cesses of cognition in which the formation of illusions, the "false objectifiction of the presentational forms," arises. He discusses certain inversions or reversals whereby reality is seen as making a demand rather than the person making a demand of reality, as when, with respect to final causality, the end is construed as a cause. Overgeneralization is identified as a further source of falsity, with ideologies as a prime example. Finally, illusory forms of everyday life, as play, language, and art, are considered.

The spirit and methodology of the book are avowedly determined by a Marxist and Lukacsian position. For the reader who does not share this standpoint, the most interesting passages will be those where the author turns away from abstract theory to concrete examples. The latter, which reflect Almási's very considerable knowledge of history and literature, are often suggestive, but a perspective which politicizes the most mundane and inconsequential of activities, right down to games, will not always seem the most illuminating. The theoretical passages, expressed in the often turgid and opaque style of this genre, are heavy going, and while the tone of the work is highly reasonable, the observations none the less proceed from a point which does not see the need to go beyond assertion on fundamental matters. Though this may, of course, be all illusion.

BEDE RUNDLE

STANLEY ARONOWITZ, *Science as Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modern Society,* Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1988, xii + 384 pp.

A good way of reading this book is as an updated version of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*—except that Aronowitz is accusing virtually all of Western Marxism (including French, German, and Italian versions) of retreating to the phenomenalism and uncritical scientism that Lenin originally lambasted as "empirio-criticism." As Aronowitz sees it, Marxism overreacted to positivist strictures against history having a telos by divesting human agency of any genuine purposefulness. This emasculation of the purposive only serves to enlist Marxists among the passive defenders of the hegemony of modern science. Aronowitz drives home the point most effectively in his critique of Habermas (chapter 6), whose idea of purposeful human action is bifurcated between technocratic decision-making and the free expression of one's personal perspective. Habermas thus fails to open a conceptual space for the transformation of the material conditions in which the sphere of human action is constituted. Aronowitz links this failure to Marxism's traditional aversion to the material, which he interestingly traces to Marx himself being of one mind with classical political economy on the desirability of minimizing physical labor. Aronowitz's positive project, which is explicitly deferred to his next book, is to use feminism and ecologism as a basis for constructing an epistemology that takes seriously the implications of knowledge of the world always being *in* the world, specifically in worldly creatures such as ourselves.

By any contemporary standard, and especially Marxist ones, the book is remarkably well-informed on a variety of philosophical and sociological topics, including recent sociology of science. Along the way, Aronowitz offers illuminating reassessments of Taylorism (as an instance of science colonizing a subject matter rather than simply being applied to it), Lysenkoism (as having been better biology than its ideologically inspired detractors have admitted), and the work of Christopher Caudwell (as the first to see the indeterminism of quantum physics as symptomatic of science turning against its bourgeois supporters). Curiously, though, the book seems to be less informed on matters directly bearing on Aronowitz's own project. For example, no reference is made to the burgeoning epistemologies of experimental intervention (e.g. Roy Bhaskar, Ian Hacking, Patrick Heelan) or to the quasi-Marxist attempts to incorporate the trajectory of mature science within a comprehensive social policy (e.g. Gernot Boehme, Sal Restivo). Also, one may wish to contest the political feasibility of Aronowitz's very quest for a "post-scientific" epistemology. Here it is telling that Aronowitz reads Bruno Latour as arguing that the laboratory is increasingly becoming the model of the world

(a la Taylorism), whereas Latour is probably better read as saying that the laboratory is becoming *indistinguishable* from the world, as more and more of society is incorporated into the production of scientific knowledge. Could it be that Aronowitz will turn out to be another one of those utopian socialists that Marx warned us against? In any case, it will be worth reading his next book to find out.

STEVE FULLER

RICHARD E. AQUILA, *Matter in Mind: A Study of Kant's Transcendental Deduction,* Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1989, xiv + 245 pp.

"The Kantian self is originally self-conscious," argues Richard E. Aquila, "only through consciousness of the noematic correlate, in the world of appearances, of its own noetic structuring of experience." Although that strikes me as being exactly, and importantly, right, I confess to being a little disappointed by the book's tardiness in arriving at such humdrum correlates—Strawson calls them "objects in the weighty sense"—as the houses and ships figuring in Kant's favorite examples. Early on, Aquila acknowledges that his "primary concern" lies more in the vicinity of the subjective (as contrasted with the objective) deduction of the categories, and even in that regard one must not look to him for an explicitly sustained effort at a rational reconstruction of what might be supposed to be Kant's central argument in the Deduction. Connoisseurs of transcendental arguments will be pleased to learn, however, that Aquila does provide a highly suggestive specimen of the genre on p. 176, and it is in fact as an elaboration of that compressed argument that his book proves to be most rewarding.

The primary emphasis lies very much in the noetic structuring of experience, though even here there is a welcome surprise. Where traditional Kantianism has stressed the nobler partner in the form/matter complex, Aquila is less concerned with the structuring than with what gets to be structured, thereby acknowledging—if only subliminally—the materialist turn in recent philosophy. In the first instance the "matter in mind" is identified, in the Aesthetic, with the element of sensation that, on being subjected to the forms of space and time, yields sensory intuition. Beyond that, however, a fresh source of matter will be needed to launch the Transcendental Deduction, and here Aquila appeals to the imagination—a familiar enough *tertium quid* negotiating between sensation and understanding—to supply pre-conceptual "retentions and anticipations" that even animals may be presumed to enjoy. As sensation provides the matter for intuitions, so—pretty much—do these retentions and anticipations supply the matter for empirical concepts.

Concepts are even said to be embodied in these r & a's, and at one point we are told that concepts just are r & a's, though that overstatement is quickly corrected. Concepts are at any rate constituted by r & a's. In an appropriately "materialist" vein Aquila is prone to reduce concepts to their imaginative materials, always conceding, however, that the standard account of concepts (as rules) must be accomodated as well.

Rather too psychologistic for the more analytically minded, Aquila's approach began to look promising to me only after he introduced the following refinement. There are conditional (as well as categorical) anticipations, even (we may suppose) on the animal level; and these vindicate themselves above all when they prove in the end to supply the materials for the distinction, on the noetic level, between reversible and irreversible sequences of representations that will later constitute, by way of rules, the noematic houses and ships of the Second Analogy. One can now understand why "necessity seems to be the only one of the categories to which Kant gives particular attention in the first-edition Deduction" (returning to p. 176), seeing that reversibility and irreversibility are found to feature possibility and impossibility. So the pure concepts of modality supersede even those of relation in the Kantian program?

If it is the A-Deduction with its stress on the imagination to which his study is especially attuned, Aquila's conditional anticipations pay off anew in his chapter on the B-Deduction. Thus

I was enabled, for the first time, to get a grip on the distinction between subjective and objective judgments, i.e., Kant's judgments of perception vs. his judgments of experience, where the former sort of judgment or quasi-judgment is puzzlingly illustrated by this: "If I support a body I feel an impression of weight." Again and again in his book but here above all Aquila demonstrates the power of his approach through a fierce encounter with the Kantian text.

JOSÉ A. BENARDETE

ROBERT AUDI, *Practical Reasoning*, London and New York, Routledge, 1989, x + 214 pp.

This book is one of a series entitled "The Problems of Philosophy: Their Past and Present." Each volume in the series has a Part 1 which is an introduction to the history of the problem in question and a Part 2 in which the author defends a preferred solution. Audi's historical introduction (pp. 11-82, approximately one third of the book) consists of analyses of the theories of practical reasoning of Aristotle, Hume, and Kant. These do not serve very well to define a "problem" of practical reasoning, but they do show that there is no historical consensus on the topic. Although obviously influenced by Aristotle, Audi makes little use of this historical introduction in presenting his own view; so the two parts of the book can be read independently.

In Part 2 Audi presents a theory of the basic elements and structures of practical reasoning. He makes a useful distinction between a "practical argument," which is a certain structure of propositions, and "practical reasoning" which is a corresponding process, normally involving motivational and cognitive premises from which a practical judgment is concluded. He calls it an inferential realization of the corresponding argument.

Audi devotes chapters to the relation of practical reasoning to intentional action, to the dynamics of action, and to rational action, and has a chapter on the assessment of practical reasoning.

He argues that practical reasoning does not genetically underlie the performance of every intentional action, but he does claim that to every intentional action (at least every one performed for a reason) there corresponds a practical argument, even if the agent did not reason accordingly. Such an argument is "reconstructively available" and often provides at least partial explanation and at least prima facie justification.

In regard to the dynamics of action, practical reasoning serves both to guide an action based on it and to strengthen the agent's motivation to perform that action. It may also explain both how an intention is generated and why the action is executed when it is. Audi also gives an analysis of weakness of will. A chain of practical reasoning may be outweighed by competing practical reasoning, by a standing desire, or by sheer impulse.

In his chapter on rational action, Audi summarizes the positions of Aristotle, Hume, and Kant, and develops his own theory of rationality as "well-groundedness."

In the chapter on the assessment of practical reasoning, he calls attention to criteria for the soundness of the practical argument corresponding to a piece of practical reasoning, but he also points out that there are additional conditions needed to justify an agent's making the inference and in believing the propositions.

HENRY R. WEST

C. EDWIN BAKER, *Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989, viii + 385 pp.

KENT GREENAWALT, *Speech, Crime, & the Uses of Language*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989, viii + 349 pp.

Professors Greenawalt and Baker have both set out to develop a theory of free speech which can be utilized in understanding how freedom of speech differs from a general theory of human liberty, how it can be integrated into a broad understanding of the nature and uses of language, and how it can be distinguished from language-based crimes.

This is no mean task, and as American scholars these two gentlemen quite naturally turn to the First Amendment and to U.S. constitutional jurisprudence for their main focus. Both authors are law professors, but despite their heavy reliance upon legal scholarship, several branches of philosophy are utilized to help explore the relationships implicit in the concept of free expression.

In assessing these two works, one finds Greenawalt's the less powerful not only because the prose of its arguments and analyses is more dry and tedious than Baker's, but also (primarily) because Greenawalt's strength seems concentrated in the making of endless distinctions between types of issues and cases—a vital but limited function. Often, having argued strongly and coherently for a particular distinction, Greenawalt makes only weak use of it, or merely asserts the further implications of the distinction drawn.

In addition, there is a minor but disturbing error in Greenawalt: "Even in the extraordinary instance when Congress responds to a state initiative to call a convention, the requirement that it vote by two-thirds in each House. . . ." (p. 182, n. 11). Those familiar with the Fifth Article of the U.S. Constitution will recognize his conflation of the two-thirds requirement for the convention call by the states with the simple majorities required of Congress to implement a convention and to place before the states for ratification any amendments proposed by a national convention (as well as to select one of the alternative methods of state ratification—legislatures or ratifying conventions).

This error of fact is embedded within a more general error of interpretation, for in the course of quite correctly rejecting the notion that only the ratifying bodies contribute to the "intention" of an amendment, Greenawalt accurately recognizes the federal imput into any amendment's original intention, but he then translates federal imput to mean congressional imput.

In the four methods of constitutional amendment, the two which involve national conventions do not produce a congressional intent. Congress's role is merely passive, a strict ministerial duty: In the absence of a conventional call by two-thirds of the states, Congress is unable to call a convention. In the presence of such a states' call, Congress has no option but to call a convention. If a properly called convention properly proposes an amendment (at least one on the subject of its call), Congress is under obligation to select the method of ratification and to transmit the proposed amendment to the states.

The Skylla and Charybdis which both authors strive to avoid are an overly simplified notion of original intent, on the one side, and a false strict constructionist, on the other. Whatever one may think of the ordinary problems of original intent as applied to the body of the Constitution, these authors demonstrate the inadequacy of that approach when applied to the First Amendment, where original intent is widely subject to dispute and the nature of communications and society has so radically altered over the intervening two centuries.

As for a phony strict constructionism, Justice Black was infamous for telling interviewers, " 'Congress shall make no law. . . ,' means exactly that; free speech is not to be restricted." Now as both these scholars prove well aware, free speech is always a matter of drawing lines. Even ignoring such problems as sedition, obscenity, and slander/libel, innumerable crimes consist of (essentially) nothing more than speech acts: Blackmail, extortion, harassment, incitement to riot, espionage,