

Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation **by Martin Heidegger**

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Translator's preface

When it comes to understanding the genesis and development of Heidegger's thought, it would be rather difficult to overestimate the importance of the "Aristotle-Introduction" of 1922, Heidegger's "Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle." This text is both a manifesto which describes the young Heidegger's philosophical commitments, as well as a promissory note which outlines his projected future work. This Aristotle-Introduction not only enunciates Heidegger's broad project of a philosophy which is both systematic and historical; it also indicates, in particular, why a principal (or fundamental) ontology can be actualized only through a destruction of the history of ontology. This text anticipates several central themes of *Being and Time* (e.g., facticity, death, falling), and also foreshadows some of the issues which were to occupy the later Heidegger (e.g., "truth" as a heterogeneous process of unconcealment). There is no doubt that much can – and will – be written on the meaning and implications of this important text. But instead of making my own, early contribution to such secondary literature, I have decided to limit myself in this "Preface" to a few brief remarks concerning the historical background to Heidegger's "Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle."

The immediate impetus behind the writing of Heidegger's Aristotle-Introduction was the opportunity for professional advancement. Since 1919, Heidegger had been working as an Assistant to Edmund Husserl and Instructor (*Privatdozent*) at the University of Freiburg. By mid-year 1922, word had reached Freiburg that two junior positions in philosophy would soon be opening in the German academic world: one junior position (being vacated by Nicolai Hartmann) was at the University of Marburg, and the

other junior position (being vacated by Hermann Nohl) was at the University of Göttingen. Paul Natorp (in Marburg) and Georg Misch (in Göttingen) both contacted Husserl in order to express their interest in considering the young Heidegger as a candidate for the openings. There was only one obstacle which stood in the way of Heidegger's candidacy: Heidegger had published nothing since 1916, when his "Habilitationsschrift" on Duns Scotus appeared in book form (this work is entitled "Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus", and has subsequently been published as part of Heidegger's *Frühe Schriften*). In order to compensate for this relative paucity of publications, it was decided that Heidegger should write a publishable manuscript outlining his current and projected future work. Heidegger composed his Aristotle-Introduction over a three-week period (from late September to mid-October, 1922), relying heavily on the notes which he had used in his courses for the past three years at Freiburg. The finished product – "Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle" – was sent promptly to Marburg and Göttingen.

The responses from both Marburg and Göttingen were not long in coming. In a letter dated 2 November 1922, Georg Misch explained why Heidegger was ranked second – behind Moritz Geiger – on the list of candidates for the job at Göttingen. Misch acknowledged that the Aristotle-Introduction demonstrated a thorough acquaintance with the relevant sources and an impressive originality of thought. The problem, however, was that Heidegger's primary intention was not to present a clear and unbiased account of the Aristotelian heritage – as one might wish – but rather to develop his own philosophical position. In connection with this, Misch complained that Heidegger's philosophical style was often more oppressive than liberating, and that the formulations in the Aristotle-Introduction had a somewhat "tortured" quality. The response from Marburg was also prompt, but it was much more favorable. As early as 30 October, Natorp had written to Husserl to tell him of the overwhelmingly positive impression which the Aristotle-Introduction had made on him. In an official communication to the Berlin ministry (dated 12 December 1922), the philosophical faculty at Marburg ranked Heidegger first on the list of candidates for the job. By the winter of 1923, Heidegger was giving his first lecture courses at the University of Marburg.

As is well known, Heidegger continued to distinguish himself throughout his philosophical career. But the early essay which helped to launch that career has an interesting story of its own. Sometime between 1922 and 1924, Paul Natorp gave his copy of the Aristotle-Introduction to Hans-Georg Gadamer, who was a student of his. Gadamer later took the manuscript with him to Leipzig; but in late 1943, during an Allied air raid on Leipzig, the "Marburg copy" of the Heidegger essay was lost. For-

tunately for us, the Göttingen copy of the manuscript had a rather different fate. In 1964, forty-two years after Heidegger had applied for the job at Göttingen, Georg Misch gave his copy of the Aristotle-Introduction to one of his students, Josef König. Without reading it, König put the manuscript into storage and subsequently forgot about it. It was believed that the Göttingen copy of the manuscript may also have been lost for good, until recently, when it was re-discovered among the papers of the late Josef König.

The text which comes to us through the papers of Joseph König was edited by Hans-Ulrich Lessing and published in 1989 in the *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* (Bd. 6). My English translation is based on the text as it appeared in the *Dilthey-Jahrbuch*. The original manuscript of Heidegger's Aristotle-Introduction is 51 typed pages. In my translation, I have inserted page numbers in brackets in order to indicate where each new page of the original manuscript begins. I am grateful to Graeme Nicholson, Theodore Kisiel, John van Buren, Joseph Kockelmans and Gregory Fried for helpful ideas and/or discussions pertaining to this translation. Also, I would like to thank Vittorio Klostermann for permission to translate and publish this text. The copyright to this translation, as well as to the original German text, belongs exclusively to Vittorio Klostermann, Publisher.

Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle*

by Martin Heidegger

translated by Michael Baur

Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation

The following investigations serve a history of ontology and logic. As interpretations, they stand under determinate conditions of interpreting and understanding. The content of every interpretation, that is, the thematic object in the How of its Being-interpreted, is able to speak appropriately for its own self only when the hermeneutical situation (to which every interpretation is relative) is made available as sufficiently and clearly distinguished. Every interpretation, each according to a particular field and knowledge-claim, has the following:

(1) a *visual stance* which is more or less expressly taken on [*zugeeignet*] and fixed;

(2) a *visual direction* which is motivated by (1) and within which the “As-what” [*das “als-was”*] and the “That-with-respect-to-which” [*das “woraufhin”*] of the interpretation are determined. The object of the interpretation is grasped anticipatorily in the “As-what”, and is interpreted according to the “That-with-respect-to-which”;

(3) a *visual breadth* which is limited with the visual stance and visual direction, and within which the interpretation’s claim to objectivity moves.

The potential actualization [*Vollzug*] of interpretation and understanding, as well as the appropriation of the object [*Gegenstandsaneignung*] which comes about in this actualization, are transparent to the degree that the situation (in which and for which an interpretation temporalizes itself [*sich zeitigt*]) is illuminated according to the three above-mentioned aspects. The hermeneutic unique to the situation has to develop its own transparency and has to bring this transparency, as hermeneutical, into the approach of the interpretation.

The situation of the interpretation, of the understanding appropriation of the past, is always the situation of a living present. History itself, the past which is taken on in understanding, [2] grows in its comprehensibility with the primordially [*Ursprünglichkeit*] of the decisive choice and formation of the hermeneutical situation. The past opens itself only according to the resoluteness [*Entschlossenheit*] and force of the ability-to-lay-open [*Aufschließenkönnen*] which a present has available to it. The primordially of a philosophical interpretation is determined by the specific sureness within which philosophical research maintains itself and its tasks.

The idea which philosophical research has concerning itself and concerning the concretion of its problematic also already decides its basic attitude towards the history of philosophy. What is to constitute the authentically questioned object-field for the philosophical problematic is determined by the visual direction into which alone the past can be placed. This reading-into [*Hineindeuten*] is not only not contrary to the sense of historical knowing, but is indeed the basic condition for bringing the past to expression. All interpretations in the field of the history of philosophy as well as in those other fields which strive (over against problem-historical “constructions”) not to read anything into the texts must admit that they too commit such reading-into, only they do so without orientation and with conceptual means from the most disparate and uncontrollable sources. One [thus] maintains a lack of worry [*Unbekümmertheit*] over what one “actually does” and a lack of knowledge about the related means for a shutting-out of any subjectivity.

The clarification of the hermeneutical situation for the following interpretations and thus for the demarcation of their thematic field stems from the basic conviction that philosophical research, according to its Being-character, is something that a “time” – so long as that time is not concerned with it merely in relation to [3] education – can never borrow from another; but philosophical research is also something that will never want to claim to be allowed to, and be able to, take away from future times the burden and the worry [*Bekümmern*] of radical questioning; this is how philosophical research has understood itself and its possible sense of achievement in human Dasein. The effectiveness of the philosophical research which has become the past, the possibility of its having an effect upon its future, can never be situated in the results as such, but rather is grounded in the primordially of the questioning which has been achieved and concretely cultivated, and through which such research – as a problem-awakening model – is able to become the present ever anew.

The object of philosophical research is human Dasein as it is interrogated with respect to its Being-character. This basic direction of philosophical questioning is not added on and attached to the questioned object, factual life, externally; rather it is to be understood as the explicit grasping of a basic movement of factual life; factual life is in such a way that in the concrete temporalizing [*Zeitigung*] of its Being it is concerned about its Being, even when it avoids itself. Factual life has a character of Being such that it finds its own self difficult to bear. The most unmistakable manifestation of this is factual life’s tendency towards making things easy for itself. In this difficulty of bearing itself, life (according to the basic sense of its Being) *is* difficult, but not in the sense of an accidental quality. When factual life authentically is what it is in this Being-heavy and Being-

difficult, then the genuinely appropriate way of access to it and way of truthfully safe-keeping it [*Verwahrungsweise*] can only consist in making it difficult. Philosophical research must fulfill this duty, if it does not want to miss its object completely. [4] All making-easy, all misleading currying of favors with regard to needs, all metaphysical reassurances based on what is primarily just book-learning – all of this leads already in its basic aim to a failure to bring the object of philosophy within sight and within grasp, let alone to keep it there. Philosophy's own history is thus objectively present for philosophical research in a relevant sense, if and only if it provides not diverse curiosities, but rather radically simple *things worthy of thought*; i.e. if the history of philosophy does not distract the understanding present into seeking an enlargement of knowledge, but rather forces the present back upon itself so that it may heighten what is questionable. Such an appropriation of history through worry means, however – and especially for a present within whose Being-character historical consciousness is constitutive – the following: to understand radically what a particular past [form of] philosophical research posed in *its* situation and for that situation in its basic worry. *To understand* means not simply to accept established knowledge, but rather to repeat primordially that which is understood in terms of its own situation and for that situation. This happens least of all in the borrowing of theorems, propositions, basic concepts, and principles, and in the revival of these, no matter how that may be conducted. The understanding use of models, a kind of use which is concerned about its own self, will subject the models to the sharpest critique and will shape them into a possible fruitful opposition. Factual Dasein is what it is always only as its own, and not as the general Dasein of some universal humanity, concern for which can only be an illusory task. The *critique* of history is always only the critique of the present. Critique cannot be of the naive opinion that it can calculate for history how it should have taken place, if.... Rather critique must keep its view to the present and must see to it that [5] it asks questions in a manner which is appropriate to a primordially within its own reach. History is not negated because it is “false”, but rather because it still remains effective in the present, yet still without being able to be a present which is authentically taken on.

The fixing of the basic historical attitude regarding interpretation grows out of the explication of the sense of philosophical research. Its object was defined in an indicative fashion as *factual human Dasein as such*. The concrete specification of the philosophical problematic is to be derived from this, its object. For this reason a first preliminary highlighting of the specific objective character of factual life becomes necessary. But not only because it is the *object* of philosophical research, but also because philosophical research itself constitutes a determinate *How* of factual life

and, as such, in its actualization, it co-temporalizes the concrete Being of life as it is in itself, and not first through some “application” after the fact. The possibility of such a co-temporalizing is grounded in the fact that philosophical research is the explicit actualization of a basic movement of factual life and maintains itself always within factual life.

In this indication of the hermeneutical situation, the structures of the object, “factual life”, will not be concretely specified and will not be grasped in their constitutive dove-tailings with one another; rather, what is meant by the term “factual life” will be brought into view simply through the enumeration of the most important constitutive elements of facticity; and so what is meant by the term “factual life” will be made available as a *plan* [*Vorhabe*] for the concrete investigation.

The confusing ambiguity of the word “life” and of its application must not become grounds for simply getting rid of the word. For then one renounces the possibility of investigating the directions of meaning [6] which happen to belong to that word and which alone make it possible to reach the objectivity which is meant in each instance. In connection with this one must in principle keep in view the fact that the term ζωή, *vita*, means a basic phenomenon, upon which the Greek, the Old Testament, the New Testament-Christian, and the Greek-Christian interpretations of human Dasein are all centered. The ambiguity of the term will have its roots in the intended object itself. For philosophy, this uncertainty of meaning can only be an occasion for eliminating it, or for making it into an expressly appropriated and transparent uncertainty, provided that it is indeed a necessary one based in the object. This focus on ambiguity (πολλαχως λεγόμενον) is not an empty poking about among isolated word meanings, but rather is the expression of the radical tendency to make the intended objectivity itself accessible and to make available the motive source of the different ways of meaning.

The basic sense of the movement of factual life is *caring* [*Sorgen*] (*curare*). In the directed, caring “Being-out-toward-something” [*Aussein auf etwas*], the That-with-respect-to-which [*das Worauf*] of life’s care, the world at any given time, is there, present. The movement of caring has the character of *dealings* [*Umgang*] which factual life has with its world. The That-with-respect-to-which of care is the With-what of the dealings. The sense of the Being-real and Being-there of the world is grounded in and determined through the world’s character as the With-what of the caring dealings. The world is there as already always somehow grasped in care. The world expresses itself according to the possible directions of care as *world-environment* [*Umwelt*], *world-with* [*Mitwelt*], and *self-world* [*Selbstwelt*]. Correspondingly, caring is the care of livelihood, of profession, of enjoyment, of Being-undisturbed, of not dying, of Being-familiar-

with, of knowing-about, of making life secure in its final goals.

[7] The movement of concern [*des Besorgens*] shows manifold ways of actualization and of Being-related to the With-what of the dealings: tinkering about with, preparing of, producing of, guaranteeing through, making use of, utilizing for, taking possession of, holding in truthful safe-keeping, and forfeiting of. The With-what of the routine-directive [*verrichtend*] dealings, the With-what which corresponds to each of these different ways of actualization, stands in each case within a particular knowledge and familiarity. The caring dealings have their With-what always within a particular view; within the dealings, *circumspection* [*Umsicht*] is alive, and both guides and co-temporalizes the dealings. Caring is circumspecting [*Sichumsehen*], and as circumspect [*umsichtig*] it is at the same time concerned about the cultivation of circumspection, and about safeguarding and increasing the familiarity [that one has] with the object of the dealings. In circumspection, the With-what of the dealings is anticipatorily grasped as ..., oriented towards ..., interpreted as ... What is objective exists [*ist da*] as what is signified as such and such; the world is encountered in the character of significance [*Bedeutsamkeit*]. The caring dealings do not only have the possibility of giving up the care of orienting [*des Ausrichtens*]; rather, on the basis of a primordial tendency of movement within factual life, they have an inclination to do so. In this closing off of the tendency towards concerned dealings, the dealings become a mere circumspecting without any foresight regarding the directing and the orienting. The circumspecting gains the character of a bare *observing* [*Hinsehen auf*]. In the care of observing, of curiosity (*cura*, *curiositas*), the world is there, not as the With-what of the routine-directive dealings, but rather merely with regard to its *appearance* [*Aussehen*]. The observing is actualized as an observing determining, and can organize itself as *science*. This is thus a way of concerned, observing dealings with the world, a way which is temporalized by factual life. As such a movement of dealings, it is a way of Being of factual life and co-constitutes the Dasein of factual life. The state of observing which is achieved at any given time (the determinateness of the objective connections of the world with respect to [8] their appearance) coalesces with circumspection. The circumspecting is actualized in the manner of *claiming* [*Ansprechen*] and *discussing* [*Besprechen*] the objectivity of the dealings. The world is always encountered within a determinate way of Being-claimed, of some claim (*λόγος*).

In Being-released-from the tendencies of directing, the dealings take-a-pause [*einen Aufenthalt*]. The observing becomes in itself an autonomous [form of] dealings, and as such it is a defining [kind of] taking-a-pause with what is objective via abstaining from going-to-work. The objects are there as *significant*, and it is only in determinately directed and layered theorizing

that what is objective (in the sense of what is simply object-like and thing-like) arises from the world's factual character of encountering (i.e., from what is significant).

Factual life moves always within a determinate *interpretedness* which has been handed down, or revised, or re-worked anew. Circumspection gives to life its world as interpreted according to those respects in which the world is expected and encountered as the object of concern, in which the world is put to tasks, in which the world is sought as refuge. These respects are available [to factual life], but most of the time not expressly so; factual life, on the path of habit, rather *slips* into these respects more than it expressly takes them on; these respects map out for the movement of care the paths within which this movement is actualized. The interpretedness of the world is factually that interpretedness within which life itself stands. Also established in the interpretedness of the world is the direction in which life holds its own self in care; that means, however, that there is also established a determinate sense of the Dasein of life (the "As-what" and the "How"), within which human beings maintain themselves in their plans.

The movement of care is not an *occurrence* of life which transpires for itself, over against the existing [*daseiend*] world. [9] The world is there in life and for life, but not in the sense of merely Being-intended and Being-observed. How the world is there, its Dasein, gets temporalized only when factual life takes-a-pause within its concerned movement of dealings. This Dasein of the world is what it is only as having grown from a particular taking-a-pause. This presence of the world – as actuality [*Wirklichkeit*] and reality [*Realität*], or even in the objectivity of nature (which is impoverished of all significance) – must for the most part provide the point of departure of the epistemological and *ontological* problematic. The taking-a-pause is, as *such*, in and for the basic movement of the *concerned* dealings.

However, the concern is for its own part not just in general and in its primordial intentionality related to its world. The movement of concern is not an indifferent actualization such that with it in general something happens only in life and such that it is itself a kind of occurrence. There is alive in the movement of caring an *inclination* of caring towards the world as the *tendency* towards absorption in the world, a tendency towards a letting-oneself-be-taken-along by the world. This tendency of concern is the expression of a basic factual tendency of life, a tendency towards the *falling away* from one's own self [*Abfallen von sich selbst*] and thereby towards the *falling prey* to the world [*Verfallen an die Welt*], and thus towards the *falling apart* of oneself [*Zerfall seiner selbst*]. Let the basic character of the movement of caring be terminologically fixed as factual life's *inclination towards falling* [*Verfallensgeneigtheit*] (or, in brief, the *falling-prey-to* – [*das Verfallen an* –]); and with this, the sense of direction

and the intentional That-with-respect-to-which of the tendency of caring is also indicated. The falling is to be understood, not as an objective event and not as something that simply “happens” in life, but rather as an intentional How. This tendency [*Hang*] is the innermost *fate* [*Verhängnis*] which life factually bears. The How of this bearing in itself (as the way in which the fate “is”) must be determined, along with the fate itself, as a constituent of facticity.

[10] This character of movement is not a bad quality which surfaces from time to time, a quality which could be cultivated away in the more progressive and happier times of human culture. This is so little the case, that even such formulations of human Dasein in a desired perfection and heavenly naturalness are themselves only extensions of this very inclination towards falling prey to the world. In closing one’s eyes to life’s ownmost character of movement, life becomes viewed as something world-laden [*welthaft*], as an object of dealings which is producible in some ideal form, as the That-with-respect-to-which of plain concern.

The fact that factual life, in its inclination towards falling, arrives at such a world-laden interpretation of itself gives expression to a basic characteristic of this movement: this movement is *tempting* [*versucherisch*] for life itself, insofar as it spreads across life’s way possibilities (which are drawn from the world) of an idealizing taking-it-easy and thus of a missing of oneself. As tempting, the tendency towards falling is at the same time *comforting*, i.e. it detains factual life in the locations of its fallen-ness, such that life claims and caringly shapes these locations as quasi-situations of unworried security and of the most ideal effective possibilities. (In contrast to *location* [*Lage*], the *situation* [*Situation*] of factual life denotes life’s taking-of-a-stance which is made transparent as falling and which is *apprehended* in the given concrete worry as in the possible counter-movement to falling caring.) As comforting, the tendency towards falling (which breeds temptation) is *alienating* [*entfremdend*]; that means that factual life becomes more and more alien to itself in its being absorbed in the world about which it is concerned; and the movement of caring (which is left up to itself and which appears to itself as life) increasingly takes away from factual life the factual possibility of seeing itself in worry¹ and [11] thus the possibility of taking itself as the goal of appropriating return. In its three types of movement – temptation, comfort, and alienation – the tendency towards falling is the basic movement not only of the orienting, productive dealings, but also of circumspection itself and of its possible autonomy, of the observing and of the claiming and interpreting which define knowing. Factual life takes itself and cares for itself not only as a significant occurrence and as the importance [*Wichtigkeit*] of the world, but also speaks the *language* of the world, so long as it speaks with its own self.

Within the inclination towards falling there lies the fact that factual life, which is actually always the factual life of the individual, is for the most part not lived as factual life. Factual life moves instead within a particular *averageness* of caring, of dealing, of circumspection, and of grasping the world. This averageness is the averageness of the *general public* at any given time, of the surrounding area, of the dominating trend, of the “Just like the many others, too”. It is “they” [*das “man”*] who factually live the individual life. They care about, they see, judge, they enjoy, they do and ask. Factual life gets lived by the “nobody”, to which all life sacrifices its concern. Life exists [*ist*] as always somehow bogged down in inauthentic tradition and habituation. Out of these [i.e. inauthentic tradition and habituation], there arise needs, and, in these, the ways of fulfilling the needs are pursued in concern. Within the world in which it is absorbed and within the averageness in which it goes about, life hides from itself. The tendency towards falling is life’s evasion of itself. Factual life itself provides the keenest manifestation of this basic movement through the manner in which it stands towards *death*.

Just as factual life, in accordance with its Being-character, is not a series of events, so too death is not a ceasing which enters onto the scene at some time and which has the character [12] of a snapping-off of this series of events. Death is something that is imminent for factual life; it is something before which factual life stands as before something inevitable. Life is in such a way that its death is always somehow there for it; its death stands in view there for it; and this is so even if “the thought of death” is shut out and suppressed. Death presents itself as the object of care, precisely in the fact that it is encountered as a How of life in the obstinacy of its imminence. The forced lack of worry about death within life’s care gets actualized through flight into world-laden concerns. The looking-away from death, however, is so little a grasping of life in itself, that it becomes precisely life’s own evasion of life and an evasion of life’s authentic Being-character. The having of death as imminent, both in the manner of the concern which takes flight, as well as in the manner of the worry which takes hold [of life], is constitutive for facticity’s Being-character. In the having of *certain* death (a having which *takes hold* [of life]), life becomes visible in itself. Death which exists in this way gives to life a [kind of] sight, and continually brings life before its ownmost present and past, a past which comes from within life itself, burgeoning behind life.

When time and again the attempt is made to determine the object-character and Being-character of factual life, yet without mentioning the fundamental co-constituent of death and the “having of death” (a co-constituent which *guides the problematic*), the omission is such that it cannot be corrected again by merely adding further supplements. The pure

and constitutive ontological problematic concerning the Being-character of death which is described here has nothing to do with a metaphysics of immortality and a metaphysics of the “What next”? As a constituent of facticity, the death which one has as imminent (and which one has in a manner, characteristic of death, such that life’s [13] present and past are made visible) is at the same time the phenomenon out of which the specific “temporality” [“*Zeitlichkeit*”] of human Dasein is to be explicatively highlighted. The basic sense of the *historical* is determined from the sense of *this temporality*, and never through the formal analysis of concept-formation within a particular writing of history.

The constitutive characters of facticity which have been indicated – caring, the tendency towards falling, the How of the having of death – appear to run counter to what has been emphasized as the basic characteristic of factual life, namely that it is a being which, in the manner of its temporalizing, depends on its own Being. But that only appears to be the case. In all of its “getting out of its own way”, life is factually there for its own self; precisely in the “away from itself”, life presents itself and chases after its absorption in world-laden concern. Like every movement of factual temporality, the “absorption-in” has in itself a more or less expressed and unacknowledged view-back towards the thing *from which* it flees. The From-which of its fleeing, however, is life itself as the factual possibility of being expressly apprehended as an object of worry. Any dealings have their own circumspection; this circumspection brings the With-what of the dealings (a With-what within the authenticity which is achievable at any given time) into the guiding fore-view. The Being of life in itself, which is accessible within facticity itself, is of such a kind that it becomes visible and reachable only by way of the *detour* through the counter-movement against falling care. This counter-movement, as life’s worrying about not becoming lost, is the way in which the possible and apprehended authentic Being of life temporalizes itself. Let this Being, which is accessible in factual life and to factual life as the Being of factual life itself, be called *Existenz*. [14] As worried about *Existenz*, factual life is *on a detour* [*umwegig*]. The possibility of apprehending the Being of life in worry is at the same time the possibility of failing to see *Existenz*. The possible *Existenz* of factual life (as in itself something which life can fail to see) is in principle questionable. The possibility of *Existenz* is always the possibility of concrete facticity as a How of the temporalizing of this facticity in its temporality. It is impossible to ask in a direct and general manner what *Existenz* shows. *Existenz* becomes understandable in itself only through the making questionable of facticity, that is, in the concrete *destruction* of facticity with respect to its motives for movement, with respect to its directions, and with respect to its deliberate availabilities.

The counter-movement against the tendency towards falling must not be interpreted as flight from the world. It is typical of all flight from the world that it does not intend life in its existentiell [*existenziell*] character, i.e. it does not apprehend life in the questionableness which lies at its roots; it is typical of flight from the world rather to [imaginatively] insert life into a new, comforting *world*. Through worry about Existenz, nothing is changed in the factual position of life at any given time. What is changed is the How of the movement of life, which as such can never become a matter for the general public or for the “they”. The concern involved in the dealings is a concern which is worried about the self. For its own part, factual life’s worrying about its Existenz is not a brooding about oneself in egocentric reflection; it is what it is only as the counter-movement against life’s tendency towards falling, i.e. it takes place precisely in the concrete movement of dealings and of concern. Thus the “*against*” (as the “*not*”) expresses a primordial achievement which is constitutive of Being. With respect to its constitutive sense, negation has primordial primacy over position. And this is because the Being-character of the human being is factually determined through a falling, through that world-laden tendency. [15] The sense of this most basic fact itself, and the sense of this factuality as such, can only be interpreted – if it can be interpreted at all – in and relative to facticity as it is *apprehended*. The actualizing of the insight, and of life’s insightful claiming, with respect to life’s existentiell possibility has the character of a worried interpretation of life according to its sense of Being. Facticity and Existenz do not mean the same thing, and life’s factual Being-character is not determined by Existenz; Existenz is only one possibility which temporalizes itself *within the* Being of life (which is characterized as factual). But this means that the possible radical problematic concerning the Being of life is centered in facticity.

First of all, if philosophy is not a contrived preoccupation with just any “generalities” whatsoever, and with arbitrarily posited principles (a preoccupation which merely runs alongside life itself); but if it exists [*ist*] rather as *questioning* knowledge, i.e. as *research*, simply as the genuine, explicit actualization of the tendency towards interpretation which belongs to life’s own basic movements (movements within which life is concerned about itself and its own Being); and secondly, if philosophy intends to view and to grasp factual life in its decisive possibilities of Being; i.e. if philosophy has decided radically and clearly on its own (without regard for any bustling-about with respect to world-views) to make factual life speak for itself on the basis of its very own factual possibilities; i.e. if philosophy is *fundamentally atheistic*² and if it understands this about itself; – then it has decisively chosen factual life in its facticity and has made this an object for itself. [16] The How of philosophy’s research is the interpretation of this

sense of Being with respect to its basic categorial structures, i.e. the ways in which factual life temporalizes itself and *speaks* with itself in such temporalizing (κατηγορειν). Philosophical research does not need the finery of world-views or the hurried care about not-coming-along-too-late, and yet-still-coming-along, within the confusions of a present moment; this is so, as long as philosophy has understood, on the basis of its apprehended object, that with this object there is entrusted to philosophy the primordial Being-related [*seinsmäßig*] conditions of the possibility of any world-view as something to be questioned; i.e. as something that becomes visible only in the rigor of research. These conditions are not “logical forms”; they are rather, as categorially understood, also already the possibilities of the factual temporalizing of Existenz, possibilities which are grasped in their genuine availability.

The problematic of philosophy has to do with the *Being* of factual life. In this regard, philosophy is principal *ontology* [*prinzipielle Ontologie*], and it is so in such a way that the determinate, singular, world-laden regional ontologies receive the ground and sense of their own problems from the ontology of facticity. The problematic of philosophy has to do with the Being of factual life in the How of its Being-claimed and Being-interpreted at any given time. This means that philosophy, as the ontology of facticity, is at the same time the categorial interpretation of the claiming and interpreting; that is, it is *logic*.

Ontology and logic are to be brought back into the primordial unity of the problematic of facticity and are to be understood as the expressions of principal research; this principal research can be described as the *phenomenological hermeneutics* of facticity.

[17] Philosophical research has to make the ever concrete interpretations of factual life (i.e. the interpretations of caring circumspection and of concerned insight) categorially transparent in their factual unity within the temporalizing of life; philosophical research has to make these interpretations transparent with respect to their *plans* [*Vorhabe*] (into whose basic sense of Being life places itself) and in relation to their *preconceptions* [*Vorgriff*] (within whose ways of claiming and discussing factual life speaks to itself and with itself). The hermeneutic is phenomenological; this means that its object-field, factual life with respect to the How of its Being and its speaking, is seen thematically and research-methodically as a *phenomenon*. The structure of the object, a structure which characterizes something as a phenomenon, i.e. *full intentionality* (Being-related-to, the That-with-respect-to-which of the relating as such, the actualization of the relating, the temporalizing of the actualization, the truthful safe-keeping of the temporalizing) is none other than that of an object having the Being-character of factual life. Intentionality, taken simply as Being-related-to, is

the first phenomenal character of the basic movement of life (i.e. of caring) which can be brought into relief immediately. Phenomenology is radical philosophical research itself, just as it was in its first breakthrough in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. One has not apprehended phenomenology in its most central motives if one sees in it (as is sometimes the case within phenomenological research itself) only a philosophical pre-science for the purpose of preparing clear concepts with whose help alone some *authentic* philosophy is then supposed to be set in motion – as if one could descriptively clarify basic philosophical concepts without the central and always newly appropriated [*zugeeignet*] basic orientation towards the object of the philosophical problematic itself.

With this there is indicated the *visual stance* which the following interpretations, as phenomenological and as [18] investigations into the history of ontology and logic, will take. The idea of the phenomenological hermeneutic of facticity includes within it the tasks of: formal and material logic and a theory of their objects; the theory of science; the “logic of philosophy”; the “logic of the heart”; the logic of “pre-theoretical and practical” thought; and it includes these within itself, not as some unifying collective concept, but rather according to its own effective force as the principal approach of the philosophical problematic.

But it has still not become understandable what kind of role historical investigations are supposed to play for such a hermeneutic, and just why *Aristotle* is being placed within the theme of the investigation; and furthermore it is not clear how the investigation is to be carried through. The motivations for the particular *visual directions* emerge from the *concrete* setting of the visual stance. The very idea of facticity implies that only *authentic* [*eigentlich*] facticity – understood in the literal sense of the word: one's own [*eigen*] facticity – that is, the facticity of one's own time and generation, is the genuine object of research. On account of its inclination towards falling, factual life lives for the most part in what is inauthentic, i.e. in what is handed down, in what is reported to it, in that which it appropriates in its averageness. Even that which is primordially cultivated as one's own authentic possession falls prey to averageness and publicness; it loses the specific sense of origin which belonged to its primordial situation and it arrives, freely floating, in the ordinariness of the “they”. This falling affects all of factual life's dealings and circumspection; and it affects not least of all life's own actualizing of interpretation according to its plans and pre-conceptions. Philosophy, in the manner of its asking questions and finding answers, also stands within this movement of facticity, since philosophy is simply the explicit interpretation of factual life.

Accordingly, the philosophical hermeneutic of facticity necessarily makes its own beginning within its factual situation, and it does so within

an already given particular interpretedness of factual life which first [19] sustains the philosophical hermeneutic itself and which can never be completely eradicated. According to what has been said about the tendency towards falling which affects every interpretation, it follows that precisely “*what is obvious*” about this interpretedness (what is not discussed about it, what is assumed not to require any further clarification) will be that which *inauthentically* (i.e. without explicit appropriation on the basis of its origins) maintains the dominating effective force as regards the posing of the problems and the direction of the questioning.

The claiming and self-interpreting which are actualized by factual life itself receive their visual pathway and manner of speaking from what is objective as world-laden. Where human life, Dasein, the human being, is the object of an interpretatively defining kind of questioning, this objectivity stands within [one’s] plans as a world-laden occurrence, as “nature” (the mental is understood as nature, and the same goes for spirit and life, which are understood in an analogous categorial articulation). There are intellectual-historical motives for the fact that we today still speak of the “nature” of the human being, of the soul, and in general of the “nature of the thing”, and also for the fact that we talk about this [kind of] objectivity categorially, i.e. in categories which stem from a particular explication, from “nature” as seen in a particular way. Even where the objects fundamentally are no longer approached as “substances” in a crude sense (an approach, by the way, from which Aristotle was far removed, contrary to what is often taught) and where the objects are not interrogated according to their occult qualities, the interpretation of life nevertheless moves within basic concepts, within questioning approaches, and within tendencies of explication, all of which have arisen from experiences of objects, experiences which we today no longer have – and for quite some time have not had – available to us.

For the most part, the philosophy of today’s situation moves inauthentically within the *Greek* conceptuality, and indeed within a conceptuality which has been pervaded by a chain of diverse interpretations. The basic concepts have lost their primordial functions of expression, functions which are particularly suited to particularly experienced regions of objects. [20] But in all the analogizing and formalizing which have penetrated these basic concepts, there remains a particular character of origin; these basic concepts still carry with them a part of the genuine tradition of their primordial meaning, insofar as there is still detectable in them the meaning-direction which goes back to their objective source. By beginning with the idea of the human being, the ideals of life, and representations of the Being of human life, the philosophy of today’s situation moves within off-shoots of basic experiences which have been temporalized by Greek ethics and

above all by the Christian idea of the human being and of human Dasein. Even anti-Greek and anti-Christian tendencies persist fundamentally within the same visual directions and ways of interpreting. Thus the phenomenological hermeneutic of facticity sees itself as called upon to loosen up the handed-down and dominating interpretedness in its hidden motives, unexpressed tendencies, and ways of interpreting; and to push forward by way of a *dismantling return* [*im abbauenden Rückgang*] towards the primordial motive sources of explication; the phenomenological hermeneutic of facticity sees itself called in this way, insofar as it wants to help today's [philosophical] situation along through interpretation towards a radical possibility of appropriation (and this in the manner of a making-attentive which first provides concrete categories). *The hermeneutic carries out its task only on the path of destruction* [*nur auf dem Wege der Destruktion*]. So long as it has understood the manner of objectivity and the manner of Being of its thematic That-with-respect-to-which (the facticity of life), philosophical research is "historical" knowing in the radical sense of that term. For philosophical research, the destructive confrontation [*Auseinandersetzung*] with philosophy's history is not merely an annex for the purposes of illustrating how things were earlier; it is not an occasional review of what others "did" earlier; it is not an opportunity for the [21] projection of entertaining world-historical perspectives. The destruction is rather the authentic path upon which the present must encounter [*begegnen*] itself in its own basic movements; and it must encounter itself in such a way that through this encounter the continual question springs forth from history to face the present: to what extent is it (the present) itself worried about the appropriations of radical possibilities of basic experiences and about their interpretations? The tendencies towards a radical logic of origins and the approaches to ontologies thereby gain a principal critical elucidation. Thus the critique which simply and already arises from the concrete actualization of the destruction does not apply to the bare fact *that* we stand within a tradition, but applies rather to the *How*. What we do not interpret and express primordially is what we do not possess in authentic truthful safe-keeping. It is factual life (and that means at the same time the possibility of Existenz which lies in factual life) which is to be brought into a temporalizing truthful safe-keeping; thus if such life renounces the primordially of interpretation, then it also renounces the possibility of receiving its own self in rooted possession; and this means that it renounces the possibility of *being* [*zu sein*].

The intertwined-ness of the decisive constitutive effective forces of the Being-character of today's situation (with reference to the problem of facticity) is to be described briefly as the *Greek-Christian interpretation of life*. The anti-Greek and anti-Christian tendencies of interpretation (which

are determined by and relative to the Greek-Christian interpretation of life) shall also be contained within this description. The idea of the human being and of human Dasein which is set within such an interpretation determines the philosophical anthropology of *Kant* as well as that of German Idealism. *Fichte*, *Schelling* and *Hegel* start from *theology* and borrow from it the basic impulses for their speculation. This theology is rooted in [22] Reformation theology; such Reformation theology succeeded to only a very small extent in achieving a genuine explication of *Luther's* new basic religious position and of its immanent possibilities. For its own part, this basic position resulted from *Luther's* primordially appropriated [*zugeeignet*] interpretations of Paul and of Augustine, and from his simultaneous confrontation with late-Scholastic theology (Duns Scotus, Ockham, Gabriel Biel, Gregory of Rimini).

The late-Scholastic doctrines concerning God, the Trinity, the situation before the Fall, sin, and grace all operate with the conceptual means which Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure provided for theology. But that means that the idea of the human being and of the Dasein of life which is determined in advance within all of these theological problem-areas is based upon the Aristotelian "Physics", "Psychology", "Ethics", and "Ontology"; and thus the basic Aristotelian doctrines are treated according to a particular selection and interpretation. At the same time Augustine is crucially influential as well; and through Augustine, so too is neo-Platonism; and through neo-Platonism, *Aristotle* is once again influential, and this to a greater extent than is ordinarily assumed. These connections are more or less familiar in their bare literary-historical filiations. What is missing completely is an authentic interpretation with its central foundation in the basic philosophical problematic of facticity, as it has been revealed [above]. The research of the Middle Ages, in its leading respects, is constrained within the schematism of a neo-Scholastic theology and within the framework of a neo-Scholastically molded Aristotelianism. First of all, it is necessary in general to understand the scientific structure of medieval theology, as well as its exegeses and commentaries, as particularly mediated interpretations of life. Theological anthropology must be traced back to its basic philosophical experiences and motives; only with reference to these can one understand the influential forces and the manner of reformulation, a reformulation which originated from the basic [23] religious and dogmatic attitude of the time.³ The hermeneutical structure of commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (which bore the authentic development of theology up until Luther) is not only not laid bare as such; the very possibility of *questioning and approaching* it is lacking. Even those things which were brought into Lombard's Sentences in the manner of and in selections from Augustine, Jerome, and John Damascene are

already important for the development of medieval anthropology. In order to have any standard for these reformulations at all, there must be available an interpretation of Augustinian anthropology which does not simply excerpt propositions on psychology from his works, in the manner of some textbook on psychology or moral theology. The center of such an interpretation of Augustine with respect to the basic ontological-logical constructions of his life's teaching should be taken from his writings on the Pelagian controversy and from his teachings on the Church. The idea of the human being and of Dasein which is effective here points back to Greek philosophy, to patristic theology (which is founded upon Greek thinking), to Pauline anthropology, and to the anthropology in John's Gospel.

Within the context of the task of the phenomenological destruction, the important thing is not merely to point out, in a pictorial manner, the different currents and dependencies; the important thing is rather to highlight the central ontological and logical structures within each of the decisive turning points of the history of western anthropology by way of a primordial return to the sources. This task can be achieved only if a concrete interpretation of the Aristotelian philosophy is made available; this interpretation must be oriented according to the problem of facticity, i.e. according to a *radical* [24] *phenomenological anthropology*.

In light of the problem of facticity which has been formulated, *Aristotle* is only the fulfillment and the concrete refinement of the philosophy which had gone on before; at the same time, however, Aristotle gains in his *Physics* a principal new basic approach from which his ontology and logic stem; and in turn the history of philosophical anthropology, which has been schematically and retrospectively described above, is infiltrated by this ontology and logic. The central phenomenon, whose explication is the theme of the *Physics*, becomes the being in the How of its Being-moved.

At the same time, the literary form in which Aristotelian research has been handed down (treatises in the style of thematic exposition and investigation) offers the only fundament which is suitable for the particular methodical intentions of the following interpretations. Only by going back from Aristotle does Parmenides' doctrine of Being become determinable and understandable as the decisive step which decided the sense and destiny [*Schicksal*] of western ontology and logic.

The researches which aim at carrying out the task of the phenomenological destruction take as their object late Scholasticism and Luther's early theological period. Thus this framework also encompasses tasks whose difficulty is not easily over-estimated. Therefore the basic comportment towards history, and the visual direction with respect to Aristotle, are determined by the visual stance (i.e. by the starting point and the exposition of the problem of facticity).

Every interpretation, according to both its visual stance and visual direction, must over-illuminate its thematic object. The thematic object becomes appropriately determinable only when one succeeds in seeing the object, not arbitrarily, but rather in seeing it too keenly on the basis of the accessible determination-content of the object; [25] and thus when one succeeds, through a taking-back of the over-illumination, in coming-back to a demarcation which is as appropriate for the object as possible. An object which is always seen only in half-darkness becomes graspable only by passing through an over-illumination of the object precisely in its half-dark givenness. As over-illuminating, however, the interpretation must not question too far and must not claim for itself a fantastic objectivity in the sense of historical knowledge in general, as if the interpretation dealt with an "in-itself". To ask only about the "in-self" in general is to misjudge the object-character of what is *historical*. To arrive at relativism and sceptical historicism because of the unavailability of such an "in-itself" is only the reverse side of *this same* misjudging. The [following] translations of the interpreted texts and above all the translation of the decisive basic concepts have developed from the concrete interpretation and, at the same time, contain this concrete interpretation *in nuce*. The coining of terms stems not from a desire for innovation, but rather from the content of the texts.

The starting-point of the Aristotle-interpretation, which is determined by the visual stance, must now be made understandable, and the first part of the investigations must be sketched in summary fashion. The guiding question of the interpretation must be: *as which objectivity of which Being-character is Being-human, "Being-in-life", experienced and interpreted?* What is the sense of Dasein, within which the interpretation of life fixes in advance the object, the human being? In brief, within which *Being-plan* [*Seinsvorhabe*] does this objectivity stand? Further: how is this Being of the human being conceptually explicated; what is the phenomenal ground of the explication and which categories of Being develop as the explicata of what is thus seen?

Is the sense of Being which in the end characterizes the Being of human [26] life drawn genuinely from a pure basic experience of just this object and its Being; or is human life taken as a being within a more comprehensive field of Being, that is to say, is it subject to a sense of Being which is fixed as something which relates to it archontically? What does Being mean for Aristotle in general; how is it accessible, graspable and determinable? The object-field which provides the primordial sense of Being is the object-field of those objects which are *produced* and used in dealings. Thus the That-with-respect-to-which towards which the primordial experience of Being is directed is not the Being-field of *things* as of a kind of object which is grasped in a *theoretical* and fact-like manner, but

rather the world which is encountered in the dealings which produce, perform, and make use of. That which is finished in the movement of the dealings of production (ποιήσις), that which has arrived at its Being-present-at-hand [*Vorhandensein*], available for a use-tendency, is that which is. Being means *Being-produced* and, as something produced, it means something which is significant relative to some tendency of dealings; it means Being-available. Insofar as it is the object of circumspecting or the object even of an independent, observing kind of grasping, the being is claimed according to its *appearance* (εἶδος). The observing [kind of] grasping is explicated in claiming and discussing (λέγειν). The “what” of the object, i.e. the “what” which is claimed (λόγος), and the object’s appearance (εἶδος) are the same in a certain way. But that means that that which is claimed in the λόγος is, as such, the authentic being. In the object being claimed, the λέγειν brings the being in its appearance-related Beingness (in its οὐσία) into truthful safe-keeping. But οὐσία has the primordial meaning of that which is in the household, that which is one’s belongings, that which is available for use within one’s surroundings; this primordial meaning is at work in Aristotle himself and also even later on. Οὐσία means *possessions* [*die Habe*]. That about the being which, as the being’s Being, comes into truthful safe-keeping relative to the dealings, i.e. that which characterizes the being as *possessions*, is the being’s [27] *Being-produced*. In production, the object of the dealings comes to its appearance.

The field of the Being of the objects of the dealings (ποιούμενον, πραγμα, ἔργον κινήσεως) and the way of claiming which belongs to the dealings (a logos which is characterized in a particular way, or, more exactly, the object of the dealings in the How of its Being-claimed) indicate the plan from which the basic ontological structures (and thus the ways of claiming and determining which concern the object “human life”) are to be drawn.

How do the ontological structures develop? As the explication of a claiming, observing [kind of] determining, i.e. on the path of a kind of research which takes the field of Being (a field of Being which is brought into the particular plan by way of a basic experience) according to particular respects and articulates it in these respects. Therefore the researches (researches whose object is experienced and intended in the character of Being-moved, researches within whose What something like movement is given in advance) must mediate the possible access to the authentic motive source of the Aristotelian ontology. Such research is present in the *Physics* of Aristotle. This research is to be taken interpretation-methodically as a *full phenomenon*, and is to be interpreted: with respect to its object in the How of the researching dealings with the object; with respect to the basic experience within which the object is pre-given as the starting point for the

research; with respect to the constitutive movements of the actualization of the research; and with respect to the concrete ways in which the object is intended and conceptually articulated. And in this way the being-which-is-in-movement becomes visible according to its Being-character and movement becomes visible according to its categorial structure; and thus the ontological constitution of the archontic sense of Being also becomes visible. But for the phenomenological interpretation of this research, there is [also] required an understanding of the sense in which Aristotle generally understood research [28] and the actualization of research. Research is a way of observing dealings (ἐπιστήμη). Research has its particular genesis in the concerned and directed dealings, and only on the basis of this genesis does it become understandable with respect to the manner of its dealings – i.e. the manner of its questioning something with respect to that thing’s “in what way” (ἄτιον) and its “from whence” (ἀρχή). Insight into the genesis of the research is provided through the preliminary interpretation of [*Metaphysics*, Book A, chapters 1 and 2].⁴ But understanding which observes and defines (ἐπιστήμη) is only one way in which beings come into truthful safe-keeping: beings which are what they are necessarily and for the most part. Another possible way of dealings (in the sense of dealings which are concerned, which orient things, and which think things over) exists with respect to the beings which can also be other than what they are at the moment, the beings which are managed, handled, or produced first of all within the dealings themselves. This way of the truthful safe-keeping of Being is [τέχνη].⁵ Aristotle interprets the ways of illuminating the dealings (circumspection, insight, regard [*Umsicht*, *Einsicht*, *Hinsicht*]) – ways which are different, corresponding to the different regions of Being – as ways of actualizing pure *beholding* [*reines Vernehmen*] which provides vision in the first place; he interprets these within a primordial problem-context and does so with respect to their possible basic achievement of the appropriation of Being and truthful safe-keeping (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Z). Through the interpretation of this part, the phenomenal horizon shall be won in advance; this is the phenomenal horizon into which research and theoretical knowing are to be placed as ways οὗς ἀληθεύει ἢ ψυχῇ 1139^b15). The first part of the investigations thus includes the interpretations of:

- 1) *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Z;
- 2) *Metaphysics*, Book A, chapters 1 and 2; and
- 3) *Physics*, Books A and B; and Book Γ, chapters 1–3.

Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI

The interpretation of this treatise makes the “dianoetic virtues” understandable as ways of having at one’s disposal the possibility of actualizing the genuine *truthful safe-keeping of Being* (the interpretation is conducted with a preliminary disregard for the specifically ethical problematic). Σοφία (authentic, observing understanding) and φρόνησις (solicitous circumspection, circumspection which is concerned with one’s own as well as others’ well-being) are interpreted as the authentic ways of the actualizing of νους: of pure *beholding* as such. In them, beings which correspond to their character of beholding become accessible and come into appropriation and truthful safe-keeping. But that means: with the interpretation of these phenomena there is given the possibility of determining and demarcating the beings (which are brought into truthful safe-keeping within these ways of beholding) in the How of their Being-beholden and thus with respect to their genuine character of Being. And thus the connection between this interpretation of the “virtues” and the formulated ontological problematic is clear. The principal phenomenal structural difference between the two basic ways of beholding [likewise] allows the two different corresponding regions of Being to become visible. Ἔστω δὴ οἱ ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφανοί και ἀποφανοί πεντε τον αριθμον. ταυτα δεστι τεχνη, επιστημη, φρονησις, σοφια, νους. υποληψει γαρ και δοξη ενδεχεται διαψευσθαι. (1139^b15–18). “Thus let it be assumed that the ways in which the soul takes and brings beings, as uncovered, into truthful safe-keeping – and this in the manner of both affirming and denying explication – are five in number: routine-directive-productive operating, observing-discussing-revealing determination, solicitous circumspecting (circumspection), authentic-seeing understanding, pure beholding. (Only these come into question); for it belongs to the sense of taking-something-for and the sense of “having-an-opinion” that these do not [30] necessarily give the being as uncovered [*unverhüllt*], but rather give it such that what is intended only looks-as-if, such that what is intended puts itself in front of the being and thus deceives.” (cf.1141^a3). The “virtues” which are under discussion here are those ways καθ ας μαλιστα ... αληθευσει ἡ ψυχη (1139^b12), corresponding to whose pure manner of being actualized the soul “most of all” gives the present being as *unconcealed* [*unverborgen*] in primordial truthful safe-keeping. The correct interpretation of the sense of ἀληθες–ἀληθεια is of fundamental importance: 1) for the understanding of the Aristotelian analysis of the above-mentioned phenomena; 2) for the understanding of their phenomenal different-ness; 3) for the understanding of their different constitutive achievements in actualizing the truthful safe-keeping of Being (which is given along with their phenomenal different-ness); and finally 4)

for the understanding of their character as the concrete ways of actualizing the basic liveliness of beholding as such (νοϋς, νοεῖν). Similarly, only the phenomenological grasp of νοϋς makes the structural connectedness of the phenomena among one another understandable.

In determining the sense of “truth”, one used to appeal to Aristotle as the original progenitor. According to him, “truth” was supposed to be something “that occurs in judgement”; more specifically, the “agreement” of thought with the object. At the same time, one understands this concept of truth as the basis for the so-called “representation-theory” of knowledge. In Aristotle, there is not a trace either of this concept of truth as “agreement” or of the common conception of logos as valid judgement or – least of all – of the “representation-theory”. Even to make Aristotle the main authority for the epistemological freak-birth of so-called “critical realism” – which is done in apologetics over against a misunderstood “idealism” – is to misunderstand completely the situation of the phenomenon as it is available in its sources.

The sense of ἀληθεύς: Being-there [*da-sein*] as unconcealed, i.e. as Being-intended in itself, is in no way taken explicatively from judgement and thus also not primordially [31] at home in and related to judgement. Ἀληθεύειν does not mean: “to seize hold of the truth”; it means rather to take the being which is intended, and which is intended as such, as uncovered in truthful safe-keeping.

Αἰσθησις, which is *beholding* in the How of the sensory, is not “also” called true merely through the *transference* of the “concept of truth” from the λόγος; rather, according to its own authentic intentional character, it is that which in its own self primordially and “originarily” [*originär*] provides its intentional That-with-respect-to-which. Its sense is the “providing of something objective as something uncovered”. That is why η μὲν γὰρ αἰσθησις τῶν ἰδίων αἰεὶ ἀληθής. (*De Anima*, Γ3, 427^b12; cf. chapter 3). It is shown here that the expression “truth” – “true” is meaningless in view of the phenomenal state of affairs which is [merely] intended. Conversely, there is “falsehood” (ψεῦδος, ψευδής) only where there is “synthesis:” τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐν συνθεσεί αἰεὶ (*De Anima*, Γ6, 430^b). Falsehood presupposes, as the condition of its possibility, an *other* intentional structure of intending something as object; it presupposes a going-towards the being in “respect” to another Being-intended. Where the being is intended not simply in itself, but rather as such and such, i.e., in an “as”-character, the beholding takes place in the How of *taking-together* and *taking-with*. Insofar as the beholding, as sensory, actualizes itself in the manner of claiming-its-object-as and discussing-its-object-as (in λέγειν), it is possible that the object can thus give itself as something that it is not. But the tendency of intending the object within the “as”-character is founda-

tional for the possibility of ψευδος in general; [οτι μεν γαρ λευκον, ου ψευδεται, ει δε τουτο το λευκον η αλλο τι, ψευδεται (*De Anima*, Γ3, 428^b20). (η αισθησις) διανοεισθαι δ'ενδεχεται και ψευδως και ουδενι υπαρχει ω μη και λογος (Ibid., 427^b13)] – only that which is beholden in the manner of Being-claimed with respect to an “as” can give itself for such claiming “as deceiving it”. [32] According to its meaning, the “Being-true” of the λογος of claiming is constituted only by way of the detour through ψευδος. The λογος itself must be taken in its own *intentional* character: it is αποφανσις, intending, on the basis of the object and drawing on (απο) the object, claiming and discussing this object. Correspondingly, αποφαινεσθαι is to be taken as: allowing the object for itself (medium) and from its own self to “appear” as its own self. That will be important for the interpretation of φαντασια.

Λεγειν gives the being in its own self; that means now that it gives the being in its uncovered “as-what”, insofar as a “what” pushes forth, not as a deceptive “what”, but only as a “what” which gives itself in this way. Ψευδος as self-covering has sense only on the basis of the meaning of αληθες, a meaning which is not primordially related to λογος: δοξα ψευδης εγνετο, οτε λαθοι μεταπεσον το πραγμα (*De Anima*, Γ 3, 428^b8). Here, the *remaining-concealed*, the *Being-covered*, is fixed explicitly as that which determines the sense of ψευδος, and thus the sense of “truth”. Aristotle sees Being-concealed as something positive in itself, and it is not a coincidence that the sense of “truth” for the Greeks is characterized privatively – and this according to its meaning, and not just grammatically. The being in the How of its possible “as-what-determinations” is not simply there; it is a “task”. And the being in the How of its Being-uncovered, ον ως αληθες, is that which must be taken into truthful safe-keeping against possible loss. That is the sense of the εξεις, αις αληθευει η τυχη; the highest authentic [kinds of these habits] are σοφια and φρονησις, insofar as they maintain the αρχαι in truthful safe-keeping, each within its own field of Being. The ον ως αληθες is not the authentic Being, or the authentic field of Being, or the area within which true judgements are valid, but it is rather the being itself in the How (ως) of its uncovered Being-intended. It is εν διανοια as νοητον, in the “understanding”, as the That-with-respect-to-which of the understanding’s beholding. [33] This interpretation of αληθες and αληθευειν, which eliminates a series of merely contrived difficulties in interpretation, will be concretely verified through a detailed phenomenological analysis of *Metaphysics*, E 4; *De Anima*, Γ 5 f.; *De Interpretatione*; *Metaphysics* Δ 29; and, above all, *Metaphysics*, Θ 10.

Λογος, λεγειν, is the way in which νοειν is actualized, and as such it is a διανοεισθαι, a kind of beholding which takes apart: a διαιρεσις; ενδεχεται δε και διαιρεσιν φαναι παντα (*De Anima* Γ 6, 430^b3). The claiming and

discussing, in the manner of synthetic determining, can also be claimed as taking-apart, as explicating.

Noεiv has the basic character of beholding. Νοϋς is beholding per se; that means it is that which in general makes possible, that which in general presents a That-with-respect-to-which for any oriented dealings whatsoever. It is τω παντα ποιειν, ως εξις τις, οιον το φως (*De Anima*, Γ 5, 430^a15). Beholding produces *everything* as a [kind of] being-able-to-have-at-one's-disposal, and it does so like light. Νοϋς in general provides sight; it provides a something; it provides a "there". Νοϋς exists [*ist*] as the ιδιον του ανθρωπου in its concrete actualization, as ενεργεια – as at work – its own work – that means providing-sight, always such in a manner of concrete dealings with, in orienting, producing, handling, determining. Insofar as νοϋς gives sight to the dealings themselves, it can also be characterized as illumination-of-the-dealings, an illumination which, however, has the sense of the truthful safe-keeping of Being. That which is genuinely objective for νοϋς is that which it (as ανευ λογου) beholds without the manner of claiming something according to its "as-what-determinations" (ου τι κατα τινοϋ; *Ibid.*, 430^b28); the αδιαιρετα, that which in its own self cannot be taken apart, that which is not further explicable. As such it presents that which is objective, purely as such in its uncovered What, and as such νοϋς is "simply true": η μεν ουν των αδιαιρετων νοησις εν τουτοις, περι α ουκ εστι το ψευδος (*Ibid.*, 430^a26). [34] The "simply" here means: "in general not yet" in the possibility of Being-false, and does not mean something like "no longer" in this possibility. Νοϋς provides every concrete [instance of] discussing with its possible About-what, which itself can never become accessible first of all in the discussing as such, but rather only in the επαγωγη ("induction") – this, however, in the pure understanding of the word, not in the sense of an empirical taking-together which gathers, but rather as a simple-and-direct leading-to ..., letting-see of ... Νοϋς is αισθησις τις, a beholding which in each case gives the appearance of the objects purely and simply: ο νοϋς ειδος ειδων και η αισθησις ειδος αισθητων (*Ibid.*, 432^a2). Just as the hand οργανον εστιν οργανων (*Ibid.*), i.e. just as a tool [*Werkzeug*] in the hand first comes to its authentic Being in *generating work* [*Werk-Zeugen*] – so too the *appearance* of the objects is within sight only through νοϋς and "in" νοϋς, as its That-with-respect-to-which; it *appears*. Insofar as an object-field as such stands within the task of becoming explicitly accessible (and that not simply in the sense of theoretical determining), the "from-whence" (αρχη) of the λεγειν must be available in advance as that which is uncovered. With an eye to the αρχη, the λεγειν takes its point of departure from the αρχη, and in such a way that it keeps this point of departure "within view" as its fixed basic orientation. As uncovered, these αρχαι are explicitly taken into truthful safe-keeping

within the επαγωγή των αρχων επαγωγή (1139^b31); λειπεται νουν εινα των αρχων (1141^a7); within this giving-over-to-truthful-safe-keeping of the αρχαι (αρχαι which correspond to each area of Being), there lies the authentic and highest achievement of νους; μαλιστα αληθευει; the concrete ways of actualizing this authentic truthful safe-keeping-of-Being are σοφια and φρονησις.

Purely observing understanding brings into truthful safe-keeping that being which is in such a way, and whose “from-whence” is in such a way, that this being always and necessarily is what it is. By contrast, circumspecting which discusses and which is solicitous brings into truthful safe-keeping that being [35] which *can be otherwise* and whose “from-whence” *can be otherwise*.

Both ways of truthful safe-keeping temporalize themselves μετα λογου, actualized in the manner of discussing explication. This is constitutive for them, insofar as they take the αρχαι into view, not as things which are isolated for themselves, but rather *as such*, i.e. in their ownmost sense as αρχαι *for*. The What-for [*Wofür*] also comes into truthful safe-keeping as the What-for of these αρχαι, a What-for which is thus to be determined. The λογος is an ορθος λογος. The discussing is such in a primordially maintained *taking-of-direction*; it always has its fixed “end”; corresponding to the sense of the manner of truthful safe-keeping at any given time, this “end” is of importance for the illuminative explication of the manner of truthful safe-keeping. Φρονησις brings the That-with-respect-to-which of the dealings of human life (and dealings with human life itself) and the “How” of these dealings in their own Being into truthful safe-keeping. These dealings are πραξις; the conducting [*Behandeln*] of one’s own self in the How of dealings which are not productive, but are rather simply *actional* [*handelnd*]. Φρονησις is the illumination-of-dealings which co-temporalizes life in its *Being*.

The concrete interpretation shows how the being which is καρπος constitutes itself in φρονησις. The actional and solicitous [kind of] conducting is always a concrete conducting in the How of the concerned dealings with the world. Φρονησις makes the location of the one who performs the action accessible: in securing the ου ενεκα (the “Why”), in making available the particular Towards-what-end [*Wozu*], in apprehending the “Now”, and in sketching out the How. Φρονησις looks to the εσχατον, the outermost, the extreme, in which the determinately viewed concrete situation comes to a head. Φρονησις is possible as a discussing, a solicitous and considerative [kind of] φρονησις, only because it is primarily an αισθησις, i.e. it is in the end a simple over-view of the moment-of-insight [*Augenblick*]. The πρακτον, as the being which becomes uncovered and available in the αληθευειν of the φρονησις, is something which exists as *not*

yet such and such Being. As [36] “not yet such and such”, and in fact as the That-with-respect-to-which of concern, it is at the same time *already* such and such, as the That-with-respect-to-which of a concrete readiness-for-dealings, whose constitutive illumination is determined by φρονησις. The “not-yet” and the “already” are to be understood in their “unity”, i.e. they are to be understood on the basis of a primordial given-ness, a given-ness for which the “not-yet” and the “already” are determinate explicata. Determinate, because with them, that which is objective is placed in a determinate aspect of movement. The concept of στερησις is the category of the above-named explicata. The Hegelian dialectic has its intellectual-historical roots in this category.

The αληθεια πρακτικη is nothing other than the uncovered, full moment-of-insight into factual life in the How of its decisive readiness for dealing with its own self, and it is such within a factual relationship of concern with respect to the world which is thus encountered. Φρονησις is *epitactic*; it presents the being which has the character of that about which one is to be concerned; it brings and holds within this aspect every determination of the moment-of-insight (these being the respective How, Towards-what-end, To-what-extent, and Why). As epitactic illumination, it brings the dealings into the basic orientation of readiness-for..., breaking-out towards... The That-with-respect-to-which which is hereby intended, the being of the moment-of-insight, stands within the aspect of significance-for, of the capacity-to-be-an-object-of-concern, of that-which-is-now-to-be-dealt-with. Φρονησις is an observing *κατα το συμφερον προς το τελος* (1142^b32). Because it is the way of truthfully safe-keeping the full moment-of-insight, circumspection (in its authentic sense) maintains the “Why” [*das “Weswegen”*] of the action (i.e. its αρχαι) within truly genuine safe-keeping. The αρχη is what it is always only in concrete relatedness to the moment-of-insight; the αρχη is there in Being-seen and Being-apprehended, in and for the moment-of-insight.

At the same time the interpretation characterizes concretely [37] the method within which Aristotle explicates the phenomenon of φρονησις: in descriptive comparing and distinguishing, and this according to the different phenomenal aspects of Being-related-to, of the That-with-respect-to-which of the relation, and of the How of the actualization. The description takes place always within the simultaneous comparison of the different εξεις. Particularly instructive for this is the analysis of ευβουλια, the concrete way of actualizing the λεγειν which is immanent to φρονησις. This brings into circumspective view the How of the appropriate and authentically goal-achieving going-to-work, and does so out of the moment-of-insight itself.

But it is not only the being and its Being-character (which φρονησις

brings into truthful safe-keeping) which are highlighted through the interpretation; at the same time, the interpretation achieves a first understanding of the Being-character which φρονησις has *in its own self*. Φρονησις is an εξις, a How of having-at-one's-disposal the truthful safe-keeping of Being. But as εξις it is a γινομενον της ψυχης, which temporalizes itself within life itself as life's own possibility and which brings life into a particular stance [*in einen bestimmten Stand*] – in a certain way it brings about life [*zu-stande-bringt*]. So in φρονησις there is indicated a doubling of aspects, into which the human being and the Being of life are placed, and which becomes decisive for the intellectual-historical destiny of the categorial explication of the sense of the Being of facticity. In circumspection, life is there in the concrete How of a With-what of dealings. But the Being of this With-what – and this is decisive – is not thereby characterized ontologically in a positive manner; rather it is characterized only formally as that which can also be otherwise, that which is not necessarily and always what it is. This ontological characteristic is actualized in the *negating* Holding-against [which is directed] against [that kind of] Being which is other and *authentic*. For its own part and according to its basic character, this Being is not won explicatively from the Being of human life as such; in its categorial structure, it stems rather from a determinately *actualized*, [38] *ontological radicalization of the idea of being-that-is-moved* [*Bewegtseienden*]. For this being itself and for the possible highlightings of its structure of meaning, the movement of *production* is brought into the plan as exemplary. Being is *Being-finished*, Being within which the movement has come to *its end*. The Being of life is seen as movement which transpires in its own self, and indeed the Being of life is within this movement when human life has come to its end with respect to its ownmost possibility of movement, i.e. when human life has come to its end with respect to the possibility of the movement of pure beholding. This movement is in the εξις which is σοφια. It is not the case that pure understanding, according to *its* intentional character, brings human life (in the How of its factual Being) into truthful safe-keeping; φρονησις does not even have life as its intentional That-with-respect-to-which; for life is a being which is, precisely insofar as it can be otherwise. On account of the authentic movement which is available to σοφια, the Being of life must be seen exclusively in the pure temporalizing of σοφια as such. First of all, νοϋς, as pure beholding, is in its genuine movement when it has given itself over to *orienting* concern and *simply* beholds; secondly, as such beholding it is movement which not only does not stop, but also *is movement* for the first time, precisely as “movement which has come to its end”; this movement has come to its end insofar as it has that which is purely behold-able within view.

Every movement is – as βαδις εις – Being-underway-towards; according to its sense, it is a not-yet-having-reached its That-towards-which; movement exists [*ist*] precisely as a going-towards: learning, going, house-building, in its Being-character, the going is principally different from the having-gone: ετερον και κινει και κεκινηκεν (1048^b32). In contrast, the having-seen is simultaneous with the seeing; he [39] has seen – [has] in sight –, only insofar as he is seeing just now; he has beholden precisely in the beholding; νοει και νενοηκεν (Ibid.). Such movement is Being within a temporalizing which [at the same time] is a truthful safe-keeping, i.e. within a truthful safe-keeping which [at the same time] is a temporalizing (ομοιοτητα) (Ibid. 33; cf. *Metaphysics*, Θ 6). Only νοησις as pure θεωρειν is adequate for the highest idea of pure movement. The authentic Being of the human being temporalizes itself in the pure actualization of σοφια as in the *unworried*, time-possessing (σχολη), pure beholding Tarrying-by the αρχαι of the always [existing] beings. The Being-character of εξις and thereby of απρη, i.e. the ontological structure of Being-human, becomes understandable in terms of the ontology of that being [which exists] in the How of a determinate movement and out of the ontological radicalization of the idea of *this* movement.

***Metaphysics*, Book A, Chapters 1 and 2**

With respect to the guiding problem of facticity, the interpretation of these two chapters brings to light a *triad*:

(1) the phenomenal structure of the observing dealings which determine the Why-connections (επιστημη), and this [structure] according to the intentional That-with-respect-to-which and the intentional relation of the dealings; the phenomenal structure of the highest possible temporalization of these dealings, of the authentic observational understanding (σοφια) as of the Bringing-into-truthful-safe-keeping of the αρχαι. From this, the concrete αρχη-research (and the *Physics* is to be understood as this) becomes transparent in advance, and it becomes so (a) according to the *demarkation of objects*, a demarcation which is marked out for the research on the basis of the idea of pure understanding and which is done according to the starting-point of the specifically critical laying-of-foundations; and (b) according to the method of categorial explication.

(2) the way in which Aristotle in general gains access to the phenomenon of pure understanding, and the manner of interpreting this phenomenon; both of these are characteristic for the basic sense of “philosophy”; [40]

(3) the Being-character of σοφία as such and the constitutive achievement of σοφία for the Being of human life.

The three aspects of the examination are connected amongst themselves, and in such a way that the structure of pure understanding becomes understandable precisely only on the basis of its rootedness in the Being of factual life and on the basis of the manner of its *genesis in factual life*. Thus the actual weight of the interpretation resides in the demonstration of what has been mentioned under (2).

We are asking: How does that which Aristotle characterizes as research exist *with respect to its starting-point*? Where is it to be found, and as what is it to be found? How does Aristotle approach it, and how does he deal with it? Aristotle takes the language of σοφώτερον – to understand more than... – from factual life, from its own dealings-related [colloquial] way of speaking; i.e. he sticks to the factual ways of *taking-something-for*, within which life interprets its own ways of dealings, εμπειρία, τεχνη: οιομεθα, υπολαμβανομεν, νομιζομεν, ηγουμεθα. He begins with a *comparativistic* expression. In this expression there is manifest what is of importance to life when it claims something as σοφώτερον: what is of importance is μαλλον ειδενα, the More of observing, or seeing more [*das Mehr an Hinsehen*]. Factual life is concerned with developing its dealings (and most primordially the routine-directive, productive dealings in particular) into a kind of dealings which for its own self (as the dealings which are given at any time) always has available a More of observing. In this More of observing, the “appearance” of the With-what of the dealings becomes visible, and it does so not as the object of theoretical determining, but rather as the That-with-respect-to-which of the orienting concern. The “appearance” (e.g. of a sickness) has a Why-character (αιτιον) for the dealings-related, routine-directive concern (“to doctor, to patch up”, ιατρευειν). The Why has a primordially “practical” sense.

In its tendency towards the More of observing, or seeing more, [41] factual life comes to the point of giving up the care of routine-directing. The With-what of the routine-directive dealings becomes the That-with-respect-to-which of *bare* observing. The appearance becomes viewed and explicated according to its Why-relations, which determine the What of the object in its own self. The tendency of care has displaced itself into observing for its own sake. This observing becomes an independent form of dealings, and as such it becomes the That-with-respect-to-which of a separate kind of concern.

In the interpretation of the sense of the More of observing (the sense which factual life *itself offers*), there lies the directedness towards μαλιστα ειδενα. Aristotle goes along with factual life in factual life’s own direction of interpretation; again, he borrows from life itself the ways of taking-

something-for, ways within which a human being is claimed as σοφον, as the one who genuinely understands. The interpretation of these ways of claiming provides the corresponding sense of σοφια: the one who authentically understands is concerned with the *ultimate respects* in which the being in itself is brought to possible determination. These respects have the first “From-whences” [*die ersten “Vonwoaus”*] as their That-with-respect-to-which; these are “From-whences” with respect to which the being must be uncovered in advance, if it is to be brought into appropriate truthful safe-keeping within the concrete determinative claiming and discussing of the research. Aristotle thus secures the sense of philosophy *through the interpretation of a factual movement of care with respect to its ultimate tendency*. These purely observational dealings, however, prove to be such a kind that, in their That-with-respect-to-which, they no longer see that very life itself within which they are. But insofar as these dealings, as pure understanding, are life-temporalizing, they are that through their very movement.

Pure understanding has its concrete possibility of being actualized in Being-free from the concerns of the routine-directive dealings; this possibility of being actualized is the How within which life, in view of one [42] of its basic tendencies, takes-a-pause. Θεωρεiv is the purest movement which life has available to it. Because of this, it is something “god-like”. But for Aristotle the idea of the god-like did not arise in the explication of something objective which was made accessible in a basic religious experience; the θεiov is rather the expression for the *highest* Being-character which arises in the ontological radicalization of the idea of being-that-is-moved [*Idee des Bewegtseienden*]. The θεiov is νοησις νοησεως only because such beholding, with regard to its Being-character (i.e. with regard to its movement), *suffices most purely for the idea of Being-moved* [*Idee des Bewegtseins*] as such. This being *must* be pure beholding, i.e. free from *every emotional* relation to its That-with-respect-to-which. The “god-like” cannot be envious, not because it is absolute goodness and love, but rather because in its Being as pure movement it can neither hate nor love at all.

But that means: the decisive Being-*plan*, the being in motion, and the particular ontological explication of *this* being are the motive sources for the basic ontological structures which later decisively determine: god-like Being in the specifically Christian sense (*actus purus*); inner-godly life (the Trinity); and thus at the same time the Being-relation of God to the human being, and thus the sense of Being proper to the human being itself. Christian theology and the philosophical “speculation” which stands under its influence and the anthropology which always also develops within such contexts all *speak in borrowed categories, categories which are alien to their own field of Being*.

In spite of this, it is precisely the Aristotelian ontology [43] of the soul-like which helped in temporalizing a far-reaching and rich interpretation of the Being of life within the Christian life-world; this is because, along with the aspect of movement and precisely through it, the decisive phenomenal character of intentionality came into view and thereby solidified a particular visual direction.

Physics, Books A and B; Book Γ, 1–3

The phenomenon of movement is brought to its ontologically categorical explication in that research which has been handed down under the title “Physics”. From the phenomenal movement of this research itself, the interpretation has to show the following: the basic experience which is effective within this research, i.e. the way in which the object is presented (κινούμενον); furthermore, the aspects into which this objectivity is placed; and the explicata which develop within such an observing analysis.

The research is characterized as ἀρχη-research; it has to bring the “From-whences” (ἀρχα) into truthful safe-keeping; the κινούμενον is viewed from these “From-whences”. But insofar as these ἀρχα should be able to arrive at the result which corresponds to their sense, they themselves must be drawn from the phenomenal content of that which is objective. The ἀρχα of beings are *not present* [*nicht da*] for the concerned, orienting dealings and for the circumspection of these dealings; the concern lives in other aspects, in those aspects which are directed towards the world of dealings which one first encounters. In the visual breadth of the concerned dealings of factual life, the “From-whences” of beings as such are concealed. The primordial sense of the “concept of truth” shows itself as effective in the *Physics* Book A, chapter 1, and in general within the problem-approach of physics as research.

The ἀρχη-research is *access-research* [*Zugangsforschung*]. As such, this research:

- 1) has to make its *plan* secure; i.e. it has to bring into view the thematic object-field in the How of the basic phenomenal [44] character of its content-laden-ness;
- 2) has to cultivate its *pre-conceptions*; i.e. it has to prepare the aspects within which the actualization of the explication of the field of Being is to take place.

The *approach* of the research is *critique*, and in fact principal critique. The interpretation makes understandable why such access-research necessarily has to take a critical approach: all research moves within a particular level of some pre-given interpretedness of life and of some pre-given ways of

discussing the world. Effective within one's own facticity is the How in which the "ancient physicists" had already seen, claimed, and discussed "nature".

Thus the critical question which the αρχη-research has to ask of the past will be: has the past brought the being which is meant as φυσικ into the plan [of the research] such that the decisive phenomenal content-character of that being (a content-character which the previous research also always somehow intended in its ways of claiming) – i.e. movement – is brought into truthful safe-keeping and to a primordial explication? Or: does traditional research's manner of access to the area of Being in question already move within "theories" and principal theses which are not only not taken from the area of Being, but which in fact block access to it?

The sense of Aristotle's critical comportment lies in this question. His critique is positive in the most excellent sense, and it is based explicitly on the decisive basic experience: "We assume from the outset (ημιν υποκεισθω) that there are beings in movement." These beings within such a How are immediately accessible in the επαγωγη. The first book of the *Physics* displays an extremely tight structure, and the first level of the critique, the critique of the Eleatics, becomes understandable only out of the concrete task of the access-research and out of its necessary, critical approach.

Indeed the Eleatics – according to Aristotle's explicit [45] observation – do not "actually" belong at all within the theme of the critique. Their pre-conceptions, their theory of Being, are such that they fundamentally block access to the beings as beings in movement (and thus block access to the φυσικ). The Eleatics make themselves incapable of seeing the basic phenomenon of that area which lies within the theme of the research (i.e. the phenomenon of movement); and they make themselves incapable of allowing the decisive aspects of concrete questioning and determining to present themselves out of this movement.

In spite of their "not-belonging", however, Aristotle brings the Eleatics into the discussion, not (as Bonitz believes) in order to have an easy object for refutation; but rather in order to *secure within this critique the visual-field which is to be decisive for every further problematic*: to secure the λογος, or the κινουμενον as λεγομενον. Aristotle shows: that which lies within the theme of the research, the κινουμενον, is, as object of επιστημη, an object which is claimed and discussed: επιστημη and σοφια (as νους και επιστημη 1141^a5) are μετα λογου. These beings must be approached in advance within the ontological structure; this ontological structure is pre-formed insofar as it is fundamentally a That-with-respect-to-which of claiming and discussing, i.e. it is intended in the How of the "as-characters". These beings are categorially always these somethings *as* such and

such, and that means: the sense of Being is principally *manifold* (multiple). From the sense of λεγειν, it is determined apriori that everything which is claimed is something *as* something. The idea of the αρχη, of something's From-whence, i.e. the "reference-to as regard-for", in general becomes categorially impossible, if Being, according to its sense, is not articulated as multiple, if the science of physics approaches its object-field with the thesis εν τα παντα.

An intermediary observation (as an interpretation of the [46] decisive ontological connections of the doctrinal poem of Parmenides) shows how Parmenides for the first time got the Being of the beings into view, but that things remained at this first "impression of Being" (to express it ontologically). With this first but decisive view, ontological seeing was also already at its end. The idea that everything which is experienced is experienced in the How of Being-an-object became a thesis relevant to the area in question; and it did so in such a way that this Being-an-object itself was in general "really" intended as the be-ing Being, on the basis of which matters relating to the remaining Being-determinations were now decided in the manner of a negative separating-off. Noεiv as intending per se and φαναι, claiming, are seen for the first time in the same way, and indeed are seen in unity with Being. But this αληθεια remains unemphasized in its first decisive basic phenomenal structures.

The first level of the critique intends to show that the αρχη-research, insofar as it wants in general to secure the given area and its aspects, must work out the ontological constitution of this area by observing the basic phenomenon of movement. It is only an inner consequence of the problem at hand that, within the context of his critique of the Eleatics, Aristotle comes upon the problem of the ορισμος, i.e. the problem of the bare explicating definition of something that is objective in the What of its Being-laden-ness [*Seinshaftigkeit*]. This objective something is the phenomenon of movement which is to be explicated here.

On the basis of the first level of the critique (a critique which secures the visual-field in general), the interpretation shows how Aristotle interrogated the opinions and the explications of the "ancient natural philosophers" with respect to how far they let the phenomenon of movement speak from its own self and how they were thus always fundamentally handicapped in their explication through preconceived theories about the sense of Being. Through such an interpretation it becomes [47] clear that behind the apparently formalistic question, how many and which αρχαι are to be postulated with respect to the φυσαι οντα, there lies hidden the following question: To what extent is movement seen and genuinely explicated from its own self at any given time? If movement is seen and explicated from its own self, then there is necessarily *more than one* "From-whence" in its

categorial structure, and just as necessarily *not more than three*. Aristotle provides the positive explication of the phenomenon, and he does so first of all purely within the framework of the formulated λογος-problematic, in chapter 3; from there, one must *look back* to the preceding chapter. The “basic category” of στερησις arises in the explications of chapter 7; the “basic category” of στερησις dominates throughout the Aristotelian ontology; but that means that it arises within the explication of the particular claiming, of a determinately viewed [kind of] movement. Characteristically, the “coming-to-be of the statue from bronze” (in the movement of the dealings of *production*) plays the role of an example within the problematic which is directed towards the κινήσις of the φύσει οντα.

In the second book of the *Physics* the αρχη-problematic is approached from another visual direction. It is asked which possibilities of theoretical *being-interrogated* (ατιον – why) are motivated within the content of the φύσει οντα and of their basic categorial structure. The interpretation shows how the “four causes” arise from the ontological problematic which has already been characterized. But at the same time the book (chapters 4–6) is of decisive importance with respect to the problem of facticity as such. It is shown how Aristotle ontologically explicates the “historical” movement of factual life (the movement of that “which daily happens, and can happen, to someone”), and how he does so under the titles of τυχη, αυτοματων (titles which, in respect of their authentic meaning, are absolutely untranslatable). Today, these ontological analyses are [48] not only unsurpassed; they have not even been understood and evaluated as such. One [usually] takes them as an uncomfortable and no-longer-useful annex to the determination of the “actual [*eigentlich*] causes”, causes which clearly show their *conditionedness* via the particular approach to the problem.

In the third book, Aristotle begins his authentically thematic analysis of the phenomenon of movement. The interpretation of this book (above all, chapters 1–3) – an interpretation which must contend with almost insurmountable textual difficulties (Simplicius (395, 20) had already complained about that) – can be presented only in its concrete context. What is decisive for Aristotle is to show that the phenomenon of movement fundamentally and categorially cannot be grasped with the traditional categories (categories which until now have been provided by ontology) of Being and Not-Being, Being-other, Being-dissimilar. The phenomenon provides from its own self the structures which, for their own part, are primordial and ultimate: δυναμις, the always particular being-able-to-have-available; ενεργεια, the utilizing-of-the-availability; and εντελεχεια, the utilizing holding-in-truthful-safe-keeping-of-this-availability.

In the second part of the investigations, the stress of the interpretation is to be on the *Metaphysics* ΖΗΘ. It is to be shown how Aristotle develops the basic problematic of Being-laden-ness and how, on the basis of this, he comes to the ontological shaping of the “categories” δυνάμεις and ενεργεία, which, along with Aristotle’s categories in the more restricted sense, are constitutive for the Being “of the beings”; Aristotle develops the basic problematic of Being-laden-ness through a determinately conducted explication of that which is claimed as such within the determinate λογος; at the same time, that which is thus claimed is, according to the plan, the appearance of that which is somehow moved, of that which has arisen from a movement (κίνησις – ποιησις – πράξις).

The *Ethics*, as the explication of the being which is Being-human, human life, [49] the movement of life, is then to be placed into this ontological horizon. This is to be done in such a way that *De Anima* is interpreted in advance according to its ontological-logical constitution; and this is to be done on the broad basis of the explication of the field of Being of *life* as of a particular [kind of] movement (interpretation of *De Motu Animalium*). It is to be shown how “intentionality” comes into view, and it does so as “objective”, as a How of the movement of life, life which is somehow “noetically” illuminated in its dealings. Beings in the basic aspect of Being-moved – in the basic aspect of “Being-out-toward-something” – are the plan, i.e. the condition for the ability to emphasize intentionality as it becomes explicit in Aristotle and as it, for its own part, makes the basic character of λογος visible. Thus the concrete motive-basis is to be made available for the first time; through this concrete motive-basis, the final level (of the ontological and logical problematic) which Aristotle reached becomes understandable. This motive-basis is to be shown in its rooting through the interpretation of *Metaphysics* Γ, Ε, Β, and Ι, and through the interpretation of *De Interpretatione* and of the *Analytics*. From this it becomes clear to what extent the particular ontology of a particular field of Being, and the logic of a particular claiming, became (following the tendency towards falling which belongs to interpreting) *the ontology and the logic* which has decisively pervaded not only its own history, but also the history of spirit itself, i.e. the history of Existenz.

The origin of the “categories” lies neither in λογος as such nor are they read off from the “things”; they are the basic ways of a particular claiming of the particular *appearance-related* object-field (an object-field which is maintained within the plan); this is the object-field of those objects-of-dealings about which one may be concerned in [routine] orienting. As such they are the sense-related “roots” of the As-what-characters within which this object becomes capable of getting claimed. Along with the δυνάμεις and ενεργεία ον, they are constitutive for the Being of the objects-of-“deeds”

(ον ως πραγμα), because they develop out of, and for, the objective What. [50] By contrast, the ον ως αληθες as the character of the beings, as the How of Being which is there uncovered in its own self, is not constitutive for the πραγμα; and yet it is the κυριωτατον (1051^b), that-which-is-decisive, that-which-gives-direction, with respect to the access to the beings in the manner of simple beholding and of explicative determining. The ον κατα συμβεβηκος (Being in the How of the quality of having been had along with [*Mithaftigkeit*]) is as little constitutive for the beings as is the ον ως αληθες. For the sense of Being is primordially *Being-produced*. This being is originarily [*originär*] present as that which it is only for the productive dealings; [but] it is already no longer present within the kind of dealings which makes use of it, insofar as these dealings can bring the finished object into diverse, no longer primordial, aspects of care.

The Being of the house is Being as Being-constructed (ουσια γνομενη, ποιηθεισα); the sense of Being is thus a *completely determinate* sense, not the vague and indifferent sense of reality in general; and Being is relative to production, or to the circumspection which illuminates these dealings (i.e. the [way of] proceeding). Following this fundamentally formulated sense of authentic Being, the ways of the appearance and of the encountering of the objects of dealings (ways which present the objects in their full, world-environmental significance: the comfortable, beautiful, nicely-situated, well-lit Being of the house) must come to light as *only that which has been had along with* and as a εγγως τι μη ον – ωσπερ ονοματι μονον (1026^b21). But the fact that Aristotle can thus emphasize the quality of having been had along with as a separate sense of Being is at the same time the strongest expression for the fact that the world-environment is taken [by him] as the fully experienced world-environment, that the quality of having been had along with is seen [by him]; but this is done already through the terminology of (i.e. this is already ontologically interpreted according to the theme of) a determinate sense of Being which is pre-shaped as the decisive one. This pre-shaped sense of Being itself has its origin in the primordially given world-environment; but then even with Aristotle himself [51] it loses its sense of origin under the pressure of the pre-shaped ontology, and, in the course of the further development of ontological research, it falls into the indeterminate averageness-of-meaning of reality and actuality; as this indeterminate averageness-of-meaning, this sense of Being then provides the approach for the epistemological problematic, insofar as the “objectivity” of the theoretical determination of objects as “nature” (an “objectivity” which in turn first arises from this sense of Being) is not [itself] made into the sense of Being about which the problematic is oriented.

Notes

1. Worry [*Bekümmern*] does not mean a mood with a worried mien, but rather the factual Being-decided [*Entschieden*], the apprehension of *Existenz* (cf. p. 13 [pagination of the original manuscript]) as the apprehension of that about which one is to be concerned. If one takes “caring” as a *vox media* (which in itself, as a category of meaning, has its origin in the claiming of facticity), then worry is the care of *Existenz* (gen. ob.).
2. “Atheistic”, but not in the sense of a theory such as materialism or something similar. Every philosophy which understands itself in what it is must – as the factual How of the interpretation of life – know (and it must know this precisely when it still has some “notion” of God) that life’s retreat towards its own self (which philosophy achieves) is, in religious terms, a show of hands against God. But only then is philosophy honest, i.e. only then is philosophy in keeping with its possibility (which is available to it as such) before God; here atheistic means keeping oneself free from misleading concern which merely talks about religiosity. [One may very well ask] whether the very idea of a philosophy of religion (especially if it makes no reference to the facticity of the human being) is pure nonsense.
3. The hymnology and music of the Middle Ages, as well as its architecture and sculpture, are intellectually-historically accessible only on the basis of a primordial phenomenological interpretation of the philosophical-theological anthropology of this period; this anthropology expresses itself (in Being-with and Being-in-a-world-environment) through sermon and school. As long as this anthropology is not explicitly appropriated [*zugeeignet*], “Gothic man” remains just a phrase.
4. This reference to *Metaphysics*, Book A, chapters 1 and 2, was added by the editor of the *Dilthey-Jahrbuch*, where this text was published in the original German. [-M.B.]
5. This term has been added by the editor of the *Dilthey-Jahrbuch*. [-M.B.]