Even though it is true that linguistic luck is a distinct phenomenon from epistemic and moral luck (Rey 2023; Armstrong 2023; Graham and Peet 2023), we must not overstate the differences among them. As I have argued in (Barceló 2012) and (2019), despite the subtle differences of how it affects our moral, epistemic and linguistic evaluations, luck is the very much the same phenomenon manifesting in these and other fields of human action. Therefore, as important as it is to study the specificities of linguistic luck as a distinct phenomenon, there is also much to learn from thinking of linguistic luck as just luck in the linguistic realm.

Unlike the ordinary sense of “luck”, the philosophical notion of luck, i.e., the notion of luck involved in moral and epistemic luck (but, of course, not only in these two phenomena) does not refer to some providencial causal force that graces some and disfavors others (Desalles 2010, Teigen & Jensen 2011), but to a related factor involved in our normative practice of assigning blame, praise and responsibility. In this sense, someone has good luck or is lucky in relation to some given event or state of affairs if (i) such an event or state has a positive valence for that person yet (ii) she is not fully responsible in a praiseworthy way for such event or state happening (symmetrically, she is unlucky or has bad luck if (i) such an event or state has a negative valence for her yet
(ii) she is not fully responsible in a blameworthy way). Both conditions are necessary and both are evaluative (Barceló 2012, 2019). Therefore, talk of linguistic luck makes sense in so far as linguistic acts can have (i) positive or negative effects for those involved in linguistic behavior and (ii) these effects can be the object of blame, praise and/or responsibility.

It is usually accepted that luck is a gradual notion, i.e., even among cases of good or bad luck, some cases are usually judged more or less lucky than others, where “typically, the most ‘lucky’ person is the winner who most easily could, or should, have lost” (Teigen 1996: 156) meaning that our judgments of how lucky an event was depend on downwards counterfactual reasoning, i.e., reasoning about how different are those real or imagined others who did worse than us (Teigen & Jensen 2011). Thus, linguistic luck must also be conceived as a gradual notion, even though this aspect of linguistic luck will not concern us in this chapter.

Another caveat worth mentioning is that recent work has challenged the long held assumption that praise and blame are symmetrical aspects of a single phenomenon (Eshleman 2013, Stout 2020). I have no room here to address these concerns, but as with the gradual aspect of luck, the issue of whether blame and praise are asymmetrically related has little bearing on the main points I make in this chapter.
Without getting too much into the debate of how and in what sense is language normative, in order to make sense of linguistic luck, it is enough to recognize that speech involves many telic acts. In so far as people usually use language to achieve many sorts of specifically linguistic goals, many sorts of states can be deemed positive or negative in the relevant sense to satisfy condition (i): We can understand or misunderstand an utterance, we can fail to communicate what we intend to communicate or refer to the entities we want to refer to, our speech acts can be infelicitous or, in general, do not achieve some or all of its intended effects, etc. Success and failure are both common in linguistic performance. Even the most skilled speaker is bound to flounder now and then. All speakers commit slips of the tongue, ear and pen (Fromkin et al. 1981, Wilson 1994: 47, Yus 1999).

Some linguistic failures can be attributed to structural features of the language, like semantic and syntactic ambiguities or similarities between different linguistic elements that might be easily confused, as well as other the external factors, such as channel disturbances, while others can stem from features of the participants in the

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2. I acknowledge the many controversies surrounding linguistic normativity, i.e. whether linguistic norms like those of grammar are genuinely normative instead of regularities contingently abstracted from the complexities of language use. On the one hand, there is genuine danger in presenting language as goal oriented, for it invites the extrapolation to the damaging idea that some languages are better fit to help us reach those goals than others and thus are superior and must prevail. While, on the other, it is hard to make sense of genuine phenomena like hate speech, doublespeak, etc. without admitting some place for genuine normativity on language (Vázquez Rojas 2020, Barber & Stainton 2021).
conversation and their performance (Bazzanella 2019). Linguistic mistakes can stem from the speaker’s faulty choice of words – for example, if she speaks in uncommon terms or uses expressions with close homophones, etc. – or from errors in her phonetic performance, etc. Or the speaker might perform impeccably and yet fail to be properly understood if the interpreter lacks the proper lexical competence, shows faulty cognitive processing, etc. Or the error might stem from interactive factors, like failures to establish proper common ground, focusing problems, etc. (Bazzanella & Damiano 1999)  

Consequently, we can say that some linguistic failures are faultless, while others are the result of guilty negligence, just as some successful speech acts are the result of skillful performance while others are not.

Thus, linguistic luck occurs when an individual or collective agent’s interests are affected, either positively (in cases of good luck) or negatively (in cases of bad luck) as a  

3 Yet, even when the factors triggering the linguistic failure attain to their agents, they might still not be responsible for them. Errors stemming from diminished auditory acuity, for example, cannot be normatively attributed to the hearer. It would be unfair to censor people for misunderstanding utterances spoken in ways that demand hearing acuity beyond their capacities, or to demand accommodation “through technology such as cochlear implants and high-tech hearing aids” (Garland-Thomson 2011: 597). Furthermore, so-called external factors, like features of the environment or the very language used, might still nevertheless generate responsibilities for individuals or societies. If there is environmental noise, for example – a typical example of what Banzanella (2019) calls external triggers –, it might still be worth asking who is making it (or who might be able to stop it) and why; if a language generates systematic errors whose negative effects burden an already disadvantaged sector of society, it becomes imperative to transform it, etc.
consequence of a speech act in which they are involved (usually as hearers or speakers), and such that some or all of them are not fully responsible in a praiseworthy or blameful way for such outcome.

Despite the generality of the phenomenon, in the recent literature, a lot of attention has been paid to so-called Loar cases, i.e. “cases where a hearer ends up entertaining a thought with the same truth-conditions as that asserted by the speaker but where, intuitively, communication has not been successful”, named so because of Loar’s seminal 1976 paper (Onofri 2019). At least some of these cases of referential coordination without communicative success can be rightfully called cases of linguistic luck because they satisfy this general characterization. In at least some of these cases, speaker and hearer achieve their communicative goal of communicating information about some object through the use of some referential expression or device in such oblique way that such achievement cannot one normatively attributed to them, but is better described as a matter of luck (Peet 2019, 2016; Buchanan 2014). As Unnsteinsson (2018) has correctly noticed, most Loar cases are usually under-described so that it is hard to determine what is happening in them, yet one can still see how they would work as cases of genuine linguistic luck. Consider Loar original puzzle:

Suppose that Smith and Jones are unaware that the man being interviewed on television is someone they see on the train every morning and about whom, in that latter role, they have just been talking. Smith says, “That man is a stockbroker”, intending to refer to the man on television; Jones takes Smith to be referring to the man on the train. Now Jones, as it happens, has correctly identified Smith’s referent, since the man on television is the man on the train; but he has failed to understand Smith’s utterance. (Loar 1976)
The referential goal of Smith’s use of “that man” was to use it to communicate something about the man being interviewed on television and who they see on the train every morning. This goal was achieved, yet Smith’s referential intention was not correctly grasped by Jones. As describer by Loar, Smith intended to refer to the man on television, while Jones took Smith to be referring to the man on the train. In order for this concordance to be a matter of luck, it must depend on circumstances beyond their normative reach. This means that we must reconstruct the case in such a way that none of them did enough to justify that Smith’s referential intension be correctly grasped by Jones. Perhaps, Smith assumed that the man being interviewed was salient enough and/or Jones also assumed that the fact that they had been recently talking about the man on the train was justification enough for his assumption that Smith was referring to him. Thus, even if neither Smith nor Jones were negligent in their communicative performance, they were still lucky to coordinate on the same referent.

However, there is nothing special about reference or truth here. Similar phenomena can give rise to analogous cases of good or bad linguistic luck. For example, if my aim is to talk about water and thus decide to use the word “water” to refer to such substance under the rational assumption that my hearer knows of the conventions that link this word with this substance and I thus succeed in referring to water this way, I am fully responsible for this positive outcome. My speech act was adroit and thus I am entitled to the relevant praise resulting from my having successfully referred to water. On the other hand, if my decision to use “water” with this purpose was based on a defective appraisal of my context so that I mistakenly assumed that my hearers were English
speakers or otherwise knowledgable of the conventional meaning of the English word “water” then I am fully responsible for their failure to grasp my referential intension. I am fully responsible for this negative outcome. In either case, in our evaluative assessments there is no need to appeal to luck, neither good nor bad.

However, in many cases, communication does not behave this well. Consider a closely similar situation in which I also use the word “water” with the goal of referring to water, and I am mistaken in my assumption that my hearer is a competent English speaker. Perhaps she does not speak English at all, and instead she is a competent Swedish speaker. Consequently, she does not recognize the English word “water” but recognizes its phonetic similarity with the Swedish word for water, “vatten”, and thus correctly guesses that my communicative intention was to refer to this substance. Communication is somehow achieved, but this achievement cannot be attributed to her linguistic abilities or adroit performance and instead must be credited to good luck.

Things might go astray in the opposite direction as well. I may be right in assessing my context and thus right in choosing to use the word “water” to refer to water in my linguistic exchange with a competent English speaker. Yet, this does not exclude the possibility of bad luck rearing its ugly face in a million possible ways. My hearer might get distracted for a key second, or environmental noise might affect how my words sound, I may even be inadvertently transported into twin earth, and so forth. For whatever

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4. It is possible, as well, that she correctly infers that English and Swedish might have similar etymological roots and that therefore, “vatten” and “water” must also be semantically related. In those cases, we may want to attribute the success in getting to the meaning of “water” to her inferential skills and linguistic knowledge. I want to exclude those cases from my example.
unfortunate reasons, the communicative exchange might get derailed in such a way that my word might fail to refer to water in a way for which I cannot be held responsible. Thus, it is appropriate to talk of referential bad luck in cases like this.

Consider Jerzy Kosinski’s 1971 celebrated novella Being There. The story is completely built on fortunate linguistic misunderstandings. “When faced with complex questions [the novella’s main character] Chauncey responds with infantile answers that are constantly misinterpreted, to his credit. [For example, a] simple statement about gardening is taken … as a profound metaphorical comment on national affairs.” (Hartney 2006) When the President of the country asks Chauncey for advice on how to face the current bad season – meaning the country’s economic recession –, he famously replies that seasons continuously turn and that “as long as the roots are not severed, all is well and all will be well.” The president finds the response “refreshing and optimistic” and thanks Chauncey for the advice. (Kosinski 1971: 32) Thus, the president’s metaphorical use of “season” is interpreted literally by Chauncey, while his literal talk of seasons and roots in his reply is interpreted metaphorically by the president. This creates a strange situation where the president seeks advice, gets good advice and yet no actual good advice is communicated between Chauncey and the president. We can describe this situation as one of illocutionary luck. Chauncey and the president perform

5. Luck is such a central topic in Kosinsky’s novella that its cinematographic adaptation (Ashby 1979) was re-titled “Un Jardinero con Suerte” (A lucky gardener) for the Mexican market. Furthermore, for the cinematographic version, Kissinsky re-named the main character “Chance”.

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complementary adequate illocutionary acts – giving and taking advice – while their locutionary acts fail miserably!⁶

Outside of fiction, illocutionary luck is not rare either. Think of every time you have tried to compliment someone you do not know well enough, for example, when trying to leave a good first impression. No matter how good you are at assessing people, you will still run the risk of saying something that the other person will not find flattering (Maíz-Arévalo 2012). If in the end the compliment lands, you still cannot fully attribute the success of your illocutionary act to yourself and instead need to recognize that luck was on your side. And the same thing can be said of other illocutionary acts like threats, insults, promises, etc. Anything we try to do with words might fail or succeed and this failure or success cannot always be fully attributed to us. Sometimes, it will be the result of good or bad luck.

2. The General Structure of Linguistic Luck

Even a cursory look at all the above examples reveals a common structure behind every case of linguistic luck (Barceló 2012, 2019). Whenever, as speakers or hearers, we try to accomplish some linguistic task we work on a series of usually implicit assumptions about ourselves, our hearers, language itself and the world. We assume what language is being spoken, what common beliefs are shared among the participants, what aspects of the context are more salient, what is the topic under discussion, etc. We assume how

⁶. For a more detailed pragmatic analysis of the misunderstandings in Kosinski 1971, see (Ferrer Revull 2014)
things are or can be, but perhaps as importantly, we also make assumptions about how things are or cannot be. These assumptions usually share two important features that make them specially relevant for our normative assessments. On the one hand, they are closely linked to personal skills that have application beyond the case at hand. Assuming what language is spoken, what common beliefs are shared among the participants, what aspects of the context are more salient, what is the adequate register for the situation, who has standing to make which sort of speech acts, etc. are all not only things we assume when participating in conversation, but also general linguistic skills, and not particular pieces of worldly knowledge. We usually talk of people mastering or failing to master linguistic skills, as when we say that someone still cannot speak a second language well, or when we say that someone has a way with words. This means that their linguistic successes or failures are not a matter of mere good or bad luck, but can be traced and attributed to their linguistic skills or lack thereof. Thus, for example, even if it is possible to arrive at a clear and elegant turn of phrase by mere fortunate chance, it takes a special skill to write texts that are clear, concise, effective and project a personal voice. Yet this does not exclude the possibility that such success be attributed to good luck.

A second, but not unrelated, important feature of these assumptions is that some of them are warranted, while others are not. Hearing somebody speak in what sounds like Spanish in a way that seems coherent warrants us in assuming that she understands that language. This assumptions excludes the real, but remote possibility that she is rehearsing for the stage. For example, a close friend of mine, a singer, had to learn her lines phonetically when participating in operas in languages she did not herself speak, for
example; she did it so well, you could not tell from hearing her act that she did not actually speak Spanish or Italian. The speaker, however, is warranted in excluding this possibility and just assuming that if someone sounds like speaking Spanish, it is because she does speak Spanish.

In order to better understand the dynamic interplay between these two features, it is important to distinguish two very different senses in which our assumptions may misled us: On the one hand, we might exclude a possibility that might nevertheless become actual. For example, for whatever reason, I might assume that you speak English even though you don’t. On the other hand, we might exclude a possibility that we were not justified in excluding – for example, I might assume that you speak English even though my evidence for this is scarce. Mistakes of each of these two sort are relatively independent from each other and have different consequences to our evaluative judgments – I might be mistaken in assuming that you spoke English even as I had good reasons to assume so as much as I might be unwarranted in assuming you spoke English even if you actually did. If we do not reach one of our linguistic goals, if communication breaks, for example, because of our mistaken assumptions, the error might be negligent only if those assumptions were unjustified, but not if they were. Thus the person who uses “water” to refer to water in a non-English speaking environment without taking care of noticing this would be a negligent speaker and his failure of referring tooth’s substance would be fully his wrong, but not so for the person who uses the same word, with the same referential intention, in an English-speaking environment, but unfortunately addresses a non-English speaker. This is how our assumptions define what can be
attributed to us regarding the success of attaining our goals: these successes can be
normatively attributed to us only when our assumptions are fulfilled. Otherwise, they can,
at most, be attributed to luck.

I say that these are “relatively independent” because it is expected that mistakes
of the former kind be accompanied by mistakes of the later kind. In other words, since
our justified assumptions manifest our linguistic skills, this justification is expected to
trace success. As can be fathomed from the above example of my opera singing friend,
in normal circumstances, someone who has the skill to detect Spanish will justifiably
assume that someone is speaking in Spanish in cases where they are speaking Spanish; in
normal circumstances, one is justified to assume that one person is the most salient when
the person actually is the most salient, etc. In the same fashion, it is our unjustified
assumptions that will normally lead us astray. In other words, we expect our mistakes to
result from ungrounded assumptions. In normal situations, we would expect people who
are not skilled in a language to commit the most mistakes. Exceptions must be rare, but
not impossible, since the skills behind this sort of assumptions are still fallible. Thus, it is
possible for mistakes of one kind to happen without mistakes of the other. One can be
justified in acting on a mistaken assumption as much as one can be unjustified in acting
on a correct assumption.

It must be clear by now that this is a broad notion of justification and not the narrow epistemic
one. On the difference and relation between justification broadly construed and epistemic
justification, see Gómez-Torrente (2005).
At this moment, it would be very fruitful to say a little more about what these assumptions are. First of all, it is important to notice that assumptions need not be occurrent beliefs or even conscious thoughts. It is rare that we consciously choose which language to speak in a given situation, for example (Kapiley & Mishra 2019, Reverber et ai, 2018). When engaging in conversation, we are usually not consciously looking for clues that our interlocutor is not a robot or engaged in some sort of fictional performance, and the mechanisms responsible for our extraordinary success at sharing the reference of our terms are largely automatic. Thus, it is better to think of assumptions as the manifestation of skills, either conscious or automatic, instead of occurrent thoughts (Merriweather & Montemayor 2017) Assumptions are less about what we do than what we do not do. To be more precise, a possibility is included in an action’s set of assumptions if the agent has done enough to secure the reaching of its goal if that possibility were to be actual. This means that if the set of assumptions of the action holds in the actual situation, then the agent is responsible in a praiseworthy way for achieving her goal, whatever it might be.

Thus, the fulfillment of our assumptions is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for success. Assumptions ground our rational default, and most times unconscious expectation that our speech acts will be successful. For example, to successfully use “water” to refer to water is to manage to make one’s referential intention to use that word to talk about that substance. But it would be quite misleading to say that that is what we assume, i.e., that when we use “water” to refer to water we assume we are making our referential intention (to use “water” to refer to water) manifest. Instead,
what we assume is that the circumstances are such that what we will actually end up doing will make our referential intention manifest. What we assume are things like that our hearer is a competent speaker of English, that “water” is the English word for water, that we can competently use the word “water” in a grammatically correct sentence and pronounce it in a way that the hearer can identify, etc. In general, we do not assume that we will succeed in our linguistic goals, what we assume is that what we will do will secure such success. We know that what we do does not guarantee success in all possible situations, but only in some of them. Thus, we assume that one of those will be the actual case and hence that what we do will be enough to reach our goals. We know that uttering “water” does not guarantee the reference to water in all possible situations, but we assume that it does in the current one.

Thus, even though our capacity of making the right sort of assumptions depends on our general linguistic skills, whether these assumptions hold or not in the particular circumstances of the conversations at hand usually lies outside our direct and immediate control. For example, it is not entirely up to us what conventions are operating in a given context, what is up to us is to know those conventions and to identify when they are operating. It is not up to us how other people evaluate their achievements or traits, yet it is up to us to try to find out how they do if we want to compliment them. It is not up to us how words sound, yet it is up to us to pronounce them correctly if we want to use them, etc. Assumptions explain why an agent does what she does when she pursues a goal, even when she fails. For example, the assumption that English is being spoken explains why the speaker used the word “water” to refer to water, even if the assumption was mistaken.
In the original Loar case, Smith assumes that the man on the television is the most salient man in her context of assertion.

As aforementioned, assumptions tell us a lot about what the agent did and thus gives us good information about how responsible she was in the pursuit of her goals, that is why they have such significance in our evaluative judgments. As long as the assumptions of our actions hold in the conversation’s actual circumstances, we are completely responsible for the achievement of our linguistic goals. As soon as they fail, however, the fate of our actions is no longer up to us. Things may go our way, or they may not. Things may fall into place in such a way that we might nevertheless reach our linguistic goals. In those cases, we must consider ourselves lucky. But since the world is mostly indifferent to our wishes, it is quite likely that our efforts will result in failure, regardless of how justified we were in our initial assumptions. If those assumptions were justified, we must attribute our failure to bad luck, otherwise we must attribute it to negligence (Rescher 2001: 35).

As aforementioned, Loar’s original example does not specify why Smith thought the man on the television was more salient than the man on the train they had been talking about. Depending on this, she might have been justified in making this assumption or not. Since justification is fallible, either possibility is consistent with the fact that she succeeded in referring to that man, and with the fact that Jones failed to grasp her communicative intention and notice that she meant to talk about the man on the television. If Smith was not justified in assuming the man on the television was the most salient and thus had failed to refer to that man by her use of “he”, it would have been
correct for us to call her action negligent. However, luck played in her favor and she succeeded in referring to that man, but this success cannot be attributed to her – neither under the assumption that she was justified in making this assumption nor had she been justified, for her assumption failed and thus it was no longer up to her who the pronoun ended up referring to.

3. Luck and trust

Once we understand how luck affects our normative judgments we can better understand why we might prefer android successes over lucky ones. For example, it explains why the trust required for collective endeavors is incompatible with lucky successes. Remember that lucky successes are those where the success cannot be attributed to the agent because it happened despite her actions being based on mistaken assumptions. As such, these mistaken assumptions do not manifest the linguistic skills of the speaker. But trust is based on skills, and thus requires genuine successes, not lucky ones. It is having the appropriate skills that makes someone trustworthy. As Mclelond summarizes:

> Without relying on people to display some competence, we also can’t trust them. We usually trust people to do certain things, such as look after our children, give us advice, or be honest with us, which we wouldn’t do that if we thought they lacked the relevant skills… Rarely do we trust people completely (i.e., A simply trusts B). Instead, “trust is generally a three-part relation: A trusts B to do X” (Hardin 2002: 9) … or A trusts B in domain D (D’Cruz 2019; Jones 2019).”
Thus, in conversation we trust others to communicate successfully, to understand us, etc. because they have the adequate skills to be competent in the linguistic domain. In other words, to be trustworthy regarding an activity is nothing but to have the appropriate skills required for the activity. In the linguistic case, this means that being trustworthy regarding conversation is nothing but to have the capacity of partaking as a responsible participant in linguistic conversation, which requires having the appropriate linguistic skills. Now, to trust someone in conversation one better know that the person one trusts is trustworthy in the relevant sense, that is, one need to know that she has the relevant linguistic skills. Thus, in order to maintain mutual trust, participants in conversation must track not so much the linguistic successes of other participants, but their linguistic skills, i.e. they must be able to trace their successes to the agent and not to external circumstances. But lucky successes do not manifest skill and therefore show no evidence of the true capacities of performers and, therefore, are useless for building trust. This is as much true in the linguistic realm as outside of it. We care about successes because they provide us with defeasible evidence of skills, but this evidence is defeated if such successes cannot be attributed to the agent, but are instead the product of lucky. Therefore, if we care about trust, that is, if we care about agents and their skills, we need to be wary of lucky successes.

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