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*Self-Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz’s Law*

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Abstract

I argue that an individual has *aspects* numerically identical with it and each other that nonetheless qualitatively differ from it and each other. This discernibility of identicals does not violate Leibniz's Law, however, which concerns only individuals and is silent about their aspects. They are not in its domain of quantification. To argue that there are aspects I will appeal to the internal conflicts of conscious beings. I do not mean to imply that aspects are confined to such cases, but the best way to start is to recognize them experientially. We can feel the conflicts within ourselves. In doing so we can feel some of our aspects. I will try to enhance our understanding of the concept of aspect by listing and formalizing some principles for its use. After that I will argue that all sorts of individual things have aspects, not just people who are conflicted.

Ockham rejects Scotus's formal distinction with these words, "But among creatures the same thing cannot be truly affirmed and truly denied of the same thing."[[1]](#endnote-2) I will argue that Ockham was not entirely right. There are cases in which numerically identical things qualitatively differ.

 Ockham's principle has become enshrined in one direction of the biconditional that Tarski calls *Leibniz's Law*.[[2]](#endnote-3)

For anything, *x*, and anything, *y*, if *x* is numerically identical with *y* then, for any property, *x* has it if and only if *y* has it.

In what follows I will use ‘Leibniz’s Law’ to refer only to this conditional. It has come to be known as the *Indiscernibility of Identicals*, though misleadingly I will suggest.[[3]](#endnote-4) As I will argue, in some cases identicals are discernible without falsifying the principle. I will say that an individual has *aspects* numerically identical with it and each other that nonetheless qualitatively differ from it and each other.[[4]](#endnote-5) These aspects are entities that are said loosely to be many in virtue of their qualitative differences, but which strictly speaking are not many since they are not numerically distinct. Leibniz's Law concerns only individuals and is silent about their aspects.

 Note that the qualitative complexity that I argue for will not be explicable in terms of "distributional properties," nor "regionalized properties," nor "regionalized instantiation" of properties, nor "localized tropes." Distributional properties involve heterogeneity over space or time, and the others involve heterogeneity over space. The differing aspects that I argue for will not always differ with respect to space or time.[[5]](#endnote-6) Note also that aspects are to be distinguished from tropes, qua-objects, and guises.[[6]](#endnote-7) These entities are not exceptions to the Indiscernibility of Identicals properly understood; aspects are. Note further that aspects are to be distinguished from properties or qualities. Aspects are not properties; they have properties. Note finally that aspects are not basic building blocks of the world, not "the very alphabet of being" (Williams 1953: 7); they are dependent entities, dependent on individuals and properties.

 To argue that there are aspects I will appeal to the internal conflicts of conscious beings. I do not mean to imply that aspects are confined to such cases. To the contrary, I think the world is rife with them. But the best way to start is to recognize them experientially. We can feel the conflicts within ourselves. In doing so we can feel some of our aspects.

After trying to convey an intuitive sense of what aspects are I will explain that I am not proposing counterexamples to Leibniz’s Law as formulated above, which would be better called the *Indiscernibility of Identical Individuals.* Rather I am proposing counterexamples to a related principle, which can be called the *Indiscernibility of Identical Aspects*. It would be more appropriate to call the conjunction of these principles, the *Indiscernibility of Identicals*. Thus I am proposing counterexamples not to Leibniz's Law but to the Indiscernibility of Identicals, properly so-called.

I will try to enhance our understanding of the concept of aspect by listing and formalizing some principles for its use. After that I will argue that all sorts of individual things have aspects, not just people who are conflicted.

I.

 Consider cases in which someone is torn about what to do or how to feel. In ordinary speech we capture the inner conflicts by saying that someone is of two minds about something. A dramatic case is that of Euripides' Medea who struggles with herself whether to kill her children to punish their father Jason who has abandoned her.

Ah, Ah! Why do you gaze at me with your eyes, children? Why do you smile your last smile? Oh, what shall I do? My courage has gone, women, now that I've seen the shining eyes of the children. I couldn't do it. Goodbye to my former plans! I'll take my children from this land. Why should I, in harming them to give their father pain, make myself suffer twice as much? I cannot. Goodbye plans!

 But what is happening to me? Do I want to make myself ridiculous, letting my enemies go unpunished? I must go through with this. What a coward I am--even to admit soft words into my mind! . . . I shall not weaken my hand.

 Ah, Ah! Don't, my heart, don't you do this! Leave them alone, wretched heart, spare the children! Living there with me they will give you joy.

 By the avenging furies down in Hades, I swear I'll never leave these children for my enemies to insult and torture! They must certainly die; and since they must, then I who gave birth to them shall kill them.[[7]](#endnote-8)

Insofar as Medea is enraged at the father, she wants to kill the children. Insofar as she loves them, she has no desire to kill them. She is torn. She is in conflict with herself. She differs from herself. Medea's struggle is between two aspects of her: Medea insofar as she is enraged at Jason *versus* Medea insofar as she loves her children.[[8]](#endnote-9)

 The alternating speeches should not mislead us into thinking that Medea is whole-heartedly one way then whole-heartedly the other. When we are torn, one side may predominate temporarily but the other side does not vanish.

 There may seem to be a simple argument that no-one differs from herself. Here it is: there is no respect in which someone differs from herself, therefore no-one differs from herself.[[9]](#endnote-10) The premise is true if it means there is no respect such that someone in that respect differs from herself in the same respect. However, it is false if it means that there is no respect such that someone in that respect differs from herself in some other respect. It is this latter formulation that captures what it is to be torn.

 Such struggles with ourselves are all too common, even if less fevered than Medea's. Who has not been moved in opposite ways by love and anger in a custody dispute, or in child rearing, or in a close relationship? Self-differing is something we all experience.

 But is this literal self-differing? Many will say that we merely have opposing desires--ones that cannot both be satisfied. The conflict is between the desires, not between one and oneself. However, this way to make theoretical sense of the self-differing is not true to the phenomenon.

 First, the relevant conflict here is not just desiring to do incompatible things. The conflict is that one both has a desire and lacks it. Though Medea insofar as she is enraged at Jason has a desire to kill her children, Medea insofar as she loves her children lacks all desire to do so. It is not that Medea insofar as she loves her children is moved to oppose another desire she has. Insofar as she loves her children she is not moved by the murderous desire at all.

 Second, desires are not like quarrelsome children in being opponents one is merely related to. To have internal conflict like Medea's is like trying to move in opposite directions. Or it is “to take something to oneself and to cast it off” as Plato puts it (1974: 437b1-3). As argued in the *Republic*, this internal opposition indicates a complexity in oneself not just in what one is related to: a complexity that seems to break up the self's unitariness.

It is clear that one thing cannot act in opposite ways or be in opposite states at the same time and in the same part of itself in relation to the same other thing; so if we find this happening we shall know that we are not dealing with one thing but with several. (Plato 1974: IV, 436b6-9)

In consequence, after noting some conflicts, Plato concludes:

It is therefore not unreasonable for us to say that these are two distinct parts, to call that with which it reasons the rational part of the soul, and that with which it lusts and feels hungry and thirsty and gets excited with other desires the irrational and appetitive part, the companion of repletions and pleasures. (Plato 1974: IV, 439d2-e1)

He argues for a third part--the spirited part--a little later.

 The reality of such conflict has led a number of other important authors to downplay the unitariness of the self as well. St. Paul writes:

For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other: so that ye cannot do the things that ye would. (Galatians 5:17)[[10]](#endnote-11)

Goethe echoes this theme in *Faust*:

Two souls, alas! reside within my breast,

and each is eager for a separation:

in throes of coarse desire, one grips

the earth with all its senses;

the other struggles from the dust

to rise to high ancestral spheres. (Goethe 1994: I, 1112-1117)

Here Goethe uses the image not of one self with parts but of two selves joined by a body. Their opposition is made even clearer by a more literal translation of the second line--“Die eine will sich von der andern trennen”: each wants to separate from the other.[[11]](#endnote-12)

 George Elliot writes the same way when describing the steady Lydgate’s incongruous declaration of love to an actress: “He had two selves within him apparently, and they must learn to accommodate each other and bear reciprocal impediments” (Elliot 2004: 146).

 Du Bois writes this way as well:

It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness--An American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. (Du Bois 1903: 3)

See also Fanon:

The black man has two dimensions. One with his fellows, and the other with the white man. A Negro behaves differently with a white man and with another Negro. That this self-division is a direct result of colonialist subjugation is beyond question. (Fanon 1967: 17)

As these authors convey, the internal conflicts are real and deep. Nonetheless, it is going too far to conclude that there are distinct parts of the self or of distinct, co-habiting selves. Such a conclusion neglects the unitariness of the conscious self. It is one oneself who tries to move in each of opposite directions.

Sartre emphasizes this unitariness in his criticism of the Freudian interpretation of bad faith. “By the distinction between the ‘id’ and the ‘ego,’ Freud has cut the psychic whole into two” and would have it that self-deception is a case of one part deceiving another (Sartre 1956: 50). However, when someone lies to himself, if there is a lying part conscious of the lying and a lied-to part that is not conscious of the lying, then the lying part is simply an Other to the lied-to part. This is not self-deception. Nonetheless, Sartre argues, the Freudian scheme presupposes a unity required for true self-deception. The lying could only happen by the operation of a censor that decides what is allowed into consciousness and what stays unconscious. The censor “must be the consciousness (of) being conscious of the drive to be repressed, but precisely in order *not be* conscious of it” (Sartre 1956: 53).

The very essence of the reflexive idea of hiding something from oneself implies the unity of one and the same psychic mechanism and consequently a double activity in the heart of unity, tending on the one hand to maintain and locate the thing to be concealed and on the other hand to repress and disguise it. (Sartre 1956: 53)

In other words there must be a “single consciousness”, such that “I must know in my capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in my capacity as the one deceived” (Sartre 1956: 49).

 Sartre’s talk of a single consciousness captures the unitariness of the self overshadowed by the previous dramatic appeals to two-ness. The subjects in these cases would say that it is I who desire to do something yet lack all desire to do so. It is I who move toward the pleasures of the world yet also move away from them. It is I who am attracted to and repelled by the values of white America. It is I who am aware of the truth and who am not. The fact that it is me, even when I am in conflict with myself, must not be overlooked. It is I who am conscious on either side of these divides. Descartes brings our attention to this fact when he says in the Sixth Meditation that the mind, unlike the body, is “utterly indivisible.”

For when I consider the mind, that is, myself insofar as I am only a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish any parts within me; rather, I understand myself to be manifestly one complete thing. . . Nor can the faculties of willing, sensing, understanding, and so on be called "parts" of the mind, since it is one and the same mind that wills, senses, and understands. (Descartes 1984: 89)

Don't be misled by the appeal to Descartes and the other talk of soul. I am not arguing for a unitary immaterial entity that inhabits the body. I am simply arguing that the self on one side of the conflict is numerically identical with the self on the other side. The unitariness of the mind is the identity of the mind in one conscious action with itself in another. That is why, as Descartes says, “[W]e cannot conceive of half of a mind, as we can half of any body whatever, no matter how small” (1984: 13). If any remnant of your mind is you, then it is you and not half of you. If any party to an internal conflict is you, then it is you and not just part of you.

 But without an immaterial self how can there be this unitariness, one might wonder.[[12]](#endnote-13) After all, if the self is material it will have distinct parts, and its complexity will doubtless lie in the differences between its parts. Plato's view that the soul has parts thus seems accurate for a material self.

 Take for instance the highly plausible picture consonant with cognitive science in which the self is material and is like an institution--one consisting of various departments that cooperate in playing various roles contributing to the overall purposes of the institution. Each department in turn consists of cooperating bureaus, and so on down to the level of neurons. The institution is the person and the departments, bureaus, etc. are therefore subpersonal (for a few levels down, anyway). There could be differences between some of the subpersonal departments that make it true that Medea differs from herself. Perhaps her war department wants revenge and her state department has no desire for revenge. On such a view a person is a "corporate entity" (Lycan 1987: 40) or a "committee or army" (Dennett 1978: 80).

 Granted, the self on such a view has parts. Note, however, that being a material whole with distinct parts does not preclude being unitary. It does not require accepting compositional nihilism (according to which, though the unitary whole may be said to exist loosely speaking, only the many parts really exist).[[13]](#endnote-14) Even a material whole with parts can have the unitariness I have emphasized. Given that this material whole is conscious then it does have that unitariness, as Sartre and Descartes emphasize.

 Granted secondly, the complexity of the whole is in virtue of the differences between the parts. So, any conflict within the self can certainly be there in virtue of conflicts between the parts, just as in the example. Nonetheless, the whole is one thing and the parts are distinct things, each distinct from the whole. As already argued concerning Medea, the conflict in the conscious unitary whole is not just a matter of standing in relations to distinct things in conflict, even if they are its parts. This point holds true even if the conflict in the whole is in virtue of the conflict between the parts. Thus, there is self-differing in conscious selves, even if they are material.

 The point is hard to see because, as Hume points out, we tend to conflate two distinct connected things with one single, identical thing.[[14]](#endnote-15) If we carefully distinguish these, it is easier to see that understanding how two connected parts can be in conflict is not yet fully to understand how their unitary whole can be in conflict with itself.

 Note that when I talk of the unitariness of the mind, soul, or self, I am distinguishing unitariness from unitedness. I am talking about being a single thing--one and the same thing--rather than being more than one thing connected in some way. Two connected things are still two. They are still two even if their connection were to ground the existence of a third, unitary thing. Again, in the cases at issue the parties to the conflict are the same self. Thus, discussions about how it is that many objects, acts, or subjects of consciousness are united into a one that comprises them are beyond my purview (see Bayne and Chalmers 2003).

 Note also that I am not making the overarching claim that all conscious acts of a given human being are the acts of a unitary consciousness (see Dennett 1991, 1992). I am not entering into that controversy. All I need are some internal conflicts in which there is a unitary consciousness. In fact, there are many such conflicts.

 The most famous challenge to a unitary consciousness in Western philosophy is Hume’s. Note, however, that his inability to find a simple and continued self rests on his inability to find an unvariegated, steadfast, and unchanging self (Hume 2007: 1.4.6.1-4). Variation is contrary to identity and unitariness, for Hume (Hume 2007: 1.4.3.2). It is precisely this assumption that I am arguing against. After all, I am arguing that something can differ from itself. If my argument works, then Hume’s argument fails.

 To conclude, I am taking such cases of internal conflict--of being torn--as cases of qualitative self-differing. It is easiest to capture the conflict by writing in terms of two distinct parts of a soul or two distinct souls. However there are not two numerically distinct things in conflict. There is just one self in conflict with itself.

 In such a case of qualitative self-differing, call what differ the “aspects” of the individual that self-differs. For the case to be one of *differing*, one aspect must have a quality that somehow the other aspect lacks. For it to be a case of *self*-differing, the aspects must be numerically identical with the individual that self-differs.

II.

As noted above, I am giving counterexamples not to Leibniz's Law but to the Indiscernibility of Identical Aspects.

For anything, *x*, and anything, *y*, if *x* is numerically identical with *y* then, for any property, any aspect numerically identical with *x* has it if and only if any aspect numerically identical with y has it.[[15]](#endnote-16)

Individual *x* might be numerically identical with an aspect that differs from an aspect that individual *y* is numerically identical with, even when *x* and *y* are identical. Reference to aspects makes the Indiscernibility of Identical Aspects false.

 Note that Leibniz's Law does not entail the Indiscernibility of Identical Aspects. It would if aspects were in the domain of quantification for both principles, but they are not for either principle. The variables range over individuals only.

Granted, the Indiscernibility of Identical Aspects in this informal presentation appears to quantify over aspects, as well. However, as will be more apparent in the formalizations to follow, I am using just familiar first and second order quantifiers that quantify over individuals and properties respectively. Aspects are not additional individuals nor additional properties in the domains of quantification. By this means, I hope to convey that aspects are dependent entities, not basic ones, even though they are entities we cannot explain away. Apparent quantification over aspects is to be done in terms of quantification over individuals and properties. Thus “There is an aspect” should be understood as “Some individual has an aspect” which should be understood as “For some individual *x* and some property *Y*, *x* is numerically identical with *x* insofar as it is *Y*,” where “*x* insofar as it is *Y*” refers to an aspect. Note than “insofar as” will be the canonical expression for forming a term that refers to aspects out of a term and an open sentence. Thus the fact that identical individuals never differ does not entail that the aspects of identical individuals never differ.

There would seem to be an argument that Leibniz's Law applies to any entity or entities whatsoever. It may seem that the original Indiscernibility of Identicals is just another way of saying that nothing both has and lacks a property, which is just another way of saying that no contradictions are true.[[16]](#endnote-17) Thus it may seem that the original Indiscernibility of Identicals is as unassailable as the Principle of Non-Contradiction--the principle Aristotle calls "the most certain of all"--and is as perfectly general.[[17]](#endnote-18) However, following Aristotle, the principle is "that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect." [[18]](#endnote-19) This formulation leaves some room to maneuver. I will say that something in one respect can have a property that itself in another respect lacks. This claim is not contradictory. The contradiction would be to say that something in one respect can have a property that it in no respect has. I will say further that something in one respect is numerically identical with itself in another respect. Thus it can be that numerically identical things qualitatively differ without contradiction. Thus Leibniz's Law should not be thought of as applying absolutely generally to anything that can be talked about; the argument that it must apply so generally, fails.

 The reader may wonder how I am defining numerical identity if not by Leibniz's Law. However I am not defining identity; I am taking it as primitive. The basic idea is that to be numerically identical is to be one single individual. To be numerically distinct is to be two single individuals.[[19]](#endnote-20) It is the connection with cardinality that is essential to numerical identity, not some connection with qualitative sameness.[[20]](#endnote-21)

 When a single individual differs from itself it is natural to say that it has two or more aspects. Doesn't their two-ness thus entail their numerical distinctness? No. This way of counting aspects is a loose way of counting individuals. Aspects of the same individual are counted as more than one based on their qualitative differences. That does not entail the numerical difference that makes them be more than one individual. That the same individual may properly be counted as two is a familiar point. For instance, when an airline counts passengers it might count the same person taking separate trips as two. I suggest that the great authors who saw our selves as doubled or as consisting of numerically distinct parts were overlooking the distinction between the loose way of counting individuals by counting by qualitative difference and the strict way of counting individuals by counting by numerical distinctness.[[21]](#endnote-22)

 One might object that talk of numerical identity not defined or at least constrained by Leibniz's Law is just inconceivable. This is a standard approach when rejecting attempts to question basic assumptions. Similarly, one might have said before Newton that talk of action at a distance was inconceivable, or might have said before Freud that talk of an unconscious mental state was inconceivable. Locke is an example of someone committed to both things. In the first three editions of the *Essay* he says, "The next thing to be consider'd, is how *Bodies* *operate* one upon another, and that is manifestly *by impulse*, and nothing else. It being impossible to conceive, that Body should operate on what it does not touch . . ."[[22]](#endnote-23) Secondly, in all editions we find, ". . . it being hard to conceive, that any thing should think, and not be conscious of it" and ". . . *it* [the soul] *must necessarily be conscious of its own Perceptions*" and in the second and subsequent editions he speaks of "that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive."[[23]](#endnote-24) Both action at a distance and unconscious mental states have proved conceivable. Likewise identity not fully constrained by Leibniz's Law may be conceivable as well. These examples of successful questioning of basic assumptions do not prove that I am right, but suggest that I may not automatically be wrong.

 Leibniz's Law is closely related to the principle that co-referential terms are substitutable *salva veritate*. However, the principle concerns singular reference. It concerns the substitution of expressions that refer to single individuals. There needs to be an argument that it generalizes to reference to aspects. An argument against generalizing can appeal to the substitution failures in simple sentences noted by Jennifer Saul (1997, 1999). It is not a clear strike against aspects that reference to them provides counterexamples to a principle for which to all appearances there are already counterexamples. Granted I cannot show decisively that these are counterexamples, but all I need is that has not been decisively be shown that they are not.[[24]](#endnote-25) Note that we can keep to the convincing appearance that there can be failures of substitution for terms that refer to numerically identical things, if those terms refer to qualitatively differing but numerically identical aspects.[[25]](#endnote-26)

 Thus I am proposing that there is another kind of reference. Besides singular reference there is aspectival reference. The former is not sensitive to the difference between aspects; the latter is. An expression that singularly refers, refers to an individual. An expression that aspectivally refers can refer to an aspect without referring to one numerically identical with it.

 Thus, again, I am not proposing that there are counterexamples to Leibniz’s Law understood as a principle about the objects of singular reference; I am proposing that there are counterexamples to the Indiscernibility of Identical Aspects, and so to the Indiscernibility of Identicals properly so-called, that is, the conjunction of the two principles.

 The distinction between singular and aspectival reference allows me to be more precise when I say that there is self-differing. When I say that something differs from itself, what I mean is that something in one respect qualitatively differs from itself in another. That is, numerically identical aspects qualitatively differ. With “something” and “itself” I am not singularly referring to one individual, rather I am elliptically aspectivally referring to some of its differing aspects. So for example, suppose someone asks Ralph if he wants to retire and he says, "Yes and no" or "I do and I don't." He is not attributing a contradiction to himself. He is elliptically saying that he insofar as he still loves the work does not want to retire, but he insofar as he is weary does want to retire. Self-differing is the differing of aspects numerically identical with the self.

III.

My procedure so far has been to try to get the reader to take a perspective on familiar situations that allows him or her to discern aspects and get an intuitive sense of what some are. Next, I will follow Jason Turner's lead in formalizing the theory and listing some of its principles.[[26]](#endnote-27) As Turner says, such regimentation is an aid to understanding of the concept of aspect by helping people to use the concept, by helping to reveal commitments and consequences of its use, and by serving as an implicit definition of it (2014: 225-26). [[27]](#endnote-28)

 First, let me explain the sort of expression to be used to refer to aspects. I form the canonical aspectival referring expression with “insofar as”: for example, Hume insofar as he is an agent, Socrates insofar as he is wise, Medea insofar as she loves her children. I do not take “insofar as” to be equivalent to “as” or “qua”.[[28]](#endnote-29) I think Landman is right that it is a valid inference from, for instance, “Socrates as wise is admirable” to “Socrates is wise” (1989:734). However, “Socrates insofar as he is wise is admirable” does not entail “Socrates is wise”. He may be wise only to a very limited extent and mostly foolish, so that “Socrates is not wise” is what is true. Here and in what follows I take Socrates at his word that he is not wise, but is only a little bit wise.[[29]](#endnote-30)

 Note that there are potentially various uses of “insofar as”. Call such expressions “qualifiers,” examples being “insofar as”, “in some respect”, “so far forth as”, “to the extent that”, "as", “*qua”*, etc. [[30]](#endnote-31) There are numerous uses of qualifiers proposed by scholars. Anscombe suggests that they sometimes relativize the predicate of a sentence. Bäck finds in Aristotle that they sometimes play the role of a sentence connective like “because”, and sometimes enables reference to something’s parts. Szabo urges that qualifiers sometimes provide adjunct predication.[[31]](#endnote-32) I will take “insofar as” to be a term restrictor, somewhat analogous to how Landman treats “as”.[[32]](#endnote-33) For my purposes think of “insofar as" as a function from a term and an open sentence to a term that refers to an aspect.

 Following Turner (2014: 227), if a term “*a*” is an expression that singularly refers and “*Fy*”is an open sentence with *y* as an unbound variable, then “*ay*[*Fy*]” is a term that refers to an aspect of the single individual, *a*. Read it as “*a* insofar as it is F”. If “*a*” aspectivally refers then “*ay*[*Fy*]” refers to an aspect of that aspect. Thus “*ay*[*Fy*]*z*[G*z*]” is another example of a term that refers to an aspect of an aspect. As Turner notes, aspect terms can be open, so we can quantify into them, for instance “*ay*[*Ryx*]”: “*a* insofar as it bears *R* to something”. I will also assume that aspect terms can be open in the predicate as well, for instance “*ay*[*Xy*]”: “*a* insofar as it is some way”.

 Another way to say “*a* insofar as it is some way” is “*a* in some respect”. I take it that the term “respect” is a generic way to refer to aspects, or parts, or relations. I also take it that when the relevant respects are aspects or parts, the “in” of “in some respect” works the way it does when we say someone is weak in the knees.[[33]](#endnote-34) “The suitor is weak in the knees” is true just in case the suitor has knees and they are weak (or at least are feeling weak). Although it is not idiomatic, we can use “in” with the same sense to say that Socrates in his wise aspect is admirable.[[34]](#endnote-35) That would be true just in case Socrates has a wise aspect and it is admirable. Likewise, “Socrates insofar as he is wise is admirable” is true just in case Socrates has a wise aspect that is admirable.

 As noted in Turner, I take it that not all aspect terms refer. I will assume that an atomic sentence with an aspect term that does not refer is false.

 To make the formulae easier to read, I often use dummy second order constants where there strictly should be universally quantified second order variables. I use first order quantifiers to reduce the temptation to substitute aspect terms for the variables. The first order variables only range over individuals.

 Lastly, the only terms with numerically identical referents that can reliably be substituted *salva veritate* are ones that do not refer to aspects.

 First, some principles relevant to the **existence and numerical identity** of aspects. I will assume that some individuals exist and that every individual has some property.

1. $ (∀x)(Fx\rightarrow \left(x=x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]\right))$ For any individual, if it is *F*, then it is numerically identical with itself insofar as it is *F* (in other words, the individual insofar as it is *F* is an aspect of the individual).
2. $ (∀x)(∃X)(x=x\_{y}\left[Xy\right])$ Every individual is numerically identical with an aspect.
3. $(∃x)(x=x\_{y}\left[Fy\right])$ Thus, there is an individual that is numerically identical with an aspect. In other words, some individual has an aspect. So, there is an aspect.
4. $ (∀x)(x=x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]\rightarrow \left(∃z\right)\left(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]=z\right))$ Every aspect is numerically identical with an individual. This statement follows trivially from the way I am quantifying over aspects, but is important when said in English.
5. $(∀x)(G(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right])\rightarrow \left(∃z\right)\left(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]=z\right))$ More generally, every aspect that is any way is numerically identical with an individual.
6. $(∀x)(x=x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]\rightarrow F\left(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]\right))$ For any individual *x*, if *x* insofar as it is *F* is an aspect of *x*, then *x* insofar as it is *F* is *F*. For example, Socrates insofar as he is wise is wise. Landman finds this true of 'as' as well (1989:733).[[35]](#endnote-36)
7. $ (∀x)(x=x\_{y}[Fy]\rightarrow (∃X)(F\left(x\_{y}\left[Xy\right]\right))$ Thus, for any individual *x*, if *x* insofar as it is *F* exists then some aspect of *x* is *F*. For instance, if Socrates insofar as he is wise exists, then Socrates insofar as he is some way is wise. Note that in English I am using “Socrates insofar as he is wise exists” interchangeably with “Socrates is identical with Socrates insofar as he is wise”.
8. $(∀x)(G\left(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]\right)\rightarrow x=x\_{y}\left[Gy\right])$ For any individual *x*, if any aspect of *x* is *G* then *x* insofar as it is *G* exists. For instance, if Socrates insofar as he is wise is admired then Socrates insofar as he is admired exists.
9. ($∃x)(∃X)(∃Y)(∃Z)(Z\left(x\_{y}\left[Xy\right]\right) \& \~Z(x\_{y}\left[Yy\right]))$ Some individual has qualitatively differing aspects. For example, Socrates insofar as he is wise is wise and Socrates insofar as he is not wise is not wise.
10. $(∃x)(x=x\_{y}\left[Fy\right] \& G(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]) \& \~Gx)$ Some individual qualitatively differs from one of its aspects. For example, Socrates is not wise but Socrates insofar as he is wise is wise.
11. $\~(∀x)((x=x\_{y}\left[Fy\right])\rightarrow Fx)$ Thus, it is not the case that for every individual *x*, if *x* insofar as it is *F* exists then *x* is *F*. For example, it is not the case that if Socrates insofar as he is wise exists then Socrates is wise. Socrates may be wise to a small extent--one too small for it to be true that Socrates is wise.

The Denial of the Indiscernibility of Identical Aspects:

1. $\~(∀x)(∀y)(∀z)(∀w)(∀X)(∀Y)(x=y \& x=z\_{k}\left[Xk\right] \& y=w\_{k}\left[Yk\right]\rightarrow \left(∀Z\right)\left(Z\left(z\_{k}\left[Xk\right]\right)\leftrightarrow Z\left(w\_{k}\left[Yk\right]\right)\right))$ It is not the case that for every individual, *x*, and every individual, *y*, if *x* is numerically identical with *y* then, for any property, any aspect of *x* has it if and only if any aspect of *y* has it. This follows from 9.

Aspectival Leibniz's Law:[[36]](#endnote-37)

1. $(∀x)(∀y)(x=y\rightarrow \left(∀z\right)\left(∀X\right)\left(x=z\_{m}\left[Xm\right]\leftrightarrow y=z\_{m}\left[Xm\right]\right))$ For any two individuals if they are numerically identical then any aspect of either is an aspect of the other. This follows given the transitivity of numerical identity.

Some principles concerning "nested" aspects:

1. $(∀x)(G\left(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]\right)\rightarrow x=\left.x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]\_{k}[Gk]\right)$ For any individual *x*, if any aspect of *x* is *G* then *x* insofar as it is *F* insofar as it is *G* exists. For example, if Socrates insofar as he is wise is virtuous then Socrates insofar as he is wise insofar as he is virtuous exists.
2. $\left(∀x\right)(x=x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]\_{z}[Gz]\rightarrow x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]\_{z}[Gz]=x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]$) For any individual *x*, if *x* insofar as it is *F* insofar as it is *G* exists, then that nested aspect is identical with *x* insofar as it is *F*. For example, Socrates insofar as he is wise insofar as he is canny is numerically identical with Socrates insofar as he is wise.

Next, defining **aspectival** **identity** (as opposed to numerical identity):

1. $ x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]≈z\_{k}\left[Gk\right] =\_{df}(∀X)(X(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right])\leftrightarrow X(z\_{k}\left[Gk\right]))$ Two aspects are the same aspect just in case everything true of each is true of the other. For example, Socrates insofar as he is wise is the same aspect as Plato’s teacher insofar as he is sagacious if and only if all the same things are true of them (including what they are numerically identical with).

Next, more concerning **properties of aspects**. Here I generally follow the lead of Fred Landman in his discussion of “as”(1989: 733). The difference between “as” and “insofar as” will lead to a departure from Landman at the end. It will help in thinking through these truths to think of aspects as if they were sets of the properties they have. I will just assume that the relevant aspects exist.

1. $ (∀x)(G(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]) \& H(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right])\rightarrow G+H\left(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]\right))$ For anything *x*, if *x* insofar as it is *F* is *G* and *x* insofar as it is *F* is *H*, then *x* insofar as it is *F* is *G* and *H*. For example, if Socrates insofar as he is wise is admirable, and Socrates insofar as he is wise is heeded, then Socrates insofar as he is wise is admirable and heeded. Here I am assuming with Landman that there is a way to make conjunctions of predicates in this way.
2. $(∀x)(\left(G\left(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]\right) \& \left(∀z\right)\left(Gz\rightarrow Hz\right)\right)\rightarrow H\left(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]\right))$ For anything *x*, if *x* insofar as it is *F* is *G* and if anything that is *G* is *H*, then *x* insofar as it is *F* is *H*. For example, if Socrates insofar as he is wise is wise and if being wise implies being virtuous, then Socrates insofar as he is wise is virtuous.
3. $\~(∃x)(G\left(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]\right)\& \~G\left(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]\right))$ Nothing has an aspect that is both *G* and not *G*. For example, it is not the case that Socrates insofar as he is wise is both virtuous and not virtuous. (Though of course it may be that Socrates insofar as he is wise has differing aspects.)
4. $(∀x)(G\left(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right]\right)∨\~G(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right])$) Any aspect of anything is either *G* or not *G*. For example, either Socrates insofar as he is wise is valued or Socrates insofar as he is wise is not valued.

Next, a noteworthy departure from Landman:

1. $\~(∀x)( G(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right])\rightarrow Fx)$ It is not the case that for every individual *x* if *x* insofar as it is *F* is *G* then *x* is *F*. Instead, the closest approach is:
2. $(∀x)(G(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right])\rightarrow \left(∃X\right)\left(F(x\_{y}\left[Xy\right])\right))$ For example, if Socrates insofar as he is wise is virtuous, then Socrates insofar as he is some way is wise. “Insofar as” does not work the same way as “as”. As Landman recognizes, “as wise” would authorize inferring that Socrates is wise (1989:734). Again, however, Socrates may not be wise enough to be wise even if he is wise to some extent.

Blocking the *secundum quid ad simpliciter* inference:

1. $\~(∀x)(G(x\_{y}\left[Fy\right])\rightarrow Gx)$ It doesn't follow from the fact that an aspect of individual *x* is *G* that *x* is *G*. This follows from 10. For example, supposing Socrates insofar as he is wise is virtuous, it does not follow that Socrates is virtuous.

**Precise vs. expanded aspects**. Call the property referred to in a qualifier phrase the “qualifying property.” For example in “Socrates insofar as he is wise” the qualifying property is being wise. The question is, what other properties besides the qualifying property does the aspect have?

 Let me introduce the notion of “precise aspects”. Think of a precise aspect as an individual precisely insofar as it is a certain way. So for example, Socrates precisely insofar as he is wise (i) is identical with Socrates, (ii) is wise, and (iii) is anything entailed by these. Thus Socrates precisely insofar as he is wise is not admired. After all, it is possible to be wise and not admired.

 Sometimes, in the appropriate context, an expression suited to refer to a precise aspect can also be used to refer to a grouping of precise aspects. Call such a grouping an “expanded aspect”. The groupings can be unified in various ways: explanatory, causal, conventional, spatiotemporal, and perhaps more. However, being admired might be a conventional result of being wise, and the context might indicate that what is being referred to by “Socrates insofar as he is wise” includes conventional concomitants. In such a case “Socrates insofar as he is wise is admired” would be true.

IV.

Having argued that there are aspects and that allegiance to Leibniz’s Law is no impediment to recognizing that there are numerically identical, qualitatively differing aspects, I now want to argue that the world is rife with such aspects.

 Not all cases of self-differing involve conscious struggle or competition between the aspects. Being torn can involve an inclination to incompatible actions and the need to decide which to pursue. It can involve having feelings that are uncomfortable to have together where each feeling tries to vanquish the other. However, there are numerous other cases of self-differing that involve neither minds nor feelings. The key is having recognized that there are cases in which something insofar as it is one way differs from, but is identical with, itself insofar as it is another way. Once we are sensitized to such cases, we can find them everywhere.

 The basic idea is to appeal to cases of partial resemblance. Because one individual can both be similar and dissimilar to another, the first individual has an aspect that is similar to the second and an aspect that is dissimilar to the second. This situation is common. So for instance take a globe of white marble and a cube of white marble. The globe insofar as it is white is similar to the cube; the globe insofar as it is spherical is dissimilar to the white cube.

 However, the case has to be more complicated than it might appear at first. Even were one to grant that the first individual has an aspect that is similar to the second individual, one might resist granting that the first individual has an aspect that is dissimilar to the second individual. Instead one might argue that the situation of being similar and dissimilar amounts to this: there is an aspect of the first individual that is similar and no further relevant aspect that is similar. So for example one might say: the globe insofar as it is white is similar to the cube; the globe lacks any other aspects similar to the cube. On this way of thinking there is no commitment to qualitatively differing aspects.

 To show that there are such differing aspects, I will appeal to cases of what I will call “Differential Resemblance”, which are cases of overlapping partial resemblance (see Baxter 2011). In his discussion of Distinctions of Reason, Hume introduces a case of differential resemblance to illustrate all such cases (2007: 1.1.7.18).Consider now the globe of white marble, the cube of white marble, and additionally a globe of black marble. In addition to the aspect in which the white globe resembles the cube, i.e. the white globe insofar as it is white, there is an aspect in which the white globe resembles the black globe, i.e. the white globe insofar as it is spherical. But clearly the white globe insofar as it is spherical is dissimilar to the white cube. So there is an aspect of the white globe that is dissimilar to the white cube. So the white globe’s being similar and dissimilar to the white cube is indeed a matter of it having an aspect in which it is similar and an aspect in which it is dissimilar. It is not just a matter of having one aspect that is similar and no others that are. So the case of differential resemblance vindicates the initial basic idea of qualitatively differing aspects.

 Note that the case of differential resemblance is symmetrical. Each aspect similar to one thing is dissimilar to another. The white globe insofar as it is white is similar to the white cube insofar as it is white and dissimilar to the black globe insofar as it is black. The white globe insofar as it is spherical is dissimilar to the white cube insofar as it is cubic and similar to the black globe insofar as it is spherical.

 In this discussion I am using ‘dissimilar’ to indicate that the relevant negation is internal. The relevant dissimilarities are not a matter of lacking an aspect of similarity (external negation), but of having an aspect of dissimilarity (internal negation).

 The next step is to note that the world is rife with partial resemblance and differential resemblance. Practically any two individuals one thinks of are partly similar and partly dissimilar. A rose insofar as it is in space is similar to the ocean and the rose insofar as it is sweet-smelling is dissimilar to the ocean. And where there is partial resemblance, there is often differential resemblance, as long as the resemblances can vary independently. If *x* insofar as it is *F* is similar to *y* and *x* insofar as it is *G* is dissimilar to *y*, then there usually exists a *z* such that *x* insofar as it is *F* is dissimilar to *z* and *x* insofar as it is *G* is similar to *z*. For example, the Pope insofar as he is a religious leader is similar to the Dalai Lama and the Pope insofar as he is Catholic is dissimilar to the Dalai Lama. There exists a newly-confirmed parishioner, Dana, such that the pope insofar as he is religious leader is dissimilar to Dana and the Pope insofar as he is Catholic is similar to Dana.[[37]](#endnote-38)

 Where there is partial resemblance, or at least where there is differential resemblance, there are qualitatively differing aspects. So the world is rife with such aspects. The general argument, using Hume’s example, goes as follows. Call it the *Argument from Differential Resemblance*.

(1.0) The white globe insofar as it is white is similar to the white cube.

(2.0) The white globe insofar as it is spherical is dissimilar to the white cube.

(3.0) The white globe insofar as it is white and the white globe insofar as it is spherical are numerically identical to the white globe.

(4.0) Therefore, the white globe insofar as it is one way differs qualitatively from itself insofar as it is another way.

To put it in our shorthand: the white globe differs from itself.

 A natural objection to this proliferation of aspects via partial or differential resemblance is to contend that there are varieties of ways of resembling, not varieties of aspects that resemble. Put more perspicuously, the premises are:

(1.1) The white globe whitely-resembles the white cube.

(2.1) The white globe does not spherically-resemble the white cube.

(3.1) The white globe, that whitely-resembles something, and the white globe, that spherically-resembles something, are numerically identical to the white globe.

From these premises, the conclusion (4.0), that the white globe differs qualitatively from itself, does not follow.

 The problem with this suggestion is that it cannot capture the distinction between having a respect of dissimilarity and lacking a respect of similarity. More specifically, it cannot capture a situation in which a respect of similarity is also a respect of dissimilarity but without simply being lacked. Take, for instance, Melvin and Fred. Both are torn as to whether they want to go to town.

(i) Melvin in the respect in which he wants to go is similar to Fred in the respect in which he (Fred) wants to go, and is dissimilar to Fred in the respect in which he (Fred) does *not* want to go.

There are two ways to try to capture this situation on the proposal appealing to ways of resembling. The first is to say:

(i') Melvin go-resembles Fred and does not go-resemble Fred.

The objection turns a truth into a contradiction and so is not acceptable. The second way to try to capture the situation tries to avoid baldly saying that the respect of similarity is lacked:

(i'') Melvin is go-similar to Fred and is go-dissimilar to Fred. [[38]](#endnote-39)

However, if (i'') captures that a respect of similarity is also a respect of dissimilarity then it says that the same things are both similar and dissimilar in the same respect. But then it is contradictory.

 Thus, the appeal to ways of resembling cannot capture all the truths that can be captured by appeal to resembling aspects.

 Another natural objection to the proliferation of aspects is to try to reify respects of resemblance as more familiar entities. Let “in the respect in which it is F” expresses a relation to numerically distinct F-ness. A universal might be an example.[[39]](#endnote-40) On this view, similarities and dissimilarities between two things are had extrinsically, that is, had only relative to something numerically distinct. Put more perspicuously, the premises are:

(1.2) The white globe relative to Whiteness is similar to the white cube.

(2.2) The white globe relative to Sphericality is dissimilar to the white cube.

(3.2) The white globe, which stands in a relation to Whiteness, and the white globe, which stands in a relation to Sphericality, are numerically identical to the white globe.

From these premises, the conclusion (4.0), that the white globe differs qualitatively from itself, does not follow.

 The problem with this proposal is that resemblance between two things is had intrinsically. It is not relative to some third thing. Two things resemble in virtue of themselves; it is not the case that they resemble only relative to something distinct from both. We already have reason to believe in aspects, so we have the wherewithal to say that things resemble in virtue of their aspects. Something's aspects are not numerically distinct from it.

 Furthermore commitment to universals brings with it the notorious problem of instantiation: how can we make sense of the non-relational tie of instantiation in a way that avoids Bradley's regress? The best answer, in my view, appeals to a shared aspect between a particular and a universal (see Baxter 2001, 2013). This partial identity between particulars and universals enables things to resemble in virtue of themselves. So one should not try to use appeal to universals to escape the conclusion that there is qualitative self-differing.

 Another related objection to the argument from differential resemblance would be that respects of resemblance are numerically distinct parts of what resemble and that “in the respect in which it is F” expresses having that part. A trope might be an example.[[40]](#endnote-41) Put more perspicuously, the premises are:

(1.3) The white globe has a part that is similar to the white cube.

(2.3) The white globe has a part that is dissimilar to the white cube.

(3.3) The white globe, which has a part that is similar to the white cube, and the white globe, which has a part that is dissimilar to the white cube, are numerically identical to the white globe.

From these premises, the conclusion (4.0), that the white globe differs qualitatively from itself, does not follow.

 The response to the previous objection applies to this one, assuming that having as a part is a relation between something and something numerically distinct. Two things resemble in virtue of themselves; it is not the case that they resemble only relative to something distinct from both.[[41]](#endnote-42)

 In addition, there is a case of partial resemblance that cannot be handled this way: a lone simple can resemble something in different respects. For example, a lone simple with respect to its loneness is similar to a lone complex, yet that lone simple with respect to its simplicity is dissimilar to the lone complex. So an argument relevantly like the initial argument appears, not subject to the objection:

(1.3.1) The lone simple with respect to its loneness is similar to the lone complex.

(2.3.1) The lone simple with respect to its simplicity is dissimilar to the lone complex.

(3.3.1) The lone simple with respect to its loneness is and the lone simple with respect to its simplicity are numerically identical to the lone simple.

(4.3.1) Therefore, the lone simple qualitatively differs from itself.

The argument is not subject to the objection because, since the object is a simple, the similarity and dissimilarity are not relative to parts of it.

 At this point one might try to escape the proliferation of aspects by simply objecting that talk of respects introduces unnecessary complexity that creates the problem.[[42]](#endnote-43) Simplify, and the problem disappears. To say that something in the respect in which it is white is similar to something else is just to say that both are white. To say that something in the respect in which it is white is dissimilar to something else is just to say that the one is white and the other is not. So, put more perspicuously, the premises of the argument from differential resemblance are:

(1.4) Both the white globe and the white cube are white.

(2.4) The white globe is spherical and the white cube is not.

(3.4) The white globe, which is white, and the white globe, which is spherical, are numerically identical to the white globe.

From these premises, conclusion (4.0), that the white globe differs qualitatively from itself, does not follow.

 However talk of respects is a necessary complexity. Without it we could not accurately describe Medea's state of being torn. Once we have it there is no reason to foreswear its use in other contexts. Once cases of being torn motivated us to admit that there are aspects, cases of differential resemblance motivate us to admit that the world is rife with aspects.[[43]](#endnote-44)

NOTES

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1. William of Ockham, *Ordinatio*, d. 2, q. 6, in Spade (1994: 156). The formal distinction was supposed to be a less than numerical but more than merely conceptual distinction (Suarez 1947: 24). [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
2. See Tarski (1941: 55). Did Leibniz espouse Leibniz's Law? Feldman (1970) thinks not, but see Curley (1971). In my opinion it follows from Leibniz’s view that substances had complete concepts and being the same substance was a matter of having the same complete concept (Leibniz 1989: Sec. 8). Thus the law would in that case be restricted to substances. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
3. The usage may stem from Quine (1961: 71, 139), and I would guess owes its popularity more to assonance than accuracy. The issue strictly speaking is not about what subjects can discern. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
4. For some earlier work on aspects see Baxter (1988a, 1989, 1999, and 2014). Note that I am not using “aspect” with the connotation of appearance. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
5. See Parsons (2004: 173-80), Schaffer (2010: 57-60), and McDaniel (2009: 325-331). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
6. See Casteñeda (1975), Fine (1982), and Williams (1953). [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
7. Excerpted and translated in Annas (2001: 111-12). [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
8. For another example from literature, in Act II, Scene 2 of *Measure for Measure* there is Isabella insofar as she supports justice for her brother (who is condemned for fornication) and Isabella insofar as she wants mercy for her brother:

There is a vice that most I do abhor,

And most desire should meet the blow of justice,

For which I would not plead, but that I must,

For which I must not plead, but that I am

At war 'twixt will and will not. (Shakespeare 1969: 80) [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
9. I’m grateful to Jonathan Schaffer for this objection. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
10. See also Romans 7:25. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
11. Robert Louis Stevenson explores the consequences of such a separation in *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*. In his statement Jekyll concludes "that man is not truly one, but truly two" and observes that "of the two natures that contended in the field of my consciousness, even if I could rightly be said to be either, it was only because I was radically both" (2003: 48-9). [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
12. I'm grateful to Sam Wheeler and an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
13. See for instance Dorr and Rosen (2002). Compositional anti-nihilists include Lewis (1986: 211-213), and van Inwagen (1990: ch. 9). [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
14. "But tho' these two ideas of identity, and a succession of related objects be in themselves perfectly distinct, and even contrary, yet 'tis certain, that in our common way of thinking they are generally confounded with each other" (Hume 2007: 1.4.6.6). [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
15. See a formalization in part III. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
16. See Wiggins (1967: 4). [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
17. But no more so. See Priest, et al. (2004). [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
18. Aristotle (1984: IV 3 1005b18–20). [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
19. For ease of exposition I am focusing on individuals, but the same holds of properties. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
20. Although they clearly would not agree with my overall approach here, Alston and Bennett emphasize the connection of numerical identity with cardinality (1984: 554). [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
21. Here I mean the contrast between strict and loose to be the standard one between true, on the one hand, and false but usefully taken to be true, on the other. I do not mean to invoke the idiosyncratic contrast found in my (1988b). [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
22. Locke (1975: 2. 8.11; critical apparatus for p. 135, line 31 to p. 136, line 2). Only in the fourth edition of the *Essay* does Locke change this claim to accommodate Newton's results (Stein 1990: 31-32). [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
23. Locke (1975: 2.1.11-12; 2.27.9). [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
24. See arguments that they are not, in Forbes (1997) and Moore (1999). Moore gives a reply to Saul that preserves substitution *salva veritate* by appeal to a reference shift between individual and numerically distinct aspect, depending on context. Note that his version of aspects differs from mine in that, for Moore, aspects of the same individual are numerically distinct from the individual and each other. Despite this difference, I like Moore's account of reference shifting. It can be used to answer the important questions about substitution of “Clemens” for “Twain” raised by Turner (2014: 230). The questions arise because of the referential ambiguity of the names. Once it is settled by the context of utterance whether individuals or aspects are being referred to, substituting names with exactly the same referent preserves truth-value, and otherwise risks changing the truth-value. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
25. What is true of an aspect is often not true of the individual it is an aspect of. However, in some cases, what is true of an aspect is true of the individual. For instance, if John insofar as he is a judge earns money, then John earns money. For some discussion see Szabo on "persistent predication" (2003: 400-1). Likewise having sex with a woman insofar as she is your lover entails having sex with the woman. This is so even if you did not have sex with her insofar as she is your intern. This latter fact does not allow you truthfully to deny the affair. See Saul (1999: 109). [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
26. Note that for purposes of this paper, I will not appeal to my theory of Many-One Identity wherein numerical identity is relative to various standards for counting. I will assume here that there is just one standard for counting. This assumption will make the principles simpler. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
27. I'm grateful to Marcus Rossberg, Andrew Parisi, and Andrew Tedder for discussing these principles with me. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
28. Thus I depart from Turner's and my old self's interchangeable use of them. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
29. *Apology*: 23b1-2, in Plato (1978: 9). [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
30. I originally got the term from Bäck (1982). [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
31. Anscombe (1979); Bäck (1982, 1996); Szabo (2003). [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
32. See Landman (1989: 729-32). For example, “The Hero of this book is David Hume--not as philosopher, or historian, or economist, or political scientist, or skeptic--but simply as a human being, *le bon David*,” from Mossner (1943: xi). [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
33. Or soft in the head or long in the tooth. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
34. It strikes me that idiomatic use of “in an aspect” evokes the appearance sense of “aspect”. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
35. What about Socrates insofar as he is an individual? It would seem that by (6) that this aspect is an individual, so not an aspect. But there is an ambiguity here. 'Socrates insofar as he is an individual' can refer to his haecceity. That is a non-qualitative aspect. Alternatively, it can refer to Socrates in his whole panoply of respects. But that is just Socrates--an individual. This fact suggests that singular reference is the limiting case of aspectival reference. I'm grateful to Noah Greenstein for the initial question. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
36. Suggested by Toby Napolitano. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
37. Ultimately the similarities and dissimilarities will hold in virtue of similarities and dissimilarities between aspects. For instance the Pope insofar as he is a religious leader is similar to the Dalai Lama insofar as he is a religious leader. The Pope insofar as he is Catholic is dissimilar to the Dalai Lama insofar as he is Buddhist. As noted previously, however, in some cases what is true of an aspect is true of its individual. That can lead to similarities and dissimilarities between an aspect of an individual and some individual. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
38. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for making this suggestion. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
39. See Armstrong (1978: 45). [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
40. See Williams (1953: 4). [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
41. Note that things that resemble in virtue of the resemblance of their parts, still have their resemblance intrinsically (cf. Lewis 1986:61). If things resemble in virtue of their parts, then they also resemble in virtue of themselves. For example, suppose that Socrates has a brother who also has a snub nose. The noses resemble insofar as they are snub, and the brothers resemble insofar as they are snub-nosed. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
42. I’m grateful to Sam Wheeler for the objection. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
43. I'm grateful to John Troyer, Philipp Blum, and Michael Lynch for various discussions of the issues in this paper. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)