

## Recent texts in philosophy of mind

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The field of textbooks in philosophy of mind is a crowded one. I shall consider six recent texts for their pedagogical usefulness. All have been published within the last 4-5 years, though two are new editions of previously published books. Three are authored monographs: *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind* by K. T. Maslin, *On the Philosophy of Mind* by Barbara Montero, and *Mind: A Historical and Philosophical Introduction to the Major Theories* by André Kukla and Joel Walmsley. The other three are anthologies: *Mind and Cognition* edited by William Lycan and Jesse Prinz; *Arguing About the Mind* edited by Brie Gertler and Lawrence Shapiro; and *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind* edited by Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen.

These six texts constitute a diverse bunch. Within each of the two groups (monographs and anthologies), each individual text differs significantly from the other two in its approach, scope, and thus suitability for various levels of teaching. I shall begin with the monographs.

**K. T. Maslin, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007, 337pp., ISBN: 978-0745640730, \$34.95 (pbk).**

The ‘classic’ contemporary introduction to philosophy of mind is surely Jaegwon Kim’s *Philosophy of Mind*. However, not all texts aim for the same breadth and depth as Kim’s book, so it is not always appropriate to use it as a comparison. Of the three monographs I review here, only Maslin’s can be fairly compared to Kim’s. The two books are approximately the same length and cover a lot of the same ground.

After introducing the mind-body problem in Chapter 1, Maslin discusses dualism (Ch. 2), the identity theory (Ch. 3), behaviorism (Ch. 4), and functionalism (Ch. 5). Chapter 6 considers consciousness and non-reductive physicalism, and Chapter 7 the problem of mental causation. Chapter 8, interestingly, defends an Aristotelian approach to the mind. The last three chapters concern the problem of other minds (Ch. 9) and personal identity (Chs. 10 and 11).

Maslin thus goes beyond philosophy of mind and into related questions in epistemology and metaphysics. He also spends a little time on basics such as the structure of arguments. All this suggests that the book is aimed at an introductory class. Maslin himself says that the book is for first-year undergraduates. It also omits some issues that many upper-level classes in philosophy of mind would want to cover. For instance, the debate over mental content (on which Kim has a whole chapter) is omitted. At times, though, Maslin's book is very detailed and even technical. Chapter 3 introduces the notions of multiple realizability (briefly), supervenience (very briefly – but it is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6), and rigid designation. These may be difficult ideas for beginning students to grasp. Chapters 6 and 7 go into some depth over the specific views of Donald Davidson and John Searle on psycho-physical reduction and mental causation. The book is thus in some ways an odd mix of introductory and more advanced material.

Each chapter opens with a list of objectives, and closes with some 'Questions to Think About' and a few suggestions for further reading. The book has a glossary where technical terms are defined and explained. Another nice feature is the inclusion of frequent exercises, in boxes set apart from the main text. These are positioned so as to encourage students to reflect on and discuss a question relevant to the foregoing text before proceeding to Maslin's discussion of the question. For example, after describing the eliminativist view (according to which talk of mental states will go the way of talk of witches and phlogiston), an exercise asks the reader to reflect on their own responses to the view, and discuss its plausibility with other students. Maslin then gives his own opinion, which in this case is not positive: "I find the whole proposal of the eliminative materialist unbelievable and ridiculous" (p. 95).

This example illustrates that Maslin's text is not merely a neutral accounting of the various views in philosophy of mind. As he announces early on, "the reader should be left in no doubt of my own views on various topics" (p. xii). He inclines towards physicalism, but believes that consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical, and yet that non-reductive physicalism cannot account for mental causation. His recommended solution is an Aristotelian view. As such, he devotes a whole chapter to Aristotle's theory of the mind.

This attention to Aristotle is a unique and appealing feature of the book. Relatedly, where most such texts begin their discussion of dualism with Descartes, Maslin's coverage in Chapter 2 begins with several pages on Plato's version of dualism. The book thus includes significant elements of ancient philosophy, which may be attractive to some instructors.

However, the chapter on Aristotle turns out to be a bit disappointing in that Maslin soft-pedals any criticism, making it seem as if Aristotle can solve all the problems that plagued the preceding theories. Thus while the list of objectives for previous chapters regularly enjoined students to understand *flaws* in the views discussed (e.g., "understand what homuncular functionalism is, and the difficulties it faces" [p. 121]), the objectives for Chapter 8 are noticeably uncritical. Many of them flag problems that Aristotle's theory *avoids*. Yet the chapter does not consider how an Aristotelian theory might solve the problems with qualia and intentionality that in Chapter 5 were said to defeat functionalism – despite the acknowledged similarity of the two views. While I do not begrudge Maslin his right to declare his preference for Aristotelianism, I wish he were as actively critical in his discussion of it as he is elsewhere in the book.

A more troublesome influence of Maslin's preferences on his discussion appears in Chapter 6. Section 6.5 is on John Searle's views on the mind-body problem. Maslin ends the section by endorsing Searle's claim that the supervenience of the mental on the physical amounts to just the proposition that physical events *cause* mental events. Maslin then says that "it is... on this basis that I shall continue to make my assessment of property dualism" (p. 167). This is worrying, for Searle's claim is highly idiosyncratic and widely criticized. Indeed the common reaction of other philosophers is that he simply conflates causal and constitutive relations (see, e.g., Jaegwon Kim, 'Mental causation in Searle's "biological naturalism"', *Phil. & Phenom. Research*, 55 [1995]). Again, while Maslin is entitled to his views, in an introductory text it is a concern if those views are very unconventional, for students will not know how unconventional they are.

And unfortunately, Maslin's stance has a sharply prejudicial effect in the next section. Colin McGinn and David Chalmers, he says, demand that an explanation of consciousness must reveal a 'necessary connection' between the physical and the mental. This demand is misguided, says Maslin, because just as Hume showed that there can be no deep insight into the physical causes

of physical events, nor can there be such insight into the physical causes of consciousness. Now this criticism is valid only if McGinn and Chalmers hold that the connection in question is *causal*. They do not hold this. Yet Maslin reads them as if they do. He quotes Chalmers saying that physicalist theories cannot explain consciousness because “Any account given in purely physical terms... will yield only... structure and dynamics” (p. 171). Interpreting this, Maslin says that “What Chalmers is claiming is that an effect must be like its cause if the causal relation is to be possible and any explanation which utilizes it is intelligible” (ibid.). This is incorrect. By “account” Chalmers does not mean ‘causal account’. Maslin is projecting Searle’s view, which he himself favors, onto McGinn and Chalmers.

While this is the only serious error of substance that I saw, I still find it hard to see myself using Maslin’s text. For a class in which many students had no previous exposure to philosophy, I would want a more basic text, of the sort exemplified by the Montero or Kukla and Walmsley books reviewed below. On the whole, Maslin’s book is more suited to upper-level classes. But there are a wealth of texts available for those classes – Kim’s being the leading instance – and given the flaws I have noted, I would pick one of them over Maslin’s text. However, I would add that if one were keen to expose students to the views of the ancient philosophers, Maslin’s attention to Aristotle (and, to a lesser extent, Plato) might tip the scales more in his favor.

**Barbara Montero, *On the Philosophy of Mind*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2009, 147pp., ISBN: 978-0495005025, \$15.95 (pbk).**

Montero’s text is an entry in the ‘Wadsworth Philosophical Topics’ series, which aims to provide brief and accessible introductions to major issues in philosophy. The book is less than half the length of Maslin’s, and accordingly much less detailed. There are twenty chapters, each of which is no more than 5 to 10 pages long. Montero’s style is friendly and appealing throughout, and she works hard to engage the reader’s interest. A nice example of her style is Chapter 3, which is titled ‘A Mad Scientist’s Instructions for Creating a Human Being’. The chapter introduces the wide range of theories of mind via the narrative device of imagining oneself in the

shoes of a ‘mad scientist’ who is trying to create a human being, Frankenstein-like, from scratch. After all the *physical* parts are in working order, asks Montero, what more – if anything – would the scientist have to do? The answer, of course, differs depending on one’s theory of mind.

After the first three chapters provide set-up, the book discusses dualism (Chs. 4-8), behaviorism (Ch. 9), physicalism (Ch. 10), and functionalism (Ch. 11). Montero then covers a series of specific issues in Chapters 12 through 20, as follows: intentionality, artificial intelligence, externalism, consciousness, the nature of physical properties (what Montero herself has dubbed ‘the body problem’), emotions, personal identity, free will, and the immortality of the soul. She thus covers all of the standard topics in philosophy of mind, as well as some associated topics such as free will and identity.

Inevitably, the brevity of the chapters means that Montero must frequently dispense with subtlety in favor of broad sketches. Nonetheless, she is usually able to do a very good job of laying out the issues in a way that invites students to dig deeper into the debates that she sketches. I particularly like Chapters 6 through 8, each of which considers one argument for dualism. Chapter 6 presents Descartes’ argument that mind and body must be distinct because it is possible that he could exist without his body. Chapter 7 presents the zombie argument, which presses the intuition that there could exist a physical duplicate of a human being without any conscious experiences. And Chapter 8 deals with Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument, concerning the case of Mary the color scientist. The exposition in all of these chapters is crystal clear, and one could very easily pair Montero’s introductory treatment with readings of the primary material of the authors discussed (such as one might find in the Lycan and Prinz anthology reviewed below). Other chapters are of similar quality.

In short, I like Montero’s approach, and I would like to say that I recommend her book. I hesitate to do so, however, because of a number of glaring lapses in content and editing.

The most serious problem is that in discussing free will, Montero repeatedly ignores or misdescribes compatibilism. In Chapter 5 she remarks that “the mind, if free, would not follow [deterministic] laws”, and therefore that “if one accepts free will..., it seems that the mind is not a material thing” (p. 33). Yet compatibilism, which Montero does not acknowledge at this point, de-

nies both claims. And in Chapter 19, which focuses on free will, things do not improve. First, there is the following infelicitous description of the compatibilist view:

You would not be free if you were in a straightjacket [sic] or physically constrained in some other way so that you couldn't raise your arm (for example, if you were paralyzed or someone was giving you an enormous bear hug). According to the compatibilist, being free from such constraints is compatible with the world being entirely determined.... (p. 133)

Well, yes; but *everyone* accepts this, not just compatibilists. The compatibilist claim is that being free from such constraints is sufficient for being free *simpliciter*, even in a deterministic world.

Even more puzzling is the next paragraph, where Montero says that compatibilists claim that if one is in a straitjacket, one can still choose to raise one's arm. But compatibilists are not committed to this claim. Perhaps she means to attribute to them the claim that if one is in a straitjacket, one can still *will* one's arm to raise, as opposed to carrying out the *act* of raising one's arm; and then to suggest that the notion of such purely mental freedom is incoherent. But firstly, the distinction between free will and free action has not been introduced in the text at this point, so the suggestion is far from clear; and secondly, Montero herself goes on to discuss such purely mental freedom without any hint that it is incoherent. What she does say, in a paragraph I shall quote in full, is that compatibilists must in fact deny that we have such mental freedom:

On the compatibilist position, the only sense in which you are free to choose to think about one thing rather than another is the sense in which there are no constraints on your thoughts, constraints such as being under the influence of drugs or powerful distractions that do not let you think. So, given that the compatibilist accepts determinism, it is not true that you could freely choose to think about the lovely time you had on your spring break. You are going to think whatever the world determines you to think even when your mind is free from physical constraints such as powerful drugs. (p. 134)

This is a non-sequitur. The compatibilist position is indeed that your thoughts are free so long as they are not constrained, and as Montero herself has already acknowledged, the world's being deterministic is not a constraint in the relevant sense. She therefore begs the question when she says that determinism entails that our thoughts are not free. Some philosophers will, of course,

defend this entailment, but Montero has not given any such defense, so she should not be asserting the entailment as inevitable – especially not in an introductory text.

Finally, the book is poorly edited. Chapter 20 contains a mangled passage about Descartes' *Meditations* in which one sentence is made outright false by a typographical error, and the next is ungrammatical. That is the only instance I saw of that kind of error, but I saw a number of misspellings throughout the book. For example, as in a quote I gave above, in Chapter 19 'straitjacket' is repeatedly written as 'straightjacket'. The worst infraction, however, is in the epigraphs with which Montero begins each chapter. On three occasions the name of an epigraph's author is misspelled: thus we have 'Mary Shelly', 'Virginia Wolf', and 'Emily Dickenson'. Further, Montero uses the case of George Eliot to illustrate the notion of identity, but repeatedly calls her 'George Elliott'. The fact that only the names of female authors are misspelled only adds to the embarrassment. One can only hope that if there is a reprinting, these errors can be fixed.

In sum, while as I said I would like to recommend Montero's book, which is admirable in its conception and (for the most part) in its content, these problems make it difficult for me to do so. If a reprinted edition were to make the necessary corrections, I would definitely consider using it. In the meantime, the errors are too numerous for my comfort.

**André Kukla & Joel Walmsley, *Mind: A Historical and Philosophical Introduction to the Major Theories*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2006, 207pp., ISBN: 978-0872208322, \$9.95 (pbk).**

Kukla and Walmsley's text has a different focus than most philosophy of mind texts. Indeed, they intend it not as a philosophy text at all, but as a theory-focused text in introductory psychology, to counterbalance the heavily empiricist slant that they see in such texts. (Walmsley is a philosopher; Kukla is a psychologist by training, but widely published in philosophy.) They would like it adopted as a primary text in Introduction to Psychology courses, though they recognize that this would require a seismic shift in how that discipline is commonly taught.

But however the book fares in psychology classes, it is worth considering as a basic introduction to some core issues in philosophy of mind, especially if one wishes to emphasize the field's relationship to psychology. I myself have profitably paired it with the anthology by Gertler and Shapiro (see below), which takes a distinctly 'naturalistic' approach that complements *Mind*'s focus on the theoretical side of psychology.

*Mind* is written in a breezy but lucid style that should guide philosophically inexperienced students to a good grasp of the theories without feeling that they are being 'talked down to'. The book tours through the development of psychology from a branch of philosophy into contemporary cognitive science. It begins with Cartesianism (Ch. 1), and proceeds through introspectionism (Ch. 2), psychoanalysis (Chs. 3 and 4 – though Ch. 3 is not really about psychoanalytic theory per se), and behavioral psychology (Ch. 5). That brings us to just past the middle of the book. The second half covers the transition from behaviorism to identity theory and functionalism (Ch. 6), then sketches some central movements in contemporary cognitive science (Chs. 7 and 8).

As this outline suggests, there is next to no coverage of many issues that are considered central to philosophy of mind – and which are, naturally, covered by both Maslin and Montero. For example, there is no discussion of the problems of either intentionality or consciousness. The exclusion of such topics should give the philosophy instructor pause, and will be reason for many to prefer another text. However, I think that *Mind* may still have value as a basic primer.

Also disconcerting may be the book's extensive discussion of Freudian theory. Few movements are held in as much opprobrium by mainstream analytic philosophy as psychoanalysis, and any text that takes it seriously enough to discuss it for two chapters (40 pages) will become suspect. It also must be said that while Kukla and Walmsley do issue criticisms of psychoanalysis, those criticisms are not very strenuous; whereas, for instance, they declare forthrightly that behavioral psychology has been refuted.

However, those who do not wish to cover psychoanalysis could readily skip Chapter 4 with no damage to students' understanding of the rest of the book. As for Chapter 3, it is worthwhile even if one is not interested in psychoanalysis, as it concerns the *motivations* for the theory rather than the theory itself. In particular, there is a nice presentation of the evidence for the existence



of unconscious mental states, a claim that Freud originated, and one which is usefully contrasted with the Cartesian assumption that the mind is transparent to itself.

The Cartesian view of the mind is laid out in the first chapter. Kukla and Walmsley characterize Descartes' theory of mind as *dualist* and *voluntarist* – as opposed, respectively, to *materialist* and *determinist* theories. By contrast, they note that B. F. Skinner was a deterministic materialist, and Freud a deterministic dualist. Thus they neatly point ahead to future chapters while highlighting the distinction between the mind-body problem and the question of free will, each of which then receives further discussion in the first chapter. Like Montero, though, they mishandle compatibilism! They characterize determinism and voluntarism in a way that puts the two theses in direct contradiction, leaving no logical space for the compatibilist position – even though they acknowledge that it is an occupied position.

Chapter 2 recounts the rise and fall of introspective psychology, and briefly sketches the subsequent schools of behaviorism, psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and humanistic psychology. Chapter 3, as already mentioned, rehearses reasons for thinking that there is much more going on in the mind than appears to conscious attention.

Chapter 5 covers the rise and fall of behavioral psychology, though in more depth than most would want for a philosophy class. Some may still find useful, however, Kukla and Walmsley's lucid portrayal of the deepest flaw in the law of effect (that is, the law that reinforced responses will increase in frequency): namely, its inability to predict behavior due to its inability to identify the *description* under which an organism is responding to stimuli. (If we train a rat to press a bar when it sees a triangle, what will it do if we then show it a square? The answer depends on whether the rat is responding to the triangles *qua* triangles or *qua* polygons or....)

The doctrine of behaviorism itself – as opposed to the science of behavioral psychology – is treated in Chapter 6, before Kukla and Walmsley move on to the identity theory. Here I have a more significant complaint. Kukla and Walmsley divide the identity theory into 'semantic' and 'contingent' versions. The former is a claim about the meaning of mental state attributions, such that when you say that (for example) you believe that penguins are carnivores, the meaning of your statement is that your brain is in some neural state X. The contingent version asserts that

mental states are contingently identical to brain states. Kukla and Walmsley say that the contingent version is preferable, as the semantic version has implausible consequences about what we mean by mental state attributions and when we are justified in making such attributions. The only problem they note with the contingent version is that it makes a risky empirical bet that neuroscience will discover correlating neural states for every mental state.

However, the authors entirely omit a far more serious problem for the contingent identity theory. Since neural state terms, and at least some mental state terms (especially for experiential states), are rigid designators, any identity claim involving them will express a *necessary* identity, not a contingent one. As an example of a contingent identity, Kukla and Walmsley offer “the identity of the president of the United States in the year 2005 and the president of the United States whose father was also a president of the United States” (p. 120; I ignore a flaw here, which is that George W. Bush is not the only president whose father was also president – John Quincy Adams is another). Here, the two terms involved are not rigid designators. Both pick out George W. Bush, but non-rigidly; *someone else* might have been president in 2005, or been the president whose father had been president. By contrast, neural state terms and many mental state terms are rigid designators, which cannot but pick out exactly the things they do pick out. Kukla and Walmsley ignore the distinction. Thus as a second example of contingent identity, they cite water and H<sub>2</sub>O. But that identity is *not* contingent, for our terms ‘water’ and ‘H<sub>2</sub>O’ rigidly designate water and H<sub>2</sub>O respectively. The serious problem for the identity theory, then, is that to be true at all, its claims have to be *necessarily* true – and yet surely they are not. For surely we can imagine (to give the usual example) pain without c-fiber firing, and c-fiber firing without pain. All this stems from the work of Kripke and Putnam in the 1970s, and now constitutes pretty much the philosophical orthodoxy on such matters. So it is surprising and disappointing that Kukla and Walmsley mention none of it.

The book’s last two chapters provide a rapid, but accurate and informative, overview of the main features of the last 40 years or so of cognitive science, from the representational theory of mind, through the debates over artificial intelligence, and the recent rise of connectionist, dynamicist, and situated approaches to cognition. I find much to like in these chapters. Especially if

supplemented with appropriate primary texts, they would give students a good overview of the current state of play regarding the architecture of the mind.

All in all, despite the absence of many core issues in philosophy of mind (for which the authors cannot be blamed, as they did not intend to write a philosophy of mind text), and the unfortunate omission concerning the identity theory, I would happily use this book as a core text for a class in philosophy of mind, especially one with a naturalistic approach and leanings toward philosophy of psychology. For its size and very reasonable price, it does the job very well.

I now move on from the monographs to the edited collections.

**William G. Lycan & Jesse J. Prinz (eds.), *Mind and Cognition: An Anthology* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008, 893pp., ISBN: 978-1405157858, \$62.95 (pbk).**

William Lycan's *Mind and Cognition*, first published in 1990, would be a leading contender for the title of the 'classic' contemporary anthology in philosophy of mind. Now going into its third edition, with Jesse Prinz joining Lycan at the editorial helm, it demands the attention of any instructor teaching philosophy of mind at almost any level. And attention should not be a problem for this volume. While the first edition's cover had a pedestrian image of a classical sculpture, and the second a bland abstract design, this edition sports a painting by Prinz himself of a young woman, looking understandably anxious, with an open drawer in her forehead.

The volume is organized by broad topics into ten parts, each containing a number of readings: some as many as ten or eleven, others only a few. The longer parts are sub-divided into sections focused on a narrower issue. At the beginning of each part the editors provide an introduction of a few pages, and an extensive list of further readings. These offer a useful orientation to the shape of the debates within each topic.

When Lycan updated his anthology for its *second* edition, he kept it to the same length: the number of readings remained at 38. This is very much not the case with the transition to the third edition. It has 56 readings, almost 50% more than before. And it is not just that 18 new readings

have been added; by my count, 32 of the 56 selections are new to this edition. (The back cover states that there are 20 new readings. I'm not sure how that figure was obtained.)

Not all of the new readings constitute genuinely new material, however. Some of them simply replace similar readings that were in the second edition. For example, where the second edition had Jerry Fodor's 'Why There Still Has to Be a Language of Thought' from *Psychosemantics* (1987), the third substitutes the earlier 'Why There has to Be and How There Could Be a Language of Thought' from *The Language of Thought* (1975). This might seem an odd decision. But the main point of the *Psychosemantics* chapter was the productivity and systematicity of cognition; and Lycan and Prinz are now including an excerpt from 'Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture', by Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn, which makes that point. Moreover, this excerpt now stands as a counterweight to Patricia Churchland and Terrence Sejnowski's defense of connectionism in 'Neural Representation and Neural Computation' (a reading found in all three editions); and the inclusion of the chapter from *The Language of Thought* facilitates the inclusion of a reply by Peter Carruthers to Fodor's arguments in that chapter.

These observations bring me to a feature of the text that I like very much: its regular inclusion of pairs of papers where the second directly responds to the first. As just noted, in 'Which Language Do We Think With?' Carruthers discusses arguments made by Fodor in the preceding selection. Other such pairings abound: Daniel Dennett's 'True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works' is followed by a trenchant reply from Stephen Stich; Lycan argues for the 'higher-order perception' theory of consciousness over David Rosenthal's 'higher-order thought' theory. There are many more. Such pairings show students something that is central to analytic philosophy: the activity of presenting, examining, refining, and criticizing the views of others. (Later in this review, I discuss a collection wholly structured in this 'pro and con' manner.) Too often in teaching philosophy, at least at the undergraduate level, one finds that students are insufficiently willing to *disagree* with the authors they are reading. There are no doubt many reasons for this, but one is that philosophers are, unsurprisingly, enormously good at making arguments. Whether by force of pure reasoning or by more rhetorical methods (or a judicious mixture of the two!), we know how to sound convincing. So when students read a philosopher's work, they of-

ten feel that there is no way to reply – that the argumentative armor has no chinks. It is therefore enlightening for them to read another philosopher engaging with the arguments of the first, and presenting reasons to disagree. In practical terms, the instructor can then assign the students to analyze and evaluate the dispute and make a judgment about who is right. More generally, these exchanges provide students with a model for their own philosophical writing.

Let me now outline the text's content. The first part concerns the ontology of mind, with a set of seminal readings on behaviorism, the identity theory, functionalism, and anomalous monism. Behaviorists were not represented in the second edition, so it is especially good to see it represented here, in the form of a selection from B. F. Skinner.

Part II, 'Intentionality', is new to this edition, as are three of its four readings – though 'Information and Representation' is merely a slightly earlier statement of Fodor's asymmetric dependence theory, as found in 'A Theory of Content' in the second edition. Particularly noteworthy is the addition of two critical discussions of naturalized semantics: one by Barry Loewer from within the naturalistic perspective, and one by Robert Brandom arguing that the naturalistic program itself is fundamentally flawed.

Part III, 'The Computational Theory of Mind and Artificial Intelligence', contains the aforementioned exchange between Fodor and Carruthers over whether we think in mentalese. Then on artificial intelligence we have John Haugeland's accessible and judicious 'Semantic Engines', followed by a more combative piece from (who else?) John Searle.

Part IV is 'Eliminativism, Neurophilosophy, and Anti-Representationalism'. I find the placement of Paul Churchland's 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes' in this part (where it has been from the first edition) a bit odd, since it seems better suited to the first section of Part VI, where it receives extensive criticism from Terence Horgan and James Woodward in their 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay'. But this is a minor quibble. The remainder of Part IV is evenly divided between connectionism and dynamical systems theory.

Part V has a section on instrumentalism and another on theory of mind. Both feature the inimitable Stephen Stich in critical mode, first against Daniel Dennett's intentional stance, and then, with Shaun Nichols, against Robert Gordon's simulationist theory of mental ascriptions.

Part VI is somewhat sprawling, with ten readings covering five issues under the broad title of ‘Mental Causation, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge’. As well as sections on the three issues named in the title, there is a section on the status of folk psychology in the wake of externalism and eliminativism, and one on radical externalism. That last section contains just one reading: Andy Clark and David Chalmers’ influential ‘The Extended Mind’. A minor regret I have here is that, given the vigorous literature in the wake of this paper, one might have hoped for the inclusion of a critical response to it.

Part VII is on ‘Consciousness, Qualia and Subjectivity’. (For the first time in the text’s history, the word ‘Qualia’ is not in scare-quotes in this title. Perhaps Prinz overruled Lycan’s wish to register his well-known dissatisfaction with the term!) This is the longest part of the book, having expanded from six readings in the previous two editions to eleven in this one. The opening section, ‘What Is Consciousness?’, will be particularly useful for students new to the area, with three relatively brief readings from Ned Block, Patricia Churchland, and David Chalmers. (Chalmers’ argument deploying two-dimensional semantics, however, will stymie most students without experience in philosophy of language.) Other sections address the nature of awareness, Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument, and representational theories of experience.

The next two parts are new to this edition. Part VIII, ‘Perceptual Content’, mostly concerns the question of whether there is such a thing as nonconceptual perceptual content. In favor are Fred Dretske and Gareth Evans, while John McDowell takes the opposing view. The fourth reading is a recent piece in which Alva Noë extends Clark and Chalmers’ extended mind hypothesis to perceptual experience. Part IX is on ‘Animal Minds’. In ‘Rational Animals’ Donald Davidson argues that animals have no beliefs because they are not part of a language community; then Michael Tye and Peter Carruthers each discuss consciousness in animals.

Finally, Part X covers ‘Emotion’ – specifically, the debate over whether emotions are fundamentally judgments or, as William James argued, feelings or perceptions of bodily changes. That debate is embodied by Robert Solomon and Jesse Prinz, after which Paul Griffiths argues that the debate has no univocal solution because emotions do not form a natural kind.

I think it is clear that *Mind and Cognition* earns its place as the premier anthology in philosophy of mind. The quality of the selections cannot be seriously faulted. The book would make an excellent choice for either an upper-level undergraduate class, or a graduate survey class.

**Brie Gertler & Lawrence Shapiro (eds.), *Arguing About the Mind*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2007, 617pp., ISBN: 978-0415771634, \$39.95 (pbk).**

This anthology, part of an innovative series currently being issued by Routledge, is very different from the Lycan and Prinz text. I would be quite wary of assigning the latter for students with no previous exposure to philosophy of mind; but *Arguing About the Mind* would be ideal, and in fact I have already used it for such a class with great success. The editors state that their purpose was to “[choose] articles that are accessible, intrinsically interesting, and free from unnecessary jargon” (p. 1). They have succeeded admirably. In order to fulfill their goal, they have assembled an unusual collection of readings. A few are familiar, such as Descartes’ second and sixth Meditations, and Searle’s ‘Minds, Brains, and Programs’. But for the most part, the selections are not the usual suspects. For instance, rather than Thomas Nagel’s ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’, Gertler and Shapiro include a more wide-ranging excerpt from Nagel’s *The View from Nowhere*, defending the claim that there is more to reality than can be captured in objective terms.

More than this, however, Gertler and Shapiro diverge from the norm in two much more significant ways. Firstly, they have chosen some unusual and indeed truly novel topics – unusual and novel, that is, for a philosophy of mind anthology. Secondly, they have chosen many readings that are not by philosophers. I shall elaborate on these two points in what follows.

Like the Lycan and Prinz text, *Arguing About the Mind* is organized into parts; in this case, nine of them. And as with the Lycan and Prinz, each part begins with a brief introduction to the topic. Some of the parts are on the expected topics: the problem of consciousness, the relationship between mind and body, the nature of the self, artificial intelligence. But others are less typical. Many of these choices reflect a forthrightly naturalistic view of the discipline on the part of

the editors, according to which philosophy is continuous with the sciences of mind and behavior. Thus Part 2 is ‘Consciousness: How Should It Be Studied?’, and Part 6 is ‘What Can Pathological Cases Teach Us About the Mind?’ These questions are actively debated in the current literature, but are much less often covered in introductory anthologies. The most surprising part of all, though, is the last one: ‘Is There Intelligent Life on Other Planets?’

Part 2 contains a trio of readings from Alvin Goldman, Daniel Dennett, and David Woodruff Smith. In his ‘Science, Publicity, and Consciousness’ Goldman seeks to undermine the ‘publicity thesis’, according to which evidence must be publicly observable, by arguing that introspection is a central and well-justified method in the investigation of consciousness. Dennett then defends his ‘heterophenomenological’ approach to the study of consciousness, arguing that in fact scientists (rightly) regard introspection with much more caution than Goldman and others say they do. Finally, Smith urges that only a more pluralistic approach, notably including introspective phenomenology and a formal ontology of the structure of experience, will allow us to understand consciousness. Through these selections the student will get a fine view of how philosophical questions impinge upon scientific endeavors.

The interdisciplinary theme is even stronger in Part 6, where philosophers engage with authors from other disciplines over philosophical questions concerning psychopathology. Three topics are discussed: the nature of delusion, theory of mind in autism, and free will in the light of disorders such as ADHD and alcoholism. Part 7, on animal minds, contains a similar mix of disciplines: after selections by philosophers Jonathan Bennett and John Dupré, there follow four readings from well-known primatologists on chimpanzee cognition. Again, the strong message is that the conceptual questions broached by philosophers are relevant to, and indeed continuous with, the questions that are faced by scientific researchers in the field.

I come now to Part 9, titled ‘Is There Intelligent Life on Other Planets?’ I have not seen this issue addressed in any other philosophy of mind text! The selections center around the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI). The first reading is a brief description by astronomer Robert Naeye of the ‘Drake equation’, which attempts to lay out the factors involved in calculating the likely number of communicating civilizations in our galaxy – and thus the likelihood of SETI



hearing from such a civilization. The next four readings are an exchange between evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr and cosmologist Carl Sagan over whether SETI is likely to succeed. Mayr argues that the likelihood is astronomically small, and thus that SETI is a waste of resources. Sagan is much more optimistic. While instructive in a general sense, this exchange is not of much *philosophical* interest. It turns on the question of what probabilities we should assign to various parameters in the Drake equation (for instance, how likely is it that a life-bearing planet will evolve *intelligent* life?). The final reading is of more value, though it perhaps belongs more in a philosophy of language class. Philosopher Neil Tennant argues that debates of the kind exemplified by Mayr and Sagan completely miss the most obvious problem facing SETI: how would we know what the aliens were *saying* to us? The chapter is basically a primer on the difficulties of ‘radical translation’ when faced with purported communications from creatures about whom we know nothing.

I’m inclined to say that with Part 9, Gertler and Shapiro stretched a little too far. The motivation, as indicated in their introductory essay, is that the question of alien intelligence is similar to the questions of animal intelligence and artificial intelligence, discussed in Parts 7 and 8 respectively. There is indeed a similarity, but I think Part 9 adds little to the previous two parts. As I remarked, only the Tennant piece is of significant philosophical interest, and it concerns philosophy of language more than philosophy of mind. There is, of course, a very closely related question in philosophy of mind, which is whether we would be able to recognize aliens as intelligent beings. But that question is, in effect, already addressed in Part 8 by Robert French in his paper ‘Subcognition and the Limits of the Turing Test’, which argues that the Turing Test is a test only for *human* intelligence, not for intelligence in general. What French says about intelligence in machines goes just as much for intelligence in aliens.

I have been talking about the most interdisciplinary parts of the anthology. Let me briefly outline the others, which are more squarely located in the domain of philosophy. The authors represented are thus uniformly philosophers. Part 1 is on the puzzle of consciousness, with readings from David Chalmers and Patricia Churchland among others. Part 3 is titled ‘Is the Mind Physical?’ The first two readings are well-edited selections from two books. First, W. D. Hart, from

his *Engines of the Soul*, gives a very clear and careful presentation and defense of Descartes' argument for dualism. Then David Papineau, from *Thinking About Consciousness*, lays out what he takes to be "the canonical argument for materialism" (p. 126), which is that it is entailed by the causal closure of physics. Part 4 considers the relationship of the mind to the body and to the world, and begins with excerpts from Descartes' second and sixth Meditations. The next reading, an excerpt from Bill Brewer's 'Bodily Awareness and the Self', is one of the more difficult in the book: my sense is that students will need guidance to follow the details of Brewer's critique of Descartes. The text then pairs Clark and Chalmers' 'The Extended Mind' (the *only* reading that also appears in the Lycan and Prinz anthology!) with a reply by Gertler herself, original to this volume. Part 5 concerns the self, where the quality of the selections is indicated by the authors' names: Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, Daniel Dennett, Galen Strawson, and Eric Olson.

*Arguing About the Mind* is an extremely good anthology. I highly recommend it. However, it is a very different kind of anthology from *Mind and Cognition*. The two are not really in competition. For one thing, Gertler and Shapiro's choice of topics makes their book notably distinct. For another, *Arguing About the Mind* is much more consciously aimed at an audience with little or no experience in philosophy. I know of no better anthology for such a class. By contrast, rather few of the readings in Lycan and Prinz's text would be readily accessible to newcomers to the discipline. But if I wanted a text for a more advanced undergraduate class, or perhaps a survey class at the graduate level, *Mind and Cognition* would be it.

**Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007, 408pp., ISBN: 978-1405117616, \$45.95 (pbk).**

I now turn to a third anthology, different again than the previous two. Rather than a collection of previously published material, it is a collection of up-to-the-minute essays, commissioned to portray the current state of the art in a range of issues in philosophy of mind. It is part of a *Contemporary Debates* series that has been published by Blackwell over the past five years. Each book in the series offers pairs of papers presenting opposing views on a stated question. For ex-

ample, the first question in this collection is: ‘Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content?’ Gabriel Segal argues for the affirmative, while Sarah Sawyer takes the negative.

The volume is divided into three parts, and addresses ten questions in all. Part I is on mental content, with questions on the existence of narrow content, the compatibility of content externalism with privileged access, the normativity of content, and the existence of non-conceptual content. Part II is on physicalism, with questions on the viability of non-reductive physicalism, whether physicalism is an *a priori* or *a posteriori* truth, and whether physicalism can account for mental causation. Part III is on consciousness, with questions on whether consciousness is an emergent property, whether an experience’s phenomenal character is identical to its representational content, and whether all consciousness is perceptual.

I said that Gertler and Shapiro’s anthology is designed for students new to philosophy, while Lycan and Prinz’s is best for those with at least some philosophy under their belts. McLaughlin and Cohen’s volume is for readers with considerable background in philosophy of mind in particular – perhaps as acquired through a text such as Lycan and Prinz’s. It would therefore be an excellent text for graduate students. As for undergraduates, I could only see it being useful for the most advanced and motivated students. While most of the contributors make some attempt to introduce and contextualize the debate in which they are engaged, these attempts tend to be, of necessity, very brief. Much prior knowledge is assumed. For example, the first few pages of Frank Jackson’s defense of *a priori* physicalism deploys the terms ‘causal role’, ‘identity theory’, ‘*a priori*’ and ‘*a posteriori*’ (of course!), ‘extension’, and ‘*de re*’ and ‘*de dicto*’. Only some of these terms are explained, and for the ones that are, the explanation is a sentence or two at most. I mean this not as a criticism, but merely to point out that students who lack a background in philosophy of mind will find themselves rapidly swamped by a mass of philosophical jargon. There is an introductory essay by Cohen, but there he can do little more than outline the basic gist of each exchange.

Those who have the background, however – and here I include teachers as well as their students – will find the book a treasure trove of stimulating argumentation. The list of contributors is a virtual ‘who’s-who’ of contemporary philosophy of mind, and most of the exchanges consti-

tute both a review of, and an update to, an ongoing debate. Most of the contributors are themselves major players in the debate on which they are writing. For instance, Anthony Brueckner and Michael McKinsey continue a long-running dispute over whether externalism about mental content is compatible with privileged access to one's own thoughts, which was sparked by McKinsey in 1991 (arguing for incompatibility), and in which Brueckner has published extensively. Brueckner first summarizes McKinsey's original argument, and the various responses to it in the (dauntingly extensive) literature, before launching into his own answer to McKinsey – including discussion of the latter's more recent writings on the issue.

In most (though not all) of the pairings, one author will pay some attention specifically to the other author's contribution to this volume, though usually this occurs only briefly and towards the end of the paper. But the paired papers almost always make significant contact with the view espoused in the other, even if they do not always interpret the structure of the debate in exactly the same way. This makes the volume immensely valuable as a sophisticated snapshot of this vibrant sub-field of analytic philosophy. It merits very serious consideration if one is looking for a text for a graduate class, and perhaps for a very advanced undergraduate class.

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