

# PHILOSOPHY AS IDEOLOGY

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# PHILOSOPHY AS IDEOLOGY

Steven J. Bartlett

In September, 1980, Paul Arthur Schilpp gave a most unusual talk.<sup>1</sup> In the years since then, his words have come to mind repeatedly, and have continued to strike me as remarkable.

Schilpp gave an informal, zestful, and, I felt, uncommonly candid description of the decades of work he has devoted to editing the Library of Living Philosophers. He explained to his audience that the *idée directrice* for this project was his early belief that if only a philosopher, during his own life, could respond to his critics, much philosophical misunderstanding could be avoided, and the development of the discipline would be encouraged.

After a lifetime's dedication to this idea, Schilpp made two observations which carry, I believe, a great deal of sting. For, he said, he would not now undertake the project of the Library of Living Philosophers in the light of what he has learned about the profession and the practitioners of philosophy. With the single exception of one philosopher,<sup>2</sup> Schilpp has not encountered others who have been able or willing to admit mistakes. It was clear that Schilpp was not proposing that in philosophy we discover a tradition of two millennia in which only perfect, error-free thought is to be found! What seemed to him suspect and hard to accept is a certain stubborn pride, found in us all, but not to the extreme he has found it in philosophers.

Schilpp went on to give his second reason for judging that the *idée directrice* of his life's work has been illusory. As precisely as I can remember his words, Schilpp said he has come to see that "philosophers do not *want* to understand one another." They do not wish to communicate. They are concerned only with their own private, personal sets of beliefs, views.

If the unusual experience of first-hand contact with many of the world's leading philosophers during much of this century can speak to us, and if we hear, it would tell us, then, that

Philosophers do not admit that they make mistakes.

Philosophers do not want to understand one another.

According to these observations, philosophers are true narcissists, for they are pure solipsists (even when arguing against that philosophical position). If {2} poetry is an indulgence of self in the re-creation of one's experience, then the substance of philosophy, if Schilpp is right, must be poetry.

If Schilpp is right, then the true windowless monads have been the philosophical positions that have succeeded one another through history. It would come as no surprise that "philosophy, from the earliest times, has made greater claims, and achieved fewer results, than any other branch of learning."<sup>3</sup> The history of philosophy is a cacophony of soliloquies between the deaf.

Edmund Husserl, commenting on the character of traditional philosophy, observed that philosophy "does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, every position is a matter of individual conviction...."<sup>4</sup>

Elsewhere, he reflects about this curious activity in which,

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<sup>1</sup> For the Department of Philosophy, Saint Louis University.

<sup>2</sup> G. E. Moore.

<sup>3</sup> Russell, 1972, p. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Husserl, 1965, pp. 74-75.

...instead of a unitary living philosophy, we have a philosophical literature growing beyond all bounds and almost without coherence.... This hardly attests a study carried on with a consciousness of responsibility, in the spirit that characterizes serious collaboration and an intention to produce objectively valid results. 'Objectively valid results'—the phrase, after all, signifies nothing but results that have been refined by mutual criticism and that now withstand every criticism. But how could actual study and actual collaboration be possible, where there are so many philosophers and almost equally many philosophies? To be sure, we still have philosophical congresses. The philosophers meet but, unfortunately, not the philosophies. The philosophies lack the unity of a mental space in which they might exist for and act on one another.<sup>5</sup>

Reflecting on the comments and observations made by Schilpp, Russell, and Husserl, it is important to distinguish between two very different questions: Are they right about the nature of past philosophy and about the description implicit in their views of the philosophical personality? On the other hand, we may ask, what are the presuppositions of the view they express about philosophy and philosophers? I would like to consider the second question first, returning to the other question later.

There appears to be a certain refractoriness about philosophers—so much so that it is characteristic of them to seek to evade criticism, to borrow John Passmore's felicitous phrase, "with almost inconceivable hardihood."<sup>6</sup> There is a tendency to shift the ground when the buildings begin to totter. Philosophers, indeed, are a contentious lot.

The most fully developed philosophical position of which I know that explicates these issues is that of Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. For more than twenty-five {3} years, Johnstone has written a chain of clearly written, clearly thought out papers which constitute a tenacious attempt to understand the philosophical enterprise.

Rapidly to sketch Johnstone's view, it is useful to focus on a typical instance of philosophical disagreement. Controversy ensues between philosophers when it becomes evident that their systems of belief are in conflict. Because each system of belief is, Johnstone claims, deeply rooted in one's sense of self, philosophical disagreement is experienced as personally threatening. A challenge to one's "*doxic identity*" is intimidating, and it usually elicits a defensive response.

The system of defenses employed by philosophers, when their sets of beliefs are questioned, is of a very interesting kind. Two men who disagree philosophically seldom are speaking of the same thing, for if they were, the nature of the common subject of reference could eventually lead to consensus. Instead, each philosopher, ultimately, in Johnstone's view, is speaking autobiographically, in the sense that the *point de repère* of each man's claims is the personal system of philosophical commitments with which his professional identity is bound up.

On the other hand, when each of two men speaks about different things, no disagreement should result. There is no point of conflict. And yet, in philosophy, conflict *does* arise, and frequently. Although each philosopher in a controversy has a distinct belief-system, and is in the final analysis speaking from the standpoint of a different conceptual framework—the meanings of his claims being determined in a manner wholly internal to that frame-work—each believes he is right, the other wrong. A fencing match results, the rationale being to show that the other position is untenable—at least to persuade, if not to force, the other to pledge his allegiance to one's own dogma.

The contest is, then, a contest between systems of commitment incarnated in real personalities.

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<sup>5</sup> Husserl 1960, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Passmore 1961, p. 63.

The conflict is serious because it is, as Johnstone expresses this, a matter of being true to oneself, to the philosophical values which constitute each opponent's sense of personal, philosophical integrity. Such individuals can only be responsible to themselves by their willingness, in fact their commitment to, the territorial battle in which they find themselves engaged. The response is as deep-seated and vigorous as the territorial response of any creature, yet distinctive:

Each position seeks, in Johnstone's terms, to include *all* the relevant evidence—to be all-inclusive, the universal frame of reference. The force and the validity of the philosophical argument are therefore relative to the entirety of the position; in fact, it is the extent to which an individual argument is true to the presuppositions of the position in which it is embedded that is responsible for the degree of acceptability of the argument.

It follows from this that there are two alternatives for any pair of philosophers who engage in controversy. They may remain utterly solipsistic, and hence the responses of each to the other beg the question. Neither {4} relinquishes his presuppositions, even for the purposes of argument. They intend to take a trip, but both insist on staying home, and their homes are at opposite ends of the street they must traverse if they would talk the same language. This is stalemate, an expression of fear, defensiveness, or pride, which here all come to the same thing. It is the situation most of philosophy finds itself in, if Schilpp, Russell, and Husserl are to be believed.

On the other hand, two philosophers engaged in conflict may each try on the other's presuppositions, and attempt to evaluate his opponent's position from the inside. This approach to philosophical argument is, in Johnstone's, as well as in my own view, the only potentially promising one. It has been followed by a relatively small handful of philosophers to date.<sup>7</sup> We shall again consider this line of thought, albeit briefly, later.

According to Johnstone, then, the degree of congruence of a philosophical argument with the presuppositions of the position in the context of which it is advanced determines the strength of the argument. The internal dynamics of a position may be self-reinforcing, or self-defeating.

We recall that for Johnstone, these internal dynamics are the dynamics both of a position as well as of a self, a person, who advocates that position. It is therefore of some interest to note a similar conception which exists in certain theories of personality, according to which an individual's sense of self, strength of character, sense of identity/integrity, etc., reflect analogous congruencies.<sup>8</sup> It is when these congruencies are weak or are lacking altogether, and the personality structure becomes self-defeating, that an individual suffers psychological hardship.

Analogous internal dynamics exist in societies. We turn now to consider the related topic, ideology.

By the term 'ideology', we usually mean something like 'a distorted, if only because unilateral and partial, view of reality which comes to supersede and to substitute for the real world'. From a psychological viewpoint, it is essentially an obsessive delusion, because it reifies a system of beliefs, conferring on these a significance which closes the mind of the believer to realities not admitted by the belief-system. Philosophically speaking, allegiance to an ideology amounts to subscription to a solipsistic creed. It is an orientation which Marx therefore judged to be essentially alienating, since in an ideology, a man mistakes his own mentations for reality. He becomes hermetically sealed in his own system of constructs.

The word 'ideology' is of rather recent vintage. Originally, the term was created to refer to the philosophy of mind developed by Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836). In 1802-1803, Napoleon dismissed {5} the members of the Deuxième Classe, the *idéologues*, of the Institut

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<sup>7</sup> Illustrative arguments drawn from the history of philosophy may be found, e.g., in Johnstone 1959, Passmore 1961, and several papers by the present author (see note 13).

<sup>8</sup> See, e.g., Kelly 1955 and 1963. Cf. also Maher 1969 and Bannister 1970.

National, and condemned them for what he considered their impractical and visionary proposals for institutional reform. Napoleon's ridicule of the *idéologues* gave the term its deprecatory overtone.

When a set of beliefs filters all that one is willing to see, and motivates the behavior of its adherents, ideology is born. In its social and political application, the term normally now refers to the embodiment in social institutions of an exclusionary set of beliefs. Understood in this way, an ideology represents the dominant institutionalized social/political paradigm. The beliefs which comprise the ideology provide rationalizations for the policy decisions made by those in power.

In Marx's view, the distorting effects of ideologies result as much from mistaking a view for reality, as from resisting to ask external questions about the ideology.

Similar to the way in which the aberration of fetishism replaces the physical presence of a partner when the fetishist handles an article of clothing, the system of commitment of an adherent to an ideology is sparked, summoned present, and takes over behavior when such cries as "freedom," "imperialism," "communism," "abortion," "integration," etc., ring out. Like a fetish, they are artificial substitutes for the real, possessing an almost magical power to influence, even control, behavior.

Ideology is essentially factitious—it is a sham, a pretense, whose force to motivate lies precisely in its status not being recognized. Attempts to call attention to its biased status as a distorted reality-substitute will immediately be labeled as seditious, heretical, or at least noncompliant.

Like philosophical positions, ideologies are unusually resistant to criticism. They, too, often possess an almost inconceivable hardihood in the face of opposition. The defense system of an ideology is, like that of a philosophical position, generally impervious to direct external ideological attack: The clash between ideologies tends to define and even magnify their differences, to move them toward greater rigidity, and encourages unilateral allegiance on the part of their subscribers.

The institutional reaction to disagreement with the prevailing ideology is one of defensiveness: intimidation, anger, and fear being expressed in political rhetoric and suppression. Here, too, the contest that ensues is motivated by the need to be true to the position taken; the self-avowed social and political identity of a population is called into question.

Detailed similarities between ideology and philosophy are striking.

An ideology forms a substitute for reality: it is fostered by an underlying belief that there is a single, *best* system of beliefs which can provide the basis for a conceptual framework in terms of which the important problems can be solved and the relevant questions resolved. This framework comes to have an exclusionary status as *the* context for social and political self-understanding. The ideology is institutionalized, and becomes the built-in conception of reality for its adherents.

{6} Similarly, a philosophical position is intended to serve as the universally applicable theory of reality, one which seeks to "include all relevant evidence." The frame of reference it establishes is therefore essentially exclusionary. The questions of importance to its propounders derive both their interpretation and their resolution in terms of the philosophical position advocated. The philosophy becomes the preferred framework which permits self-understanding. Like an ideology, it constitutes a hermetic definition of what is real. An ideology, as we have said, comprises a set of beliefs that motivate an appropriate kind of behavior. A social-political ideology motivates social, political behavior; a religious ideology motivates certain personal and community behavior including ritual. The ideology is a source for general principles of conduct and responsibility; a pattern of behavior is prescribed by the ideology's belief-system.

There are many similar sorts of "philosophical behavior" which are associated with propounding a philosophical position. They include defending it when it is threatened, committing oneself to the task of clarifying and amplifying it, seeking to instruct others, and, of course, for philosophical positions of sufficiently wide comprehension, some point of view will be formulated concerning the status of normative issues, probably including precepts for certain classes of behavior, etc. A

philosophy shares this property of ideology, that it involves a set of regulative injunctions. Their application may be purely and only conceptual.

An ideology constitutes a dominant institutionally embodied *paradigm*. It functions as a paradigm in the fullest possible sense, since an ideology is an organization of a set of constructs in terms of which pertinent experience is represented. It exemplifies in the most extreme sense, because the exemplification-relationship is severed. A paradigm not tied to a reminder that it is *an* attempt to *represent* (re-present) reality is a sham, whose status is unrecognized, ignored, forgotten, or repudiated. This is a major defining characteristic of ideology.

Philosophical positions frequently, though not always, fall victim to Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness: The theory of reality expressed by a philosophical position comes to take on the force of the reality it would represent. Often a position or approach to philosophical investigation becomes fashionable, and indeed may achieve the status of an intellectual paradigm for a country or a school of thought. The more commitment to its frame of reference that it encourages, the greater its persuasion, the more the enthusiasm of its disciples is fueled. Then the exemplification-relationship is soon cut, perhaps by subtle degrees so that misplaced concreteness occurs without explicit recognition. The belief-system advocated by the position permeates the conceptual structure of its propounders-ideally, clinging to their every judgment, an inescapable filter for each perception.

Furthermore, like an ideology, the position is resistant to external questions, to questions posed from outside the framework which would raise {7} doubts concerning the presuppositions underlying the position.<sup>9</sup> External questions rely upon alien presuppositions not admitted by the position, and hence are subject to the charge of *petitio principii*. Often, such questions will therefore make no sense from the point of view of the internal dynamics of the position. When they are re-interpreted so as to align them with the assumptions of a philosophical position under attack, they frequently become innocuous, their sting neutralized. This insistence that questions comply with stipulated presuppositions effectively insulates philosophical positions from one another, encouraging monadic isolation.

An ideology points to its belief-system to rationalize its policy decisions. Justifications for decisions refer back to fundamental commitments, to beliefs which can be questioned only at some risk. In a similar way, the claims of a philosophical position are justified in a curiously circular way by virtue of their relationship to other claims of the position. No single claim can be questioned in isolation from the presuppositions of the position, since the meaning of a philosophical claim is determined contextually, a function of the warp and woof of the claim and related claims. A philosophical position is, as Johnstone puts this, a systematic whole, from which it is not possible without misrepresentation to disentangle an isolated philosophical statement.

In this sense, any one philosophical statement "summons up" the entire conceptual structure which defines the position advocated. This capacity of a philosophical statement to call present the systematic whole which provides the context of its meaning is again not unlike a similar capacity of ideology: There, the belief-system implicit in the ideology is sparked by adequately laden exhortations, in the form, e.g., of cries to action, incantations, or epideictic oratory, the intellectual and emotive significance of which is contextually defined within the ideological framework. An ideological framework frequently is less narrow than the conceptual system of interpretation of a philosophical position in that it usually also embraces prescriptions for practical action and duty.

Unresolved tensions between equally convinced but conflicting ideologies usually, in the social-

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<sup>9</sup> Carnap used the term 'external questions' differently. An external question for him concerns the external reality of the class of entities which a particular theory is about. External questions in Carnap's sense cannot be resolved in any way that is capable of satisfying his criterion of meaning. cr. Carnap 1956, pp. 205-221.

political world, take the form of war. This is no accident, but rather bears the ineluctable stamp of tragedy and irony, for in the violence to preserve the self-identity of a population, its members must lose their own in struggles that increasingly bring with them the promise of self-destruction. War is a self-defeating dynamic for resolving unresolvable conflicts. It is an admission of failure, but this failure is implied by the nature of ideology, which does not admit of the possibility of effective communication across the abyss that divides self-enclosed systems of belief. Carried to its logical conclusion, the conflict between viewpoints founded on divergent {8} and exclusionary convictions can only lead to the desire to suppress and dominate one another. It is the occasional successes of diplomacy that are miraculous, since effective communication in a world of competing ideologies is ruled out from the beginning by a self-chosen deafness which is the cousin of absolute conviction.

Being a somewhat more civilized pursuit, philosophy has a different set of ways to deal with conflict. Unresolvable tensions between equally convinced but opposing philosophical protagonists usually take the form—as is witnessed at any philosophical convention—of finessing the opponent into silence, by recourse to a quicker wit, traps to embarrass, displays of scholarship aimed to intimidate, or comparatively subtle verbal crucifixion. These are some of the displays of plumage in these territorial struggles. Like war, they are signs that the conditions of communication have not been fulfilled. There is, as Husserl observed, a lack of the unity of a mental space in which philosophical positions might come to understand one another. Whether in philosophy or in the social order, the problem is to make this unity of mental space possible, for it is antithetical to the self-interests of ideology.<sup>10</sup>

The strength of an ideology lies in its status being unrecognized, ignoring its position as one among potentially many systems of self-definition. Its grip on a population is weakened if its members are made aware of the pluralism of values and beliefs. In a somewhat similar way, the effectiveness of a philosophical position lies in its capacity to be applied universally and without self-conscious deliberation. The most effective position, it seems, is one which blinds its adherents totally to the existence of other options, without their being conscious of the boundaries of their own awareness.

As Danto has said so well, speaking not about philosophy, but about the everyday world-view, in the context of Plato's allegory of the cave:

[O]ur imprisonment consists exclusively of the fact that we are *not* aware of being in our prison. So we cannot (logically) both be in this condition and know that we are in it, and knowledge of our condition is instantly delivering, like a cure for a disease which consists only in not having the cure. But deliverance is complicated by the extraordinary difficulty of explaining to the prisoners, in terms intelligible to them, that prisoners are what they are. For the conditions which make self-understanding possible are incompatible with the conditions they are in, and he who speaks of imprisonment to prisoners must be regarded by them as a madman in his raving. For the bonds which hold them captive are the boundaries of the understanding, and how are we to bring the boundaries within themselves to make them understood? The limits of understanding are not part of what is understood.<sup>11</sup>

{9} The prisoners, everyday men and women untutored by philosophy, are victims of an uncritical acceptance of a certain everyday world-view. If the association of philosophy with ideology is to the point, it is—paradoxically—philosophy's intention to overcome this naive acquiescence. It is soon, however, replaced by another, as the first acquiescence is transposed, as it

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<sup>10</sup> Cf., e.g., Bartlett 1975.

<sup>11</sup> Danto 1971, p. ix.

were, to a higher level, and a philosophical belief-system comes to predominate, filtering and channeling thought in a self-enclosed circuit which forms the boundaries of the philosophical self.

Like the boundaries of everyday understanding, these cannot be brought within a philosophical position. To paraphrase Danto, the conditions which make philosophical self-understanding possible are incompatible with the conditions of commitment to a particular philosophical position. The bonds which hold philosophers captive are the boundaries of their own philosophical understanding.

To resolve the dilemma, a metaphilosophical position is necessary. And it, too, is vulnerable to the provincialisms of ideology.

I have tried to present a description of a tragic impasse which I believe most philosophy is in, and has been in for a long time. The association I have suggested between philosophy and ideology focuses attention on a discipline whose avowed intention is to liberate thought from unselfconscious provincialisms, only to terminate in divergent, monadically isolated positions between which there can be little communication. The intentions of dialogue, of explicit controversy, cannot succeed as long as the ideological character of the profession and of the personalities of its practitioners is maintained.

Here lies a fundamental problem, surrounded by a host of sensitive questions and equally sensitive individuals. It can be solved only by a solution which cannot but be viewed by even the most contentious partisan as neutral. That is diplomacy. Such a solution would constitute one approach to meta-communication, among others that are possible. It would impose no special presuppositions of its own upon views it would critique and bridge.<sup>12</sup>

This, then, is the difficulty to be faced: If both an ideology and a philosophical position can represent a collective or personal illusion, both philosophy and ideology pose an epistemological question: How is it possible to detect the illusion? How to make the boundaries of understanding part of the thing understood? What criteria are to be held aloof from ideological error?

I cannot propose here to try to answer these questions in any detail.<sup>13</sup> What I would like, briefly and in conclusion, to do is to point to a general approach which has occasionally been employed by philosophers, though usually without explicit methodological self-consciousness. It is a forceful tool of criticism and of philosophical justification. It is the only approach I have found that provides a non-ideological unity of a mental space necessary {10} to overcome the monadism of the field, and make possible incremental progress that can build upon earlier efforts.

We have observed that ideologies are seldom weakened by controversy, by antagonism between exclusionary belief-systems. Rather, they are weakened—or they are strengthened—by virtue of their internal dynamics. Hegel and Marx have suggested how the internal dynamics of certain political-economic ideologies imply their own downfall and replacement by others. Without a detailed treatment of the ways social and political ideologies come to fail and are succeeded by others, this seems to be a general and sufficient condition for ideological failure: In attempting to achieve certain intended ends, these intentions, or the ends at which they aim, are undermined. In certain Latin American countries, for example, in attempting to improve the standard of living of the peasant, the bureaucracy grows to the point that resources are concentrated to support the bureaucracy, further impoverishing the peasant class. Alternatively, in a society dedicated to the value of the individual, support of free enterprise leads to the growth of giant corporations, which foster a concern for a set of interests that increasingly undermine the importance of the individual, and hence support of free enterprise comes into conflict with the original values espoused.

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<sup>12</sup> Here is perhaps a residual concern for presuppositionlessness, in Husserl's sense.

<sup>13</sup> For some detailed answers I have proposed to some of these questions, see Bartlett 197S[a], 1976, 1980, 1982 and 1983.



Direct confrontation generally strengthens an ideology, fueling its territorialism, as we have noted. Head-on conflict involves a *petitio principii* and becomes self-defeating.

The indirect approach is frequently the stronger: Just as in the martial arts it is possible to use the dynamic of one's opponent to bring about his defeat, to overthrow an ideology that has a self-undermining dynamic, it is only necessary to *encourage* the development of internal imbalances.

It is interesting to note that this strategy bears close similarities to paradoxical intervention practiced, when it is sometimes indicated, in individual and family therapy. The therapist encourages the maintenance, and indeed the exaggeration, of the very conditions which have become intolerable, and so helps the patient(s) to reach a desirable level of self-control through heightened frustration over the problematic condition.<sup>14</sup>

To the extent that a philosophical position resembles an ideology, the same is true.

Like an ideology, a philosophical position is frequently strengthened when it is explicitly opposed. The most dangerous critic is therefore the sympathetic critic, for only he can achieve a first-hand internal understanding of the dynamics of a position. He is then ideally placed to practice intellectual judo, using the expressed claims, intentions, and presuppositions of a position to show that the position is self-defeating.

The philosophical responses to such an "intervention" are the same as those available to a patient in therapy: to change, in a direction away from the old self-defeating patterns, or so to construe the intervention that its {11} message is ignored or distorted (as it would be, e.g., in catatonic, hebephrenic, or paranoid schizophrenia, where an analogous inability to meta-communicate exists). One path leads to growth, which is never free from risk of further imbalance; the other path insures self-defeat, the defeat of the self on a psychological level, and the general reinforcement of a self-undermining orientation implicit in the philosophical position.

Most philosophers, if P. A. Schilpp is right, have chosen the second path: to ignore or to misconstrue what is not compatible with their views. There is a poetic solitude that comes in this self-enclosed privacy, one which offers attractions to the independent spirit of the Cartesian world-builder that ought not to be underestimated.<sup>15</sup> For the discipline of philosophy, however, if it has aspirations to more than a historical succession of often incompatible intellectual solipsisms, there is need for a therapy—a therapy capable of detecting and correcting *conceptual pathologies*—which can, through internal criticism, reduce the numbers of alternative positions so that rational men of good will are able, in a spirit of openness, to get on with the task of making the human condition intelligible.

A positive application of this approach is possible and desirable. If a philosophical position is such that attempts to reject it are self-undermining, then the position is self-justifying. A critic of the position finds that it is impossible *not* to accept the position, for his attempted rejection of the position becomes self-undermining. Here, as before, the locus of attention is the internal dynamic of position-taking. In its critical use, this approach shows a position to be untenable if the assumption of its claims leads to self-referential inconsistency. Conversely, in its constructive application, the approach shows that a position cannot *not* be accepted, since any attempted rejection of it is self-referentially inconsistent.

In either application, critical or constructive, this approach is in complete congruence with the dynamics of the position to be analyzed; no external assumptions are introduced or imposed. Philosophers have over the many years of their assiduity produced great quantities of literature. Initially, at this stage in its development, the task of philosophy must be critical, in an attempt carefully and with circumspection to separate the seeds from the chaff. That philosophy stands in

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<sup>14</sup> See, *inter alia*, Watzlawick-Weakland-Fisch 1974 and Fay 1978.

<sup>15</sup> Delightfully illustrated, *mutatis mutandis*, in Anatole France's novel, *The Crime of Sylvestre Bonnard*.

need of such therapy is unfortunate; the claim implicit in P. A. Schilpp's observations about the field will annoy some, be ignored by many, and perhaps motivate a few to undertake the often thankless task of revisionary work.

Philosophy freed from ideology, while initially destructive, ultimately is a constructive affair, building upon the efforts of others,-a vertical discipline, with results established and gradually closer to genuine understanding. A prospective sense of truth would replace the multitude of truths offered by the many philosophical ideologies that vie for our allegiance. {12}

To develop the methodology to begin this change is not enough. Many such tools already exist.<sup>16</sup> What is required is foremost a change of attitude: to recognize the temptations of intellectual narcissism for what they are, and to embrace a more sober, patient approach in the hope of gaining a maturity that has been long in coming.

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<sup>16</sup> See references in notes 7 and 13.

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