Abstract
Marya Schechtman's *The Constitution of Selves* presented an impressive attempt to persuade those working on personal identity to give up mainstream positions and take on a narrative view instead. More recently, she has presented new arguments with a closely related aim. She attempts to convince us to give up the view of identity as a matter of psychological continuity, using Derek Parfit's story of the “Nineteenth Century Russian” as a central example in making the case against Parfit's own view, and offers a form of narrative theory as a way out of the problem. In this paper I consider this new case, and argue that we should not be persuaded towards the narrative.

Section 1: Introduction
One of the most interesting and influential arguments against the standard account of personal identity as a matter of psychological continuity during the last decade was Marya Schechtman's in her book, *The Constitution of Selves*. She argued impressively against the mainstream view on its own analytic terms, claiming that it needs to be replaced by a narrative account of identity: a view more familiar to the hermeneutic tradition. She contended that in trying to reduce personal identity to the more basic relation of psychological continuity, analytic philosophers were guilty of running together quite different questions, providing an answer to one as if it were the answer to another. In realising that the intuitions to which they appeal in support of their view are more appropriate to answering questions of characterisation than questions of re-identification, they would also realise that people constitute their own identities on becoming able to construct a narrative into which their actions fit.

Schechtman's original arguments have attracted much attention1 and I will not deal with them here other than in passing. My interest is in a new set of arguments she has offered (Schechtman 2004) which independently aim at achieving the same goal: showing the psychological view to be misguided, and pointing towards how its problems could be solved through a form of narrative theory. What makes the new arguments particularly interesting is that they are centrally based in an example Derek Parfit introduced in arguing for his version of the psychological view: in effect, she

---

1 A notable example is Christman (2004).
Section 2: Schechtman's new case against the Psychological View

One of Parfit's most important suggestions in *Reasons and Persons* was that the debate around personal identity should shift its focus from identity to survival. Schechtman accepts this shift, but then contends that psychological continuity theorists like Parfit are unable to provide an adequate account of personal survival. She draws a distinction between two kinds of psychological continuity and argues that, once the distinction is recognised, we have two distinct and possibly conflicting accounts of survival. In this light, the psychological view faces two problems. First, it is unable to produce a single criterion of survival that encompasses both views. Second, it is unable to accommodate the complex ways in which the two different versions of survival are interconnected.

According to Schechtman, psychological theorists fail to adequately observe the distinction between *continuity of consciousness* and *continuity of personality* and tend to run the two together. The importance of this distinction emerges in how a discontinuity in each case can mean a failure to survive, even though the other kind of continuity is present. Locke held that discontinuity of consciousness in the form of amnesia – as in the case of the person in the cobbler's body who cannot remember the cobbler's experiences - would bring about a loss of identity regardless of continuing personality traits. (Schechtman points out, however, that contemporary psychological theorists like Shoemaker accept that someone can survive discontinuity of consciousness in the form of a loss of all of their distinctive memories as long as enough of their other psychological features remain [Shoemaker 1984: 87-88]. The continuity of the cobbler's personality would explain his survival despite the break in continuity of consciousness that amnesia brings.)

To illustrate a case of discontinuity in personality, Schechtman appeals to Parfit's Russians.

Parfit…tells a story about a nineteenth-century Russian couple. It revolves around a young socialist who knows that he will inherit vast estates and fears that his change of fortune will alter his values. To protect his current ideals he tries to ensure that the land he inherits will be given to the peasants even if he is corrupted by his new wealth. He signs a document which transfers the land – a document that can be revoked only with his wife's consent – and tells her not to revoke it even if he later requests it. He says “I regard my ideals as essential to me. If I lose these ideals, I want you to regard your husband then, not as me, the man who asks you for this promise…” [Parfit 1984: 327]. Parfit…think(s) that for important practical purposes…the young Russian's pronouncement should be taken seriously. At the very least, then, this case suggests that changes in character or commitment are survival-threatening quite independent

---

2 This makes it reminiscent of Bernard Williams's argument in “The Self and the Future” (Williams 1970), where he turns the psychological theorists' “body-swap” thought experiment against themselves. Although it is not the only argument she uses in the paper, it is the most interesting, and her case does hinge on it. I think that is sufficient to justify my focusing solely on the role of the Nineteenth Century Russian.
Schechtman points out that the psychological theorist expects you to perceive this kind of case as a threat to identity, despite the continuity of consciousness that would be evident in the older Russian's remembering the promise that was made earlier (2004: 91a). The point of their presentation of the case is to reveal our intuition that personal survival requires continuity of personality. Her charge is that this represents a distinct view of what constitutes personal survival from that which requires continuity of consciousness. Psychological theorists tend to lump all these psychological connections together, but the two views can conflict and offer different answers to a question of survival. This means that the psychological view is in trouble: “there is no way to string together a criterion which will satisfy both” (2004: 92a).

That is Schechtman's first charge against the Psychological View based on the case of the Russians. The second follows closely. She contends that psychological continuity theories are “unable to capture” the fact that the two different kinds of survival interact. On this count, she uses the case of the Russians to show that important aspects of continuity of consciousness depend on continuity of personality.

Schechtman acknowledges that continuity of consciousness does not always require the continuity of other personal characteristics. Her idea here is that a rich level of continuity of consciousness, however, does. It is this rich level of continuity that marks the difference between survival through personal development and a “loss of self”. But the difference is not just a matter of degree, as this might suggest. The difference consists in whether or not the change concerned is internally or externally motivated. Self-preserving internal change involves special access to your psychological past – not just access of memory, but connections to your past that simple awareness does not provide (2004: 93b).

She asks us to reconsider the Russian. In Parfit's original scenario, the young Russian imagines that he will become corrupted by the wealth he will inherit, and the document he draws up is to ensure against this interfering with the success of his current plans based on his current ideals. He imagines that his early ideals will not have any force over the actions of the wealthy Russian. This is a case of externally motivated change, of greed compelled by capitalism, with a resultant loss of self. But now consider other ways in which the story might pan out.

Perhaps he learns that his comrades are themselves corrupt or that the peasants are going to use the wealth he would give them to somehow perpetuate their own subjugation… Or perhaps he simply comes to view his enthusiasm for the Socialist cause as well-meaning and responsive to real injustices, but ultimately naïve. (2004: 93a-93b)

These scenarios represent change that is different in kind from the original version:

In these alternatives … things are different. The old passions are not entirely lost, they are just placed in a new context where they take on a different cast and lead to different results. In these cases the older Russian can not only remember that he felt a certain way as a youth: he still has sympathy for his old values, and feels their force, even if they are outweighed by other considerations. (2004:93b-94a)
Even though there is still a change of commitment in the new versions, we do not conclude that the Russian does not survive. This is because of the richer level of continuity of consciousness that the new versions present. Because the continuity of consciousness is built on an “empathic access” to his earlier values, those values no longer appear alien to the Russian. Schechtman concludes that this rich level of continuity is impossible without stability of personality. Psychological theorists who allow mere memory as sufficient for survival have missed out on the complex dynamic between the two kinds of consciousness, and have no way of reflecting it in their theory.

Schechtman also argues for the converse principle – that continuity of personality depends on continuity of consciousness, and the Russians also play a role in this part of the argument. Her insight is that some psychological connections (on the personality side) depend to a great degree “upon their placement in a particular biography and on the existence of autobiographical memories” (2004: 95b-96a). These “specific” (as opposed to generic) features are necessary for survival that is anything more than token: that is, they are necessary for a person to survive in the sense of continuing to live their life.

The part played by the Russians here is in Schechtman’s speculation concerning whether we should expect the Russian’s judgement about his identity to change if he were assured that the loss of his intention to give his inheritance to the peasants was caused by a loss of memory rather than by the personality change that Parfit outlines. Her answer is that if we imagine the Russian left with only the most generic traits – that is with personality traits that do not depend on autobiographical memories –, then his judgement as to whether he survives is unlikely to change. But if he is assured that he will be left with certain specific features, then he is likely to change his mind about his survival.

If he retains his commitment to bettering the plight of the common man, his distrust of those who control the means of production, and his interest in politics and economics, he may well view his prospects of personal survival as more or less undamaged by the loss of his specific intention to give his land to the peasants. (2004: 96b-97a)

She contends that all these personality traits involve memory connections. And so she concludes, “the traits which are interwoven with autobiographical memory seem crucial to a robust or complete survival” (2004: 97b). And, once again, this is not something that the psychological theorist can accommodate. The generic features that psychological theorists like Shoemaker accept as enough for survival at best allow for a partial survival, leaving out a “tremendously important element”, and the dynamic interaction of the two types of continuity is missed.

The account that will do justice to their dynamic interaction as well as provide a satisfying answer to the question of what matters in survival will not be an account of a relation between a person and a future or past person, but rather of what people want to allow them to continue living their lives.

According to the view proposed here a person would survive if her life continued; fail to survive completely when her life ended definitively…; and survive partially if her capacity to live her life is compromised or diminished… It would not, for instance, be able to give a straightforward reply to the question of whether a person would survive total amnesia, or splitting into two, or having his psychological make-up transplanted into a new body. Instead it would
have to allow that the answers to these questions will depend upon the effect these changes have on the person's life, and thus, in turn, will depend upon the individual details of that life. (2004: 104a)

And so we end up with a view that is not far from Schechtman's original “narrative self-constitution” view. Whether or not actions are yours depends on whether or not they fit into your narrative, and whether or not you survive depends on whether this narrative autobiography continues or ends – whether it would still be a case of living your life.

Section 3: Investigating the role of the Russians

The prominence of the story about the Russians in Schechtman's new case might strike readers of her *The Constitution of Selves* as puzzling. For there she made comments warning against the usefulness of the sort of thought-experiments that psychological theorists trade on - comments reminiscent of the complaints that Paul Ricoeur registered against “technological fictions” (Ricoeur 1992: 150). Back then she was concerned that psychological theorists draw conclusions from their thought-experiments that are too strong (Schechtman 1996: 130-135). While it may just be that she sees this thought-experiment as different from those about which she had misgivings, I wish to argue that she expects even more of this thought-experiment than psychological theorists expect from theirs. And I will argue that this one is in no position to support the conclusions she draws from it. As a result, I think that any initial puzzlement is well justified.

When she initially brings up the case of the Nineteenth Century Russian, Schechtman carefully distances herself from conclusions that might be drawn from the case. She starts by saying that “Psychological continuity theorists depend heavily on the use of examples to demonstrate the importance of psychological features to personal survival” (2004: 91a). With regard to cases like that of the Russians,

> It is assumed that in these cases … a threat to identity will be perceived. Parfit for instance, tells a story about a nineteenth-century Russian couple. (2004: 91a)

It is clear that she is not committing herself to any agreement with such claims or assumptions – if anything, it is quite the opposite: the implication is that those assumptions are not well-founded, and are certainly not her own.

Things change subtly as the argument develops. Once she has outlined the story of the Russians she writes,

> At the very least, then, this case suggests that changes in character or commitment are survival threatening quite independent of what happens to memory. (2004: 91b, my italics)

Does this mean that the case suggests this only to psychological continuity theorists, or to Schechtman and others as well? The grammar suggests that she does not mean it is only suggested to the former, and the ensuing discussion serves to reinforce that. As the exposition runs in my previous section, the case of the Russians not only suggests to Schechtman that discontinuity in personality can be survival threatening, but it also suggests that continuity of personality – in important cases, anyway - depends on continuity of consciousness and vice-versa. In case you suspect that I am overstating the
degree to which she commits herself to the claims in question, consider the introductory sentence to Section V:

The discussion of amnesia and radical personality change has shown that continuity of memory and continuity of personality both contribute to personal survival… (2004: 99a, my italics)

As far as I can see, the only evidence offered in “the discussion” of radical personality change – apart from a few extremely general speculations – is the case of the Russians. In a way, Schechtman is quite upfront about this. She is not about to offer any empirical evidence, for instance:

This discussion will pursue an investigation into points of conceptual convergence between (the relations of interdependence) between memory and personality … (2004: 92b)

The investigation of conceptual convergence is the one I have outlined - one entirely based on a thought-experiment, as those whose business is conceptual convergence might have expected. This however means that Schechtman thinks that a thought-experiment – and this one in particular – can do, and does, much more than her earlier self would have believed.

Should we just accept that she has had a change of heart with regard to thought-experimental fictions? In her book, she regularly appealed to literature to support her points. Like Ricoeur, then, she always believed that fiction can show things about ourselves, it was just thought-experiments that were problematic. Perhaps the Nineteenth Century Russian reaches the status of literature, whereas the usual stuff about fission or body-swapping does not. Even if this were a serious suggestion, we should not take it as the way out of the dilemma I have raised. For I think that the judgment that this particular thought-experiment does not show anything interesting about our persistence is correct, and that Schechtman would have been well advised to maintain her initial distance.

Why should we be careful of the Russians? Let us start by considering Schechtman’s first usage of the story. She presents it as the sort of example used by psychological theorists to support the view that personal survival requires continuity of personality, by drawing out the intuition that the Russian does not survive. Schechtman acknowledges that she shares the view that the Russian does not survive. She agrees that continuity of personality contributes to personal survival in its own way, and that this is shown by the discussion based on the Russians (99a). Although she does not say so explicitly, she presumably would admit that this is her response to the story.

Is the example of the Russians any good in this role? Does it evince the response that it is supposed to? I think it is worth noting that Parfit does not present it as the sort of imagination-grabbing story that might serve as an “intuition pump”. He comments after his telling of the story that the Russian’s plea (that his wife regard him as someone else if he asks her to revoke the document) “using the language of successive selves, seems both understandable and natural” (Parfit 1984: 327). He expects us to have some sympathy for the Russian’s view that he will not survive the loss of his ideals. But that is a long way from assuming that we perceive this as a case of non-survival despite continuing memories, which is how Schechtman presents Parfit’s strategy. Parfit places no stress on the Russian’s ability to remember his past. Throughout the chapter where the example arises, he is extremely wary of making any bold claim
about when one self replaces another (or even about the implications of his favoured view of identity for morality). The Russian's wife, he says,

might plausibly regard herself as not released from her commitment. She might believe that to do what her husband now asks would be a betrayal of the young man she married… (Parfit 1984: 327, my italics)

He is not ruling out that it is also plausible that she regards the older Russian as surviving and sees herself as released from the promise.

Parfit is not trying to convince us that “personal survival requires continuity of personality” as Schechtman makes out. And if he did want to do this, he would need a much more convincing example – one in response to which we would look absurd in insisting that the protagonist survives. That the Russian says he would not survive is neither here nor there; if Parfit insisted that we should see it that way - and he does not - that would make the case no stronger. Any strength would lie only in its demanding the intuitive response that the Russian does not survive, and it does not even begin to do that.

Although the story of the Russians does not contribute to establishing that continuity of personality is required for survival, perhaps it can contribute to showing that continuity of consciousness, at least in significant cases, depends on continuity of personality – Schechtman's second claim for it. She does indeed make this strong claim. After outlining her alternative outcomes for Parfit's Russian, and how she thinks the connections to the Russian's past in these outcomes are different from those in Parfit's description, she concludes: “There are thus different levels at which one can experience continuity of consciousness” (2004: 94a-94b, my italics). The difference is evident in our responses to the question of whether the changes in the Russian mean that he survives or not, and it being the case that in her scenarios (unlike in Parfit’s) “the conclusion might well be that the change in even such an ardent commitment poses no real threat to survival” (2004: 93b).

I think the move from how we might respond differently to the conclusion that there are differences in levels of consciousness is significant and without any adequate support. Apart from a short foray into Sartre's account of alienation, nothing other than the alternative versions of the Russian example and our possible responses is offered as grounds for her conclusion. This is enough to make the problem clear. There is no real argument being offered for the important difference between the rich level of continuity of consciousness (which represents survival) and the poor level (which does not) other than that this is Schechtman's view of personal survival. What we are getting is not an argument, but the statement of a theory disguised as an argument.

Not only is there no real argument for it, but it is very doubtful that her conclusion is one that we should accept. The crucial distinction she hopes to establish is between the poor level of continuity of consciousness – where you only remember that you had different earlier values, and the rich level - where you have empathic access to those values. Her Russian sympathises with his earlier values and survives; Parfit's Russian does not sympathise and does not survive. It all turns on a link between “empathic access” and “a richer level of consciousness”, but there is good reason to doubt such a link. I cringe at the actions of Simon Beck as a 16 year old when I can bring myself to think about them. I would not cringe if there were not a rich level of continuity of consciousness – that embarrassment requires seeing those actions as my own. But what it

3 I will come back to what he is trying to do later.
also requires is a lack of empathic access – exactly what I do not have is sympathy with the values that led Simon Beck to act in such ways.

Similar worries affect the argument from the Russians to the conclusion that continuity of personality depends on continuity of consciousness. Schechtman's argument involves presenting alternative details to Parfit's story of the Russians which lead to the result that the Russian might make a different judgment as to whether he survives or not.

If he retains his commitment… he may well view his prospects of personal survival as more or less undamaged by the loss of his specific intention... (2004: 96b-97a)

We need to ask some hard methodological questions here. Schechtman's reasoning appears (even from a sympathetic viewpoint) to be that if we can tell the story such that the Russian responds differently or thinks he might respond differently, that is enough to show that there is a difference between the kinds of psychological trait and whether or not they are sufficient for survival. It does not take much reflection to see that this is a pretty hopeless method. For the only limits being set are that the Russian's response is reasonable – or rather, might be reasonable. The response of a character in a story being reasonable or possibly reasonable is just woefully short of showing that a kind of psychological trait is necessary for survival – for showing that survival "depends on" such traits, to use Schechtman's own words (95b) – even in conceptual terms alone. I understand that she is trying to lead us away from "necessary conditions" and on to what details are important in a particular life. But the words and arguments are hers, and if this is how she presents things, then the onus is on her to move us from the one to the other. At the very least, my point is that she has undertaken to bear this burden and is simply not doing nearly enough to achieve that.4

So, Schechtman's appeal to the Russians does not show that continuity of personality depends on continuity of memory. Even if it did, would it be the case that the psychological theorist could not cope with this conclusion? Her reasoning here is rather vague, however – she does not explain to any extent why a psychological approach "cannot cope" with a link between these notions. She insists early on that the two notions present competing accounts of continuity that could lead to conflicting judgments as to survival. In this regard, however, her own claims that the two types of continuity are interdependent suggest that such a conflict is not a serious possibility – at least, not once we have thought through what each type of continuity really involves.

The only other way she adds to the case is through the charge that psychological theorists like Shoemaker acknowledge that generic traits allow survival, contrary to her view that the continuity of generic traits alone would not allow someone to continue "living their life". I am not sure that she has offered anything to back up this view other than the claim itself. She at best only implied that the inadequacy of generic traits is an intuitive response to a case that we all share; as my complaints have indicated, her paper is shy on the details of her methodology. All the same, I think you might well agree that someone who has lost all their specific psychological traits does

4 I realise that there are large methodological issues in the background here, and that from the point of view of someone like Ricoeur, working in the hermeneutical tradition, my complaints would reflect a deep methodological misunderstanding. But Schechtman's arguments are intended to take on psychological theorists in the analytic tradition on their own terms, so she is in no position to reject my complaints on such grounds.
not survive. If psychological theorists are committed to such a person surviving, a case begins to emerge against them.

A case begins to emerge, but not much of one. All we have to go on is a quote from one psychological theorist without much context. Does someone who thinks that psychological continuity is what matters in survival have to say that the generic trait amnesiac survives? It is only if they must say that that the emerging case takes on any compelling form. If psychological theorists have other options, then it would be more plausible to read Shoemaker’s claim as rash and the problem as harmless to the cause. So let us consider whether psychological theorists can accommodate the intuition that the generic trait amnesiac does not survive.

On the face of things, it appears that they can do so fairly easily. They just need to agree, in the tradition of Locke, that generic traits as envisaged by Schechtman do not provide sufficient psychological connections for survival. Survival requires further connections, or character traits which are bound together with memory connections. This may sound too easy – why does Schechtman not see this way out for the psychological theorist? I think that the answer lies in a difference in understanding of what counts as an appropriate psychological connection.

To see this, consider Schechtman’s example of one of the offending generic traits. She contends that the psychological view is committed to accept a very changed (amnesiac) Russian with an “inexplicable desire to give money to the peasants” as the same person because he (like the earlier one) displays this desire (2004: 98b). So, for her, having a desire with the same content is a psychological connection between the earlier and later Russian. In this, she fails to take adequate cognizance of the fact that it is causal continuity that is central to the psychological view. Even if psychological theorists are guilty of confusing different kinds of continuity, the continuity they are talking about is constituted by overlapping psychological connections; for, say, an intention to make up such a connection it must have its causal roots in relevant experiences or other mental states, or continue to be causally relevant to behaviour. The same is true for memories, beliefs, affections and so on. The causal chains involved may be very complex and intertwined. The point is that something like similarity of state-content simply does not constitute the kind of continuity that plays a role in the psychological view, but rather this sort of causal grounding. So when Schechtman holds that the psychological view is committed to accepting that the amnesiac Russian survives, she is just wrong (and so is Shoemaker, if he agrees with her). That the desire is “inexplicable” in her description gives away the lack of the causal link that is so important in the psychological view. To count as a psychological connection, it must be causally explicable.5

Similar considerations apply when Schechtman sees the need to defend her claim that survival-carrying personality traits depend on autobiographical memories against the counter-example that we often forget the experiences that were the origin of our current plans, concerns or intentions. She maintains that “in the ordinary case, although the particular details of an affection or intention’s origins may be lost there remains a broader context and sense of biography in which it makes perfect sense”

---

5 Schechtman’s ignoring the importance of causal links to the psychological view also emerges significantly in her arguments in The Constitution of Selves. She contends that “on the psychological view all it is for someone in the future to be me is for some distinct individual in the future to be like me” (Schechtman 1996: 55) and argues against this. As I point out here, this psychological theorist is a straw man. The psychological view (or the more sensible version of it) demands causal links, not mere similarity.
The psychological theorist has a much simpler story. As long as there are such causal origins, there will be continuity. Indeed, it is this very causal continuity that supports the sort of biography she favours. The psychological theorist can plausibly insist that it is this and not the narrative that does the work in survival. The psychological theorist can cope with the amnesiac Russian with continuing general traits and with the Russian who can remember but loses his central values. On its terms, the first does not survive and the second does. No harm is done to the theory in the process.

But here we need to pause. Is the case of the Russians not presented by Parfit – the psychological theorist – as an example of a loss of self? I am implying that psychological theorists should deny that it involves a loss of self as there is no lack of causal psychological connections between the earlier and later Russian, yet they (in the person of Parfit) affirm such a loss. Two points can be made in response to any puzzle here. The first refers back to my earlier comments as to how Schechtman applies a large amount of spin in her account of what Parfit is doing with the case of the Russians. I pointed out that, as an intuition pump in support of the claim that continuity of personality is necessary for survival, the story of the Russians is worse than unconvincing. I also suggested that this was not what Parfit was offering it as, and that is relevant at this stage. Parfit offers the story in Chapter 15 of *Reasons and Persons* in the context of an attempt to show that the consequences of his reductionist view of identity need not be as counterintuitive for morality as some suggest. Following his account, the psychological connections that do the work in constituting identity are matters of degree – the connections over time can be stronger or weaker. Parfit acknowledges that it is reasonable to hold that the degree of connectedness between the person to whom you made a promise and the person who faces you now can affect the degree of your commitment. The Russians are presented as an example which you might view sympathetically as a case of diminished commitment – in the face of those (non-reductionists) who claim that commitment cannot be a matter of degree. Not that he is claiming to show that they are wrong – as my earlier quotes make clear, his claims are tentative and very careful.

Having said this, I do not wish to offer too much in Parfit's defence on this point. Even if his claims are tentative and surrounded by qualifications, Parfit does show sympathy for the view that the Russian undergoes a loss of self. But I also do not wish this admission to be taken as offering any solace to Schechtman. Parfit's sympathy plays along with the narrative view that Schechtman is advocating, and as a result I can see why it is the one thought-experiment that she views with favour out of the many that Parfit describes. This brings me to the second point concerning its use by a psychological theorist. The point is that Parfit should never have used it. Not only does his attitude towards it suggest a view that is at odds with the causally based continuity that does the work in his metaphysical theory, but even in the context of defending the consequences for morality that his metaphysical view implies, it does a very poor job. I argued this 20 years ago when I held non-reductionist views (Beck 1989), and harboured growing guilt for that argument all these years as my views changed. I am happy to note now that the guilt was misplaced.

**Section 4: Conclusion**

Schechtman's new charges against the psychological view were that it cannot provide a single criterion that encompasses both continuity of consciousness and continuity of personality, and that it cannot accommodate the complex ways in which these distinct
types of continuity are interconnected. I have explained how her arguments that the
continuities represent competing criteria for survival and that these continuities are in-
terconnected depend centrally on the case of the Nineteenth Century Russian. I have
argued that the case offers no support to any of these conclusions, and that the psycho-
logical view has nothing to fear from the Russians – not even when psychological the-
orists themselves suggest it does. Even if the case had the consequence of showing the
interrelation between the two continuities, the psychological view would be quite
capable of coping with that. The result is that we have no new reason to go narrative.

References
Christman, John. 2004. “Narrative Unity as a Condition of Personhood”. Metaphilo-
sophy 35(5), 695-713.
of Chicago Press.
Press.
Survival”. American Philosophical Quarterly 41(2), 87-105.
161-180.