other: material substances like stone, iron, and trees, and immaterial substances like human souls or minds.

So, they believe that human souls are of a completely different nature than the material things to which human bodies belong. On the other hand, monists believe that there is only one kind of substance or being in the universe. However, they differ in terms of the nature of this substance. According to the most prevalent version of monism, materialism, or, with its currently more popular name, physicalism, this single substance is material or physical in nature [17, p. 52]. In contrast, another version of monism, namely, neutral monism, maintains that both the body and the soul are made up of a neutral substance that is neither material nor spiritual [32, p. 36].

Although it has currently lost its popularity, dualism was the most widely recognized position among philosophers until the near past. In spite of its long historical background, dualism's broad recognition in the field of philosophy and debates on it began with Descartes. Descartes claimed that human being is a composition of material and immaterial opposite substances [23, p. 4]. However, the idea that the human being consists of a material body and an immaterial soul was not Descartes' invention. It is an idea that one can find in the writings of the ancient Greek philosopher Plato.

Similarly, in Islamic philosophy, which emerged after the transfer of the ancient Greek's philosophical heritage to the Islamic domain through translations, the main philosophical theory on human nature was dualism. The main issue with dualism is the interaction and/or the unification of these opposite things. If, indeed, the soul is a non-spatial, unextended thing, as dualists claim, then how does it interact with the body, which is a spatially extended thing? Apart from the fact that there has not been a satisfying answer to this question, it seems that dualist philosophers of the classical period and, to some extent, those of the medieval period did not pay quite as much attention to this issue as it deserves, taking it for granted, or some were even not aware of it. However, Descartes' contemporary Muslim philosopher, Sadraddin Shirazi may have been aware of the problem.

At least, some research claims that Shirazi tried to solve this problem with his "corporeal origin, spiritual subsistence" soul theory. According to them, in Shirazi's concept of the human, soul and body are not separate beings but are different grades of a human being that exist with a single existence and are therefore capable of interacting with each other [31]. The soul's being corporeal in its origination and spiritual in its subsistence means that, as opposed to being a composition of two opposite substances, the human being is an evolutionary existence that emerges as a material thing or in a material thing, and then this material thing gradually evolves into a spiritual entity. The main factor behind this evolutionary spiritualization process, that is, the principle by which corporeal being gradually becomes spiritual, is substantial motion (*al-harakat al-javhariyya*), which is another philosophical theory put forward by Sadraddin Shirazi [9].

Although the research on the philosophical psychology of Shirazi has illuminated his understanding of the human soul and body to a certain extent, it has not been made clear how his theory could be considered a solution to the mind-body problem, which is the mind-body problem of the dualist philosophers. Did Shirazi solve the mind-body problem that is found in the dualistic views of philosophers such as Avicenna and Descartes, or did he introduce a completely different human concept to avoid encountering this problem? Therefore, this paper tackles Sadraddin Shirazi's evolutionary human concept to figure out what kind of answer it offers to the mind-body problem: dualistic or monistic. To do this the paper adopts descriptive, analytical methodology. First, it describes the mind-body problem as it understood in the contemporary related literature. Second, it analyses Shirazi's view on the issue through his main philosophical works trying to determine its peculiarities comparing it with other earlier philosophers' accounts.

For these purposes, the paper first deals with the mind-body problem, then in the next heading it touches upon pre-Sadradian philosophers' views on the issue, and in the last section before the conclusion it elaborates on Shirazi's views on the in-question problem and tries to find out the nature of his answer to it.

The Mind-Body Problem. Mind-body problem is actually not a single problem but a cluster of different problems. The mind-body problem currently discussed in the philosophy of mind is not exactly the same problem discussed by medieval philosophers. For medieval philosophers, the mind-body problem was more of a metaphysical problem rather than being an epistemological and semantic one [20, p. 2]. Although the difference is detectable, even today, it is not so obvious where the problem exactly is when running through the literature related to this matter. According to Lagerlund, the reason

for this situation is the flexibility of the problem – that is, it could be put in various ways – and the fact that indeed there are mind-body problems rather than a problem to be dealt with. Another writer who believes it is more than a single problem is Kim Jaegwon, who, similarly, states that a mind-body problem is not a sole problem but rather a bunch of related problems concerning mind-body relations [Kim, 2005, p. 7]. One of these problems is what is referred to as an interaction problem. The problem with the interaction of mind and body or soul and body is how these substantially different natures interact with each other or how they are capable of having an impact on one another, that is, how the material mind or soul causes things in the body or vice versa? The second problem is known as the unification problem. Here the problematic issue is the unification of the soul or mind-body; how do the soul and body, two opposite substances, capable of independent living, unify to form a human being? What makes this unification possible? Another problem is the emergence of sensual perception and generally thinking things in the mind or soul. In other words, how do sensual perceptions appear in the soul without a body? [20, p. 2].

When presenting the mind-body problem with logical propositions, it becomes quite easy to understand. In this regard, we can consider Keith Campbell's description of the problem in his book *Body and Mind*. In his book, he introduces the mind-body problem in the following propositions:

- 1) The human body is a material thing.
- 2) The human mind is a spiritual thing.
- 3) Mind and body interact.
- 4) Spirit and matter do not interact [6].

These four propositions that summarize the mind-body problem are known as “inconsistent tetrad” amongst philosophers and logicians. The inconsistent tetrad means that only three of these premises could be true at the same time; that is, the fourth one is always faulty. If, in spite of being physical and non-physical substances, body and mind interact or are capable of unification, then the fourth premise, which says material and immaterial things cannot interact, is wrong. Or, we can assume that all four premises are true, but the first one. If the body is physical and it interacts with the soul, or they have an impact on each other regardless of our assumption that material and immaterial things cannot interact, then the soul that interacts with the body is a physical substance.

If that were not the case, it could neither affect the body nor be affected by it; therefore, the idea that the soul is immaterial is wrong [35, p. 3]. Another option is to reject the second proposition. If the soul is an immaterial thing and the third and fourth premises are true, then the second premise is inevitably wrong. In a nutshell, just as we mentioned earlier, there is no way to accept all four premises. So this is an insolvable problem from a logical point of view. But what we find impossible to solve is accepting all four premises at the same time. So, inevitably, one of them must be denied. But which one? Which proposition is false?

The majority of philosophers since Greek thinkers have accepted the first two premises to be true. Those who were accepting the first two premises true this time were in need of suggesting a mechanism to explain their relationship. And this was the main source of disagreement. However, today, approaches to this issue are totally different. For example, in Islamic philosophy, as well as in medieval western philosophy, the soul was considered an independent entity or substance, whereas in contemporary philosophy of mind, as in behaviorism, the soul, or more precisely, the mind or mental states, is not an independent, separate substance but rather an aspect of human existence or a state that emerges in it. Hence, according to Campbell, within this particular philosophical framework, it is more appropriate to refer to this issue as mental-physical rather than mind-body problem [6, p. 5].

The above-mentioned propositions more express the interaction problem, which is substance dualists' mind-body problem. For the first and second premises, regard the soul and body as different substances, and only in this case can one speak of interaction between two opposite things. Therefore, the interaction problem is substance dualists' mind-body problem. However, there is no interaction problem for physicalists. Because physicalists are monists, physicalism believes that human beings consist of a single substance. But it does not mean that they have no problem to deal with. Regardless of its name, mind-body, or mental-physical, as Campbell said, physicalists too encounter a different form of the mind-body problem, whereas the essence of the problem emerged in physicalist concepts is relatively different from that of the problem that concerns dualists.

For physicalists, this issue involves two varied but related matters: mental causation and consciousness. They are interested in a mental causation that is not between two different things but in a one and single substance; how mental states or events appear in a physical substance; how the body being material causes immaterial events; and what is the nature of their causal relation. In general, how is it possible that mental events have causal effects in the physical world? The second part of the problem is the consciousness phenomenon. Here the main question is the existence of mental or nonphysical beings in a physical world. Why there is a thing called mind or consciousness in a physical world and how it exists. This is the very problem referred to as “the hard problem of consciousness” by Chalmers [24, p. 3–4].

No matter what approach we adopt, dualism or physicalism, the problem we have involves the relationships of two distinct phenomena. Whether you are a substance dualist or a physicalist, you have a kind of mind-body problem to solve. However, the problems are not hard in the same way; in most cases, the provided solutions have brought about more problems than solved the issue. Once considered the most profound and therefore the most substantial solution, Descartes’ theory became subject to severe criticism [26, p. 81]. Despite the positive sciences’ rush to help and the adoption of different paradigms, this issue still continues to be an aporia for humanity.

A brief survey into the history of Islamic philosophy shows that Muslim philosophers were also of the Cartesian view in general. Therefore, as a matter of fact, their problem concerning this issue was the interaction or unification problem. However, the philosopher that is the matter of concern for us in this research, Sadraddin Shirazi, is not a thinker that one easily can call a hard-core dualist or monist indeed. Therefore, before assigning any of the foregoing mind-body problems to him, it is necessary to analyze his thoughts on the soul, body, and their relationship. But before engaging in Shirazi’s thoughts on the issue, the paper briefly considers pre-Sadrian approaches to it.

Pre-Sadrian Muslim Philosophers’ View. In this section, we will provide three Muslim philosophers’ opinions on the topic: Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, and Avicenna. Al-Kindi is known as the first Islamic philosopher. He has written many treatises on various themes as well as the soul.

In his treatise *On Definitions* (*fi al-hudud wa al-rusum*), he defines the soul in the following way: “Soul (*nafs*) is the perfection of a natural body that has organs and life potential. It has been said that the soul is the first perfection of a natural body that has potential life. Again, it has been said that the soul is a self-moved intellectual substance that has various faculties.” [19, p. 179] Apparently, in this treatise Al-Kindi presents three different definitions for the soul: 1) soul is the perfection of a natural body that has organs and life potential, 2) soul is the first perfection of a natural body that has potential life, 3) soul is a self-moved intellectual substance that has various faculties. The first and second definitions are very similar to Aristotle’s soul definition in the *De Anima*.

The third definition, however, is different. If the former definitions are Aristotelian, the latter is more of a Pythagorean or platonic character, which regards the soul as a self-moving, independent spiritual substance [15, p. 49]. Based on the third definition, it is possible to assume that he may have understood the first and second definitions differently from Aristotle. It is not a coincidence that some have already claimed this. Even some scholars believe that al-Kindi never saw Aristotle’s *De anima* or did but an incomplete copy [21, p. 211]. If this claim is true, then it means that al-Kindi knew about *De Anima* through its platonic commentaries.

In *On the Soul*, al-Kindi writes that the soul is simple. Being an honorable and perfect divine entity, its essence comes from the holy, unbeginning Creator, as the sun-light emerges from the sun. Its lofty nature and resistance against bodily carnal desires demonstrate that the soul is the opposite of the body and independent from it. Its essence is spiritual and divine [18, p. 244]. Considering the foregoing account in the treatise, one can easily assert that he has been a substance dualist.

As Adamson asserts, it is not easy to deduce a complete soul theory from al-Kindi’s account of the soul; however, his writings on the issue in question clearly convey Neo-Platonic traces [1]. Subsequent philosophers, namely al-Farabi and Avicenna, although they similarly possess Neo-Platonist features, are more faithful to Aristotle’s *De Anima* and have more sophisticated soul theories. Although it is not obvious whether al-Farabi had access to *De Anima*’s complete version or not, it is believed that he has a relatively precise description of the Aristotelian soul concept [21, p. 211]. Following Aristotle, al-Farabi defines the soul as “the first entelechy of an organic body that has life potentially” [4, p. 94]. Nevertheless, it may not be true to regard his view as hylomorphism, as we do

that of Aristotle. According to al-Farabi, the human being consists of two different substances. One of them, the body, is a temporospatial, dividable thing that has a particular shape and is sometimes in motion but sometimes static. The soul, however, has the opposite characteristics because it is of the affair of the Lord [5, p. 2858].

Al-Farabi distinguishes the spiritual, abstract beings that mankind has into three: intellect, spirit, and soul. They differ in terms of the degree of abstraction. The intellect is the most abstract and graceful whose locus is the heart. The spirit is the second stage in the downward order and is more graceful than the soul. The soul, being less abstract than the spirit, ensures its relationship with the body and resides in the brain. The body is connected to the soul, the soul to the spirit, the spirit to the intellect, and the intellect to the "ruhul-amr," which is from God's spirit [5, p. 2859]. Their difference is related to their degree of spirituality. With regard to the aforementioned account, it is possible to conclude that, like al-Kindi, it seems al-Farabi is also dualist.

When looking at Avicenna's psychological writings, it initially appears to be increasingly Aristotelian. His definition of the soul is a good example to consider in this respect. In the *Compendium on the Soul*, summarizing the definition of the soul, it says that "it is a prime perfection (consummation, realization) attaching to an organic natural body; and, if we wish, to say further, a prime perfection attaching to a natural body having a life potentially" [11, s. 29–30]. There is no need to mention how Aristotelian this definition is. In his other works as well, the philosopher holds to Aristotle's *De Anima*, particularly while defining the soul.

But despite his adherence to Aristotle in terms of defining the soul as the perfection of the body, it is thought that what he meant by "perfection" is different from what Aristotle meant by *entelechy* [12, p. 27]. *Entelechy* in Aristotle's psychology is something that cannot exist without the body, while Avicenna's soul, which is the perfection of the body, is capable of independent existence [34, p. 88]. In the second book of *De Anima*, Aristotle denies the Platonic idea that the soul is made of a kind of substance that enables it to live autonomously.

His soul is the *entelechy* of a natural organic body. It does not mean that the soul is subsequently attached *entelechy* to an already existing body; in contrast, it is the soul that makes the matter a thing. In the same way, the soul is not a concrete thing without the body. Aristotle clearly states that the soul is not an independent substance that could exist separately [25, p. 3–4]. However, Avicenna says the opposite. For example, at the beginning of the cited treatise, while defining the soul, he is not mentioning that the soul is an independent substance, but in the following pages, as some have pointed out [2, p. 61], he states that human souls or thinking souls are spiritual.

He justifies this with the immateriality of universal forms. Hence, Avicenna's dualism is also based on the traditional view that intellectuality requires immateriality [14, p. 44]. Universal forms cannot reside in matter as they are deprived of material features; therefore, they should live in a spiritual entity, and according to him, this being is the human soul (*al-nafs al-natiqah*) [11, p. 83]. This means that although Avicenna seemingly holds to Aristotle while defining the soul, he draws apart from him, at least in terms of human souls. In his opinion, human souls are immortal. His argument for the immortality of the soul is essentially based on the soul's existential independence [10, p. 163].

According to him, there is no real causal relationship between the soul and the body. So the body is not the cause of the soul, though that does not mean that it has no role to play in the origination of the latter. In contrast, it plays a key role in the emanation of the soul from the Active intellect. When the blend of the human body is there, ready to accept a soul, the Active intellect bestows upon it the soul. Therefore, the body is the accidental cause of the soul, and as it is the accidental cause, its corruption does not affect the soul because the absence of an accidental cause does not necessarily require that of the result. The soul emerges with the emergence of the body but does not cease to exist along with it [7, p. 108]. Therefore, Avicenna asserts that the soul is immortal. Consequently, comparing the three pre-Sadrrian philosophers' views on the nature of the human being, we may conclude that they are all dualistic in nature.

Sadraddin Shirazi's Respond. One of the most interesting theories of Sadraddin Shirazi is his theory of the soul. The most interesting part of his theory of the soul concerns its origination. According to Shirazi, the soul is corporeal in its origination and spiritual in its subsistence (*jismaniyat al-huduth ruhaniyat al-baqa*):

“The human soul has many levels and stations, from the beginning of its generation to the end of its goal; and it has certain essential states and modes of being. At first, in its state of connection (with the body) it is a corporeal substance. Then it gradually becomes more and more intensified and develops through the different stages of its natural constitution until it subsists by itself and moves from this world to the other world, and so returns to its Lord. Thus the soul is originated in a corporeal (state), but endures in a spiritual (state). The first thing to be generated in its state (of connection with the body) is a corporeal power; next is a natural form; then the sensible soul with its levels; then the cogitative and recollective; and then the rational soul. Next, after the practical intellect, it acquires the theoretical intellect according to its various degrees, from the rank of the intellect in potency to that of the intellect in actuality and the Active Intellect [13, pp. 131-132.]”

According to Shirazi, the soul begins its existence as a corporeal being. Then, through substantial changes, this corporeal being gradually becomes an immaterial being. He argues that the nature of the human being is a flexible reality that includes different degrees. Like existence, human existence has different grades. However, these different modes of existence are not actually existent from the beginning but potentially. At the beginning, the soul's actual existence is corporeal, but thanks to substantial motion, it abandons this existence mode and moves toward spirituality. Shirazi claims that previous philosophers did not understand the nature of reality properly and therefore developed erroneous theories about the soul's origin and its relationship to the body [33, p. 144]. For this reason, he rejects earlier philosophers' theories on the origination of the soul.

While discussing earlier Muslim philosophers' views, we saw that they considered the soul a simple abstract being from the very beginning. Even Avicenna, who believed the soul emerges simultaneously with the body, thought the soul to be abstract and spiritual in its origination. Shirazi, however, thinks that abstractness is not compatible with origination [27, 8, p. 399]. For originatedness requires potentiality, and potentiality necessitates a carrier, which is matter. So if we say that the soul is originated, then we ought to accept that it is comprised of a form and a matter, which means it is not simple [33, p. 144].

In other words, if something is originated then it is not spiritual. For, being spiritual or immaterial means being abstract and simple. Again, he believes that if the soul is immaterial, then it cannot interact and unify with the body; they could not have an effect on each other. The soul is influenced by the body, while simple substances cannot have bodily impacts. Moreover, if the soul is simple, then it cannot be many, so it makes its existence in different bodies impossible [27, 8, p. 399]. Therefore, Shirazi considers the soul corporeal in its origination. According to him, the spiritual soul emerges as a result of the corporeal body's substantial motion. He also accepts that the soul per se is immaterial; to him, this immateriality is reached at the end of matter's gradual substantial movement, that is, there is no substantial dualism between the soul and body.

There is an intimate relationship between the soul and body similar to that of form and matter. Thus, their relationship is not accidental, like a captain-ship relationship. Actually, they exist with a single existence like matter and form [22, p. 209]. In case of regarding them two different things, spiritual and material, because of the impossibility of interaction between material and immaterial substances, we are forced to deny their unity and any kind of relationship. However, it is clear that they are united, which proves the materiality of the soul at its origin. And the emergence of a spiritual being from matter itself stands for substantial motion [27, 8, pp. 400–401].

Sadraddin Shirazi accepts the existence of the soul, and according to him, the soul is not bodily in nature. In other words, the thinking substance that humans' possess is spiritual. Arguments of different kinds to prove this idea are available in his writings. In this regard, he is no exception in the history of philosophy. However, according to him, the creation of this spiritual being starts in the corporeal world. "Indeed, the human soul is corporeal in its origination; if it actualizes its potential and becomes perfect, it reaches its spiritual subsistence" [28, p. 264].

Nevertheless, contrary to traditional dualists, Shirazi says that a human being consists of one single entity, not a body and a soul. At the beginning of its existence, a human being is completely material, but this very material being becomes spiritual. In other words, rather than being gifts from a spiritual entity that subsequently enters our bodies from the outside, the skills that we humans possess—which have traditionally been attributed to the soul—have developed within our bodies. As it becomes spiritual, the soul obtains immortality. After the soul becomes perfect and turns into actual

intellect, there is no doubt that it will continue to exist after the body's death [28, p. 267]. Actually, the body's death, from Shirazi's point of view, is the result of substantial motion [30; 8, p. 327].

It means that although the soul is corporeal while coming into existence and requires a body, this is only temporal. On the other hand, Shirazi believes that there are strong existential ties between the soul and body. The soul and body are united [27, 9, pp. 63–64]. In his magnum opus, *al-Hikmah al-mutaaliyah fi al-asfar al-aqliyyah al-arbaah*, he writes that the soul needs a body in order to come into existence and have individualization, not in its subsistence [27, 8, p. 380]. It appears that when it gains spirituality, it becomes independent of the body. But until this happens, their relationship is not accidental. As far as the soul is the material body's soul and as far as it utilizes bodily faculties, their unrelatedness is unimaginable, whereas when its existence intensifies and it becomes self-sufficient, it becomes independent of the body [29, p. 53].

From the perspective of the mind-body problem, which was discussed early on in this paper, one can regard Sadraddin Shirazi as either a dualist or a monist for different reasons. On the one hand, he is a dualist in the sense that he accepts the existence of the two different substances generally and asserts that human existence includes these different modes of existence. On the other hand, he is a monist in the sense that he believes the soul and body are different degrees of the human being and exist as a single existential unit. The soul originates as a material being and gradually becomes spiritual. It needs a body, but not the body. The body is under constant change thanks to substantial motion, and therefore the soul's body always changes but preserves its identity.

At the end of its substantial motion, the soul reaches spiritual existence and becomes independent of the body. Again, it becomes independent of the material body, but it continues to have a body appropriate to the realms that the soul lives in. Thus, the soul leaves the material body in the end, in spite of being related to it and even created in it. We saw that, according to Shirazi, death is the result of substantial motion. So, as far as souls are with bodies, that means that they have not reached the required level of perfection to be independent and get rid of material bodies, and if the souls have not got quite the spirituality to dwell on their own, then they relate to material bodies, and this relation is natural and existential.

Consequently, although the soul eventually abandons the physical body, as long as they are together, they constitute unity. Therefore, it is possible to argue that Shirazi is monist in terms of human nature that he does not consider human beings to be a composition of two existentially different substances. On the other hand, if we consider the body only as this material body, we can see him as a substance dualist as well, because he says that there is a spiritual thing within this body that continues to live after the body's death. If that spiritual thing is able to live without the body, which is left to decay, then it is substantially different. However, Shirazi claims that this spiritual being evolved within this material body.

We can think of it as a kind of dualism such as property dualism if not substance dualism. But in property dualism mental properties are only aspects of physical being, while in Shirazi's philosophy although the soul developed from matter it is independent and capable of separate living. Thus, seemingly it is not easy to plainly contextualize Sadraddin Shirazi's evolutionary human concept into the framework of dualism or monism.

Conclusions. Shirazi had denied earlier philosophers attempts to bring the soul and body together due to the impossibility of immaterial and material beings unification. He himself, however, believes that material beings, through substantial motion, can become spiritual entities. Although the spiritual soul emerges within the body, Shirazi thinks that they are existentially unified.

Therefore, it seems that for the Sadrian soul concept, there is no interaction or unification problem, at least philosophically. The mind-body problem in Shirazi's theory might be similar to the consciousness or mentality problem in modern philosophy of mind, that is, how a spiritual entity comes into being within the material world or body. It is a question for which nobody has an exact answer. Shirazi's answer to this question is substantial motion. But how, through substantial motion, matter becomes spirit is another problem to solve.

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Багіров Ібрагім

докторант

Інституту сходознавства імені З. М. Бунядова

Національної академії наук Азербайджану

просп. Гусейна Джавида, 115, Баку, Республіка Азербайджан

orcid.org/0000-0002-2976-2119

КОНЦЕПЦІЯ САДРАДДІНА ШІРАЗІ ТІЛЕСНОГО ПОХОДЖЕННЯ ТА ДУХОВНОГО ПІЗНАННЯ ДУШІ ЯК ВІДПОВІДЬ НА ПРОБЛЕМУ РОЗУМ-ТІЛО

Природа душі та її відносини з тілом завжди були предметом занепокоєння філософів протягом всієї історії філософії. Сьогодні це та інші споріднені питання обговорюються в рамках філософії розуму під назвою проблеми розум-тіло. Особливу увагу в ісламській філософії приділено питанню проблеми розуму і тіла, або душі та її зв'язку з тілом. Одним із мусульманських філософів, який багато писав на цю тему, був Садраддін Шіразі, широко відомий як Мулла Садра. У цій статті розглядається підхід Садраддіна Шіразі до проблеми розуму та тіла. Відомо, що історично більшість філософів розглядали людину як сукупність матеріального тіла та нематеріальної душі. Хоча цей дуалістичний підхід до людини має довгу історію, він став більш популярним завдяки зусиллям французького філософа Рене Декарта. Як правило, мусульманські філософи також були дуалістами, як Декарт. Однак Садраддін Шіразі, який був сучасником Декарта, відкидає теорії попередніх філософів про природу людини. Він стверджує, що людина, коли вона виникає, є матеріальною, тоді як ця матеріальна істота поступово еволюціонує в нематеріальну істоту. Подорож душі від матеріального буття до нематеріального стає можливим завдяки субстанційному руху. Відома теорія Шіразі з цього питання відома як тілесне походження душі та духовне існування. Хоча ця стаття визнає оригінальність і послідовність теорії Шіразі, вона залишається скептичною щодо того, чи відповідає його теорія дуалізму чи монізму. Тепер, після обговорення погляду Садраддіна Шіразі на це питання, я можу стверджувати, що його теорія тілесного походження душі є досить революційною ідеєю. З точки зору проблеми розум-тіло, навіть на початку це вирішує проблему. Шіразі вважає душу тілесною на ранній стадії. Якщо душа не духовна, то є матеріальне тіло і матеріальна душа, і вони можуть взаємодіяти й об'єднуватися. Тому проблеми розуму та тіла немає. Однак тоді виникає духовність, як і проблема розуму та тіла.

Ключові слова: Мулла Садра, проблема душа-тіло, тілесне походження, духовне існування, дуалізм, монізм.