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Language and identity
policies in the 'glocal' age
New processes, effects,
and principles of organization

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IN THE 'GLOCAL' AGE**

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Autonòmics

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BARCELONA
2012

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First edition: December 2012

ISBN: 978-84-393-8988-0

Legal deposit no.: B. 32394-2012

Layout: El Tinter, SAL (certified company ISO 9001, ISO 14001 and EMAS)

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Dosis sola facit venenum
(The dose alone makes the poison)
Paracelsus

1 · INTRODUCTION

1.1 · The questions we raise and why?¹

A frequent source of conflict between humans may be found in the diversity of languages and identities manifested by their groups. We self-co-construct ourselves within our various sociocultural contexts of experience, from which we then draw our linguistic varieties and initial affiliations of identity. Our species has diversified and spread out across the planet, and the coming together of different human groups and the need to organise their interrelations in shared political spaces and institutions often gives rise to the problems and inconveniences of adaptation. If to this we add the historical propensity for conflict and the ease with which human groups tend to confront each other — owing to a lack of mutual understanding and many sources of friction — the need to explore the subject of language and identity contact becomes more than apparent. The aim of such an exploration is to gain a fuller understanding of the mechanisms involved and to identify workable solutions that might reconcile imaginatively conflicting points of view and interests, and which might thus contribute to reducing these tensions.

Contact between culturally distinct human groups in the contemporary world is much greater than at any point in history. And the difficulties we face today in organising this coexistence and the relations between different national and language groups are acquiring even greater urgency in an age that is marked by significant technological and economic changes, and by major migratory movements. Thus the challenge we face is the identification of the most convenient ways to organise the coexistence of different human language groups in order that we might promote their solidarity as members of the same culturally developed biological species.

1 *I would like to thank the Institut d'Estudis Autònoms of the Catalan government for the economic support provided, without which the study could not have been undertaken. Most of the research was carried out at Glendon College/York University in Toronto, Canada. I am most grateful to the dean, Kenneth McRoberts, and to professor Esther Raventós for their kind welcome and for the facilities they placed at my disposal. This text is the updated English version of “Les polítiques de la llengua i la identitat a l'era ‘glocal’”, published previously in Catalan by the Institut d'Estudis Autònoms. I gratefully acknowledge the ICREA Acadèmia programme for enabling me to finish this English version.*

Despite the fact that in recent years the number of theoretical studies examining the organization of multilingual states and their sociolinguistic dynamics has increased greatly, humanity is incorporating new techno-economic and political structures that differ from those that were predominant until a short time ago, and which, consequently, will require the adoption of new approaches and new solutions. Thus, the various phenomena that hide beneath the frequently applied label of ‘globalization’ may well change many of the widely accepted patterns, and, in all likelihood, the long-established societies and states will have to adapt the images they hold of themselves and their organizational structures to these new realities. In the modern age, language contacts are increasing geometrically but, moreover, they are taking on new patterns which might give rise to evolutionary changes that are not so easy to predict, since the macro-phenomenon of ‘globalization’ is bringing new elements into play and, in all probability, setting in motion or favouring new processes that might have a great impact on multilingualism.

Processes of economic and political integration currently in motion are seeing increasing numbers of people seeking to become polyglots in order to gain access to international relations and to the products and information that circulate on the global market. Thus, English is establishing itself as the usual world supra-language, although it coexists with other ‘lingua francas’ that are widely used in certain parts of the globe. The fact is that there is an increasing number of people that are not only fluent users of their language of origin but who are also proficient in others, which enables them to participate in the expansion of the typical areas of interrelations. All this is occurring in parallel with processes such as the consolidation of the European Union and other suprastate organizations, in which different countries aggregate in supra-institutions and create a shared public space, characterised by the free movement of their citizens, goods and information. Finding effective ways in which to organise these new supra-spaces in terms of their language needs is a major challenge in order to ensure that the process leads to full integration, without any unnecessary tensions and with a general feeling of recognition and mutual respect between the various groups. The choice, for example, between the official recognition of all (or the vast majority of) the European languages or the adoption of a single supra-language is under review — whether we wish it or not — and such problems need to be examined with the utmost care.

These new factors and shifting patterns challenge the validity of the traditional principles underlying the organization of language diversity. Can an organization function effectively both internally and externally if it recognises various languages as being both official and equal? Can people of many different languages become socially integrated and move in space without one (or perhaps two) languages becoming the most usual code of intercommunication? If one majority supra-language is chosen — or becomes so *de facto*, how might this affect the use and the existence of the other languages? Will the increasing growth in bilingualism (and multilingualism) lead to a general abandonment of other languages? What conditions seem to favour or, by contrast, hamper this evolution? What, therefore, is the optimum form of language organization to ensure the existence of a general language of intercommunication without critically undermining previous sociolinguistic ecosystems?

These questions, as can be readily seen, are also pertinent to many present-day countries that may recognise to varying degrees, or not at all, the linguistic diversity of their peoples. How can these states improve their official and social linguistic organization so that the communities speaking the non-dominant languages can feel comfortable and can safeguard the continuity of their languages? Can new practical principles be found that would allow us to overcome the monolingual/multilingual without a supra-language dichotomy and thus to promote positively all these situations?

Not only, however, have we been witness to the development of techno-economic and political globalization in recent years but at the same time, as mentioned above, an old human phenomenon has gained a new impulse, extending into increasingly distant areas: the phenomenon of migration. As a result, language diversity has become ‘delocalised’ and has appeared in traditionally homogenous societies which now find themselves linguistically diversified. What responses should we expect in terms of language policy to these new situations? What types and what degree of recognition should be granted (if at all) to the languages of displaced groups? And moreover: how should places, such as for example, Catalonia, respond to the situation in which huge earlier migratory movements have already socially minoritized the language of the autochthonous people, and which are now receiving new immigrants, all in a framework of non-sovereignty? What principles should be applied in such situations as these? Should they be the same as those applied in situations of the state integration of a historically smaller language group? If so, why? If not, why not? How do these two major phenomena,

techno-economic change and migration, relate to one another in this ‘glocal’ age? What bearing does this all have on linguistic diversity and human identity in general and on the way it is organised in particular? We stand on the threshold of an era that will perhaps require a reappraisal of the theories, principles and solutions currently adhered to and a reformulation of organizational alternatives for the plurality of human languages and identities.

1.2 · Theoretical foundations

1.2.1 · General theoretical bases

If we hold with the belief that “vision is a function of imagination”, as John Holland, the expert in emerging processes claims, then we should base our discussion quite clearly on the fact that the concepts with which ‘we create’² the world are our own, and not directly part of the world. It is in this sense that our perspectives of reality play, from the very outset, a fundamental role in our shaping of how we see this reality and the events that unfold there. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that in all studies of sociocultural phenomena we make explicit the models used to represent this reality and their basic conceptual categories.

In this study, I shall understand the reality of the world to be one that is eminently dynamic and changing, in which “the ever-changing flux of patterns (...) leads to *perpetual novelty* and emergence” (Holland, 1999:4). As such, the contexts that give rise to the sociolinguistic and glotto-political situations are patterns in a state of flux, which can remain relatively stable through long periods of history or which will initiate changing evolutionary shifts if the organization of their ecosystem should be affected by the introduction of new elements or by internal changes with sufficient capacity to bring about disorganization. As Appadurai has written, “we are functioning in a world fundamentally characterised by objects in motion. These objects include ideas and ideologies, people and goods, images and messages, technologies and techniques. This is a world of flows. (...) But (...) the various flows we see — of objects, persons, images, and discourses — are not co-eval, convergent, isomorphic, or spatially consistent. They are (...) relations of disjuncture” (2001:5). We need to abandon, therefore, the “paradigm (...)

2 “*Alumbramos un mundo*” — we light up a world, in the words of Maturana & Varela (1990).

[that] has tended to mistake a particular configuration of apparent stabilities for permanent associations between space, territory, and cultural organization” (Appadurai, 2001:8). This leads us inevitably to consider linguistic phenomena and identity not as ‘essences’ but rather as ‘existences’, or if we wish, as temporary ‘emergences’, the result of the union of previously unconnected and distinct elements in specific multidimensional contexts.

It is precisely this ‘uncoupling’ of the various dimensions present in the reality that will serve as our guide as we explore the changes that may lead to the processes involved in the macrophenomenon of globalization. The reality will be seen as a dynamic ecosystem of systems in which certain innovations in the techno-economic and political organization and/or in the plan of the peoples dis-re-organise the previous (unstable) balance and give rise to new changes, the result of the interdependent self-organization of the sociocultural actors. In terms of the metaphor of a polyphonic or orchestral score (see Bastardas, 1996), the introduction of new instruments, together with new tones and rhythms, throws the existing ensemble into disharmony but provides the means to seek out new mutually consistent adaptations. The new phenomena of globalization are these new instruments that play different tunes to those previously heard, and at a volume which requires major changes in the existing scores, with the forces and the interests of the participants set against each other. Thus, “it is the disjunctures between the various vectors characterizing this world-in-motion that produce fundamental problems of livelihood, equity, suffering, justice, and governance” (Appadurai, 2001: 6).

Seen in this light, then, we need to study the “whole” of the human groups, in order to see how changes at the general level have an impact (directly or indirectly) on aspects of language and/or identity and oblige governments/societies to adopt measures regarding various aspects that are beginning to become disorganised (or which it is feared will become disorganised) with respect to their former state. It is clearly important to contextualise the dynamics of the phenomena within the great current of events: as John Edwards has so discerningly written, “linguistic shifts and loss are *symptoms* of a larger dynamic. The logical implication (...) is to attend to this broader dynamic” (2003:35). Our position, therefore, will be to think *à la Morin* that “the part is in the whole which is in the part”. Languages and identities, and the policies that link them, are interdependent with their contexts and they unavoidably interact in an interpenetrated existence. Thus, from the changes in the ‘whole’ we may see new situations emerge

that can throw the prevailing paradigms into crisis: interrelations between broader spaces, new communication needs, new needs for new language skills, new possibilities for extending products in the new languages that we know, new possibilities that these products or functions take the place of our ancient languages, new possibilities that we will gradually abandon the use of ‘our’ languages, new possibilities that this process will be experienced as a “loss” of a very part of us, experienced as a rupture from our ancestors, new ideas concerning the configuration of the simultaneous collective identities, new responses from the individual unlike those that typified earlier periods, etc. etc.

Taking these as my basic premises, the approach adopted considers the following to be priority issues in the conception of this monography:

1. Drawing simultaneously on a human ecology of linguistic codes and a linguistic ecology of human beings, in an attempt to discover how the latter interpret, feel and act when confronted with the linguistic diversity of the species. In other words, shifting from the usual focus of the (socio) linguists, which tends to concentrate on the human wrapper as a context for ‘linguistic diversity’, to that of considering ‘linguistic diversity’ also as another important factor of the context/wrapper of human life, to which they react within the general vicissitudes of daily life. From this perspective, questions such as the following become particularly pertinent: What impact does linguistic diversity have on man? What exactly does it provoke in them? How do they confront situations in which they encounter this phenomenon? How does this affect their representations and emotions of identity? How do they choose which language they should or should not use? What are the factors that intervene here exactly?³

2. Taking the broadest perspective possible of these phenomena, considering Humanity as a whole as a subject also, so as to grasp the common elements of the different situations, seeing them in a transversal light, and reaching the most general of principles that allow us to organise and adequately reduce the conflict that might derive from the linguistic diversity and the way in which this phenomenon is internationally conceptualised and experienced.

3 These major questions, like those outlined earlier, are the underlying referents to this research, but the study does not pretend to offer definitive responses given the current state of development of the sociocultural sciences.

3. Giving great attention to the fact of the constant interpreted social meaning of reality by human beings (taking into account the interests and life experiences of each), and the emotive and, hence, behavioural consequences that are derived from them. The centre of the theorising has to be, therefore, the person, who is the node where the influences of the ‘higher’ dimensions in which s/he participates meet (ethnic group, local community local, nation/state, the sphere of the suprapstate, world techno-economic level). And,

4. as a result, always seeing this part of the reality as ‘the-languages-and-their-contexts’, since this will constitute the complex unit of socio-significance (and not the linguistic codes considered in isolation as such). As elements of the reality which can take on significance in certain situations of human encounters, the ‘languages’ — or, more specifically ‘the-interpreted-linguistic-differences’ — can mobilise profound group sentiments and emotions, which can have an enormous impact on communicative, social and political behaviour.

1.2.2 · Languages and identities

It should now be more than apparent that this study does not seek to undertake an internal examination of ‘languages’ as codes of communication — that is, focusing on their grammatical organization — but rather as elements of reality perceived as conceptual units by individuals. Within the framework of their ideologies, life experiences and representations, individuals may designate social meanings to these conceptual constructs, leading them to associate these constructs with a range of sentiments and emotions, which may also have an influence on their verbal behaviour as well as on their social and political behaviour. All this will normally occur provided language codes are compared and contrasted with others that are present — at least perceptually — a circumstance that gives rise to given representations of the socio-political-linguistic situation and to the aforementioned emergence of the emotive and behavioural cognitive interpretations of reality. Thus, rather than being an examination of languages in themselves, this study is about the *multiplicity* of these languages and the reactions to which this can give rise in human beings.

It is my belief, therefore, that it is this variety and the resulting *differences* that can provoke in individuals the perception of the phenomenon of the language diversification of humanity, and the generation of ideas, be-

liefs and values, not just of the circumstance itself, but especially of each of the differentiated sets. While barely mastering their grammars or being aware of their specific features, individuals will know that other languages exist that differ from their own. And they can value them according to their vicissitudes and the historical contributions of their creators, while comparing them with the ideas and beliefs that they hold of their own group and language code.

In situations of very close and continuous language contact, this phenomenon will be much more pronounced and developed, since the perception of the difference between codes may be constant and the possibility that different beliefs and sentiments might be held is that much greater. This is the typical situation, for example, when a human group is politically and economically integrated in a state in which it is in a demographic minority, or when groups migrate to other societies that speak a language different to the one spoken at the group's place of origin. It is in such situations, typically characterised by the contact between a majority group and one — or more — minorities, in which we usually see the emergence of the individual and at the same time collective phenomenon known as 'identity'.⁴ Thus, 'languages (and groups) in contact' and group 'identities' are typically phenomena that coincide and which, at the same time, are mutually

4 "Generally, in social sciences, identity is considered to be that process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute enabling people to find meaning in what they do in their life. Through a process of individuation they feel what they are, they have a meaning because they refer to something more than themselves; they refer to a cultural construct." (Castells, 2010:94). Regarding this process of construction, Bouchard points out: "[La culture] (...) fournit [l'individu] les catégories de pensée, a partir desquelles il se situe par rapport aux autres, et grâce auxquelles il construit son identité. (...) Parmi les catégories que définit la culture, l'individu choisit des éléments auxquels il s'identifie plus ou moins fortement: race, religion, langue, nationalité, sexe, classe ou groupe social particulier, clan, famille, etc. Dans cet ensemble d'éléments identitaires, certaines sont de premier plan, d'autres secondaires, et ils forment une structure hiérarchisée. (...) Cependant, l'identité se construit au sein d'un environnement complexe et susceptible de changement. Aussi, l'individu doit-il être en mesure de s'adapter aux conditions mouvantes de son milieu, et d'y ajuster, sans rupture, l'image qu'il se fait de lui-même. Enfin, en construisant son identité, le sujet est amené a s'attribuer une valeur par rapport a l'autre. (...) L'identité de l'individu (...) est donc aussi fonction du milieu et de l'autre. (...) Une atteinte trop grave a l'identité d'un sujet peut amener ce dernier a se forger une image négative de lui-même" (Bouchard, 1998:23-24). To this we might add that an identity does (or does not) emerge according to the relation of (in)coherence between the cultural I (we) and that of the space/place/setting. Therefore, the dis-location, the de-localization of people/cultures is a source of the production of identity, of the awareness of this difference (be it through political 'absorption' without changing location or physical migration between sociocultural spaces).

reinforcing. In virtually all situations, understanding and managing language contact also means understanding and managing 'identities in contact'.⁵

The phenomenon of identity, therefore, is conceived as a markedly relational and 'emo-cognitive' fact, that is, as a meaningful representation of the reality self-co-constructed by the individual in their context of group relations, capable of engendering a powerful emotive activity, which can result in a high degree of behavioural and mobilising motivation.⁶ This 'identity' will lead the person to identify with given cultural, symbolic and behavioural models that will acquire pre-eminence, and which s/he will aspire to conserve and develop. If s/he believes that these models might be undermined, for example, by political or demographic changes, the individual that presents this high degree of identity may take steps to prevent these changes prospering; in this way, s/he might ensure that it is possible to maintain the fundamental elements of their collective identification. On the contrary, it might occur that, if the contexts in which the person lives are not only highly antagonistic to their presuppositions of identity but that they are also clearly difficult to change, then these individuals might have to undertake a revision of their collective images, with the corresponding effects that this might have on their behaviour.⁷

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- 5 It appears that language and collective identity did not acquire this intense potential relation until Fichte, in 1806, argued that language was what naturally defined a nation. Thus he wrote that "The first, original, and truly natural boundaries of states are beyond doubt their internal boundaries. Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of indivisible bonds by nature herself, long before any art begins; they understand each other and have the power of continuing to make themselves understood more and more clearly; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole". It was thus, according to Djité (2006), that "soon enough, nationalism became intricately bound with language and began to be built on linguistic difference". However, we should bear in mind that the central process of building an identity performed by a language is not seen today as an automatic phenomenon but rather one that will depend on the cognitive-emotive interpretations of the situation, and according to the individuals and their sociocultural characteristics. Thus, for example, as Mallikarjun (2003) points out, "even the role of a language as an identity marker may not happen in India, because caste, religion, attire, food habits, and even personal names may often provide important identities for the individual or the family or the society. Language may assume a secondary role as an identity marker in such contexts".
 - 6 "Identities and their conditions of existence are inseparable. There is no identity outside of its context: Identity depends on conditions of existence which are contingent, its relationship with them is absolutely necessary" (Keith & Pile, 1993:28).
 - 7 Thus, Bauman is able to state that "'belonging' and 'identity' are not cut in rock, (...) they are not secured by a lifelong guarantee, (...) they are eminently negotiable and revocable" (2004:11).

1.3 · The problematics of identity

Many elements of human life seem to have a dual, simultaneous existence, that is, they exist as a ‘physical’ phenomenon, and, at the same time, as socio-cognitive units. For example, skin colour and the genitals exist in the biological domain as such, but at the same time they live in our cognitions, and also in our emotions, as ‘races’ or ‘sexes’, and it is in this ‘interpretative’ dimension where conflicts tend to occur, and not as regards their original functions. Something similar seems to occur in the language domain. They can work perfectly well in the domain of human communication — when the knowledge is shared — but they can be the origin of group conflicts and personal unhappiness in the socio-cognitive domain. Thus, as history and the present world show, individuals can easily enter into disagreements and confrontations in which languages play a key role, but, if we look more carefully, the conflict centres on socio-cognitive units of collective representation rather than on tools of interpersonal communication.⁸ We need to look, therefore, closely at this dual existence of language codes if we wish to understand the potential for conflict of language diversification and if we wish to suggest ways to resolve or reduce the possible tensions.

1.3.1 · Majorities and minorities

Undoubtedly one of the most frequently recurring situations in which the phenomena of identity and the awareness of language group differences might appear is that characterised, as discussed above, by the presence of a majority group and that of one or more minorities. Above all in cases of a historical group or groups that have been settled for a long period in a given land, and who have become ‘minority groups’ — often against their will — because of their political integration in states where a different demographically superior group holds sway, these peoples may become particularly sensitive to the unequal treatment handed out to their

⁸ As Dua says, “language acts as a symbol par excellence and is subject to ideologization in varying degrees of intensity under different social conditions. It can magnify or minimize ethnic, social, religious or other forms of divisions, and is therefore used as a catalyst in such social processes as modernization, mobilization and communication” (1985:25). Likewise, “as Donald Horowitz observed (1985), language is an especially salient symbolic issue because it links political claims with psychological feelings of group worth” (Schmid, 2001:42).

code in official and political spheres. If this difference in treatment occurs — a not infrequent occurrence it would seem — then the situation might be perceived as unjust or humiliating, in particular if there are or there have been other historical conflicts or differences between the groups in question. This would mean that the reality might tend to be interpreted in the light of this historic tension, and the differences in the way the codes are dealt with might be considered to be socio-significant and emotionally important.

In such situations, the minority national group will tend to have a high awareness of the identity of its own differential attributes with respect to those of the majority group, and this can lead to wide scale mobilisations to obtain more satisfactory political and linguistic acceptance for their interests and wishes. As Bauman claims, “whenever you hear that word, [identity], you can be sure that there is a battle going on. A battlefield is identity’s natural home. Identity comes to life only in the tumult of battle; it falls asleep and silent the moment the noise of the battle dies down” (2004:77). In many cases, therefore, language takes on an extremely important collective significance, and it becomes a highly prized symbolic object, well beyond its practical usefulness in day-to day communication. It lies at the heart of the group’s identity.⁹

If the majority group resists the changes the minority seek, then this may strengthen further the construction of their identity as a distinct and separate group from that of the majority, and they could show absolutely no inclination to adopt a multi-identity that would enable them to include that promoted by the corresponding state entity. In such an instance the function of the representation of their identity will be to maintain themselves in the group’s collective image, avoiding the acceptance of changes

9 Often, the language — as an idea and practice — becomes central to the minority situation because no other satisfactory alternatives are offered for organising the self-government and/or the recognition of the distinct identity, even in formally liberal states of law. Thus, as Mortimer says, “democracy, by giving power to the majority of citizens, gives questions of culture and community an urgency which they do not have so long as power is legitimized by dynastic or religious arguments. If decisions that may affect my most vital interests are to be taken by a majority of my fellow-citizens, I need to feel a great deal of confidence in them. I may not mind being on the losing side in an election once in a while, or even every time, so long as the issues on which elections are fought do not threaten my existence or call my identity into question; so long, in other words, as I feel confident that majority and minority together form a single community with shared perceptions and interests. But democracy has little to offer me if I feel that I and people like me are permanently and structurally in a minority” (1999:xi).

that might be seen as emanating from the majority group. In certain cases, and if this minority status stretches between generations, the identity constructions of the group can change if the new individuals do not prescribe to the same cognitive-emotional constructs as those held by their predecessors. In many cases, in fact, the minoritized group runs the risk of an internal division and major internal confrontations, because of the differences in opinion regarding the present situation and what represents the best future paths for them.

Thus, for those groups that find themselves in a minority in states with a single identity and which are officially monolingual, their identity is, very often, an ‘identity of resistance’, as Castells calls it (2010:95): “that identity in which a human collective that feels either culturally rejected or socially or politically marginalised reacts by constructing with the materials of its history forms of self-identification, enabling it to confront what would be its assimilation into a system in which its situation would be structurally subordinated”.¹⁰ These groups in resisting will seek to change their situation of subordination using whatever they have to hand, even though it may be difficult because of their ‘structural minority’, in the sense that, above all in democratic systems, they will never constitute a sufficient numerical majority to change the situation in their favour. However, in some cases important steps have been taken thanks to pacts with the state institutions, which have gradually been able to recognise — albeit only partially — the identity and language of the minority group. However, as we know, not all minoritized groups adopt postures of resistance in this process of accommodation to the pressure exerted by the state and the majority group, but rather, some in accordance with their subordinate socio-economic situation or in accordance with their negligible demographic weight, gradually over the generations adopt the identity facilitated by the state and, consequently, slowly abandon the use of their own language and adopt the official state language. In such instances, we witness a process of language shift that may terminate in the original language of the group falling into complete disuse and the adoption as native speakers of the state language. Thus, changes in identity and changes in language behaviour may be quite closely bound together. If the collective —rela-

¹⁰ A view shared by others, including Murray: “Communities, and minorities in particular, excluded from the prevailing image of the nation have often found in the notion of culture a method of self-assertion” (1997:13).

tional— identity is perceived in negative terms with respect to the other alternative identity with which they are in conflict, the language of the group may also acquire a negative socio-significance and so its members may gradually abandon it. The ideas and feelings concerning language and identity often seem to go hand in hand.

Majority-minority or majority-minorities situations, however, do not occur today solely as a result of the political integration of different historic peoples in common politico-economic states or structures but also as a result of major migratory movements. Here also we find a relation between a majority group — the host group — and a minority group or groups. Although the emergence of contrasting identities is likely because of the contact between culturally distinct groups, the outcome of the group's self-definitions are not necessarily the same as those that occur in situations of political integration of large groups of peoples without migration. In the latter instance, the definitions of reality may be built on a historic conscience of having inhabited a land and group characteristics inspired in the 'national' conceptualisation of human groups, something which is much less likely to occur in the case of migratory movements, which are much more likely to be the result of individual decisions, taken in full awareness of the territorial shift involved, and, in many cases, assuming the ethno-linguistic continuity of the group in their place of origin. In cases of collective political integration, the minority situation is often 'involuntary', and in many cases the result of forced, or a non-consultative process of annexation. In the case of migrations, the minority status is foreseen and accepted, since the move — if we are not dealing with a refugee situation — is, despite everything, voluntary, and reflects a decision taken by the individual who has first weighed up the advantages and disadvantages of this new life compared with that in his place of origin. The cognitive and emotional experiences in the two cases may be quite different, and should not be treated under the same 'multicultural' label that is so much in fashion today.

In this context, it would seem that the fear felt by a group of losing its language and identity is what could underlay the 'identity fear' in the new global era. Given the great expansion of languages in contact brought about by the growth in the media, trade and exchanges between different peoples, not only those that are without their own sovereign land, but also many of those who are, may feel a new concern for the path that we might be taking. As Castells writes, "Nations excluded from the process of

generating their own state — Catalonia, Scotland, Quebec — but also those which generated a strong nation — France — are at this moment feeling lost in globalization, which is glimpsed both as a loss of autonomy in terms of the power of the state and as invasion of foreigners of a culture which resists assimilation (2010:96). Human constructs of identity have taken on, therefore, a central importance at the start of this century, and, along with these concerns, the language differences that go with them and on which they are often based.

2 · THE 'GLOCAL' AGE

2.1 · Why ‘glocal’?

It was, apparently, the sociologist Roland Robertson who, back in the 1990s, was responsible for popularising the term ‘glocalisation’ throughout the western world, preferring the term, that had originated from within Japanese business circles, to that of ‘globalization’ with which he sought to contrast it. Whatever its exact origin, the idea captured by the term — a portmanteau formed from the first syllable of ‘global’ and the final syllable of ‘local’ — is interesting as it enables us to denote an inescapable circumstance: namely that, although new world relations have been forged and strengthened exponentially at increasingly broader scales in many sectors of human activity, life continues to be, unavoidably, at one and the same time eminently ‘local’, whether one is, shall we say, in New York or in a village in *les Garrigues* in the heart of Catalonia. The term ‘glocal’ allows us to express this idea — that of an essential ‘localness’, and all that that entails — and at the same time to relate it with the events that are unfolding at all the other scales up to and including that of the globality of the planet. Thus, we take account of the reciprocal influence of the elements and of their mutual and complex interplay in the reality, a process that is operating at a multiplicity of interconnected levels. The result is, as Appandurai says that, “globalization (...) produces problems that manifest themselves in intensely local forms but have contexts that are anything but local” (2001:6). So that here, once again, we attest to the essential interpenetration of the elements of our reality: or as Edgar Morin would put it, ‘the local is in the global which is in the local’.

We would do well then to accept Dufour’s proposal of “a conceptualisation of globalization as a space (and in this sense, globalization is simultaneously local, national and global)” (2003). Seeing it in this light, as a multidimensional phenomenon — recall the metaphor of the polyphonic or orchestral score — allows us to attempt to identify the interconnections between the various phenomena that occur in the different areas of human life and so understand their evolution better. My approach, therefore, focused on the innovations that are being made at global levels, is concerned essentially with their impact at the local scale, where the vast majority of people live their lives. It is not my conscious wish to add to the increase

in the mythical discourse of ‘hyperglobalization’, but rather, as Stuart Hall so judiciously put it, we cannot stop recognising that, today, our local reality and global reality are interdependent, and that, as a result, “local differentiation not only remains but actually intensifies”. In common, then, with Hall, it is my belief that “the reason that [we are] partially interested in globalization is exactly the reverse process, the intensification of the commitment to the local.” We explore the global, therefore, to understand the local.

Typified as a set of interconnected spaces¹¹ — albeit ones that remain identifiable — in which human activity is played out, the glocal age presents, for this very reason, a high degree of ecosystemic dis-(re)-organization: techno-economic transnationalisations, suprastate politico-economic unions, technological innovations of massive impact, and new migratory movements are all sufficiently important happenings to have an impact on former equilibriums and to question the paradigms and the classic representations of many distinct phenomena of our reality.¹² Thus, today we live in a world-system that is vastly more dynamic and prone to change.

2.2 · Characteristics and some effects of globalization

To be able to navigate satisfactorily within the globalising — or as we have said the ‘glocalising’ — macro-phenomenon as an “objective structuring process of the whole of the economy, societies, institutions and cultures” (Castells, 2010:90) and to seek to understand its possible socio — and

¹¹ See, Keith & Pile, 1993.

¹² According to Wright, the bringing about of all these changes is what enables us to speak of a general process of globalization: “some political power seemed to be leaching away from the nation state to inter— and supranational bodies (...) and international courts ruled that there were limits to state sovereignty. The economic autonomy of the state diminished significantly (...) and (...) capitalist interest groups pressed for a global market place without tariffs and quotas. The idea that a national economy could stand alone or be protected was no longer tenable. Culture increasingly crossed frontiers; few national film and music industries continued to produce only for their own domestic market, and the US product penetrated most markets. The revolution in information technology allowed an unprecedented volume of information to circulate at an unprecedented rate, at least among the societies and classes able to afford the hardware. (...) And it is not only virtual contact that increased, but real contact too. Improved transport communication put the major cities at a few hours flying time from each other and at a price that a growing number could afford” (2004:10-11). To this we should add that, with all this growing interdependence, there has probably been a *crisis of linguistic autonomy* of human groups and states.

politico-linguistic consequences, we need to begin by identifying some of the distinct ambits that interact there. For example, the events that have occurred in the organization of economic interchanges — although they might certainly be interrelated — are not exactly the same (especially now that they are much more open than before to the free traffic of goods and products and to the transfer and delocalisation of large transnational firms) as, for example, the expansion of the Internet or the concentration in the control over the mass media. Likewise, the phenomena of the gradual political unification of Europe and the migratory movements are not the same type of process. At the same time, however, everything, to varying degrees, is interrelated and mutually influenced.

One of the basic changes, therefore, that has occurred in the framework of the new ‘glocal’ age has been without doubt the expansion of the traditional areas of economic organization and exchange and the establishment of a much greater degree of free trade at the global scale. This opening of borders has had a range of direct effects, such as those in the economic sphere, 1) the creation of large transnational conglomerates and the absorption of large local firms by the other, stronger international companies — and the closure of local firms that have failed to be compete,¹³ 2) the introduction of foreign capital in traditionally local firms, 3) the need for a large number of local firms to make the full leap into the continental or world markets, 4) the entry in local markets of products manufactured in other countries using cheaper workforces, which has led to the closure of many local firms, and, 5) the growth in awareness around the world of the need to innovate and to be leaders so as to compete in the new international economic space.

Thus, this globalization of exchanges and this greater interconnection between spaces, capitals and persons, local and global, has served to transform the dynamic equilibriums which until recently were relatively stable and which may lead to new inequalities and spark off new situations of change and conflict: “emphasising the lifting of borders, the spread of

13 The transnational firms are of central importance in the current interdependent mode of economic organisation. As Castells states, “Multinational companies and their auxiliary networks only employ around two hundred million workers. This seems a lot, but in fact, compared with a world labour force of three thousand million, it is nothing. However, these two hundred million in these fifty-three thousand multinational companies account for 40% of the gross world product and two thirds of international trade. Thus, what happens in this production system conditions all economies.” (2010:91).

communications and access to foreign markets weakens the links between the central states and the regional economies and reawakens historic national conflicts; clarifying the perception of growing social and cultural differences leads to a questioning on the part of the citizens regarding their categorisation as individuals with any history and culture and reduces the imaginary homogenising effect of the nation; finally, it participates in the mutation in international relations and in the consolidation of a human rights ethic that limits the power of control on the citizens by the states” (Helly, 2006:1).

When the states chose to renounce many of the classic internal regulations in favour of the free circulation of goods and communications, techno-economic globalization became a polycentric and self-regulating process, and one that the political powers, who often remained at the nation-state scale, found hard to control or to ‘correct’, albeit that steps were taken towards forming greater entities in some regional or continental areas. Thus, many of the sociolinguistic effects are to be felt in non-official ambits where the political powers have little authority to intervene. These powers will have to try to undertake compensatory measures, although they will also have to be complementary to the process of globalization itself — including, for example, the polyglottisation of many individuals — so as to facilitate the survival of society within this process of macro-integration.¹⁴

The states, therefore, are restricted in their powers to intervene in the linguistic domain, since they themselves have to promote the necessary powers for navigating in the globalising framework, though at the same time they have to respond to the voices that see this polyglottisation as a

14 As Castells writes, “the states, governments and businesses of each country try to position themselves in this global network; because outside it there is no growth, there is no development, there is no wealth. If there is no possibility of an investment of financial capital or technology in a country, that country — or region or sector of population — is marginalised from the global economy” (2010:92). What’s more, and contrary to appearances, “what has happened is that the states, in order to manage globalization and intervene in it, are those who have really encouraged it. It is not true that multinational companies are the globalisers. From the empirical perspective, the globalisers have been the nation-states, which have liberalised and deregulated, while there was the technological structure to develop that globalization. In other words, the globalization of capital or international trade does not only depend on the existence of technology or business strategy to globalise: it depends on the nation-state to really liberalise, deregulate, privatise and remove frontiers. And this is what they have done. To a certain extent, all states have been the main agents of liberalisation and globalization ” (Castells, 2010:92).

negative process and who fear its consequences for national identities and languages. Likewise, in terms of identity, the states have two obstacles to overcome, because while they have to establish supranational political associations and stimulate international techno-economic interchange, they also have to deal with the resulting fears of large numbers of their people regarding the excessive external influences, which might provoke the depersonalisation of the corresponding national culture. The growth of the “individualistic” outlook at the expense of the more classical group perspective also means that many more individuals feel freed from the traditional pressure of sociocultural adaptation, and that they can choose different identities of reference or of varying complexity in their make-up, which also have potential repercussions in the glotto-political arena for all groups, both those with their own state and those that have sought to establish one throughout their history.

Globalization, however, is a complex process that can also bring about changes among the other participants, that is, adaptations in the transnational firms and organizations. It is important not to fall, therefore, into the old ecological trap, which tended to place greater emphasis on the context than the parts, and to push the inverse effects into the background, in other words, the effects that the parts might have on the whole. The global spread of economic activity seems to induce firms to undertake major cultural adaptations too, in order to ensure their success in new countries and cultures where they wish to operate. To cite one example, mentioned by Castells, “Murdoch produces American soap operas according to the American classical models, but the Sky Channel in England adapts to the British tradition. Sky in India produces in Hindi in North India and in Tamil in Madras and with local characters; and Sky in South China produces in Cantonese and with local stories. In contrast, in Beijing and in North China it does so in Mandarin and with different stories. In other words, the formula, the business, the strategy is one of global communication, the relation is obviously with specific cultures, identities, because otherwise nobody would sell, nobody would disseminate their information” (2010:91). Thus, while it is true that the management teams should be able to communicate with the central directors at headquarters and that the general language of the firm will be used in certain communications, it is equally true that most of the personnel will tend to be from the country in which the new factory or work centre is installed, and that they will tend to use local languages with each other, not to mention their potential consumers who

will dictate the adaptations that have to be made of the product and its commercialisation.¹⁵ Once again we see, therefore, how the process tends to be ‘glocal’, and not solely ‘global’.

All this, taken together, will have, and is indeed having, sociolinguistic consequences that may be important for the whole of humanity. This growth in supralocal economic and technological interdependence and interrelations means that there is an increasing need for people that speak a range of languages, which will enable them to carry out the tasks required so as to mediate in international relations. Alongside this, there are transnational firms who will increasingly require individuals who are proficient in the language or languages that the firm uses for its internal operations, as well as other languages that they might need to set up in other countries. At the same time, local firms who wish to communicate effectively and have a presence in continental and global markets require their employees to be well trained in languages so as to be able to fulfil their objectives of establishing themselves internationally. All in all, this is leading to a growing awareness of the disadvantages of not knowing any other more languages than that which is spoken locally. And this has generated the desire among many members of the general population to become proficient speakers of other languages so that they might compete for those jobs, in the main well remunerated, in the framework of an increasingly ‘dual’ economy.¹⁶

This establishment of a global market is occurring in parallel with the spread of the communicative network formed by the Internet, which permits communication in real time with any point on the planet, and at the same time to have access to the enormous quantity of information stored in the thousands of computers connected to it. This ease of access to this vast universal library and databank, written in a multitude of languages,

15 Here, Mufwene reports that “‘Anglo-Saxon’ companies do not make English a requirement in developing branches outside the UK, the USA, and Australia. Except for the highest management levels of their business ventures, the language of the relevant industry is the local *lingua franca* (especially at the lowest level of the work structure) or official language” (Mufwene, 2005:32).

16 We are witnessing a mutation in the job market and an increase in socioeconomic inequalities. According to Helly (2006), since the 60s most demand for jobs has been recorded in the tertiary sector, and 40% of those jobs with high salaries require considerable training, creativity and, in all probability, increasingly a proficiency in international languages. This means that language skills, in common with human capital —distributed unevenly — may play an increasingly important role in the workplace.

but with a marked predominance of English in terms of the number of pages and in terms of the most up-to-date information, means that many people can come into contact with languages other than the one they use each day, and this encourages them to acquire a greater understanding — at least of those they come across most frequently — so as to reap the rewards of having access to so much information. At the same time, the parallel development of electronic messages has made possible instantaneous communication in real time with any point on the planet, which allows relations to be established between persons and organizations of different languages and between those who historically could not communicate, with the obvious condition that they have at their disposal common language tools that allow them to understand each other. Likewise, the expansion of satellite and digital television gives people the opportunity of tuning into channels that broadcast from distant countries, and, here again, to expose themselves to other languages than might act as an incentive to make new language acquisitions — for themselves or for their children — which they are well aware can help them in their future socio-economic standing.

However, we know little today about the sociolinguistic impact of having access to this world electronic library or the use of electronic mail. It seems most likely that as the number of pages in the languages of the various human groups increases, people will tend to visit those they find most readily understandable, even though, given perhaps the difference in quality of the information and just how up to date it is, they are able to go to international webs in other languages if they have, at least, a reading knowledge. What is true is that the Internet and electronic mail can serve to encourage the learning of new codes, although they probably cannot give rise to a proficient understanding if used in isolation. However, they can increase the ease of exposure to different languages inasmuch as they allow individuals to listen to foreign radio stations, and to download foreign music and films, etc.

Thus, all in all, these new communication technologies, and their use for the globalization of the economy and the opening up of global markets, have created new spaces for global relations that require that new communicative functions be undertaken, which were previously either not present or not particularly widespread. Establishing understanding with firms, organizations and specific individuals in other countries — in order to buy or sell, working in transnational economic conglomerates, broadcasting —

and understanding — media products on a global scale, visiting webs from other places, travelling and exploring new cultures, etc., are increasingly present needs for a large number of people, which have to be met by given linguistic codes. Given the deregulatory dynamics of globalization, the selection of these codes of international communication has rarely been made through public debate or decisions, but rather via a process of numerous individual decisions that have crystallised in a more or less generally accepted consensus.

2.3 · The challenges faced by language policy and planning

The issue that now has to be tackled is the new situation of a planet that acts as a unit of interrelation and communication of a species that is highly diverse both culturally and linguistically. State boundaries, the traditional limits to political, economic and sociocultural units, have been overrun and the world is being reorganised along suprastate lines, although a planetary unit is making itself increasingly evident. One of the most important effects of this process of globalization, questioned and criticised by many sectors, may be the exponential growth in human awareness at this planetary scale. Not only do we now receive much more information about all kind of events that are occurring at considerable distance from us and we buy products and goods that come from the other side of the globe, and we can work for transnational companies, but we are becoming increasingly aware that we belong to one single human species and we all share the same bio-cultural destiny.

We are now facing new situations that have never before been experienced at this scale and with this intensity. New needs, new fears, and new dilemmas are presenting themselves, to which we do not yet have clear responses. Alongside this awareness — albeit perhaps still a very incipient feeling — of the unitary nature of the species at this global scale, and of the advantages that might accrue from having recourse to common tools of communication, new suprastate units are emerging in which questions of language and identity need to be addressed, and the classic glotto-political organizations are being debated in those states with a linguistically diverse population. This general reorganization may lead to new contacts, with potentially new dis-re-organizations of the traditional spaces and functions of the languages (and identities) of the various human groups, all of which might result in the creation of situations of unease or conflict until an ade-

quate adaptation —within the cognitive-emotive paradigms— has been found to the new shifting contexts.

Thus, for example, the languages of groups with greater political and demographic sovereignty and/or techno-economic power find that today they have the possibility of exercising their dominion well beyond their traditional areas of influence. By contrast, smaller demographic groups and those without a state are not so competitive in the new ‘glocal’ space and, moreover, are on the receiving end of the potential dis-re-organizational impacts emanating from the larger or more powerful groups. At the same time, they have to be able to adapt to the new economic and commercial situations and they have to be able to participate in a global economy, with markets and competitors that operate in much wider areas, which means that they — or, at least major segments of their population — have to make the effort to acquire the languages of the dominant groups. With these mechanisms up and running, these languages are becoming even more influential in the historically ‘subordinate’ societies, and the increase in language contact becomes widespread in such situations. The crux of the matter lies in the fact that the increasing numbers of people that are becoming bi— or multilingual have the potential to disorganise existing language communities, as we have already witnessed in cases in which languages have been abandoned. In fact, it is this trepidation that the European states might probably feel if Europe should adopt a common supra-language.

Thus, as I suggested above, globalization might not only affect the minoritized communities without a state but also states and languages with a well-established tradition. This discomfort has even become manifest in the French-speaking world — the language heretofore adopted for many international functions — where a number of specific measures, as is the case in France itself, have been adopted to fend off the penetration of the English language. In fact, today the ‘francophonie’ movement, in which Quebec plays an important role, is seeking the recognition of language diversity, contrary to the classically uniformist postulates adopted by France.¹⁷ That we are entering a new era is also demonstrated by the behav-

17 Thus, the former minister of international relations affiliated to the *Parti Québécois*, Louise Beaudoin, averred that it was necessary to “changer les choses, enfin, pour que les aires géoculturelles telles que la francophonie, la lusophonie, l’hispanophonie, notamment, jouent un rôle dans une mondialisation que nous voulons multipolaire et fassent contrepoids à la puissance impériale américaine. Changer les choses pour que vive la francophonie. Car si les civilisations

hour of increasing numbers of parents in Quebec, who in an apparently contradictory move, want to ensure that their children have a good level of English so as not to miss the boat in terms of economic opportunities, despite the nationalist stances of this society and the historical fear of the possible assimilation by Anglophone Canada.¹⁸ The situation, therefore, only seems to make manifest what are apparently paradoxical movements, which reflect two coeval forces, a) the need to develop multilingual skills so as to compete socio-economically, and b) the struggle not to lose the group's linguistic identity.

Operating in parallel to all this, and in another dimension, the new migratory movements are having the effect that even many majority language groups which have traditionally been stable perceive these shifts as a linguistic and cultural threat, and are adopting protective policies. Thus, blighted by poverty and the lack of opportunities in their homelands, more and more people are deciding to move to other countries in search of a better life for themselves and their families. When the number of migrants is high and they originate above all from the same group, the situation can become strained, since this has led in some areas to the emergence of situations of conflict between the host group and the immigrants, with a specific impact on the language domain. Thus, the immigrant group may be feared if the host community believes that they are making little effort to learn and use the language of the host society. Moreover, the immigrants may 'wish' to learn the host's language, but at the same time they may well want to maintain their own for communicating within their own community, and so they are appreciative of specific services provided for them in their own code although they do not yet dominate very well that

sont mortelles, les langues et les institutions le sont aussi". ("La 'nouvelle' francophonie", *La Presse*, 3-12-2005).

18 Paule des Rivieres, for example, as early as 1999 was speaking of the fact that parents in Quebec wanted more English for their children, "comme si la peur de l'assimilation qui a longtemps imposé la prudence en ce domaine avait fait place à une autre inquiétude, celle d'être bloqué par l'unilinguisme à l'heure de la mondialisation". ("Les parents sont nombreux à demander plus d'anglais!", *Le Devoir*, 17-3-1999). A further news article, this time from 2002, makes a similar point: under the headline "French students on rise in English schools", and a subheadline of "Anglophone institutions see boost as enrolment in French ones decline, institute's analysis shows", it reports the following statements: "Some parents, eager for their children to learn a second language, send their kids to Pierre Elliott Trudeau school without speaking a word of English", Moore said.(...) "I think parents want their child to be bilingual — capable and competent in both languages," she said. (Allison Lampert, *Montreal Gazette*, 8-2-2002).

of the host community. Certain groups, although this is somewhat less frequent, have even been known to demand the teaching of (and in) their own languages within the education system. How to reconcile this, within a wider global framework, is also one of the great challenges of the glocal age.

This set of new forces certainly raises questions as to the validity of the traditional principles for the linguistic organization of diversity, and poses many questions, both new and old. What is undeniable is that, as Tonkin & Reagan state, “what ultimately may be significant about the language situation at the beginning of the twenty-first century is not the fact that one player or set of players is winning out over another, but that the interrelationship of languages is different and more complicated. (...) There was a time when, at least in the west, it was possible to live out one’s life in a monolingual envelope, removed from other languages. (...) But the day when one language could serve all the communicative goals of a single individual appears to be receding — at least for everyone but the monolingual speaker of English. (...) If our model is monolingualism, the world appears to be a kind of Darwinian battleground among competing languages; if our model is plurilingualism, the world resembles a network of languages in which one language supplements another” (2003:4).

It might be the case, therefore, that we are heading towards an era of dread and fear as a result of the increase in language interrelationships, an era that will demand above all dialogue and imagination to bring about a reorganization in the languages and identities of the human species. It might be that the majority, faced by the internationalisation of the economy and contacts in general, will come down in favour of individuals and firms having one or more common languages of intercommunication. At the same time, we will also have to accept that, in all likelihood, many countries and human groups will not want this ‘common language of intercommunication’ to replace their code in the usual and normal ‘internal’ functions of each group. We will need to find new principles and new representations of identity that are suitable for a world that is markedly different to the world we knew in previous periods of our history. In all probability we will need to be aware that “the old notion of the single, isolated, fully self-sufficient language may be fading before a different model — that of the language functioning in linguistic interstices, co-existing with other languages” (Tonkin & Reagan, 2003:6). And all this,

however, will have to be achieved in a framework of political decision-making in which “a linguistic free market replaces language *planning* (a modernist top-down approach to the phenomenon of language) with language *choice* (a post-modern bottom-up approach that empowers the consumer rather than the producer) (Tonkin & Reagan, 2003:3). All in all, it will require considerable changes also within language planning and policy, and is set to be a mammoth task for the future.

3 · COMMUNICATION AT THE GLOBAL SCALE

3.1 · English as a global language

The growth in economic, technological and scientific interrelationships and, above all, the increase in a whole range of associations at the planetary scale has given rise to the need to find common tools of communication that will allow everyday, effective interactions between all actors on the global stage. While within leading international institutions (UN, UNESCO, etc.) problems of communication have been resolved by officially recognising some of the world's main languages and by providing simultaneous interpreting services, a more practical solution is needed for the great number of communications that are growing spontaneously between organizations and peoples of different countries and languages. And this solution, still in the throes of development, but which would seem to be gradually establishing itself, has been the widespread adoption of an international code of communication, in this case English, the language in the best position at this particular point in our history to take on this bridging role.

Thus, in little more than a few decades, we have gone from using French as the most frequently spoken international *lingua franca* to using English,¹⁹ a situation that no doubt reflects the combined effect of various factors, among which are the linguistic impact of the British Empire and the hegemony of the United States in the fields of technology, economy and the media. Today, English is by far and away the most taught “foreign language” in the vast majority of countries and the most used as an international medium of communication in the technoscientific, economic and media fields, albeit that it shares this role with other important codes that are used in smaller areas, though, in no case are they used on the general planetary scale that has been achieved by the language created originally in England.

19 For example, Georgeault (2003) notes that “Le français demeure présent à l’ONU mais pourrait être plus utilisé. Ainsi, la langue dans laquelle les missions permanentes aux Nations Unies préfèrent recevoir du courrier présente la distribution suivante : sur 185 membres qui ont répondu à l’enquête, 130 préfèrent l’anglais, 36 le français, 19 l’espagnol. Par ailleurs, à l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU, le nombre de délégations s’exprimant en anglais est passé de 74 à 97 en moins de dix ans. Celles qui s’expriment en français ont chuté de 31 à 21. Il y a pourtant 28 pays, membres de l’ONU, qui ont le français comme langue officielle. En outre, plus de 40 sont membres de la francophonie. On comprend donc mal le faible (21) nombre de délégations qui s’expriment en français”.

An interesting feature of the process by which English has been adopted at this more global scale of communicative needs is the absence of any centralised political level involved in its organization. Given the planetary dimension and unofficial nature of the phenomenon and the absence of any effective political bodies of debate and decision-taking in the ambit of international language communication, the process has advanced, and continues to do so, through a process of non-centralised self-construction, founded on decisions taken by firms and other economic agents, and, indirectly by the states and their education authorities, and by the people of the world themselves. With the exception of the international institutions, and unlike the other scales that we shall examine below, at the world level there is no explicit ‘language policy’ implemented by any collective institution that might be designated this specific task. The decisions taken by the actors at this global level are not the result of political initiatives that seek to bring about the disappearance of other languages — as has occurred in many cases at the state level — but rather they correspond to the ideologies and interests of the directors of the leading firms and organizations that operate at this level. Thus, it is basically the autonomous decisions of techno-economic and scientific agents who have backed English as the language of intercommunication, the decisions of many educational authorities to include English as the first-choice foreign language, and, also we should not forget, the decisions of many individuals and families who seek a good working knowledge of this language that has led to the widespread adoption of English as the world’s *lingua franca*.

The fact that the world is moving towards a higher level of integration means that the most dynamic segments of developed societies, as well as those enjoying high levels of techno-economic development, are investing considerable amounts of energy and resources in the learning of English, and are pressing the political authorities to provide adequate facilities for the learning of this language in the state education systems. In developed and emerging economies the interest in English is growing as it is seen as a means to achieving socio-economic and cultural progress at both the collective and personal levels, facilitating world circulation and access to a vast store of information. With a good command of English, people believe they will be better equipped to compete in the job market,²⁰ take full advan-

20 As Mufwene points out, “it is the aspirations of local (potential) employees that create the market for English (or any other language of power), which then takes a free piggy-back ride. Hopes

tage of the Internet, enjoy the media and art produced in this language, and to travel to and around many other countries.

Thus, in terms of political decision-making, English is the first choice for many states around the world as their main ‘foreign’ language, and it is taught, with varying degrees of effectiveness and success, by private and public education systems. The results, however, vary greatly from one country to another, for reasons that include the structural distance between the country’s own language and English, the methods used, the opportunities of gaining exposure to the language (e.g., countries that do not dub films as opposed to those that do), etc. In the university systems, various states are beginning to incorporate English as a medium of instruction, above all in postgraduate studies, but there is also a growing tendency in certain countries to do so in the latter years of undergraduate courses.²¹ To facilitate these changes, in those countries where the proficiency in English remains low, the universities are beginning to consider perfecting the understanding of this language among their students and even establishing it as a requisite for being awarded their degree.

In the unofficial field, many firms require or value a good knowledge of English as well as that of other foreign languages, so as to ensure their internationalisation, a fact which serves even more to disseminate the image that a knowledge of English can bring higher salaries and better jobs and, hence, greater financial rewards. As a result there is a proliferation of private schools offering an education *in* English — either bi- or multi-lingual — as well as of those that specialise in teaching English specifically as a foreign language, with timetables that allow people to study after work or school. It seems quite clear, therefore, that, although it might be a self-fulfilling prophecy, a command of English will become more and

to rise to high or top levels of the firms’ managements incite the locals to learn English (or any other relevant language)” (2005:33).

21 “English was introduced as a medium of instruction, especially at the tertiary level, in the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands many years ago, but recently it has begun to be used in such countries as Germany and Japan” (Ammon, 2003:25). Likewise, in many other countries, including above all China, the policies that are being designed foresee the early introduction of English in the schools. The introduction of these policies, however, can vary greatly from one place to another, because of differences in resource provision and trained teachers. What is eminently clear, however, is that English has become the language of world techno-scientific communication. An example of this is evident in Germany where “practically all German science journals have now shifted from German to English, beginning in the 1970s. They have to do so, publishers claim, in order to survive economically” (Ammon, 2003: 29).

more widespread, and that the consensus regarding its use as the language of international communication will become increasingly broader.

This emergence of English as the language of global intercommunication at this point in our history may well be an important event in the evolution of the whole species and may have consequences at many different levels. For the first time, for example, we are glimpsing the possibility of a real consensus — albeit without an open political debate — regarding the language which, in practice, should permit communication between all peoples, whatever their first language might be, and from whichever country or group they belong to. The fact that increasingly more and more countries have chosen English as their ‘first’ foreign language means that there is now the real possibility that people can understand each other by communicating in the same global *lingua franca*, rather than having to resort to those languages which until now had served a similar function, albeit at a more regional level. If English is widely taught, for example in Malaysia, and India, and in South Korea and Japan, in South Africa and Liberia, and in Singapore, and in Europe and it is already the most widely used language in Canada, Australia and the United States, we are facing a planetary spread unlike any achieved by any language before. Despite all the proposals that have been made for this intercommunicative function, among which the best known is Esperanto, it seems that finally it is English that has the most *de facto* possibilities of fulfilling this role, at a time in which humanity is truly aware of the inescapable need of solving the problem of mutual understanding and the benefits that can be derived from it. Thus, just as techno-economic contexts have an influence on language knowledge and behaviour, the transformation of these linguistic phenomena can have their own effects and lead to new synergies that can provide humanity with new collective representations and new structures of interrelation.

3.2 · The consequences

In truth, this expansion in the international use of English serves as a sizeable benefit, in all fields — economic, commercial, the media, politics, etc., for those countries that are lucky to have it as their own language, albeit that it means that their citizens are becoming in comparative terms the most firmly monolingual of all. It is true that the exportation of their language to all corners of the world brings work and income to the people and firms in these countries, and that it favours enormously their international

relations, thanks to their domination — without having had to make any additional effort — of the language that is becoming the medium for general communication internationally.

What for these speakers and firms is simply ‘talking’ or using proficiently their normal code can become, however, a burden for those in other countries or language groups, in particular if they have not received any instruction in this language at the optimum age. Therefore, at academic congresses or in negotiations between different international actors, the handicap of a poor knowledge of English can have repercussions in terms of the ability to present or defend a particular position. Further, certain language-based products traditionally located in other non English-speaking countries (data banks, technical periodicals, etc.) have also had to adapt to English so as to maintain a competitive presence at a world scale, a change that has forced them to increase their production costs, since they have to employ more translators and/or correctors, etc. In contrast with publications in other languages, all that is presented in English has a much greater chance of reaching many different and distant points on the globe and, moreover, of being understood.

This broad expansion of English as a language for global intercommunication has given rise to a series of important debates regarding the consequences of such a change. Voices have been raised in protest against what is considered no more than a manifestation of ‘linguistic imperialism’, closely tied to the hegemony of the United States. And English has even been accused of being a ‘killer language’.²²

Here, I should stress from the outset that it is still too early to say whether this expansion in the knowledge and use of English for carrying out these international functions will lead to the abandonment of other languages. As we know, in all processes of language shift there has to be an initial phase of becoming effectively bilingual which later, and usually in the next generation, will or will not develop into a shift phase, that is, the replacement of the normal uses of the language by that adopted initially as a ‘foreign’ or second language. The expansion of English as a bridging-language is too recent a phenomenon, and, clearly, the process of massive, effective bilingualism has by no means occurred across the board.

What is true, however, is that this possibility of resorting to *one* general language of intercommunication among all humanity generates unease

22 See, for example, Phillipson, 1992, and Nettle & Romaine, 2000.

or fear in many people in certain countries who see this process as negative, particularly in the case that this language is not an ‘artificial’ one. Specifically, many associate it, as we have said, with the hegemony of US culture and its media and with US ‘imperialism’, and fear that these phenomena will only grow (see Phillipson, 1992; Tsuda, 2008), or they suspect that the fact of having this common tool will lead us all to a process of linguistic and cultural homogenisation which is not good for humanity.

And it is precisely this way of seeing things that can have a particular impact on those who are actively seeking to maintain and promote language diversity. For example, Canada’s Official Languages Commissioner, who has the task of overseeing the promotion of language plurality within the state, finds it difficult to accept the existence of just *one* language to undertake the functions of intercommunication, given its battle to ensure that there are two (or more) in the country: “Our country must continue to resist the siren-like appeal of adopting one international language and one world view”.²³ The ‘francophonie’ organizations have been, as mentioned earlier, among the most active in expressing this state of anxiety when faced by the possibility that English might come to occupy exclusively this function of intercommunication, since they believe that “*toujours dans le cadre de la mondialisation des échanges, il appert que ce ne sont pas uniquement les langues dites minoritaires qui sont menacées, mais aussi les langues nationales, et ce, au profit d’une langue globale, je vous laisse deviner laquelle!*” (Dumas, 2004).²⁴ Thus at the 2002 summit held in Beirut, their members decided to commit themselves strongly to the principle

23 Conference given at the Institut d’Estudis Catalans (Barcelona), 29-3-2006, <http://www.iecat.net/cruscat/documents/comissaria/index.htm>

24 A clear demonstration of this situation of tension and current division in Francophone countries, and, above all, in France itself, regarding the recognition of English as a language of intercommunication, was the attitude of former president, Jacques Chirac, who, at an economic summit of 25 countries in Brussels in March 2006, stood up and abandoned the room on hearing the president of the European employers’ association, his fellow Frenchman Ernest-Antoine Seillière, give his address in English on the understanding that it is the ‘langue des affaires’, even though he had the possibility of using the simultaneous interpreting service. Later, president Chirac declared that he had been greatly upset to hear a Frenchman express himself in English before the Council. “*La France a un grand respect pour sa langue. Elle se bat depuis longtemps pour affirmer la présence du français*” at the Olympic Games, in the European Union and at the UN, he reminded listeners. He added that “*c’est l’intérêt national, c’est l’intérêt de la culture, du dialogue des cultures*”, and that “*on ne va pas fonder le monde de demain sur une seule langue, donc une seule culture*”, in a clear allusion to the supremacy of English (see, *Le Figaro*, 23-3-2006).

of cultural diversity and they gave their unconditional support to the creation of “un instrument international, juridiquement contraignant, pour préserver la pluralité des cultures”.²⁵ In 2003 Spanish — and Portuguese-speaking organizations, such as the *Organización de Estados Iberoamericanos* (OEI) — which brings together some twenty Latin American states, in addition to Spain and Portugal — and the *Union Latine*, undertook a similar commitment by adopting the *Déclaration sur la diversité culturelle*, during the *II^e Colloque des trois espaces linguistiques*.²⁶ Likewise in Catalonia, where language awareness is great, there is a considerable number of people who are not entirely convinced by the expansion of English as an international language, as they fear the increasing uniformity that this would usher in and the disappearance of cultural variety, and so they seek to protect and provide a safe environment for present-day identities.

Yet, we believe that there is considerable confusion on this matter owing to the failure to distinguish properly between the different levels that human beings and the various language functions simultaneously have to occupy. Thus, the policies adopted within a state have to be concerned above all with the protection and promotion of language diversity in the daily life of the community, but this should not contradict that fact that outside the states, without losing sight of this first wish, effective state communication and that of firms, organizations and individuals has to be organised in the international domain. And it is true that the sole guarantee of the fact that we can all understand each other is for us to share *at least one* language as a ‘foreign language’, which does not mean that it has to be the only language we know other than the initial language of each group.²⁷ And, clearly, at the moment there appears to be no other language — be it natural or artificial — that can be accepted worldwide as an alternative to English to fulfil this role.²⁸

25 See also Klinkenberg, 2002, in the session ‘Le français, langue de la diversité culturelle’.

26 Mexico, 2/4 April, 2003 (see, Dumas, 2004).

27 On the same problem in Europe, see, Grin (2006).

28 Often other languages with a large demographic base, such as Chinese, Hindi and Spanish itself, are set up in opposition to English. We should be careful not to confuse, as Mufwene says, what is a “world language” with what is a “major language”, so that what characterises a global supra-language is the large number of people that learn it even though it is not their usual first language or the language typically used in their country, while the speakers of the ‘major languages’ typically have them as their first and native language and not as a ‘foreign’ language for international communication. Thus Mufwene states: “Spanish is not as much of a world language as French is, although it has more native speakers than the latter does. The

Seen from another perspective, other authors draw different conclusions regarding the possible influence of English and tend to minimise its impact. Dua, for example, writes that “as regards the international function of LWC [language of wider communication], it needs to be recognised that only a small fraction of people, mainly scientists, businessmen and political leaders, require it for communication at the international level. A large majority of people do not have any need to communicate with the whole world. They can fulfil all their expressive, communicative and linguistic needs through their native, or at the most, the regional language” (1994:4/5). Similarly, Mufwene also rules out the supposed threats of English for Europe, claiming that “whether or not European languages will endanger indigenous languages of Africa and Asia is an open question. Right now it is the indigenous lingua francas that do; and their effect has been far less extensive than that of European languages in former settlement colonies. One would not even want to speculate on the effect of English, identified precociously by Crystal as a ‘global language’, because in most of the countries where its usage has increased over the past few decades, its strictly lingua-franca function is in competition with none of the indigenous vernaculars”. Mufwene, thus, maintains that, should it occur, the languages that will be displaced by English are more likely to be the ones that to date have served for supragroup or suprastate communication, and not the local languages. This author, a theoretician in language ecology also, believes that “the fact that a language acquires prestige from functioning as a world language does not necessarily situate it in the kind of ecological dynamic that would make it dangerous to indigenous vernaculars. Not all ecologies favor world languages over indigenous ones” (Mufwene, 2005:28). The evolutionary changes, therefore, depend on the specific circumstances and dynamics of each individual case and above all, on whether English begins to be used for the everyday, interpersonal

vast majority of Spanish speakers are those native ones, from Spain and its former settlement colonies in Latin America. The situation is just the opposite with English and French, most of whose speakers are non-native” (Mufwene, 2005:32). Leaving to one side the fact that many speakers today included as members of the hispanophone and francophone language groups have a different first language, we need to retain the distinction as to whether they learn a language for international relations or because it forms part of their daily social context. Thus we cannot say that the current situation will not evolve, and that, for example, Spanish cannot become a ‘world language’, if more and more people from other countries show a massive interest to learn it and, at the same time, let us suppose, the international uses of French decline.

functions of a community, a situation which to date seems very unlikely in the vast majority of cases.²⁹

3.3 · The simultaneous expansion of the other major languages

Alongside the expansion of English as a global language of intercommunication in this glocal age, we are also witnessing a parallel process involving the expansion of other languages that might be said to be more ‘local’, but whose potential effects are no less important. On a smaller scale, but in many cases also quite extensive, various languages that boast a large number of speakers and/or which belong to former colonial powers or to new countries with a wide influence in their immediate areas are also benefiting from the techno-economic integration that forms a part of globalization. As Wright claims, “regional supranational groups have arisen alongside globalization and in a complex relationship with it. They are themselves a form of globalization in that they relocate power at the supranational level, but their genesis also stems from a desire to build a counterweight to American global structures” (2004:11). With the support of the new technologies of communication and the increase in interrelations, languages such as Spanish, and even French, can reap the benefits of their colonial pasts and consolidate very broad areas of communication, which in turn enable them to strengthen their historical language markets. In the case of Spanish, for example, recent initiatives to promote cooperation with the governments, institutions and firms of Latin America have enabled this language to project itself over a broad area, with a perimeter that stretches from one side of the Atlantic to the other. The Spanish language has shown itself capable of engineering products of all kinds that allow it to defend its own vast area of communication with great effectiveness. Obviously, this does not mean that the elite in these countries are renouncing the need to be proficient in English and the need to use English when communicating with other language areas and groups, but it has meant the consolidation of the internal expansion of this language, for example, to include groups of autochthonous speakers that have yet to make it their L1, and guaranteed its full use in the national functions of each of these states.

²⁹ We should not confuse situations in which English serves as a global language with those in which English penetrates in the everyday social fabric owing to the fact that it is the official or the former colonial ‘local’ language. The forces involved in the two cases are quite distinct.

Similarly, Mandarin Chinese, adopted as the official code of written and oral communication within China, has the opportunity to embrace new speakers and take on new uses hitherto fulfilled by other varieties within the great Chinese conglomerate. In Africa, Swahili serves as the ‘local’ language of communication between different language groups, while Arabic can be used between various countries united by this common language and religion. We should not forget that at the ‘local’ scale too, we are witnessing an extension and intensification in areas of contact, which can in this case have a great influence on the evolution in the existing language diversity. English, in these situations, remains a distant language for most of these peoples, although in some places — if there is tourism, for example — its influence may start to be felt among those persons that work there, and among the political elite. However, English here does not compete in the daily domains of the majority of these peoples. For example, among Africans and Asians, Mufwene describes the situation as being as follows: “Language competition is more local than linguists have shown it to be, and the fact that English does not function as a vernacular has certainly kept it out of the arena in which these indigenous vernaculars have been competing. This supports my position in Mufwene (2003a, 2004) that European colonial languages are generally no threat to the indigenous languages of Africa and Asia. In some cases, the expansion of the European official languages is hampered, instead, by the indigenous urban vernaculars, which are associated with an aspect of modernity that is more tangible, being closer to indigenous cultures” (2005:30).

If, Mufwene goes on to say, English competes, as we have said, with other non-local or former colonial languages, which have not yet established themselves on a broad scale, it might replace them in some of their functions of intercommunication: “We must remember that this language operates in domains where it competes not with the indigenous vernaculars or lingua francas but with other imperial languages. Hence, however “global” English becomes (in the way Crystal 1997, 2004 defines it or how Phillipson 2003 uses the term), it endangers only other European imperial languages with which it competes in the prestigious and potentially lucrative ethnographic domains allocated to them” (Mufwene, 2005:33).

The emergence of what we might call ‘languages of wider communication’ together with the expansion of English as a ‘global language of intercommunication’ has led De Swaan (2001) to depict the emerging planetary linguistic organization as a ‘constellation’, where English is the ‘hypercen-

tral' language, accompanied by these other 'supercentral' languages. The latter also facilitate international and long distance communication in certain areas of the globe, and include Arabic, Chinese, French, German, Hindi, Japanese, Malay, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Swahili, etc., all of which, apart from Swahili, boast more than 100 million speakers, and which serve to connect the speakers of a series of languages that the author defines as 'central' (2001:5). For the time being it is clear, therefore, that English has no exclusive rights over international communication, but that it is the prevalent language in communication at the world scale, that is, in the true global or planetary domain.

De Swaan points out that, in the case of English, "[since] its expansion as a native tongue reached its zenith more than a century ago, with the settlement of North America, Australia and South Africa (...) English has spread in spectacular fashion, but only as a second, foreign language. (...) English, people say in the tropics, is the language of the office during working hours, not of the home at leisure time" (2001:185). In reality, therefore, where English wins most speakers is as a second language and not so much as a first language — except in those cases in which it acts as the language of the country and not as an international language.

In fact, English can have various roles. Indeed it takes on all roles. It is the 'global' language, but at the same time it can be the language of a 'wider area', that is, facilitating communication between groups located close to each other in space and integrated in the same 'polity' or trade area, and, obviously, it is also very much a 'local' language, operating as the native tongue of large groups of people resident in their traditional language areas — autochthonous or following colonisation. It is, clearly, the only language that can fulfil *all* these functions.

As we shall see later in this discussion, however, the distribution of the functions of the languages is by no means definitive, and changes may occur in those of the large areas. The presence of English as a global language can alter many things. For example, it can bring about crises in zones traditionally assigned to the other major languages. This would seem to point to cases such as the emergence of English in certain areas of Europe traditionally influenced by German, as is illustrated by the fact that Hungary, which hastened to rid itself of Russian following the collapse of the Soviet Union, did not seek to replace it with German — the closer language — but with English, seen as "an intangible but powerful symbol of modernizing and liberating notions and practices" (Bruthiaux 2003:17). It might be ar-

gued that, in the case of these countries under the former influence of the Soviet Union, the socio-significance of English is highly oblique, but I believe it is indicative of potential crises, at least in certain parts of the planet.

In fact, such crises cannot be ruled out in the future if the adoption of English for these major functions continues apace, since it might serve other supralocal functions too, given that those who are becoming quite proficient in English as an L2 can often have recourse to an “instrumental, non-emotional view of a language they regard as serving their interests quite adequately and see no purpose in promoting another language of global communication” (Bruthiaux 2003:12). Thus, they might decide to give priority to English over languages that were traditionally used to communicate with neighbouring countries. For example, it is not unusual in Paris today to hear conversations in English between speakers of Romance languages who previously would have used French or the language of one or the other. As Tonkin says, in the global scale of things, “Globalization has essentially eliminated the possibility of (...) planning for a situation in which the world might be divided into a number of linguistic spheres of influence, each dominated by a regional language (not necessarily English), with relatively little contact among them. Simple economic and technological realities would seem to require the cultivation of a global lingua franca, for which role English is at present the sole major contender” (2003:326). The various areas of communication, therefore, will never again be fully independent and self-sufficient — if in fact they ever were — and hereon in they will always have to contend with the presence of the global language (whichever eventually becomes predominant), and all that that entails. As we shall see later in the discussion, certain states will not escape the tensions that the global presence of English might provoke.

Likewise for language groups with no more than sub-state powers and with a common state, such as Catalan, the presence of English inevitably has to be dealt with as it can complicate language education policies. As in Quebec, more and more parents want their children to speak English to ensure that they are not at a disadvantage in the future world as they envisage it, something that is already happening even among autochthonous groups in Mexico, in contact with the tourist industry.³⁰ School language

30 It seems that many people, and, in particular parents, who are concerned for the future of their children, have internalised the idea, according to Wright, that “with the rise of global regulation,

policy, therefore, needs to be reviewed sooner rather than later, so as to provide individuals with the basic skills, which in the case of Catalonia means preparing children to be trilingual. How this is to be undertaken and whether the minimum level of English needed has to be the same for all are matters that have to be debated and studied with care. In communities with a weaker sense of identity and among those that place a lower value on their own language, the study of English can even be preferred among a large section of the population to that of their own historic language. Thus, English, in conjunction with that of the state language, can serve to confine the language of the autochthonous group to a minority status. These sub-state groups will have to take quick and brave decisions to ensure that their own preservation is compatible with their effective participation on the global stage, something that will probably lead to a revision of many important aspects of their policies that govern languages and identity.

Whatever the case, it seems that one thing is quite clear and, that is, despite the desire for English as an instrument for international communication and as an important socio-economic tool for individuals, English is not seen as a legitimate option to take over the functions considered the property of the local language. The majority of those that use English as their L2 seem to be clear, at least for the time being, as to the distribution of functions between this code and that of their group. Despite this, there have been cases whereby the authorities of certain countries have had to intervene so as to put the functions of English in their place, in the belief that they had unnecessarily encroached upon the local functions and that this was not appropriate. Similarly, as De Swaan says, “the short-term preferences of individual consumers may damage their collectively accumulated cultural capital in the long run” (2001:47), since, often, the decisions of speakers regarding the functions of their language codes are blind to the consequences regarding their collective consequences, even though these might be negative to the interests of their own language. It awaits to be seen, therefore, how far the people, if they make rapid advances in their understanding of English, will or will not maintain the distinction in these functions between those of their own

systems and regimes, the world operates as a unit in an increasing number of domains, and communication among the parts needs to be achieved”. Thus, they believe that “learning the languages of others is no longer the affair of a small cosmopolitan elite or a bilingual clerical class, traders or travellers”. As a result, “a far larger proportion of the world now wants or needs to communicate across language borders” (Wright 2004:102).

code and those of the global language —or the others of the large area that might also intervene.

A fundamental element in this awareness of the language choices that have to be made by various groups of peoples is the representations they hold of their identity. If their first language continues to define the basic identity of the group then it is easier for them to maintain a linguistic behaviour that is ‘protectionist’ of their language, as it forms part and parcel of the group’s identity. If, for some reason, this bond between language and identity weakens or undergoes a change — as a result of the complex reformulation of the group’s collective definitions-, the people might not attach so much importance to maintaining the uses of a language that has less communicative compass and so a process is initiated in which its functions and social value are gradually eroded at the expense of those of the more global code. All this, however, would mean having first attained a high degree of bilingualism and fluency in English as an L2, which, for the time being, exists it would seem in very few places.

4 · CONTACT THROUGH SUPRA-STATE UNIONS

4.1 · The European Union

Against a backdrop of widespread global change, another key process in the “glocal” era has been the rise of regional economic blocs and political unions. In large part because global change has expanded the scale of human activity, states in Europe and on other continents have realised that competing successfully in the new landscape requires them to increase their political-economic weight and/or their geostrategic influence. That is the reason why new regional agreements and treaties have sprung up, creating organizations like the European Union, NAFTA and Mercosur.

These new arrangements in regional cooperation and integration have frequently involved stepping up the traditional economic and social interactions existing between their member states. To differing degrees, members have had to tackle the issue of language policy and planning, while taking into account, as always, any potential implications for cultural identity. Language policy and planning has never been a straightforward matter nor is it so now either, especially in those settings where the number of languages and countries is greater.

In the European Union, for instance, not only have processes of economic integration been at work, but common regional political institutions have also been undergoing development. In future, EU institutions may yet be able to drive integration farther, addressing a wider number of areas and bringing the EU’s diverse populations closer together. While EU institutions have adopted language policies based initially on the full recognition of equal official status for all the languages that enjoy such status in their respective member countries, practical daily needs have, at the same time, led to the creation of a special category of “working languages”. The purpose has been to make the operation of EU bodies more workable and more agile.³¹ In addition, the European Union has recommended that all EU citizens learn at least two languages in addition to the language of their own country, with the aim of bolstering interaction among people across

31 There are 23 recognized languages in the European Union: Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish Gaelic, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish, and Swedish.

the continent. It is apparent, however, that the model cannot settle all the issues posed by dealings within the EU. The model has not fully resolved the institutional issues, business issues and people issues that are involved. In all likelihood, in fact, a rethink will be required in the coming years, and new decisions will need to be reached. Whatever may be said, however, European integration does appear to have keenly heightened people's awareness of linguistic diversity and of the need to learn other languages, turning their investment in polyglottism into genuinely shared vehicles of mutual communication. In practice, what is happening, though, is that English is more and more clearly emerging as the first and preferred "foreign" language being taught in EU states, and this phenomenon points to the emergence of a rather widespread consensus on the matter. English is now outpacing French as the most frequently used language in the daily documentation of EU institutions, and it is far outstripping German too in this regard. This is occurring despite the fact that French and German are also "working languages" which are used in the simultaneous interpretation of sessions and, of course, in the formal translation of the most important documents and texts, which are provided in all the official languages.³²

Under the EU model, the recognition of multiple official languages based on the official languages of member states appears, as noted before, to settle identity and equality issues to quite a satisfactory extent³³ in the context of bottom-up and top-down interactions between citizens, national institutions and EU institutions. However, it appears to work less effectively for horizontal interaction *across* the various actors. Translation and simultaneous interpretation are potential "institutional" strategies for solving the problem. However, they are obviously not always available for every personal interaction. While they may work in plenary sessions and full committee meetings and for written materials generally, they are inf-

32 One example of this evolution can be seen in the European Commission's preparation of documents. English has jumped from being the original language for 44.7% of EC documents in 1996 to 57% in 2001. In the same period, France has fallen from 38.5% to 30% (see Georgeault, 2003; Wright, 2007, and Fiedler, 2010). Similarly, Grin (2006) cites Durand (2004 : 117), adding, "rappelle que si, en 1997, la part du français et de l'anglais comme langue de rédaction d'origine des documents circulant au Conseil de l'Union européenne était sensiblement identique, à 42% et 41% respectivement, cet équilibre a complètement basculé en faveur de l'anglais, avec des taux de 18% et 73% respectivement en 2002 — selon le Secrétariat général du Conseil".

33 This level of satisfaction is not currently enjoyed by official sub-state languages that are still considered "non-official" at the level of the nation-state, such as Catalan in Spain.

fective in face-to-face spoken interactions or for person-to-person dealings online, for instance. Whatever the EU's stated principles, the truth of the matter is that in social or economic activity unrelated to government — e.g. in the international activities of companies, universities and NGOs, as well as for large numbers of meetings between nationals of different countries — there is an increasing tendency to use English, whenever possible, as a language of interaction between groups. English has certainly become the most shared “foreign” language in Europe and, in fact, in a number of countries it actually serves as a “second language” nationally in certain organizational structures, such as transnational companies or advanced academic and technical/scientific institutions.³⁴ At present, everything points to the EU's acceptance in practice of English as the preferred language for communication between any actors whose first languages differ.

In fact, as a greater number of people need to communicate with one another who happen to share a given language, the shared language in question becomes their most practical vehicle for interaction. Such a situation weakens any spontaneous motivation to make use of languages that are not shared by all.³⁵ In addition, English has the benefit of growing competence and use not only across the EU but, as noted before, across the world as well, further increasing its usefulness and desirability. If English as a code rises to fulfil the function of global language of communication, Europe will be hard-pressed to maintain one or more other languages at the same level, serving equally as bridge languages. No definition of European identity on offer appears to oppose English strongly enough to push for the need to choose a necessarily different vehicle for communication, despite

34 According to data from the academic year 1993-94, Uppsala University in Sweden, for example, saw already between 90% and 100% of all theses and papers in technology, science, pharmacy and medicine written in English.

35 Grin (2006) also thinks that “il existe une forte probabilité que beaucoup d'Européens, malgré les exhortations de la Commission et tous les *Plans d'action* possibles et imaginables, se contentent de l'investissement dans une seule langue étrangère (probablement l'anglais), et négligent le reste. De fait, c'est une évolution que l'on constate déjà dans différents pays d'Europe, de la Scandinavie à l'Italie en passant par la Suisse — cas que, par nécessité, je suis de plus près”. At the same time, however, he acknowledges that matters cannot be that straightforward, because “diverses études montrent que des compétences dans des langues autres que l'anglais sont utiles dans la vie professionnelle, et qu'elles sont rémunérées sur le marché du travail. Dès lors, indépendamment de toute invocation des beautés de la diversité, les acteurs sociaux auront certaines incitations matérielles à apprendre d'autres langues. Cependant, même s'ils le font, ce sera alors dans une optique de complément, repoussant ces langues dans une semi-périphérie, en orbite autour d'une langue super-centrale comme l'anglais”.

the Euro-skepticism often voiced by the nation that gave us English. Despite resistance from some member states, the EU will almost certainly have to raise the subject and address it deeply and rigorously. It will need to look genuinely into how a future European communication area could be organised, both for governmental and non-governmental communication. The resulting area would need both to allow for widespread understanding between different language groups and also to support the solid maintenance of the languages and identities of each social group within the EU. So far, the subject has appeared to be taboo, but its consideration is becoming inevitable in light of the evolution of linguistic communication on a global scale.

In fact, it is becoming plain, as pointed out by Grin (2005) with great clarity, that the current recommended model based on all EU citizens' learning *two* "foreign" languages in addition to their own does not guarantee communication between all parties concerned. That would only be possible if, as noted earlier, all Europeans shared at least *one common* language. By way of example, let us say that one group knows languages "a" and "b", another knows "e" and "f", still another knows "j" and "k" and a final group knows "j" and "a". In such a case, the system cannot guarantee general understanding among all of them. From a strictly logical standpoint, therefore, the only solution is to accept that Europeans must share at least *one common* language beyond the individual language of each group. Obviously, if they shared such a language, the purpose would be to use it as and when circumstances required.³⁶

From my standpoint, determining such uses and functions is precisely where a potential solution may be found to the barriers thrown up by the problem. On the one hand, everyone clearly holds the view that mutual understanding between all is a laudable goal, while on the other hand, it is equally desirable that this goal not require anyone to give up their own language. After all, each European group has been constructing these languages throughout the course of history. They shape identity and furnish a fundamental sense of belonging for the people in each group. The great

36 Grin similarly holds the view that "la politique linguistique Européenne ne poursuit pas qu'un seul objectif, mais au moins deux, à savoir la pluralité et l'intercompréhension ; et si l'on a plusieurs objectifs, il faut un instrument (ou un *ensemble* d'instruments) par objectif" (Grin, 2006). The existence of multiple, official languages, therefore, fosters the *recognition* and maintenance of linguistic plurality, but it does not resolve the further objective of achieving fluid *communication* among the distinct recognised groups.

challenge, therefore, is how to go forward building an orderly distribution of functions based on clear and explicit distinction between the uses that may be assigned to English — or whatever other supra-language may be chosen — in official, institutional settings, and the uses that must reside with state/national languages. The approach must, however, avoid falling into the trap of distributing functions in a way that could foster the perception among citizens that there are first-class languages and second-class ones. What must be avoided is any sense that their own languages are of less value than the one chosen for mutual communication. As we know, this has occurred in other historical circumstances. For this reason, all state/national languages must fulfil functions within their own territories that are clearly higher and more important, with a guarantee of exclusivity, so that any perception of “threat” or destabilisation from English is averted.

In addition, the emergence of English as Europe’s common “foreign language”, so to speak, also presents other advantages and drawbacks, depending on how its effects are viewed. For example, if English becomes the usual language of communication on the continent and European citizens master it, they will gain the advantage of knowing a language that will, from what has been seen, probably take on the function of an inter-continental and global language as well. French and Spanish are also able to fulfil this function in their respective former colonies or areas of influence, as described earlier. At present, however, only English is becoming a truly “common” language across continents or, in any event, among groups of people from countries that have entered into international relations. In such a context, the Europeans would be well situated.

Equally, English is the clearly predominant code in North America, where the societies are more advanced and creative in technological terms. Their media output is extensive and their economic power enormous. In that light, it would not be a bad idea to be able to communicate and interact with them readily. If, on the contrary, Europe opted for a language other than English, then all the above points, which could be viewed as “advantageous”, would not be so. However, the chances are that if English continues in future to consolidate its role as a “global” language, the Europeans — at least the sectors most reliant on international relations — will need to acquire it just the same in order to take part in global techno-economic and cultural life. So English does not appear to be a poor choice. What is more, after all, it is a language of European origin.

The drawbacks of choosing English, according to some schools of thought, primarily grow out of uneasiness over any excessive influence that the United States might exercise as a major technological and economic power today. The effect on the lifestyles and values of young people in Europe could be great. Of particular concern is the phenomenon of “cultural imperialism”. The view is not, however, that Europe cannot offer anything fresh and appealing to its people that could compete with — and beat, so to speak — what is coming out of the US. Having looked at the techniques employed and understood the mechanisms at work, there is no reason why Europe could not take the lead in a new era, based on home-grown products developed out of updated traditions and created through dialogue with people from other parts of the world, who are not yet engaged but will, in future, be equally ready and able to get involved by virtue of their use of English. Whatever the case may be, the coming together of humankind will probably be unstoppable and a great number of ideas, values and products of a material or cultural nature will spread across the planet, and few borders will be able to stop them. It would be more sensible, therefore, to prepare for the new era now than to put up protection barriers, which will very likely be of no use, especially given the highly dynamic technological and economic advance of the new Asian powers, which are typically highly pragmatic and certainly intelligent and ambitious.

4.2 · NAFTA and Mercosur/Mercosul

Fear of US cultural imperialism is not only felt in Europe. It may be felt even more acutely in Canada, which is geographically much closer and, for the most part, shares English as a language of family life and daily use. Despite Canada’s proximity and the circulation of US products within its borders, however, Canada’s differentiated identity is much in evidence, precisely for these reasons. Often, contrary to intuition, the more extensive the interactions, the greater the need to differentiate identities.³⁷ This has also been seen in the debates over the free trade treaty signed in 1994 between Canada, the US and Mexico. Known as NAFTA (the North American

³⁷ As an anecdote that is nevertheless revealing, Canadians abroad try, to a very great extent, to ensure the visibility of their highly distinctive flag — on rucksacks, luggage, clothing, caps and so forth — in order to indicate that they are not “Americans” from the US.

Free Trade Agreement), the treaty raised much greater concern of potential “imperialism” from anglophone Canada than from francophone Canada, whose language concerns, particularly in Quebec, lie rather in safeguarding the full and exclusive use of French.

In Mexico, voices of concern can also be heard, citing the danger of “Americanisation” from the United States, especially in light of the cross-border contacts between the two countries and the scope of their interactions. While English is spreading in Mexico so far merely as an L2 or “foreign” language — albeit quite effectively among the upper echelons of society — unease over issues of identity could start to surface and outward displays of concern could gain force along the lines of the frequently raised notion that the greater the interaction, the greater the cognizance of differences in identity — in relation, that is, between oneself and another. Morris, for instance, has already cited as an example the speech of Ernesto Zedillo, then president of Mexico, at the *First International Congress of the Spanish Language: Language and the Media*, held in April 1997 in Mexico. The leader made reference at the meeting to Mexico’s great responsibility as the most populous Spanish-speaking country in the promotion of Spanish as a global language.

Within the framework of NAFTA, however, changing Mexican governmental action on the language front has placed emphasis on redressing the language and cultural issues of its numerous immigrants in the US. Mexico has opened new consulates and it has set up cultural aid programmes to assist in maintaining its language and raising awareness of the value of such maintenance, while also supporting bilingualism. In fact, looking at North America, immigration may well be the primary source for action on the language policy front, setting aside the case of Quebec. Paradoxically, as we will see in greater detail, it is most likely the arrival of Spanish speakers that has mobilised the English-only movement. Interestingly, this has occurred right in the backyard of the language that now enjoys greatest use in global communication. Even so, it appears that “local” phenomena such as migratory movements are seen as significant and even threatening by a vast number of people and institutions in the US, leading to the adoption of specific measures geared to ensure that new arrivals take up English in the receiving society. Clearly, what we can learn here are the separation of functions and the by no means automatic nature of the influences that the “global language” in question can generate with regard to other functions at other levels, especially locally. In all likelihood, these

influences can be much greater because of face-to-face contact between populations than because of any abstract need of humanity to have recourse to a single language as a second code — or a third or, at times, a fourth code — for inter-group communication. In fact, the direction that face-to-face contact in daily life is heading, so far seemingly inexorably, is to the effective bilingualisation of second-generation Spanish speakers in the US and to the wholesale abandonment of Spanish as a mother tongue by the third generation.

Without turning from the Americas, another experience of interest has been the setting up of Mercosur,³⁸ the regional economic bloc created by treaty between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991, and Venezuela (2006).³⁹ Having greater political and cultural ambitions than NAFTA, Mercosur is currently the third largest trading bloc in the world, drawing together a total of over 270 million people. Three quarters of them live in Brazil, whose official language is Portuguese, while the remainder lives in countries where Spanish performs that function, although another language, Guarani,⁴⁰ has held the same status in Paraguay since 1992. At the level of language, the Mercosur case is significant because, unlike NAF-

38 Mercosul, in Portuguese. Now Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru have an “associate state” status.

39 As Hamel points out (2003), “Mercosur aims at attaining profound regional integration and at strengthening the international position of its member countries. Here immediately the differences with another common market on the continent — the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among Canada, the US and Mexico — become apparent. According to the South American point of view, in the dichotomy between “Pan-Americanism” (economic base without a common cultural foundation) and “Latin Americanism” (cultural community without a common economic base), Mercosur was born out of cultural convergence, while NAFTA represents a mere market aggregation based on cultural divergence.”

40 To date, Guarani has not been given official status as a Mercosur language. In 1995 the cultural wing of Mercosur stated that it “officially recognised [Guarani] as one of the historical languages of Mercosur, declaring support for its renewed appreciation and its promotion in the areas of research, academic studies and education” (see Bosselli, 2003). At present, however, there is a strong movement to achieve its parity with Spanish and Portuguese. For example, according to recommendation number 15 of the *Second Inter-American Seminar on the Management of Languages*, held in June 2003 in Asuncion, the meeting agreed to “request the inclusion of Guarani as an official language of Mercosur alongside Spanish and Portuguese and propose to member states the adoption of language policies that ensure equal treatment for the three languages in the areas being considered.” (see http://dtiil.unilat.org/segundo_seminario/recomendaciones.htm). Since December 13, 2006, the Guarani is “one of the languages of Mercosur” according to Decision 31/06 of the Common Market Council. However, the art. 2 of the decision states that “The working languages are the official languages of Mercosur established in Article 46 of the Protocol of Ouro Preto”, i.e., Spanish and Portuguese.

TA, express provisions have been made for language and there has been a desire for convergence. In this respect, the Committee of Ministries of Education was set up in 1991, in the same year that Mercosur was founded, and a triennial plan was approved in the following year to promote education fostering integration among members, advance the training and development of human resources, and lead to the harmonisation of the members' educational systems. Along these lines, the plan called for the teaching of Spanish in Brazil and Portuguese in Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay within their respective educational systems.

While NAFTA and the EU, as noted earlier, did not address the matter until later, Mercosur did give immediate attention to language matters, probably as a response to potential US influence in the region. As nations sharing a Latin culture, Mercosur members identify more with one another than with the US. As a result, they could aspire to integration on a cultural level in order to countervail pressures coming from the colossus to the north. The view held was that there were only two languages involved — Guarani was not included — and members opted for their mutual recognition. The solution, at least on paper, was certainly workable in this sort of linguistically straightforward union. The proposal, therefore, was made to provide reciprocal education in the other language as a required subject in each of the countries, through the *Learning Programme for the Official Languages of Mercosur*, whose stated aim is to “implement the learning of Spanish and Portuguese in institutions of different levels and tracks within the educational system in order to improve communication between the countries that make up Mercosur”. In practice, however, the application of these agreements has not occurred at the same speed or with the same intensity everywhere. Whereas in Brazil, for example, the implementation of Spanish teaching has been the subject of relatively bolder political decisions, the process in Argentina appears to be moving more slowly with regard to Portuguese. There may even be doubts as to whether the political will exists to put the programme into practice (see Hamel, 2003, Bein 2002, and Varela 2001). Nevertheless, the expectations of closer economic integration did create a market for Portuguese teaching that seemed to increase in the wake of Argentina's severe economic crisis. The need, however, was addressed more quickly by the private sector than by the public sector.⁴¹

41 For examples, although the governor of the province of Buenos Aires announced in March 1995 that the teaching of Portuguese was mandatory in the secondary schools, “the announcement.”

Where the greatest progress has been made in the use of one language or the other is in the borderlands between the two great language areas, where bilingual schools have spread widely.

At the heart of the matter, each country can perfectly well pursue its own preferences in the face of globalization. While Brazil appears to have clearly opted for an economy rooted in the Latin American region, Argentina seems to be doubting over whether it ought to lean instead towards closer economic ties with the United States (Hamel, 2003) given the broader context of globalization. On the language front, the effect of this uncertainty can be clearly seen in the fact that Portuguese is in demand as a foreign language but always behind English. As a result, it is often viewed as a second-best choice. So the debate, rather like in the Europe, appears to turn on whether English has to be the only compulsory second language or whether there must be others. In short, two visions are in collision here: one that is more Latin American and the other more Pan-American. In this respect, Hamel (2003) commented that “the defenders of Spanish and Portuguese converge with the ‘traditionalists’ (who are in turn allied with the international ‘Francophonie’) in their opposition to the total and exclusive hegemony of English and in their defense of a plurilingual option”. In this case, the tensions, which exist in many other places as well, surface here between the adoption of a common international language by everyone — in this case, English — or the support of a plurality of options. Such a plurality, it must be said, would also be limited to a small number of other languages. The geostrategic position of South America may well make its situation more complex, heightening the fears mentioned earlier of US economic and cultural imperialism.

In any event, the dilemma will continue to deepen because, as we have seen, English is spreading as a general language of interaction not only across the Americas but around the globe. It will be a formidable task to dispense with it, giving up the second language that the vast majority of people wish to learn above all others. Although English may at present be seen fundamentally as “imperialist” and “oppressive” in some parts of the

as Varela (2001) points out, “had no immediate effect other than to confirm how unworkable the measure was: without enough teachers or materials, it was impossible to put it into practice. As in the case of English, however, the private sector took due note of the signal: a new *need* was emerging in the marketplace, which the State could not satisfy. With the solid backing of the State’s political and linguistic message, a golden era of business in English and Portuguese language teaching was launched”.

world, the truth is that the language is being taken up as a basic L2 in an increasing number of educational systems. It will, therefore, be hard to prevent its becoming the common, most shared language among people from distinct language groups, even though levels of English competence differ by circumstance and individual. A possible solution, raised by commentators like Graciela Barrios and Hamel himself, would be to leverage the structural similarities between Spanish and Portuguese to teach them early on in an integrated fashion as languages more tightly bound up with identity. English could be introduced subsequently, so that a competent level of functional trilingualism could be achieved. In my view, that is the direction in which to look for a possible solution to the dilemmas of regional integration without turning a back to knowing the global language.⁴²

For now, however, the presence of only a few languages in Mercosur has enabled linguistic coexistence based on giving two of them full official status — while almost ignoring Guarani — and on establishing reciprocal learning between the language groups, sidestepping the difficulty of agreeing on a single supra-language. While English may in future grow more dominant as the worldwide language of interaction — at least among the ruling classes — it may face problems being accepted as a language of interaction among neighbouring countries on grounds of identity. At present, for example, it may be a stretch to imagine English, in future, becoming the supra-language of Mercosur, since communication in Spanish and Portuguese is straightforward. The *social meanings* associated with English in those countries would have to shift substantially for English to be seen as a “neutral” language. By contrast, however, this could occur in other places, such as India — as we will see next — and perhaps also in the European Union, situations with a far greater number of languages that do not offer the possibility of reciprocal bilingualisation.

Certainly, the number of languages present in a regional union is a variable that should not be downplayed. Each situation calls for a different solution. Sensing that you are in an equal, respectful relationship with another person because each of you has learned the other’s language definitely makes matters easier. In practice, however, if the unfolding situation should lead to the predominant use of *one* language over the other, a sense of inequality might arise. The matter could come down to which party shows greater interest in learning the other’s language — i.e. the Brazilians

42 Note that, in the Catalan case, a solution of this sort might also work.

learning Spanish or the Spanish speakers taking up Portuguese — and whether the asymmetry is very strong or not. At present, however, current indications are that neither one language nor the other is in danger of its internal ecosystem breaking down. Spanish is the majority language of Latin America, and Brazil alone constitutes a vast and significant linguistic community. In this case, the usual concerns of colonisation by the other group, with the consequent rupture of an established political and economic union, do not appear necessary in this region of the globe. If such a situation were to develop, it would be as a result of other distinct reasons.

4.3 · Unions and supra-languages

So far, we have seen three cases of regional economic unions or treaty organizations which are home to several languages and face the question of how to formulate language policy and planning among themselves. To date, all three have managed to avoid officially assigning the functions of interaction to a single express code. In fact, they operate in all the official languages within their borders. However, while both NAFTA and Mercosur only include two and three languages, respectively, the European Union has now reached twenty-three languages recognised as official for use in EU institutions.

Of the three cases, the Europe Union is clearly the one which has made most headway towards convergence of common areas and rules, with free circulation of goods and people and shared political institutions, such as the European Commission and the European Parliament. The EU has already become more than just an area for economic trade and consensus decision-making. It has taken on some features that might be said to be “federal” in nature. The obvious question is once again whether an advanced process of integration like the EU’s should not involve naming a language that could expressly act as a bridge between its participating language groups, especially given the goal of integrating, for example, the universities, business and, in the long term, populations.

As noted earlier, English is currently the language best positioned to play that role, because the vast majority of countries have spontaneously adopted it as the preferred L2 in their educational systems. In addition, English clearly continues to spread as the language enabling communication at the global level. Nonetheless, the topic regularly stirs up a great deal of conflict, especially on the part of France, whose language has provided

this function in earlier periods in history, and from other countries, such as Germany, whose economic contributions to the EU are the largest, and from Spain, whose language is spoken extensively on the other side of the Atlantic. Officially adopting a priority language of interaction, though, may not be an easy step to take at the moment, more on grounds of identity than for practical reasons. EU members do not yet seem to have reached widespread, calm-headed agreement on any integration within a common continental area that would have identity traits surpassing national boundaries. In addition, English may still convey an unacceptable social meaning for many people. In practice, however, there is no doubt that it continues to make headway as the code for mutual communication and this fact will have to be acknowledged sooner or later, whatever the reluctance on grounds of identity. To reach that point, being cognizant of the twofold role of languages — enabling communication and constructing identity — will be vital. Drawing such a distinction will make it possible to steer any readings on the use of English towards “neutrality” in terms of identity. Using the language strictly in the functions assigned to it should not in any way signify the *spread* of British culture, much less of US culture. Rather, it should reflect the acceptance on practical grounds of a language gaining international consensus for the function of interaction.

In this respect, India offers a point of reference that we might consider. As a case of greater interest than NAFTA or Mercosur, India nevertheless has rates of development that are distinct from the EU’s. The challenges that it faces at an institutional level, however, are similar to the EU’s. The constitution of India⁴³ envisaged that the language of its colonial power — English, to be exact — would be used for a certain period⁴⁴ as the official language of interaction among the new nation’s different political units — with their different internal, official languages. Later on, however, that role was to be assumed by Hindi, the language of the nation’s most numerous group. So far, the transfer has been blocked by groups who do not agree that Hindi should play this role — in all likelihood, on grounds basically of identity. As a result, the deadline for ending the official use of English has been extended time and again. In the case of India, in other

43 According to the 1961 census, 1,652 languages are spoken in India (Mallikarjun 2003). *Ethnologue* recognizes 438 living languages in India (http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=IN).

44 Hindi was to have replaced English as the official language of interaction in India within a period of fifteen years starting from 1950.

words, English has paradoxically been seen as more “neutral” in terms of identity than Hindi, which belongs to only one of the groups in the country, the largest one in fact. The choice of Hindi has been a source of grievance for the other groups, whose languages were not chosen to take on the same official function. With globalization in full swing, the situation has become even more complex. In a number of India’s states where a language other than Hindi is spoken, the population may now prefer to place a higher priority on learning English than on taking up Hindi in light of its usefulness at the international level. At the same time, the elite classes whose first language is Hindi are also interested in English in order to maintain their socioeconomic status and to gain access to international information and relations. In this way, the former colonial language of India continues to be kept as the country’s official language of interaction. Even though the relative knowledge of Hindi has also made progress over the years through education and the media, English still performs the function that it was to have abandoned some decades ago.

In the glocal era, as Mallikarjun points, “Indian families everywhere compete with one another to provide their wards with good English education. Clear functional separation in the choice of language by the public is seen: English for economic progress, and, normally, mother tongue for cultural purposes and as a token of identity”. The author points out that the same state of affairs reaches even as far as the rural areas of other language groups, where English is spreading and Hindi receding: “English is becoming more popular in the rural areas due to the growth and development of reading skill in English through school. English, thus, is establishing a solid mass base for itself in the rural areas” (Mallikarjun 2003).

What might well occur is that the EU also fails to gain consensus among its member states over which language to use in interactions. However, it seems quite clear that EU citizens will continue to take action to arm their children with the language resources that they believe can be of help to them in future. English will clearly be one of those choices and the most important one after each group’s own language and the languages of its immediate environment. Concerns need to be cast off. It is time to see how an equitable multilingual Europe can be organised by assigning exclusive “internal” functions to each language and by sharing a second — or even third — language in common. The fundamental hurdle that needs to be cleared first is in the area of identity. The stumbling block comes if a general language for EU communication were to be identified as a “na-

tional European language” or as “representative” of an identity that may be felt to be in competition. At present, the language of each group must play the fundamental role of identity, and Europe must not be built upon the mirage of some “language/identity cohesion” based on a common code, a mistake which has been made in a good number of European countries throughout history. The language of interaction must not come with any discourse of an “emotional” or “national” character, nor be at all denigrating of other languages. Vigilance is needed from both those who are in favour and those who are against, because quite often, as Dua notes, “the question of a link language is subject to a great deal of political manipulation and ideological representation” (1994:13).

Attention must also be given to another of the EU’s overarching objectives, linguistic *sustainability* — in other words, the maintenance of its language diversity over time. To do so, a constant eye must be kept on ensuring that English as a regional language does not overstep or replace the necessary functions of other languages.⁴⁵ Such problems could arise whenever individuals share multiple languages. The keystone of the structure is a clear distribution of functions, applying the principle of *linguistic subsidiarity* formulated to benefit local languages as follows: *anything that the local language can do must NOT be done by the more global one.*⁴⁶ Following this prescription and ensuring some dynamic stability, the EU as a whole will very likely have much to gain and little to lose, finding itself better able to adapt optimally to the glocal era in which we live.

⁴⁵ Cases of this sort have already arisen in the Nordic countries where, for example, Norway’s minister for transport protested that the website of the airline SAS, basically owned by three Scandinavian countries, appeared exclusively in English. Similarly, Sweden’s government sponsored a study to see whether English was taking over any of the functions of Swedish, and it has been adopting the measures necessary to ensure that Swedish remains a “full-blooded” language employed in all areas of use.

⁴⁶ See Bastardas, 2005 & 2007.

5 · PLURILINGUAL STATES IN THE NEW CONTEXT

5.1 · Effects of globalization on the language policy and planning of states: the swiss case

Building nation-states raised the issue of language in official and public communication within new political entities which were, in the vast majority of cases, made up of linguistically diverse populations. In such cases, the implementation of equitable, official multilingualism as a solution, broadly speaking, has so far generally been based on the application of two principles. The principles, known as “territoriality” and “personality”, refer to the way “language rights” are distributed. Recognising the linguistic diversity of groups incorporated into a new state, one solution applies the principles by naming a single official language for each geographic part within the state’s sovereign borders. As a result, this sort of state represents a case of official multilingualism comprised of unilingual regions. As for shared institutions, all of the languages have normally been accorded official status. Simplifying somewhat, a second solution has not distributed language rights by geography, but rather has recognised languages across the entirety of the state, giving citizens the right to choose which language to use when they interact with government bodies run under this principle. To date, however, both solutions have been applied in populations which are largely unilingual and normally have little mastery of one or other of the languages involved. One of the fundamental consequences of the two solutions has been their failure to force effective mass bilingualisation upon populations whose individual languages have official status.

This type of solution — following either the first or second approach — accounts for the peaceful coexistence of linguistically diverse groups in Switzerland,⁴⁷ Belgium, Finland and Canada, for example. Of course, that

47 In the Swiss case, commonly viewed as the most successful one in regulating the coexistence of different language groups in the same state, Kenneth McRae (1998b) points out nine highly interesting characteristics that help us to understand Switzerland’s enduring domestic peace. “First, in a formal sense there are no minority languages in Swiss constitutional law, only equal languages. This applies to official languages (French, German, Italian) and also to national languages (French, German, Italian, Romansh). In neither context — official usage or symbolism — does the law countenance the idea of subordination of one language to another. Second,

is not to say that there has not been — or will continue to be — conflict to varying degrees. In all of the cases, however, the recognised official languages enjoy the state's affirmation of equality, and official multilingualism is envisaged at the appropriate levels. For example, they all affirm language equality at the federal or central level. All of them also contemplate the official status of each language in territorial subnational institutions or envisage other solutions involving multiple official languages if the language groups are not clearly delimited by geography.

In general, given full and equitable official recognition, these situations present a low degree of genuine mass bilingualisation in the languages of other groups in the same state (unless, as in the case of Swedish speakers in Finland, the distribution is mixed and the demographic gap significant). Such a situation strongly guarantees the predominant use of each group's own language, because the states in question do not make use of a general

each national language has its historic territory. Most of the 23 cantons are officially unilingual, but four are plurilingual though still partitioned into language areas. Bilingual municipalities are rare, but a few can be found. When the long-standing unilingualism of isolated valleys was threatened by railway tunnels and improved roads, this ancient territoriality of natural origin was reinforced by policy measures to maintain it. Third, the cantons containing the two smaller language regions (speaking Italian and Romansh) receive extra federal funding for education and cultural support, again in order to defend Swiss cultural diversity. The broadcasting budget also tilts disproportionately in favor of the smaller groups. Fourth, Swiss political culture emphasizes proportionality in political representation, and this tendency applies to both political parties and languages. The results may be seen in the federal public service, the supreme court, and most prominently in the executive government itself. (...) Fifth, the Swiss political system has a long-standing suspicion of majoritarianism, preferring consensual decision-making where possible. When majority voting is used, it is often qualified. Thus constitutional referenda require a double majority to pass a majority of total votes cast and majorities in a majority of cantons. Sixth, the Swiss also practice decentralized federalism, especially in matters of language and culture. Jurists refer to the language sovereignty of the cantons, which means in effect that language policy is applied according to cantonal needs and priorities. There is an absence of symmetry here, which contrasts strangely with our Canadian fixation on symmetry even for asymmetrical situations. When asymmetry in Switzerland leads to friction, as it sometimes does, the remedy is not to press for a uniform formula but to step up dialogue across language boundaries in search of improved mutual comprehension. Seventh, Switzerland shows a refreshingly low level of conflicting or overlapping jurisdiction between Confederation and cantons. In many fields the federal government typically legislates but leaves execution to the cantons, which do so in their own ways. (...) Eighth, a firm tradition expects cantons to mind their own business and refrain from criticizing actions of other cantons. Private citizens tend to follow suit. While this rule came under severe strain during the protracted Jura conflict in Bern canton in the 1960s and 1970s, it survived and helped to bridge a dangerous chasm between French and German Switzerland. Ninth and last, the vast majority of Swiss citizens have no difficulty in reconciling simultaneous loyalties to the Confederation, their canton, and their home commune, even if they may rank these loyalties differently in different regions."

lingua franca, but rather function through the recognition of multiple official languages. As a result, the influence of government institutions can be much more “neutral”. At the same time, the fact that each group sees its language fully recognised by shared national bodies has a positive effect on each group’s self-image. Individual group identity is seen to be respected and valued.

Certainly, the most stable situations are the ones that have the highest concentration of a given language group in a specific territory. If political power is distributed to subnational bodies as well, then the situation also enables a group to enjoy far-reaching language autonomy and stability according to the language-rights principle of “territoriality”. In this way, subnational equality is achieved through the reciprocity of “unequal” treatment. If a German-speaking citizen, for example, moves from his territory of origin to a French-speaking area, he will have to adapt to the subnational and municipal institutions of his new home, and vice versa.⁴⁸ This structure has generated strong sociolinguistic results in terms of the continuity and stability of the community. At the same time, each community can also learn any other languages it wishes for whatever functions it believes suitable. Typically in most cases, however, wide-scale education in the other official languages is not very successful, because their usefulness is limited in practice and each community can receive all (or the vast majority of) services in its own language.

The negative effect that this situation may generate, which will be explored later in greater depth, is that there is a lack of any effectively devel-

48 In fact, in Switzerland — as in Canada too, in part — the principles differ by *distinct level* of government. At the canton level, the fundamental principle is “territoriality”: there is “cantonal sovereignty” on language policy and each canton can therefore choose its own official language, the language in which schooling is given there. “While compromises are made in practice, the cantons have no legal obligation to provide translations or deal with citizens in languages other than their own”. By contrast, at the federal level, the principle applied is “personality”. “According to the Constitution, in direct dealings between the citizen and the Confederation, and vice versa, the federal government must adapt to the language of the individual within the limits of the four national languages” (Schmid, 2001:140). In that regard, however, note should be taken that the citizen is not required to have dealings with the federal government very often. That is because matters of this sort are handled by the cantonal government on behalf of the federal government: “In addition to the subsidiarity principle, Switzerland applies a particular system called *federalism of execution*. According to this system, cantons are in charge of carrying out certain duties of the federal government. This usually applies for those duties which require direct contact with the local public. For example, the collection of *federal taxes* is administered by cantonal authorities, with the *same language regime* that prevails for *cantonal duties* — that is, monolingually” (Grin, 1998:4).

oped language of interrelation shared in common by the majority of citizens. This lack cannot exactly be seen as an element encouraging interaction among the various groups residing the same country. Shared official institutions may offer simultaneous translation services where needed, and the situation may lead political representatives to be bilingual in practice. The vast majority of citizens, however, may not have had the opportunity to gain adequate knowledge of the other code and that can hamper the ease with which people and organizations of different language groups communicate with one another.

It is precisely these types of situations, in which no specific language of interrelation is designated, that could enter into crisis in today's global era. The potential reach of human communication beyond the traditional boundaries of groups and states has grown enormously. Given that fact and as a consequence of it, the need is widening for a code that could enable mutual understanding between businesses, institutions and people of different language groups, and it is English that is taking on more and more of these functions. As a result, a kind of paradox may arise in which many people in these countries can know a "foreign" language to communicate internationally but does not have a common 'national' one to make mutual understanding within their own country's borders. Without policies and attitudes that genuinely promote the learning of the other group's language, this is clearly what will come to pass. Where such policies and attitudes have existed, the traditional balance may need to be reviewed so that one or more of the groups do not prioritise the learning of English over the other group's language, a problem that may already be occurring now, for example, in certain parts of German-speaking Switzerland.⁴⁹

The problem is appearing now to the extent that populations may be increasingly interested in knowing English for its potential use in communicating internationally. The growth in this interest can run counter to a

⁴⁹ For example, Grin (2001) notes the uproar caused by the "decision of the Zurich cantonal government to make English a compulsory school subject, while (modestly) reducing the number of hours allocated to the teaching of French in the Canton's public schools. True, this measure was suspended almost as soon as it was announced, because of the stern negative reactions that have poured in from various sides, including the Commission of Cantonal Public Education Directors (EDK/CDIP). This decision coincided with the publication of a survey where Swiss youth indicated a preference for English as a second language over national languages" (Grin, 2001).

historical commitment to learning of one or more of the other codes existing within the same state. In such cases, language policy in the educational system will be first flashpoint for conflict. In Switzerland, that is what could happen: “People living in plurilingual Switzerland may have greater need to acquire English and other non-Swiss languages than a second, a third or even a fourth of the traditional Swiss national languages. And where they need additional Swiss languages, their needs might be different from what has been arranged to satisfy these needs by the official language education program. French and Italian-speaking Swiss, for example, need courses in Swiss German, which they are denied. Italian-speaking Swiss have much greater needs for Standard German than for French; nevertheless, they have to take French before they are offered Standard German. And, although all the Swiss claim that they have greater needs for English than for any other language, they are offered courses in English only in second or third position, if at all” (Dürmüller, 1997). Grin offers a similar assessment, adding, “At the price of much simplification, it can be said that in the eyes of large segments of the population, national languages are losing relevance by comparison with English. This means that for many, it is considered enough to learn English as their first (and perhaps only) foreign language and to disregard the acquisition of another national language (normally, German in French-speaking Switzerland and French in German-speaking Switzerland). Several opinion polls do suggest a drift in this direction, which is abetted by the recent decisions of some cantonal authorities” (1998:6).

As globalization affects relationships and communication and, by consensus, English gains ground as the common code, the impact is most intensely felt precisely by those states which have not designated any supra-language for interrelation between groups but have rather been based on the official monolingualism of their various populations. This is so even where the schools have been promoters of learning the other groups’ languages. Just as in the Belgian case, therefore, Grin can state, “To be sure, many Swiss citizens consider that English could be the most efficient way to solve communication problems between distinct language communities, particularly the German-speaking group on one side, and the ‘Latin’ minorities on the other side” (1998:6). It is readily apparent that the change in the situation is not minor and that it could go so far as to affect the historical coexistence of Switzerland’s — or Belgian’s — language groups, based on mutual, equal respect. This is because “it implies

a de-legitimisation of Switzerland's national languages — or, more specifically, a de-legitimisation of the languages of *other* communities in the country. De-legitimisation of the language may be a forerunner of the de-legitimisation of the communities who speak these languages. This is serious enough as such; however, it seems to be associated with (and possibly accelerated by) an emerging socioeconomic rift which carries major risks” (Grin 1998:6).

The problem on the table is how to reorganise a system that, for many years, has worked on the basis of official language equality at the federal level, on the territoriality of language rights, and on an educational policy that backs mutual learning of the other “national”, official languages of Switzerland. In reality, the Swiss model, while it did not officially envisage a vehicular language or *lingua franca*, is now suffering from the decline of French as an international language. As long as French indisputably served a wide array of functions, significant segments of the German-speaking Swiss population sent their children to French-speaking cantons to learn the language. It had both a “local” and an international usefulness for them.⁵⁰ Now, however, that model is now longer useful. English has been taking over the vast majority of more far-reaching functions and, as a consequence, the perceived value of French is much lower now. Mastery of English has become the need now.

Internally, the other serious problem that Switzerland faces is that the German-speaking population — clearly the largest group —⁵¹ has never settled on creating a standard language based on their own spoken lan-

50 Clearly, countries that have no declared official interlingua, in practice, need polyglot or bilingual facilitators. As Laponce says, “In a multilingual society, the cost of multilingual communication is borne mostly by the individuals who have to learn and maintain extra languages. Rightly, the author [Grin] points to the importance of bilinguals who reduce the friction of language in economic, social, and political transactions. The role of these individuals as facilitators of communication is especially important in countries such as Switzerland and Belgium who have adopted the principle of unilingual territoriality to structure the coexistence of their language communities” (Laponce, 2004:207). In the Swiss case, to be precise, the communication bridge was provided more by German-speakers than by French-speakers. As Grin points out, “The problem has to do with the perception that speakers of French rarely achieve sufficient competence in German to interact easily with German-speakers, while the latter, which had the reputation of gaining, on average, respectable skills in French as a second language, no longer bother to do so” (1998:5).

51 Leaving aside the languages brought by immigrants to Switzerland, the nation, broadly speaking, is made up of 65% German-speakers, 20% French-speakers, 7.5% Italian-speakers and 0.5% Romansh-speakers.

guage. Instead, they have chosen to learn standard High German from Germany. With the addition of some local colouring, High German is the language that has been used for “institutional” and formal functions, giving rise to the widely-known Swiss diglossia. The paradox of the situation lies in the fact that non-German-speaking Swiss who do learn standard High German find it of limited use in actually speaking with German-speaking Swiss, because the German-speaking Swiss consistently use their own local varieties of spoken language. The structures of the local varieties are quite far removed from the standard one. At present, therefore, no solutions taking German as a national code for interaction would work either. The likelihood seems greater, therefore, that English could one day become the language of communication — if not *de jure*, then *de facto* — among the different groups in Switzerland.⁵²

While using English might appear to work from a practical standpoint — since the language would be used strictly for functions of interaction without attaching any symbolism to it — the identity issues could weigh heavily. The official adoption of such a measure may not be close at hand. The symbolic weight of languages can be quite substantial and the acceptance of a foreign language to perform “internal” functions in what has been viewed as a “multilingual nation” may raise resentments about identity that should not be underestimated. The element of “identification” and differentiation attached to languages is clearly at work here, and it may well become one of the primary impediments to decision-making that could otherwise seem perfectly sensible from the practical standpoint of communication. The greater the sense of national unity, the more difficult it will likely be to accept a code like English for “internal” functions of interaction. Such acceptance will be much easier for “external” bilateral or international functions. It is clear, as Davis says, that “these transitions [involving changes in the needs, purposes, and use of languages for economic growth and social stability] are often difficult to realize since language and social traditions are commonly perceived as central to national cohesion and individual identity” (1994:xix).

What will happen may all depend in the end on what social meanings come to be attached to English. If it comes to be viewed as a “neutral”

⁵² Knowledge of English is already quite widespread in Switzerland. It has been learnt in different degrees by two out of every three German-speakers, one out of every two French-speakers, and one out of every three Italian-speakers.

language, ultimately helping humans to understand one another, and not as a threatening language identified with a few specific countries, then it could gain acceptance. To the extent, however, that the ideological and symbolic aspects outweigh the practical and communicative ones, the process will be slowed. Suppose, for example, that instead of English the language that had been gaining in usage internationally were Esperanto. Then, how would the Swiss population react to the possibility of adopting Esperanto as an official language of interaction among its various groups? In all likelihood, the process would be seen as more “natural” and far less contentious on identity grounds, since Esperanto would not carry with it any baggage linking it to a specific human group. On the contrary, it would conjure up an idea of universal brotherhood. Clearly, matters of identity can assume a significant role in these kinds of processes and great care must be taken in dealing with them.

Thinking back to the case of India, English does seem able to continue playing a central role in general official functions and for internal communication. While the role arose initially for colonial purposes and later on because of identity issues, it is now based on the utilitarian value of English. The surrounding emotional and social meanings of languages can change through history and according to the socioeconomic interests groups and individuals. Similarly, on the international stage, English may come to be viewed as the language of modernity, of technological progress and even of universal “internationalism” and solidarity, as it is used in more and more forums and functions internationally. That could make it appealing to an increasing number of populations without, however, requiring them to repudiate the basic functions of their groups’ own language.

5.2 · Cases involving an official intercommunication language

The other overarching model for organising linguistic plurality would be to recognise an official state language, while simultaneously recognising the possibility of other official languages limited to the geographic areas in which each distinct language group lives, but with little — or no — recognition by the central institutions of the state. Spain and Italy are two examples, in which the operation of central institutions is clearly monolingual, although subnational or regional institutions are allowed to use the local language of the area involved without, however, denying to Spanish or Italian its status as official language in the given area as well.

The most significant effects of this model are, on the one hand, effective mass bilingualisation in the language of the state by practically all of the populations who speak other languages and, on the other hand, lack of respect for their identity, which may be felt by significant sectors of these populations at seeing their language not be given fully legitimate and official recognition in common state bodies. Here again, it is readily apparent that a clear distinction needs to be drawn between the dimensions of communication and identity. The approach may eradicate any problems of mutual comprehension because everyone has access to a shared language, but it may also raise the problem of inadequate recognition of identity. The latter phenomenon is much more likely to develop where the central government is monolingual than when there is effectively an equitable plurilingual situation.⁵³

In this model of linguistic policy and planning, the impact of the global era can run counter to the Swiss case. The systems of equitable, official multilingualism adopted by regional blocs — and the European Union is a clear example — recognise the official languages of their member states and that is a clear contradiction for any member states that do not apply similar principles in their own domestic structures. Seeing that other models are possible even at levels higher than the state with a much higher number of languages must, inescapably, raise questions about the internal organisation of such states. Without looking any farther afield, Spain finds itself facing this very incongruity: it officially called for the use — although very limited— of the other languages of Spain in specific EU institutions, but it has not yet resolved the matter of their recognition in its own state institutions. The Spanish case could be a situation whose evolution is of interest; it could give rise to a “third way” among models recognising plurilingualism. Generally, the states that have recognised multilingualism either have done so fully and equitably in common bodies, and without express language of intercommunication, or only one

53 Although this does not fall within the typology of a state with a single official language, Laponce’s citation on Quebec does illustrate the role of identity in these situations. Even in this case, “The Quebec separatist leaders are not unilingual French, they are typically fluent in English. When language motivates their resentment it is not for their inability to communicate, it is for their language being constantly reduced to second fiddle, or even worse: not being allowed in the orchestra” (2004:207). The best solution cannot lie in fully achieving the possibility of intercommunication but at the cost of non-recognition and, therefore, resentment on the part of other language groups. The optimal solution is to achieve *both* objectives.

such language has been recognised as official at the country level. With the latter solution, the issue of intercommunication was put to rest, but the other languages were given official status only in limited areas — as in the case of Spain.

In these cases, the failure to see a language recognised in official common institutions can often give rise to profound dissatisfaction on the part of its speakers, because the state's single official language generally predominates in the area of competences — the official language is the only one genuinely shared by everyone — and in the area of uses — it is overwhelmingly the language of product labelling and advertising, for example. It is also the language predominantly used in relations between the various regions of the country and in the general press, audiovisual media and new technologies. In situations like these, the likelihood is greater that “identities of resistance” may emerge, especially in situations in which the minoritized population feels a serious lack of recognition of its identity. This is because, as Castells points out, “insofar as they feel like orphans of the state as an instrument of representation and meaning, insofar as they cannot cling onto the state institutions as an element of construction of their lives, then they tend to reconstruct their meaning based on what they historically are. And it is here where we see identity appear and emerge (2010:94). Feeling that neither their language nor their identity is recognised by the state of which they form a part, they have to construct an “alternative identity” that is not the state's one. In fact, it is clear that the intensity of support felt for non-state identities may, in large part, be proportional to the degree of pressure exerted by homogeneous state-sponsored identities in opposition to cultural and national plurality. In other words, “the more the state accommodates the ethnic group, the less will its members press for change” (Jacob & Beer 1985:4).

A possible third way for such states would be to combine the official recognition of their other languages in common state institutions with the maintenance of one language — previously the single official one of the state — as a language of intercommunication among its various language groups. That is, it would blend the advantages of the Swiss, Belgian and Canadian models, which recognise all their languages at the federal or central state level, but it would keep a common language to address the probable inadequacy of the models that lack one. Obviously, the official recognition of language pluralism, bringing all the languages onto a level

playing field, would need to have effect on non-governmental functions like product advertising and labelling. Likewise, efforts would need to be made to ensure their equitable presence in the mass media. In this way, language groups which had not previously been recognised could feel that the state belonged to them as well and that they were being treated with the respect and dignity that they deserved, which should clearly raise their level of confidence in the state. At the same time, the advantages of sharing a mutual code of communication at the country level would not be forfeited. Rounding out these principles with far-reaching autonomy for each group in their own language policy and planning, the model could be quite adequate and stable for many situations in which there are historical minoritizations and intergroup tensions that are frustrating and futile.

In states with a language of intercommunication, their success in managing potential conflicts will always be better assured if they also grant official recognition to their other languages in central institutions than if they refuse to do so. A message that welcomes and embraces the diversity of a state's national and languages groups will also be of much greater assistance than a message of rejection and condemnation, which can clearly have an adverse effect on the groups that are not recognised and lead to tension and instability. The powerful symbolic value of a language must be kept ever-present. One of its fundamental functions lies in creating a group's sense of "identification", which is quite distinct from its role in communication. Even though mutual comprehension may be achieved, the situation cannot be satisfactory if there is inadequate symbolic and practical recognition at the official level common to all.

Needless to say, the potential for conflict can be even greater in states where no sort of official recognition is granted to the other languages present. If the group perceives unfair or unequal treatment — and if this carries over into other aspects as well — the dynamics can lead to serious conflicts, which can later be very difficult to resolve. Today, setting up systems that are entirely monolingual and offer the other languages no substantial role in the public sphere is clearly an option that is antiquated and perilous in the glocal era. The more accepted and more recognised that populations find themselves, the closer and more invested they will feel regarding their institutions and the majority group that controls them. Nevertheless, the outlook for minority language groups in the various states in which humankind is currently organised may continue to be

discouraging. As Kymlicka put it, “In the absence of accepted principles, these conflicts are often decided on the basis of brute power — that is, whether the majority has the power to subdue the aspirations of minority cultures, or whether the minority has the power to upset the status quo, and wring political concessions for itself. There is very little sense of what would be a just or fair solution to these conflicts” (1995:2).

6 · MANAGING THE (NEW) MIGRATIONS

6.1 · Increasing multiethnicity and social tensions

In addition to globalization occurring fundamentally because of technological and economic advances, a significant growth in migration has also taken place in recent years. A vast number of individuals have left their territories of origin for other more economically developed societies, seeking greater prosperity for themselves and for their families. According to the UN's Population Division, in 2010 there were an estimate of 213.9 million immigrants worldwide compared to 155.5 in 1990.⁵⁴ The majority of the immigrant population goes to developed countries, which currently receive 59.7% of the total as against 53% in 1990.⁵⁵

Obviously, given the linguistic diversity of the human race, such migratory phenomena lead to contact events in the majority of the places where they take place that then have significant effects on how immigrant populations and the receiving society develop. From the perspective of language and identity, what is new and perhaps most significant in recent years is the effect these movements have had — and are now having — on the receiving societies and the policies they are adopting to address the issue. In addition to the usual policies to welcome immigrants and facilitate their integration, other policies have begun to appear in defense of the receiving society's culture and identity, with stricter controls on immigration. At the same time, the new arrivals have begun to demonstrate a deeper sense of their own rights as people and of the dignity of their cultures, and this could speed up or slow down their adaptation in terms of language and identity within the receiving society.⁵⁶

The *growing multiethnicity of societies* — a fact which is different of the *multinationality of states* — is occurring in tandem with techno-economic globalization, but it is a (partially) independent phenomenon and it

⁵⁴ A recent example is provided by Spain, which currently has the highest growth in immigrant numbers anywhere in Europe. In 2010, the number had reached 6,378,000 persons, the 14.1% of the country's population (see United Nations, 2011).

⁵⁵ In 2010, the largest number of international migrants lived in Europe (70 million), followed by Asia (61 million) and Northern America (50 million). Currently, immigration is the largest source of population growth in developed countries, where birth rates are otherwise so low.

⁵⁶ See Wright, 2004.

is taking place at a different level of reality. While globalization broadens interactions “at the top”, migratory movements do so “at the bottom”. In terms of the immigration’s consequences for language and identity, that fact would explain, for example, why so many states (the “local” level) of the United States are adopting protective legislation in the face of non-English-speaking newcomers, even though English is the very language that is now hegemonic in global communication. A sense of vulnerability about language and identity seems to be spreading across the country, especially in places where Spanish-speaking immigrants live in the greatest numbers. As Schmid says, “A significant portion of the population has the perception that the linguistic hegemony of English in the United States is at an end and that many non-English speakers, encouraged by government policies, retain their native tongues” (2001:8). It is in this context that, by October 2012, twenty-eight states had passed laws declaring English as the only official language, because “in general, there has been a sense of vulnerability that has torn away at America’s sense of security and identity” (Schmid, 2001:8). An important contributory factor to the growing support for measures like these “is the perception that new immigrants are unwilling or unable to learn English as readily as earlier waves of immigrants”, much as “language battles in the 1980s and 1990s — like their counterparts in the 1900s — appealed to patriotism and unity, often casting language minorities into the role of outsiders who deliberately chose not to learn English” (Schmid, 2001:44).⁵⁷

Despite the perceived fear that immigrants are not assimilating, the existing data appear to confirm that the usual processes of bilingualisation and assimilation continue to be occurring to a significant extent in the United States. Reputable studies “certainly do not indicate that hispanophone immigrants resist the learning of English; in fact, the data indicate very rapid movement to English on the part of Spanish immigrants. (...) Even more important, approximately 70 percent of the youngest immigrants and 40 percent of those aged 10 to 14 (at the age of arrival) will make English their usual language” (Schmid, 2001:48). Certainly, however, the large-scale influx of new Spanish-speaking immigrants can lead to the perception that they are not becoming bilingual enough in English and that they

⁵⁷ The ‘English-only’ movement, which is the largest promoter of these sorts of legal measures, goes so far as to request that companies do not permit their employees to speak any languages other than English on their premises (Schmid, 2001:54).

frequently use their Spanish for intergroup communication, a phenomenon which is common in such circumstances. The problem generated by recent immigration, therefore, seems to stem from the scale of the influx and perhaps from the homogeneity of the immigrants' language origins. At the same time, fault may also lie with the receiving populations' lack of understanding of either the mechanisms and difficulties of bilingualisation among first-generation adults or the intergenerational characteristics of assimilation.

Whatever the case may be, the reaction in the United States is a clear example of how, even in a society viewed as hegemonic globally, local events can have a powerful effect on how language and identity are felt and played out in the public sphere. Their effect is often even more important than macro techno-economic events, which are perceived as more distant and less critical in daily life. In fact, the issue of language comes up in the vast majority of the debates and decisions about immigration now taking place, because there is a desire to ensure that immigrant populations learn the language of the receiving country. In the US case, not only have many states declared English to be their official language — a matter left unresolved by the US constitution because it was considered self-evident — but also the Senate has taken action. In the course of debating legislation on immigration, an amendment was approved on May 18, 2006 declaring English to be the 'national' language. Another amendment was passed deeming it to be the "common unifying language" of the United States.⁵⁸ Similarly, the legislation envisages the creation of a path for undocumented workers to obtain citizenship that would require them expressly to declare their agreement to learning English.⁵⁹ The political movements of this sort in the US are not the only ones in the English-speaking world either. In the United Kingdom, the same aim of ensuring that immigrants learn the language of the receiving society is receiving explicit support.

Reactions of this kind are not only occurring in countries that have English as their official and historical language. France offers a similar example. French president Sarkozy proposed new legislation as Minister

⁵⁸ However, the bill did not pass the United States House of Representatives. As New York Times editorial says in August 9, 2012, "bills that seek to make English the official language of the United States never go anywhere, but there's at least one proposed in every Congressional session, invariably put forth by Republicans to appeal to nostalgia for a mythical past" (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/10/opinion/representative-kings-english-only-bill.html?_r=0).

⁵⁹ *National Post* (Toronto), 2-5-2006, p. A11.

of the Interior that would oblige immigrants to learn French.⁶⁰ In the Netherlands, where immigrants accounted for 11,1% of the population in 2010, state legislation encourages them to learn and use Dutch.⁶¹ Also the Rotterdam city government approved a law that runs along these lines. Although it does not envisage legal sanctions, it does require that residents speak only Dutch in the schools, at work and on the street in order to boost use of the language by Turkish and Moroccan immigrants.⁶² Likewise, in Germany, measures have been taken to ban speaking languages other than German on the premises of a number of education institutions in Berlin. The objective is to encourage fuller, deeper learning of the language by students of immigrant origin where they are in the majority.⁶³ Clearly, concern is widespread over immigrants' knowledge and use of languages, and the focus is on achieving their bilingualisation in the language of the receiving society.

What lies behind this concern is not, in all likelihood, limited strictly to aspects of language and communication. Clearly, identity would also seem to play a role. When the scale of immigration is greater, some sectors in the receiving societies can experience tensions because their daily lives now involve people from other cultures and languages in settings where they had only considered their own "nation" legitimate and their own cultural norms of behaviour appropriate. Awareness of identity comes to the forefront in such situations and people begin mobilising to safeguard what defines that identity, in much the same way that historical minorities do when they are subordinated within countries dominated by another language group. Paradoxically then, as has been said, the United States, the home of the most populous country of Anglo-Saxon culture, has also come to experience these tensions, giving rising there to a "deeper debate over the meaning of American identity and the means of preserving it". Clearly, for a large number of people in the US, "there is the belief that national iden-

⁶⁰ *National Post* (Toronto), 2-5-2006, p. A11.

⁶¹ Since 2007 an immigration law obliges people entering the Netherlands to integrate into Dutch society. After a period of three-and-a-half years (five years for some), they must have passed an exam measuring their level of integration. It consists of two parts, a Dutch language exam and a test of knowledge of Dutch society (*Wikipedia*, October 23, 2012).

⁶² All these changes were promoted by Dutch immigration minister Rita Verdonk because by doing so, according to her, "in such a code, you tell people what's expected of them and hope that they will live by it" (see http://www.workpermit.com/news/2006_02_09/europe/immigrants_speak_dutch.htm).

⁶³ *ZDFheute.de*, 24.01.2006.

tity and speaking accentless English are intertwined” (Schmid, 2001:75). Clearly, language and identity are interrelated again.

Evidently, groups of humans, even those best placed to control the near-entirety of political and economic institutions, can eventually feel that the preservation of their language behaviour and (self-) image as a collective is under fire. They do not reject the inclusion of other individuals. Rather, they tend to call for “full inclusion”, demanding assimilation to the culture, language and way of life of the receiving society, and it would appear that all receiving societies, at root, desire such. Undoubtedly, if groups were asked how they would optimally like to live, most would not state a preference that a large number of outsiders should arrive, from other language groups, and make a home in their country without learning the language of the people already living there, choosing instead to speak only the language of their origin. Multiculturalism is making headway, but with respect to the culture of immigrant groups, it is widely clear that newcomers are at least expected to adapt on the language front, trying to acquire the receiving society’s code and use it as the usual language of interaction in public spaces and in intergroup relations. A clear example of this is offered by Canada, which is usually cited as representing a respectful, multicultural approach to the immigrant phenomenon. In Canada, everyone is expected to learn and use English or French in public spaces, depending on which part of Canada, because they are the receiving country’s languages. Any room for debate lies in the extent to which an immigrant language of origin is maintained and developed within the group and not at all in immigrants’ effective bilingualisation or in the receiving society’s general social use of their own language.

In practice, however, it is clear that the level of bilingualisation that immigrants can achieve depends largely on their age at the time of immigration and on the social context in which they find themselves in the new society. If individuals are fairly young and have frequent contact with people who habitually speak the receiving society’s language, they will develop the needed language competence. In all likelihood, they will also tend to use the new language to communicate with people who are not of the same origin. If, on the other hand, individuals are older, have little contact with people who use the common code of the receiving society, and have little opportunity or make no specific effort to learn it in the appropriate institutions, they will tend to exhibit a lower level of bilingualisation. As a consequence, they will also have greater difficulties getting ahead

socioeconomically. Quite often, however many legal provisions governments may adopt, the above factors are, in practice, what ultimately determines the language behaviour of individuals, especially for the first generation. As for their children born in the new country, it is more likely that, given adequate social and educational contexts, they can adequately develop the needed language competences. They can do so to a practically native level, without facing too severe a problem from being raised in their family in another language.

The large numbers of immigrants and their residential concentration in specific parts of cities, however, does reduce their chances to have contact with people in the receiving society. The spontaneous development of language competence can be diminished, which would otherwise occur from common interactions in daily life. This happens much less in the second generation, however, because the biocognitive predispositions to learn the other language are much higher and because obligatory attendance in the official educational system enables language competences to be developed, although more formal and written language may be given greater attention than informal oral expression. In some schools where there is a large concentration of students who are linguistically homogeneous, the informal language of use can often be their parents' language of origin, because it will tend for them to be the first language they have in common. If, on the other hand, the students' origins are mixed, then the receiving society's language can serve as the intergroup language informally as well, and it will become the usual language of interaction between the various groups.

6.2 · Major languages, immigrant adaptation and the reformulation of identities

New to today's glocal era perhaps is the possible use of the major languages in place of the receiving group's language where new contacts occur as a result of immigration. As societies become more polyglot and gain knowledge of languages other than their own, one of these codes could be used for communication between members of a receiving society and newcomers, if the newcomers also know it. This is what, for example, often occurs in Quebec, despite the fact the French has also been a major language of international communication. The cause lies in English frequently being the language used by various immigrant groups, particularly in the first generation, to

communicate with the receiving society.⁶⁴ Similarly, in Luxembourg, French is the language most in use for communication between immigrants of Portuguese origin and the native population, and this state of events has given rise to educational reforms that aim to ensure that at least the second generation is better able to use Luxembourgish fully in daily life. A similar situation has existed and continues to exist in Catalonia, where Spanish has performed and largely still performs the function of communicating between the immigrant and native populations. Clearly, populations try to satisfy their communication needs using the tools they have at hand, attempting to make use of the most effective language approach available to them to achieve mutual understanding with other individuals they encounter in their new setting. Should such individuals have language competences that newly arrived immigrants also possess, then these competences can be used for intergroup communication over what is likely to be long periods of time in the case of first-generation immigrants.

Situations of this sort can result in a somewhat paradoxical fact. A language that serves, at first, merely as a quick and easy way to interact can later become, on grounds of identity, a source of resentment towards the immigrants on the part of the receiving population, especially in cases where immigrants are numerous. Given that language acts not only as a code for communication but is also bound up with identity, key sectors of a receiving population can become alarmed over the long run as they see newcomers settling permanently in their country, who fail to adopt the language and continue to use the foreign language that enabled communication when they arrived. Receiving populations will probably be more willing to accept speaking a foreign language in their own country with visitors and recent newcomers. However, they will not look positively on a situation in which newcomers, even after some time has passed, make no effort to acquire or use the native language, at least in intergroup interactions. This is especially true where immigrant numbers are high. From my perspective, where such behaviour is widespread, the chance exists that conflict will increase.

In that case, the way in which techno-economic globalization drives more and more populations to learn English — or other major languages

⁶⁴ Within the second generation, however, the matter changes for immigrants. They have had the chance to learn the receiving country's language — French, in this case. Quebec's laws ban immigrants from sending their children to English-speaking schools (see McAndrew, 2001 and 2010).

— can eventually have an influence at the local level. It can at least partially act to break down the classic processes by which immigrants become bilingual, learning the language of the receiving society. As such and without necessarily being a consciously sought outcome, the spread of English, for instance, through schools and workplaces could ultimately affect the uses of language communities through their contacts with immigrants, especially where immigrant numbers are high. In fact, in the Catalan-speaking area, this dynamic occurs often, making in this case Spanish not only the language used between groups who share it as a first language, but often and extensively the language of intergroup communication with the native population as well. The result is that the native population is forced by the situation to use Spanish even for local functions that should correspond, in a normal way, to the language of the receiving community.

In this fashion, immigration can have a potentially detrimental effect from the standpoint of language and identity, especially in societies that are not very large demographically and speak languages that are not widespread. It is precisely these societies that can, by virtue of having languages of limited reach, present more intense polyglotism. The situation can be maintained over the long run, if polyglotism rests on a clear distribution of functions between the local and other languages, if there are clear and exclusive functions for the local language and, above all, if the local language serves as the common code for daily social interactions with the native population. This is clearly witnessed by, for example, the diglossia of Swiss German and the polyglotism of the Dutch. If, however, such societies receive newcomers in very high numbers and, especially, if they come from the same place of origin and speak any of the major languages that may also have been learnt by the receiving population, then the situation could evolve uncertainly for the receiving population's language. It could lose social and intergroup functions and that could spark unease about identity, as seen even in the United States. Even accepting a transition period in which the use of a language of intercommunication enabled fluid interaction between natives and immigrants in these cases, everything points to less conflict where immigrants gradually adapt so that they can *additionally* use the receiving society's code and make full social use of it.

Nevertheless, receiving populations will also have to undergo an *adaptation of identity*, changing their conception from one of a uniform culture to a diverse culture, made up of people from various places of origin, who are fully accepted and socioeconomically integrated. In addition to a shared

civic identity as citizens with equal rights and responsibilities, there could be distinct group sub-identities, based on individual cultural origins, which are fully respected and accepted by all. Under such a framework, each subgroup would then be able to maintain or abandon cultural traits and specific languages as part of a usually lengthy, dynamic process of inter-generational adaptation.

In fact, such a reformulation of identity appears to represent the path followed by, for example, societies like Canada — both in its English-speaking and in its French-speaking areas. They have reviewed their prior, rather assimilationist policies and opted instead for seeing “the varied origins of their immigrants as a potential resource, and the maintenance of the linguistic and cultural traditions as an opportunity rather than a threat” (Wright 2004:10). They have done so, however, without setting aside the need to prioritise bilingualisation in the receiving society’s languages. This overall approach recognises the cultural diversity of people who have immigrated to the receiving society and it encourages respect for them and for the safeguarding of their cultures, while, as a corollary, expecting them to adapt to a common civic identity, accept the culture and language, and adhere to the general norms of peaceful coexistence.⁶⁵

The above approach is probably the most adequate for the glocal era, showing the greatest respect for language difference, while also driving the adoption of receiving societies’ languages as a common vehicle of interaction and of shared civic and political identity. Contact through immigration is set to rise in light of the differences of development evident across the planet. Greater identity issues could also spring up, both among receiving and immigrant populations. As a result, the most adequate solution appears to be devising some clear, flexible principles for adaptation and mutual respect.⁶⁶ In addition, the worldwide opening-up of markets makes it even more worthwhile now for receiving countries to have access to an additional resource of people who could serve as a bridge between the various language groups on the planet and energise both economic and cultural relations.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Account should be taken, however, that in Canada the vast majority of immigrants are legal and pre-selected and that selection already takes their language competences into account (see Bastardas, 2002).

⁶⁶ See Bastardas, 2005.

⁶⁷ Nevertheless, many immigrants, once they have firmly decided to take up residence in a new country, may see no importance in maintaining and transmitting their way of speaking to their children, because they may view it as “dialectal” or popular, lacking in social meanings that are

The rise of immigration and the ever-increasing numbers of people of different languages and cultures coming together cause real organizational problems and complicate the traditional structures. Accommodating different customs and religions in societies unused to such differences, for example, or teaching a receiving society's language to adults and children who come in the middle of the school year are problems that will not be easily resolved. Time will be needed to address them. In fact, the new situations will demand new theoretical and conceptual frameworks different from the classic ones. New psychosocial research will be required to enable the various processes to be followed up with due care and to devise policies that are socially more effective and more harmonious. As Barreto warned (1995), in the final analysis, it may be easier to legislate pluralism and avert tensions, if so desired, where contact is "vertical" — i.e., as a consequence of forming part of the same state — than where contact is "horizontal" — i.e., because of immigration or face-to-face in linguistically diversified states.

either prestigious or valuable (e.g. Italian speakers in Toronto). By contrast, they may place much greater importance on knowing the receiving society's language, because it will make work and social integration possible. They can be keenly aware of this need for their children, creating the tendency for some parents, where possible, to speak the new language to their children themselves. For others, questions of identity may hold greater weight, as may their own sense as a cultural group, and they may place importance on speaking their language of origin with their children, even though they now live in another country. This is especially likely if both parents are of the same origin. In other cases, even though they do not keep up the language with their children, parents may feel it is worthwhile for their children to learn the language. They may then make efforts so that their children can study their language of origin, even though it may be in a formal setting. Sending them to spend time in their country of origin is also possible in order to prevent loss of that group identity. The most common case, however, is that the third generation has already completely abandoned the language of its ancestors. In fact, until now, education authorities in many countries have not helped very much, but have rather discouraged maintaining the language of origin. For example, as Schmid points out, "Unfortunately, education in the United States strongly encourages immigrant children to lose their fluency in the languages they speak at home. This policy is in agreement with nativist ideals and organizations such as U.S. English (...), but is at odds with the interests of individuals and a global economy" (2001:49).

7 · DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

7.1 · On identities and languages

7.1.1 · *'Identity' vs. 'language'*

One conclusion that can be firmly drawn from this study is that, despite the inter-relationships which may bind the two, 'identities' and 'languages' are not the same thing, and nor do they belong to the same order of things. Languages may exist in the absence of a strong sense of identity, and there may be identities that have nothing to do with language. If a group of humans has no contact with other individuals from different groups, that group's collective self-representation will not be based on the contrast with other groups with different traits, but rather, where appropriate, on a contrast with other elements of the surrounding environment. Thus, such people may be unaware of how they speak as this will be a totally spontaneous and habitual phenomenon, like breathing, something that requires no conscious attention. In the event of contact it may also be that the basic trait which the groups believe distinguishes them from one another is not language, which they may or may not share, but rather religious beliefs or skin colour or political structures. Therefore, 'language' and 'identity' are not necessarily linked phenomena.

Furthermore, identity is not always equivalent to a simple attribution that serves to classify individuals. If there is contact we may 'know' that we belong to the group of 'X' and that others belong to that of 'Y' but without this being accompanied by an emotional response in either party, or without it giving reason to feel separate and profoundly different; likewise, there may not be aspects that, when making the comparison, cause us to feel ashamed or which provide a motive to organise ourselves socially in opposition to one another. 'Identity-building' (and it is indeed something under construction) occurs in specific circumstances that may lead one or both of the groups in contact to develop a strong awareness of the other, this being produced by a sensation — whether real or imagined — of conflict or strong difference between the two. In such situations, this self-awareness may be transformed into a positive or negative self-image with respect to the other group, and this can lead one of the parties to take a course of action based — according to the circumstances — on adaptive

submission or active resistance. In the former case a 'negative' self-image will have emerged and this will favour a situation in which the behaviour of the other group is followed. In the latter case, the 'positive' self-image will lead this group's members to resist and generate conflict with the other group. There may also be situations characterised by the adoption of an intermediate position between these two extremes.

The situations in which we consciously tend to link the two terms 'language-and-identity' are generally those that correspond to the latter of the abovementioned forms, namely a context of resistance and, therefore, of tension with respect to the other or other groups with which there is contact. In these cases, and for whatever reason, a clear process of identity-building has occurred in one of the groups, which constructs a definition of itself in which the conflict with the other group moves centre-stage, and where the linguistic differences between one group and another play a key role or take on some other symbolic value. In certain situations the simple use of one language or another, corresponding to one or the other group, may become highly significant in social terms, that is to say, this usage is interpreted not only in terms of 'what is said' but also 'how' it is said, in which language, and this may have repercussions as regards what is felt toward the other person: friendliness or dislike, proximity or social distance, etc.

Needless to say, the very fact of linguistic diversity among the human species readily facilitates these types of situation in which linguistic identity-building is produced. This is particularly the case in situations involving minoritized groups, whether of a political or demographic nature, and where one human group may feel threatened or unfairly treated by another within their own specific territory. However, as we have seen, the same may also occur in the case of majority groups, who may feel less safe than before as a result of widespread immigration, leading them to increasing self-awareness as regards their identity and language.

Nevertheless, although the idea of identity-building has clear repercussions on the level of individual awareness and with respect to certain actions, it should be noted that its influence in the linguistic domain is less automatic, a fact that also indicates the need for a distinction to be made. As Joseph says, "knowing who one is belongs to the realm not of communication, but representation" (2004:91). In everyday 'linguaging' (a term which reveals the 'dynamic' nature of the process), individuals-with-linguistic-identity may not manage to transmit their group ideas co-

herently, and may behave linguistically in ways that do not reflect them, as these behaviours are often subconscious and have become routine. The distinction is also illustrated by the fact that some people may be competent in a given communicative form but not wish to use it; alternatively, people with ideas of identity might favour the use of a given language but fail to do so because they lack the necessary competence. Clearly, therefore, identity-building belongs to the realm of awareness and representations of reality, whereas language belongs to the domain of basic cognitive skills and social action; of course, as we have seen, this does not mean that connections between the two cannot be established in either direction.

7.1.2 · *Language-and-identity*

Having distinguished between the terms and the phenomena it should now be noted that it is increasingly common to find the two elements united in a single discourse, one in which they appear as an increasingly common syntagm. In the past this was commonplace in the context of minoritized groups or migration, usually within the most subordinate group, but nowadays it is also appearing in the discourse of majority groups or those in a position of superiority. This is clearly a result of the greater contact between human groups produced by technological and economic globalization, a process which is extending the traditional areas of inter-relationship not only to a continental but also to a planetary level. As a consequence, groups that previously would not have recognised and/or would have given short shrift to the claims of sub-groups within their nation state over language and identity now, for example, find themselves obliged to take on board these discourses, since the new situation in which they find themselves can begin to seem unsettling in this regard. Thus, the ‘defence’ of language and identity has entered international debate as never before, particularly as regards the spread of English as the language of global relations, but also with respect to the new political and economic unions that cross individual state borders.

The new ‘fears over identity’ aroused through globalization, and their association with language, rest fundamentally on the dual social function of language, namely communication and identification (or identity-building). Although language clearly serves as a vehicle for communication, in other words, for *inter-signification*, it also provides key elements of *socio-*

signification.⁶⁸ For we do not only mutually suggest meaning to each other to those aspects of reality that we refer to mentally but also, and more precisely, it happens that the visible difference between the codes used by humans serves as a potential vehicle of emotions through which we become identified with a given group. Thus, it is far from easy for a human group to consider relinquishing its linguistic code, since this implies not only ceasing to use a given language but also letting go of one of the basic aspects around which its identity as a group is structured, and this has important emotional repercussions on the personal level.

If a human group finds itself collectively in a situation in which it is forced to give up its language it is likely that a sizeable proportion of that group will wish to resist and seek ways to prevent this from happening, despite the fact that the slow nature of such processes means that by the time awareness is raised it is often too late to stem the tide.⁶⁹ Whatever the case, if a sense of insecurity and threat develops to an as-yet non-advanced extent, human groups will tend to be dissatisfied with this situation and a period of conflict may be ushered in with respect to the other group or groups, who may refuse to introduce the necessary changes.

However, at this point in history there is a need to consider the unnecessary conflict that could arise if these ‘fears over identity’ become widespread in the global age. From a glocal perspective, and with a more measured viewpoint, it must be said that these fears are often unfounded and are due to the inherent ignorance of these processes, or even to the demonisation of personal bi— or multilingualism. Many people who are used to monolingualism and a unitary identity may now look warily at the changes being ushered in by globalization. There is a need, therefore, to develop adequate political strategies that enable individuals to understand how processes of bilingualisation work, and to identify whether or not they might lead to the abandonment of a language, the aim being to calm their anxieties in the face of increasing contact between different languages. Like-

⁶⁸ Cf. Bastardas, 2004.

⁶⁹ This is the case of many groups of American Indians who are now striving to recover their language: “Someone could say you’re not a people any more because you don’t have a language. I don’t want to hear that in my lifetime”, points out, for example, Amos Key Jr., director of the First Nations Language Department of the Woodland Cultural Centre, near to Brantford, Ontario. According to the 2001 census only 24% of people descended from Aboriginal groups of Canada are able to converse in the original language of their group (Cf. “Vanishing words”, *Canada World View* 23 (2004), pp. 14-15).

wise, it is necessary to help people assimilate images of identity in which the latter is plural in nature rather than something set in stone, images that can bring together without undue difficulty the different levels of relationship and communication in which human beings increasingly find themselves. People may be polyglots and maintain without conflict their own language as the habitual and core tongue in their collective identification, while at the same time making use of others as accessories.

On an international level, and given that generalised contact is most likely irreversible, ensuring that these new perspectives take root will entail finding ways of enabling all parties involved to adapt to the new situation, setting out a series of general principles that allow them to live peacefully and in respectful harmony alongside one another. Efforts are also required in terms of modifying the traditional views held by each human group, and these groups will have to take an open-minded view of the diversity of languages and identities, as well as imagining themselves as an internally diverse group rather than as separate and distinct units in conflict and rivalry with one another. As Fettes says, there is a need for imagination in helping human beings see themselves “as members of a ‘world polity’ which includes all states and all people within its horizon of significance. (...) World-centric thought and belief is quite diverse (...) [b]ut it does seem to offer an opening for new forms of thought and action as well” (2003:50).

There will also be a need to learn from history so as not to repeat the same mistakes on what is now a much larger scale. If we compare different examples it is clearly possible to achieve a degree of enduring peace with respect to language and identity provided that political and linguistic organization is carried out in a mutually respectful way that prioritises equality and justice. In contrast, forms of coexistence in which there is no official or public recognition of the language and identity of different human groups leads to discontent among them and can generate potentially long-lasting conflict, which sadly may also become violent. Although its value may not be understood by non-minority groups, ‘identity capital’ can be of enormous symbolic importance to large numbers of people who, as a cultural group, find themselves without their own space and in a position of subordination.

One of the key aspects in need of change is the tendency to view these issues from the perspective of classical logic, one that does not allow the simultaneous existence of apparent opposites; instead, a more ‘oriental’ point of view is required, one that can go beyond simple dichotomies and

give free rein to more complex thought.⁷⁰ It is no longer viable to argue that if there is an identity ‘X’ then there cannot *also* be an identity ‘Y’. For identities are not physical but rather *emo-cognitive* elements which, as such, can coexist and blend with one another in space and within individuals. Although languages are more complex phenomena they too, when well developed and distributed, can exist alongside one another in space and within people, and thus the diversity that humanity has created across the evolution of our species can come to be organised in a peaceful and harmonious way. Identities and languages are, therefore, as much ‘essences’ as they are ‘existences’. And to avoid conflict as far as possible and achieve a new equilibrium there is, as Edgar Morin would say, an urgent need “for us to take possession of the ideas that possess us” (1991).

7.2 · On globalization and its effects on language and identity

7.2.1 · Globalization and English

Advances in communications technology and transport, as well as world-wide free-trade measures and the emergence of large, transnational media and financial conglomerations have all fostered an enormous expansion of the classical geoeconomic areas. The traditional nation-state markets now stretch across the planet, the telephone has been overtaken by worldwide online communication in real time via the internet, a small number of TV channels have given way to the possibility of tuning into large numbers of private channels from all over the world, and news of what was happening on a national scale has now been replaced by live coverage of conflicts and events taking place thousands of kilometres away, etc. Similarly, people have shifted their attention from the local — or at most the nation-state — level to the continental and global stage. This extraordinary expansion of the areas of relationship and communication has generated the practical problem of communication between members of a linguistically-diverse species, a problem that remains unresolved despite the early attempts of Esperanto and other constructed systems.

Although French was, for two centuries, the language of inter-communication between diplomats and the economic, scientific and artistic elite, and despite the fact that other languages such as Spanish had also

⁷⁰ Cf. Nisbett, 2003.

crossed the oceans, the general consensus seems to be that English should be given the role of global *lingua franca*. As mentioned earlier, English is now the language of most worldwide communication, it is taught as the first foreign language in the majority of countries, and it is continually in demand by those companies wishing to compete on the international stage.

It would seem, therefore, that for the time being a certain *de facto* agreement has been reached about the language which will, over the coming decades, increasingly take the role of the language that the majority of people use to communicate with those from other linguistic regions, and through the sharing of which they will be able to understand one another.

Although English has often been associated with US imperialism, and previously with that of the United Kingdom, this does not appear to be hindering its expansion. For increasing numbers of people, English is an instrumental language that does not necessarily require the speaker to identify with any of the countries where it is habitually spoken, and in some situations it is regarded precisely as ‘neutral’ and ideal for fulfilling roles that, were they assigned to another language, could lead to important conflict.

Of course, many people and groups fear a significant break-up in the traditional linguistic order of human society, and this is especially felt among the other major languages which until now have also been used for communication between groups and countries, whether these be distant or close neighbours. As we have seen, organizations of French and Spanish speakers have mobilised themselves and are attempting to mount a strong defence of their traditional areas of inter-communication. In fact, the most significant effects of this spread of English as a global language of communication are that it has come to fill many of the new niches created by new technologies (Internet, DVDs, etc.), and also that it is now used in international political and scientific relations; as regards the latter, the increasing linguistic competence of participants in these areas has led to a gradual reduction in the number of translators and interpreters required, although this remains far from being a widespread phenomenon. What we are dealing with, then, is more a project than a reality.

It is true, however, that the very possibility of a global language, one that is shared by everybody across the planet, is driving more and more people — who don’t really need it at present — to learn English and/or at least be convinced that their children should do so. As John Edwards says, “the desire, for instance, for mobility and modernisation is, with some few

notable exceptions, a global phenomenon” (2003:38). So if one also considers how it is increasingly used in international events, or how it is more than ever a prerequisite for certain jobs, then it is possible to understand people’s growing interest in English and the resulting pressure they exert on the educational systems of their respective countries. However, the level of working knowledge of English varies greatly between countries, and depends on a country’s history, its geostrategic position and the degree to which its people have been exposed to the language. The level of English — at least in terms of comprehension — is not the same among people from a country that only shows subtitled rather than dubbed films, just as there is a difference between people whose own language is more closely related structurally to English and those whose mother tongue is quite differently organised. Thus, each country needs to assess its own situation and decide what measures are required if it is not to get left behind or out of the race for global communication. The time has come, therefore, for technical decisions to be made about when and to what extent English should be introduced into educational systems, and in this regard there is also an urgent need to train teachers capable of instilling in their pupils a practical knowledge of the language.

The more catastrophic voices raised as regards the negative effects that the adoption of English as a language of intercommunication could have on other world languages have been gradually replaced by other more measured views that do not see, at least at present, a danger of this kind, since bilingualisation in English is only now taking off and it is most unlikely that world populations would give up their own language and embrace English exclusively. As Mufwene points out, “the vitality of French in France and in Quebec is not negatively affected by the acquisition of English as a second language by French citizens and by French Québécois. It is also debatable whether even the fact that English is used as a medium in higher education in Holland and Denmark is endangering Dutch and Danish. Though it is true that one can visit these countries without feeling the pressure to learn to say hello in the local vernacular, it is not clear that the more important role that English plays in their higher education will produce results more adverse to indigenous languages (Dutch and Danish)” (2005:34).

For English as a global language to pose a real threat to the cultural ecosystems of other languages there would need to be a massive and full-scale bilingualisation by a large majority of a given population, and these

people would have to give up their identity and use English to communicate in everyday life, even with others who share their mother tongue. But as we know, for this to happen would require either the emergence of a highly negative view among this group of people or a large-scale encounter with others with whom it was necessary to speak English in everyday social life; although they cannot be completely ruled out neither of these scenarios seems very likely to occur. At present, as Joseph says, “there is no indication that national and ethnic identities will cease to matter; no reported cases of people renouncing their mother tongue in favour of English, other than among third-generation immigrants to English-speaking countries, which has always been the case and occurs in reverse as well” (2004:190-91). As has already been said, the continuity of the majority of languages may be affected less by English than by the other major languages that are spreading across regional areas, even though the latter are less dominant on a global level.

Nonetheless, and especially given that the process has so far been conducted without any public debate or explicit political decision-making on the part of world organizations, it would be advisable to set up some kind of common body that could oversee the linguistic organization of human societies, and thus begin to outline a model that could adequately combine the sustainability of the different languages with the inter-comprehension required by the species.

Perhaps one area to which close attention should be paid, at least in the immediate future, concerns the social distribution of competence in English, since, once it has become a clear example of cultural capital with economic repercussions, the language skills which people possess could prove to be a factor that marks their social status, especially in those societies where the spread of English has yet to be consolidated and where the differences between social strata remain marked. If public authorities wish to make a genuine commitment to globalization and shared understanding among human societies then they cannot sit back but must take whatever measures are necessary to facilitate this global language.

Having reached this point we will find ourselves facing new problems that must be resolved, problems that are linked to the ones set out in the previous paragraph. Will all countries be able to bear the significant costs of providing the staff needed for this large-scale teaching of English (in addition to other subjects on the curriculum)? Is it really necessary that everybody has a high level of this language? Or should the emphasis be on

teaching, for example, a general, basic level and, at the same time, ensuring that those professions that require English for international communication achieve a practical and efficient command of the language? And at what educational level should this be done? What can be done to ensure that none of this leads to social discrimination? It is clear, then, that once the necessary geostrategic decisions have been made as regards the economic policy of each country, the respective educational authorities have their work cut out in terms of setting in motion the process through which English-language skills will be disseminated, and of making sure they develop adequate structures for doing so.

It needs to be said, however, that this project aimed at achieving a global language of communication should be carried out in such a way that the appropriate levels of communication for each language are properly defined. Clearly, English could take on the functions of the global order, in other words, the inter-national level, and thus facilitate communication between individuals or groups who would not otherwise understand one another. However, it should not take on the functions corresponding to other orders, for example, those of the continental, supra-state or nation-state levels, unless explicitly invited to do so. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that a long period of transition will be necessary and provision will need to be made to ensure that nobody ends up being unduly discriminated against. Thus, each level must have the freedom to choose its own linguistic organization, one which should be clearly based on the principles of mutual respect and the distribution of functions, this being the only way of building a worldwide system of language communication that, at the same time, enables linguistic sustainability and intercommunication among human societies.

7.2.2 · Globalization and the other major languages

As was also pointed out earlier many of the same factors that have led English to become a global language are also affecting the status of other major world languages, which now find themselves in a position to increase their usage and, above all, to finalise processes of ‘internal’ expansion that had begun with previous colonisations. Perhaps the most obvious example in this regard is Spanish, which, through its presence on both sides of the Atlantic due to what has been called the ‘first globalization’, now has the technological and economic resources needed not only to become

the language of a large geographical area, with a corresponding media and publishing capacity, but also to consolidate the processes of bilingualisation and language shift already underway among pre-Columbian Amerindian populations. Moreover, the current situation is fostered by the migratory movements of large numbers of Spanish-speaking people to the United States, this being a group with an important impact on the media and the capacity to organise themselves linguistically, at least among the first generation of migrants; thus, Spanish now has the potential to become an enormous area of communication and a serious contender as an international language, even if English will remain inescapably present in the field of science and the upper echelons of politics and finance.

Nowadays, Spanish is a language with great potential in terms of emission and is already spoken by enormous numbers of people, a feature that could expand still further if the economic development and political stability of Latin America are consolidated. Although, unlike English, it has fewer opportunities to spread throughout Europe the former Spanish colonies offer it an immense foundation on which to develop and play a key role on the international stage. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that it is proving to be such a fascinating and appealing prospect among the two American giants, the USA and Brazil, who are witnessing a growing demand for Spanish as a foreign language. In fact, and as we have seen, the use of Spanish in the USA has — mainly as a result of migrations but also due to the spread of Spanish-language radio and televisions — led to active movements in favour of the legal implantation of English as the official language, a measure that until recently had not been adopted *de jure* in many states.

We also saw earlier how French-speaking countries, or those with an international tradition of being French speaking, have sought to organise themselves and consolidate the international status of French, even through potential alliances with Spanish and Portuguese. It remains to be seen, however, the extent to which this loyalty to French will be maintained by its traditional countries of influence in the face of a growing need for English. The consolidation of French in Africa is not the same as that of Spanish in Latin America, where the latter has already become the first language of most people and where indigenous linguistic groups that maintain their mother tongue are clearly in a minority in most countries. In contrast, in many African states the indigenous languages of their peoples are in good health and the processes through which these languages might have been

replaced by European languages have had much less of an effect. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that in the long run these countries, which are already linguistically complex, decide to skip the communicative level of French and move directly to the global level of English.

As we have seen, this will remain a possibility in the new linguistic ecosystem, one that is characterised by a multiplicity of dimensions: the ethnic (for want of a better term), the local/national, the state, the supra-state or continental, and the global. Were each level to function in a different language, then some people would be required to know five languages in order to participate effectively within each dimension. It remains to be seen how the various human groups will respond to this situation: whether they will opt to become polyglots in the required languages or abandon one or more of the levels, the sort of shift that tends to benefit one of the superior dimensions. However, the stage we are at now is such that the above-mentioned major languages, as well as others such as Arabic or Mandarin, will be able to increase enormously their output and usage, taking advantage of the dynamics that lie at the very heart of globalization. We are therefore moving toward a multidimensional world in which English — heading the list — will be regarded as the general global language, while the next level down will again see English widely used, although now within more circumscribed areas and in conjunction with other major languages, which will be distributed across their areas of historical influence. Finally, on a more local level, will come the other languages (see Calvet, 1999; De Swann, 2001).

7.3 · On economic and political unions

As we have seen, the expansion of the traditional areas of economic inter-relationship is accompanied by a shift toward stable forms of cooperation and/or political unions, which cover extensive areas that exceed classical political boundaries. Basically, three models of supra-state organization have been considered, the NAFTA, Mercosur/Mercosul and the European Union, in ascending order as regards the will to achieve integration from the political point of view. Although, in all three cases, the areas of economic exchange are extended and efforts are made to promote freer markets and entrepreneurial integration, the same does not apply on the cultural and political levels, and certainly not when it comes to language.

The NAFTA pays little attention to questions of language and identity, although it has, for example, led to increased trilingual labelling of commercial products that aim to circulate freely across the territories of the agreement's three signatories: Canada (English and French), the USA (English) and Mexico (Spanish). However, the agreement does not seek to bind populations together or to move things forward on the political level. Mercosur, in contrast, was born out of a stronger desire for integration and, as we have seen, soon addressed the linguistic domain by taking steps to promote the learning of Spanish in Brazil and the learning of Portuguese in Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay; the recognition of Guaraní was, however, sidestepped. These measures have had a particular effect along the border between Portuguese— and Spanish-speaking territories, an area that has witnessed the emergence of what has been termed 'Portuñol'⁷¹ and where bilingual schools have been promoted and well-received by the local populations. The teaching of the other language has been strongly promoted in Brazil, although less so in other Spanish-speaking countries, who may still be weighing up whether they should be prioritising Portuguese or English.

Here we see one of the repercussions that the presence of English can have on this second level of globalization. Given that English has taken on global functions many countries may start to have doubts about whether their 'foreign language' teaching should focus on neighbouring languages and traditional forms of interchange, or prioritise the language which is becoming most widespread. As we have seen, this affects not only the policies that are developed within supra-state unions but also the internal domains of already-existing multilingual states.

In terms of recognising the link between identity and the languages of a given state and the human groups that make up the new unions it is obvious that reciprocal learning is, on paper, the best solution. Everybody accepts the same imposition based on a reciprocal agreement and, on the basis of an egalitarian official status, the various groups can feel that their dignity is being respected. However, its incorporation into an increasingly global world, one which also needs another language, may shake the foundations of such an agreement. How all this will evolve depends on the other factors involved, as well as on the practical interests that emerge

71 On the socio-linguistic situation along the Spanish-Portuguese linguistic border of Uruguay, see Barrios, 2005.

within populations, and of course this will occur alongside the generation of identity and social meaning with respect to English. For it is one thing to regard English as the expression of US hegemony, which must be opposed, and quite another to see it as simply the practical language of inter-communication on a global level. Whatever the case, governments will have to consider which linguistic resources are the most beneficial for their respective countries and reach a decision accordingly. In some cases, such as that of two languages like Spanish and Portuguese which are quite closely related, the model may be geared toward a fairly integrated learning of the two, followed by an effective introduction of English; as pointed out earlier, this solution might also serve as an inspiration in the case of Catalan.

If, as we have seen, this ‘two-language’ model may, within the context of unions, be destabilised by the entry of English this is likely to be even more so in those cases where a larger number of linguistic groups are involved. In the European Union, for example, the process toward a predominantly political integration is already quite advanced and is based on a model that officially recognises the equal status of the respective languages of member states, alongside the recommendation that everybody also learns two other European languages, without these being specified. As pointed out earlier this model may be satisfactory when it comes to recognising the language and identity of the political units involved, but is less so in terms of inter-communication between them. Given that nothing is said about which European languages should be learnt the possibility is lost of ensuring that the various groups can understand one another through the fact of sharing the same ‘second’ language. Obviously, questions of identity come into play here, and no country wants to state officially which of the languages should be awarded the bridging role, although in practice this reticence is tempered by the fact that it is increasingly being accepted across the board that English should be given prominence within the compulsory education systems of the various countries. Even without a desire to recognise this publicly, English will become established as the shared supra-language, and even France is adapting its education system to take account of this.

Obviously, another matter — and once again France serves as an example — is that states take internal steps to halt the possible abusive functions which English might seek to adopt within their territories. Here lies the heart of the question: if the need for a common lingua franca is ac-

cepted the distribution of functions between this language and the indigenous languages of each country must be clearly spelled out, as each society has the right to feel secure as regards its linguistic sustainability and dignity. Moreover, the respective educational systems should not be prevented from promoting the learning of other languages, whether European or not, in order to provide maximum linguistic resources in a world that is as technologically and economically integrated as the one now emerging.

In fact, as we have seen, the issue of internal inter-communicability has yet to be resolved in many states, particularly in those such as Switzerland and Belgium in which existing languages have been granted equal status. In these situations, in which the full recognition of linguistic equality, along with its implementation in non-official, public linguistic communications, hindered any attempts at a forced and wide-scale bilingualisation of the population, such a process of bilingualisation may now take place in another language, namely English. The new global situation may therefore lead many people and companies of these states to feel that they can communicate more effectively in English than in the language of one indigenous group or another. This may become clear in Switzerland, a country whose German-speakers are losing interest in French, as it ceases to be an international language, and are showing an increased desire to learn English due to it being a global language. As regards the country's French-speakers, learning standard German has never meant gaining a real command of the German that is actually spoken in Switzerland, given the enormous difference between the two, and thus they may also turn their attention to English. So far, the proposal to make English the official language of inter-communication in Switzerland has been regarded as somewhat heretical on the grounds of identity and social meaning but it remains to be seen how this situation evolves over the coming years. Similarly, in Belgium, and despite the growing interest shown by French-speakers in the Dutch language, it will be interesting to see the effects that increased knowledge of English has on the country.

Clearly, a potentially greater reliance on English for internal uses in states without an official language of intercommunication does not challenge their model based on linguistic 'territoriality'; on the contrary, it may even render it more legitimate and necessary. As pointed out above, the introduction of a supra-language must go hand in hand with a clear definition of those functions that will be reserved for the languages of the social groups in a given country so as to give collective continuity to their lin-

guistic characteristics. This situation was already foreseen in Quebec, where the passing of Law 101 was designed to preserve the official functions of French in the face of the pressure of English from North America. On a practical level this policy has clearly reassured the French-speaking community, and this has subsequently enabled increasing calls for the new generation to become bilingual in English so that, given its international significance, this language can be used for external functions whenever appropriate.

This analysis would appear to suggest that in political or economic unions between different linguistic groups, whether as supra-states or states, there are at least three different levels that must be addressed. The first concerns the official *recognition* of equal status among the languages present at the federal or confederate level, or in common institutions of the union, so as to ensure the symbolic dignity of each of the groups and give citizens and organizations the possibility of addressing and communicating with general institutions in their own language. The second involves offering effective guarantees of *inter-communicability* between the people and organizations that relate to one another in a given shared area, which could be achieved — in the case of not mutual intercomprehension — by ensuring that there is, as a minimum, a common language for the corresponding functions; this often requires a process of bilingualisation, at least of those groups whose own language is not the one used for inter-communication. And thirdly, there is the question of the *sustainability* of the linguistic group as such, something which will require the maintenance of an exclusive or highly prominent core of official and non-official functions for a given language so as to retain both an optimum level of communicative utility and a positive view of the associated identity.⁷²

In this regard it would seem advisable for those states which have yet to resolve all these issues to take the necessary steps toward building a more optimum form of co-existence in the context of human plurilingual-

72 It is very important that states with linguistic diversity among their native populations are aware that, in the absence of policies which adequately take into account this diversity, it is very easy for two sorts of opposing nationalisms to arise: a 'state nationalism' *versus* a 'minority nationalism' (that resists, seeking the autonomy or independence of the group), which feed mutually off one another. As Kymlicka & Straehle say, "the fact that state nation-building can be minority nation-destroying even when conducted within the constraints of a liberal-democratic constitution, helps to explain why minority nationalism has remained such a powerful force within Western democracies, and why secession remains a live issue in several regions" (1999:76).

ism. Whereas Spain, for example, needs to go further in recognising its territorial linguistic minorities at the common administrative and political levels, as well as in terms of the support it gives to their sustainability, it may be that Switzerland and Belgium, for instance, need to address the problem of inter-communication. Likewise, on a different level, the European Union must overcome its 'statist' view of languages and give equal recognition to those as-yet unrecognised linguistic communities that are calling for this. Furthermore, it may have to decide what to do as regards the language of inter-communication. The designation of English, French and German as 'working languages' does not solve the problem, because it fails to explain why, at the end of the day, there have to be three rather than just one such language. Moreover, what kind of solution is this for those countries whose own language or languages are neither of these three? French is probably on the list due to its past prestige, and German because it is the language of the country which contributes the most in economic terms to community budgets, but this situation should be a transitory one while each country is striving to ensure that its population has at least certain skills in English in the near future. The most likely scenario is that the habitual use of English at this level of functions will, as it has done to date, continue to grow on its own accord since it is already *de facto* the most widely-used second language among Europeans.

This does not mean that efforts should not be made on the personal level to promote knowledge of as many languages as possible. Indeed, the more polyglot individuals become the better, something which would require countries to adapt their education systems, including English as the main and compulsory foreign language but providing opportunities to learn other languages too, which may differ from one centre to another in order to ensure the overall increase in a country's linguistic resources. There is also a need to pay close attention to improving current language-learning strategies, reviewing them critically, providing teachers with adequate training and developing the optimum teaching resources for language in practice.

In sum, what can be derived from the above is a model based on the *polyglotisation* of individuals and the principle of *subsidiarity*, one that gives priority, whenever possible, to local and indigenous languages and which recognises the use of other languages at higher levels of external communication. Thus, in a well-organised concentric plurality of languages and superimposed identities it might be possible to outline structural

relationships between the languages of human society that are much more adequate than those which have predominated to date. However, there may not be an ideal solution to the organization of human linguistic diversity, as current situations may evolve in ways as yet unforeseen or, alternatively, populations may continue to move in great numbers from one place to another and, as we are now seeing, generate new problems that will require new decisions, perhaps based on new principles.

7.4 · On migratory movements

As already indicated, the other major phenomenon of the glocal era is the enormous increase in migratory movements, and not only are these intensifying but the geocultural destinations involved now tend to be farther from the point of origin. In terms of language and identity these population movements may also become an important factor of change in the host societies (and also, obviously, among the migrants themselves); indeed, depending on the context, they might have even greater significance than the factors involved in technological and economic globalization. On the ‘top level’, economic globalization entails the arrival of new products, processes of economic delocalisation and the opening up of new markets, with the subsequent need for a more polyglot society, while new communication technologies facilitate linguistic contact via the screen, but at the ‘bottom level’ the movement of thousands of people to new societies entails face-to-face daily contact between languages and identities, something which may be experienced as more unsettling than the outcomes of the other phenomena mentioned above. For instance, it would seem that both the tensions in Europe as regards the proposed but failed new Constitution and the movements in favour of English being declared the official language of the USA might have much more to do with this ‘bottom-level’ globalization than with the impact of technological and economic changes on language and identity.

Although, in human societies, the arrival of other social groups from a different territory has often not been well regarded by the hosts, it would seem — at least at the European level — that the phenomenon of migration has never been the subject of such public debate and tension. Despite the fact that many factors can be involved in these situations, it is worth noting that questions of language and identity have not only been present in these debates but have also been the object of government interventions.

One of the newest features in this regard is perhaps the explicit concern being shown by governments — which obviously generates a concomitant public concern — with respect to the linguistic behaviour and skills of immigrants. A phenomenon that once seemed more often than not to occur ‘naturally’ and without drawing attention is now the focus of government and political interest, and, given that displaced persons and groups appear to be the source of public concern, attempts are being made to decide what to do about this issue. As many recent migrations have tended to be on a large scale and have involved homogenous groups of people of the same origin, many host countries have been left with the feeling that these new arrivals do not apply the maxim by which they would adapt themselves linguistically to the society in which they have gone to live. In many cases this may not actually be the case, as immigrants generally move to another country in order to improve their socio-economic situation and are aware from the outset that they will have to adapt themselves accordingly to the requirements of the host society. However, as the number of displaced persons from the same group increases, their needs and opportunities for linguistic adaptation may diminish, especially among the first generation of immigrants who are already above school age when they arrive. If to this is added the fact that immigrants often tend to speak to one another in their own language, even in public, the impression formed by hosts may be that these new arrivals are not interested in adapting to the host society and learning its language. This could explain why this concern exists in both European countries and the USA, a concern which could lead not only to increased linguistic demands being placed on immigrants but also to a bolstering of the symbolic and practical functions ascribed to the host language.

This would seem to raise doubts about the principles of ‘multiculturalism’ and reduced pressure to assimilate which, in recent years, have held sway over issues of language and identity in the context of migrations. The distance, not only linguistic but also religious and cultural, between current host and migrant groups also hinders the spontaneous development of harmonious relations, and as pointed out above, the increased number of displaced people and the fact that they have arrived from far afield can all increase a sense of separation and of the unknown among those living in the same society.

It is likely, therefore, that the best approach to *integration* will involve — although this may seem contradictory — both policies that ‘defend’

language and those which ‘facilitate’ the social inclusion of immigrants, at the same time as promoting a more open sense of identity among host societies. In other words, not only is there a need for measures that affirm and guarantee the cultural traits of the host society, but resources must also be dedicated to the linguistic and social integration of immigrants; moreover, people need to be made aware of how difficult this process of adaptation can be, recognising that it doesn’t happen overnight and that those involved require help and understanding. At the same time, and in order to resist ideological dichotomisation, it is necessary to foster acceptance of the diversity of origins and the possibility of constructing identities that are neither antagonistic nor set in stone but which rather are plural and harmonious — identities that look toward a common cooperative future. Furthermore, and as has been witnessed in some countries, a more open approach to linguistically-distinct immigrants is able to regard them as a resource and thus, in turn, this resource can be used to open up and enter new markets, something that benefits the economy as a whole.

Nevertheless, migratory movements can be a source of potential disruption, especially when they head toward smaller societies and particularly when the latter are themselves struggling with issues such as a lack of political autonomy and/or already have previous experience of large-scale immigration. For example, in the cases of Quebec and Catalonia, and despite their many differences, the tension aroused by immigration may be more complex as a result of the existing conflict caused by their being part of larger nation-state and linguistic spaces in which their own communities are in a minority. In the case of Quebec it can be seen how immigrants, despite attempts to select them, tend to use English rather than French to speak among themselves, although this trend is clearly reversed in the second generation.⁷³ As for Catalonia, it is known that Spanish rather than Catalan is the language most widely used in relations between the Catalan-speaking population and those from elsewhere, regardless of whether it is their mother tongue or not; furthermore, and unlike in Quebec, it is less clear that this changes in the second generation.

In fact, this problem is not restricted to Quebec and Catalonia, but also occurs in places such as Andorra or Luxembourg, which despite being much smaller societies in demographic terms have achieved political independence. In these cases it proves difficult to integrate immigrants into

73 For further discussion of this sub-topic, see Bastardas, 2002.

Catalan or Luxembourgish, as they prefer to develop — if they do not already have a command of — their Spanish and French, respectively. Thus, there may be a tendency among immigrants to opt for the more major language rather than the one that is confined to their immediate communicative environment, and this phenomenon could be heightened with growing awareness of globalization and the ease of movement.

Indeed, some commentators have suggested that more recent immigrants are less willing to give up their original linguistic traits as it is now much easier to maintain links with their homeland; however, it should be noted that this giving up of linguistic ties, if it occurs, has traditionally been an intergenerational phenomenon, especially between the second and third generations, and we may therefore be jumping to conclusions if we ascribe this unwillingness to them at too early a stage. While satellite dishes and internet clearly do make it easier to keep track of what is going on in one's country of origin, it is also true that the real local life of immigrants is lived out in their adoptive country, in which it will be accompanied by an inevitable cultural impact and where their children will receive a basic socialisation within the framework of this new society. Nevertheless, it does appear to be the case that displaced persons, and perhaps especially those who have or had a high social status in their own societies, are less willing to adapt to the host society, particularly in those cases where the political situation of the latter is such that it is possible to get by in another more widespread language. An example of this would be the petition in favour of the use of Spanish submitted by consular representatives of fourteen countries in Majorca.⁷⁴ This illustrates what could happen in Europe if, with the spread of English or with an increasing number of people moving from one country to another, linguistic rights are claimed in the historical territory of other societies. Any conflict could grow still further if general principles for dealing with this phenomenon are not clearly set out.

⁷⁴ These countries were France, Italy, Peru, Norway, Poland, Colombia, the United Kingdom, Holland, the Philippines, Hungary, Belize, Mexico, Sweden and the USA. Their representatives formally asked the Minister for Immigration and Cooperation, Encarna Pastor, to urge the government to guarantee the possibility of genuine bilingualism in public procedures and services, such as education, in order to ensure equal opportunities between immigrants and the Balearic people. They argued that the predominance of Catalan in the education system and the widespread lack of forms and other public documents printed in Spanish constituted an additional form of discrimination for many immigrants, especially those who had recently arrived in the Balearic Islands ("*Diario de Mallorca*", 12-11-05).

However, it is important not to confuse local, face-to-face contact due to migration on what is basically an individual level with those abovementioned situations involving minority national groups. The latter concerns societies that are historically rooted in a given territory and which come into contact with one another as a result of political and/or economic integration at a higher level; in contrast, the former involves the movement of people toward new territories whose native inhabitants and language remain in their usual geographical position. Thus, it is often the case that the ‘multicultural’ principles of one situation will not be applicable to another and vice-versa, since the two are phenomenologically distinct. This is put most succinctly by Van Parijs: “locally-existing cultural diversity, usually a result of immigration, does not deserve the same protection that we should afford to territory-based diversity, the long-standing (and especially linguistic) differences between regions” (2004).

The question therefore arises as to what other principles might be useful for a mobile, linguistically-diverse species. How should these cultural encounters be managed, at least at the level of language and identity? What might be the basis of a series of behavioural guidelines, both collective and individual, that could lead us to a non-conflictive position that would leave both parties feeling satisfied? As was said earlier, one aspect that, in principle, should remain clear is the obligation of states and host societies to respond adequately to immigrants and help them integrate as much as possible in material and socio-economic terms, as well as assisting them linguistically in that initial transitory phase which can be so difficult for displaced persons. In this regard, one of the many things that could be done to smooth the process of social integration would be to set up language advisory services to help with administrative procedures and explain in detail the norms of the host society.

On the other hand there needs to be an unfailing commitment on the part of immigrants as regards learning — to the best of their ability — the language of the host society, without this implying that they need give up their mother tongue when speaking with their compatriots or their right to celebrate those public events they so wish. With respect to the language of their children it is the immigrants themselves who will decide what is most appropriate, it being clear that their offspring will be educated in the language of the host society and will thus be in a situation of equal opportunities. Thus, everybody together must evolve toward an acceptance of a civic identity that is both inclusive and supra-ethnic, one which, based

around the host group, is able to integrate all its points of origin and forge a common project for the future.⁷⁵

7.5 · Some ideas on which to base the organization of a multilingual world

As we have seen, the technological, economic, political and demographic processes and sub-processes now underway in the glocal era may come to modify many of the solutions and approaches traditionally applied to the problem of linguistic contact. Our species, fragmented into sub-groups that cover an enormously diverse range of languages and identities, is now caught up in a process of rediscovery and re-encounters such has never before been witnessed, and it is in this new context that adequate solutions must be found for a series of organizational questions of fundamental importance in terms of cooperation and harmony.

The fact that it is now technologically possible to communicate instantaneously with the other side of the planet and move both people and objects across long distances in a short period of time has ushered in a new era characterised by enormously increased contact between institutions, companies and people from diverse and distant countries and languages. Given the diversity of languages produced by each human group this extraordinary rise in inter-relationships has made it vitally important that a solution be found to the problem of inter-communication. So far this has been resolved at the global level through the increasingly widespread use of English, while in less generalised and more circumscribed areas and functions other languages such as Spanish, Mandarin, Arabic, Hindi and Swahili are becoming more extensively and/or intensively used across large regions.

All this communicative reorganization of the human species may very well pose new problems and aggravate existing tensions as regards language and identity if certain conditions of key importance to human beings

⁷⁵ However, it should be borne in mind that even those places which had done the most to develop correct policies from the multicultural and multilingual point of view seem now to be experiencing a certain crisis in the system, and have realised that what is emerging are significant pockets of group isolation characterised by poor cultural adaptation and socio-economic failure. In Canada, for example, an increasing number of people now agree with Bernard Ostry, “one of the principal architects of multiculturalism under Trudeau, [who] has voiced anxiety that the experiment has gone wrong and must be reviewed” (Gregg, 2006:47).

are not respected. For it would seem that these processes comprise at least four major conceptual dimensions which must be taken into account above all else, as they are both widespread and, left unaddressed, may lead to significant social instability. These dimensions concern linguistic *recognition*, *communicability*, *sustainability* and *integration*.

History would clearly seem to suggest that linguistically-distinct human groups can link up with one another to form new political and economic units, and that this new state of affairs is much more satisfactory if their respective languages obtain official and symbolic *recognition* of equal status, without there being differential treatment between them. This, for example, could be part of the reason why Switzerland has a long history of harmonious relationships between its respective linguistic groups, and also explain why states with high levels of internal conflict, such as Belgium or Canada, have nonetheless maintained their political organization. In contrast, the fact that these requirements are not met by Spain's current model of plurilingualism, in which only one language is recognised as official in common state bodies, remains a source of disquiet and is viewed as disregard by large numbers of people whose mother tongue is one of the unrecognised languages. Hence, many of these citizens can come to feel that the state to which they belong is not — justifiably — *their* state, and may consider that they do not need to recognise a state which does not recognise them. Over and above the practical aspects of inter-group communication what is overlooked here by state institutions is the *identificatory* and *emotional* dimension of languages. Failure to recognise languages may thus be readily interpreted as failure to recognise a social group and, therefore, as a form of contempt for its members.

Central governments frequently argue that having one common official language is an advantage that enables quick and easy communication between all social participants. No doubt this can have its benefits when one compares it to those states that do not have a common language of real communication between the individuals and organizations of their different linguistic groups. Thus, *communicability* between the members of the corresponding political unit is a value and an advantage, both socially and economically, as it enables group barriers to be overcome and stable forms of contact and cooperation to be established. The problem has usually arisen from the way in which the two main possible solutions — one based on the official recognition of the different languages and the other on the use of a single official language in common institutions in order to promote

their common use by all citizens — have been regarded as a mutually exclusive dichotomy. And yet there would appear to be a third possibility that would bring together the advantages of both approaches, as there is no need for them to be mutually exclusive. The proposal is to recognise the equal status of each language on the official level of common state or supra-state institutions and, *at the same time*, ensure inter-communication by indicating which language everybody will share in order to maintain the advantages of this solution.

Nonetheless, there is no point pretending that it will always be easy to reach an agreement as to which language will serve as a bridge, and one need look no further than India, for example, or Europe today for evidence of this. There would seem to be at least two reasons for this: one is fear about the effects that another language which all or most people understand and have a command of could have on each linguistic group, while the other concerns the sources of group rivalry and envy, especially as regards potential major competitors and the possibility that their language will be chosen for the function of inter-communication. This can be clearly observed in contemporary Europe, where no one has yet dared to indicate explicitly that English is the European *lingua franca*, in opposition to French, especially, but also German, both of which insist on being considered as ‘working languages’. In contrast, smaller countries such as Denmark, Sweden or Holland would probably see no problem in going ahead with what they regard as a practical solution. From the functional point of view it is clearly preferable that, faced with the need to learn another language, everybody learns the same one.

Obviously, this does not mean we should fail to take into account the fears raised as to whether large-scale bilingualisation in a common language could begin to dismantle the historical developmental ecosystem of other languages. For example, at the level of higher-level common institutions, efforts must be made to avoid arguing that since everybody speaks English there is now no need to address citizens in their mother tongue. The principle that *knowing a supra-language does not exclude the recognition of the group language* must be made explicit at the outset. In other words, the fact that someone knows another language does not diminish the linguistic rights that he or she may have when dealing with common institutions. It is therefore important to set adequate limits on the functions to be served by the language of inter-communication and to establish clear criteria of co-existence so that the bridging language does not be-

come an abusive presence in the domain of each national society's indigenous languages.⁷⁶

The keystone of the system is clearly that it must ensure the linguistic *sustainability* of each group, and this requires the maintenance and development of a language's normal functions within its own geo-social space so that those who speak it retain a highly positive image and feel assured and rewarded as regards their identity. Thus, great efforts must be made to avoid falling into the same traps as before, which, as we know, have seen many human languages disappear in the face of the degrading conditions under which large-scale bilingualisation and the restructuring of identity took place. It is here, as was said earlier, that a clear commitment must be made to plural identity, one which can take on concentric and inclusive forms rather than base itself on mutually exclusive and sterilising dichotomies. For representations of identity may be 'liquid' rather than 'set in stone', and this notion has already been taken on board by thousands of people who nowadays see themselves as belonging to different levels and groups.

The basic principle underlying linguistic sustainability is likely to be functional *subsidiarity*, i.e., whatever can be done by the local language should not be done by another one which is more global. In other words, the native languages of human groups should, by default, carry out the majority of functions, while only those functions of a strictly supra-group nature should be addressed through more widely shared languages. This implies the clear assignment of exclusive functions to the languages of each social group and the precise delimitation of those to be fulfilled by the major languages. The key to maintaining linguistic diversity in the context of inter-group communicability is basically a question of the degree and organization of linguistic contact. This has to be structured in such a way that the respective communities are recognised and stabilised at the same time as being fully integrated within higher-level scenarios. Thus, as in the quote from Paracelsus that introduced this study, there is a need to recognise clearly that it is "the dose alone that makes the poison". Contact between languages is not 'poisonous' *per se*, but when the

76 De Cock (2006) provides an example of the kind of surveillance required and describes how, in Belgium, "Flemish education law has established that English cannot be used as the main language of teaching for a degree programme (unless the same institution organises an equivalent programme in Dutch)", and has also adopted the measure whereby "Master's programmes in English require special approval".

correct dose is exceeded it can prove harmful to the language whose position is weaker.

English, as a global language, is also becoming used not only transnationally — especially for contacts in the technological, economic and scientific contexts, where Internet and other media formats are paramount — but also as a ‘second’ language that will be taught in the majority of schools. Therefore, it will have a peculiar status in that it will be promoted by political authorities and ascribed worldwide functions, most of which will be non-official but nonetheless of enormous value for large proportions of society, whether in the economic and information fields for adults or in the leisure context for young people. On this global level the dimensions of recognition, communicability and sustainability have a different application in that we are here faced with a different phenomenon. Through its widespread presence in education systems, at the same time as in new and old media formats, English will penetrate societies in such a way that, on the whole, it will not pose the problems related to ‘identity’ that might be generated by other languages associated with the dominance of other groups with whom a given social group feels it is in conflict. At all events, while some people may associate English with US foreign policy this does not seem to be hindering acceptance of the language. Given that it is not being directly imposed by an external power the associations regarding identity and social meaning may be neutral or even favourable in some cases, since English is often associated with modernity and technological progress.

Furthermore, given that the technological, economic and scientific sectors are increasingly urging the incorporation of English as a vehicular language in university studies, at least at postgraduate level, it could come to compete not only with other potential languages of global communication but also with those traditionally used in a given nation-state. Thus, it seems unavoidable that English will have a considerable ‘internal’ presence and therefore the abovementioned principles of sustainability will need to be effectively applied. Indeed, as we have seen the authorities in some countries have already had to intervene to halt the use of English for inappropriate functions and this phenomenon may become more commonplace. It is likely that more areas of conflict will arise in this regard, particularly where English tends to be used exclusively because it is argued that everybody understands it (this having already been the case in Europe in the context of labelling), or alternatively when it is used as the vehicular

language in universities or in the case of certain transnational companies that impose English as the internal working language in countries without a tradition of being English speaking. There will thus be a need to find a new balance in the way society is organised linguistically, at the same time as monitoring the way in which English is used with respect to other languages, the aim being to prevent its obvious benefits in terms of communicability from being to the detriment of linguistic sustainability.

At present, however, there seems to be no immediate danger of other languages being widely replaced since we are still at a stage of bilingualisation. Nevertheless, should English come to be used across the board as the common 'second' language of the species then this would indeed constitute a shift of enormous significance. For it could then transpire that the traditional principles used so far to organise our lives linguistically would no longer be valid in such a context. For example, the system applied by those states which are most respectful of plurilingualism within their borders, namely the principle of territoriality at the local level accompanied by a principle of equal status at the federal or central level, is impractical at a planet level. There will be no general instances that can be related with each human linguistic group in the language of each one of them. Furthermore, and as pointed out earlier, the communicative needs of the supra-language are stronger in the economic, communications and technological-scientific fields than in the context of traditional functions whose nature is either official (government and schools) or religious (the church). The entrepreneurs and prime movers among society want to understand products (whether professional or entertainment-based) in this language, and they want to use it to communicate with people from outside their groups in order to do business or simply to make friends; moreover, they want to take part in scientific advances and international civil and political movements. It is unlikely that this tide can be turned, and it may lead us toward new stages of organization in terms of language and identity, and also perhaps to a reunification of the species.

A related issue is that the way we respond to migratory movements has also become of key importance due to their current volume and the likelihood that they will increase further in the future; as such they require a set of principles that will enable precise and effective policies to be drawn up as regards the tensions which could be produced. From the point of view of the *integration* of language and identity the key probably lies in the adequate handling of the stage of *adaptive transition*. In the case of migrations

it is likely to be no good ignoring them and basing our response on the *laissez-faire* approach of previous eras, but nor will it help to apply the same protective principles as would be used in the case of national minorities within their own historical territory. In the former case, immigrant groups could end up being unattended by and lost within the new society, and this could hinder their adaptation still further; in the second case a strict application of the rights usually afforded to national minority groups may not, depending on the circumstances, facilitate their adaptive bilingualisation and this could have serious consequences for their co-existence within the host society, which could turn against these groups as a result of their lack of integration.

For example, in the case of recognition, migrant groups don't necessarily assume that they will find a society which functions as their own did, or that their language will be officially recognised and given equal status. However, they may be grateful for and consider it only fair that they are given help with their social integration, for example, by finding people to act as interpreters, giving them important instructions in their own language and, where possible, offering certain services such as aspects of healthcare in their mother tongue. If they arrive accompanied by children or adolescents of school age then it will be helpful to ensure that the latter become properly integrated within the education system, and specific strategies of adaptation may be required in this regard. All of the above is appreciated by people who have arrived from another country and may go some way to laying the foundations of good mutual relations.

As regards communicability it is again clear that immigrant groups will be grateful for a rapid facilitation of the host language so that they can live independently in the new society and enter the job market on the best possible footing. To this end the organization of teaching strategies and specific services will be a priority in all cases and it will be necessary to dedicate the necessary human and financial resources to the task at hand, for example, by training suitable professionals and setting up adequate institutions. With respect to sustainability it should be remembered that in most cases of migration the language of the immigrant group continues unabated in the country of origin and therefore there is no need to apply this principle within the host society. However, policies and public pronouncements should not undermine the maintenance of their mother tongue but rather must promote its continuity, provided, of course, that an effective process of bilingualisation in the host society's language is already

underway and that the immigrant group expresses an intergenerational willingness to continue using its own language. These concepts will have to be developed further and a general consensus must be reached regarding how best to approach the question of language and identity in the case of a mobile species such as our own.

It would seem, therefore, that the linguistic organization of human societies is becoming structured on different levels, although these may tend to overlap, especially in a bottom-up direction. For example, an immigrant group may bring its own language and have to learn to function in the local language of the host society, but in the event that the latter is not in itself a nation-state the immigrant group will also have to learn a state-wide language. Furthermore, if this state forms part of a higher-level union which uses another language for inter-communication among its members, then this language will also have to be learnt and, if it is not English, then a fifth language will have to be learnt if the immigrant group wishes to participate on the global level. Although it is not unheard of for someone to be able to function in five different languages it cannot be said to be a commonplace situation at present. Moreover, if people find that they have to learn too many languages which of these will they choose to drop? Which of the levels of organization might suffer the most serious crises as a result of simplifying the linguistic competence required of individuals? We don't know the answer to these questions at present, but it is clear that when faced with a crisis of this kind, people may begin to give up those languages that are of least use to them in terms of communication, unless these languages are linked to questions of identity that prevent this from happening. Thus, the languages which will tend to be given up will be those regarded as the most dispensable, even though this will be a gradual — and probably intergenerational — process; in contrast, priority will be given to those languages that serve higher-level functions, as these will continue to enable communication between members of a group as a result of their prior polyglotisation.

Although it is also true that not everybody may need to acquire a command of five languages, it seems clear that our species will become much more polyglot in the future, a difference that will be especially noted in those countries that until now have been largely monolingual. For we are heading toward a situation in which languages will be superimposed over one another within the same space, but on different levels/orders/dimensions according to the networks of relationship/communication (from the

more local to the international); in this regard, each local node/group will have its most frequent and maximum interaction with the immediate environment, but at least some members of this group will also connect with more distant points of the network where they will use other languages — that of the state, the wider transnational area or the global level. It is within this framework that attempts must be made to achieve the delicate balance between polyglotisation and maintaining the language of each group.

We do not yet know with any certainty what the future holds for the languages of humanity, for a species that having become linguistically fragmented across its evolution is now finding itself once again and may wish to live in a more integrated and interdependent way. At all events, we must continue to observe carefully how this situation evolves and seek the most adequate policies for each moment, the objective being to ensure that the languages and identities of our species can co-exist harmoniously.

**8 · IDENTITIES AND LANGUAGES IN THE GLOCAL AGE:
THE CASE OF CATALONIA**

Many features of the interactions and the (re)encounters between human linguistic groups that we have been examining are discernible in Catalonia today. In this glocal age, as a subnational entity with a considerable degree of political autonomy and a strong national sentiment, Catalonia participates simultaneously in the political, economic and cultural frameworks of both Spain and Europe, and is becoming an increasingly important actor on the world stage. In Catalonia the various dimensions in which today's human groups organise their conduct clearly interact, with the problems of language and identity that arise from this multiplicity of levels of engagement. For some time now Catalonia has not been a linguistically homogeneous society first due to the mass immigration from the rest of Spain, and, more recently, from much further afield. This situation makes Catalonia a particularly complex case of sociolinguistic contact. In order to understand it, we need to explore the various factors involved, the way they interact, and the dynamics that arise from them.

If we apply the four dimensions of analysis that we have used so far for understanding and describing human multilingualism to the situation of Catalonia, and consider them in relation to the effects of globalization, what do we see? First, as far as *recognition* is concerned, the complex situation of Catalonia today presents different problems for the different language groups. Although Catalan is defined as the country's 'own language' and the 'language of normal use' in the autonomous Catalan government, the native-born group whose first language is Catalan may resent the fact that it has virtually no official recognition in the vast majority of the offices of the state government, where Spanish is the only official language. Catalan does not even have a symbolic presence in the vast majority of official documents; nor may citizens use it in their dealings with central state government offices, in contrast to Switzerland, for example, where the small Romansh minority are entitled to use their language in these situations.

The problem of recognition has reappeared at the supranational level since Spain's admission to the EU. Spanish is officially recognised in Europe, but Catalan is not; nor are any of the other languages used in Spain territory. This situation is absurdly discriminatory if one thinks of other languages which have far fewer speakers but which receive this official recognition in the European Union because, unlike Catalonia, they repre-

sent a state. This is a clear transgression of an important principle: merely because the members of a historically formed linguistic group settled in a territory, in either Spain or Europe, know another language, their first language should not for this reason be deprived of the right to official recognition or the right to be treated on an equal footing by the political institutions in which they collectively participate. This situation confuses the dimensions of *recognition* and *communicability* which, as we have seen, belong to different orders and have different influences on the lives of human groups (while *recognition* operates above all at the level of identity, *communicability* does so more at the level of intercomprehension). The lack of recognition works against greater identification with the state or supranational institutions on the part of the groups whose rights are being ignored; naturally enough, the injustice of the situation encourages distancing and rejection.

Spanish-speakers who have settled in Catalonia, above all during the twentieth century, speak a language that is fully recognised at state level, where it is the only official language and is the most used in general non-official communications — and also, as we said, by the European institutions. Because of its expansion to America, Spanish is also a ‘world language’, and is in increasing use in economic and technical environments and the media. Although it has official status in Catalonia alongside Catalan, some sectors regularly express their dissatisfaction at its degree of institutional recognition; they perceive a bias in favour of the other language, especially in the areas of education and the mass media which depend on the Catalan government.⁷⁷ This perception may be the reason for — or may

77 Underlying this problem is the question of how to organise the coexistence of Catalan and Spanish at two different but interdependent levels. In Catalonia, there are two main large linguistic groups and therefore, as in other cases, the organisation could be based on egalitarian official bilingualism, without any declared language of inter-communication, and with some bilinguals in each group acting as intermediators, as is the case in Quebec or in New Brunswick in Canada. In this model, all official communications would have to be in both languages since it cannot be assumed that each group understands the language of the other. In Catalonia and Spain, however, in contrast to Canada, there is a clearly defined ‘national’ supra-language — Castillian, internationally known as Spanish — which is the only official at state level and all citizens must compulsory know. It is here that the egalitarian bilingual model in the subnational level may collapse, because one of the languages has *de jure* and *de facto* very important functions at higher levels, is much more widely spoken, and, in the case of Spain, Catalan or the other languages enjoy very little recognition at the state level. Broadly speaking, the solutions to this clearly asymmetrical situation would involve either 1) making Catalan and Spanish equal also at the level of the state government and in all unofficial public communications), or 2), favour-

derive from — the fact that some sectors inside this group are unwilling to adopt a dual national identity, at one and the same time fully ‘Catalan’ and ‘Spanish’. In the population that is Catalan by origin or by identification there is also a sector that rejects this dual identity, and opts for the Catalan identity alone. However, in Catalonia so far a clear majority broadly accepts — in different degrees — the dual adscription of Catalan and Spanish, and supports a system able to balance a sufficient degree of recognition of Spanish with the necessary recovery of Catalan and a guarantee of a secure future for the latter language inside its historical territory. Most of this group would have no objection to adding another level in order to include the European identity, and probably, if it was possible, even to become a new state in Europe, independent of Spain.

This state of affairs reflects the complex recent historical situation of Catalonia. After a long period of total political subordination during which Catalan was officially prohibited and replaced by Spanish in the education system and in all other areas of public life, democracy was restored in the late nineteen seventies. By this time, half the population of Catalonia were Spanish-speaking, due to migration from other areas of Spain. The situa-

ing Catalan over Spanish in Catalonia, by granting it as many functions as possible in order to redress the balance to some extent. Note that solution 1) continues to favour monolingualism among Spanish-speakers — even though one effect might be to reduce some uses of Spanish by those whose first language is Catalan. Therefore, this approach might favour the monolingualism among the members of the majority group, and the *separation* of the groups. Solution 2) favours personal bilingualism, since each language has (quasi)exclusive functions that make it necessary, favouring the *fusion* of the groups and giving Catalan a practical utility. This approach would create a balance, as it requires the same amount of effort from both sides: Catalan-speakers learn Spanish and use it for specific (mainly extralocal) functions, and Spanish-speakers learn Catalan or use it for specific (mainly intralocal) functions. In fact, the best strategy seems to be to seek mixed solutions at each level that respond *both* to the desire for recognition and to the desire for sustainability in each group.

One must be careful in debates of this kind because there is always a basic confusion between the *official* and *institutional* versus *individual* meaning of the label ‘bilingualism’, which needs to be clarified. Though this may seem paradoxical (and simplifying a great deal) fully egalitarian *official* and *institutional bilingualism* tends to be accompanied by *individual monolingualism*, because there is no need for the individuals in the different groups to learn and use the other language if their own can be used in all situations. In contrast, *official monolingualism* tends to be accompanied, in the case of the group whose languages cannot be used in all situations, by *individual bilingualism*, since members of this group are motivated to master the official and institutional language in addition to their own. The best way to promote personal bilingualism in Catalonia and to make Catalan a useful tool at the practical level is to give this language genuinely important functions in Catalonia which can compensate for the functions that Spanish has in Spain as a whole and its increasing importance worldwide.

tion was extremely delicate: the linguistic and national rights of the native-born population had to be upheld, but the process had to be carried out in a society totally transformed by the presence of a vast number of people whose habitual language of use, in its distinct varieties, was Spanish. What is more, as a subnational entity, Catalonia remained inside a framework in which everyone was officially obliged to know this language, which was the one used in the vast majority of unofficial public communications and the main language used in the relations between the two linguistic groups.

The model of recognition that this situation has generated is the one we find expressed in the new Statute of Autonomy of 2006. The model was based on a partially asymmetrical official bilingualism, which was seeking to compensate for the differences in the scope of the two languages in terms of the historical subordination of Catalan and the use of Spanish at higher dimensions. The Statute recognised the two languages as ‘official’ but defended certain areas of use for Catalan. By declaring it Catalonia’s ‘own language’, it assigned to it the functions of the ‘normal and preferred’ language — though not the exclusive language — of the Catalan autonomous institutions and the autonomous mass media, and the language in which teaching is given in the pre-university education system. However, it explicitly guaranteed the individual right to choose between the two languages in one’s dealings with government offices and public organizations, and established that there will not be discrimination on linguistic grounds (see Branchadell & Requejo, 2006). However, in 2010 the Constitutional Court of Spain forced to eliminate the concept of Catalan as ‘preferred’ language and, in general, established a interpretation of the Statute of Autonomy in less favouring terms for Catalan.

As can be seen, these principles of language recognition corresponded to the idea of *sustainability* which holds that, in situations of contact — and Catalonia is one of the best examples — a language must have a clear range of functions of its own if it is not to be forced out by more powerful rivals.⁷⁸ Spanish is evidently a ‘world language’ and occupies almost all the official and general functions of communication in Spain, and so, in comparison with Catalan, its degree of attraction for speakers of other lan-

⁷⁸ It is widely agreed that bilingualism “does not continue across generations unless the role of the two languages is differentiated and they are reserved for different functions that do not overlap” (Wright 2004:249). Spanish clearly has these functions in the society: it is doubtful whether the same can be said of Catalan.

guages will always be much higher. In addition, Spanish in Catalonia has a high level of everyday social use by members of all the groups who currently live there.⁷⁹

In fact, from the perspective of sustainability the situation of Catalonia clearly needs to ensure that its historical language should be seen by all groups as the appropriate vehicle for communication in its social interrelations, whatever the first language of the respective speakers. A language that is not habitually used in inter-communication even in its own territory is at risk of becoming dispensable. Catalan, then, needs to recover its inter-group function and as the habitual language used at work and in social communication if it is to remain useful and if immigrants (both old and new) are to be motivated to learn it. The linguistic situation is complicated still further by the arrival of Spanish-speaking Latin Americans,⁸⁰ and by the tendency among migratory movements to use the more general language in situations in which there is a choice, as in the case of French and English in Quebec, or Catalan and Spanish in Catalonia. These factors represent a clear advantage for Spanish.⁸¹ According to Bonet, in Catalonia today, “while (for immigrants) mastery of Spanish is not only necessary but sufficient for integration in the workplace and in society, (mastery of) Catalan is left for the second stage, the stage of total integration in the culture and in posts of professional responsibility” (2006:77). The same author acknowledges that very often “Catalans are disappointed to see that the majority of immigrants do not learn Catalan and use Spanish as their *lingua franca*” (Bonet, 2006:77). Migratory movements, then, represent a new factor with enormous repercussions for the evolution of the linguistic situation. As we said before, all necessary resources must be applied to ensure

79 A prerequisite for the new ‘glocal’ situation is that, in addition to public functions related to *identification*, a group’s own language must also have functions related to *communication* which are perceived as useful and prestigious in everyday life. If not, the balance cannot be maintained; eventually, the local language will come to be seen as an instrument that confers a ‘negative’ and ‘inferior’ identity compared with the other language, which has these prestigious functions. It should also be possible to add other languages with ‘communicative’ functions, which might in certain circumstances take on ‘identificative’ functions. The identities do not have to be mutually exclusive, but may combine in concentric circles (like the layers of an onion) or with other, not necessarily conflictive configurations (see Bastardas, 2005).

80 For example, according to Bonet, in the Catalan school system, Latin Americans represent the largest immigrant group (47%), followed by Maghrebis (27%) (2006:32).

81 As Bonet says, for the new immigrants “the need to become integrated in an officially bilingual society may surprise or even annoy some immigrants (who see it as an extra barrier in the process of their integration in the workplace and in society)...” (2006:24).

the full integration of the immigrant communities if our aim is to establish a society which comprises people of different origins but is harmoniously organised.

The other area in which Catalan language policy must be particularly active in the global era is *communicability*. Now that it is generally accepted that members of Catalan society must master both Catalan and Spanish to communicate successfully in Catalonia and in Spain, the relations with supranational institutions, the broadening of markets and technological exchanges mean that as many citizens as possible must also master English as a *lingua franca* for their international communication. As we have mentioned in previous sections, the mastery of English by Catalan society should not have negative repercussions for the current sociolinguistic ecosystem, and in fact may even promote the country's linguistic resources as it progresses in the economic, technological and cultural fields.

English would give Catalonia the chance to expand into larger markets, providing direct access to the most recent technological, scientific and cultural information and allowing the country to establish itself as a fully-fledged participant in the life not only of Europe but of the world. So beside the widespread concern for the sustainability of Catalonia's own language the governments should also cater for the society's broader language needs — especially those of the new generations — in an increasingly interdependent world.⁸²

The effective introduction of English as a third language is a huge challenge which requires immediate action. To know precisely which policies should be implemented, first we must study the existing teaching methodologies, see where and why the current model is failing, decide which changes should be introduced in the school system, provide adequate training for teachers, and secure the funding needed to ensure the project's success.⁸³ Catalonia must join Europe's polyglot countries and

82 Isidor Mari (2006) poses some important questions: “What multilingual skills will the country need in the next twenty years in order to attain its economic, strategic, social and cultural objectives, and to meet the aspirations of its citizens? How far do the current policies respond to these needs? What initiatives and strategic plans should be adopted in the current situation? The answers to these questions depend on the country's fundamental strategic orientations, and especially on economic strategies. In this regard, in the framework of the Euroregion, French could also play an important role in Catalonia due to its geographical proximity.

83 One of the problems that may emerge from the spread of English (if it has not already done so) is the level of competence that individuals are expected to reach in this language. This may

compete alongside Luxembourg, Finland, the Netherlands, Flanders, and Sweden,⁸⁴ which boast an impressive level of knowledge of languages other than their own, and which all have internationalised economies. Other foreign languages could also be acquired at school in addition to English; different schools could offer different languages and thus allow a diversification of language resources in order to train the new generations to operate in a wider range of linguistic and economic areas. The languages of current and future immigrants also have a contribution to make in our attempts to achieve this goal. Individual polyglotisation must clearly be a priority, and should achieve for Catalonia what Oakes reports in the case of Sweden: not only did linguistic knowledge allow the country “despite its small size, (to) compete internationally by means of English”, but “transformed a high proficiency in the international *lingua franca* into something very Swedish” (2005:160). A clear sense of roots, polyglotisation and cosmopolitanism should be at one and the same time the best defining features of the Catalan identity.

No one in Catalonia should fear this multilingualism of the Catalans of the future. As we have seen, language and identity belong to different spheres of life; they interact, but are not entirely interdependent. The Catalan population, diverse in origin, can perfectly well embrace a group project identity of its own (to use Castells’s term), and a polyglotisation at the individual level which will open it to the world, while at the same time maintaining Catalan as the principal language of intergroup relations and social use.

Nonetheless, this process may not be easy. Catalonia finds itself in between the two poles of globalization: on the one hand the broadening of the political and economic stage, and on the other the advent of migration. Membership of ‘higher’ units — Spain, Europe — obliges polyglotisation,

create a real problem. What should our objective be — should we try to attain more or less the same level for everyone, or should we train a highly skilled group of individuals to act as intermediaries, leaving the rest of the population with a merely passive knowledge of the language? How will this influence their socio-economic status? Will there be a difference in resources between the individuals who have achieved a high level of competence in English and those who have not? How can this result be avoided?

84 We must work hard to reach the level of the Dutch, for example, who (with the exception of the inhabitants of Luxembourg, possibly a special case) are Europe’s greatest polyglots. Almost 75% speak English, 67% German and 12% French. The Netherlands is one of those exemplary cases that show that mass polyglotisation of the population does not necessarily bring with it a renunciation of the use of, or respect for, the native language.

while the presence of thousands of non-Catalan speakers requires the country to take measures designed to aid their integration into the society (linguistic integration included) and to safeguard the historical community's own language.

The glocal age brings Catalonia both opportunities and dangers. On the one hand it reduces the homogenising power of states, since, with the removal of borders and integration in larger economic and political entities, Catalonia can project itself to the world in a way that it never could before. At the same time the necessary polyglotisation, and, above all, the acquisition of English will make the population of Catalonia less dependent on Spanish, the only language that until now has allowed it access (albeit not on a massive scale) to international information and contacts. In a situation that is (at least) trilingual, well organised and with a good network of international relations, the Catalan population will be able to reassess its identity and define itself in the way it considers most appropriate. In a less centralised world, as we have seen in specific cases, groups that are demographically small but are innovative and creative can gain access to world markets, achieve significant economic growth and bring their culture to a wider audience. This situation can offer great opportunities for Catalonia.

However, it is also true that the differences in the relative power and presence of Catalan and Spanish are likely to change substantially in favour of the latter, especially at the global scale. In certain areas of communication, in particular those in which technology plays an important part, Catalan will have to struggle hard to get some normality if does not want to be seen as a minority language. Policy in these areas must aim at creating a set of powerful Catalan language websites, for example, able to maintain a presence on the web that is consistent with the size of its population. Efforts must also be made to obtain the maximum number of TV channels possible and to continue the production of culture in a range of electronic formats, to ensure that the language is well represented in the new media. Inside their demographic limits, Catalan speakers must be as creative and energetic as possible, anticipating and reacting swiftly to events and taking the necessary risks.

The educational system will be a key part of the development of this new stage. In all likelihood, deep-seated changes will have to be introduced to produce this (at least) trilingual population, with both a local and a global identity. Language strategies must receive special attention, in order to improve current methodologies and to achieve not only the devel-

opment of skills but also a rational distribution of the uses of the different languages. Clearly, in order to preserve its living space inside its historical territory, Catalan must be the main language of group intercommunication in Catalonia; it will be unable to find such spaces at higher levels of communication. In parallel, the languages of the other groups present, apart from Spanish and English, which must receive special priority, must be valued and taught according to demand, and according to the specific features of each particular location.

The way to meet these considerable challenges is to equip Catalan society as a whole with the necessary resources and knowledge and to adopt policies that allow the construction of a new common identity, which, mutually respectful of difference, is underpinned by its Catalan origin, is able to accommodate the other groups present and interacts effectively with the higher levels of participation. Given that the sociolinguistic situation in Catalonia is among the most complex in the world today, imagination and tact are needed on all agents in order to work together to identify the policies that satisfy the wishes of the majority of the population. This seems to be the only valid alternative at this new stage of the history of humanity. We must take all steps necessary in order to assume the planetary identity that corresponds to us and to recognise ourselves as a species that is diverse and united at the same time.

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Contact between culturally distinct human groups in the contemporary 'glocal' —global *and* local— world is much greater than at any point in history. The challenge we face is the identification of the most convenient ways to organise the coexistence of different human language groups in order that we might promote their solidarity as members of the same culturally developed biological species.

Processes of economic and political integration currently in motion are seeing increasing numbers of people seeking to become polyglots. Thus, English is establishing itself as the usual world supra-language, although it coexists with other lingua francas that are widely used in certain parts of the globe.

All this communicative reorganization of the human species may very well pose new problems and aggravate existing tensions as regards language and identity. It would seem that these processes comprise at least four major conceptual dimensions which must be taken into account above all else, as they are both widespread and, left unaddressed, may lead to significant social instability. These dimensions concern linguistic *recognition*, *communicability*, *sustainability* and *integration*.

While accepting the utility of having an inter-national language, the keystone of the system is clearly that it must ensure the linguistic *sustainability* of each group. The basic principle is likely to be functional *subsidiarity*, i.e., whatever can be done by the local language should not be done by another one which is more global. As in the quote from Paracelsus —“the dose alone makes the poison”— contact between languages is not 'poisonous' *per se*, but when the correct dose is exceeded it can prove harmful to the language whose position is weaker. A multilingual and communicated humanity is possible.