

ADORNO AND HEIDEGGER ON ART IN THE MODERN WORLD

Michael Baur

Many readers have noticed that the works of Adorno and Heidegger bear many striking similarities, especially with respect to the question of art and its place in the modern world. In this essay, I shall discuss some of these similarities, and then turn to what I consider to be a significant difference. Ultimately, I want to show what is at stake in the thought of Adorno and Heidegger in general.

Art as an Alternative Way of Experiencing

As is well known, both Adorno and Heidegger argue that the experience of art constitutes an "alternative" to the dominative reign of subjectivity which has come to pervade the modern world. Adorno refers to the repressive power of "rationality" (*Rationalität*) and "identity" (*Identität*) in our fully bureaucratized and "managed" world (*die verwaltete Welt*). In a similar vein, Heidegger speaks of the pervasiveness of "representational thinking" (*vorstellendes Denken*) which seeks to make everything available or disposable (*verfügbar*) for the purposes of a subjectivity that has become the "measure of all things." For both Adorno and Heidegger, art promises a way out of this oppressive modern rationality and subjectivism insofar as it constitutes an alternative kind of experiencing. As Adorno writes, works of art "slough off a repressive, external-empirical mode of experiencing the world."¹ In a similar fashion, Heidegger suggests that art can "foster the growth of the saving power" and thereby counter-act the threat posed by the all-consuming, homoge-

nizing tendency of what he calls the *Gestell*.²

It is clear that both Adorno and Heidegger think of art as providing a possible alternative to the repressive reign of "rationality" or "representational thinking" in the modern world; yet one must guard against an overly facile understanding of the two thinkers on this point. Contrary to common misconceptions, both Adorno and Heidegger insist that there is an essential kinship, yet difference, between the experience of art and the kind of experience to which art provides an alternative. As Adorno emphasizes throughout his *Aesthetic Theory*, art is intrinsically related to, yet distinguished from, the rationality of constitutive subjectivity; "art shares in rationality."³ Thus for Adorno, even artworks aim at some form of identity; "aesthetic identity is different, however, in one important respect: it is meant to assist the non-identical in its struggle against the repressive identification compulsion [*Identitätszwang*] that rules the outside world."⁴ Accordingly, art does not subvert from an entirely "extraneous standpoint,"⁵ but rather through a kind of "immanent critique."⁶ Of course, Adorno's position on art as a kind of "immanent critique" need not be very surprising; it is the logical extension of his philosophical manifesto outlined at the beginning of *Negative Dialectics*: "To use the strength of the subject to break through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity—that is, what the author felt to be his task ever since he came to trust his own mental impulses."⁷

In a similar vein, Heidegger speaks of a

basic kinship, yet difference, between art and the essence of technology. In his essay on "The Question Concerning Technology," he writes: "Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art."⁸ The kinship resides in the fact that both art and the *Ge-stell* are "ways of revealing, of *aletheia*."⁹ The difference has to do with the fact that the *Ge-stell* blocks the possibility "that man might be admitted more and sooner and ever more primally to the essence of what is unconcealed and to its unconcealment"¹⁰ (while art can open up and foster that possibility). As is the case with Adorno, Heidegger's position here on the relatedness of art and the *Ge-stell* reflects a more basic principle of his thought in general. This principle is expressed in Hölderlin's poem, "Patmos," which Heidegger often cites:

But where danger is, grows
The saving power also.¹¹

On the basis of the foregoing, one can draw the fairly simple conclusion: for both Adorno and Heidegger, art constitutes an "alternative" way of experiencing, but not an alternative that is so permeated by alterity that it is completely unrelated to the form of experience to which it is the alternative. Art is an alternative that promises alterity, yet at the same time remains akin to the sphere of rational subjectivity itself. In the next two sections of this essay, I shall attempt to show in greater detail how, for Adorno and Heidegger respectively, art provides an alternative to dominative, objectifying rationality.

Adorno on the Experience of Art

According to Adorno, art is "mimesis raised to the level of consciousness"¹²

(where mimesis is understood as the cognition of "the non-conceptual affinity of a subjective creation with its objective and unposited other").¹³ Adorno's discussion of a "non-conceptual affinity" between subject and object, however, does not imply that mimesis is non-rational; in fact, it does not even imply that mimesis is opposed to domination. For Adorno, mimesis is itself already a form of domination or control. As one reads in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, the magician, no less than the scientist, seeks to dominate and control; the difference is that the magician does so through mimesis, through the affinity of self and object, and not by a progressive distancing from the object.¹⁴ It is clear from this that the moment of mimesis does not, by itself, constitute a radically different, non-dominative form of relating to the world. All art, as the faculty of mimesis raised to the level of consciousness, involves domination. Adorno continues to emphasize this throughout his *Aesthetic Theory*; and he alludes to Nietzsche approvingly: "Art's own posture . . . is one of cruelty."¹⁵

If mimesis and art, according to Adorno, necessarily involve rationality and domination, one might well ask how art is supposed to provide any kind of alternative to the repressive way of experiencing which pervades the bureaucratized world. The answer, simply stated, is that art opposes this dominative rationality by radicalizing that very rationality itself. This radicalized form of aesthetic rationality, which emerges "in an unplanned way"¹⁶ from the mimetic impulse, is given the name of "construction":

The principle of construction postulates the dissolution of materials and components of art and the simultaneous imposition of unity. . . . This reflects the fate of all modern art in the present age, which is that it cannot escape being infected by the untruth of the repressive totality. All the same, construc-

tion today is the only possible shape that the rational moment in art can take. . . . What distinguishes construction from composition [in the sense of Renaissance art] is the unmitigated subjection not only of all that comes to it from outside but also of all partial moments inherent in the artistic process. To that extent construction is an extension of subjective domination which increasingly dissimulates its essence as it is being pushed farther and farther. Construction tears elements of reality away from their original context, altering them until they become susceptible to a new unity.¹⁷

While involving both rationality and domination, however, construction in art can provide an immanent critique of subjectivist rationality insofar as the “new unity” that emerges is not merely a moment of instrumental, subjectivist rationality, but is also a development of the material or the object. As Adorno writes, the “new” that emerges in art is not merely a “subjective category but a necessary outgrowth of the object itself.”¹⁸ Thus “it would be wrong to ascribe the aspect of violence in modernism or experimental art . . . to some kind of subjective orientation or to the psychological make-up of the artist.... The idea of construction has always implied the primacy of constructive methods over subjective imagination. . . . The unforeseen, then . . . has a moment of objectivity.”¹⁹ It is precisely because of this non-subjectivist form of domination that art (and in particular modern art) harbors within it a utopian impulse:

the subject in its quasi-logical universality is the functionary [*der Funktionär*] of an act of aesthetic synthesis, but the manifestation of subjectivity in the result, i.e., the work of art, tends to be immaterial [*gleichgültig*]. Hegel’s aesthetics is at its most profound where it recognizes this truly dialectical relationship, long before construc-

tivism came on the scene. Hegel considered art works to be subjectively accomplished at the point where the subject vanishes in them. It is through this process of vanishing rather than by deferential assimilation to reality that the work of art goes beyond mere subjective reason, if it does so at all. This is the Utopian aspect of construction.²⁰

In his essay “Vers une musique informelle,” Adorno makes the same claim: “The domination of the material—as the reflection of the composer’s ear—must be self-critically intensified to the point where it no longer comes up against heterogeneous matter. It must become a form of reaction by the compositional ear which at the same time dedicates itself passively to the tendency of the material.”²¹ Thus Adorno is left affirming a fundamental paradox: “By following the dynamic of self-sameness to the end, art works assimilate themselves to the non-identical.”²² (It is through the very radicalization of dominative rationality that art can function as a riddle or “question-mark” that critically confronts the dominative rationality of the bureaucratized world.) Thus for Adorno, “Art is rationality criticizing itself without being able to overcome itself.”²³ Because art is a perpetually aporetic self-critique of rationality, it is utopian in the etymological sense of the word. Art manifests a striving towards that which can never find a place in the sphere of the actual: “there is [in art] an irrepressible push by spirit in the direction of what is beyond spirit’s grasp.”²⁴

Adorno’s account of rationality’s aporetic self-critique in art points to another significant feature of his thought in general. For Adorno, the dominative and repressive power of rationality can be countered *only* through its radicalization in art. For Adorno, all thinking whatsoever is always already dominative and repressive; coercion is inher-

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ent in our thinking.²⁵ "To think is [already] to identify,"²⁶ and the tendency towards identity and integration finds its ultimate fulfillment in genocide.²⁷ Accordingly, there can be for Adorno no possible recourse to a kind of thinking that does not involve domination and control. For Adorno, repressive rationality cannot be countered by a non-repressive, non-objectifying form of thought; there is no such thing. It can be challenged only by being intensified in art.

Adorno's position here seems to lead to certain difficulties. For Adorno, all thought or rationality is necessarily coercive or dominative; furthermore, such coercion or domination can be challenged only through the radicalization of rationality in art. But while art can call into question rationality's drive towards identity and domination, it can never actually overcome it. The desired reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity remains a never-to-be-realized ideal. If this is the case, however, then Adorno's own belief in the liberating potential of art can itself never be justified from a standpoint internal to rational thought itself. As Adorno continually affirms, art itself can only challenge rational subjectivity, but can never actually deliver on its promise of a reconciliation between subjectivity and objectivity. For Adorno, then, the liberating potential of art can never be demonstrated on the basis of any given actuality. Thus Adorno's belief that art is potentially emancipatory—and not just another form of non-redemptive, dominative rationality—must be guided by a hope that is extraneous to rational thought itself. Even a philosophy of "negative dialectics" must ultimately take its bearings from a utopian, eschatological vision of a never-to-be-realized reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity. On its own, rational thought is not able to recognize and articulate what is problematic about its own coercive nature.

Adorno clearly confirms this in the final aphorism of his *Minima Moralia*:

The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in the face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by redemption: all else is reconstruction, mere technique. Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it as it will appear one day in the messianic light.... But beside the demand thus placed on thought, the question of the reality or unreality of redemption itself hardly matters.²⁸

Heidegger on the Experience of Art

As noted earlier, Heidegger is much like Adorno in that he affirms a fundamental kinship, yet difference, between art and the essence of technology. Art and the essence of technology are related insofar as both are ways of revealing. The two are nevertheless different as well, since the essence of technology, the *Ge-stell*, blocks access to the essence of unconcealment, while art can open it up. Also like Adorno, Heidegger asks how art can constitute an alternative to oppressive, subjectivist rationality. What is it that makes art different from the essence of technology, even though art must also be related to the *Ge-stell*? Heidegger approaches an answer to this question in his essay "The Origin of the Work of Art."

Works of art cannot be distinguished from other artifacts simply in virtue of their supposed "purposelessness." For to think in this way would be to fall prey to the very metaphysics of subjectivity which must be questioned in the first place. The very notion of "purpose" makes sense only in relation to the intending subject, which thus becomes the standard according to which something is said to be useful or not. But there is a further

problem as well. Insofar as one looks for some characteristic (e.g., “purposelessness,” “beauty,” etc.) that supposedly distinguishes the work of art from other things or artifacts, one is already on the wrong track. For if one is searching for a “distinguishing characteristic,” then one is already treating the work of art as a mere thing or artifact that attains distinctness only by virtue of some attendant quality or feature. The problem is not merely that one searches for the distinguishing feature in terms of purpose or purposelessness. The problem is that one is looking for a “distinguishing characteristic” at all. As Heidegger writes, the work of art is not a piece of equipment or artifact “that is fitted out in addition with an aesthetic value that adheres to it.”²⁹

One must not treat the work of art first as a mere thing or artifact which then attains aesthetic value by virtue of some additional distinguishing quality. Instead, one must turn first and foremost to “what is workly in the work” [*das Werkhafte des Werkes*]. Of course, this is not to deny that the work of art also has a “thingly element” to it [*das Dinghafte am Werk*]: “but if it [the thingly element] belongs admittedly to the work-being of the work, it must be conceived by way of the work’s workly nature” and not vice versa.³⁰ What, then, constitutes the work’s workly nature? Heidegger writes:

The art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings. This opening up, i.e., this revealing, i.e., the truth of beings, happens in the work. In the art work, the truth of beings has set itself to work. Art is truth setting itself to work.³¹

By this, Heidegger does not mean that the art work must be a correct representation of some particular being. Art does not have to represent anything at all.³² In the work of art, some particular being may indeed “come to stand in the light of its Being.”³³ But that is

not the whole story. The work of art reveals not merely the Being of some particular being that is present within the world; the work of art “opens up a world” in the first place. “To be a work [of art] means to set up a world.”³⁴ Thus the temple “first gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves.”³⁵ Similarly, “in the revelation of the equipmental being of the shoes [of the peasant woman] . . . beings as a whole attain to unconcealedness.”³⁶ In the work of art, it is not merely this or that particular truth, but rather the happening of truth itself that gets manifested. The work of art is a way of showing the happening of truth itself; it is a way of showing that simultaneously shows that the happening of truth is not restricted to the sphere of subjectivity and its representations.

Because art is a kind of human comportment that somehow pushes beyond the realm of mere representational thinking and subjectivity, one can no longer think of art in terms of the traditional form-matter distinction, a distinction which has provided the conceptual schema for all previous art theory and aesthetics;³⁷ for the traditional metaphysical terminology of “form” and “matter” involves a kind of “assault” upon beings.³⁸ Especially when form is correlated with the rational and matter with the irrational, “representational thinking has at its command a conceptual machinery that nothing is capable of withstanding.”³⁹ It is the form (the rational, whose standard resides within the subject) that determines the arrangement and the type of matter. Furthermore, the interfusion of form and matter itself is already determined in advance by the purposes that are to be served. The traditional metaphysical distinction of form and matter does not have its origin in the beings themselves, but in the purposive orientation of instrumental subjectivity. Accordingly, Heidegger speaks of

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“world” and “earth,” instead of “form” and “matter.”

As Heidegger writes, “earth” is that which “comes forth” in the art work. According to traditional metaphysics, or in the language of the philosophy of subjectivity, the earth would be called the matter or material. Thus in the metaphysical tradition, the earth is the Other of “rationality” that is dominated and used up for the purposes of intending subjectivity. In the art work, by contrast, this Other is allowed its own expression: “*The work [of art] lets the earth be an earth.*”⁴⁰ Of course the painter “uses” pigments, but in such a way that the color is not “used up” and forgotten, but allowed to shine forth instead: art does not try to relegate the Other of rationality to inconspicuousness and oblivion.⁴¹ Thus:

the temple-work, in setting up a world, does not cause the material to disappear, but rather causes it to come forth for the very first time and to come into the open region of the work’s world. The rock comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock; metals come to glitter and shimmer, colors to glow, tones to sing, the word to say.⁴²

The earth comes forth in the work of art, but it is not *merely* that which comes forth; it is also that into which the work “sets itself back” and lets itself be sheltered.⁴³ Artistic creation is a “letting be” of the earth,⁴⁴ and not a form of domination or control; the art work is thus set back and sheltered in the earth. This “setting back” is neither reflective nor objectifying, but is a form of “letting be,” or *Gelassenheit*, which betokens the most genuine happening of truth. As such, it parallels the comportment of the peasant woman who lives and works non-reflectively, sheltered by the earth.⁴⁵ As in the case of the peasant woman, truth happens most primordially insofar as one is *not* objectifying, reflecting, controlling, or trying to be-

come self-aware. Thus for Heidegger, the essence of truth is freedom: the freedom to “let be,” and thus to be claimed by what shows itself.⁴⁶ This kind of “being claimed” and “being sheltered” is operative even in the essence of technology (which is a way of revealing);⁴⁷ the difference is that the essence of technology dissimulates and covers up this truth, while the work of art manifests it.

Insofar as the happening of truth presupposes a non-reflective “being claimed,” there is inevitably always something going on “behind the back” of all reflection. Thus the happening of truth, of unconcealment, always involves concealment as well: “The earth is the spontaneous forthcoming of that which is continually self-secluding and to that extent sheltering and concealing.”⁴⁸ This inter-play of concealment and unconcealment is the primordial presupposition of all truth, including truth in the more limited sense of “correctness” of representation:

With all our correct representations we would get nowhere, we could not even presuppose that there already is manifest something to which we can conform ourselves, unless the unconcealedness of beings had already exposed us to, placed us in that lighted realm in which every being stands for us and from which it withdraws.⁴⁹

This inter-play of unconcealment and concealment is the presupposition of all revealing whatsoever, even in art and technology; but while the essence of technology is to cover this up, art can freely manifest it. Thus the inter-play of unconcealment and concealment is paralleled by the strife between earth and world which takes place in the work of art: “the world is the lighting of the paths of the essential guiding directions with which all decision complies. . . . The earth is that which rises up as self-closing.”⁵⁰

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The world, as the horizon of meaningfulness within which Dasein lives, “cannot endure anything closed. The earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there.”⁵¹ Thus the strife between earth and world reflects the essence of truth as concealment and unconcealment: “Each being we encounter and which encounters us keeps to this curious opposition of presencing in that it always withholds itself at the same time in a concealedness.”⁵² The strife between earth and world thus instigated by the work of art⁵³ is nothing other than the art work’s way of showing the creative tension in the happening of truth itself. Thus by letting the earth be the sheltering, self-concealing Other of subjectivist rationality, the work shows us the strife that is truth. “Truth wills to be established in the work as this strife of world and earth.”⁵⁴

In the strife between world and earth, each “opponent” carries the other beyond itself.⁵⁵ Thus the happening of truth belongs to neither side exclusively. Similarly, the primordial struggle of concealedness and unconcealedness is a togetherness that belongs wholly neither to rationality, nor to the Other of rationality, but that gets played out, as Heidegger often likes to say, “in between” (“*dazwischen*”): “Truth is not present among the things, nor does it occur in a subject; rather it lies—almost literally—in the middle ‘between’ the things and Dasein.”⁵⁶ The “in-between-ness” of truth (e.g., in art) is, furthermore, the reason why the real origin of the art work can lie neither in the artist, nor in the work itself, but rather in some third thing (“*ein Drittes*”).⁵⁷

Heidegger’s insistence on the “in-between-ness” of truth may sound much like Adorno’s own position. Like Heidegger, Adorno denies that truth in art belongs exclusively to the sphere of either subject or object: the truth of an art work coincides neither

with the “work’s facticity” nor with “the subjective idea or intention of the artist.”⁵⁸ But there is a significant difference between Heidegger and Adorno as well. While Heidegger agrees with Adorno that art challenges the dominative orientation of instrumental thinking, Heidegger denies that dominative rationality can be challenged only through art. When Heidegger refers to the happening of truth in the art work, he is not referring to a phenomenon that can be experienced only in art as such. Our non-objectifying “being-in-truth,” the prior kind of openness and letting-be that the art work makes manifest, is in fact the most basic and primordial presupposition of *all* our comportments to beings. The experience of art simply makes manifest to us the happening of truth which already claims us and thus constitutes our being; art makes manifest the non-objectifying comportment that always already lies at the basis of all objectification. Thus for Heidegger, unlike for Adorno, this non-objectifying, non-dominative kind of comportment can be recognized and explicated by thought, even apart from the experience of art. The kind of experience articulated by Heidegger in *Being and Time* (and afterwards) is meant to testify to this.

For Heidegger, our ability to question or challenge the hegemony of rational subjectivity does not depend on the experience of art. Furthermore, for Heidegger, our ability to recognize the liberating potential of art does not presuppose a utopian, eschatological vision of a never-to-be-realized reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity. Heidegger can deny the necessity of such a presupposition, since Heidegger (unlike Adorno) denies that all thinking is necessarily coercive or dominative. Because of this denial, Heidegger (unlike Adorno) can also affirm that thought as such is able to recognize and articulate what is problematic about

its own coercive nature, even apart from any utopian, eschatological vision.

Conclusion

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, one can see that Heidegger seems to escape some of the ostensible difficulties that confront Adorno regarding the critical capacity of thought. For Heidegger, not all thought is necessarily objectifying and dominating; and because of this, Heidegger can affirm the possibility of a non-objectifying comportment towards beings, even apart from the experience of art and apart from any utopian vision of a subject-object reconciliation. Nevertheless, one may very well ask whether Heidegger is left with some difficulties of his own. In denying that all thought is necessarily dominative and objectifying, Heidegger seems committed to a set of distinctions and dualisms inherited from the metaphysical tradition itself: the distinction between objectifying (primordial) and non-objectifying (derivative) forms of thought, the distinction between what is originary (*ursprünglich*) and derived, or (in Husserl's terminology) between what is founding (*fundierend*) and founded (*fundiert*). These distinctions are problematic, since, as Heidegger himself recognizes, such metaphysical distinctions are bound up with the objectifying orientation of rational subjectivity itself.

One might say that, compared to Heidegger, Adorno tries to be a more consistent critic of metaphysics. Like both Marx and Nietzsche, Adorno denies that there is any experience of beings or nature apart from that of instrumental, dominative reason. But in order to avoid the nihilistic implications of both the Marxian and Nietzschean legacies, Adorno is led to affirm that, in art, instrumental reason can radicalize itself in a way that begins to set the conditions for self-critique. "Art is rationality criticizing itself without being able to overcome it-

self."⁵⁹ In art, rationality can radicalize itself to the point where subjectivity begins to coincide with the development of the object (although it never actually does so). "Thus subjectivity in art becomes an integral part of objectivity."⁶⁰

With this reference to the promised unity of subjectivity and objectivity, Adorno reveals the extent of his indebtedness to Hegel. As with Hegel, the implicit *telos* of Adorno's thought is the reconciliation, or unity, of rational subjectivity and its Other (objectivity); such a reconciliation or unity would effectively overcome the domination and oppression exercised by rational subjectivity. Unlike Hegel, Adorno claims that this promised reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity can never become actual and thus must remain a perpetually hoped-for "beyond." For Adorno, since rational subjectivity is inevitably objectifying, thought that seeks to be genuinely liberating must ultimately take its bearings from a utopian, eschatological vision of the impossible unity of subject and object.

Unlike Adorno, Heidegger argues that we do not need to look beyond what is given in order to envision the possibility of a non-objectifying, non-dominative comportment towards beings. For Heidegger, all thought is always already indebted to a non-objectifying comportment that lies at its very basis. But unlike Adorno and unlike Hegel, Heidegger argues that the proper way to think about this non-objectifying thought is not in terms of the identity or reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity, but rather in terms of an ontological difference, i.e., in terms of the sheer givenness ("*es gibt*") of Being to thought, a givenness over which rational subjectivity itself has no control.

At the end of this confrontation between Adorno and Heidegger, we are left with the following problem. Adorno's thought borders on self-contradiction. According to

Adorno, all thought is intrinsically dominative; but if this were really the case, then thought itself would be unable to recognize and articulate what is problematic about itself. Heidegger's thought also borders on self-contradiction, but in a different way. Against Adorno, Heidegger denies that all thought is intrinsically objectifying and dominative. But in his attempt to distinguish between objectifying and non-objectifying forms of thought, Heidegger must resort to a cluster of metaphysical dualisms. Unfortunately, such dualisms are themselves bound up with the subjectivistic rationality which

Heidegger seeks to call into question. It remains for us, then, to ask whether there can be a non-objectifying, non-dominative form of consciousness that is presupposed in all thinking (as Heidegger suggests), but that is *also* the end point or *telos* of all thinking (as Adorno argues). It remains for us to ask whether we can think of the reconciliation of rational subjectivity and its Other as something that is simultaneously *both* "given" and "not yet." The confrontation between Heidegger and Adorno thus points us in the direction of Hegel.⁶¹

ENDNOTES

1. T. W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. C. Lenhardt, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 6. (This work will be cited henceforth as AT).
2. Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1977), pp. 315–16. (This essay will be cited henceforth as QCT).
3. AT, p. 79.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
7. Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1973), p. xx. (This work will be cited henceforth as ND).
8. QCT, p. 317.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 307.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 310 and 316.
12. AT, p. 367.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
14. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1972), p. 11.
15. AT, p. 74.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
21. Theodor W. Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. 16 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978), p. 537.
22. AT, p. 194.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
25. ND, p. 48.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 362.
28. Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, translated by E. F. N. Jephcott (London: New Left Books, 1974), p. 247.
29. Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, p. 166. (This essay will be cited henceforth as OWA).
30. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 164–65.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 158.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 162–63.

46. For more on freedom as the essence of truth, see Heidegger's essay, "On the Essence of Truth," in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, pp. 113–41.
47. Cf. QCT, pp. 296–301.
48. OWA, p. 172.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 174.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 175.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
56. Martin Heidegger, *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. 24 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), p. 305.
57. OWA, p. 149.
58. AT, p. 187.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
61. See Hegel's discussion of "The Actualization of Rational Self-consciousness through its own Activity," where he argues that the reconciliation of rational subjectivity and its Other can be understood as *both* the presupposition *and* the end point of the odyssey of Spirit. *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 211–17.

Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. 20064