

the review of
metaphysics

a philosophical quarterly

Review

Reviewed Work(s): Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other by Robert R. Williams

Review by: Michael Baur

Source: *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Jun., 1994), pp. 849-851

Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20129615>

Accessed: 21-10-2019 12:20 UTC

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In practice we tend to identify only the final stage in a causal chain, though in theory the cause is the complete set of conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the change.

In the chapters on concepts White explains Schopenhauer's faculty psychology. We have sensibility, understanding, reason, and judgment. Through understanding we gain full knowledge of the world of intuitive representations. It is through reason that we formulate concepts from these representations. Intuitions and concepts are linked by judgments. These concepts may be related to particulars or to other concepts, but in all cases they are universals which allow us to transcend particulars. They give rise to, among other things, scientific thinking.

White criticizes Schopenhauer often for being too sketchy, sometimes for making implausible claims, and occasionally for simply being wrong. In his view, however, these faults are outweighed by Schopenhauer's strengths, which include his methodological procedures, his analysis of causality, and especially his ambitious effort to explain reality.

There are some puzzling features about White's book. He discusses Schopenhauer's connections to numerous philosophers but virtually ignores Leibniz, the most vigorous champion of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. More curious is that while White claims to be concerned with the later editions, he disregards the numerous inflammatory and intriguing remarks that were added to the second edition. Schopenhauer inserted them because he believed that his contemporaries were not only wrong but pompous in their belief that they were right. He had given up hope of securing an academic post and could afford to make comments that would antagonize those whom he called the "Professors of Philosophy." He made caustic comments about many of his contemporaries, singling out Hegel for particularly bitter attacks. These remarks were prompted by Schopenhauer's belief that only he (and Kant) offered true philosophy. White ignores that which serves to characterize much of what is fascinating about Schopenhauer, remarks that undoubtedly attracted his many posthumous readers, including Nietzsche.

White offers a readable introduction to Schopenhauer's philosophy, paying close attention to the connections between the *Fourfold Root* and the better known work, *The World as Will and Representation* (1818). He provides an elementary explication of Schopenhauer's philosophy based upon his reading of the dissertation. Beginners in philosophy will find White's book helpful. Advanced students may consider looking at Schopenhauer's dissertation itself.—Christopher Adair-Toteff, *University of South Florida*.

WILLIAMS, Robert R. *Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. xv + 332 pp. \$19.95—The purpose of this book is both scholarly and polemical: the author seeks not only to render an accurate picture of Fichte and Hegel on the issue of intersubjectivity, but also to correct contemporary misconceptions

which have led to the dismissal of German Idealism as abstract, rationalistic, and ahistorical.

The book is divided into three main parts. In Part 1 (which is co-extensive with chapter 1), Williams presents a brief overview of Fichte's and Hegel's transformation of transcendental philosophy into "a concrete social philosophy of spirit" (p. 13). Part 2 (chapters 2 and 3) is dedicated to Fichte, who held that transcendental philosophy must be unified by reference to a single, underived first principle. By arguing that this (theoretically undecidable) first principle must be decided by reference to the practical domain, Fichte effectively brought the issues of intersubjectivity and historicity into the systematic philosophy of German Idealism.

Part 3 (chapters 4 through 12) explicates Hegel's conception of intersubjectivity. Williams shows in chapter 4 how the early Hegel already differed from Fichte in his understanding of the other as a potential enrichment, and not merely a restriction, of the self's own freedom. In chapter 5, Williams compares and contrasts Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenology, arguing that Hegel carried out the phenomenological reduction "more radically and consistently than any other phenomenological philosopher" (p. 102). In chapter 6 Williams analyzes the meaning and method of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a "self-accomplishing scepticism." Chapter 7 articulates what Williams calls the "eidetics of intersubjectivity," including the three stages of the dialectic of recognition between two selves: first, the phase of abstract and exclusive universality; second, the phase of opposition between the two selves as particular; and third, the phase of mutual recognition in which each self has its own identity confirmed through the other. In chapter 8 on the "empirics of recognition," Williams shows how the eidetics of recognition can be played out in concrete form, either unsuccessfully (in the master-slave dialectic) or successfully (in love). Chapter 9 explicates the meaning of *Geist* and its three stages: immediacy in Greek ethical life; cancellation of this immediacy through self-diremption; and the overcoming of this diremption through intersubjective conscience (leading to absolute *Geist*).

Chapter 10 takes up the issue of absolute *Geist*, explaining how religion is both human self-recognition in the divine and divine self-consciousness through human self-recognition. In chapter 11, while trying to show how Hegel's absolute knowledge preserves otherness within it, Williams contrasts two models of absolute knowledge—the "idealist" (solipsistic, a-historical) model and the "intersubjective" (social, historical) model—and argues for the latter. In a twelfth and final chapter, Williams criticizes the alternatives to Hegelian social ontology offered by Husserl, Sartre, and Levinas.

While admirable for its comprehensiveness and lucidity, this study also suffers from some weaknesses. Most seriously, Williams does not always distinguish adequately between two senses of the "other." Williams is quite right to insist that the individual consciousness must be open to the other as other. He is also correct in observing that the other as other is preserved within absolute *Geist*, even though absolute *Geist* has no opposite. Unfortunately, when Williams attempts to explain the preservation of otherness in the case of absolute *Geist*, he frequently

expresses it in terms of the otherness which is preserved in the case of individual consciousness. This conflation of the two senses of the "other" undermines Williams's defense of Hegel against contemporary critics, since such critics generally acknowledge Hegel's allowance of otherness in the case of individual consciousness, but not in the case of absolute *Geist*. A related weakness concerns Williams's explanation of absolute knowledge. Williams correctly observes that absolute knowledge should not be understood as an infinite that excludes the finite. If this is true, however, then the dichotomy which Williams accepts between two models of absolute knowledge (pp. 255ff.) should really be uncovered as a *false* dichotomy. These weaknesses, however, are relatively minor when viewed in light of Williams's achievement: Williams has begun the difficult task of filling a serious lacuna in scholarship on German Idealism. —Michael Baur, *The Catholic University of America*.

ZAMMITO, John H. *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992. x + 479 pp. Cloth, \$65.00; paper, \$18.95—“In this study,” Zammito writes at one point, “the philological-historical question takes precedence over the epistemological one” (p. 48). Zammito's primary task is not to discuss the contemporary relevance of Kant's thought, but to identify what Kant himself was trying to do within his own context. Yet the result is not just a commentary on Kant's third *Critique*. It is an intricate, subtle, and exciting explanation of how Kant's thinking developed and adjusted to new challenges over the decade from the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to the appearance of the *Critique of Judgment*.

Zammito takes over from Giorgio Tonelli the thesis that a major shift in focus occurred in the midst of writing the third *Critique*. It started out as a Critique of Taste. While completing the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant realized that one could establish a transcendental basis for aesthetic judgments: based on the harmony of imagination with understanding, they purported to have intersubjective universality and exemplary necessity. In developing this thesis he amplified a distinction, already implicit in the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, between determinate and reflective judgments. The latter did not apply categories of the understanding, but concepts of reason, organizing experience in a way that was not strictly required. Once he noticed how reflective judgments were involved in ascribing beauty to nature, Kant realized that much more was possible. We recognize in nature something comparable to the purposiveness of art. Organisms, for example, require such a mode of interpretation. A similar pattern is involved when reason develops scientific explanations that organize data into coherent patterns (what Zammito calls induction), and has in addition the potential of systematically uniting all reason's operations. Zammito calls this shift, identified by Tonelli with Kant's use of the term “reflective judgment,” the “cognitive turn.” It found expression in the bulk of the Critique of Teleological Judgment, and in the first draft of the Introduction.