Essence, Effluence, and Emanation:
A Neo-Suarezian Analysis

by Andrew Dennis Bassford

University of Texas at Austin | a.d.bassford@utexas.edu
Austin Community College | andrew.bassford@austincc.edu

Abstract: The subject of this essay is propria and their relation to essence. Propria, roughly characterized, are those real properties of a thing which are natural but nonessential to it, and which are said to “flow from” the thing’s essence, where this “flows from” relation is understood to designate a kind of explanatory relation. For example, it is said that Socrates’s risibility flows from his essential humanity; and it is said that salt’s solubility in water flows from the essential natures of both salt and water. The question I raise and attempt to answer in this essay is: In what sense do propria “flow from” essences? What kind of explanatory relation is this exactly? Some suggest that it is a relation of logical consequence (e.g., Kit Fine); others, of grounding (e.g., Michael Gorman); and still others, of formal causation (e.g., David Oderberg). In this essay, I reintroduce and defend a view suggested by the late scholastic Spanish philosopher and theologian Francisco Suárez, who in 1597 wrote that effluence is best understood as a very special kind of efficient causation, which we can call the relation of emanation. The thesis of this essay, then, is that propria emanate from essences. Along the way, this paper offers a new taxonomy of types of propria; it explains the significance of propria for the metaphysics and epistemology of essences; it discusses at length varieties of efficient causation (and emanation in particular); and then it offers an extensive abductive argument in favor of Suárez’s account, whereby the former accounts of effluence are critiqued, each in turn, and Suárez’s view is motivated and ultimately shown to be superior to its competitors. [274 words]

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1. Introduction

The subject of this essay is *propria* (sing., ‘*proprium*’; sometimes also ‘*proprietaes*’) and their relation to essence. ‘Proprium’ is a concept from within the Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophical tradition. Propria, roughly characterized, are those real properties of a thing which are natural but nonessential to it (i.e., proper to it), and which are said to “flow from” the thing’s essence, where this “flows from” relation is understood to designate a kind of explanatory relation (cf. Locke 1689: III.iii.18ff; Bittle 1937: 58-59). (Propria are also sometimes said to “follow from,” “spring from,” or “derive from” essences.) The question I raise and attempt to answer in this essay is: In what sense do propria “flow from” essences? What kind of explanatory relation is this exactly? For ease in exposition, I'll hereafter refer to this relation, without meaning to imply any specific account of it, as the relation of effluence.

This question has not generated much discussion within contemporary analytic philosophy, and to be candid, philosophers have historically tended to be pretty evasive about addressing it directly. At present, the following positions have been suggested, though none but the last has been seriously defended at length. Kit Fine (1995) suggests that the relation is one of logical consequence. Michael Gorman (2005, 2014) suggests that effluence is the relation of grounding. Irving Copi (1954), Richard Sorabji (1969), and Matthew Kelly (1976) suggest that we instead understand the relation in terms of causation. What kind of causation? David Oderberg (2011) suggests that it is a relation of formal causation, conjoined, too, with a kind of non-causal origination relation. And other plausible positions are possible too. In this essay, I will (re-)introduce and defend a different sort of causal account. I will defend a view suggested by the late scholastic Spanish philosopher and theologian Francisco Suárez, who in 1597 wrote that effluence is best understood as a very special kind of efficient causation, which we can call the relation of emanation.¹ The slogan of this view, then, and the thesis of this essay, is that propria emanate from essences.

¹ Baruch Spinoza (1677: e.g., III.7) may have held this view too (see T. Ward 2011: §ff). I will remain silent throughout the rest of the essay on to what extent Spinoza's account of effluence agrees with Suárez's. An investigation of that sort demands a paper of its own and therefore some other occasion.
The arrangement of this essay is as so. I am cognizant that propria and their importance for our best metaphysics and epistemology of essence are not readily apparent to, nor any longer commonly appreciated by, the typical contemporary philosopher. And so, I'll begin in section 2 with a discussion of the different variety of propria, some examples of each, and the role(s) they have historically played within Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy. In section 3, I'll then discuss Suárez’s views of causation, generally, and, more specifically, what exactly the relation of emanation is supposed to be. Finally, in section 4, I'll offer an extensive abductive argument to the effect that Suárez’s view is more plausible than the competing views just mentioned.

2.1. Propria and Varieties Thereof

To begin, let’s disambiguate the term ‘accident,’ since propria are a special kind of accident. In Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy, ‘accident’ can be used to designate at least two different genera of properties. On the one hand, there are per accidens accidents—those properties of a thing which are non-essential to it, (usually) contingent to it, and which are generally non-characterizing of it (or its species), as well—whether because the property under examination is not a real one, but only a mere conceptual or Cambridge property, or because it is a real property but it is nonetheless not closely enough related to the thing’s essence to be of any metaphysical or epistemological significance. It is in this sense that my having brown hair is accidental to me. I needn’t have brown hair, since I could dye it. Besides, while my having brown hair is indeed a real property of me, it is only scarcely bound up with my identity or what I am. Another example of an accident of this kind is a triangle’s being Pythagoras’s favorite plane figure. A triangle’s having this property in no way flows from its essence, its being what it is. This is the sense of ‘accident’ that has been intended throughout the entirety of analytic philosophy, and the usage of the term which may be found in the writings of contemporary “essentialists,” such as Saul Kripke (1972/1980), as well as in those of contemporary “anti-essentialists,” such as Robert Stalnaker (1979).

There is another, much-neglected species of accident. On the other hand, there are per se accidents—i.e., propria—those real properties of a thing which are non-essential to it, naturally had by it (or its species), and which are genuinely characterizing of it. It is in this sense that Socrates’ being able to get a joke is accidental to him, since although this property does genuinely characterize what he is, and although it is (in some sense) necessarily had by him by virtue of his essence, this

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2 Yet a final example is something’s having a rigidified, actual-indexical property, such as my cat’s being actually asleep on the couch at this precise moment (cf. Miroiu 1999). This is a necessary feature of my cat, but one which is clearly not part of her nature.
Another example of an accident of this kind is a triangle's having interior angles summing to 180 degrees. A triangle is essentially a plane figure possessing three angles, and it is by virtue of being such that it necessarily has interior angles summing to 180 degrees (cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 76a4-9; Hauser 2019: 28ff).

Now, propria themselves may be classified according to two different dimensions. There are exclusive and inclusive propria, and perfect and imperfect propria, yielding a total of four distinct varieties. (This division has not previously been drawn so explicitly. I therefore offer it as the basis for the following novel taxonomy.) Exclusive propria are those propria of a thing that are exclusive to it (or its species). Grammaticality in human beings is a proprium of this sort (leaving aside the possibility of linguistic aliens). Our previous example of having interior angles that sum to 180 degrees in triangles is another proprium of this sort. In each case, the proprium is a property possessed by that kind of thing and by that kind of thing alone. Inclusive propria, on the other hand, are those propria of a thing that are not exclusive to it (or its species). Having webbed feet in ducks is a proprium of this sort (viz., because, e.g., pelicans have webbed feet too). Sterling silver’s having a melting point of (about) 900 degrees Celsius is another proprium of this sort (viz., because, e.g., brass has this melting point too). In each case here, the proprium is a genuinely characterizing property of the thing that is not possessed by that thing alone. Traditionally, the

3 It should be clear at this point that I'll be assuming a very robust conception of essence throughout this paper. Speaking loosely, ‘essence’ can be used to denote that set of attributes without which a thing cannot exist, which will also include its propria or “essential accidents.” Whenever people speak of “essential properties,” they seem to have this notion in mind. More strictly, ‘essence’ denotes only that attribute or those attributes of a thing which make it to be what it is, which is a thing’s intrinsic and ultimate principle(s) of operations. Sometimes these two senses are taken to be two different competing accounts of essence: the modalist and the Aristotelian conceptions, respectively (cf. Fine 1994). This, however, strikes me as a mere verbal dispute, as even Aristotle often used ‘essence’ in the loose, modalist sense too (see, e.g., his Topics 102b5ff; see also Robertson Ishii & Atkins 2020).

4 The distinction between what I'm calling ‘exclusive propria’ vs. ‘inclusive propria’ is important for the metaphysics and epistemology of essence, as the two play similar but importantly different theoretical roles. I draw the distinction, first, for that reason. (I'll explain this point more momentarily.) I draw it, second, because some may dislike this use of the term. There are many senses of ‘proprium.’ The term can refer to both predicables and properties. As a kind of predicable, propria are those predicables that are convertible with their subject—like definitions—such that As are Bs iff Bs are As, but which nonetheless do not designate the thing’s essence (Aristotle, Topics I.5). This is the most proper sense of the term. More loosely, propria can also refer to properties, and they are (contentiously) synonymous with what Aristotle refers to as ‘per se accidents,’ sometimes also called ‘necessary accidents,’ ‘proper accidents,’ or, confusingly, ‘essential accidents’ (see Aristotle’s second definition of ‘accident’ in Metaphysics V.30; I refer the reader also to his Posterior Analytics, where his ‘in itself’ accidents play a pivotal role in his conception of science; for more on why identifying propria with per se accidents is contentious, see, e.g., Wedin 1973 and Graham 1975). So understood,
essence of a thing has been characterized in terms of its genus and differentiae. Accordingly, it would seem that the exclusive propria of a thing flow from its differentiae, whereas its inclusive propria flow from its immediate genus or one of its higher genera.

The second dimension of distinction is as follows. Perfect propria are those propria of a thing that are necessarily had by it (i.e., which are had by it without exception or deviation). Propria of this sort are characteristically found in properties and abstracta, presuming some among these categories of being possess accidents. (Why this is so will be addressed later in the essay—see n.34.) Again, our triangle's having interior angles that sum to 180 degrees is a proprium of this sort; it is impossible for a triangle not to possess it, even though, as we said, this is a property that merely flows from its essence rather than being of its essence. Imperfect propria, by contrast, are those propria of a thing that are normally had by a member of a thing's species, or which are had by the species usually or for the most part. A chicken's having one head is a proprium of this sort. This is a property of chickens that need not be had by all of its members, but which is nonetheless proper to them. A member of a species that is lacking a proprium of this sort is said to be mutated, dysfunctional, deviant, or otherwise deprived. In this way, abnormalities imply the absence of an imperfect proprium.

There are, then, four species of propria in our taxonomy: exclusive perfect, exclusive imperfect, inclusive perfect, and inclusive imperfect propriia.

Porphyry (c. 270 AD) tells us that there are four types of attributes that ‘proprium’ might designate. Here is what the early modern scholastic logician Robert Sanderson (1631) writes about that distinction: “Proprium is said in four senses. In the first sense, proprium is what belongs only to a kind, though not to all of its members: as, for example, Practicing Medicine belongs to man. In the second sense, proprium is what belongs to all of a kind, but not only to them, as being Two-legged belongs to man. And this (bad) sense is the most improper of all. In the third sense, proprium is what belongs to all of a kind & only to them, but not always: as growing grey in old age belongs to man… In the fourth sense,.. proprium is what belongs to all the members of a kind, only to them, and always to them: as the capacity to laugh belongs to man” (Bk. 1, Ch. 5, p. 17; trans. Jacovides 2007: 488). My use of the term ‘proprium,’ then, thus far corresponds to the class of properties at the intersection of the second and fourth senses of ‘proprium’ offered by Sanderson. I use ‘inclusive proprium’ to refer to his second sense; ‘exclusive proprium,’ to his fourth sense. Now, Gorman (2014: 125) complains that it is bad hygiene to use ‘proprium’ in this way, but I disagree. Among those who still use the term ‘proprium,’ few though they are, it has become standard to use the term so inclusively. For example, Oderberg, a self-avowed “traditionalist” (2001: 41ff), describes gold’s malleability as one of its propriia (2011: 104). This use of the term is only coherent if ‘proprium’ may designate both inclusive and exclusive propriia, since malleability is only a mere inclusive proprium of gold.
I leave it to the reader to generate further examples of each category.

2.2. The Importance of Propria

Throughout much of the history of analytic philosophy, propria have simply been “lumped in” with the category of accidents, or sometimes even essences, generally (cf. Copi 1954: 707; Oderberg 2001: 39). Scholars apparently saw no need to differentiate them from other species of accident or essence. Very recently, however, scholars have finally begun to un-lump them, and rightly so. Propria have historically played a very important role in both our best metaphysics and epistemology of essence.

Metaphysicians of essence generally want essences to play at least three theoretical roles. First, the essence of a thing is supposed to tell us in virtue of what a thing is what it is. In saying, then, that table salt is essentially a chemical compound comprised of sodium and chloride, with a ratio of 1:1 between the two, we mean to say that it is in virtue of being thus composed that salt is salt. Second, the essence of a thing is supposed to tell us how exactly a thing (or species of thing) fits into the Porphyrian Tree of nature (a.k.a., the scala praedicamentalis)—that most fundamental taxonomy by which we classify the various natural substances in the world (cf. Aquinas 1256: De Ente et Essentia, c. 1). In saying, then, that human beings are essentially rational mammals, we mean to say that human beings are categorized under the genus mammal and then possess the differentia of rationality, in virtue of which they form a distinct natural class from every other species of mammal, such as flying squirrels. And finally, the essence of a thing is supposed to explain why exactly the thing has all of the propria that it does. In saying that triangles are essentially plane figures with three angles, we mean to have identified that feature or attribute of triangles on account of which they necessary have interior angles of 180 degrees. Propria are thus useful in

5 Sometimes these three different functions of essence are taken as three different (possibly competing) accounts of essence, which we can dub: real definitionism, categoricalism, and explanationism, respectively. Sometimes one of these functions is taken to be definable in
helping the metaphysician to distinguish between various candidate essences of a thing. If the thing under examination possesses propria, then a proposed candidate essence of it must be able to explain them; otherwise the candidate attribute is not really the thing’s essence, but only, perhaps, some exclusive perfect proprium of it.6

Propria are of great service within the epistemology of essence too. According to Aristotle’s influential scientific essentialist account of scientific inquiry, accounting for the propria of things is the chief task of science. Propria are the explananda of every properly scientific explanation; essences, on the other hand, are the explanantia (cf., e.g., Groarke 2014: 248-251). The picture, then, is this: We observe some peculiar feature of some phenomenon, such as salt’s dissolving in water; we wonder why this is; and we then attempt to explain it by citing the underlying essences of salt and water on account of which salt must dissolve in water. Alexander Bird (2001: 268-269) has described how this works in some detail. In this way, knowing a thing’s essence is of epistemological value precisely because a thing’s propria are of epistemological interest.

Moreover, not only are essences useful for understanding a thing’s propria, but understanding a thing’s propria are also useful for coming to know its essence. Historically, essentialists have held an aposteriorist epistemology of essence (in contrast to an apriorist epistemology), according to which coming to know the essence of a thing essentially involves a kind of abduction (cf. Bird 2007, 2010; Lowe 2008; Tahko 2018; Oderberg 2001: 40, 2007: 161-166). It is in this context that the exclusive/inclusive propria distinction becomes important. The medievals called this abductive process regressus, and it proceeds, in summary, as follows:7 We begin by observing some phenomenon and noting all of its observable properties. Some are more easily recognizable, and we take these as the phenomenon’s identifying features. We note that some of a thing’s properties are sometimes had by it and sometimes not, whereas others are always had and, evidently, necessarily had by it.

terms of the other(s). For my part, I understand essences to play all three roles, and I understand all three to be distinct from one another. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that one could suppose that essences essentially play only one or two of the three, and this would not be entirely implausible. Spinoza very well may have accepted a kind of explanationism about essence while at once denying real definitionalism and categoricalism (T. Ward 2011).

6 Aristotle, in fact, uses this criterion to evaluate competing definitions of phenomena on various occasions. In De Anima, for example, Aristotle considers potential real definitions of the soul according to which the soul is a kind of harmony, or a self-moving number. In response, he writes: “It is impossible for such a thing to be a definition of soul... It is clear if one tries from this formula to give an account of the affections and the activities of the soul, such as reasoning, perception, pleasure, pain and other such things. For... it does not even facilitate conjecture about them” (De Anima 409"13-18; trans. Kung 1977: 371). For more on explanationism within Aristotle’s account of essence, see (esp.) Kung (1977), Matthews (1990), and Hauser (2019).

7 In what follows, I offer the briefest of sketches of regressus. For more on the history and epistemology of regressus, see Jacobides (2007) and Jardine (2008).
We then bracket those contingent features of the thing as being nonessential to it, since the essence of a thing is of necessity always and necessarily had by it.

Next, we observe the properties of other, especially similar, phenomena, likewise distinguishing between their necessary and contingent features. The second step is essentially comparative: We compare those necessary features of the initial phenomenon with those of the others. We observe that some of the initial phenomenon’s necessary properties are also properties of other phenomena. We then bracket those features of our phenomenon that are shared by others, since the essence of a thing must explain all of its propria, and two things cannot have the same essence without also having the same propria, since propria by nature “flow from” a thing’s essence.

This leaves us with just those properties of the thing that are necessarily had by it and by it alone. If our inventory of the thing’s properties has been exhaustive, we know that (at least) one of the remaining properties must be its essence; the others will be its mere exclusive perfect propria. The question we now pose is: Which of the remaining features (or set thereof), if any, is able to account for the other necessary characterizing properties of the thing (exclusive perfect propria), those other properties necessarily had by the thing but not by it alone (inclusive perfect propria), as well as those properties of the thing that are usually had by it, whether uniquely or in common with other species too (exclusive and inclusive imperfect propria)? We first suppose that the one feature is essential, and then see if it can play that explanatory role. If it cannot, we try another, and another, and another,... in each iteration bracketing the failed properties as being nonessential to the thing. We continue this process until we land on that attribute (or set of attributes) fit to the task of best explaining the phenomenon’s propria. If we find such an attribute, this we call the thing’s essence. If we do not find such an attribute, then we say either that the thing has no essence, or otherwise we take its genus and the set of its exclusive perfect propria and use these attributes as its proxy-essence until we can find some better candidate. (Consider Kant’s definition of gold as a yellow metal.) It was by using such a process, presumably, that we were able to discover the essences of the natural elements and many other phenomena.

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8 Aristotelian: “[S]tart from the things which are more knowable and obvious to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not ‘knowable relatively to us’ and ‘knowable’ without qualification. So... we must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and knowable by nature” (Physics 184a17-21; trans. Hardie & Gaye 1941: 218).

9 Aristotelian: “It would seem that not only is the knowledge of a thing’s essential nature useful for discovering the cause of its [propria], as, e.g., in mathematics the knowledge of what is meant by the terms straight or curved, line or surface, aids us in discovering to how many right angles the angles of a triangle are equal: but also, conversely, a knowledge of the attributes is a considerable aid to the knowledge of what a thing is. For when we are able to give an account
3.1. Suárez on Causation

It should now be evident why the relation of effluence is of such philosophical importance. It is by tracking the relation and following it to its termini that we come to know a thing’s essence, as well as thereby come to explain all of its scientifically interesting propria. So, what exactly is this relation? I will answer that it is Suarezian emanation. But before offering that account, I need to first say a word about Suárez’s understanding of causation. I need to also say something about the different varieties of efficient causation, since Suárez holds that it is not just efficient causation in general through which propria flow out of a thing’s essence, but rather a very specific kind of it.10 I’ll offer only a brief summary of these points. The goal of this paper, after all, is not primarily exegetical, but rather topical and directly argumentative.11

Now, Suárez holds a broadly Aristotelian view of causation. Accordingly, there are said to be four basic types of cause (cf. Aristotle, Physics II.3). There are the two intrinsic causes—the material and the formal—and there are the two extrinsic causes—the final and the efficient. A statement of a thing’s material cause is a statement about that out of which a thing is what it is—i.e., of what the thing is materially composed (e.g., brick). A statement of a thing’s formal cause is a statement about that of which a thing is what it is—i.e., of what type or sort of thing it is (e.g., a house), its real definition. A statement of a thing’s final cause is a statement for which a thing is what it is—i.e., of for what end, purpose, function, or reason the thing is as it is (e.g., within which to dwell). And a statement of a thing’s efficient (or agential)

of all, or at any rate, most of the [propria] as they are presented to us, then we shall be in a position to define most exactly the essential nature of the thing. In fact, the starting point of every demonstration is a definition of what something is. Hence the definitions which lead to no information about [propria] and do not facilitate even conjecture respecting them have clearly been framed for dialectic and are void of content, one and all” (De Anima 402\textsuperscript{a}15-403\textsuperscript{b}2; trans. Hicks 1907: 4-7).

10 Suárez discusses efficient causation and emanation in books XVII-XXII of his Disputationes Metaphysicae (hereafter abbreviated ‘DM’). In books XVII-XIX, he discusses creaturely efficient causation, whereas in books XX-XXII, he turns his attention to divine efficient causation, such as is involved in God’s creation, conservation, and concurrence of everything that exists. Book XVII is devoted to the discussion of efficient causation generally, and so we’ll start there. We’ll then turn afterwards to book XVIII.i, titled “The Principle by Which Created Substances Produce Accidents,” where Suárez offers his most sustained discussion of effluence as emanation. Books XX-XXII may be bracketed, given that God is said to have no accidents and therefore no propria either. For a translation of these latter books, see Freddoso’s (2002). For critical discussion, see Freddoso’s lengthy introduction, as well as, e.g., Tuttle (2019).

11 For more exegetical works on Suárez’s theory of causation and its varieties, see Shields & Schwartz (2019: §§2.2-2.4), Schmid (2014); and see esp. Tuttle (2016, forthcoming) for a detailed discussion of Suárez on efficient causation and active causal powers. (I call my presentation of the account ‘Neo-Suarezian’ to signal that I may be taking some liberties in my interpretation.)
cause is a statement from which a thing is what it is—i.e., of from what agent and process the thing came to be as it is, or indeed, came to be at all (e.g., the bricklayer). What is common to all four causes in virtue of which they share a common genus? According to Suárez, we may define a cause generally as any principle that communicates being (or “esse”) distinct from its own individual being to that of which it is a cause (DM XII.i.4-7). All four types of cause satisfy this definition. The intrinsic causes communicate an esse to their effects necessarily like their own esse; the extrinsic causes, on the other hand, communicate an esse to their effects possibly unlike their own (cf. Freddoso 2002: xvi). Another way this distinction might be drawn is by saying that intrinsic causes are “constitutive parts of the compound Being, resulting from their union,” whereas the extrinsic causes are not (Shallo: 1916: 159; cf. Bittle 1941: 297-298).  

3.2. Efficient Causation and Varieties Thereof

Suárez offers a more precise definition of efficient causation than just stated. Following Alfred Freddoso (2002: xxxiv), we can explicate his definition as follows (cf. also Freddoso 1991: §2): x is an efficient cause of y just in case x is an extrinsic principle from which y is generated or sustained by mediation of an action (cf. DM XVII.i). This definition distinguishes efficient causation from formal and material causation in being an extrinsic principle, and it distinguishes efficient causation from final causation in being mediated by some action.

There are many different varieties of efficient causation. Let’s run through some of these significant distinctions, that way we’ll have very fine tools by which to state what emanation is supposed to be. With respect to efficient causation, there are said to be: (i) first and second causes, (ii) total and partial causes, (iii) per se and per accidens causes, (iv) univocal and equivocal causes, (v) physical and moral causes, (vi) principal and instrumental causes, (vii) conjoined instrumental and separated instrumental causes, (viii) proximate and remote causes, (ix) in fieri and in esse causes, and finally (x) quo and quod causes. (In explicating these distinctions, I’ll rely heavily on both Suárez and Bittle 1939: 337-340.)

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12 Space and topical cohesion do not permit fuller discussion of it, but it should be said that Suárez, like his contemporaries, also presupposed a substantival powerful theory of causation (in contrast to contemporary empiricist accounts such as regularity theories and counterfactual ones). This is to say that he presumed that it is ultimately substances in the world which are the primary agents of generation, corruption, and change in general. Things happen as the result of substances exercising their causal powers—e.g., pushing, kicking, blowing up, boiling, etc. A thing’s active powers are those abilities in virtue of which the substance might occupy the agent role in a relation of change. A thing’s passive powers are those abilities in virtue of which it might occupy the patient role in a relation of change.
(i) A *first cause* is a cause whose causality is absolutely independent of any other cause or being, and on which all other causality depends. So understood, there is only one First Cause—namely, God. Every other cause is accordingly classified as a *secondary cause*.

(ii) A *total cause* is a cause whose causality is, or was, sufficient for bringing about a particular effect. A *partial cause* is a cause whose causality was in part responsible for bringing about a particular effect, but whose causality was insufficient on its own for producing it: The effect was brought about by the thing’s combined causal power with that of another cause, as well.

(iii) A *cause per se* is a cause which has a natural tendency to produce a particular effect, or, in the case of free agents, which was intended to produce the effect. A *cause per accidens* is a cause without the natural tendency to produce some particular effect, or which was produced, as we say, “by accident.” This distinction is usually only discussed with reference to free agential action. If while hammering a nail, I hit the nail, then here we have an instance of per se efficient causation, whereas if I instead hit my finger, we have a mere instance of *per accidens* efficient causation.

(iv) A *univocal cause* is a cause which produces an effect of the same species as itself, such as when an oak tree produces another oak tree. An *equivocal cause*, on the other hand, is a cause which produces an effect dissimilar in species from itself, such as when a robin builds a nest in the tree.

(v) A *physical cause* is a cause which produces some particular effect through its own action directly. This is in contrast to a *moral cause*, which is used to describe that kind of causality through which a cause influences a free agent to act. A criminal who blackmails a victim into giving him money is in this way the moral cause of the victim’s giving him the money.

(vi) A *principal cause* is a cause which produces an effect in virtue of its own power. An *instrumental cause* is a cause which produces an effect in virtue of the power of another. In this way, when a sculptor sculpts a statue with a chisel, the sculptor is the principal cause, and the chisel is the instrumental cause.

(vii) A *conjoined instrumental cause* is, as Suárez put it, an instrumental cause that is “united to the principal agent in some way or other whether through contact or through some sort of presence or through some real union—in the way that a writing pen, say, is a conjoined instrument. By contrast, the [separated instrumental cause] will be an instrument that is not conjoined to the principal agent in any way—as, for example, semen after it has been separated” (DM XVII.ii.22; trans. Freddoso 1994: 33). Alternatively, the distinction might be put as follows. A *conjoined instrumental cause* is a cause “that requires the principal agent’s actual and proper influence and causality in order to cause... [whereas] the corresponding separated instrument will be an instrument that in its action does not require the principal agent’s special influence and causality” (*idem*).
A proximate (or ultimate) cause is a cause which, between it and its effect, no other agent interposes its action. A remote cause is a cause which, between it and its effect, some other agent does interpose its action (cf. Mercier 1916: 536). If we are both speakers of the same language and I communicate some message to you directly, then I am the proximate cause of your receiving the information. If, however, we do not speak the same language and I must get my message to you via a translator, then I am merely the remote cause of your receiving it, since the action of our translator stands between my action and its effect on you.

A cause in fieri is an originating cause; it is that which brings about some novel effect. A cause in esse, by contrast, is a sustaining cause; it is that which maintains some effect, without which it would cease. One’s parents are their cause in fieri of their existing. If a chain is dangling from a ceiling, the ceiling is the cause in esse of the chain’s remaining suspended in the air.¹³

Finally, a cause quo is the actual agent that acts in the instance of causation. A cause quo, on the other hand, is understood as designating the causality itself through which the cause causes its effect.

Some of these distinctions are mutually exclusive, such as proximate and remote causation, and some are not, such as originating and sustaining causation, where the agent may function as the principle of change in both ways simultaneously.

3.3. Suarezian Emanation

The thesis of this essay is that propria emanate from essences. What does this mean exactly? Emanation can now be stated precisely. This means that with respect to its propria, a substance’s essence is an efficient cause which is (i) secondary, rather than primary; (ii) total, rather than partial; (iii) per se, rather than per accidens;¹⁴ (iv) equivocal, rather than univocal; (v) physical, rather than moral; (vi) principal, rather than instrumental; (vii) [N/A, though I’ll suggest later that a substance produces its propria via a conjoined instrumental cause]; (viii) proximate, rather than remote (“if the accident is immediately connected with the substance; in some cases, however, an accident can result by means of [another] accident if it has a closer connection with

¹³ This distinction is most often discussed in reference to Aquinas’s (in)famous cosmological argument. Some understand the claim that there must be a first cause as meaning that there must be a first originating cause; others understand it as meaning that there must be a first sustaining cause. See, e.g., Edwards (1959) for further discussion.

¹⁴ Suárez: “[N]atural resulting is wholly intrinsic and in a certain sense has to do with the completed production of a thing, since it tends solely toward constituting the thing in the connatural state which is per se owed to it by dint of its generation” (DM XVIII.iii.14; trans. Freddoso 1994: 101).
the accident” (DM XVIII.iii.3; trans. Freddoso 1994: 92);\(^\text{15}\) (ix) both \textit{in fieri} and \textit{in esse};\(^\text{16}\) and (x) \textit{quod}, rather than \textit{quo}, whereas the efficient action of emanation itself is the cause \textit{quo}. The thought, then, is that the essence (or substantial form) of a thing engages in an act of emanation, through which, on its own, by its own power and inclination, and directly, it naturally produces and sustains its propria. In this way, according to Suárez, the relation between a substance’s essence and its propria is similar in kind to the relation that obtains between a flashlight and its light. Just so, by its own internal constitution and power (essence), the flashlight (substance) produces and sustains its light (proprium) via a thoroughly causal process (emanation).

4.1. Competing Accounts of Effluence

Let’s now situate this thesis within its proper dialectical context. The question of the essay is: What sort of explanatory relation is it that obtains between a thing’s essence and its propria? Suárez (and I) answer that it is the relation of emanation, which, we have just seen, is a very specific type of efficient causation. This account has not yet been endorsed in the contemporary literature. And so, I want to argue now that the Suarezian account of \textit{effluence} is superior to those competing accounts mentioned in

\(^{15}\) Suárez: “The thesis posited... assumes... that the accidental properties, especially those that follow up or are owed [to a substance] by reason of its form, are caused by the substance not only as a material cause and a final cause but also as an efficient cause through a natural resulting—either immediately, if the property in question is a primary property, or mediate, if it is a secondary property... [T]he same [principle] applies to any [substantial] form whatsoever and to the [propria] that follow upon it or are owed to it by reason of itself” (DM XVIII.iii.4; trans Freddoso 1994: 93).

\(^{16}\) Suárez: “[W]ith respect to all the properties that result from [substantial] forms at the very beginning one can... ask whether the resulting in question occurs only in the mode of production at the first instant or time at which the thing is produced or co-produced or whether instead it perdues in the mode of conservation for the whole time during which the property itself perdues, with the result that just as, in the case of illumination, it is not just the light but also the action of illuminating that perdues, so too, in a soul that has an intellect, it is not only the intellect but also the emanation of the intellect from the soul that perdues—and similarly, in the case of fire or water, it is not only the heat or coldness that perdues but also their actual emanation from their forms. As I see it, on this question nothing can be established by a conclusive argument... [H]owever, it seems probable that this actual emanation does not cease, since its principle remains present and conjoined to it to the highest degree, and it always retains the same power to sustain the emanation... Further, one can better explain in this way why, other things being equal, it is possible for there to be greater resistance in the expulsion of a [proprium] from its proper subject than there is in its expulsion from some other subject” (DM XVIII.iii.12; trans. Freddoso 1994: 98-99). About this remark, Freddoso helpfully adds: “A standard scholastic example is that it is easier to heat air (which is naturally disposed to be hot and moist) than water (which is naturally disposed to be cold and moist).” The sort of proprium in question here is clearly what I have referred to earlier as an \textit{inclusive imperfect} proprium. More on this point later.
the beginning of the essay and, therefore, warrants serious consideration. Fine has it that effluence is the relation of logical consequence. Gorman has it that it is the relation of grounding. And Oderberg has it that it is a non-efficient causal relation, which he described as origination by substantial form, or “formal causation.” I'll examine all three accounts, critiquing each in turn, and I'll end with a demonstration of how Suárez’s account is able to succeed where they each fail.

4.2. Criteria of Evaluation

But before getting under way, we should note at the outset that all four positions on the table are prima facie plausible. This is, in part, because all four take seriously, and attempt to correctly model, the necessary formal features of effluence. Let’s state what those formal features are. Moreover, let’s also discuss a few theoretical virtues by which to adjudicate the dispute between the four accounts, since without first positing a criteria of evaluation, it will be far from evident how to proceed with it.18

Formally, effluence is a relation of the following sort. First, effluence is irreflexive, such that no property $P$ flows from itself. Second, it is asymmetric, such that if $P_1$ flows from $P_2$, then $P_2$ does not also flow from $P_1$. Third, it is transitive, such that if $P_1$ flows from $P_2$, and $P_2$ flows from $P_3$, then $P_1$ flows from $P_3$ too. And fourth, it is (contentiously) terminating, such that every property of an object cannot flow from some other property of it. The reason for these first four formal features is that we are supposing that effluence is an explanatory relation, and these features are sine non qua for any genuinely explanatory relation.19

Fifth, effluence is, as Gorman puts it, a kind of ontic relation, obtaining in the order of reality, rather than an epistemic one, obtaining only in the order of knowledge. This is to say that effluence is “about how things are related in the world, not about how our understandings of things are related in our minds” (Gorman 2014: 17). I am taking some liberties in attributing this view to Gorman. Strictly speaking, Gorman only offers an account of essence and accident, not proprium or effluence. Nonetheless, he considers in passing a view of effluence according to which it is “similar” or “roughly equivalent” to grounding. For this reason, I should really say that this account is inspired by Gorman, but not properly of Gorman.18

Some of the following formal characteristics have been noted by Gorman (2005; 2014: 127-129); some have not. Gorman offers them in discussion of what he calls a relation of “internal support,” which is just his term for what I’m calling “effluence.” He offers his remarks in the context of describing his specific, substantive account of the relation, and so some of the features he mentions are controversial as aspects by which to adjudicate the dispute between the competing accounts. I have, therefore, only chosen to detail those neutral points that genuinely seem helpful in objectively assessing different views.19

Some may dispute that explanatory relations must be terminating. This is not the proper forum in which to enter into that debate.
This is in contrast to some anti-essentialists, who also suppose that there is indeed a sense in which some properties of a thing “flow from” other properties of it, and so that some of a thing’s properties are privleged, but who also suppose that this is merely an epistemic relation (cf. Sullivan 2017).

Sixth, effluence obtains only between real properties of things. Not every “property” that can be formed via lambda-abstraction corresponds to a real property.20 Having a mass of 2.43 grams is an example of a real property; Fine’s infamous “being such that 2+2=4” is not. Consequently, being such that 2+2=4 will not flow from the essence of any one thing. Perhaps it will flow from the essence of multiple things, taken as a plurality, a strategy of reduction popularized by Fine and carried out by others sympathetic to the project of reducing modality to essence; but perhaps not. I leave it open how we should understand what it is for a property to be real vs. non-real.21

Seventh, effluence is plausibly understood as a relation in which the patient of the relation is singular, and the agent of the relation is singular, too, whenever the proprium is monadic, and plural whenever the proprium is polyadic. So, for example, to account for a triangle’s proprium of having interior angles equaling two right angles, we need only cite the essence of the triangle; to account for table salt’s dissolving in water, on the other hand, we must cite the essence of the salt and then also something about the essence of water too. (Of what ontological category those relata are, is less clear. It is sometimes said, generically, that, e.g., risibility flows from rationality, which would seem to suggest that effluence is a relation between universals, or perhaps between powers. At other times, it is said that the risibility of Socrates flows from the rationality of Socrates, which would seem to suggest that effluence is a relation between specific token instances of universals, or perhaps between tropes. Still other times, it is said that Socrates’s being risible flows from his being rational, which would seem to suggest that effluence is a relation between events, or perhaps between facts. For present purposes, we can leave this theoretical issue aside and continue to speak of effluence as a relation between properties.)22

20 For more on lambda abstraction and its calculus, see Alama & Korbmacher (2021).
21 My suggestion would be to follow Lewis (1983) in carving out a distinction between sparse and abundant properties (cf. also Cowling 2013), and then to follow de Melo (2019) in supposing that sparseness comes in degrees and is also relative to the sort of object we are talking about. So, being prime is not sparse relative to the kind, human, but it is sparse relative to the kind number. Much more might be said about this distinction, but now is not the time to pursue this line any further.
22 My own intuition is that effluence is best understood as a relation between tropes, where both a thing’s essence and its propria are modeled as tropes, or instead as a relation between a substance and some trope. One reason I say this, and deny that it is a relation between universals, is because otherwise effluence would sometimes be a symmetric relation, and so lead to circular explanations. This becomes evident once one realizes, with Joan Kung (1977:
And, eighth, effluence is a relation not confined to the domain of metaphysics and studied only by metaphysicians. Effluence must be a kind of relation known also to scholars, theoreticians, and researchers from other disciplines. This is a necessary feature, because we suppose, for example, that chemists have correctly identified the essence of many of the natural elements, and have done so, at least in part, by discovering that the propria of those elements do indeed flow from their essences. This holds similarly for other scientists and philosophers, who have likewise discovered the essences of the phenomena proper to their domain. The relation of making a thing to be what it is, what we’ve called the real-definitional function of essence, may very well be special to metaphysics, but the relation of effluence is not.

Finally, let’s posit three additional theoretical desiderata on accounts of the relation between essence and propria. An account can violate one of the following criteria, but doing so will come with a theoretical cost and will make the account, all things considered, less plausible. The first is a variation of Occam’s Razor. It is more parsimonious to suppose that effluence denotes only one type of relation, rather than a set or plurality of them. Relatedly, it is more parsimonious to suppose that effluence is a kind of relation already known and recognized in most ontologies, rather than a novel relation which has hitherto gone unnoticed. The second is a kind of virtue of conservatism. An account that allows us to preserve relevant beliefs is better than one that forces us to revise them. This holds generally, but in this case, we should also want our account of effluence to preserve the insights of earlier metaphysicians from within the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition, in particular. Aristotle and St. Thomas, unfortunately, say painfully little about effluence itself, but they do offer many examples. They might be wrong on occasion about whether the relation obtains between any two or more properties, but, generally speaking, the less we diverge from their examples of the relation’s obtaining, the better. And the third and final desideratum worth mentioning here is a kind of virtue of moderate ecumenicality. The most popular kinds of essentialisms are those about persons (e.g., Socrates), 367-368), that a property that is essential to one thing may be a mere proprium of another. Now, consider the two properties being equiangular and being equilateral. Equiangularity is essential to equiangular triangles, whereas equilaterality is only a proprium of them. From this, it would follow that equilaterality flows from equiangularity. But then, of course, the situation is precisely reversed in the case of equilateral triangles, where its being equiangular flows from its being equilateral. Consequently, if we supposed that effluence is a relation between universals simpliciter, then it would follow both that equiangularity flows from equilaterality and that equilaterality flows from equiangularity, which cannot be the case. On the other hand, if one models the relation as one between tropes, then the problem is avoided, because in the first case we would not thereby be speaking of equiangularity in general, but only the equiangularity of a particular subject (e.g., the equiangularity of the equiangular triangle vs. the equiangularity of the equilateral triangle); this goes similarly for the second case too. And so, the relata of both relations are different, and the circularity problem is avoided. (This is a philosophically rich subject and much remains to be said, but this suffices for present purposes, within the present forum.)
organisms generally (e.g., dingoes, tomato plants), artifacts (e.g., laptops), and abstracta (e.g., justice, irrational numbers). Some properties of these objects have historically been said by proponents of plausible varieties of essentialism to flow from other properties of them. And so, per moderate ecumenicality, an account of effluence that is serviceable to all four is better than one that is not so serviceable.

4.3. Effluence as Logical Consequence

Now that the necessary and desirable formal features of the relation have been outlined, we can begin examining substantive theses about what sort of relation effluence is exactly. What is the relation of effluence? Fine suggests in passing that it is the relation of logical consequence, and he, accordingly, compares propria with his notion of consequential essence:

Say that the property Q is a (logical) consequence of the properties P₁, P₂,..., or that they (logically) imply Q, if it is a logical truth for any object, that it has the property Q whenever it has the properties P₁, P₂,... An essential property of an object is a constitutive part of the essence of that object if it is not had in virtue of being a consequence of some more basic essential properties of the object; and otherwise it is a consequential part of the essence. (1995: 57)

He says that this distinction (more or less) corresponds to the essence/propria distinction, where the essence of a thing is constitutive of it, whereas its propria are merely consequential upon its having the essence that it does—they are whatever else is true of the object in virtue of possessing its constitutive essence. This account is clearly simple; it is, by and large, conservative, since effluence is often spoken of in terms of consequence; and, moreover, it coheres well with several of the important necessary features of the relation, such as our requirement that the relation be one that is also known in other scientific domains besides that of metaphysics.

However, this account is also clearly unsatisfactory. This is because it is extensionally inadequate. It would mistakenly include as propria some properties of a thing which are not propria of it, and it would fail to include as propria properties of a thing which are propria of it. This account of effluence is too broad since, as Oderberg (2011; 2007: 160) rightly observes, it would include as propria Socrates's being an animal, which is logically entailed by his being a mammal. It would include his being a

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33 Aquinas (1274), for example, sometimes refers to effluence as a relation of “natural consequence”; “The [effluence] of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of change, but by a certain natural consequence; thus one thing results naturally from another, as color from light” (Summa Theologica I, q.77., a.6, ad.3; trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province 1952: v.1, p. 405).
mammal, which is logically entailed by his being a man. Finally, it would also include his being rational, which follows from his being a man. But in this case, animality, mammality, and rationality are manifestly not accidents of Socrates, but rather parts of his essence. Oderberg summarizes the point:

Whatever genus an object belongs to, its being in that genus entails its being in all the higher genera that subsume it... In addition, whatever infima species an object belongs to, its being in that species entails its being in its proximate genus. And whatever infima species an object belongs to, its being in that species entails its being in (or having) the specific difference of that species. (2011: 100-101)

And so, with Oderberg, we should suppose that logical consequence “simpliciter cannot make the requisite distinction between essence and properties,” and is therefore not to be identified with effluence (101).

Two sorts of replies are available in response to this objection. The first is not very plausible, but the second may be. Gorman suggests the first tack. It has two parts. The first part is to model effluence by restricting the relata of logical consequence to real properties alone, in accordance with our sixth necessary criterion. And the second is to then deny that, say, being a mammal, is a real property of Socrates. As he says:

I side with those philosophers who accept only determinate features into their ontology. ‘[Human being]’ and ‘mammal’ are both perfectly legitimate predicates, of course, but only ‘[human being]’ has a feature proper to it; the determinable predicate ‘mammal’ is formed by abstraction from the determinate feature of being a [human being], rather than having a distinct feature—being a mammal— proper to it. Now let us recall... [that effluence] holds only between real features. Predicates that are not underwritten by their own proper features are not proper substitutions in the [effluence] schema... Therefore, ‘being a mammal’ does not fit into the [effluence] schema, and therefore the assumption of the objections—that [something’s] being a mammal [flows from its] being a [human being], or vice versa—is false. (2014: 132-133)

Incidentally, Oderberg makes a similar remark. He says that, even though we typically define a thing in terms of its genus and differentia, the distinction here is purely conceptual, not real:

[It is not the case that] in the human being rationality has a distinct existence from animality or animality from rationality, as though there were two forms in the human being, combined or added together in some way. The rationality of the human being is animal,
and the animality of the human being is rational. One can, of course, investigate human rationality while abstracting from anything animal (e.g., language) and also human animality while abstracting from anything rational (e.g. digestion), but one does not thereby investigate distinct forms or elements of a single form... There is a conceptual distinction between, say, rationality and animality in the human being: one can consider the human form under the aspect of rationality or of animality, but one does not thereby consider distinct forms that are elements of a larger form, or distinct parts of the human form in any sense. (2011: 96)

If one therefore denies that animality, mammality, and rationality are really distinct properties had by Socrates, then the above counterexamples may be circumvented.

The question, then, is this: Is the essence of a thing in every case simple, comprised of only a single property (e.g., rational-mammality or mammalian-rationality), or is the essence of a thing in some instances complex and possibly comprised of several distinct properties (e.g., rationality and mammality)? Gorman and Oderberg suggest here that it is simple, but there is reason to deny this. Earlier we distinguished between exclusive and inclusive propria and said that the exclusive propria of a thing plausibly flow from its differentiae, whereas its inclusive propria plausibly flow instead from its genus. But if mammality is not a real property, then it would be mysterious how any real properties could flow from it. It would be equally mysterious to suppose that many of the inclusive propria of, say, a human being, such as having skin, flow from the property of rationality alone. Moreover, we have said that the essence of a thing is supposed to serve as the basis for its classification in the Porphyrian Tree of nature. But if the essence of everything is singular, then there is nothing anything essentially has in common with all of the other distinct substances, and there is therefore no basis by which to classify everything according to a metric of fundamental similarity. Finally, I do not really see how one could deny that a water molecule’s essence is simple or that its having two hydrogen molecules and its having one oxygen molecule are only virtually distinct from one another. This reply, therefore, seems to me shortsighted. It would be better to continue supposing that both the genus and differentia of a thing are real properties of it, which are really distinct from one another, that way we can better account for the different effluent origins of the two types of propria, preserve the integrity of the scala praedicamentalis, and avoid committing ourselves to certain highly counterintuitive claims.

More sensibly, a proponent of Fine’s account could take a second tack. A second reply to the objection is to modify the account by distinguishing between two different kinds of logical consequence. On the one hand, there is containment (i.e., conjunctive consequence); and on the other, there is entailment (disjunctive
consequence) (cf. Angell 1977; Fine 2016; Yablo 2016). We could then restrict the relevant sense of “consequence” to logical entailment alone. As a result, supposing Socrates’ essence might be expressed as a conjunction of properties that he essentially exemplifies, it would not be a logical consequence of the relevant sort that he is a mammal, and so would not need be counted among his propria. This seems like a more plausible modification.

And so, a proponent of the logical consequence account may or may not be able to escape the too-broad complaint. Nonetheless, both the original and the modified logical consequence accounts of effluence are still clearly too narrow, as well, since it is not in general true that the proprium of a thing follows from its essence analytically, or by logical consequence, whether containment or entailment; nor do propria in general follow by means of logical operations alone, either. For example, it is no part of the definition of ‘bird’ that anything that is a bird also chirps, even though being naturally disposed to chirp is indeed a proprium of birds. One could argue that it is an analytic consequence of something’s being a triangle that it has interior angles summing to 180 degrees; but such a strategy could not plausibly be extended to every other case of a proprium flowing from some essence. Nor can one deduce that birds chirp by implementing any known inference rule (e.g., Peirce’s Law). Perhaps some additional modification to the account could be made to broaden its sense of “logical consequence,” but I do not see how this could as plausibly be done. It would therefore be better to turn to some more promising account of effluence.

4.4. Effluence as Grounding

Let’s turn, then, to the second account. Gorman (2014) suggests that effluence is the relation of what he calls “internal support,” which he says is very similar to the notion of grounding currently popular in contemporary analytic metaphysics (134, n. 1). This statement, however, requires a caveat. There are at least two different senses of ‘grounding’: uppercase ‘G’ grounding and lowercase ‘g’ grounding, which, following Jessica Wilson (2014), we can refer to as ‘Grounding’ and ‘grounding,’ respectively. Grounding is a metaphysically substantive relation, whereas grounding denotes a set of loosely connected substantive relations, such as “type identity, token-but-not-type identity, functional realization, the classical mereological part-whole relation, the causal composition relation, the set membership relation, the proper subset relation, and the determinable–determinate relation,” and so on (Wilson 2014: 539)—any sort of explanatory relation which might be described as a metaphysical building relation (cf. Bennett 2017). In their discussions, grounding theorists more often have in mind Grounding, not grounding. Gorman, on the other hand, says that by ‘internal support’

Thanks to Jon Litland for this point.
he means to denote “a broad and diverse genus of relations, rather than... one species of relation” (2014: 127). In other words, he means to denote grounding.

However, the thesis that effluence is no single relation, but just a broad and diverse genus or genera of relations, is far too general to be of interest here. If it amounts to the thesis that effluence really does take multiple forms, then it immediately violates the virtue of parsimony. But if it is meant to denote only one among those relations in the set, then it is more general than it needs to be—it would be better simply to state which species of relation among that broad and diverse genus actually does the work. And so, I’ll bracket the thesis that effluence is lowercase ‘G’ grounding, taking it as a position of last resort, and instead focus the remainder of the discussion on Grounding.

As a substantive relation, Grounding (also commonly referred to as ‘ontological dependence’ or ‘metaphysical dependence’) is the relation that obtains whenever an explanation contains an explanans that is both prior in being and prior in explanation to the explanandum (cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V.11). It is the sort of relation implicated in Plato’s (c. 395 BC) Euthyphro Dilemma: Is something pious because it is loved by the gods or is something loved by the gods because it is pious? It is often picked out in colloquial English when we say, e.g., that p because q, or ... in virtue of q, or ... makes it the case that q, or ... determines or ... fixes or ... grounds q. Jonathan Schaffer (2009: 375) offers as examples of Grounding the relation between: “(i) the entity and its singleton, (ii) the Swiss cheese and its holes, (iii) natural features and moral features, (iv) sparse properties and abundant properties, and (v) truthmakers and truths,” where the prior relatum is the grounds, and the posterior relatum is the grounded. To this list of examples I would also add the relation between (vi) substance and mode, in traditional Aristotelian ontology. Formally, it is a hyperintensional relation between an agent comprised of a possible plurality of facts and a patient comprised of a single fact.25 To suppose that there exists ontological dependence is to accept also what Schaffer (2009: 355) refers to as an ordered (or hierarchical) metametaphysical ontological position, as opposed to a flat or (merely) sorted one. In this way, Grounding might also be thought of as a kind of relative fundamentality relation.

The position that effluence is the relation of Grounding is very intuitive. There is no doubt that some dependence relation obtains between essence and proprium, such as that between being a lobster and turning red when dropped in boiling water, or that between being a liquid and being a body adaptable to every shape. Schaffer’s example of the relation between the Swiss cheese and its holes is especially suggestive

25 There is some disagreement in the Grounding literature over of what ontological category (or categories) the relata of the Grounding relation consists. Fine (2012) and Rosen (2010) hold that they are facts, whereas Schaffer (2009) holds that the relation might hold between entities of several categories. For present purposes, not much hangs on this dispute, since, as we said before, it is unclear what are supposed to be the relata of effluence, as well.
In this context. In addition, this account coheres very well with the first seven necessary features of effluence described above (of notable interest is its congruence with our seventh formal feature; cf. Fine 2012).

Nonetheless, there are problems here too. The first problem is that this account violates our eighth necessary formal feature on effluence. Grounding is a kind of relation strictly confined to the domain of metaphysics. As Schaffer says, metaphysics is distinct from other disciplines in that it is concerned with the question of what Grounds what. Fine (2012: 37) similarly speaks of a Grounding explanation as “a distinct kind of metaphysical explanation,” as opposed to ordinary “scientific or causal explanation.” But, we have said, effluence is a relation proper to other disciplines, as well (cf. Gorman 2014: 127).

In reply, the Grounding theorist could employ another of Fine’s (2012) distinctions and distinguish between kinds of Ground: Some grounds Ground via a relation of normative Grounding; some, via natural Grounding; some, via metaphysical Grounding; and perhaps there are other types besides. Utilizing this distinction, we could then say that, strictly speaking, the only kind of Grounding that is confined to the domain of metaphysics is metaphysical Grounding. Perhaps the sense in which a triangle’s having interior angles that sum to 180 degrees flows from its being a plane figure with three angles is a relation of metaphysical Grounding (or perhaps even a kind of mathematical Grounding). The sense in which risibility flows from rational mammality, on the other hand, is a kind of natural Grounding. And we can suppose that natural Grounding is not so problematically confined to metaphysical inquiry. In this way, if one accepts a plurality of Grounding relations, then the objection can apparently be circumvented.26

This reply has some merit, although for my part, I do not find it nearly so intuitive to suppose that when chemists were investigating the essential nature and constitution of the various elements, they were engaged in an exercise in applied Grounding.27 Leaving aside that concern, however, other problems remain. The first is that, if we accept this modification, then the Grounding account can indeed satisfy the eighth necessary formal feature of effluence, but only at the cost of then running up against the virtue of parsimony again. Like the grounding account, the Grounding account would posit that effluence takes many different forms, albeit a plurality more tightly unified than within the (little ‘G’) grounding account. For example, this account

26 Fine in fact defines metaphysical Grounding in terms of being true by virtue of essence, but that account is not compulsory, and we might define each type in any number of ways. We can therefore bracket the substantive question of how to define each type of Grounding, supposing there really are many varieties.

27 Not all grounding theorists share the intuition that Grounding a kind of explanation special to metaphysics. And so, of course, another response to this objection is simply to deny one of its premises. If so, see the “second major problem” below.
would have it that the relation between Socrates and his risibility is one relation, $R_1$; the relation between the triangle and its having interior angles summing to 180 degrees is another, $R_2$. $R_1$ and $R_2$ share a common genus, but they are nonetheless different species of the same relation. By contrast, Suarez's account would have it that the relation between Socrates and his risibility, on the one hand, and a triangle and its interior angles, on the other, are not only *generically* the same, but also *specifically* the same too; they are both just the same relation, $R$. When stating how the propria flow from a thing’s essence, Suarez’s account needs to only posit one specific type of relation, whereas this account needs to posit many different specific types to fully model essences and propria. All things being equal, Occam’s Razor would dictate that we prefer a simpler account, so long as one is available. Therefore, the Grounding position ought only to be taken as one of last resort, as well.²⁸

Another problem with the different kinds of Grounding reply is this. If the Grounding theorist takes this tack, then not only do they risk violating parsimony, but they also risk violating our third criterion above. Plausibly, effluence is a transitive relation, such that if $A$ flows from $B$, and $B$ flows from $C$, then $A$ flows from $C$, too. But now, suppose that the effluence by which $A$ flows from $B$ is one kind of Grounding, $R_1$, and the kind of effluence whereby $B$ flows from $C$ is another kind of Grounding, $R_2$. In that case, we might very well ask: Supposing the Grounding theorist should still wish to say that $A$ flows from $C$, by which kind of effluence is it supposed to flow—$R_1$ or $R_2$? It isn’t clear how to respond, since saying it is either $R_1$ or $R_2$ is arbitrary. We might say it is yet another kind of Grounding relation, $R_3$; but if so, then it is not the case that effluence is necessarily transitive, since we now have three distinct types of relation in the premises and conclusion. Now, many Grounding theorists do think that Grounding is a transitive relation. For this reason, and the problem just stated, some have argued that we ought not accept that there are many kinds of Grounding in the first place, on pain of violating the transitivity of Grounding (cf. Berker 2018). I am inclined to agree.

Finally, the second major problem that remains is that Grounding accounts, of whatever sort, are likewise *extensionally inadequate*. Grounding is generally understood to be a kind of *necessitating relation*, such that if one posits the grounds, one thereby also and necessarily gets the grounded. But, we have said that some propria are *imperfect* and do not follow by absolute necessity from their bearer’s essence. This is the case, for example, in featheredness in pigeons. *Being feathered*

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²⁸ To be clear, if Grounding pluralism is indeed true, then this objection is relatively minor. An account of this sort would still be a reductivist analysis of effluence in that it would reduce effluence to a set of previously known and presumably better understood relations. Moreover, effluence to some other set of relations which are previously, and presumably better, known. It would even reduce effluence to a set of relations of a common class with one another. However, it would still posit a plurality of specific relations, even if not a plurality of generic ones. For this reason, if effluence can be understood as just one relation both in genus and species, that alternative account would be preferrable, per explanatory parsimony.
flows from the essence of pigeonhood, but it is nonetheless possible for there to be a pigeon that is lacking this property. It therefore follows that effluence cannot be a relation of Grounding, since the modal force by which propria flow from essence is oftentimes weaker than that by which the grounded are Grounded by their grounds. I do not see how this objection can similarly be met. I therefore submit that, although prima facie plausible, it would be best to reject the Grounding account in favor of some alternative one.

4.5. Effluence as Formal Causation

Copi (1954), Sorabji (1969), and Kelly (1976) (inter alia) suggest, thirdly, that effluence is a kind of causal relation. Such an account would appear to suggest itself, especially in light of the failures of the Grounding account. Causation is a relation which is known to scientists in disciplines outside of metaphysics too; causation is not a strictly necessitating relation, since it is possible to dampen, mask, or otherwise interfere with an agent’s exercise of its causal powers (however, more on this in a moment); and as Schaffer (2016) has convincingly shown, causation and Grounding have a great deal in common. And so, presumably, accounts of this sort have the potential to inherit the virtues of the previous accounts while also avoiding their shortcomings.

29 I suppose one could simply deny the existence of imperfect propria. However, if this route is taken, then the account would run up instead against our virtue of conservatism, since imperfect propria have been recognized as legitimate stretching at least back to Porphyry. Recall Sanderson’s third sense of ‘proprium’ as any attribute that “belongs to all of a kind & only to them, but not always: as growing grey in old age belongs to man.” One might also attempt to argue that maybe sometimes the Grounding relation is not necessitating, and therefore the account can make sense of imperfect propria. But if that tack is taken, then the account risks violating Occam’s Razor. Non-necessitating Grounding relations are not recognized in the average metaphysician’s ontology. Therefore, the Grounding account would advise in this case that we take on board sui generis relations to fully model effluence; but again, if we already have a relation available that can do the work (e.g., emanation), then revising our understanding of the modal force of Grounding only complicates things unnecessarily.

30 Note also that Aquinas sometimes speaks of propria as being caused by essences too. For example, when inquiring whether God possesses accidents, he writes: “[I]t is clear that there can be no accident in God... because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Hence as God is absolute primal being, there can be nothing accidental in Him. Neither can he have any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the principles of the subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God” (Summa Theologica I, q.3, a.7, oc; trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province 1952: v.1, p. 18; italics added for emphasis). Indeed, see Pasnau (2004: e.g., 35-39) for an excellent extended discussion of medieval authors (such as Henry of Ghent in the 1280s) who thought, like Suárez, that the substantial form (or essence) of a thing is causally responsible for its propria.
There are many different varieties of causation. What kind of causation is it that obtains between a thing’s essence and its propria? Oderberg suggests that effluence is a relation of “formal causation,” which is intended to denote a type of non-efficient causation (cf. Vohánka 2015: 12). What sort of causation is this exactly? Traditionally, a statement of a thing’s formal cause is a statement about that of which a thing is what it is,—i.e., of what sort the thing is—as was stated earlier; a formal cause is one of the two intrinsic causes, meaning that the formal cause of a thing communicates an esse to the thing resembling its own; and unlike in the case of univocal efficient causation, formal causation operates without meditation of an action. The standard example of a formal cause is the relation between an architectural blueprint (the cause) and the resulting building (the effect). Arthur Ward (2011) offers these additional instances of the relation between formal cause and effect, respectively: the relation between a recipe and the cake; between a programming code and its program; and, most contentiously, between an organism’s genotype and its phenotype (177, 180). The formal cause of a thing might also be thought of either as a schematic representation of the substances of its kind, as in the case of a design, or as a set of instructions for producing something, as in the case of the recipe and the cake.

Now, it should be clear from reflecting on these examples that this cannot be what Oderberg has in mind as that which obtains between a thing’s essence and its propria. Two reasons suggest this. The first is because the formal cause of a thing is not one of its originating principles: a blueprint does raise the building; the builder does. But the propria of a thing very clearly do owe their being to the thing’s essence as from some originating principle. And the second reason this sort of cause is inappropriate is because, as we said, formal causation is an intrinsic relation, where the cause imparts being to its effect which resembles it. But the essence of a thing does not resemble its propria in the requisite way. Even if there seems something right about understanding the relation between essence and propria as similar to that between a recipe and the cake, it cannot be said that the recipe resembles, say, how tasty the cake is, which might be said to be a proprium of cakes.

And so, Oderberg likely has some alternative sense of “formal causation” in mind, and his “formal cause” should be understood here as an infelicitous choice of phrase. More specifically, he says we should understand the relation as origination by substantial form. What sort of causation is this? Here is what Oderberg (2011: 101-103) says on this point:

[Propria] flow from the form. Here is a way of making the notion more precise:

(1) Causation: The form of a K cause the [propria] of Ks.
(2) **Origination**: The [propria] of Ks originate with the form of a K.

We can then define the relation between essence and [propria], given that form provides the essence:

**FLOW**: The properties \( P_1, ..., P_n \) are [propria] of the objects of kind \( K \) with essence \( E \) = def \( P_1, ..., P_n \) are caused by and originate with the form of a \( K \)...

What kind of causation does FLOW invoke? ... [T]he causation of properties by form is sufficiently different from any other kind of causation to be given its own name of *formal causation*. Only formal causation, by whatever principle of operation, is the kind of causation in virtue of which what a thing is determines what it is like. In the cases where the causation has no material pathway, formal causation is essentially the same as for the material case. Surprising as it may sound, then, the causation of the mammalian [propria] by the form of mammals is more like the causation of the properties of a triangle by the form of the triangles than it is like the causation of a fire by the striking of a match...

In addition... [propria] originate with the form... Not all origination is [efficient] causation: water can originate from a well without being caused to exist by the well; a graph has an origin without the origin’s causing further points on the graph. An origin in a metaphysical sense is where we must start from in trying to understand some phenomenon because it is first in the order of explanation relative to the phenomenon. Put conversely, if we want to understand the phenomenon, we have to trace it back to its source. This source, at least in ontology, will usually be the first cause of the phenomenon as well, as in the case of form and [propria]... The form, then, is where the metaphysical buck stops.

Oderberg’s remarks here are less than perfectly helpful. Even so, a few points are evident. In speaking of causation, he seems to have in mind here a sort of causation that is unmediated by some action; otherwise this would just be a kind of efficient causation. And so, like the intrinsic causes and the teleological cause, it is a kind of immediate causation, although evidently it is not to be identified with any of the four causes. (“[Effluence] is a sui generis relation connecting form and matter” (Oderberg 2011: 109.))

However, like an efficient cause, Oderberg says that the propria of a thing...
originate with the form—not in the way of efficient causation, however, but rather via the sort of “origination” that, as he says, obtains between an origin of a graph and the data points, or as between a well and the water in it. In this way, Oderberg’s formal causation can apparently escape both of the earlier objections, since it is equivocal, rather than univocal, and it is a kind of originating cause, rather than merely like a representation or blueprint of the thing.

Be that as it may, this account’s vices would seem to outweigh its relative virtues. It is worth saying first that the examples of the sort of causation Oderberg has in mind are problematic. The relation between the origin of a graph and its data points is not an explanatory relation at all. Neither is the relation between a well and its water (unless it is counted as a partial material cause for the whole entity composed of both the well and its water, which Oderberg does not seem to intend to express here). One could cite the well as a cause of some water’s being in a bucket that was used to draw water from it. But then this could only be called an originating cause in the sense that it enters into the complex (efficient) causal history responsible for imparting unto the bucket the accident of having the water. But the well, even in this case, would for all that still not be an originating cause unmediated by some action.

A second problem with the account is that if origination by substantial form really is supposed to be a kind of sui generis explanatory relation, then it likewise violates our virtue of parsimony. This is for the reason that non-reductivist accounts are less simple than reductivist accounts. It would be better to not introduce new relations into our ontology unless absolutely necessary.

And the third problem with this account is that it, too, has difficulty accounting for imperfect propria. It seemed to be a virtue of causal accounts of effluence in general that they could make sense of this. But this is only so in accounts which make use of efficient causation. (I’ll show this momentarily.) If the sort of causation that is involved in formal causation is immediate and non-active, then it is unclear how a thing could ever fail to possess one of its propria while still possessing its essence. The sort of causation here would presumably be perfectly necessitating, like the relation of Grounding. Oderberg himself says as much, and initially commits himself to the thesis that “Necessarily, for any kind K with essence E, and for any [proprium] P that characterizes the members of K: all members of K have P” (2011: 104). In this way, Oderberg’s account has inherited one of the vices of the Grounding account and is thus extensionally inadequate too.

Oderberg (2007: 160-161; 2011: 103-110) is aware of this potential objection and addresses at length:

.offer a five-cause metaphysics. The fifth cause was the exemplary cause (cf. Shallo 1916; Mercier 1916). This fifth cause is no longer standardly recognized, but the point stands.
We seem to be surrounded by non-necessary [propria] of things. Humans can communicate linguistically, yet some cannot. Wood is combustible, yet it is possible to make non-combustible wood. Tigers have stripes, yet there are albino tigers. But how, given the sorts of case just mentioned, could [effluence be necessitating]? (2011: 104)

In reply, Oderberg attempts to modify his commitment. He changes it to the following instead: “Necessarily, for an kind \( K \) with essence \( E \), and for any [proprium] \( P \) that characterizes the members of \( K \): all members of \( K \) have \( P \) unless they are prevented from doing so,” where ‘prevention’ here is used broadly to refer to, e.g., finks, masks, universal antidotes, etc.—what we can call causal preventers in general.\(^{32}\) In this way, it would seem that his account can make room for imperfect propria, and he offers a theory of what it is that distinguishes accidents from propria whose manifestation has been prevented.

However, it is not clear that Oderberg can help himself to this modified thesis. One can only prevent a proprium’s flowing out of its essence if effluence is, or involves, an action or causal process. Consider that one can similarly only prevent someone from catching a ball that has been thrown to them because the thrower (cause) would only cause someone else to possess the ball (effect) by way of having thrown it (action). But if the sort of origination relation under investigation does not operate by mediation of some action (because otherwise it would be a type of efficient causation), then there is no process or action with which a preventer could interfere. It is for a similar reason that one could never prevent some grounds from Grounding what it grounds—Grounding is not a relation that is, or obtains by, mediation of any action or process on the part of the grounds. Without a causal process, a proponent of this account cannot make use of finks, masks, universal antidotes, or so on.\(^{33}\) And so, while I am very sympathetic with Oderberg’s account, I therefore recommend that

\(^{32}\) “Finks remove the disposition of an object to respond in a certain way to a stimulus. Masks... are dispositions of an object which interfere with the manifestation of a distinct disposition by the same object. Universal antidotes... stop a disposition from ever manifesting itself by breaking the causal chain between stimulus and manifestation” (Oderberg 2011: 108).

\(^{33}\) Suárez offered a similar complaint to a rival account. During his own day, Thomas Cajetan (1522) argued that effluence is neither logical consequence nor causality but is rather a kind of quasi-causality. Like logical consequence, it is a kind of immediate relation; but like efficient causation, it is productive. But about this account, Suarez writes: “Cajetan... suggests that [effluence] is a natural consequence without any mediating operation. However, he does not explain what this ‘natural consequence’ is or how it might occur in the absence of a mediating action or operation... ‘It does not occur through any transmutation, but through a natural resulting’... [But], if we are to speak precisely, I take it to be closer to the truth that this resulting does not occur without a real action, even though it is not always counted either as a distinct action per se or as a proper change” (DM XVIII.iii.§-6; trans. Freddoso 1994: 94).
we reject this third account of effluence and adopt instead some alternative one, as well.\textsuperscript{34}

4.6. Effluence as Emanation

Let’s take stock. We are attempting to state what precisely the relation of effluence is. Four accounts are on the table. The first is that effluence is \textit{logical consequence}. The second is that it is \textit{grounding} (big ‘G’ or little ‘g’). The third is that it is \textit{formal causation} (or “causation by substantial form”). And the fourth is the one I have endorsed early on in the paper—namely, that effluence is \textit{emanation} (a kind of efficient causation). What I must now do is show that the Suarezian account is immune from the problems of which I have accused its competitors. Moreover, I have not yet offered any positive argument in favor of the account, and so that task remains too.

I first objected to the logical consequence account by showing that it is doubly extensionally inadequate in being both too broad and too narrow. It would, for example, seem to count Socrates’s mammality as a proprium of him, when it is actually of his essence; and it would seem to fail to count, e.g., his two-leggedness, which is a proprium of him. Suárez’s account is clearly not too broad, since by no means must it count Socrates’s \textit{mammality} as being an efficient effect of his essence. Nor is the account too narrow, since \textit{two-leggedness} very certainly is something that has a complex causal history: One need only observe an embryo in the womb grow legs. And this point generalizes. This, therefore, checks out.

I then objected to the \textit{grounding} account by showing that it violates our eighth necessary formal feature on effluence—viz, that effluence is a relation which is not confined to the domain of metaphysics alone. Efficient causation, on the other hand, is, of course, the coin of commerce in many other sciences. That checks out too. I next objected to the same account by showing that it is also extensionally inadequate—in this case, because it has trouble accounting for imperfect propria. This is because Grounding is typically understood to be a kind of necessitating relation, which would exclude exception. I objected to the \textit{formal causation} account for the same reason. Now, it is on this point and similar ones that Suárez’s account, by my lights, really

\textsuperscript{34} These objections have operated on the assumption that Oderberg’s “causation by substantial form” relation is, indeed, intended to be a causal one that operates without mediation by some action. Now, Oderberg himself does not explicitly say as much. And so, my disagreement with him might actually be understood in one of two ways. The first way is as I have prevented it here—as an objection to his (non-efficient) causal account of effluence. On the other hand, Oderberg might instead agree that propria flow from essences as mediated by some action. In that case, I have no problems with his account. He and I would simply disagree about what counts as an “efficient cause,” and so also whether or not effluence is a relation that is sui generis. He says it is, but I would say it is not.
shines. The kind of move Oderberg hoped to make to accommodate imperfect propria is exactly the kind of move an efficient causal account of effluence can make. Emanation happens by way of action. Given this, it is therefore (if only theoretically) possible to interfere with its causality by interfering with its corresponding causal process. Let’s see how that might work on a Suarezian analysis.

Consider a baseball player, say, Babe Ruth, who has a natural aptitude for hitting homeruns. Ruth does this by stepping up to the plate and swinging his bat. If his swing has enough power, and, importantly, if his bat is in proper condition, then he will hit the homerun. However, if his bat has been tampered with and hollowed out, then the execution of his swing will be ineffective and he will fail to hit the homerun. It is just so in the case of an imperfect proprium of which a thing has been deprived. Like Ruth, the essence of a thing can only produce and sustain its propria if the matter of its corresponding substance is in proper condition. As Ruth has his (separated) instrument,—the bat—so too, the form of a thing has its (conjoined) instrument—its substantial matter. We might interfere with Ruth’s hitting his homerun by tampering with his bat; so too, we might interfere with a substance’s producing its propria by tampering with its matter. In such a case, while, like Ruth, the essence of a thing retains its natural aptitude for producing its result and is attempting to so produce it, its action will fail to achieve it. This process is not very mysterious, but only if we assume that the essence of a thing produces its propria by way of some action.

To illustrate, consider rubber. It is a proprium of rubber to be elastic, and when the matter of it is in proper condition, it will be elastic, since elasticity flows from rubberity. However, it is possible to remove this proprium from the rubber by freezing it. In such a case, we will have interfered with the action by which the rubber would produce its elasticity by tampering with its matter, thus preventing it from taking on a property that is natural and proper to it. The rubberity of the thing is still actively attempting to produce its elasticity, but it is failing in each instance from lacking the proper instrument by which to bring it about. The same goes for other cases of instances in which a thing has been deprived of its imperfect proprium.35 This is the

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35 This is no doubt why we so often observe mere imperfect propria in concreta but perfect propria in abstracta. Abstracta possess no material cause—or, rather, the material cause of an abstractum is no different than its formal cause, as Oderberg mentioned. Consequently, whenever an abstractum attempts to produce its propria by way of emanation, it cannot but succeed in doing so, since its conjoined instrument is one and the same with its essence, the principal cause of its propria (if we can put it that way). Alternatively, we might follow Aristotle and suppose that, e.g., numbers do have a distinct material cause—immaterial matter (“hulē noêtē”)—by which their essences emit their propria, but whereas material matter is susceptible to change,—mutation, corruption, growth, and the like—immaterial matter is not (cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI.6, VII.10-11, XI, XIII; cf. also Cohen & Reeve 2021: §13). More ought be said on this subject, since it is no doubt a looming paradox inherent in the Suarezian account, to say the least, that it must suppose that abstracta are active causal agents—are not abstracta defined as non-causal?—but this suffices for present purposes.
benefit of understanding effluence as involving some action. For, as we said, without any accompanying active process, it really would be mysterious how we could ever make sense of this.

So much for the Suarezian account’s ability to circumvent the previous objections. I want now to conclude by briefly describing Suárez’s (1597) positive argument for why we should think effluence is best understood as emanation. His argument for this point, again, relies on imperfect propria. I’ll quote him at length and then explicate what I take the upshot of his argument to be:

The [effluence] in question occurs in some cases by itself alone and separately from the production of the entity from which it results. However, in other cases, it is conjoined with the production in such a way that it is never posterior to it but is altogether simultaneous with it. For example, when water reduces itself to its pristine coldness, this is a natural emanation... [T]he same thing [may be said] about the motion of a heavy thing that has been generated in a higher place, a motion which, when the impediment is removed, naturally results from its gravity. Now whenever a resulting occurs in this way, it is absolutely evident that it does not occur without efficient causality or without a true action and change, as is manifestly obvious from the examples just given. The reason is that in such a case something that did not exist beforehand begins to exist in the subject, and it begins to exist per se, without the de novo production of any other thing. Therefore, it begins to exist through some efficient cause and through a proper action and change. Hence, that action is the proper cooling [in the one case] and a local motion [in the other]... Now it is on this basis of the latter resulting, which is separated in time from the production [of the substance], that one should judge concerning every other sort of resulting, even if it is conjoined in the same instant (DM XVIII.iii.7-8; Freddoso 1994: 95-96).

What is the argument in this passage? As I understand him, Suárez says that we ought believe that effluence is emanation because it offers the best explanation of the following kinds of case. It is a proprium of a lizard that it has a tail. Nonetheless, a lizard can have its tail cut off, and so here we have a case of an imperfect proprium. But interestingly, some lizards possess the ability to regrow a tail that has been severed, and thereby regain the lost proprium. How best can we explain this phenomenon? Suárez says that the best explanation is that the lizard’s essence exerts

36 This is the crucial point. As Shallo (1916: 165) observes: “Wherever new Beings come into existence, there efficient causality is exercised,” as what it is to be an efficient cause is to be “[a] Being, which by the exercise of its energies, makes something to be which was not before, i.e., transfers something from non-existence to existence” (161).
a positive causal influence, and in this case we see it exercised as it attempts to reconfer to the lizard what naturally flows from it. When it succeeds, we therefore witness an instance of causal production, which is obviously a kind of efficient causation. If this is right, then not only can the efficient causality of a thing’s essence be seen in cases in which we interfere with it, but it can also be observed in cases in which it shows an active influence by re-producing in its subject a property of which it has been deprived. Suárez then generalizes: “Now it is on this basis of the latter resulting, which is separated in time from the production [of the substance], that one should judge concerning every other sort of resulting, even if it is conjoined in the same instant”—i.e., cases of perfect propria too. I, for one, find this sort of argument very convincing. And so, not only do we have indirect evidence in support of the Suarezian view (in the form of its relative merits with respect to the competing views), but we have direct evidence in favor of it too. Most plausibly, propria emanate from essences.

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37 For additional exegetical analysis of this passage, see Lecón (2013). Similar examples can be found in Occam (1324: Quodlibet III.vi) (inter alia). Boyle (1666: 59ff) notably critiques Suárez’s example of the water and its coldness from the perspective of his corpuscularian metaphysics. It is for that reason that I offer the less disputable example of the lizard and its tail instead.
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