Introduction to the Book

What Is Epistemology?

Brian C. Barnett

Part I – Traditional Epistemology: Chapters 1–4

Epistemology—as traditionally construed—is the study of knowledge. Its name derives from the Greek *epistêmê*, which translates as “knowledge” or “understanding.” This study includes four main questions:

- The What-Is-It Question: What is knowledge?
- The Justification Question: What makes a belief reasonable or rational or justified?
- The Source Question: What are the ultimate sources of knowledge (or justification)?
- The Scope Question: What, if anything, do (or can) we know?

Part I of this volume covers each in turn. In Chapter 1, Brian C. Barnett analyzes knowledge (addressing the What-Is-It Question), beginning with Plato’s view that knowledge is “justified true belief” (to phrase it in standard modern terms). A justified belief is a belief backed by good reasons. More specifically, knowledge requires reasons that are indicative of the truth (as opposed to practical, aesthetic, or moral reasons). Truth-directed reasons (and the kind of justification they supply) are called *epistemic*, meaning that they pertain to knowledge. Epistemic justification receives special attention in epistemology, in part because it is the component of knowledge unique to the field—in contrast to truth and belief, which are topics shared by other philosophical domains (belief in the philosophy of mind, and truth in the philosophy of language and logic).

The What-Is-It Question thus leads directly to the Justification Question. In Chapter 2, Todd Long theorizes about epistemic justification, including *internalist* theories (on which justification is determined solely by factors internal to the mind) and *externalist* theories (which admit factors external to the mind). Internalists and externalists alike typically recognize both reason and experience as justificatory sources. But does all justification ultimately bottom out in one fundamental source?

The Source Question dominated much of Early Modern British philosophy. In Chapter 3, K.S. Sangeetha referees this classic debate between *empiricists* (who take experience to be primary) and *rationalists* (who posit an innate rational capacity prior to experience), culminating in Immanuel Kant’s synthesis of the two positions. Debates over the interpretation and success of Kant triggered the (in)famous analytic-continental split in philosophy. Relatedly, post-Kantian debates were partly responsible for reinvigorating an ancient position: *skepticism*—significant doubt about our capacity for knowledge (or justification). This takes us to the Scope Question.

Skepticism comes in a variety of forms, ranging from *domain-specific* (doubts about, for example, religious or moral knowledge) to *global skepticism* (the view that we know nothing at all). In Chapter 4, Daniel Massey spotlights an influential intermediate form: skepticism about a mind-independent world.

“Unsettled Meddling: An Introduction in Verse” (Excerpt)

*Dr. Seuss and Philosophy: Oh, the Thinks You Can Think!*

Epistemology! “What can I know?”
And why does it matter and how does it go?
This stuff is important for one cannot travel
The road of the wise if one can’t unravel
The true from the false, the sense from the babble
The solid and firm from the dribble and drabble.

~Jacob M. Held
After explaining the most popular argument for this *external-world skepticism* (owing to René Descartes), Massey assesses two prominent strategies for being skeptical about such skepticism.

**Part II – Expanded Epistemology: Chapters 5–8**

A familiar fact about philosophy is that answers tend to generate further questions. Traditional epistemology is no exception. New puzzles emerged directly from the traditional project. New questions also emerged when connections were established between epistemology and other areas of thought (both inside and outside of philosophy). Moreover, some epistemologists grew dissatisfied with traditional assumptions and priorities. These developments did not displace traditional epistemology as much as expand it. Part II of the volume is devoted to this expanded epistemology.

The traditional boundaries were stretched in several directions or “turns” (not to suggest that any of them were discipline-wide or in clear historical succession). The value turn in epistemology revived Plato’s original motivation for pursuing the What-Is-It Question: to explain why knowledge is valuable. The expanded goal is to explain epistemic value generally (including the value of truth, justification, inquiry, and intellectual virtue). A full account of epistemic value must address the relationship between it and value in other domains (e.g., practical, aesthetic, and moral). This brings into close dialogue epistemology and ethics, at the intersection of which lies the debate over the “ethics of belief.” Guy Axtell navigates these normative issues in Chapter 5.

While some seek to connect epistemology with ethics, others prefer to make epistemology more rigorous by importing “formal” methods from linguistics, logic, and mathematics. An important development in this formal turn linked justification with the degree to which one’s belief is made probable by the evidence, which can be modeled by formulae (e.g., Bayes’ Theorem) in the mathematical theory of probability. Applying this idea to empirical hypothesis testing results in a theory of scientific confirmation, which can be utilized in the philosophy of science. Jonathan Lopez “formalizes” epistemology and examines its scientific application in Chapter 6.

Formal and value-driven epistemology initially inherited from traditional epistemology its focus on individuals considered in the abstract. This idealization ignores that people are epistemically affected by their social situatedness. We exchange knowledge with others, disagree with one another, and engage in collaborative inquiry and decision-making. Accounting for social dimensions yields the social turn in epistemology. William Rowley lays the foundations of social epistemology in Chapter 7.

In its early phases, even social epistemology ignored epistemic standpoint—how one’s social location (e.g., gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, culture, religion, disability, economic status) influences one’s perspective on the world. Standpoint is epistemically significant because it shapes experience, how one thinks, what information one has access to, how others judge one’s credibility, etc. Although standpoint was brought to the fore by feminist epistemologists, their work can provide a framework for epistemologies from a range of social locations. For this reason, we may take feminist epistemologies (plural) as representative of the gamut, extending beyond feminist perspectives. Monica Poole concludes this volume in Chapter 8 with an introduction to feminist epistemologies broadly construed.

As epistemologists expanded, real-world applications became increasingly apparent. While epistemologists historically fixated on highly theoretical questions far removed from real life, some recent work attends to everyday problems: fake news, political/religious disagreement, ignorance-
induced discrimination, discerning experts, communal standards for inquiry, and more. Since applied issues are best considered together with the epistemological theories suited to address them, this **applied turn** is exemplified not in its own chapter, but via examples that occur throughout this volume.

**Epistemology Reconstructed**

It should be clear by now that the expanded project far outstrips the traditional one. What, then, should we say epistemology is, exactly? Unfortunately, the traditional definition remains in common usage. But should philosophers of justification, inquiry, or understanding be expelled from the epistemological community if they don’t also philosophize about knowledge per se? Surely not. Such philosophers consider themselves epistemologists, teach epistemology courses, give epistemology talks, publish in epistemology journals, and are counted as fellow epistemologists even by committed traditionalists. So, a more inclusive definition is desirable. The key plausibly lies in the recognition that all epistemologists study subjects *related* to knowledge in *some* salient respect or another, *directly or indirectly*. For example, justification is a condition on knowledge, inquiry aims at knowledge (or at least dispelling ignorance), intellectual virtues facilitate inquiry, and there is epistemic value in all of these. Knowledge may therefore continue to serve as the touchstone for *identifying* the relevant topics, even though one need *neither study nor prioritize* knowledge itself. This shift is subtle but crucial: **Epistemology began as the study of knowledge, but it has become the study of the epistemic.**