

equates *perceiving A* as pleasant, being *pleasantly affected by A* and [sensually] *desiring A*. On the interpretation Charles favours, these are just one type of activity differently described. Pearson objects that a virtuous person who is inadvertently injected with heroin cannot help but be pleasantly affected by the drug. But that importantly does not mean that he is attracted to it – or that he desires it. Yes, he would find the effects of heroin as caused by heroin pleasant, and in that sense he is attracted to it, but he is not attracted to it if by this we mean that he desires the effects of heroin as caused by heroin. Pace Charles, *experiencing A as pleasant* does not require ‘being attracted to A’ in the same sense in which ‘being attracted to A’ amounts to *desiring A*. Pearson invokes *NE* VII.6 (1149a25–b3) in support for thinking that Aristotle recognizes a distinction between the cognition that something is pleasant and a desire for it.

I. Vasiliou investigates Aristotle’s alleged commitment to virtue ethics in ‘Aristotle, agents, and actions’. This fine study considers some of the key passages that have led virtue ethicists to claim Aristotle for their cause. Virtuous actions are not virtuous *because* they are performed by virtuous agents, argues Vasiliou – they are virtuous independently of it. In ‘The metaphysics of pleasure in *Nicomachean Ethics* X’, C. Shields lays to rest a charge that has frequently been made against Aristotle, namely that pleasure is the topic that, in the words of G.E.M. Anscombe (*Intention*, Ithaca, 1976, 76), ‘finally and astonishingly reduced [him] to babble, since for good reasons he both wanted pleasure to be identical with and to be different from the activity that it is pleasure in’. Shields’ essay gives the lie to Anscombe’s claim, and shows that, far from babbling, Aristotle develops a coherent and philosophically attractive theory of pleasure. The fifth and final essay in this section is S. Leighton’s thoughtful and phenomenologically precise study of envy and Aristotle’s treatment of this emotion (‘Inappropriate passion’).

The two final essays, T.H. Irwin’s ‘Beauty and morality in Aristotle’ and H. Fossheim’s ‘Justice in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Book V’, have been placed together in a separate section of the book, under the rather awkward heading ‘Virtues’. Whatever thematic unity this section lacks, the essays fully make up for in virtue of their intrinsic merit. They round out a volume that should be obligatory reading for anyone working on Aristotle’s ethics. One minor quibble at the end:

why are all but one essay in this volume written by men? That doesn’t seem representative of the state of the field.

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REEVE (C.D.C.) *Action, Contemplation and Happiness: an Essay on Aristotle*.

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In *Action, Contemplation and Happiness*, Reeve takes the reader on an educational tour of the Aristotelian corpus, focusing on those passages that bear on Aristotle’s theory of happiness. The book ranges over issues in cosmology, theology, biology, psychology, logic, as well as, of course, ethics and politics. Roughly half of it consists of quotations from Aristotle (lucidly translated by Reeve), while the other half discusses them and attempts to weave them into a continuous narrative. By assembling passages of similar topic from different parts of the corpus, Reeve says he aims to let ‘Aristotle’s philosophy emerge in its own terms’ (ix). To a large degree, he succeeds.

The book’s genre, however, is unclear: it seems to be a (not obviously acceptable) cross between an advanced introduction to Aristotle’s philosophy and a scholarly monograph on Aristotle’s ethics. On the one hand, it contains few citations to secondary literature and almost no discussion of the Greek text. It moves quickly over a wide variety of subjects, often giving interpretations that are either standard or indebted to recent scholarly work. On the other hand, the book advances a number of original and/or contestable views on central issues in Aristotle’s ethics, theology and psychology, but does not always make clear the status of these views. It also does not sufficiently explain the decision to make free use of the *Protrepticus*, *Magna Moralia* and *Eudemian Ethics* – works traditionally accorded a peripheral role in Aristotle interpretation.

One can divide the book into three parts. Part 1 (chapters 1–2) discusses the ‘transmission of form’, focusing first on cases of biological reproduction and celestial motion, and then turning to acts of desire, perception and understanding. Part 2 (chapters 3–5) discusses the nature of human virtues: theoretical wisdom, virtue of character

and practical wisdom. And part 3 (chapters 6–8) discusses the respective natures of divinity, humans and happiness. Though no chapter is organized in support of any single thesis or view, several organizing claims emerge when one considers the book as a whole. Four of these are as follows. First, in order for an intellect (*nous*) to be attached to a human soul-body composite, its activity needs to be ‘coded’ in ether, a special kind of matter traditionally thought to be confined to the superlunary realm (18, 206). Second, just as there are natural sciences, so there are practical and productive sciences, and this is because all involve universal ‘for the most part’ claims (76–79). Third, despite what *Nicomachean Ethics* X.6–8 suggests, ‘the best political and contemplative lives are not so much separate lives as distinct phases of the same life’ (270). And fourth, when Aristotle exhorts the readers of the *Nicomachean Ethics* to contemplate and so to *athanatizein* (as Reeve renders it, ‘to immortalize’), he is counseling them to become literally immortal and divine.

This last claim goes to the heart of the book, and some words on it are in order. Reeve’s thought is as follows. Since God is an immaterial activity of thinking that has merely itself for its object, and since our speculative intellect becomes identical to any immaterial object that it thinks, it follows that when we contemplate God, our intellect ‘becomes temporarily identical to God’ (215). (If I am not mistaken, Reeve implies that he has himself experienced this, describing it as a ‘Zen-like state of consciousness’, 276.) The view is not unproblematic. As Reeve would seem to agree, though some predicates do not hold of God essentially (for example being a mover), some do (for example being simple, changeless and timeless) and this is because they hold of him just in virtue of his essence. But if God is essentially simple (211; cf. *Metaphysics* Λ.7.1072a30–32, 9.1075a6–7) and timeless (cf. *De Caelo* I.9.279a16–22; *Metaphysics* Λ.7.1072b28), then it is not possible for one to be temporarily identical to God’s timeless activity just as it is not possible for God’s simple activity to have a temporal part to which one could be identical. What is timeless is not temporally extended, and what is simple does not have parts. Given the provocativeness of Reeve’s claims, one would have appreciated a discussion of this and other natural objections.

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NETZ (R.), NOEL (W.), TCHERNETSKA (N.) and WILSON (N.) *Eds. The Archimedes Palimpsest*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, for the Walters Art Museum, 2012. 2 vols. Pp. 340 + 344. £150. 9781107016842.

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There is little doubt that Archimedes was one of the greatest mathematicians of the ancient world and one of the most influential thinkers of all times. Although he wrote numerous treatises, only some of them are still extant; thus, contemporary scholars have to reconstruct his work from a limited number of sources. In this sense, we should welcome the publication of *The Archimedes Palimpsest* as an important event in the history of Greek mathematics.

In 1906, the great Danish philologist J.L. Heiberg discovered a Byzantine prayer book – best known as ‘The Archimedes Palimpsest’ – that contained a number of Archimedes’ treatises, some of Hyperides’ speeches and a lost commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*. The book was considered lost until 1998, when it went on sale at Christies’ auction house. An anonymous billionaire won the auction and loaned the Palimpsest to the Walters Art Museum, where a team of restorers and scholars managed to preserve and translate it. Since 1998, several publications have appeared on the subject; nevertheless, no adequate modern edition of the Archimedes Palimpsest has been available until the appearance of this two-volume book, published by the Walters Art Museum and Cambridge University Press.

The first volume contains an introduction, five parts (chapters) and a bibliography. The material is arranged according to broad topics, in which the contributors expose a range of historical, philosophical, mathematical and technical views. More particularly: Noel’s short introduction provides some basic information about the Archimedes Palimpsest Project; part I contains a detailed catalogue of the Palimpsest’s contents; part II presents its fascinating history in detail; part III exposes the effort to conserve the half-damaged book; part IV lists the image-processing techniques used to uncover its contents; and, finally, part V contains a scholarly analysis of the place of the Palimpsest in the Archimedes scholarship and a discussion of the history of manuscripts in the Greek world.

As regards the first four parts, the material is rich and varied in content. Evidently, the